
Class No.....

[illegible]

S_E_C_R_E_T.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, and is intended only for the personal information of _____

and of those officers under him whose duties it affects. He is personally responsible for its safe custody and that its contents are disclosed to those officers and to them only.

The document will be kept locked in a safe place when not in actual use.

*The possession of the document will be accounted for annually in accordance with para.12(b) of "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents (India) 1943.

* If applicable.

GAZETTEER
OF THE
PERSIAN GULF,
'OMĀN,
AND
CENTRAL ARABIA.

GAZETTEER
OF THE
PERSIAN GULF,
'OMĀN,
AND
CENTRAL ARABIA

BY
J. G. LORIMER, C.I.E.
INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

VOL. I
HISTORICAL.

PART I



CALCUTTA
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA
1915

Under such a system it follows necessarily that a topic of considerable prominence during one period may have no sequel in the period immediately following though it may possibly be, and often is, continued in a later one.

In order therefore to enable the reader to follow up the thread of any one particular subject a "detailed table of contents" has been prepared on the following lines.

The various "periods" in each chapter have been given a number. Each period has again been sub-divided into "subject headings" each of which has been lettered.

When any particular subject is continued in a later period an entry to that effect in italics immediately below the "subject heading" concerned has been made, giving the number of the "period" and the letter of the "subject heading" in which the continuation will be found.

It should be noted however that though the above system has been found capable of application in the majority of chapters and periods, instances occur throughout the volume in which special subjects (especially British policy and relations) are so inextricably woven into the general history of the State under review that no definite sub-division of its "periods" into "subject headings" is possible and in such cases the sequel to a particular subject can only be traced by a careful perusal of the general text.

In addition to the twelve chapters referred to above Volume I includes a number of Appendices, also written by the late Mr. Lorimer dealing separately with subjects of special importance or interest in the Persian Gulf Region, and also a series of genealogical trees of the ruling families of States in the same area.

A table of chapters, annexures, appendices and genealogical trees will be found at page 5 and the "detailed table of contents" at page 9.

For convenience of binding Volume I has been divided into three parts.

Part I consists of the first nine chapters, *i.e.*, the General History of the Persian Gulf Region, the Histories of 'Oman, of the Arab States on the western shores of the Persian Gulf, of Central Arabia and of Turkish 'Iraq, in fact of what may conveniently be termed the "Arabian" portion of the Volume.

Part II consists of the remaining three chapters, *i.e.*, of the Histories of 'Arabistan, of the Persian Coast and Islands, and of Makran, in other words of the "Persian" section of the work and of the Appendices.

For facility of reference, the "Introduction," the "Table of chapters" and the "detailed table of contents" have been prefixed to both Parts I and II

Part III consists of a portfolio containing genealogical trees, maps, etc.

L. BIRDWOOD.

SIMLA ;

10th October 1914.

VOLUME I.—HISTORICAL.

TABLE OF CHAPTERS, ANNEXURES, APPENDICES AND GENEALOGICAL TREES.

PART I.

	Page.
CHAPTER I. GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION 1	
Annexure No. 1.	
Indian Army and Royal Indian Marine establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1905	395
CHAPTER II. HISTORY OF THE 'OMĀN SULTANATE	397
Annexure No. 1.	
History of Dhufār	589
Annexure No. 2.	
History of Gwādar and Chahbār	601
Annexure No. 3.	
History of Ruūs-al-Jibāl	622
Annexure No. 4.	
Agreement regarding cession of territory by the Sultān of 'Omān, 20th March 1891	628
Annexure No. 5.	
Translation of an undertaking given by the Sultān of 'Omān on the 31st May 1902, to the British Political Agent at Masqat regarding the Sur coalfields	629
CHAPTER III. HISTORY OF TRUCIAL 'OMĀN	630
Annexure No. 1.	
Internal history of the Shārjah principality	755
Annexure No. 2.	
Internal history of the Abu Dhabi principality	763

Annexure No. 3.		Page.
CHAPTER III.	Internal history of the Dibai principality . . .	772

Annexure No. 4.		
	Internal history of the Umm-al-Qaiwain principality . .	775

Annexure No. 5.		
	Internal history of the 'Ajman principality . . .	776

Annexure No. 6.		
	History of the Shamailiyah Tract . . .	777

Annexure No. 7.		
	Mutual agreement entered into by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān on the 24th June 1897 in regard to fraudulent absconders . . .	784

Annexure No. 8.		
	Exclusive, agreement of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān with the British Government, March 1892 . .	786
CHAPTER IV.	HISTORY OF QATAR . . .	787
CHAPTER V.	HISTORY OF BAHRAIN . . .	836

Annexure No. 1.		
	Exclusive agreement of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the British Government, 13th March 1892 . .	945
CHAPTER VI.	HISTORY OF HASA . . .	947
CHAPTER VII.	HISTORY OF KUWAIT . . .	1000

Annexure No. 1.		
	Agreement by the Shaikh of Kuwait regarding the non-reception of Foreign representatives and the non-cession of territory to Foreign Powers or subjects, 23rd January 1899 . . .	1048
CHAPTER VIII.	HISTORY OF NAJD OR CENTRAL ARABIA . .	1051

Annexure No. 1.		
	Separate history of the Jabal Shammar principality of Northern Najd . . .	1161

Annexure No. 2.		
	Separate history of the Qāsim district . . .	1173
CHAPTER IX.	HISTORY OF TURKISH 'IRAQ . . .	1179

Annexure No. 1.		
	Journey of English travellers to Baghdād, 1583 . .	1616

Annexure No. 2.		
	Correspondence relating to the establishment of the British Residency at Baghdād, 1798 . . .	1620

PART II.

CHAPTER X.	HISTORY OF 'ARABISTĀN	Page. 1625
CHAPTER XI.	HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN COAST AND ISLANDS	1776
CHAPTER XII.	HISTORY OF PERSIAN MAKRĀN	2150

THE APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.	METEOROLOGY AND HEALTH IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2205
APPENDIX B.	GEOLOGY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2212
APPENDIX C.	THE PEARL AND MOTHER-OF-PEARL FISHERIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF	2220
APPENDIX D.	DATE PRODUCTION AND THE DATE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2294
APPENDIX E.	FISHERIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF	2308
APPENDIX F.	SAILING CRAFT OF THE PERSIAN GULF	2319
APPENDIX G.	TRANSPORT ANIMALS AND LIVESTOCK OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2333
APPENDIX H.	RELIGIONS AND SECTS OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2349
APPENDIX I.	WESTERN CHRISTIANITY AND MISSIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2386
APPENDIX J.	THE TELEGRAPHS OF THE PERSIAN GULF IN THEIR RELA- TION TO THE TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS OF PERSIA AND TURKEY	2400
APPENDIX K.	MAIL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE INDIAN POST OFFICE IN THE PERSIAN GULF	2439
APPENDIX L.	THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2475
APPENDIX M.	EPIDEMICS AND SANITARY ORGANIZATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2517
APPENDIX N.	THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION TRAFFIC IN THE GULFS OF PERSIA AND 'OMĀN	2556
APPENDIX O.	THE IMPERIAL PERSIAN CUSTOMS	2594
APPENDIX P.	CRUISE OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON, VICEROY OF INDIA, IN THE PERSIAN GULF	2626
APPENDIX Q.	BRITISH AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL AND CON- SULAR REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNTRIES BORDERING ON THE PERSIAN GULF	2663
APPENDIX R.	BOOKS OF REFERENCE	2700
APPENDIX S.	EXPLANATION OF THE SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION	

PART III.

GENEALOGICAL TREES.

	Pocket No.
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Sa'idi families of 'Omān and Zanzibar . . .	1
Table of the ruling Qāsīmi family of Shārjah in Trucial 'Omān . . .	2
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Falāh (Bani Yās) family of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān . . .	3
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Falāsah (Bani Yās) family of Dibai in Trucial 'Omān . . .	4
Table of the ruling Āl 'Alī family of Umm-al-Qaiwain in Trucial 'Omān .	5
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Kharaibān (Na'im) family of 'Ajmān in Trucial 'Omān . . .	6
Table of the Qāsīmi family formerly ruling Lingeh . . .	7
Table of the ruling Āl Thāni (Ma'ādhīd) family of Dōhah in Qatar .	8
Table of the ruling Āl Khalifah ('Atbi) family of Bahrain (Sheet No. I) .	9
Table of the ruling Āl Khalifah ('Atbi) family of Bahrain (Sheets Nos. 2 and 3) . . .	10
Table of the ruling Āl Subah ('Atbi) family of Kuwait . . .	11
Table of the ruling (Wahhābi) Āl Sa'ūd ('Anizah) family of Southern Najd (Sheets Nos. 1, 2 and 3) . . .	12
Table of the ruling (Wahhābi) Āl Sa'ūd ('Anizah) family of Southern Najd (Sheets Nos. 4 and 5) . . .	13
Table of the ruling Āl Rashid (Shammar) family of Jabal Shammar .	14
Table of the ruling Abul Khail ('Anizah) family of Buraidah in Qasīm .	15
Table of the ruling Salāini (Sabai) family of 'Anizah in Qasīm .	16
Table of the Qādiriyah (Saiyid) family of the Naqībs of Baghdād in Turkish 'Irāq . . .	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24

MISCELLANEOUS.

CHART SHOWING THE PEARL BANKS ALONG THE ARABIAN SHORE OF THE PERSIAN GULF BETWEEN Rās TANŪRAH AND DIBAI (VIDE PAGE 2263 OF PART II) . . .	25
	26
	27
	28
	29
	30

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

PERIOD I.

PERIOD I.
1507—1600.

1507-1600.

Page.

FROM THE APPEARANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE IN 1507 TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN 1600	1
A. Proceedings of the Portuguese in the East	2
<i>(Continued in Period II, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Occupation by them of Hormūz, 1507	3
(ii) Portuguese struggles with the Turks	3
B. General situation in 1600	8

PERIOD II.

PERIOD II.
1600—1622.

1600-1622.

FROM THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN 1600 TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM HORMŪZ IN 1622	10
A. First English "Mission" to Persia, 1615-1616	13
(i) First English "Factory" established at Jāshk in 1616, and at Shirāz and Ispahān in 1617	17
(ii) Grant of the "Farmān of 1617" by Shāh 'Abbās I	19
(iii) Further concessions by the Shāh, 1618, including apparently a monopoly of the silk trade	22
B. Proceedings of the Portuguese
<i>(Continued in Period III, headings A and F.)</i>	
(i) Opposition to the English, 1616-1617	20
(ii) Naval engagement with the English off Jāshk on 28th December 1620 in which the Portuguese are defeated	22
(iii) Expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormūz by the English and Persians, 23rd April 1622	25

Page.	Page.
CHAPTER I.	
PERSIAN GULF. C. Agreement with the Persians in regard to English co-	
operation for the capture of Hormūz, 9th January 1622 .	23
PERIOD II.	
1600—1622.	
(<i>Continued in Period III headings B (i) (a) and (b) and headings E (ii).)</i>	
(i) English to be entitled to moiety of the customs dues at Hormūz .	24
(ii) English goods to enter Hormūz duty-free for ever	24
(iii) Undertaking of some kind apparently given that "English shipping should clear the passages of this Gulf and sustain the moiety of the charge." See also page 30, page 88, and page 209 .	24
PERIOD III.	
1622—1653.	
PERIOD III.	
1622-1653.	
FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM HORMŪZ IN 1622, TO THE "FIRST" WAR BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH, 1653	28
A. Portuguese attempts to retake Hormūz 1622-1625 and naval encounter at Bandar 'Abbās which Dutch assisted English	28
(<i>Continued in heading F below.</i>)	
B. Owing to destruction of Hormūz British settle at Bandar 'Abbās, 1623	29
(i) Precarious condition of English trade, 1624-1625	29
(a) Persians agreed that English should receive moiety of Bandar 'Abbās customs in lieu of those of Hormūz	30
(<i>Continued in heading E (ii) below.</i>)	
(b) Persian requisitions for naval assistance	30
(<i>Continued in period V, heading C (iii).</i>)	
(ii) The Dutch settle at Bandar 'Abbās about 1623	31
(<i>Continued in heading G below.</i>)	
C. Sir Dodmore Cotton's embassy to Persia, 1626-1628	31
D. Internal and external affairs of Persia, 1628-1653	34
(<i>Continued in Period IV, heading E.</i>)	
(i) Death of Shāh 'Abbās, 1628	34
(ii) Reign of Shāh Safi, 1628-1641	34
(a) Perso-Turkish frontier treaty of 1639	34
(iii) Reign of Shāh Abbās II, 1641-1666	35
E. Relations of the East India Company with the Persian Government, 1628-1653	35
(<i>Continued in Period IV, heading F.</i>)	
(i) Renewal in 1629 of the "Farmān of 1617"	35
(ii) History of the English moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās customs receipts, 1628-1653	35
F. Decline of Portuguese power in the Gulf, 1628-1653	37
(<i>Continued in Period IV, heading H.</i>)	
(i) Peace between England and Portugal in the East from 1634	38
(ii) Expulsion of the Portuguese from 'Omān, 1640	38
(iii) Position of the Portuguese in the Gulf in 1650	39

	Page.	CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.
G. Growth of the Dutch power in the Gulf, 1628-1653 . . .	40	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading G.)</i>		
(i) War declared between England and Holland in 1652 . . .	42	PERIOD III. 1622--1653.
H. History of the East India Company . . .	42	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading B.)</i>		
(i) Competition of "Courten's Association" ("The Assada Merchants") with the East India Company, 1636-1650 . . .	42	
I. Trade of the East India Company, 1628-1653 . . .	42	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading J.)</i>		
PERIOD IV.		
1653-1722.		
PERIOD IV. 1653—1722.		
FROM THE "FIRST" WAR BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH IN 1653 TO THE INVASION OF PERSIA BY THE AFGHANS IN 1722 . . .		
	45	
A. Events in Europe, 1653-1722 . . .	45	
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading A.)</i>		
(i) First war between the English and the Dutch, 1652-1654 . . .	46	
(a) £85,000 damages paid by Dutch Company to English East India Company . . .	46	
(ii) Foundation of French East India Company, 1664 . . .	46	
(iii) Second war between the English and the Dutch, 1665-1667 . . .	46	
(iv) War between England, Holland and France, 1672-1678, and inde- pendence of the Dutch secured by "Peace of Nimieguen" in 1678 . . .	47	
(v) War between England, Holland and France, 1688-1697, and "Peace of Ryswick" in 1697 . . .	47	
(vi) War between England and France, 1702-1713, and "Peace of Utrecht" in 1713 . . .	47	
B. History of the East India Company . . .	47	
(i) The "Merchant Adventurers," 1654-1657 . . .	47	
(ii) Formation in 1698 of a "New East India Company" known as the "English Company" . . .	49	
(iii) Struggle between the "English" company and the old East India Company now known as the "London" Company . . .	50	
(iv) Union of the two companies, 1708 . . .	51	
C. Events in India, 1653-1722 . . .	52	
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading A.)</i>		
D. Events in Turkey, 1653-1722 . . .	55	
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading B.)</i>		
E. Events in Persia, 1653-1722 . . .	55	
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading B.)</i>		
(i) Reign of Shāh Sulaimān, 1666-1694 . . .	55	
(ii) Reign of Shāh Husain, 1694-1722, and virtual end of the Safavi dynasty . . .	56	
(iii) Invasion of Persia by the Afghans under Mahmūd and abdication of Shāh Husain in his favour . . .	56	

CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.	Page.
F. Relations of the East India Company with Persia, 1653-1722	56
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Farmān obtained from Shāh Husain dated 18th June 1697, on lines of the "Farmān of 1617" with 20 subsidiary grants	61
(ii) Discredit to the English from prevalence of Piracy, 1705-1707	62
(iii) History of the English moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās customs, 1653-1722	63
G. Proceedings of the Dutch, 1653-1722	65
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading I.)</i>	
(i) General predominance of the Dutch over the English, 1654-1684	65
(ii) Dutch commence to lose credit, 1688-1689	67
H. Proceedings of the Portuguese, 1653-1722	68
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading H.)</i>	
I. Proceedings of the French, 1653-1772	71
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading J.)</i>	
(i) French East India Company establish a factory at Bandar 'Abbās in 1677	71
J. Trade of the East India Company, 1653-1722	71
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading F.)</i>	
K. East India Company's Establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722	77
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading G.)</i>	
(i) Staff	77
(ii) Stations (a) Bandar 'Abbās, (b) Shīrāz, (c) Isfahān	77
L. 'Omān affairs, 1653-1722	78
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading K (i).)</i>	
(i) Piracy and aggressions on Persia by 'Omānis, 1699-1707	79
(ii) Seizure of Persian islands by 'Omānis about 1720	79

PERIOD IV.
1653—1722.

PERIOD V.
1722-1763.

FROM THE INVASION OF PERSIA BY THE AFGHANS IN 1722 TO THE REMOVAL OF THE BRITISH HEADQUARTERS IN THE GULF FROM BANDAR 'ABBĀS IN 1763	80
A. Events in Europe and India, 1722-1763	80
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>	
(i) The Silesian Wars, 1742-1748 and "Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle," 1748	80
(ii) The several years' war, 1756-1763	80
(iii) The "Black Hole" of Calcutta, and the "Victory of Plassey," 1757	81

	Page.	CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.
B. Persian and Turkish affairs, 1722-1763	81	PERIOD V. 1722—1763.
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>		
(i) Occupation of Persia by Afghans, 1722-1729	81	
(ii) Tahmāsh Mirza, a son of Shāh Husain, proclaims himself Shāh of Persia	81	
(iii) Encroachments on Persia by Russia and Turkey and treaty between them for partition of North-West Persia, 1723	81	
(iv) Death of Mahmūd, 1725 and war between Afghans under Ashraf, Mahmūd's successor, and the Turks	81	
(a) Treaty between Ashraf and the Turks, 1726, former acknowledging Sultān as his spiritual superior and latter admitting Ashraf's title to the throne of Persia	81	
(b) Tahmāsh Mirza obtains support of the Qājār tribe of Astarabad and is also joined by Nādir Qulī, an Afshar Turk, who takes the name of Tahmāsh Qulī Khān	81	
(vi) Expulsion of the Afghans from Persia, 1729	81	
(a) Shāh Husain murdered by the Afghans, 1729	81	
(vii) Shāh Tahmāsh dethroned by Tahmāsh Qulī Khān, 1732, and the former's infant son substituted in his place as Shāh 'Abbās III	83	
(viii) Tahmāsh Qulī Khān accepts the crown of Persia as Nādir Shāh, 1736	83	
(ix) Nādir Shāh's attempt to make the people of Persia Sunnis	83	
(x) Nādir Shāh successfully subjugates the Bakhtiyāris and invades Turkey, Afghanistan, India as far as Delhi, and 'Omān, 1737	84	
(xi) Nādir Shāh assassinated, 1747	84	
(xii) Anarchy and the rise of Karīm Khān Zand, 1747-1763	85	
C. General relations of the East India Company with Persia, 1722-1763	86	
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>		
(i) The Company provide Nādir Shāh with two ships, 1736	87	
(ii) Renewal in 1737 of all former privileges except right to receive share of the Bandar 'Abbās customs but right is given of taking one-third of the duty on British goods	88	
(iii) Demand for British naval assistance again advanced, 1740	88	
(iv) British trade crushed by "inland duties", 1743	89	
(a) The English freed from these duties, 1746	90	
(v) General anarchy after death of Nādir Shāh and British factory at Isfahān plundered, 1750	90	
(vi) Question of removing British headquarters from Bandar 'Abbās, 1750-1763; Bahrain, Qishm, and Hanjam suggested in turn	91	
(vii) "Raḡam" obtained from Karīm Khān for the establishment of a factory at Rīg, 1755. See also heading E (ii) below	91	
(viii) Report on Hormūz, 1760	92	
(ix) Experimental cargo for Būshehr sanctioned April 1762	94	
(x) British headquarters transferred from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah, February-March 1763	94	
D. Affairs at Bandar 'Abbās and in its neighbourhood, 1722-1763	96	
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>		
(i) Events leading up to withdrawal of British headquarters from Bandar 'Abbās, 1763	
(a) Events before accession of Nādir Shāh, 1722-1736	96	

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF**

**PERIOD V.
1722—1763.**

	Page.
(b) Events during reign of Nādir Shāh, 1716-1747	97
(c) Events after reign of Nādir Shāh, 1747-1763	98
(d) Capture and destruction of the British factory at Bandar 'Abbās by the French, October-November 1759	102
E. Affairs on the Persian Coast between Rīg and Kungūn, 1722-1763	110
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>	
(i) Position at Būshehr in 1755	110
(ii) Position at Rīg and establishment there of a British Factory and Residency, 1755	111
(a) Withdrawal of factory from Rīg, 1756	115
F. Trade of the East India Company, 1722-1763	116
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading H.)</i>	
G. East India Company's Establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1722-1763	122
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading G.)</i>	
(i) Organization and nomenclature	122
(a) The head of the Company's interests known as "Agent" and his headquarters at Bandar 'Abbās as the "Agency".	122
(b) The term "Honourable Company" in use as early as 1737	122
(ii) Staff in Persia	123
(iii) Communications and correspondence	127
H. Extinction of Portuguese influence, 1722-1763	127
I. Proceedings of the Dutch, 1722-1763	128
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading D.)</i>	
(i) Dutch re-establish settlement at Būshehr, 1747	128
(a) Withdrawal again from Būshehr, 1753	130
(ii) Virtual expulsion of Dutch from Basrah in 1752 and occupation by them of Khārag Island in 1753	129
(iii) Dutch retire from Bandar 'Abbās in 1750	132
J. Proceedings of the French, 1722-1763	133
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading E.)</i>	
(i) Withdrawal from Bandar 'Abbās	133
K. Affairs of the Arabian coast and Turkish 'Irāq, 1722- 1763	136
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>	
(i) 'Omān. Rise of the Hināwiyah and Ghāfiriyah factions in 'Omān	135
(ii) Trucial 'Omān	135
(iii) Qatar and Bahrain. Latter seized by the Shaikh of Būshehr in 1753	135
(iv) Kuwait. Governed by the 'Atbi family with whom the Dutch at Khārag maintained friendly relations from 1753 to 1756	135
(v) Turkish 'Irāq. British factory established at Basrah, 1723	136
L. Affairs of the Persian Coast, 'Arabistān and Makrān, 1722-1763	136
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings A, B and C.)</i>	

PERIOD VI.

1763—1797

Page. **CHAPTER I.**
PERSIAN GULF.

PERIOD VI.
1763—1797.

FROM THE TEMPORARY LOCATION OF THE BRITISH
HEADQUARTERS AT BASRAH IN 1763 TO THE
BEGINNING OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA 1797 . 137

A. General affairs and British interests before the Persian in-
vasion of Turkish 'Irāq, 1763-1775 137

(Continued in Period VII, headings A and B)

- (i) Political effect of transfer in 1763 of British headquarters from
Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah 138
- (ii) Establishment of a Residency at Būshehr in 1763, subordinate to
the headquarters agency at Basrah. See heading B (i) below 138
- (iii) Relations with Karīm Khān Zand and Mīr Mahanna of Rīg. See
also Chapter XI, Period I, heading A 139
- (iv) Anglo-Turkish war against the Ka'ab, 1765-1766. See also
Chapter X, Period I, heading A 140
- (v) Difficulties between Karīm Khān and the Imām of 'Omān 141

B. General affairs and British interests during the siege and
occupations of Basrah by the Persians, 1775-1779 145

(Continued in Period VII, headings A and B.)

- (i) Capture of Basrah by the Persians, 16th April 1776 145
- (ii) British Agency at Basrah reduced to a Residency in 1778. See
heading G (i) below 145
- (iii) Effect of Persian occupation of Basrah on Kuwait and on Zubārah
in Qatar 146

C. General affairs and British interests after the retirement
of the Persians from Basrah, 1779-1797 147

(Continued in Period VII, headings A and B.)

- (i) Evacuation of Basrah by the Persians, 1779 147
- (ii) Decline of Persia on death of Karīm Khān, 1779-1797 147
- (iii) Loss by Persia of Basrah in 1779, of Bahrain in 1783, and vir-
tually of Bandar 'Abbās and dependencies in 1794, which
latter are leased to 'Omān. See also Period VII, heading
A (iv) (a) 147
- (iv) Internal state of Persia, Turkish 'Irāq and 'Omān 148
- (a) Omān obtains possession of Gwādur and Chahbār in 1793 148
- (v) Hostilities between British and French, 1778 to 1783 and 1793 to
1797 149
- (vi) British Residency at Basrah removed to Kuwait from 1793 to
1795 150

D. Disappearance of Dutch influence, 1763-1797 150

- (i) Expulsion of Dutch from Khārag, their last and only settlement,
by Mīr Mahanna of Rīg, 1766 150

E. Proceedings of the French, 1763-1797 151

(Continued in Period VII, heading A.)

- (i) French political establishments, Basrah and Baghdād 151
- (ii) French dealings with 'Omān 151

	Page.
CHAPTER I.	
PERSIAN GULF. F. Activity of native Indian powers in the Persian Gulf, 1763-1797.	156
PERIOD VI. 1763—1797.	
(Continued in Period VII, heading A (i) and (iv).)	
(i) Political Representative of the Mysore Government at Masqat, 1776	156
G. British administrative and official arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1763-1797	157
(Continued in Period VII, heading D.)	
(i) After 1778 the establishments of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf consisted of two Residences at Basrah and Būshehr independent of each other, and of a Native Agency at Masqat. A Native Agency at Baghdād was added in 1783	157
(ii) Customs and consulage of the East India Company, 1763-1797	157
(iii) Formation of the "Secret and Political" Department of the Bombay Government, 1785	158
(iv) Services rendered by the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf	158
(v) The "Desert" mail	160
(vi) Grant of marine passes and convoys to native vessels, 1767-1771	160
(vii) Private personal trade and the acceptance of presents prohibited in India for the first time during second Governorship of Clive, 1765-1767. See also Chapter XI, Period IV, heading K (i)	162
H. Foreign trade of the Persian Gulf, 1763-1797	163
(Continued in Period VII, heading C.)	
(i) Exports	164
(ii) Imports	165
(iii) Distribution of trade	165
(iv) Commercial communications	166
(v) Recommendations by the Basrah Residency in 1790 for the promotion of trade	167
(vi) Recommendations by the Basrah Residency in 1790 in regard to establishments	168
 PERIOD VII. 1798—1810.	
 PERIOD VII. 1798—1810.	
THE PERSIAN GULF DURING THE NAPOLEONIC ERA IN THE EAST, 1798-1810	169
A. Situation vis-à-vis France and measures to check extension of Napoleon's influence eastwards	170
(Continued in Period VIII, headings A and D.)	
(i) The intrigues of Tipu Sultān of Mysore, 1799	171
(ii) British Residency established at Baghdād, 1798	172
(iii) British missions to Persia of Medhi 'Alī Khān, Malcolm, and Harford Jones, 1798-1810. See also Chapter XI, Period IV, heading H	172
(iv) British agreements with 'Omān—	...
(a) Agreement of 12th October 1798, giving right to settle at Bandar 'Abbās	172
(b) Agreement of 17th January 1800, giving right to locate a British European Political Agent at Masqat. This resulted in the departure of the Mysore representative, vide Period VI, heading F (i) above	173

	Page.	CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.
(v) French missions to Persia and treaty of Finkinstein of 10th May 1807. See also Chapter XI, Period IV, heading G	174	
(vi) French agreement made with 'Omān during 1807-1808, giving France the right of establishing a Political Agency at Masqat	174	PERIOD VII. 1798—1810.
(a) French agent withdrawn, 1810	177	
B. Disturbed condition of the Gulf, 1798-1905	178	
<i>(Continued in Period VII, headings B and C.)</i>		
(i) Development of the Wāhhabī power and their advance to the shores of the Persian Gulf, 1800	179	
(ii) Occupation for a short period by 'Saiyid Sultān of 'Omān of Khārag Island in 1799 and of Bahrain from 1800 to 1801, when the Wāhhabīs took possession	180	
(iii) Seizure from 'Omān of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies by the Bani Ma'in	180	
(iv) General development of piracy	180	
(v) "First" British expedition against the Qawāsīm, 1805-1806	181	
(a) Recapture of Bandar 'Abbās en route	181	
(b) Treaty with the Qawāsīm of 6th February 1806	182	
(vi) "Second" British expedition against the Qawāsīm, 1809-1810	183	
(a) Capture of Rās-al Khaimah, and operations against Lingeh Lāft, and Shīnūs	184	
C. British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1798-1810	185	
<i>(Continued in Period VIII, heading E.)</i>		
D. British Political Establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1798-1810	185	
<i>(Continued in Period VIII, heading F.)</i>		
(i) Residencies of Baghdād and Būshehr prohibited in 1806 from corresponding direct with the Government of India	188	
PERIOD VIII. 1810-1836.		
PERIOD VIII. 1810—1836.		
FROM THE END OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA IN THE EAST TO THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF, 1810-1836		
188		
A. Events in Europe and India. First suspicions of Russian designs on India. Wars between Russia and Persia. Russo-Persian and Anglo-Persian Treaties. See also Chapter XI, Period IV, headings F and II		
188		
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading A.)</i>		
B. The Wāhhabī power. Maximum development, decline, and temporary extinction, 1810-1819 and revival in 1830		
189		
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading C.)</i>		
(i) Wāhhabīs at one time possessed all Central Arabia, greater part of Hijāz including Makkah and Madīnah, portions of Yaman, part of Syria, and the whole of Hasa, Qatar, Bahrain and Trucial 'Omān	189	
(ii) Wāhhabīs driven from Qatar and Bahrain by Sultān of 'Omān in 1811	193	

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

**PERIOD VIII.
1810—1836.**

	Page.
(iii) Expulsion of the Wāhhābīs from Hijāz by the Egyptians, 1812-1813, and gradual withdrawal from the Gulf	190
(iv) Conquest and occupation of Najd and Hassa by the Egyptians, 1817-1818	191
(v) Revival of Wāhhābī influence, 1830	207
(a) Bahrain for a period from 1830 to 1833, and 'Omān in 1833, become tributary to the Wāhhābī Amīr	207
C. Revival of piracy, 1811-1836, and measures taken to suppress it	193
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading G (iii).)</i>	
(i) "Third" British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1819-1820	197
(a) Capture of Rās-al Khaimah and construction there of a fort, 1820	198
(b) "General Treaty of Peace," 1820, signed by all chiefs of the Pirate Coast and by Bahrain	198
(ii) Submission of the Shaikhs of Bahrain to the Sultān of 'Omān, 1820	199
(a) Independence of Bahrain recognized by Sultān of 'Omān in 1829	210
(iii) Question of a Political, Military, and Naval base in the Persian Gulf. Eventual settlement at Bāsīdu in 1822, withdrawal in 1823 and re-establishment at end of year, <i>vide</i> page 203. See also Chapter XI, Period IV, heading J (ii), (iv) and (vi)	199
(iv) Two expeditions against the Bani Bn 'Alī tribe of 'Omān, 1820-1821	201
(v) Expedition against the Bani Yās of Abu Dhabi, 1835	205
(vi) The first "Maritime Truce," 1835, and "Restrictive Line," 1836	210
D. British relations with Turkish 'Irāq and Persia, 1810-1836
<i>(Continued in Period IX, headings A, D and E.)</i>	
(i) Rupture of British relations with Pāsha of Baghdād and withdrawal to Kuwait, 1821-1822	201
(ii) Request in 1827-1828 by Pāsha of Baghdād for British Military instructors, refused	203
(iii) Colonel F. R. Chesney's expedition of 1835 to Turkish Arabia and introduction of steam navigation upon the Euphrates	212
<i>(Continued in Period IX, headings B and H.)</i>	
(iv) Unauthorised agreement executed by Resident at Būshehr with the Shirāz Government, 1820-1822. See also Chapter V, Period II, heading D and Chapter XI, Period IV, heading J (v)	202
(v) Incidents at Būshehr, 1826-1832	209
E. British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1810-1836	212
(i) Abolition during the period of the "Company's" trade as well as the private trade of the Company's servants. Abolition also in 1813 of the Company's trade monopoly	212
F. British Establishments and official organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1810-1836	213
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading J.)</i>	
(i) British interests in 1810 represented by 4 separate and independent "Residencies" at Baghdād, Basrah, Būshehr and Masqat, all entirely subordinate to the Government of Bombay	213
(a) In 1835 all establishments placed under the control of the Government of India, but in this connection see pages 265 and 1339	220

	Page	
(ii) Absorption of Masqat by Būshehr and of Baghdād by Basrah, title of latter post being changed in 1812 to "Political Agent in Turkish Arabia", <i>vide</i> page 217	214	CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF. PERIOD VIII. 1810—1836
(iii) Scheme for placing Turkish 'Irāq and the Persian Gulf under a single officer; see also page 220	217	
(iv) The "Political Agent in Turkish Arabia" made subordinate in 1824 to the "Resident" at Būshehr in all matters affecting the maritime Arabs and the Persian Coast, and ordered to furnish him with copies of all his despatches	218	
(v) From 1832 onwards Baghdād appears to have become the regular headquarters of the "Political Agency in Turkish Arabia," the Political Agent being almost always described as "Resident at Baghdād," <i>vide</i> page 217	218	
(vi) Financial—		
(a) Salaries prevailing in 1811	216	
(b) Cost of the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia in 1828-1829	218	
(c) Cost of the Residency Būshehr, in 1829-1830	219	
(vii) British Representation at Tehrān. Post filled by nominees of the Indian Government from 1823 to 1834. See also Chapter XI, Period IV, heading H (xi)	219	
(viii) Suggestion in 1839 to reduce status of officer at Būshehr from "Resident" to that of "Assistant to the British Envoy at Tehrān"	219	
(ix) Question of establishing a British station at Khārag, 1830	219	
(x) First Marine Survey of the Persian Gulf, 1810-1836	220	

PERIOD IX.

1836-1862.

PERIOD IX.
1836—1862.

FROM THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF TO THE INSTITUTION OF REGULAR STEAM COMMUNICATION AND MAIL SERVICES, 1836-1862

A. Conflict of Russian and British Policy in Persia and Afghanistan to 1842. See also Chapter XI, Period V, headings A, B, F and II	222	
<i>(Continued in heading E below.)</i>		
(i) First British Afghan War, 1838-1842	224	
B. Communications to the Mediterranean by rail and river through Turkish 'Irāq, 1837-1861	226	
<i>(Continued in Period X, headings A (ii) and C (ii).)</i>		
(i) Armed flotilla of the East India Company on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, 1837-1842	226	
(ii) Origin of the stationnaire at Baghdād (see also page 264)	226	
(iii) Introduction of commercial steam navigation on the Tigris in 1861, by Messrs. Lynch and Company	227	
(iv) Proposed Euphrates valley railway, 1856-57	227	
C. Central Arabian Affairs, 1839-1853	227	
<i>(Continued in Period X, heading D.)</i>		
(i) Egyptian aggressions, 1839-40	228	

CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.

PERIOD IX.
1836—1862.

	(ii) Wahhābī aggressions, 1844-53	Page. 228
	(iii) British Convention with Bahrain of 1861	229
D.	Turco-Persian Frontier disputes, 1836-1852	229
	(Continued in Period X, heading C (v).)	
	(i) Joint Commission and second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1843-47	230
E.	Difficulties between Britain and Persia, 1853-1857	230
	(Continued in Period X, heading B, and Period XII, heading A.)	
	(i) The Crimean War, 1854-56	230
	(ii) The Anglo-Persian War and Treaty of Penae, 1856-57. See also Chapter XI, Period VI, heading C	231
	(iii) The Indian Mutiny, 1857-58	231
F.	French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1836-1861	231
	(Continued in Period X, heading E.)	
	(i) Commercial treaty with Persia, 1855	232
	(ii) Commercial treaty with 'Omān, 1844	232
G.	British Naval arrangements and maritime security, 1836- 1861	232
	(Continued in Period X, heading F, and Period XI, heading F.)	
	(i) First steamer in the Persian Gulf, 1838	232
	(ii) Relative status of the "Resident" at Būshehr and the "Com- mander of the Indian Naval Squadron" defined, 1841	233
	(iii) Perpetual "Treaty of Peace" signed by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in 1853	235
H.	Marine surveys, 1836-1862	235
	(Continued in Period X, heading G.)	
	(i) Kuwait surveyed in 1839 and Bahrain in 1859	235
I.	Land and River surveys and explorations, 1836-1861	236
	(Continued in Period XI, heading G.)	
J.	Archæological research, 1836-1861	236
	(Continued in Period XII, heading E (i).)	
	(i) Excavations in Assyria, Babylonia and Susiana by Layard, Rawlinson and Loftus	237
K.	British official organisation and arrangements, 1836-1862	237
	(Continued in Period X, heading H.)	
	(i) Administration of India passes to the Crown on 1st November 1858 and the Governor-General receives the title of Viceroy	237
	(ii) Status in 1859 of Legation at Tehrān vis-à-vis Home and Indian Governments. See also Chapter XI, Period VI, heading D	237
	(iii) A British "Resident" reappointed to Masqat in 1840, but transferred to Zanzibar	237
	(iv) Separation of the Sultānates of 'Omān and Zanzibar and a British representative again appointed at Masqat. See also Period X, heading D-(v)	237
	Vice Consul appointed to Mūsāl, 1839, and the office of at Basrah made a European appointment in 1851	237

PERIOD X.
1862-1873.

Page. **CHAPTER I.**
PERSIAN GULF.

PERIOD X.
1862—1873.

FROM THE INSTITUTION OF REGULAR STEAM COMMUNICATION AND MAIL SERVICES TO THE ASSUMPTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE DIRECT CONTROL OF POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS, 1862-1873 238

A. Internal and external communications, 1862-1873 238

(Continued in Period XI, heading H.)

- (i) Regular steamer communication established between Bombay, Būsbahr and Baghdād, 1862-66 followed by installation of British Indian Post Offices 238
- (ii) Telegraph and cable lines introduced, 1864-69 239
- (iii) Railway and navigation projects, 1871-73 239

B. Persian affairs and relations, 1862-1873 240

(Continued in Period XI, heading B.)

(i) Relations with Britain—

- (a) Afghanistan, (b) Sistān, (c) Makrān, (d) The “Reuter Concession.” See also Chapter XI, Period VI, headings B (iv) and (v), C (viii) and (ix), J (v) 240

C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1862-1873 241

(Continued in Period XI, heading C.)

- (i) Financial difficulties of Turkey and general disorder 241
- (ii) Midhat Pāsha, First “Wali” of Baghdād, 1869 242
- (iii) Turkish opposition to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company 242
- (iv) Annexation of Qa’a and Hasa by Turkey in 1871 and her claims to Kuwait, Banarāin and Trucial ‘Omān 242
- (v) Zone to Turco-Persian frontier differences extended southwards in 1869 244

D. Affairs and Relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf and of the ‘Omān Sultānate, 1861-1873 244

(Continued in Period XI, heading D.)

- (i) Wahhābi operations against ‘Omān, 1865-66, and British measures 244
- (ii) Destruction of Dōlah and Wakrah by Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, 1867-68, and British action taken 245
- (iii) Persian claims to Bahrain 245
- (iv) Expulsion of Wahnābis by Sultān of ‘Omān from Barāimi in 1869 245
- (v) ‘Omān and Zanzibar Sultānates separated in 1861 and the Zanzibar subsidy made a charge on the British and Indian Treasuries in 1871. See also Period XIII, heading I (iv) 246
- (vi) Lapse of the Sultān of ‘Oman’s Bander ‘Abbās fief in 1868 246

E. Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1862-1873 247

(Continued in Period XI, heading E.)

- (i) Anglo-French joint declaration of 1862 to respect the independence of the ‘Omān and Zanzibar Sultānates. Government of India ignorant of the declaration until 1871 247

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

**PERIOD X.
1862—1873**

(ii) French activity in Turkish 'Irāq	Page. 247
(iii) French Vice-Consulate reinstated at Basrah in 1870	247
F. British Naval arrangements, 1861-1873	247
<i>(Continued in Period XI, heading F.)</i>	
(i) Abolition of the Indian Navy, 30th April 1863, and difficulties arising therefrom	247
(ii) Colonel Pelly's suggestions, 1866, regarding the maritime policing of the Gulf	249
(iii) Introduction in 1871-72 of Royal Navy arrangements by which three Royal Navy ships were to remain in the Persian Gulf at the disposal of the political authorities	250
(a) Rule reference not undertaking hostilities without reference to the Naval Commander-in-Chief relaxed with reference to the Persian Gulf	250
G. Marine Surveys, 1861-1873	251
<i>(Continued in Period XI, heading G.)</i>	
(i) Total discontinuance of marine surveys from 1861 to 1873	251
H. British policy and official matters in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1862-73	252
<i>(Continued in Period XI, headings A and I.)</i>	
(i) Colonel Pelly's Musandam scheme, 1863	252
(ii) Extract from some of Colonel Pelly's despatches on politico-commercial questions, 1866-69	258
(iii) Restrictions on the powers of the Resident to seize vessels belonging to native chiefs, 1862-1871	261
(iv) British representation at Tehrān and the House of Commons Committee, 1870-1871. See also Chapter XI, Period VI, heading D (iii)	263
(v) The stationnaire at Baghdād, 1869-70	264
(vi) The "Oudh Bequest" comes into operation at Baghdād in 1849	264

PERIOD XI.

**PERIOD XI.
1872—1876.**

1872-1876.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD NORTHBROOK, MAY 1872 TO APRIL 1876	265
A. Transfer of British political interests in the Persian Gulf from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, 1872-1873. See also page 220, "Administrative Changes in 1835"	265
<i>(Continued in heading I below.)</i>	
B. Persian affairs, 1872-1876	267
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading B.)</i>	
C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1872-1876	267
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading C.)</i>	
(i) New Basrah Wilāyat formed including Hasa, 1875	268
(ii) Turkish intrigues at 'Odaid 1872	268
(iii) Fruitless Turco-Persian frontier discussion, 1872-74	268

	Page.	CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.
D. Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf and of 'Omān, 1872-1876	269	PERIOD XI, 1872—1876.
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading D.)</i>		
(i) Shaikh of Bahrain dissevers his interests from those of the people of the mainland, 1874	269	
E. Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1872-1876	269	
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading E.)</i>		
(i) French activity in 'Arabistān	270	
F. British Naval arrangements, maritime security, and suppression of the "Slave Trade", 1872-1876	270	
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading F (i) heading (F).)</i>		
(i) Orders reference His Majesty's Ships proceeding regularly to Karachi and Indian waters for change	270	
(ii) Turkish protest against a British man-of-war visiting Qūruah	271	
G. Marine surveys and investigations on land, 1872-1876	272	
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading G.)</i>		
H. Communications, 1872-1876	272	
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading H.)</i>		
(i) Internal postal service established by Persian Government, 1875	272	
I. British interests and official matters in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Irāq, 1872-1876	272	
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading I.)</i>		

PERIOD XII.

1876-1880.

PERIOD XII.
1876—1880.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD LYTTON, APRIL 1876 TO JUNE 1880	272
A. Serious tension between Britain and Russia in connection with Afghanistan	272
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, heading A.)</i>	
(i) Death of Dōst Muhammad Khān, 1863	273
(ii) The "Second" British Afghan War, 1878-1880	273
(iii) The "Third" British Afghan War, 1879-1880	273
(iv) Afghanistan united under 'Abdur Rahman, 1881	273
B. Persian affairs and relations, 1876-1880	274
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Unsuccessful British attempts to obtain concession for navigation of the Kārūn and for the construction of roads in south-west Persia	274
C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1876-1880	275
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading C.)</i>	
(i) The First Turkish Constitution of 1876, followed by Russo-Turkish War, 1876-1880, and "Treaty of Berlin" by which Britain secured Cyprus	275

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

PERIOD XII.
1876—1880.

	Page.
(ii) Turkish operation against the Wahhābis, 1879	276
(iii) Turkish claims to 'Odaid	276
D. Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf and of 'Omān, 1876-1880	277
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading D.)</i>	
(i) Disturbances in Bahrain and a British Political Officer with a military guard sent to reside on the main island in 1879	277
(ii) Occupation of Matrah and investment of Masqat by rebels in 1877	277
E. Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880	277
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading E.)</i>	
(i) French archaeological researches at Tallo	277
(ii) Slave traders begin to use French flag	278
F. British naval arrangements and maritime security, 1876-1880	278
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading F.)</i>	
(i) Serious outbreak of piracy in 1878 along coast of Hasa and Qatar, and difficulties with the Turks	278
(ii) Agreement in 1879 among Shaikhs of Trucial Coast for surrender of absconding debtors	279
G. Marine and other surveys, 1878-1880	279
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, heading H.)</i>	
H. Communications, 1876-1880	279
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading H.)</i>	
(i) The "Tigris Valley Railway" scheme, 1878-1879	279
I. British official matters in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1880	279
<i>(Continued in Period XIII, heading I.)</i>	
(i) Suggestion to supply Resident at Būshehr with a steam vessel in exchange for one of the three naval vessels	280
(ii) Status of British representative at Basrah raised from that of a Vice-Consul to a Consul, 1879	280
(iii) Distribution of the Oudh bequest	280

PERIOD XIII.
1880—1884.

PERIOD XIII.
1880-1884.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD RIPON, JUNE 1880 TO DECEMBER 1884	281
A. Period without signal change of any kind	281
B. Persian affairs, 1880-1884	281
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, heading B.)</i>	
C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1880-1884	281
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Formation in 1881 of a "Department of Public Debt" by which Turkish finance, came to a large extent under international control	281

D. Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf and of 'Omān, 1880-1884	282
--	-----

(Continued in Period XI, heading D.)

(i) Turkish intrigues against Bahrain and "Exclusive Agreement" given by Shaikh of Bahrain to hold no political relations with any Power but the British, 1880, see also page 301	281
(ii) Turkish Government informed in 1882 that Britain did not admit her claim to Qatar. Shaikh of Dōhah compelled to admit British traders	282
(iii) Attack by rebels on Masqat in 1883 repulsed by Sultān with British aid	283

E. Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1880-1884	283
---	-----

(Continued in Period XIV, heading E.)

(i) French activity in 'Arabistān and subsidised steamer service to the Gulf, 1881. See also Chapter X, Period IV, heading L	283
(ii) French Vice-Consulate at Basrah closed, 1873	283
(iii) Russian Consulate established at Baghdād in 1881	283

F. British naval arrangements and maritime security, 1880-1884	283
--	-----

(Continued in Period XIV, heading F.)

(i) Quotion of salutes and flags, 1879-1882	284
(ii) Revival in 1883 of Persian navy scheme and two small ships ordered from Germany. See also Chapter XI, Period VI, heading I (iii)	284
(iii) Continuance of piracy off Coast of Haṣa. Impossibility of obtaining Turkish co-operation. British naval ships absolved in 1881 from obligation to respect the three-mile limit on the Turkish coast	284

G. The "Arms Trade" in the Persian Gulf, 1880-1884	285
--	-----

(Continued in Period XIV, heading G.)

(i) Commencement of the trade. Importations at Muḥannurah by French merchants	285
(ii) Importation of arms into Persia prohibited by the Shāh in 1881	285

H. Communications, 1880-1884	285
--	-----

(Continued in Period XIV, heading I.)

(i) Turkish opposition to British post offices	285
--	-----

I. British official matters, 1880-1884	285
--	-----

(Continued in Period XIV, heading J.)

(i) Virtual evacuation of Bāsīdū, 1883	285
(ii) Despatch vessel sanctioned for the Resident at Būshehr, 1884	286
(iii) Turkish obstruction of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	286
(iv) Transfer of Zanzibar from Government of India to Home Government in 1883	286

CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.

PERIOD XIV.

1884-1888.

PERIOD XIV.
1884-1888.

	Page.
VICEROYALTY OF LORD DUFFERIN, DECEMBER 1884 TO DECEMBER 1888	288
A. Renewed tension between Britain and Russia ; occupation by latter of Merv, 1884, the Panjdehi incident, 1885, and addition to the Indian Army of 30,000 men 288	
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading A.)</i>	
(i) Escape and surrender of Ayub Khān, 1887.	288
B. Persian affairs, 1884-1888	288
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Opening of the Lower Kārūn to navigation, 1888	289
(ii) Formation of the Persian Governorship of the Gulf Ports, 1887	289
(iii) Period of great Persian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1887-1888	289
C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1884-1888	290
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Shalbah island dispute, 1884	290
(ii) Construction of Turkish fort at Fao, 1885-1888	290
D. Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf, and 'Omān, 1884-1888	291
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading D.)</i>	
(i) Troubles of Indian traders settled at Dōhah in Qatar	291
(ii) Turkish and Persian intrigues against Bahrain in 1888 and British naval action taken	291
(iii) Turkish intrigues against Trucial 'Omān 1888	292
(iv) Limited guarantee given by British Government for the safety of Masqat and Matrah, 1886	292
E. Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf 1884-1888	293
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading E.)</i>	
(i) Visits of Russian officers to the Gulf, 1887-1888	293
(ii) Archaeological investigations begun at Shūsh in 1885-1886 by the French, and at Nifār in Turkish Arabia by the Americans in 1888	293
(iv) American consulate established at Baghdād, 1889	293
F. British naval arrangements and maritime security, 1884- 1888	293
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading F.)</i>	
(i) Number of naval ships subsidised by Indian Government reduced from six to four	294
(ii) Arrival in 1885 of the "Persepolis" and the "Susa" for the Persian navy	294
G. The arms trade, 1884-1888	295
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading G.)</i>	
(i) British and British protected firms engage in the trade in spite of warning	295

	Page.	CHAPTER I PERSIAN GULF.
H. Marine surveys, 1884-1888	295	
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading H.)</i>		
(i) Discovery of Khor Bani Bū 'Alī, 1886	295	
I. Communications, 1884-1888	295	PERIOD XIV. 1884—1888
(i) Abolition in 1886, of the old British overland post between Baghdād and Damascus	295	
J. British official matters, 1884-1888	296	
<i>(Continued in Period XV, heading I.)</i>		
(i) Arrival in 1887 of the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence"	296	
(ii) Abolition of the Mūsāl Vice-Consulate, 1887	296	
(iii) Jubilee of H. M. Queen Victoria, 1887	296	
PERIOD XV.		PERIOD XV. 1888—1894.
1888-1894.		
VICEROYALTY OF LORD LANSDOWNE, DECEMBER 1888 TO JANUARY 1894	297	
A. Continued tension between Britain and Russia, scene being transferred from Afghanistan to Persia	297	
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading A.)</i>		
B. Persian affairs, 1888-1894	297	
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading B.)</i>		
(i) Acute rivalry between Britain and Russia in regard to Railway, road and commercial concessions. See Chapter XI, Period VI, headings C (xi) to (xv) and E (ii)	297	
(a) Imperial Bank of Persia established, 1889	297	
C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1888-1894	299	
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading C.)</i>		
(i) Irrigation schemes in Turkish 'Irāq, 1892	298	
(ii) Turkish expedition against Qatar, 1893	299	
(iii) Turkish claims to Muhammerah and interference with navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab, 1893. See also Period XVI, heading J (iii)	299	
(iv) The Turkish Fort at Fao, 1890-1894	299	
(v) Turkish Consular Agent appointed to Lingeh, but not recognised by Persia	300	
D. Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf and of 'Omān, 1888-1894	300	
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading D.)</i>		
(i) Turkish pretensions to 'Odaid, Bahrain and 'Omān, resulting in "Exclusive Agreements" between the British and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain	301	
(ii) French intrigues on the Trucial Coast, 1891	301	
(iii) French and Russian intrigues at Masqat followed by agreement with Sultān of 1891 whereby latter bound himself and his successor never to alienate territory in favour of any power but Britain	302	

CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.	Page.
E. Foreign powers, other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1884-1888	300
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading D.)</i>	
(i) Franco-Russian joint activity	300
(a) French Vice-Consulate established at Büshehr	300
(ii) American mission established at Basrah and Bahrain, 1891-1893	300
F. British naval arrangements and maritime security, 1888-94	302
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading F.)</i>	
(i) Question of using the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence" for combatant purposes, 1888-1894	302
(ii) Piracy in the Shatt-al-Arab, 1888-1890	303
G. The arms trade, 1888-1894	303
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading G.)</i>	
(i) Diversion of the trade from Zanzibar to Masqat, 1890	303
(ii) Import of arms into Gwādur prohibited by the Sultān, 1891	303
H. Marine surveys, 1888-1894	303
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading I.)</i>	
(i) British tidal observatories established at Büshehr and Masqat in 1892 and 1893	303
I. British official matters, 1888-1894	303
<i>(Continued in Period XVI, heading J.)</i>	
(i) Difficulties of British navigation on the Kārūn	304
(ii) British Vice-Consulate established at Muhammerah in 1890	304
(iii) Consular port at Mūsāl revived in 1893	305
(iv) Examination as to terms of the "Ondh Bequest"	305
<p>PERIOD XVI. 1894-1899.</p> <p>PERIOD XVI. 1894-1899.</p>	
VICEROYALTY OF LORD ELGIN, 1894-1899	305
A. Franco-Russian Alliance, 1895. Fashoda incident, 1898. Appearance of plague in India, 1896. Chitral expedition, 1897	305
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading A.)</i>	
B. Persian affairs, 1894-1899	306
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Loans to Persia resulting in the customs being placed in charge of Belgian experts	306
(ii) (a) Northern 'Arabistān, (b) Southern 'Arabistān, (c) Persian Coast and Islands, (d) Persian Makrān, Murder of Mr. Graves, 1897	308
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading L.)</i>	
C. Turkish affairs and Turco-Persian relations, 1894-1899	308
<i>(Continued in Period XVIII, headings C and K.)</i>	
(i) Armenian Massacres and Greco-Turkish War	308

	Page.	CHAPTER I. PERSIAN GULF.
D. Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1894-1899	309	PERIOD XVI. 1894—1899.
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, headings D, E, F, G, H and I.)</i>		
(i) French Vice-Consulate established at Masqat, November 1894	309	
(ii) Attempt by the Messageries Maritimes Company to start a steamer service to the Gulf, 1896	309	
(iii) Re-institution of subsidised French line contemplated, 1898	309	
(iv) French obtain monopoly for antiquarian research in Persia, 1895	309	
(v) Russian Consul-General appointed, Isfahān, 1897	309	
(vi) Despatch of Russian engineer officer to Hormūz and contemplated Russian coaling station on that island, 1895	310	
(vii) Despatch of Russian medical officers to Büshehr, 1897	310	
(viii) Contemplated Russian railway from Tripoli to Kuwait, 1898	310	
(ix) German Vice-Consulate established at Büshehr, 1897	310	
(x) Germany obtains in 1898 a preferential right for construction of a railway to the Persian Gulf	311	
E. Affairs and relation of 'Omān and the Arabian coast, 1894- 1899	311	
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading J.)</i>		
(i) 'Omān	311	
(a) Occupation of Masqat by rebels and alienation of Sultan from Britain, 1895	311	
(b) Grant of coaling station (Bandar Jissah) to France, 1898, in disregard of the agreement with British of 1891	312	
(ii) Trucial 'Omān	312	
(iii) Qatar	312	
(a) Shaikhs of Qatar in 1898 intimated their willingness to be included in same political circle as chiefs of Trucial 'Omān	313	
(iv) Bahrain		
(a) Attempted invasion with Turkish support of Bahrain from mainland frustrated by British action, over 40 vessels being destroyed and 120 captured, 1895	313	
(b) Proposal in 1897 to establish sanitary post of the Con- stantinople Board of Health in Bahrain rejected by His Majesty's Government as also a request in 1898 by the Porte that British representative in Bahrain should obtain a Turkish exequatur		
(v) Kuwait	313	
(a) Accession of Shaikh Mubūrak, 1896	314	
(b) Appointment of a Turkish sanitary official to Kuwait	314	
(c) Decision of British Government to enter into relations with Shaikh, 1898	314	
F. British naval arrangements and maritime security, 1894- 1899	314	
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, headings N and P (i).)</i>		
(i) Revision in 1895 of the subsidy arrangements between Home and Indian Government	314	
(ii) Restrictions on the action of naval authorities on land, 1898	315	
(iii) Salutes	315	
(iv) Piracies in the Shatt-al-Arab and British gun-boat stationed in the river, 1898-1899	315	

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

Page.

**PERIOD XVI.
1894—1899.**

G. The arms trade, 1894-99	316
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading P (ii).)</i>	
(i) Rapid growth of the trade	316
(ii) Seizure of a British ship at Masqat in 1898 and confiscation of stock at Masqat	316
(iii) Agreements with Masqat and Bahrain in regard to the Arms Traffic, 1897-1898	317
H. Sanitary organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1894-99	317
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading P (v).)</i>	
(i) The " Venice Conference " of 1897	317
(a) Sanitary posts established by the " Constantinople Board of Health " at Kuwait, Qatif, and 'Oquir	317
(ii) Persian Government confide all quarantine arrangements at Persian ports to British Agency	317
I. Marine surveys, 1894-99	318
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading O (i).)</i>	
J. British official matters, 1894-1899	318
<i>(Continued in Period XVII, heading Q.)</i>	
(i) Disorders in 'Arabistān. See also Chapter X, Period V, heading F.	318
(ii) Disorder in Makrān and murder of Mr. Graves in 1897. See also Chapter XII, Period IV, heading B (i).	318
(iii) Continued Turkish interference at Fao with British navigation of the Shatt-al-Arab. British naval action taken. See also Period XV, heading C (vi)
(iv) British demands for consular representation at Fao	318
(v) Voluntary transfer of Basrah Consulate from Government of India to Home Government, 1898.	319
(vi) Revised arrangements in regard to Oudh Bequest	319
(vii) Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, 22nd June, 1897	319

**PERIOD XVII.
1899—1905.**

**PERIOD XVII.
1899-1905.**

VICEROYALTIES OF LORD CURZON, JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905 (DIVIDED BY THE TEMPORARY VICEROYALTY OF LORD AMPHILL, APRIL TO DE- CEMBER 1904).	319
A. Activity of France and Russia. The South African War, 1899-1902. Lord Curzon's views on the Persian Gulf, 1892	320
B. Persian internal affairs, 1899-1905	322
(i) Extravagance of the Shāh and financial difficulties	322
(ii) Increasing and widespread disorder in all parts of the country	322
(a) Birth of doctrines of representative government	322
(iii) Improvement of the Customs Department in the hands of the Belgians and growing power of the latter	322
C. Turkish internal affairs, 1899-1905	322
(i) Formation of a political party in favour of representative government	324

(ii) Formation in 1904 in the Hamīdiyyah Navigation Office which took over all Turkish steamers on the Tigris and Euphrates . . .	324
(iii) General disorder in Hasa. Practical extinction of British Indian trade	324
D. Russian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905 . . .	325
(i) Russian policy in Persia generally	325
(a) Her loans to Persia, her quarantine methods in Khurāsān, her active hostility to Britain in Sistān, Isfahān and Kirmānshāh and the Russo-Persia trade declaration of 1901	325
(ii) Russian designs in the Persian Gulf	326
(a) The creation of a Russian naval base in the Persian Gulf and a railway through Persia to support it	326
(b) Attempt in 1900 to found a coal depôt in Bandar 'Abbās	327
(c) Series of Russian naval demonstrations in the Persian Gulf, 1900-1903	328
(d) Russian railway reconnaissance in Southern Persia, 1900. Tehrān, Kirmān, Chahbār the route favoured. Russian fear of junction between Baghdād and Indian railways	331
(iii) Russian commercial designs in the Persian Gulf (M. Siromiatnikoff's proposals)	332
(a) Subsidised Russian steamship line (started 1901)	333
(b) Russian Bank for Būshehr	333
(c) Russian Consulate and Vice-Consulate as also coal depôts at Būshehr and Basrah	333
(d) Cossack guards for the Consulates	333
(e) One Russian warship to be constantly in the Gulf	333
(f) Contract made for 12 years from 1903 for subsidised Russian steamship line	336
(g) The "Anatouni" commercial missions of 1904 and 1905	337
(h) Russian sanitary policy in the Persian Gulf	337
E. French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905 . . .	338
(i) Common policy of France and Russia in the Persian Gulf	338
(ii) The separate ambitions of France in 'Omān	338
(a) Indiscriminate conferment of French flags on native vessels	339
(b) Attempt to gain footing at Bandar Jissah	339
(c) Close relations with the Banī Bū 'Alī and Jannabah tribes at Sūr	339
(iii) French naval demonstrations, 1900-1904	339
(iv) Malicious press campaign against the British	339
(a) Monsieur Antoine Goguyer	339
(b) Extraordinary care and strange experiences of the Arab Salim Qamri	343
(v) French commercial enterprises in the Persian Gulf	344
(a) Intention of two French merchants to settle at Bahrain, March 1903	345
F. German activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905 . . .	345
(i) Germany and the Baghdād Railway	346
(ii) Beginnings of German trade in the Gulf	346
(iii) First Hamburg-America line ship to visit the Gulf, 1906	346

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

Page.

PERIOD XVII.
1899—1905.

G. Belgian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905 . . .	347
(i) Proposed Belgian syndicate and bank	347
(ii) Movement of the "Selika" and her connection with a pearl-fishing concession	347
(iii) The "Selika" eventually purchased by the Persian Government and became the "Muzaffari"	348
H. American activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905 . . .	345
(i) Archæological and missionary	348
I. Muhammadan forces and movements, 1899-1905	348
(i) The Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf	348
(ii) Arabic and Persian press	349
J. Affairs and foreign relations of 'Omān and states of the Arab coast, 1899-1905	350
(i) 'Omān—	
(a) British ultimatum to Sultān and settlement of the French naval base question	350
(b) Crisis between Britain and France in regard to the French flag question terminated by reference to the Hague Tribunal	350
(c) Undertaking given by Sultān to Britain in 1902 regarding coal fields in 'Omān	351
(d) Russian agents at Masqat and British attitude as regards appointment of a Russian Consul	351
(ii) Trucial 'Omān	352
(a) Instances in which virtual suzerainty of Britain over Trucial 'Omān was brought to notice of France and Persia	352
(iii) Qatar—	
(a) Turkish intrigues and appointment of Turkish officials	353
(b) Turkey undertakes to maintain the <i>status quo</i> 1903	354
(c) Overtures in 1900 by Shaikh of Qatar for agreement with Britain refused	354
(iv) Bahrain—	
(a) Maladministration of the Bahrain customs	354
(b) Disorders in Bahrain and attacks on German and Persian subjects, 1904	354
(c) British ultimatum to Shaikh in 1905 and deportation of 'Ali	355
(d) British Assistant Political Agent appointed in 1900 and replaced by a Political Agent in 1904	355
(e) Turkey and Bahrain	355
(f) Persia and Bahrain	355
(g) Position of German subjects in Bahrain. No claim to extra-territorial rights	356
(h) France enquires if Bahrain may be considered as included in the French Vice-Consular district of Büshehr	356
(i) Russian visitors to Bahrain	356
(v) Central Arabia	357
(a) War between Ibn Rashīd, the Northern or Shammar Amīr and Ibn Sa'ūd, the Southern or Wahhābi Amīr	357

(b) The Wahbābi Amīr and the Trucial Shaikhs	358
(c) Overtures in 1904 by Ibn Sa'ūd for British protection declined	358
(vi) Kuwait—	
(i) Exclusive agreement with Britain, 1899	359
(ii) Mutual Turco-British agreement in 1901 to respect the <i>status quo</i>	360
(iii) Turkish attempts to seize Kuwait foiled by British action in 1902	360
(iv) Turkish encroachments on Kuwait territory	360
(v) British Political Agent appointed to Kuwait, 1904	360
(vi) Germany and Kuwait	361
(vii) Russia and Kuwait	361
K. Affairs and foreign relations of Turkish 'Irāq, 1899-1905	361
(i) Increased attention of European powers to Turkish 'Irāq. Russian Consulate raised in 1901 to a Consulate-General. New British Residency built in 1905	361
L. Affairs and foreign relations of 'Arabistān, of the Persian Coast and Islands, and of Persian Makrān, 1899-1905	362
(i) 'Arabistān —	
(a) The Shaikh and the Imperial Persian Customs	362
(b) British support of the Shaikh, satisfactory arrangement in regard to the Customs, and British assurances given	363
(c) Russian attitude towards the Shaikh	363
(d) British navigation on the Karun	364
(e) The Bakhtiyāri road opened, 1899	364
(f) The Khurramābād-Ahwāz road and attack on Colonel Douglas and Captain Lorimer by Lurs, 1904	364
(g) Agreement with Bakhtiyāri Khāns for exploitation of British Oil Concession, 1905	364
(h) Visits of British Ministers to 'Arabistān in 1899 and 1903. Muhammad Vice-Consulate raised to a Consulate and a Vice-Consulate established at Ahwāz, 1904	364
(ii) Persian Coast and Islands	365
(a) The Russian coal at Bandar 'Abbās <i>vide</i> heading D (ii) above and page 328	365
(b) Russian doings along the coast	365
(c) British claims amount to £30,000	366
(d) British re-occupation of Hanjām, 1904	366
(e) Miscellaneous foreign and British Consular appointments	366
(iii) Persian Makrān	367
(a) British Vice-Consulate established for a short period at Bam	367
M. British response to foreign activity, 1899-1905	367
(i) Diplomatic and Parliamentary measures—	
(a) Reminder to Persian Government reference priority of British railway rights	367
(b) Reminder that assurance reference non-alienation of the Southern Customs still held good	368
(c) Anglo-Persian Trade Declaration of 1903	369
(d) Lord Lansdowne's statement of 5th May 1903 in regard to British policy in the Persian Gulf and warning to European powers	369

**CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

PERIOD XVII.
1899—1905.

	Page.
(ii) Other measures	370
(a) Thorough examination and survey of the Gulf with regard to the question of a naval base	370
(b) Limits of Bā'idū defined, and British attitude in regard to immigration there	372
(c) Re-occupation of Hanjām, 1904	373
(d) Erection of flagstuffs on the Ruus-al-Jibal promontory and question of latter's ownership	374
(e) British lighthouse scheme, 1904	375
(iii) British naval demonstrations	375
(a) Lord Curzon's tour, 1903	376
N. British naval arrangements, 1899-1905	377
(i) Suggestion to use "Lawrence" for combatant purposes, 1902	377
(ii) Number of naval ships subsidised by the Indian Government reduced from four to three, all the latter for use in the Persian Gulf, 1903	378
(iii) Admiralty proposals for handing over all duties in Indian waters to Royal Indian Marine, 1905	379
(iv) Salutes	379
(v) British military and marine establishments	380
O. British official undertakings of a general or commercial character, 1899-1905	381
(i) Marine surveys	381
(a) Būshehr harbour and creek, 1904	381
(b) Kuwait harbour and Bandar Shuwaikh, 1904	382
(c) Bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab	382
(d) Bahrain	383
(ii) Compilation of the Persian Gulf Gazetteer commenced 1904 by Mr. J. G. Lorimer, I.C.S.	383
(a) Journeys and explorations in connection therewith	383
(iii) Geological reconnaissance of the Persian Gulf, 1904-1905, by Mr. G. Pilgrim	384
(iv) Antiquarian research at Bahrain and Ganāveh	384
(v) British steam communications and postal services in the Gulf and on the Tigris	385
(vi) British telegraphs	385
(a) Masqat cable laid, 1901	385
(b) Bandar 'Abbās connection, 1904-1905	386
(c) Central Persian telegraph line, 1902	386
(vii) British Commercial Missions	386
(a) Mr. Maclean's mission, 1903-1904	386
(b) Mr. Newcomen's mission, 1904-1905	387
P. Miscellaneous British proceedings, 1899-1905	389
(i) Maritime security—	
(a) Peace of the seas undisturbed except in waters adjoining or in the proximity of Turkish jurisdiction	389
(b) Piracies off Qatar, Hasa and in the Shatt-al-'Arab	389
(ii) The "arms trade"	390
(a) Its rapid and alarming increase especially at Masqat	390

Page. **CHAPTER I.
PERSIAN GULF.**

PERIOD XVII.
1899—1905.

(b) Discussion in 1905 as to whether naval agency should not be used to combat exportation from Masqat	391
(iii) The slave trade	391
(a) Great blow struck at the trade by Portuguese authorities in East Africa, 1902	391
(iv) British sanitary organisation	391
(a) In Persia, Customs interference with work of British sanitary agents	391
(b) In 'Omān. Sultān hands over charge of his sanitary administration to the British Agency Surgeon	392
(c) In Bahrain. Shaikh continued to resist the introduction of proper sanitary measures	392
(d) British dispensary opened in Kuwait in 1904 and maintenance of Victoria Memorial Hospital at Bahrain undertaken by British Government in 1901	392
Q. British official matters, 1899-1905	392
(i) Death of Her Majesty the Queen Victoria, 22 January 1901	392
(ii) Division of expenditure in Persia between Home and Indian Governments	392
(iii) Sir Mortimer Durand, I.C.S., relinquishes charge in 1904 of the Tehrān Legation after six years in office	392
(iv) From 1899 to 1901 functions of Military Attaché and oriental Secretary combined in a British officer of the Indian Army	392
R. Conclusion	393
ANNEXURE No. 1. Indian Army and Royal Indian Marine establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1905	395
(i) Armament of the "Lawrence" and the "Comet"	395

CHAPTER II.

THE 'OMĀN SULTANĀTE.

**CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.**

PERIOD I.

1566-1624.

PERIOD I.
1566—1624.

Page.

RULE OF THE NABĀHINAH, 1566-1624	397
A. Internal history of 'Omān, 1600-1624	397

(Continued in Period II, heading A.)

(i) Capital of 'Omān at this time is Bahlah	398
(ii) Rivalry between the Nabāhinah and a coalition of the Bani Hina tribe, the ruler of Samāil and the chief of Rustāq	398
(iii) At close of period the Nabāhinah overthrown by the Ya'āribah, connections of the chief of Rustāq	399

CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.

B. The Portuguese and Persia in 'Omān, 1600-1624 . . .	Page. 399
--	--------------

PERIOD I.
1566—1624.

(Continued in Period II, heading B.)

(i) Masqat still held by the Portuguese who had appeared there in 1507	399
(ii) Capture by the Portuguese of Sohār 1616 and of Khor Fakkān in 1624	399

PERIOD II.
1625—1744.

PERIOD II.

1625-1744.

RULE OF THE YA'ARIBAH, 1625-1744	400
--	-----

A. Internal history of 'Omān, from the rise of the Ya'aribah to the expulsion of the Portuguese, 1625-1650 . . .	400
--	-----

(Continued in heading C below.)

(i) Capital of 'Omān is Rustāq	400
--	-----

B. The Portuguese, Persia and England in 'Omān, 1625-1650 . . .	400
---	-----

(Continued in heading D below.)

(i) Gradual loss by Portuguese of their possessions in 'Omān and final capture of Masqat by the Arabs in 1650	402
---	-----

C. Internal history of 'Omān from the expulsion of the Portuguese to the Persian invasion, 1657-1736 . . .	402
--	-----

(Continued in heading E below.)

(i) Development of 'Omān as a naval power, 1695-1715	403
--	-----

(ii) Rise of the Hināwi and Ghāfiri factions, 1723-1728	403
---	-----

D. The Portuguese, England and Persia in 'Omān, 1650-1736	404
---	-----

(Continued in Period III, headings C, D, E, and F.)

(i) Series of naval engagements between the Portuguese and 'Omān and capture by the latter of Mombāsah	404
--	-----

(ii) Scheme for establishment of an English station at Masqat, 1659, but Imām's consent not obtainable	404
--	-----

(iii) The Masqat pirates respect vessels of the East India Company up to 1704-1705	405
--	-----

(iv) Relations of Persia and 'Omān hostile owing to piracies of the latter. Capture by 'Omānis of the islands near Bandar 'Abbās about 720	405
--	-----

E. Persian invasion and occupation of 'Omān, 1737-1744 . . .	406
--	-----

(Continued in Period III, heading A.)

(i) The Imām Saif-bin-Sultān II after defeat of his Baluch mercenaries invites the assistance of Nādir Shāh against a tribal rival	406
--	-----

(ii) Arrival of the Persian expedition, 1737, capture of Masqat, and siege of Sohār then held by Ahmad-bin-Sa'id, Āl Bū Sa'id . . .	406
---	-----

(iii) Death of the Imām and expulsion of the Persians in 1744 by Ahmad-bin-Sa'id, who is elected Imām and thus became the founder of the Āl Bū Sa'idi dynasty which still governs 'Omān	407
---	-----

PERIOD III.

1744-1783.

CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.PERIOD III.
1744-1783.

REIGN OF THE IMĀM AHMAD-BIN-SA'ID, 1744-1783 . 407

Page.

- A. Troubles due to the hostility (i) of the displaced Ya'arabi,
(ii) of the Ghāfiri, (iii) of two of the Imām's own
sons 407

(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)

- (i) Loss of Mombālah to the Mazāri tribe 410

- B. Relations with North-Western 'Omān (i.e., the Musan-
dam peninsula), 1744-1783 410

(Continued in Period V, heading B.)

- (i) Hostilities with the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khainah 410

- C. Relations with Persia, 1744-1783 410

(Continued in Period V, heading B.)

- (i) Hostilities with the Khān of Lār, with the Shaikh of Hurmūz
with the Ka'ab of Muhammarch, and Mīr Mahanna of Rīg,
1753-1767 411

- (ii) Hostilities with Karīm Khān of Shīrāz and claim by latter of the
tribute at one time paid by 'Omān to Nādir Shāh 411

- D. Relations with Turkey, 1744-1783 413

(Continued in Period V, heading B.)

- (iii) Naval assistance given to Turkey by 'Omān during attack by
Karīm Khān on Basrah, 1775-1776 413

- E. Relations with India, 1744-1783 414

(Continued in Period V, heading F (iv).)

- (i) Envoy of the Mughul Emperor visits Rustāq and concludes a
treaty with 'Omān, 1776-1800 414

- (ii) Envoy is afterwards known as "Tipu Sultan's Wakil" and his
residence as the "Nawab's House" 414

- F. Relations with European powers, 1744-1783 414

(Continued in Period IV, heading C.)

- (i) Relations with Britain 414

- (a) Relations friendly but Britain as far as possible always
neutral in the wars between 'Omān and Persia 414

- (ii) Relations with France 416

- (a) Relations (through French agents at Baghdād and the
Mauritius) friendly up to 1781 when breach occurred
owing to seizure of "Sālīh" 416

- G. General administration of 'Omān, 1744-1783 416

(Continued in Period V, heading H.)

CHAPTER II.
OMAN.PERIOD III.
1744—1783.

(i) Internal administration and Revenue	416
(a) Complete religious freedom	416
(b) Import duties	416
(ii) Military and naval resources	416
(iii) Trade of Masqat	417

PERIOD IV.
1783—1792.

PERIOD IV.

1783-1792.

REIGNS OF IMĀM SAĪD-BIN-AHMAD, 1783, AND OF
SAIYID HAMAD-BIN-SA'ID, 1784-1792 417

- A. Sa'id-bin-Ahmad was the last genuine elected Imām of 'Omān and the last ruler to reside at Rustāq. He abdicated in 1783 in favour of his son Hamad 417

(Continued in heading B below.)

- B. Internal events in 'Omān, 1784-1792 418

(Continued in Period V, heading A.)

- (i) Grant of Gwādar in 1784 by Khān of Kalāt to Saiyid Hamad's rebellious uncle Sultān. This is the origin of the title of 'Omān to Gwādar 419
- (ii) Removal of capital from Rustāq to Masqat about 1784 418
- (iii) Succession henceforth confined to one family 419

- C. Regulations with European powers, 1784-1792 420

(Continued in Period V, headings E and F.)

- (i) Relation with British 420
- (a) Unsuccessful efforts of British to obtain permission to establish a factory at Masqat 420
- (ii) Relations with French 420
- (b) Visit of French ships to Masqat in 1785 and permission to open a factory likewise refused 420

PERIOD V.
1792—1804.

PERIOD V.

1792-1804.

REIGN OF SAIYID SULTĀN-BIN-AHMAD, 1792-1804 420

- A. Saiyid Sultān, uncle of Saiyid Hamad, usurps the throne, 1792 420

(Continued in heading B below.)

- B. Relations with Persia, Turkey, and the Qawāsīm, 1793-1800 421

(Continued in Period VI, heading C.)

- (i) Saiyid Sultān occupies Gwādar and from there seizes Chahbār,

- (ii) Overthrows the Bani Ma'in of Qishm and Hormūz and obtains in 1794 the revenue lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies (*i.e.*, Mīnāb, Qishm, Hormūz and Hanjām) 421
- (iii) Rupture between 'Omān and Persia in 1797 and between 'Omān Turkey in 1798 but no hostilities actually take place 422
- (iv) Hostilities with the Qawāsīm of Rās-al-Khaimah 422

C. Relations with Bahrain, 1799-1802 422

(Continued in Period VI, heading C.)

- (i) Attack on Bahrain and occupation by 'Omān of Khārag, 1799-1800 423
- (ii) First and second occupations of Bahrain by 'Omān, 1800-1802 423

D. First Wahhābī invasion of 'Omān, 1800-1803 423

(Continued in Period VI, heading A and Period VII, heading B.)

- (i) Establishment in 1800 by the Wahhābīs of a fortified settlement at Baraimi 424
- (ii) Naval and land campaign in 1803 against 'Omān by the Wahhābīs assisted by their subjects, the Qawāsīm of Rās-al-Khaimah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Kuwait. 'Omān compelled to agree to pay a tribute of \$12,000 per annum 425
- (iii) Withdrawal of the Wahhābī to Baraimi on assassination of Abdul 'Aziz, 1803 425

E. Relations with Britain, 1792-1804 425

(Continued in Period VI, heading B.)

- (i) War between French and British, 1792-1804 425
- (ii) Mission of Mehdi 'Alī Khān and "First Agreement" with Britain, 12th October 1798, excluding the French and Dutch from Masqat during the war and giving British right to erect a fort at Bandar 'Abbās 426
- (iii) Mission of Captain Malcom and "Second Agreement" with Britain, 17th January 1800, signed off Hanjām 429
 - (a) Provides for admission of a British Political Agent at Masqat 429
- (iv) Saiyid Sultān declines to accept French representative sent by Napoleon, 1803 430
- (v) Difficulties with Saiyid Sultān in regard to piracies, 1803-1804 431

F. Relations with France, 1792-1804 432

(Continued in Period VII, heading M.)

- (i) French authorities in 1790 replace the Sālih unjustly seized by them in 1781, *vide* page 416 432
- (ii) Continued employment of Frenchmen by Saiyid Sultān 432
- (iii) Communication with Mauritius 433
- (iv) Dealings of Saiyid Sultān with Tipu Sāhib of Mysore, 1792-1800 433
 - (a) Tipu Sāhib's representatives quit Masqat soon after installation in 1800 of our first Political Agent Dr. Bogle 433

G. Last cruise and death of Saiyid Sultān, 1804 434

(Continued in Period VI, heading A.)

- (i) Saiyid Sultān killed in 1804 at sea by Qāsimī war vessels of Rās-al-Khaimah 434

**CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.**

H. General administration of 'Omān	Page, 434
--	--------------

**PERIOD V.
1792—1804.**

(Continued in Period VII, heading O.)

(i) Internal administration and revenue	434
(a) Large income by sale of salt to India	434
(ii) Military and naval resources	435
(iii) Trade of 'Omān	435
(a) Great increase of foreign trade	436
(b) Saiyid Sultān's claim to protect navigation in the Gulf and his desire to make preliminary visit to Ma-qat obligatory on all vessels proceeding up the Gulf. The hostilities against Bahrain (<i>vide</i> heading C above), and difficulties with the British [<i>vide</i> heading E (v), above] due to this latter cause <i>vide</i>	436

**PERIOD VI.
1804—1807.**

PERIOD VI.

1804-1807.

REIGN OF SAIYID BADAR-BIN-SAIIF, 1804-1807	437
--	-----

A. Disorders on death of Saiyid Sultān resulting in the accession to power of his nephew Badar-bin-Saif, supported by the Wahnābis	437
--	-----

(Continued in heading D below.)

B. Policy of Government of India, 1905	438
--	-----

(Continued in Period VII, heading L.)

(i) To establish friendly relations with the <i>de facto</i> ruler	438
--	-----

C. Relations of 'Omān with Persia and the Qawāsīm, 1805	438
---	-----

(Continued in Period VII, heading D.)

(i) Recovery of Bandar 'Abbās with co-operation of the British from the Bani Ma'in, by whom it had been appropriated on the death of Saiyid Sultān	438
(ii) Joint Anglo-'Omāni operations against the Qawāsīm, 1805, <i>vide</i> Chapter I, Period VII, heading B (v)	439

D. Internal events in 'Omān	439
---------------------------------------	-----

(Continued in Period VII, heading A.)

(i) Assassination of Badr-bin-Saif by Sa'id-bin-Sultān and accession of latter to power, 1807	440
---	-----

**PERIOD VII.
1807—1856.**

PERIOD VII.

1807-1856.

REIGN OF SAIYID SA'ID-BIN-SULTAN, 1807-1856	440
---	-----

A. Sālim, elder brother of Sa'id, associated with latter in Government until former's death in 1821	441
---	-----

(Continued in heading F below.)

		Page.	CHAPTER II. 'OMAN.
B. Hostilities with the Wahhābis and their allies the Qawasim,			
1807-1820		441	
(Continued in heading I below.)			PERIOD VII. 1807—1856.
(i) Repulse of Saiyid Sa'id from Khor Fakhān, 1808		441	
(ii) Anglo-'Omāni expedition against Shinās, 1809-1810 . . .		442	
(iii) Wahhābis expedition under Mutlaq the Mutairi against 'Omān 1811		443	
(iv) Joint Perso-'Omāni expedition against the Wahhābis, 1812 . .		444	
(v) Fearful Wahhābi invasion, 1812 or 1813		444	
(vi) Saiyid Sa'id's "First Expedition" against Ras-al-Khaimah, 1813		445	
(vii) Saiyid Sa'id's "Second Expedition" against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1814-1818		446	
(viii) Reduction of Rās-al-Khaimah in 1819, by a British expedition .		446	
C. Relations with Bahrain, 1812-1828		447	
(Continued in heading K below.)			
(i) Three expeditions against Bahrain in 1811, 1816, and 1828 . .		447	
D. Relations with Persia, 1807-1829		448	
(Continued in heading J below.)			
(i) First attempt by Persia to annul the Bandar 'Abbās lease, 1823 .		449	
(ii) Hostilities of 'Omān with Shaikh of Būshehr, 1826		449	
E. Relations with Turkey, 1807-1829		449	
(Continued in Period XI, heading J.)			
(i) Blockade of Bushrah by 'Omān fleet and payment by Turks of the compensation claimed for assistance given in 1775		450	
F. Internal events in 'Omān, 1814-1829		450	
(Continued in heading H below.)			
(i) Sohār, Nakhil, and Dhuhār annexed to 'Omān		450	
G. Pre-occupation of Saiyid Sa'id with East African affairs, 1829-1856		450	
(Continued in Period VII, heading A.)			
(i) Visits in 1829-1830, 1832, 1833-35, 1836-39, 1840-51, and 1852-54, to Zanzibar and operations against Mombāsa ^h		451	
H. Internal affairs of 'Omān, 1829-1856		452	
(Continued in Period VIII, heading A.)			
(i) First rebellion and loss of Sohār, Khābūrah and Majīs, 1830 . .		453	
(ii) Second rebellion and loss of Dibah, Khor Fakhān and Ghāllah on the Shamailiyah coast to Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, 1832 . . .		453	
(iii) Third rebellion and loss of Rustāq, 1834		454	
(iv) Recovery in 1858 of Sohār and Khābūrah		456	

**CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.**

**PERIOD VII.
1807—1856.**

	Page.
I. Aggressions of the Wahhābis and Egyptians, 1829-1856	456
<i>(Continued in Period VIII, heading D.)</i>	
(i) Revival of Wahhābi influence	456
(ii) 'Omān agrees to pay a tribute of \$5,000 a year to the Wahhābis, 1833	456
(iii) Omān threatened by Egypt, 1839-1840	456
(a) British attitude	457
(iv) Wahhābi aggression renewed, 1845	457
(v) Tribute increased from \$5,000 to \$12,000, 1853	458
J. Relations with Persia, 1829-1856	459
<i>(Continued in Period VIII, heading F.)</i>	
(i) Second attempt by Persia to resume the Bandar 'Abbās fief, 1846-48	459
(ii) Renewal of the Bandar 'Abbās lease to Omān and unfavourable terms	461
(a) Edict of 1855	460
(b) Treaty of 7th November 1856, general effect of which was to transfer the 'Omān position at Bandar 'Abbās from a basis of right to one of sufferance	460
(c) New arrangement in favour of Sa'id and his sons only	460
K. Relations with other native powers in the Gulf, 1829-1856	461
(i) Renewed designs of Saiyid Sa'id on Bahrain, 1839-1843	461
L. Relations with Britain, 1807-1856	462
<i>(Continued in Period VIII, headings B and F.)</i>	
(i) Early preference of Saiyid Sa'id for a French alliance	462
(a) Treaties concluded with France in 1807 and 1808 and French representation admitted to Masqat
(b) Decline of French influence on capture in 1910 by the British of Mauritius and Reunion	462
(ii) British policy as regards assistance to be given to ruler of 'Omān in internal troubles and British view of obligations involved by the treaties of 1798 and 1800. (See also page 466)	467
(a) British attitude during Wahhābi invasions and in operations against the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah	463
(iii) British expeditions against the Bani Bū 'Alī of the Ja'alān district near Sūr, 1820 and 1821	463
(iv) British assistance rendered to Saiyid Sa'id on various occasions, 1720-1856	466
(v) Treaty of Commerce, 1839	467
(b) Slave trade treaties, 1812 and 1845	467
(c) Customs Agreement, 1846	467
(d) Gift to Britain of the Kuria Muria Islands, 1854	467
(vi) British representation	467
(a) British officers up to 1809	467
(b) Under supervision of Bushehr Residency and no British Officer till 1840	467

	Page.	CHAPTER II. 'OMAN
(c) British officer appointed 1840, but soon after transferred to Zanzibar	467	
M. Relations with France, 1809-1856	468	PERIOD VII. 1807—1856.
<i>(Continued in Period XI, heading L.)</i>		
(i) See heading L (i) above for relations during 1807 and 1808	
(ii) French representative withdrawn between 1810 and 1815	468	
(iii) Treaty of Commerce with French 1844	468	
N. Relations with America, 1807-1856	468	
<i>(Continued in Period XI, heading L.)</i>		
(i) Treaty of Commerce with the "United States of America" 1833	468	
O. General administration of 'Omān, 1807-1856	469	
(i) Administration, customs, and naval resources	469	
PERIOD VIII.		PERIOD VIII. 1856—1866.
1856-1866.		
REIGN OF SAIYID THUWAINI-BIN-SA'ID, 1856-1866	469	
A. Separation of Zanzibar from 'Omān, 1856-1861	469	
<i>(Continued in heading C below and also in Period IX, heading E.)</i>		
(i) Division of Saiyid Sa'id's dominions	469	
(a) Thuwaini to get 'Omān	469	
(b) Mājid to get Zanzibar	470	
(c) Turki to hold separate possession of Sohār	470	
(ii) Projected expedition by Thuwaini against Mājid, and attack by Turki on Masqat prevented by British interposition in 1858	470	
(iii) Lord Canning's award of 1861 permanently separating 'Omān from Zanzibar but not recognising the independence of Sohār	471	
(iv) British Government adopt title of Sultān for rulers of 'Omān and Zanzibar	471	
B. Re-establishment of the British Residency at Masqat, 1861	472	
<i>(Continued in heading F below.)</i>		
C. Internal affair of 'Omān, 1861-64	472	
<i>(Continued in heading E below.)</i>		
(i) Rebellious attitude of Turki. His treacherous seizure in 1861 and release in 1862	472	
D. Renewed Wāhhābi aggressions and British intervention, 1864-66	473	
<i>(Continued in Period X, heading B.)</i>		

**CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.**

Page.

PERIOD VIII.
1856—1866.

(i)	Wahhābi raid on Sūr, 1865, and damage inflicted on Hindu traders	474
(ii)	Direct action by British Government against the Wahhābis at Qatif and Dammān and against the Jannabūh of Sūr, 1865-1866	475
(iii)	Settlement in 1866 between the British and the Wahhābis	475
E. Assassination in 1866 of Thuwaini by his son Sālīm		476
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading A.)</i>		
F. Foreign relations of 'Omān, 1856-66		476

(Continued in Period IX, headings B and D.)

(i)	Relations with Britain	476
	(a) Telegraph treaties, 1864 and 1865	476
	(b) British Assistant Political Agent posted to Gwādar in 1863	476
(ii)	The Anglo-French declaration of 1862 to respect the independence of Masqat and Zanzibar. The Indian Government not aware of its existence until 1871	477
(iii)	Relations with Persia	477
	(a) Persian claims in 1864 to Gwādar and Chabbār

PERIOD IX.
1866—1868.

PERIOD IX.
1866-1868.

REIGN OF SAIYID SĀLIM-BIN-'THUWAINI, 1866-1868	477
A. General insecurity on accession of Sālīm, 1866	477

(Continued in heading C below.)

(i)	Removal from Masqat of all British subjects	477
B. Relation with Britain, 1866-1868		478

(Continued in Period X, heading D.)

(i)	Overtures from Sālīm for recognition, April 1866	478
(ii)	British subjects permitted to return	478
(iii)	Recognition accorded, September 1866	478
(iv)	Consular powers of British representative defined by Order in Council, 1867	478
C. Rebellions of Saiyid Turki and Hamad-bin-Sālīm, 1837-1869		478

(Continued in heading F below.)

(i)	Rebellion of Turki, intervention of the British, and his deportation to Bombay with an allowance of \$7,200, 1867	479
(ii)	Rebellion of Hamad-bin-Sālīm, 1867	479
D. Relations of Persia		480

(Continued in Period XI, heading I.)

(i)	Termination automatically in 1866 of the 1856 lease of Bandar 'Abbās	480
(ii)	British intervention and renewal of the lease on 4th August 1868	480

	Page.	CHAPTER II. 'OMAN.
E. The Zanzibar subsidy, 1866-1868	481	
<i>(Continued in Period X, heading E.)</i>		
(i) Attempt by Sultān of Zanzibar to cease payment of the subsidy	481	PERIOD IX. 1866—1868.
F. Expulsion in 1868 of Salīm by 'Azzān-bin-Qais, great- great grandson of the Imām Ahmad	481	
<i>(Continued in Period X, heading A.)</i>		

PERIOD X.	PERIOD X.
1868-1871.	1868—1871.

REIGN OF SAIYID 'AZZĀN-BIN-QAIS, 1868-1871 482

A. Internal events, 1868-1869 482

(Continued in heading C below.)

 (i) 'Azzān's chief supporter Sa'id-bin-Khalfān Khalīlī 482

B. Relations with the Wahhābis, 1869-1870 484

 (i) Capture by 'Azzān in 1869 of Barāini, alliance with Shaikh of Abu
 Dhabi, and inability of the Wahhābis to retaliate 485

C. Internal events, 1870-1871 485

(Continued in Period XI, heading A.)

 (i) Successful invasion of 'Omān by Turki and defeat and death of
 'Azzān, 1871 485

D. Relations with British 487

(Continued in Period XI, heading B.)

 (i) Interpretation of British policy in regard to maritime warfare.
 Naval movements within territorial waters of 'Omān not prohi-
 bited 488

 (ii) The Political Agent, Masqat, placed in strict subordination to the
 Resident at Būshehr, 1869 488

 (iii) Sultānate of 'Azzān never officially recognised by Britain 490

E. The Zanzibar subsidy, 1868-1871 490

(Continued in Period XI, heading B (ii).)

 (i) Subsidy discontinued during reign of 'Azzān 490

 (ii) Question of its continuance. Correspondence on subject with Home
 Government who desired its discontinuance in exchange for a
 Slave Treaty with Sultān of Zanzibar 490

F. Character and administration of 'Azzān 491

PERIOD XI.	PERIOD XI.
1871-1888.	1871—1888.

REIGN OF SAIYID-TURKI-BIN-SA'ID, 1871-1888 492

A. Events in 'Omān up to Turki's temporary retirement, 1871-
 1875 492

(Continued in heading C below.)

CHAPTER II
'OMAN

PERIOD XI.
1871—1888.

	Page.
(i) Position at commencements of Turki's reign, and rival factions	492
(a) Ibrāhim-bin-Qais (brother of 'Azzān) at Sobār	492
(b) Faisal-bin-Hamūd (cousin of 'Azzān) at Rastāq	493
(c) Baraimi in the hands of the Wāhhābis	493
(d) Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, the ex-Sultān living at Qishm	493
(e) 'Abdul 'Aziz, Turki's brother, in occupation of Gwādar in 1871	493
(ii) Chahbār passes finally into the hands of the Persians	494
(iii) Recapture of Gwādar in 1872 and deportation to India of 'Abdul 'Aziz	494
(iv) Reconciliation with 'Abdul 'Aziz, 1874	496
(v) Hināwi-Ghāfiri disturbances, 1874-1875	496
(vi) Retirement of Turki to Gwādar in 1875, 'Abdul 'Aziz being left in charge	497
(vii) Cause of Turki's initial want of success	498
 B. Relations with British, 1871-1875	 499
<i>(Continued in heading E below.)</i>	
(i) Anti-Slave Trade Treaty of 1873	499
(ii) Regrant of the "Zanzibar" subsidy on condition of fulfilment of treaty engagements with Britain, expenditure being divided equally between Home and Indian Governments	499
(iii) British support at first given to Turki but is confined to action at sea; later support is confined to good officers only	500
(iv) British policy as regards recovery of British claims	502
 C. Regency of 'Abdul 'Aziz, 1875	 502
<i>(Continued in heading D below.)</i>	
(i) Sudden return of Turki in 1875	503
 D. Events in 'Omān from the return of Turki to the attack by Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Aziz on Masqat, 1876-1883	 504
<i>(Continued in heading F below.)</i>	
(i) Disturbances caused by Sālih bin 'Ali, Ibrāhim-bin-Qais, and 'Abdul 'Aziz and attacks on Masqat	504
(a) Third attack was by way of the Wādi-al-Kabir and not via Matrah as usual	509
 E. Relations with British, 1875-1883	 512
<i>(Continued in heading G below.)</i>	
(i) History of the "Zanzibar" subsidy	512
(a) The subsidy became an entirely Indian charge from 1st September 1883, the date on which Britain assumed exclusive charge of Zanzibar affairs	512
(b) Subsidy was fixed in 1773 at Rs. 86,400	512
(ii) British policy one of modified support of the Sultān	513
(a) Political Agent informed in 1881 that on Turki's death Government of India would not interfere in event of succession being disputed unless to prevent reunion of 'Omān and Zanzibar	513
(iii) The protection of British subjects and recovery of British claims	513
(iv) Question of the levy of illegal harbour dues at Khor-al-Hajar and Khor-al-Jarāmah, 1877-1880	515

	Page.	CHAPTER II. 'OMAN.
F. Events in 'Omān to the death of Turki, 1883-1888 <i>(Continued in Period XII, heading A.)</i>	516	
G. Relations with British, 1883-1888 <i>(Continued in heading K below.)</i>	518	PERIOD XI. 1871—1888.
(i) Public undertaking given by British in 1886 to uphold Turki in repelling unprovoked aggression during his life-time, but that their active support would not necessarily be continued to his children	519	
(ii) Protection of British subjects	519	
H. Relations with Zanzibar, 1871-1888	520	
(i) Excellent relations between Turki and his brother Barghash, the Sultān of Zanzibar. Gift by latter to Turki of the SS. "Sultani" and the SS. "Dār-as-Salām"	520	
I. Relations with Persia, 1871-1888	521	
(i) Non-renewal of Bandar 'Abbās lease notwithstanding British inter- vention, 1871	521	
J. Relations with Turkey, 1871-1888	521	
(a) Turkish intrigues in Dhufār, 1875-1886	522	
K. Relations with British, 1871-1888 <i>(Continued in Period XII, heading B.)</i>	522	
(i) Investment of Sultān with G. C. S. I. 1866 and presentation to him of two batteries in 1887	522	
(ii) Recognition by Sultān of the amenability to British jurisdiction of subjects of Native Indian States, 1873	522	
(iii) Abolition in 1872 of transhipment duty on cargo not landed	523	
(iv) The levy of manifest fees, etc., and the question of monopolies in connection with the Commercial Treaty of 1839	523	
(v) Octroi tax on produce entering Masqat and Matrah from landward not regarded as unfair to British subjects	524	
(vi) British attitude as regards the imposition of "export" taxes. Treaty of 1839 in any case regarded as having reference only to exports for abroad	524	
(vii) Compulsory weighing of Matrah dates at Masqat	524	
(viii) Limits of the Aden Residency and the Masqat Agency fixed in 1880 at Rās Sājar	524	
(ix) Military guard provided for the Masqat Agency in 1880	524	
(x) Tours in the interior by Colonel Miles, the Political Agent	524	
L. Relations with non-Asiatic powers other than Britain, 1871-1888	525	
(i) Relations with Holland	525	
(a) "Most favoured nation" agreement with the Netherlands, 1877, negotiated through the British Resident	525	
(ii) Relations with America	525	
(a) American Consul (a British merchant) appointed to Masqat, 1880	525	
(iii) Relations with France	"	
(a) The American Consul recognised as French Consular Agent, 1881	525	

**CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.**

PERIOD XII.

FROM 1888.

PERIOD XII.
FROM 1888.

	Page.
REIGN OF FAISAL-BIN-TURKI, FROM 1888 . . .	525

A. Events in 'Omān up to the rebellion of 1895 . . .	525
--	-----

(Continued in heading C below.)

(i) Faisal, second son of Turki succeeds. Turki's desire to separate Gwādar from 'Omān and leave it to his eldest son Muhammad not countenanced by British . . .	525
(ii) Rebellions of 'Abdul 'Azīz and Hamūd the Jahāfi, 1889-1890 . . .	527
(iii) Hināwi-Ghāfiri dissensions . . .	528
(iv) Tribal disturbances in various districts mostly settled by Sālih-bin-'Ali or Ibrāhim-bin-Qais . . .	529
(v) Alienation of Sālih-bin-'Ali's support in 1894 and Faisal's failure to maintain his steam-vends . . .	532

B. Relations with Britain, 1888-1894 . . .	532
--	-----

(Continued in heading F below.)

(i) Zanzibar subsidy continued to Faisal on accession . . .	533
(ii) Faisal recognised by British Government, 1890, but no guarantee of support given . . .	533
(iii) British Commercial Treaty of 19th March 1891, replacing that of 1839 . . .	533
(a) Duration was for 12 years . . .	534
(b) It prohibited export taxes without consent of British . . .	534
(c) Sultān debarred from prohibiting the import and export of any particular article . . .	534
(iv) Agreement of 20th March 1891, by which Sultān barred himself and his successors never to cede any portion of his dominions save to the British Government . . .	534
(v) Attitude of Sultān in regard to British claims . . .	535
(vi) British Agency rebuilt, 1890 . . .	536

C. The rebellion of 1895 . . .	536
--------------------------------	-----

(Continued in heading D below.)

(i) Treacherous seizure of Masqat on 13th February 1895 by 'Abdullah-bin-Sālih, Muhsin-bin-'Amr (both of the Hirth tribe) and Hamūd the Jahāfi . . .	537
(ii) Retirements of the rebels, 9th March 1895 . . .	542
(iii) Arrival of the French Cruiser "Touche", 13th March 1895 . . .	542
(iv) The rebel tribes implicated . . .	543

D. Events in 'Omān from the rebellion up to the rupture with Great Britain, 1895-1898 . . .	543
---	-----

(Continued in heading J below.)

(i) Deaths of Sālih-bin-'Ali, Ibrāhim-bin-Qais and Hamūd-bin-Sa'id . . .	544
(ii) Muhammad-bin-'Azzān dismissed and succeeded as Wazīr by Mohammad-bin-Sa'id, 1896 . . .	546

	Page.
(iii) Other public servants of the Sultān	546
(α) Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz of Samāil	546
(β) Sulaimāh-bin-Suwaitim	546
(iv) Limits of the Sultān's authority, 1895-1898	546

E. Relations with French, 1891-1898 546

(Continued in heading H below.)

(i) Compact between France and Russia, 1891, and undertaking by French Minister of Foreign Affairs to create a post of French Vice-Consul at Masqat, 1893	547
(ii) French Vice-Consul appointed, 1894	547
(iii) Encouragement given to 'Omāni navigator to use the French flags, there being in 1897 no less than 38 'Omāni vessels having a French status	547
(α) Sultān informed by Britain that use of French flag could have no effect as against himself	548

F. Relations with Britain and decline of British influence in 'Omān, 1895-1898 550

(Continued in heading G below.)

(i) Growing estrangement with Sultān due to —	
(α) Neutral behaviour of Britain during the rebellion.	
(β) Vexatious claims for compensation due to the rebellion	
(γ) Growing French influence	550
(ii) Safety of Masqat and Matrah guaranteed by the British Government, 1895	551
(iii) Suggestion made by Government of India in 1896 for declaration of a protectorate;	551
(iv) Loans to the Sultān and suggestion in 1897 that such should be made on security of the customs vetoed by Home Government on ground that direct control by the Government of India over the Masqat customs would be inconsistent with the Declaration of 1862	553
(v) British claims in connection with the rebellion	554
(vi) Grievances of British Indian traders	554
(α) Compulsory weighment of Matrah dates at Masqat	554
(β) Illegal dues and taxes	554

G. Rupture with Great Britain, 1899 555

(Continued in heading I below.)

(i) Question of the salute on the 1st January	555
(ii) Muhammad-bin-Sa'id replaced as Wazir by his predecessor Muhammad-bin-'Azzān, 1898	556
(iii) 'Abdul 'Aziz-Ruwāhi, Sultān's confidential secretary and French dragoman	556
(iv) Grant by the Sultān in 1898 to the French of a coaling station, 1898	556
(v) Ultimatum presented to the Sultān, 9th February 1899	558

**CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.**

**PERIOD XII.
FROM 1888.**

	Page.
(a) Dismissal from Sultān's service of 'Abdul 'Azīz	585
(b) 5% interest to be paid on balance of the rebellion indemnity of 1895	588
(c) Equality of taxation between British and 'Omān subjects	558
(d) All import duties and export duty on dates to be reduced to 5% in accordance with treaty	558
(e) Cancellation of the concession to the French	558
(vi) Sultān summoned on board the flagship	559
(vii) Submission of Sultān to British demands and public cancellation of the concession	559
H. French policy in 'Omān after 1899	560
(i) French coaling station question settled by sharing the British coal yards in Makallah cove, May 1900	561
(ii) Progress of the French flag question—	
(a) Intimation by Sultān to French Vice-Consul that he did not recognise right of the French to exercise jurisdiction over 'Omān subjects in 'Omān, 16th February 1899	562
(b) Sūis agree to renounce French protection and return all French flags in this possession, 12th June 1900	562
(c) Public edict and proclamation by Sultān in regard to use of foreign flags, 15th June and 6th August 1900	563
(d) French Government intimate that no more French papers of protection would be issued, 29th June 1900	563
(e) Peremptory claim by French to entire jurisdiction over French flag-holders, 23rd January 1902	564
(f) British protest against claim as being opposed to Declaration of 1862	564
(g) Withdrawal of French claim and statement that all she demanded was "rights of surveillance and police over vessels bearing the French flag," 1902	564
(h) Crisis due to the "Khadhra" case at Sūr and a quarantine incident at Masqat, 1903	565
(i) Decision to refer question to the Hague, 1903	566
(iii) Proceedings at the Hague	567
(a) Court assembled, 25th July 1905	567
(b) Decision of the tribunal, 8th August 1905	568
(c) Carrying out of the award, 1905-1906	569
I. Relations with Britain after 1899	570
(i) Substitution of Muhammad-bin-Sa'īd for Muhammad-bin-'Azzān in dealings with the British	570
(ii) Visit of Saiyid Taimūr to India for the 1903 Durbar accompanied by Saiyid Yūsuf Zawāwi and Ahmad-bin-Nāsir	570
(iii) Visit of Lord Curzon and conferment on Sultān of G.C.I.E.	571
(iv) Liquidation of British claims from the "Zanzibar" subsidy, 1900	571
(v) Loans to the Sultān	571
(vi) Question of British control of the Sultān's customs	573
(vii) Agency Surgeon placed in charge of the whole of the Sultān's sanitary administration and staff and appointed private physician, 1st October 1900	573

	Page.	CHAPTER II.
(viii) Telegraph service inaugurated, 1901	574	'OMAN.
(ix) Protection of British subjects and British claims	574	
(a) Wreck in 1904 of the "Baron Inverdale" and massacre of her crew on Masirah Island	574	PERIOD XII. FROM 1888.
(x) Question of duty on goods landed at Masqat for transhipment	575	
(xi) Question of the revision of the Commercial Treaty of 1891	576	
(xii) Question of the "Zakāt" or agricultural tax on dates	576	
(xiii) Restrictions on the liquor trade	576	
(xiv) Captain Cox's journeys to hinterland of Sūr in connection with reported coal mines and engagement with Sultān in regard to the same, 1901 and 1902	577	
(xv) Other journeys by Major Cox	577	
(xvi) Acquisition of land and erection of Government quarters, 1901	577	
(xvii) Harbour improvements, 1903-1904	578	

J. Events in 'Omān after 1899 578

(i) Affairs at Sūr	579
(ii) Affairs in the Rustāq valley	580
(iii) Miscellaneous disturbances and murder in 1907 of Sulaimān-bin- Suwailim	583
(iv) Customs in 1899 brought under direct management of the Sultān instead of being farmed	585
(v) Sultān's financial position, 1906:	585
(vi) The currency question	586
(a) Scheme prepared in 1904 for the universal and exclusive adoption of the Indian currency in 'Omān	586
(vi) Military and Naval resources	586
(a) Purchase in 1902 with British help of the "Nūr-al- Bahr"	586
(vii) Dynastic matters	587

ANNEXURE No. 1.—History of Dhufār 589 ANNEXURE 1.

(i) First annexation of Dhufār to 'Omān, 1829-1875	590	DHUFAR.
(ii) Usurpation of Saiyid Fadhl, Moplah, 1875-1879	591	
(a) Protest made by Britain to Turkey, 1876 and 1877	591	
(ii) Second annexation of Dhufār to 'Omān, 1879 to 1885	592	
(a) Dhufār transferred from the Aden Residency to the Masqat Agency and boundary fixed at Rās Sājar, 1879	592	
(b) Three rebellions against 'Omān and partial evacuation by the latter in 1885	594	
(iv) Efforts of Saiyid Fadhl to recover Dhufār, 1879-1887	595	
(a) Assistance rendered to him by the Turks and the Sharif of Makkah	595	
(v) Re-establishment of 'Omān authority in 1887	596	
(a) Intrigues of Saiyid Fadhl, 1887-1895	596	
(vi) Serious rebellion in 1895 and practical loss of Dhufār by 'Omān	597	
(a) Sultān's authority restored by an Anglo-'Omān expedi- tion to Dhufār, 1897	599	
(b) Death of Fadhl, 1900	601	

CHAPTER II.
'OMAN.

ANNEXURE No. 2.—History of Gwādar and Chahbār Page.

ANNEXURE 2.
GWĀDAR AND
CHAHBĀR.

(i) Origin of connection between Gwādar and 'Omān, 1784-1792	601
(a) Grant of Gwādar in 1874 to Saiyid Sultān then a refugee from 'Omān	602
(b) Character and validity of the grant	602
(c) Annexation of Gwādar to 'Omān by Saiyid Sultān, 1792	603
(ii) Events of Chahbār, 1792-1809	603
(a) Capture of Chahbār in 1792 by the 'Omāni Governor of Gwādar	603
(b) Temporary loss of Chahbār in 1804 and recovery in 1809	603
(iii) Events at Gwādar, 1792-1861	603
(iv) Claim of Kalāt to Gwādar, 1861-1863	604
(v) Claims of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār, 1863-1869	605
(vi) Establishment of an Assistant Political Agency at Gwādar, 1863	606
(vii) Events at Gwādar, 1861-1872	607
(a) Telegraph subsidies paid in 1869 to 'Omān both for Chahbār and Gwādar, <i>see</i> also page 609	608
(viii) Events at Chahbār up to its capture by Persia, 1861-1872	609
(a) Capture of Chahbār by the Governor of Bampur in 1872	610
(b) British acquiescence in the Persian occupation	612
(ix) Events at Gwādar, 1873-1888	612
(x) Difficulties with the Rind tribe, 1875-1876	614
(a) Troubles primarily due to the treaty of 1873 for the abolition of the slave trade	615
(b) Sir Robert Sandoman's visit to Panjgur and Gwādar in 1884 with a view to the settlement of Rind difficulties	616
(c) Settlement with the Rinds, 1885-1886	617
(xi) British political representation from 1873	618
(xii) Proposals since 1895 for the transfer of Gwādar from the Sultān of 'Omān to the Government of India or the Khān of Kalāt	619
(xiii) Renewed trouble with Rinds, 1891-1894	620
(xiv) Events at Gwādar from 1888	621
(a) Taxation	621
(b) Customs

ANNEXURE 3.
RUŪS-AL-JIBĀL.

ANNEXURE No. 3.—History of Ruūs-al-Jibāl 622

(i) Early period, 1836-1864	622
(a) External relations mainly with the Qawāsīm of Shārjah though apparently considered subject to 'Omān	622
(ii) Middle period, 1864-1868	624
(a) Telegraph cable landed in 1864 on the Maqlab isthmus	624
(b) Discussions as to ownership of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district	624
(c) In 1864 ownership remained indeterminate	625
(iii) Recent period, 1869-1907
(a) Written agreement given by Sultān of 'Omān in 1871 acknowledging title of Qāsimi Shaikh to whole of Ruūs-al-Jibāl district except Khasab. Agreement repudiated by Sultān in 1879	626
(b) Investigations of political states of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1900-1905	627

ANNEXURE No. 4. —Agreement regarding cession of territory by the Sultān of 'Omān, 20th March 1891	628	CHAPTER II. 'OMAN. ANNEXURE 4. AGREEMENT RE- FERENCE CESSION OF TERRITORY.
ANNEXURE No. 5. —Undertaking given by the Sultān of 'Omān regarding the Sūr coalfields, 31st May 1902	629	ANNEXURE 5. COALFIELDS UNDERTAKING.

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER III. TRUCIAL OMAN.

TRUCIAL 'OMĀN.

PERIOD I.

PERIOD I. 1600—1778.

1600-1778.

PERIOD PRECEDING THE RISE OF PIRACY	630
A. Doings of the Portuguese, 1600-1750	630
B. Establishment by Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah of a settle- ment at Bāsīdu in 1720 and British naval expedition against Shaikh, 1727	631
C. Establishment of the Qawāsīm on the Persian coast and islands, 1750-1765	632
D. Expulsion of the Qawāsīm from Persia about 1765	633

(Continued in Period III, heading E.)

PERIOD II.

1778-1822.

PERIOD II. 1778—1822.

PERIOD OF THE RISE AND SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY	633
A. General history, 1778-1805	633
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading F.)</i>	
(i) Commencement of piracy by the Qawāsīm, 1778-1780	633
(iv) Establishment of the Wahlābis in 'Omān, 1800-1803	635
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading D.)</i>	
(iii) Increase of piracy, 1804-1805	636
B. First British expedition against the Qawāsīm, 1805	637
(i) Coercive measures adopted, 1805	638

**CHAPTER III.
TRUCIAL
'OMAN.**

PERIOD II.
1778—1820.

	Page.
(i) First British treaty with the Qawāsim, 6th February 1806	639
(ii) Temporary cessation of piracy, 1806-1808	640
(iv) Deposition by the Wahhābis of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, 1808	641
(v) Revival of piracy, 1808-1809	641
C. Second British expedition, 1809-1810	643
(i) Capture and destruction of Rās-al-Khaimah, 13th November 1809	646
(ii) Destruction of Lingeh, 17th November 1809	647
(iii) Capture of Lāft, 28th November 1809	648
(iv) Question of the Qatar pirates	649
(v) Renewed troubles with the Qawāsim, 1811-1819	650
D. Third British expedition, 1819-1820	658
(i) Negotiations with the Sultān of 'Omān, 1819	662
(ii) Negotiations with Ibrāhim Pāsha of Egypt, 1819	663
(iii) Assurances to Persia, 1819	664
(iv) Capture of Rās-al-Khaimah, 9th December 1819, and establishment there of a British force	666
(v) Capture of Dhāyah near Rams, 22nd December 1819	668
(vi) Further operations, 1820	669
(vii) General Treaty of Peace, 1820	670
(viii) Individual status and independence of the various Shaikhs of the pirate coast at time of signature	671

PERIOD III.
1820—1835.

PERIOD III.

1820-1835.

PERIOD FROM THE GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE TO THE FIRST MARITIME TRUCE, 1820-1835	674
A. Permanent arrangements for the repression of piracy	674
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)</i>	
(i) Evacuation by the British of Rās-al-Khaimah and temporary occupa- tion of Qishm, July 1820	676
(ii) System of purely maritime control adopted with naval base at either Qais Island, Masqat, Mughu or Bāsīdu. Latter eventually chosen, 1823	676
B. Relations of the British Government with the Pirate Coast, 1820-1835	677
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Instructions to the Resident, 1822 and close touch established with pirate coast from that date	677
(ii) Native agency established at Shārjah about 1823	678
(iii) Questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty of 1820	678
(iv) Miscellaneous Piracies, 1823-1835	679
C. Relations of 'Omān with the Pirate Coast, 1820-1835	684
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading D.)</i>	
(i) Annexation by the Shārjah Shaikh of the Sāmāilīyah district, 1832	687

D. Relations of the Wahnābi with the Pirate Coast, 1820-1835	687
--	-----

(Continued in Period IV, heading C.)

E. Relations of Persia with the Qawāsīm, 1820-1835	688
--	-----

(Continued in Period IV, heading D, (ii) and (iii).)

F. Internal affairs of the Pirate Coast, 1820-1835	689
--	-----

(Continued in Period IV, heading E.)

(i) Position in 1821	689
(a) Sultān-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of Shārjah, the principal authority among the Qawāsīm	689
(ii) Position in 1823	689
(iii) Hostilities between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, 1825-1834	681

PERIOD IV.

PERIOD IV.
1835—1853.

1835-1853.

PERIOD FROM THE FIRST MARITIME TRUCE TO THE PERPETUAL TREATY OF PEACE, 1835-1853	694
---	-----

A. The Maritime Truce and Restrictive Line, 1835-1836	694
---	-----

(Continued in heading F below.)

B. British relations with 'Trucial 'Omān, 1835-1853	696
---	-----

(Continued in Period V, heading A.)

(i) First Maritime Truce succeeded by others for periods of eight months and one year and in 1843 by one for 10 years	696
(ii) Working of the maritime truces	697
(a) Question of absconding divers	697
(iii) Treaties for the suppression of the Slave-trade, 1838, 1839 and 1847	701

C. Relations of the Egyptians and the Wahnābis with Trucial 'Omān, 1835-1853	702
--	-----

(Continued in Period V, heading B.)

(i) Intrigues of the Egyptians on the Trucial Coast, 1839	702
(ii) Counteractive measures by the British	703
(iii) British support of the Shaikhs of Baraimi, 1840	705
(iv) Captain Hamerton's journey from Shārjah to Sohār <i>via</i> Baraimi, 1840	705
(v) Discontinuance of British support to Shaikhs of Baraimi and re-occupation of latter by the Wahnābis, 1845	706
(vi) Proposal of the Wahnābis to build a fort at Zora, 1845	706

D. Other external relations of the Trucial Shaikhs, 1835-1853	709
---	-----

(i) Relations with 'Omān	709
------------------------------------	-----

(Continued in Period V, heading C.)

**CHAPTER III.
TRUCIAL
'OMAN.**

Page.

(i) Relations with Persia	709
-------------------------------------	-----

(Continued in Period V, heading F.)

**PERIOD IV.
1835—1853.**

(iii) Relations with the Ka'ab of Persian 'Arabistān	709
(iv) Relations with Bahrain	710
E. Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1835—1853	710

(Continued in Period V, heading G.)

(i) Main features, the contest for supremacy between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi and the gradual rise of Dibai	710
(ii) Relation between Shārjah, Abu Dhabi, and Dibai	711
(iii) Relations between Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain	715
(iv) Aggression by Shaikh of Shārjah on the Shihūh of Ruūs-al-jibāl, 1839	718
(v) Conflict between 'Ajnān and Hamriyah, 1848	718
F. Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 4th May 1853	719
(i) Shaikh of Shārjah assured that new Treaty would not debar him from defending his possessions in Gulf of 'Omān by naval means	719
(ii) Continuance of the system of periodical presents by the Resident to Shaikhs expressly sanctioned by Government	719

**PERIOD V.
1853—1892.**

**PERIOD V.
1853—1892.**

**PERIOD FROM THE PERPETUAL TREATY OF PEACE TO
THE EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT, 1853-1892 719**

A. British relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892 719

(Continued in Period VI, heading A.)

(i) Cases of "maritime irregularity," 1853-1892	719
(ii) Hostilities between the Turks and the Wāhhābis, 1871	723
(iii) Question in 1876 of the despatch by sea of reinforcements, military stores, etc., for the Shārjah garrison at Dibai, also recovery of Fujairah by sea prohibited 1880. Orders of Government reference observance of the "maritime truce" in the Gulf of 'Omān	724
(iv) The "Slave Trade," and further "Engagement," 1856, relating to the same	725
(v) Telegraph Agreement, 1864, in regard to the line across the Ruūs-al-Jibāl tract	725
(vi) Agreement reference absconding debtors, 24th June 1879	725

B. Relations of the Wāhhābis with Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892 726

(Continued in Period VI, heading C.)

(i) Fort erected by Khālid-bin-Sultān of Shārjah at Zora destroyed by British, 1866	727
(ii) Final expulsion of the Wāhhābis from Baraimi, 1869	727
C. Relations of 'Omān with Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892	728

(Continued in Period VI, heading D.)

	Page.	CHAPTER III. TRUCIAL 'OMAN.
D. Relations of Qatar with Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892 . . .	729	
(i) Continuous warfare, from 1881 to 1890 between Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Qatar in regard to the possession of Khor-al-'Odaid. See also page 819	729	PERIOD V. 1853—1892.
E. Turkish relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892 . . .	730	
(Continued in Period VI, heading E (i).)		
(i) Turkish claims to 'Odaid and intrigues at Abu Dhabi	730	
F. Persian relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892 . . .	730	
(Continued in Period VI, heading B.)		
(i) Shaikh of Shārjah assumes virtual charge of Lingeh, 1855 . . .	730	
(ii) Persian intrigues on Trucial Coast, 1887-1888	737	
G. Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892	731	
(Continued in Period VI, heading F.)		
(i) Separation of Rās-al-Khaimah from Shārjah, 1869	731	
(ii) By 1878 Debai had become the principal port on the coast . . .	732	
(iii) In 1883 the Abu Dhabi Shaikh was the most powerful among the Trucial Shaikhs	733	
(iv) Hināwi-Ghāfiri combinations on the Trucial Coast, 1889 . . .	735	
H. Exclusive Agreement of the Trucial Shaikhs with Great Britain, March 1892	736	
(i) Persian intrigues on the Trucial Coast, 1887-1888	737	
(ii) Written assurance obtained, in 1887, from Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, Rās-al-Khaimah, 'Ajmān, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shārjah and Dibai agreeing not to enter into relations with any foreign power except Britain or allow a foreign agent to reside in their dominions . . .	738	
(iii) Turkish intrigues	738	
(iv) French intrigues, 1891	738	
(v) Formal "Exclusive Agreement" signed in March 1892 by the Trucial Shaikhs and Shaikh of Bahrain	738	

PERIOD VI.

FROM 1892.

PERIOD VI.
FROM 1892.

PERIOD SINCE THE EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT, FROM 1892	739
---	-----

A. British relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907 . . .	739
(i) A Shihhi Shaikh of Khasab in Ruūs-al-Jibāl fixed by Sultān of 'Omān for armed action by sea	740
(ii) Government of India decide that the various engagements executed by Trucial Shaikhs are binding on their successors	740
(iii) "Arms Agreement" of 1902	741
(iv) British position on Trucial Coast explained to the French, 1903 . .	741

**CHAPTER III.
TRUCIAL
'OMAN.**

**PERIOD VI.
FROM 1892.**

	Page.
(v) Supply to the Trucial Shaikhs of copies of their agreements and of Trucial flags of correct pattern, 1907	741
(<i>α</i>) Hināwī Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai demur to use of flag, 1906	742
(vi) Tour in the interior by Major F. Z. Cox, 1905	742
(vii) Question of declaring a formal British protectorate over Trucial 'Omān, 1902	742
(viii) Reluctance of Shaikh of Dibai to agree to a British Post Office, and objections of Shaikh of Shārjah to British flag over the Agency	742
(ix) Question of limiting customs duty to 5 per cent. <i>ad valorem</i>	243
 B. Persian relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907	 743
(i) Expulsion in 1899 by the Persians of the hereditary Arab Shaikh of Lingeh	743
(ii) Intrigue of Governor of the Gulf Ports with Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, 1900-1901, ascribed to Russian influence	744
(iii) Principle affirmed of right of British Government to represent Trucial Shaikhs abroad 1901-1903	744
(iv) Attempted annexation of islands of Bu Musa and Tunb by Persia, 1904	745
 C. Relations of the Wahhābis with Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907	 746
(i) Wahhābi supremacy re-established in Nejd and designs of Ibn Sa'ūd on Trucial 'Omān, 1905	746
(ii) The Hināwī Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai and Sultān of 'Omān opposed to the Wahhābis, the other or Ghāfirī Shaikhs in favour of them	746
(iii) Attitude of the British Government	747
 D. Relations of 'Omān with Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907	 747
(i) Subsidy paid Sultān of 'Omān to Abu Dhabi for protection of Bātinah district, 1906	747
 E. Other foreign relations of Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907	 748
(i) Turkish relations	748
(<i>a</i>) Turkey informed in 1893 of the exclusive Agreement	748
(<i>b</i>) Dr. Ibrāhim Effendi, 1900-1907	748
(<i>c</i>) Turkish claim to 'Odait, 1902-1903	748
(ii) German relations, 1904	749
(<i>a</i>) Lease of the export duty on mother-of-pearl shells at Dibai granted to an employé of the German firm of Wöckhaus	749
 F. Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907	 749
(i) The Zora case and attempt of Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to establish a settlement there	750
(ii) Disappearance of Rās-al-Khaimah as a separate Shaikhdom 1900	751
(iii) Dispute in Wadi Hatta 1905 and difficulties due to Bani Qitab affairs	752
(<i>a</i>) Respective spheres of influence of the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain defined, April 1906	753
(iv) Treacherous seizure of Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain by Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and his release by the Resident, 1907	754

	Page.	CHAPTER III. TRUCIAL OMAN.
ANNEXURE No. 1.—History of Shārjah	755	
(i) Shaikh Saqar-bin-Rāshid, 1777-1803	755	
(ii) Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, 1803-1866	756	ANNEXURE 1. SHARJAH.
(a) Removed from the Shaikhship by the Wahhābis in 1808	742	
(b) Restoration to him of Rās-al-Khaimah, 1820	756	
(c) Rebellion of Hamrīyah, 1854-1855	757	
(iii) Shaikh Khalīd-bin-Sultān, 1866-1868	759	
(a) Rās-al-Khaimah independent, 1866 to 1867	759	
(iv) Shaikh Sālim-bin-Sultān, 1868 to 1883	759	
(a) Separation once more of Rās-al-Khaimah from Sharjah, 1869	759	
(b) Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah reannexes Sha'am, Rams, and Shimil	759	
(c) Secession of Hamrīyah from Shārjah, 1875	760	
(v) Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālīd, from 1883	761	
(a) Usurpation of Shaikhdom by Saqar-bin-Khālīd in 1883	761	
(b) Reincorporation of Rās-al-Khaimah with the Shārjah Shaikhdom, 1900	762	
(c) Virtual independence of Hamrīyah, 1903-1904	762	
ANNEXURE No. 2.—History of Abu Dhabi	763	ANNEXURE 2. ABU DHABI.
(i) Abu Dhabi founded by the Bani Yās, 1761	763	
(ii) Shaikh Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt, 1818-1833	764	
(iii) Shaikh Khalīfa-bin-Shakhbūt, 1833-1845	765	
(a) Secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah (Bani Yās) to Debai, 1833	765	
(b) First secession of the Qubaisāt (Ikani Yās) to 'Odaid, 1836, and destruction of the latter by Shaikh Khalīfah, 1837	766	
(c) Assassination of Shaikh Khalīfah and interregnum following 1845	777	
(iv) Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, 1845-1855	767	
(a) Second (attempted) secession of the Qubaisāt to 'Odaid, 1849	767	
(b) Expulsion of Shaikh Sa'id, 1855	768	
(v) Shaikh Zaid-bin-Khalīfah from 1855	768	
(a) Third secession of the Qubaisāt to 'Odaid, 1869-1880	769	
(b) Attitude of the Government of India as regards 'Odaid, 1872 and 1873	769	
(c) Turkish intrigues at 'Odaid, 1874-1880	770	
(d) British action in 1878 against 'Odaid, flight of the settlers to Dōhah, 1879, and eventual return to Abu Dhabi, 1880	770	
(e) Affairs in the Baraimi oasis, which had almost become an annexure of Abu Dhabi	770	
ANNEXURE No. 3.—History of Dibai	772	ANNEXURE 3. DIBAI.
(i) Dibai attains status of a separate principality on arrival of the Bani Yās Āl Bū Falāsah seceders from Abu Dhabi, 1833	772	
(ii) Shaikh Maktūm-bin-Buti, 1833-1852	772	
(iii) Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Buti, 1852-1859	773	
(iv) Shaikh Hashar-bin-Maktūm, 1859-1886	774	
(v) Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Maktūm, 1886-1894	774	

**CHAPTER III.
TRUCIAL
'OMAN.**

Page.

(vi) Shaikh Maktūm-bin-Hashar, 1894-1906	774
(vii) Shaikh Buti-bin-Suhail, from 1906	775

**ANNEXURE 3.
DIBAI.**

ANNEXURE 4. UMM-AL-QAIWAIN.	ANNEXURE No. 4.—History of Umm-al-Qaiwain	775
	(i) Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, 1820 (?) 1853 (?)	775
	(ii) Ali-bin-'Abdullah, 1873 (?)	775
	(iii) Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah, 1873 (?) 1904	775
	(iv) Rashid-bin-Ahmad, from 1904	775

ANNEXURE 5. 'AJMAN.	ANNEXURE No. 5.—History of 'Ajman	776
	(i) Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, 1873 (?)—1891	776
	(ii) Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, 1891-1900	776
	(iii) 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Hamaid, from 1900	776

ANNEXURE 6. SHAMAILIYAH.	ANNEXURE No. 6.—History of the Shamailiyah Tract	777
	(i) Extent of Tract. From Dibah to Khor Kalba	777
	(ii) Struggles for possession between the Qawāsim, the Wahhābis and 'Omān, 1798-1850	777
	(iii) Final annexation to the Shārjah Shaikhdom in 1850	778
	(iv) Claim by 'Omān to Fujairah, 1879	780
	(v) Shamailiyah still coveted by 'Omān, 1886	781
	(vi) Shamailiyah officially recognized by Britain as belonging to Shārjah	783
	(vii) Revolt at Fujairah, 1900 and position in 1905-1907	784

ANNEXURE 7. FRAUDULENT ABSCONDERS AGREEMENT.	ANNEXURE No. 7.—Agreement reference fraudulent absconders, 24th June 1879	784
---	--	------------

ANNEXURE 8. EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT.	ANNEXURE No. 8.—Exclusive agreement of March 1892	786
---	--	------------

**CHAPTER IV.
QATAR.**

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF QATAR.

**PERIOD I.
1766—1871.**

PERIOD I.

1766-1871.

GENERAL HISTORY, 1766-1871	787
A. Qatar the headquarters of the Al Khalifah section of the 'Utūb, 1766-1782	787
(i) Settlement at Zubārah in 1766 of the whole Al Khalifah division of the 'Utūb from Kuwait and later of the Jalāhimah division of the same tribe	787
(ii) Rapid growth of Zubārah and Persian attack on the same 1777-1783	788
(iii) Conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utūb and transfer of their head-quarters from Qatar to Bahrain, 1783	788
(a) Ahmad-bin-Khalifah first 'Atbi, Chief of Bahrain	788

	Page.	CHAPTER IV. QATAR.
B. Affairs during ascendancy of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Qatar, 1783-1816	789	PERIOD I. 1766—1871.
(i) Settlement in 1783 of Rahmah-bin-Jābir of the Jalāhimah section at Khor Hassān and his rise to chief power in Qatar	789	
(ii) British attitude towards Rahmah	790	
(iii) Predominance of the Wahnābis with whom Rahmah allies himself	790	
(iv) Expulsion of the Wahnābis from Qatar in 1811, destruction of Zubārah and transfer by Rahmah of his head-quarters from Qatar to Dammām on the coast of Hasa	791	
C. Proceedings of Rahmah, 1816-1820	791	
(i) Rahmah deserts the Wahnābis by whom his fort at Dammām is destroyed in 1816. Rahmah migrates to Būshehr but returns to Dammām in 1818. His policy is mainly dictated by intense hostility to the Al Khalīfah section of Bahrain	791	
D. British relations, 1821-1823	793	
(i) Destruction of Dōhah (Bida') by the British, 1821	793	
(ii) Dōhah in 1823 admittedly a dependency of Bahrain but administered by the Al Bū 'Ainain	793	
E. General History from 1823 up to evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840	794	
(i) Shaikh of Bahrain destroys fort at Dōhah and removes the Āl Bū 'Ainain to Ruwais and Fuwairat, 1828.	794	
(ii) A section of the Bani Yās of Abu Dhabi emigrate in 1836 to 'Odaid; see also page 766	797	
(iii) British action in 1836, in connection with intrigues against Qatar and undertaking imposed on headmen of Dōhah, Wakrah, and 'Odaid	797	
F. General History from 1840 up to attack of Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi in 1867 and the occupation of Dōhah by the Turks in 1871	798	
(i) Bombardment of Dōhah by the British in 1841	798	
(ii) Affairs in Qatar during the civil war in Bahrain, 1840-1849	799	
(iii) Political position in Qatar, 1866-1867	800	
(a) Shaikh of Bahrain, subject as regards Qatar to the Wahnābis, but independent as regards Bahrain	800	
(iv) Destruction of Dōhah and Wakrah by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, 1867	800	
(v) British punitive action, and agreement of 12th September 1868, with the Al Thani Shaikh, then the most influential in Qatar. Nothing known of the family's rise to power. They belong to the 'Al-bin-'Ali tribe	801	
(vi) Agreement in respect of tribute to Bahrain which in future is to be paid through Residency	802	

PERIOD II.
1871-1893.

PERIOD II.
1871—1893.

PERIOD FROM TURKISH OCCUPATION OF DŌHAH TO
REBELLION AGAINST THE TURKS, 1871-1893 . 802

A. General History, 1871-1893 802

(Continued in heading E below.)

(i) Occupation of Dōhah by the Turks, 1871-1872 802

**CHAPTER IV.
QATAR.**

Page.

PERIOD II.
1871—1893.

(a) Turks were accompanied by Shaikh of Kuwait	803
(ii) Shaikh Jāsim-bin-Muhammad-bin-Thani appointed Qāim-Maḳām of Qatar by the Turks, 1876	804
(iii) Military garrison and steam launch stationed at Dōhah by the Turks in 1888	806
(iv) Mudirs arrive for Zubārah and 'Odaid, 1890	807
B. British relations with Qatar, 1872-1893	808
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Question of political relations with Shaikh of Dōhah and the Turks, 1881-1882	809
(ii) Turks decline to agree to a joint police of the seas, 1881	810
(iii) British Commanders empowered by British Government to act in the territorial water of Turkey, 1881	810
(iv) Shaikh Jāsim gives a verbal promise to adhere to Agreement of 1868	810
(v) British Indian traders expelled from Dōhah, 1882	811
(vi) British naval action and Shaikh Jāsim compelled to pay compensation, 1882	811
(vii) Protest in 1883 by the Turks and latter informed that Britain had never admitted Turkish rights of suzerainty over Qatar	811
(viii) Wanton attacks on British Indian traders, British action taken, and usual protests by Turks, 1887-1888	812
(ix) Further correspondence between Britain and Turkey in regard to latter's position at Qatar, 1889	814
C. Relations with Bahrain and affairs at Zubārah, 1872-1893	814
(i) Claims of Shaikh of Bahrain to Zubārah, 1873	814
(ii) Shaikh of Bahrain's claims to Qatar disallowed by the Government of India, 1875	816
(iii) Evacuation of Zubārah by Shaikh of Bahrain, 1875	816
(iv) Destruction of Zubārah by Shaikh Jāsim, 1878	817
(v) Rumours of Turkish intentions to rebuild Zubārah, 1888-1891	818
D. Relations with Abu Dhabi and affairs at 'Odaid, 1872-1893	818
(i) Relations of the Turks with 'Odaid, 1871-1876
(ii) 'Odaid claimed by Turks as a dependency of Qatar and belonging to Turkey, 1878	819
(iii) Return in 1880 of the Bani Yās to Abu Dhabi and hostilities between latter and Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, 1880-1890	819
(iv) Prospect of Turkish and Central Arabian (<i>i.e.</i> , by Ibn Rashīd) interference, 1888	821
(v) Turkish support of Shaikh of Dōhah in the war, and the communication addressed to Abu Dhabi, 1889	822
E. Rising in Qatar against Turkish authority, 1893	822
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading A.)</i>	
(i) Defeat of a Turkish force near Dōhah, 26th March 1893	823
(ii) Shaikh Jāsim appeals to the British and asks to renew the agreement of 1868, or undertake same obligations as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, 1893	824
(iii) Final settlement with the Turks, June 1893	824

PERIOD III.

FROM 1893.

CHAPTER IV.
QATAR.

PERIOD III.
FROM 1893.

	Page.
PERIOD SINCE THE RISING AGAINST THE TURKS, 1893-1907	824
A. General history, 1893-1907	824
(i) Administrative position in Qatar in 1905	825
(ii) Assassination of Shaikh Ahmad, brother of Shaikh Jāsim and its results	826
B. British relations, 1893-1907	827
(i) Question of the status of Qatar, 1893	827
(ii) Question of British war vessels at Dōbah and British liberty of action in Qatar, 1893	827
(iii) His Majesty's Government observed that there was no sufficient reason for allowing Turkish pretensions to * * * prevent Government of India making such treaties with Chiefs of Qatar as might be considered advisable	828
(iv) Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Zubārah with the countenance of the Turks, 1895	828
(v) Question of Turkish sanitary post in Qatar, 1897	828
(vi) Question of the renewal of treaty relations between Great Britain and the Āl Thāni Shaikhs, 1898-1899	828
(a) Definite overtures by Shaikh Ahmad in 1898 and 1902	829
(vii) Attempts by the Turks to appoint officials at Zubārah, Wakrah, and ṢOdaid, 1902-1904	830
(viii) Piracies on the Qatar coast, 1893-1906	831
(a) Orders of Government in regard to piracies. All cases to be reported to them before action is taken, February 1907	833
(ix) Visits by British officers to Qatar, 1899-1906	834
C. Relations with Najd, 1893-1907	835
(i) Relations of Shaikh Jāsim with Ibn Rashīd, Amīr of Jabal Shammar and Hail	835
(ii) Relations of Shaikh Jāsim and Ahmad with Ibn-Sa'ud, the Wahhābi Amīr of Riyadh	835

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF BAHRAIN.

CHAPTER V.
BAHRAIN.

PERIOD I.

1602-1783.

PERIOD I.
1602—1783

FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM BAHRAIN IN 1602 TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS IN 1783	836
A. Expulsion of the Portuguese from Bahrain by the Persians in 1602	836
(i) Persian occupation of uncertain duration	836

**CHAPTER V.
BAHRAIN.**

Page.

**PERIOD I.
1602—1783.**

B. Seizure of Bahrain by the Imām of 'Omān, 1718	836
(i) 'Omāni occupation of short duration only	837
C. The Hūwalah Arabs predominant in the island at the middle of the 18th century	837
D. Annexation of Bahrain to Persia, about 1753	837
E. British views in regard to Bahrain, 1602-1783	837
(i) Bahrain contemplated or suggested as head-quarters of the East India Company in 1700, 1751 and 1752	838
(ii) Dutch suspected of wishing to occupy Bahrain, 1753	839
F. Expulsion of the Persians by the Arab Shaikhs of the 'Utūb, 1783	839
(i) Munāmah was actually seized by the 'Utūb of Kuwait who were joined afterwards by 'Utūb from Zubārah and Ruwais and contingents from ten other Qatar tribes	839

**PERIOD II.
1783—1829.**

PERIOD II.

1783-1829.

FROM FOUNDATION OF THE BAHRAIN SHAIKHDOM IN 1783 TO THIRD AND LAST ATTACK ON BAHRAIN BY 'OMĀN AND CONCLUSION OF PEACE WITH LATTER, 1829	840
---	-----

A. Establishment of the 'Āl Khalifah dynasty as Shaikhs of Bahrain, 1783	840
(i) Succession of the Jalāhimah section under the sons of Jābir chief of whom was Rahmah, 1783	840
(ii) Abortive attempts of Persia to regain Bahrain, 1783-1785	840
(iii) The 'Utūb threatened by 'Omān make overtures to Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, to whom they pay some revenue, 1799	841
(a) The 'Utūb appear to have informed Persians on this occasion that Bahrain had belonged to the Turks some 70 years previously. This statement incorrect. Turks had temporarily occupied Bahrain in 1559 and were expelled by the Portuguese	841
(iv) First invasion and occupation of Bahrain by 'Omān in 1800 and 1802	841
B. Extension of Wāhhābi influence over Bahrain, 1803-1811	842
(i) Wāhhābi Wakīl placed in charge of administration of Bahrain, Ilasa and Qatar and tribute paid through him, 1810-1811	843
(ii) Bahrain freed from the Wāhhābis by ruler of Masqat, 1811, and alliance with latter, 1811-1813	843
(iii) New combinations formed 1816, Bahrain being in alliance with the Wāhhābis and the Qawāsīm against 'Omān and Rahmah-bīn-Jābir of the Jalāhimah of Qatar	843
(iv) Second (but unsuccessful) attack on Bahrain by Omān, 1816	844

	Page.	CHAPTER V. BAHRAIN.
C. Growth of Bahrain as a pirate depôt	845	
(i) Bahrain affairs in connection with the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1819-1820	846	PERIOD II. 1783—1829.
(ii) Submission of Bahrain to 'Omān, 1820, and payment of tribute	847	
(iii) Bahrain signs "General Treaty of Peace," 23rd February 1820	848	
D. Events in Bahrain, 1820-1829	848	
(i) Extraordinary and unauthorised agreement signed at Shīrāz by Captain Bruce, the Political Resident, explicitly admitting the title of Persia to possession of Bahrain, 30th August 1822	849	
(ii) Immediate disavowal of agreement by Bombay Government	849	
(iii) Position at Bahrain in 1823-1825	850	
(iv) Feud between Rahmah-bin-Jābir and the Shaikhs of Bahrain, until death of former in 1825	851	
(v) Renewed designs of 'Omān on Bahrain and British protests	851	
(vi) Third and last attack on Bahrain by 'Omān, 1828	852	
(vii) Treaty of peace concluded between Bahrain and 'Omān, 2nd December 1829	855	
		PERIOD III. 1829—1843.

FROM THE PEACE WITH 'OMĀN IN 1849 TO THE EXPULSION OF 'ABDULLAH-BIN-AHMAD FROM THE SHAIKSHIP OF BAHRAIN IN 1843 856

A. General history, 1830-1834	856	
(i) Re-establishment of Wahhābi influence in Hasa, submission to them of Bahrain, and payment made of Zakāt, 1830	856	
(ii) Supremacy of Wahhābi repudiated by Bahrain, 1833, and Tārūt Island captured, 1834	857	
(iii) Rebellion in Qatar, 1835	857	
(iv) Rapprochement with Wahhābis and nominal tribute paid them, 1836	858	
(v) Ineptitude and bad Government of Shaikh 'Abdullah	858	
B. British relations with Bahrain, 1830-1839	859	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading E.)</i>		
(i) Non-inclusion of Bahrain in the Maritime Truce of 1835	860	
(ii) Extension of the Restrictive Line to Bahrain, 1836	860	
C. Relations of Bahrain with the Egyptians, and Bahrain affairs, 1838-1840	861	
(i) Arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa and demands on Bahrain, 1838	861	
(ii) British attitude in regard to the Egyptians	862	
(iii) Application of Shaikh for help to Persia and arrival of a Persian Envoy, 1838	862	
(iv) Sudden submission of Shaikh of Bahrain to Egyptians and payment to tribute, 1839	865	
(v) Retirement of the Egyptians, 1840	866	

CHAPTER .
BAHRAIN.

PERIOD III.
1829—1843.

D. Civil war in Bahrain and expulsion of 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from the chiefship, 1840-1843	866
(i) Breach between Shaikh 'Abdulla and his grand-nephew Shaikh Muhammad, 1840-1842	867
(ii) Expulsion of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh 'Abdullah, 1842	867
(iii) Return of Shaikh Muhammad and expulsions by him of Shaikh Abdullah who retires to Dammām, 1843	870
(iv) Incidents during the civil war affecting British interests	870

PERIOD IV.
1843—1868.

PERIOD IV.

1843-1868.

RULE OF MUHAMMAD-BIN-KHALIFAH, 1843-1868 872

A. Attempts by Shaikh 'Abdullah to regain the chiefship, 1843-1849	872
(i) Appeals for assistance by 'Abdulla to the Wāhhābis, the Trucial Shaikhs, the Shaikh of Kuwait, and the British and Persian authorities, 1843-1849	872
(ii) Shaikh 'Abdullah's death in 1849	879

B. Relations of Bahrain with the Wāhhābis, 1844-1849 879

(Continued in heading & below.)

(i) Hostilities between Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wāhhābis 1845-1849	879
(ii) Peace concluded, 1849. Wāhhābi Amīr agrees not to encourage the <i>ex</i> -Shaikh 'Abdullah, and Shaikh of Bahrain promises an annual tribute	880

C. Relations of Bahrain with Persia, 1843-1849 880

(Continued in heading & below.)

D. Relations of Bahrain with Turkey, 1843-1849 810

(Continued in heading & below.)

(i) Turks for the first time in 1847 claim sovereignty over Bahrain	881
---	-----

E. British relations with Bahrain, 1843-1849 881

(i) Slave trade treaty concluded, 8th May 1847	881
(ii) Proposal for a British protectorate over Bahrain considered and rejected, 1847-1849, but it is decided that any attempts upon Bahrain are to be resisted by a British naval force	881

F. Internal affairs, 1843-1849 883

(Continued in heading & below.)

(i) Arrival of the Dawāsir in Bahrain, 1845	883
(ii) Malcontent 'Atbi Colony on Qais Island, 1847-1849	883

G. General history of Bahrain and British policy, 1850-1868 883

(i) Danger from Wāhhābis and sons of the <i>ex</i> -Shaikh 'Abdullah arrested by British intervention, 1850-1852	884
--	-----

	Page.	CHAPTER V. BAHRAIN.
(ii) Claim to sovereignty over Bahrain by the Turks summarily rejected by the British Government, 1851	885	
(iii) Supplementary engagement in regard to the slave trade, 10th May 1856	886	PERIOD IV, 1843—1868.
(iv) Renewed danger from the Wāhhābis, now nominally subject to Turkey, and from sons of the <i>ex</i> -Shaikh again averted by British action, 1859	887	
(v) Shaikh of Bahrain simultaneously invites protection of Turkey and Persia, by both of whom envoys are sent to Bahrain where the Persian and Turkish flags are alternately hoisted, 1859	888	
(vi) Discussion of the policy to be adopted by Britain in regard to these events; Secretary of State accepts view that independence of Bahrain shall be recognised, 1861	888	
(vii) Convention with Britain signed by Shaikh of Bahrain, 21st May 1861, result of which was to assimilate position of Bahrain to that of the Trucial Chiefs in regard to the perpetual Treaty of Peace	889	
(viii) Expulsion of Muhammad, son of the <i>ex</i> -Shaikh 'Abdullah, from Dammām by British Naval force, 1861	890	
(ix) Resident forbidden to confiscate vessels belonging to chiefs on his own responsibility	891	
(x) Reassertion of Persian claims to Bahrain, 1866-1867	891	
(xi) Claims of the Wāhhābi Amīr to Bahrain, 1866-1867	892	
(a) Colonel Pelly of opinion that Shaikh held himself independent as regards Bahrain, and only paid tribute to the Wāhhābis for protection of his Qatar possession;	892	
(b) Government of India enunciate opinion in 1867 that Shaikh was independent of other powers in respect of his insular possessions and not subject to Wāhhābis unless in regard to Qatar	892	
(xii) Treacherous attack by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on Dōhah and Wakrah, 1867	892	
(a) British punitive action against Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, 1868	893	
(b) Flight of Shaikh Muhammad and Agreement executed 5th September 1868 with his brother 'Alī-bin-Khalīfah declaring Muhammad to have forfeited the chiefship and Shaikh 'Alī to have become sole ruler. Amongst other provisos was one for appointment of an agent to represent Shaikh at Būshehr in his dealings with the Residency	895	
(c) Protest by Persia against British action and British promise that should punitive measures against Bahrain again become necessary, Persia would, if practicable, be informed beforehand, 1869	896	

PERIOD V.

PERIOD V.
1868—1869.

1868-1869.

RULE OF 'ALĪ-BIN-KHALĪFAH, 1868-1869, AND INTERREGNUM, 1869 896

A. Intrigues of the *ex*-Shaikh Muhammad, 1869 896

(i) Invasion of Bahrain and death of Shaikh 'Alī, 1869 897

CHAPTER V.
BAHRAIN.

Page.

PERIOD V.
1868—1869.

B. British action	897
(i) Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, Nāsir-bin-Ahmad, and Muhammad bin 'Abdullah captured and deported to India, 1869	899
(ii) Shaikh 'Īsa-bin 'Alī installed as Shaikh, 1869	899
C. Connection of the Wāhhābis with the invasion	899
D. Connection of Persia with the invasion	900
(i) Views of Indian Government in regard to our policy in the Gulf	901
E. Connection of Turkey with the invasion	901
(i) Turkey informed Britain could not recognise Turkish claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain	902

PERIOD VI.

PERIOD VI.
FROM 1869.

FROM 1869.

RULE OF 'ĪSA-BIN-'ALĪ, FROM 1869 902

A. Affairs arising out of the Turkish annexation of Ḥasa, 1871-1872	902
(i) Desire on the part of the Turks to lay claim to all districts over which the Wāhhābi had at any time exercised even transient sway	902
(ii) Turkish aggression checked, 1871-1872	904
B. General History of Bahrain, 1871-1895	905
(i) Threatened invasion of Bahrain in 1874 by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak	905
(ii) Question of Zubārah and other Bahrain possessions in Qatar. Claim to sovereignty by Shaikh of Bahrain over possessions on mainland discouraged by British Government	905
(iii) Fall of Zubārah and migration of the Na'im to Bahrain	908
(iv) Piracies by the Bani Hājir from Ḥasa, 1878-1879	908
(v) Preparation by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, now head of the Āl 'Abdullah branch of the ruling family of Bahrain, for an attack on Bahrain, 1880, and action by British. Warning given to Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah and the Wālī of Baghdād	909
(vi) Death of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah at Makkah in 1890	911
(vii) Rumours of renewed intentions of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to attack Bahrain, 1892 and 1894 and British warnings given	912
C. Relations of Bahrain with Turkey, 1871-1895	913

(Continued in heading I below.)

(i) Various protests by Turks against supposed British action in Bahrain
(ii) Proposed Turkish lighthouse and coal depôt in Bahrain, 1875 and 1879	914
(iii) Extradition of criminals and debtors between Ḥasa and Bahrain, 1879-1880	915
(iv) Turkish sovereignty over Bahrain proclaimed at Qatif, 1893, and British protest	917

	Page.	CHAPTER V. BAHRAIN.
(v) Transhipment of Turkish troops in Bahrain waters prohibited by the British Government, 1893	917	
(vi) Political status of Bahrain subjects in Turkey, 1890-1894	918	PERIOD VI. FROM 1869.
(a) Turkey informed that Bahrain was under British protection, 1892	918	
D. Relations of Bahrain with Persia, 1871-1895	919	
(Continued in heading J below.)		
(i) Persian claims to Bahrain and Persian intrigues, 1886-1887	919	
E. British relations with Bahrain, 1871-1895	921	
(Continued in heading G below.)		
(i) British censure of a political murder by the Shaikh, 1877	921	
(ii) First "Exclusive Agreement" with Shaikh of Bahrain, 22nd December 1880	922	
(iii) Final "Exclusive Agreement," 13th March 1892	922	
F. Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Qatar, 1895-1896	923	
(i) Formation of a hostile Āl-Bin-ʿAlī settlement at Zubārah, 1895	923	
(ii) Muster of Turkish and Qatari forces at Zubārah	924	
(iii) Destruction by British of the hostile fleet, 1895	925	
(iv) Protest by the Turks who were informed that Britain could not admit the coast on which Zubārah was situated to be part of the Ottoman Empire	925	
G. General history of Bahrain and British policy, 1895-1904	926	
(Continued in heading N below.)		
(i) Shaikh Hamad recognised as heir-apparent, 12th February 1901	927	
(ii) Differences between Shaikh ʿĪsa and his nephew ʿAlī-bin-Ahmed, 1899	927	
(iii) Question of the reform of the customs, 1899-1903	928	
(a) Shaikh raises duty from 4 to 5 per cent., 1899	929	
(iv) British political representation	931	
(a) European officer appointed, February 1900	931	
(b) Political Agent appointed, 1904	931	
(v) Protection of British subjects	932	
(a) Francis, Times and Co. Arms case, 1899	932	
(vi) Experimental office opened by Imperial Bank of Persia, June 1900	933	
(vii) Landing stage constructed by Shaikh, 1904	933	
(viii) Asphalt deposit near Jabal-ad-Dukhān, 1904	933	
(ix) Victoria Hospital opened, 1905	933	
H. Internal History of Bahrain, 1895-1904	934	
I. Relations of Bahrain with Turkey, 1895-1904	934	
(Continued in heading O (ii) below.)		
(i) Constantinople Board of Health propose a sanitary post in Bahrain, 1897	935	
(ii) Turkish Government request application to them for an Ottoman exequatur for the recently appointed "British Vice-Consul" at Bahrain, 1898	935	

CHAPTER V.
BAHRAIN.

PERIOD VI.
FROM 1869.

	Page.
J. Relations of Bahrain with Persia, 1895-1904	935
(Continued in heading O (iii) below.)	
(i) Question of the political status of natives of Bahrain in Persia, 1899	935
(ii) Attempt of Belgian Director of Persian customs to post Persian customs officials at Bahrain, 1901	935
K. Relations of Bahrain with America, 1895-1904	936
(i) "Arabian Mission" established, 1893	936
(ii) Complaints by Shaikh against Mr. Zwemer, 1899	936
(iii) Question of purchase of land in 1901 by Mr. Zwemer as affected by the Exclusive Agreement of 1892	936
(iv) "Mason Memorial Hospital" opened, 1902	937
L. Relations of Bahrain with Germany, 1895-1904	937
(Continued in heading O (iv) below.)	
(i) Establishment of a German firm, Messrs. R. Wonckhaus and Co. in Bahrain, 1901	937
(ii) Importation of alcoholic liquors into Bahrain prohibited, 1900	937
(iii) Question of purchase by the German firm of house property, 1902	937
(iv) Question of political status and protection of Germans and other Europeans in Bahrain, 1900	938
M. Relations of Bahrain with France, 1895-1904	938
(Continued in heading O (iv) below.)	
(i) French Government enquire if there is any objection to the inclusion of Bahrain in the jurisdiction of the French Vice-Consulate at Bushher, 1904	938
N. Rupture between Britain and Bahrain, 1904-1905	938
(Continued in heading O (i) below.)	
(i) Misbehaviour of 'Ali-bin-Ahmad, 1904	938
(ii) Outrages on Mr. Wonckhaus and Co., September 1904	939
(iii) Attack upon Persians, November 1904	939
(iv) Redress demanded by German Consul at Bushher from Shaikh of Bahrain direct	939
(v) British ultimatum delivered to Shaikh, 25th February 1905	940
(vi) Submission of Shaikh to British terms which included amongst others deportation of Shaikh 'Ali and abolition of "Sukhrak" or forced labour	941
(vii) Warning conveyed to the Mulla Jāsīm and Ahmed, who with Sharidah and Muhammad-bin-Abdul Wahāb of Dārīn were among the more mischievous of the Shaikh's advisers	942
(viii) Shaikh Hamad, the heir-apparent, also warned that his ultimate recognition would depend on his future conduct	942
O. External affairs and foreign interests in Bahrain, 1905-1907	943
(i) British relations	943
(a) No progress with reform of custom	943

	Page.	
(b) Slave trade still flourishing and oppression of subjects rife	943	CHAPTER V BAHRAIN.
(c) Policy of Government as regards Shaikh's internal ad- ministration defined	944	
(ii) Turkish relations	944	PERIOD VI. FROM 1869.
(a) Turkish postal arrangements between 'Irāq and Hasa . .	944	
(iii) Persian relations	944	
(a) Persian Government informed in 1906 that Britain main- tained her right to exercise good offices on behalf of Bahrainis and Persia's claims to Bahrain stated to be inadmissible	944	
(iv) German and French interests	945	
(a) First call of Hamburg-America line, 1906	945	
(b) Permission to fly flag of line over his house refused to German Agent	945	
(c) Intrigues of M. Goguyer, 1905	945	
ANNEXURE No. 1,—Exclusive Agreement of 13th March 1892	945	ANNEXURE 1. Exclusive agreement 1892.
CHAPTER VI.		CHAPTER VI
HISTORY OF HASA.		HASA.
PERIOD I.		PERIOD I.
1798-1840.		1795—1840,
FROM FIRST WAHHĀBĪ OCCUPATION OF HASA IN 1795 TO END OF SECOND OCCUPATION BY THE EGYPTIANS IN 1840	947	
A. First Wahhābī occupation of Hasa, 1795-1818	947	
(i) The Bani Khālid tribe rulers of Hasa at time of Wahhābī invasion in 1795	947	
(ii) Consolidation of the Wahhābī position in Hasa, 1795-1810 . .	947	
(iii) First hostilities between Turkey and the Wahhābis occurred at Thāj in 1799	947	
(iv) Capture of Qatif by the Wahhābis, 1800	948	
(v) Bahrain, Qatif, and Qatar formed into a Wahhābī governorship with headquarters at Bahrain, 1810	948	
(vi) Settlement of Rahmah-bin-Jābir at Dammām in Hasa and expulsion by the Wahhābis in 1816	948	
B. First Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-1819	948	
(i) Resettlement of Rahmah-bin-Jābir at Dammām about 1818 . .	949	
(ii) Captain Sadleir's mission to Ibrāhīm Pasha, 1819, and journey through Hasa	949	
(iii) Evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians, 1819	949	

CHAPTER VI.
HASA.

Page.

PERIOD I.

1795—1840.

(iv) Existence of a British Agent at Qatif, 1823	951
(v) Proceedings of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, 1818-1826 and his dramatic death in 1826	951
C. Second Wāhhābi occupation of Hasa, 1824-1838	953
(i) Defeat of the Bani Khālīd by the Wāhhābis, 1830	954
(ii) Enlightened policy of the Wāhhābi in Hasa, 1831	954
(iii) Seizure of Tārūt Island by the 'Utūb of Bahrain, 1834	956
(iv) Authority over Hasa asserted by the Egyptians, but successfully refuted by the Wāhhābi, 1835	956
D. Second Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-1840	957
(i) Defeat by the Egyptians in 1838 of the Wāhhābi Amīr Faisal-bin-Turkī	957
(ii) Regular Egyptian administration established in Hasa with garrisons at Hofūf, Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair	957
(iii) Evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians, 1840	958

PERIOD II.

1840—1871.

PERIOD II.

1840-1871.

FROM END OF SECOND EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION OF
HASA IN 1840 TO ANNEXATION OF HASA BY
TURKEY IN 1871 958

A. Internal affairs, 1840-1871	958
(i) Hasa under the Amīr Khālīd, 1840-1842	959
(ii) Hasa under the Amīr 'Abdullah, 1842-1843	959
(iii) Hasa under the Amīr Faisal, 1843-1865	959
B. Relations of Hasa with Bahrain, 1840-1871	960
C. British relations with Hasa, 1840-1871	926
(i) Piracies by Hamaid-bin-Majdal, 1845-1854, and his punishment by British	963
(ii) In reply to protest by Turkish Wālī of Baghdad, Resident asserts right of Britain to deal directly with the Wāhhābi Amīr	964
(iii) British operations against Qatif and Dammām, 1866, owing to rupture with the Wāhhābis	964
(iv) Establishment of small Hindu commercial community at Qatif, 1864	965

PERIOD III.

PERIOD III.

1871-1878.

1871-1878.

ANNEXATION OF HASA BY TURKEY, 1871, AND
GENERAL HISTORY, 1871-1878 965

A. The Turkish forward movement, and annexation of Hasa, 1871-1874	966
(i) Principal promoter of the movement Mid-hat Pāsha, Governor of 'Irāq	966

(ii) Discussions between Porte and the British Government	966
(a) Report of intended Turkish expedition by sea from 'Irāq to Qatif to support the Amir' Abdullah in Central Arabia and to establish Ottoman supremacy over "Bahrain, Masqat and the independent tribes of Southern Arabia"	966
(b) Porte gives assurances that its only intention is to restore order in Nejd	966
(iii) British policy in the Gulf in connection with the Turkish expedition	967
(a) Bahrain and the Trucial Shaikhs warned to hold aloof	967
(iv) Occupation by the Turks of the Qatif and Hasa Oasis, 1871	968
(a) Disembarkation at Rās Tanūrah, 26th May 1871	968
(b) Turks were assisted by Shaikh of Kuwait	968
(c) Visit of Mid-hat Pāsha to Hasa, November 1871	970
(v) Proceedings of the Wāhhābis	969
(vi) Negotiations between the Turks and Wāhhābis, 1872	971
B. Internal administration, 1874-1877	972
(i) Installation by the Turks of a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid as Mutasarrif	972
(ii) Rebellion against the Turks, its repression and creation of a separate Basrah Wilāyat including Hasa, 1775	972
C. Serious outbreak of piracy upon the Hasa coast, 1878-1880	973
(i) Various piracies, 1878-1879	973
(ii) Local Turkish and British action, 1878-1881	975
(iii) Denial by Turks of the existence of piracy, 1881	977
D. Discussion as to Turkish jurisdiction and responsibility on the coast of Hasa and orders as to British action in future upon the same, 1878-1881	977
(i) Action by British vessels on the Hasa coast prohibited, 1879	978
(ii) Full liberty of action given to Commander of British ships in Turkish waters, 1881	979

PERIOD IV.

FROM 1878.

PERIOD IV.
FROM 1878.

GENERAL HISTORY OF HASA FROM 1878 979

A. Turkish Governors of Hasa, 1878-1907	979
(i) Hasa again incorporated in Baghdād Wilāyat, 1880	980
(ii) The Basrah districts, including Hasa, finally made into a separate Wilāyat, 1884	980
(iii) Saiyyid Tālib Pasha, son of the Naqīb of Basrah was Mutasarrif of Hasa from 1902-1905	981
(iv) Attempt by Turks to create an ocean port and at Dārīn, 1887	982
B. Political administration and tribal disturbances, 1878-1907	983
(i) Wāhhābi rebellion in the Qatif Oasis, 1878	983
(ii) Help rendered to Turks in Hasa by Shaikh of Kuwait, 1893	985

CHAPTER VI
HASA.

PERIOD IV.
FROM 1878.

(iii) Dhābitīyah posts established by Turks on islands of Musallamīyah and Jinnah	Page. 986
C. Piracies upon the Hasa Coast, 1881-1907	987
(i) Turkish inaction in regard to piracies	987
(ii) Discussions between Britain and the Porte in regard to piracies, 1883-1889	988
(a) Action on land taken by the Turks, 1889	988
(b) Armed boat detailed by the Turks to convoy boats between Qatif and Bahrain, 1892	989
(iii) Discussion as to British policy in regard to piracies, 1891	989
(iv) Reparation for piracies on Bahrain boats refused by the Turks	991
(v) Piracies of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, 1902-1907	991
(vi) British action in regard to Ahmad-bin-Salmān's piracies	993
D. British relations with Hasa, 1871-1907	994
(i) History of the British Indian community established in Qatif in 1864	994
(a) Withdrawal of Hindu merchants from Qatif in 1895	995
(b) Hindu merchants in 1901 offer to contribute towards pay of a British Consular Representative at Qatif and again in 1903	995
(ii) Question of British representation for Hasa considered, 1903	995
E. External relations of Hasa other than those with Great Britain, 1871-1907	996
(i) Relations with Bahrain	996
(a) Massacre of Bahrain Shaikhs and their followers in Hasa and British representations to Porte, 1900-1904	996
(ii) Relations with Qatar and Trucial 'Omān	998
(iii) Relations with Kuwait	998
(a) Turkish Irādē authorised telegraph line from Basrah to Qatif <i>via</i> Kuwait in 1899. Line however not constructed	998
(iv) Relations with Najd	998

CHAPTER VII.
KUWAIT.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF KUWAIT.

PERIOD I.
1716-1795.

PERIOD I.
1716-1795.

FROM FOUNDATION OF KUWAIT IN 1716 TO TEMPORARY LOCATION OF BRITISH FACTORY THERE FROM 1793 TO 1795	1000
A. Early history, 1716-1793—	1000
(i) Foundation of Kuwait in 1716 by the 'Utūb consisting of three divisions, the Jalāhimah, the Āl Khalifah, and the Āl Subāh	1000
(ii) Relations with the Dutch, 1758	1001
(iii) Emigration of the Jalāhimah and Āl Khalifah to Zubārah in Qatars, 1766	1001

CHAPTER V II.
KUWAIT.

PERIOD I.
1716—1795.

(iv) Kuwait trade benefits by capture of Basrah by the Persians in 1776 and British desert mail to Aleppo is despatched from Kuwait	1001
(v) Kuwait a dependency of Basrah in 1775	1002
(vi) Participation of Kuwait in capture of Bahrain, 1783	1003

B. Temporary location of the British Basrah Factory at Kuwait, 1793-1795 1004

(i) Staff of the Factory	1004
(ii) Wahhābi aggressions on Kuwait, 1793-1795	1005

PERIOD II.

PERIOD II
1795—1871.

1795-1871.

FROM THE REMOVAL OF THE BRITISH FACTORY FROM KUWAIT IN 1795 TO THE ANNEXATION OF HASA BY THE TURKS IN 1871 1006

A. Internal and external relations, 1795-1838 1006

(Continued in heading C below.)

(i) Authority of Shaikh of Kuwait acknowledged on the coast as far south as Ras Khafji, 1829	1006
(ii) Relations with Bahrain	1007
(iii) Relations with the Wahhābis	1007
(iv) Relations with Turkey	1008
(a) Shaikh of Kuwait said to acknowledge authority of the Turks in 1829	1008
(v) Relations with 'Arabistān	1008
(vi) Relations with British	1008
(a) Temporary removal of Basrah Residency to Kuwait, 1821-1822	1008

B. Kuwait affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-1840, and up to annexation of Hasa by the Turks in 1871 1009

(i) Posting of an Egyptian agent to Kuwait, 1838	1009
(ii) Shaikh's discourtesy to British Political Officer, 1839	1009
(iii) Question of establishing British settlement at Kuwait instead of Khārag, 1839	1010

C. Internal and external relations, 1840-1871 1010

(Continued in Period III, headings A, B, and D.)

(i) Patriarchal Government of Shaikh Subāh and local conditions, justice, taxes, etc., under his rule	1010
(ii) Relations with Bahrain	1011
(iii) Relations with Najd	1011
(iv) Relations with 'Arabistān	1012

CHAPTER VII.
KUWAIT.

PERIOD II.
1795—1871.

	Page.
(v) Relations with British	1012
(a) Colonel Pelly's visits and remarkable predictions in regard to future of Kuwait as a railway terminus, 1865	1012
(vi) Relations with Turkey	1012
(a) Position of Kuwait <i>vis-a-vis</i> the Porte in 1817 and 1863	1012
(b) Dispute regarding the Süfiyeh estate of the Shaikh on the Shatt-Al-'Arab, 1866	1013
(c) Turkish designs on Kuwait and suspension of British steamer service, 1866	1013

PERIOD III.
1866—1892.

PERIOD III.

1866-1892.

RULE OF SHAIKH 'ABDULLAH-BIN-SUBĀH, 1866-1892 1014

A. Relations of Kuwait with Turkey, 1866-1892 . . . 1014

(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)

(i) Close relations maintained by Shaikh with Turkey	1014
(ii) Assistance rendered to the Turks in annexation of Hasa, 1871	1014
(iii) Turks appear to have considered Kuwait to be annexed at same time as Hasa	1014

B. Relations of Kuwait with Wahhābis, 1866-1892 . . . 1014

C. Relations of Kuwait with the British, 1866-1892 . . . 1015

(Continued in Period IV, heading B.)

(i) British indifference to Kuwait affairs	1015
--	------

D. Relations of Kuwait with Bahrain and Hasa, 1866-1892 . . 1015

PERIOD IV.
1892—1896.

PERIOD IV.

1892-1896.

RULE OF MUHAMMAD-BIN-SUBĀH, 1892-1896 . . . 1016

A. Internal history and relations with Turkey, 1892-1896 . . 1016

(i) Despatch of a force to assist Turkey in Hasa, 1893	1016
(ii) Assassination of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh Mubārak, 1896	1016

B. British relations with Kuwait, 1892-1896 1016

(i) British Ambassador at Constantinople admits, on behalf of Britain Turkish sovereignty along the coast from Basrah to Qatif, 1893	1017
--	------

PERIOD V.

CHAPTER VII
KUWAIT.

FROM 1896.

	Page.
RULE OF MUBĀRAK-BIN-SUBĀH, FROM 1896 . . .	1017

PERIOD V.
FROM 1896.

A. General history from the accession of Shaikh Mubarak in 1896 to the "Exclusive Agreement" in 1899 . . . 1017

(i) Proceedings of the sons of the late Shaikhs who are assisted by Yusuf-bin-Ibrāhīm of Dorah, 1896-1898	1017
(ii) Arrival of a Turkish quarantine official at Kuwait, 1897	1018
(iii) Appointment in 1897 of Shaikh Mubārak as Qaīm-Maqām of Kuwait	1019
(iv) British doubts as to nature of Turkish sovereignty over Kuwait, 1896-1897	1019
(v) Overtures by Shaikh for British protection, 1897	1020
(vi) Mr. Gaskin's visit to Kuwait, 1897	1121
(vii) Shaikh's overtures declined by Britain, 1897	1021
(viii) Renewed overtures by Shaikh, 1897	1022
(ix) Danger to Kuwait from Russia and Turkey, 1898	1022
(x) "Exclusive Agreement" signed 23rd January 1899	1023
(a) Hope also held out to Shaikh that British authorities would do what they could to protect his Fao properties	1024

B. General history from the "Exclusive Agreement" in 1899 to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1904 1024

(i) Shaikh establishes a regular customs at Kuwait and levies duty at 5 per cent.	1024
(ii) Attempts by the Turks to assert their authority at Kuwait and British warning, 1899	1025
(iii) Dalliānce of the Shaikh with Persia, 1899	1025
(iv) Visit of a German Railway Commission to Kuwait, January 1900	1026
(v) British declaration to Turkey and Germany in regard to Kuwait, 1900	1027
(vi) Outbreak of hostilities in Central Arabia—	
(a) Shaikh Mubārak and Shaikh Sa'dūn of the Muntafik allied against Ibn-Rashid	1027
(b) Intervention of the Turks, visit of Shaikh Mubārak to the Wālī of Basrah, and presentation to former of a Turkish decoration	1028
(vii) Invasion of Central Arabia by Shaikh of Kuwait, 1900-1901	1028
(a) Battle of Sarif, 17th March 1901	1029
(viii) Shaikh Mubārak's request for Britain to assume a permanent protectorate over Kuwait repelled, 1901, likewise overtures from Ibn-Rashid	1030
(ix) Attempted attack on Kuwait by the Turks by sea prevented by naval action, August-September 1901	1030
(a) Protests by Turkey and Germany and British reply	1030
(b) Mutual Anglo-Turkish agreement to observe the <i>status quo</i> , 9th September 1901	1031
(x) Panic at Kuwait on approach of Ibn-Rashid, September-October 1901, and British naval assistance given	1031
(xi) Attempts by Turks to upset the <i>status quo</i> and presentation to the Shaikh of an ultimatum, November 1901	1032

CHAPTER VII.
KUWAIT.

PERIOD V.
FROM 1896.

	Page.
(xii) Threatened attack on Kuwait by the Turks and Ibn-Rashid and British naval force landed for protection of Jahrah and Kuwait, December 1901—January 1902	1033
(xiii) Occupation of Safwān, Umm Qasr, and Būbiyān Island by the Turks, 1902	1033
(xiv) Home Government inform Indian Government that they acknowledged Kuwait to be a part of the Ottoman dominions, but that Sultān's authority was unsubstantial and that Shaikh enjoyed a large measure of practical independence, 1902	1034
(xv) Occupation by the Turks of Musallamiyah Island, 1902	1034
(xvi) Other means employed by Turks to harass the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1902	1034
(xvii) Shaikh informed in October 1902 that if he remained at Kuwait and observed his engagement to Britain, latter would defend such of his districts as adjoined Kuwait Bay	1035
(xviii) Attempted attack on Kuwait by Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullāh of Dorah frustrated by British naval action, 1902, and expulsion of Yūsuf to Najd	1036
(xix) Visits to Russian and French war vessels to Kuwait, 1902-1903	1037
(xx) Visit of Lord Curzon, November 1903	1037
 C. Appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1904	1038
(i) Postal agreement with Shaikh, 1904	1038
(ii) Establishment of a British Political Agent, 6th August 1904	1039
(iii) Instructions of the Political Agent on appointment	1039
(iv) Turkish protest at appointment and temporary withdrawal of the Political Agent, 1904-1905	1040
 D. General History, 1904-1907	100
(i) Shaikhs Fao properties and settlement in regard to them at Basrah, 1904	1041
(ii) Discussions regarding Turkish occupation of Būbiyān Island, 1904	1042
 E. Relations with Turkey and Central Arabia, 1904-1907	1042
(i) Mediation of Shaikh Mubārak between the Turks and Ibn-Sa'ūd, 1905	1042
(ii) Turkish mail from 'Irāq to Hasa sent <i>via</i> Kuwait, 1905-1907	1043
 F. British relations, 1904-1907	1044
(i) Kuwait and the Arms Trade, 1906	1044
(ii) Question of a distinctive flag for Kuwait, 1904-1907	1044
(iii) Land explorations and marine surveys, 1904-1907	1045
 G. Relations with Persia, 1904-1907
(i) Harassment of Kuwait subjects by Persian Customs, 1904-1905	1045
(ii) Status and protection of Kuwaitis in Persia, 1904-1906	1046

H. Relations with European powers other than Britain, 1904-1907	Page. 1046	CHAPTER VII. KUWAIT.
(i) Russian and French intrigues, 1904	1046	
(ii) Visit of a representative of Messrs. Wöneckhaus and Company, 1905	1047	PERIOD V. FROM 1896.
I. Internal affairs, 1904-1907	1047	
(i) Finances and increase of taxes	1047	
ANNEXURE No. 1.—Agreement of 23rd January 1892 regard- ing the non-reception of Foreign Representatives and the non-cession of territory to Foreign powers or subjects	1048	

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF NAJD OR CENTRAL ARABIA

CHAPTER VIII.
NAJD.

PERIOD I.

1691-1765.

PERIOD I.
1691—1765.

RISE OF THE WAHHĀBĪ MOVEMENT 1051

A. The Wāhhābī movement 1051

- (i) Birth in 1691 of the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wāhhāb at
Hautah or 'Ayyānah 1051
- (ii) His headquarters at Dara 'iyah 1051
- (iii) His death in 1787 1052

B. Rule of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, before 1765 1053

- (i) Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, Shaikh of Dara'iyah the first secular chief
to adopt Wāhhābī principles 1053
- (ii) Hence the Wāhhābī Amīr always known as "Ibn-Sa'ūd" in
contradistinction to Ibn-Rashīd the Amīr of Jabal Shammar 1053

PERIOD II.

1765—1803.

PERIOD II.
1765—1803.

RULE OF 'ABDUL 'AZĪZ-BIN-MUHAMAD, 1765-1803 1054

A. Affairs in Najd, 1765—1803 1054

- (i) Reduction of Riyādh, 1772 1054
- (ii) Assassination of 'Abdul Azīz, 1803 1054

		Page.
CHAPTER VIII.	B. Operations of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia, 1765-1803	
NAJD.		1054
PERIOD II.	(i) Capture of Taif, Qunfadh, Makkah, and Yanbo, 1802-1803	1055
1765—1803.	C. Operations of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1765-1803	1056
	(i) Wahhābi attacks on Kuwait, 1793-1795	1056
	(ii) Wahhābi conquest of Hassa, 1795	1056
	(iii) Wahhābi intervention in Bahrain, 1802-1803	1056
	(iv) Wahhābi occupation of Baraimi and relations with 'Omān, and Trucial 'Omān, 1800-1803	1057
	D. Aggressions of the Wahhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1765-1803	1057
	(i) First Turkish Expedition against the Wahhābi, 1798-1799	1058
	(ii) Sack of Karbala by the Wahhābis, 1801	1059
	(iii) Turkey's position in Europe, 1768-1807. (Footnote)	1061
PERIOD III.	PERIOD III.	
1803—1814.	1803-1814.	
	RULE OF SA'ŪD-BIN-ABDUL AZĪZ, 1803-1814	1062
	A. The Wahhābis under Sa'ud, 1803-1814	1062
	(i) General administration and divisions of the Wahhābi dominions	1063
	(ii) Financial system of the Wahhābis	1065
	(iii) Military system of the Wahhābis	1066
	B. Affairs in Najd, 1803-1814	1067
	(i) Jauḍ-al 'Amīr added to Wahhābi dominions, 1809	1067
	C. Operations of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia, 1803-1814	1067
	(i) Capture of Madīnah, 1804	1067
	(ii) Plundering of the Yaman Coast, 1804	1068
	(iii) Attitude of the Wahhābis towards the Hajj, 1802-1810	1069
	(iv) Position of Egypt in the Ottoman Empire at this time (Footnote)	1069
	(v) Muhammad 'Ali appointed Pāsha of Egypt, 1804	1068
	(vi) Preparations for the recovery of the Holy Cities	1069
	(vii) Egyptians recover Yanbo, Madīnah, Makkah, Jiddah, and Taif, 1811-1813	1079
	D. Operations of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1803-1814	1073
	(i) Wahhābi action at Kuwait, 1808-1809	1073
	(a) Wahhābis order Bahrain, 'Omān and the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah to take action against Kuwait, 1809	1073
	(ii) Wahhābi action in Bahrain, Qatar, and Hasa	1074
	(a) Wahhābi Governor appointed for the three districts with headquarters at Bahrain, 1810	1074
	(b) Withdrawal of Wahhābis, 1811-1814	1074
	(iii) Wahhābi action in Trucial 'Omān	1074
	(iv) Wahhābi action in 'Omān	1075

	Page.	
E. First contract between British and Wahhābi policy	1076	CHAPTER VIII. NAJD.
(i) Overtures by the Wahhābi Amīr to the British Government, 1811-1812	1077	PERIOD III. 1803—1814.
F. Aggressions of the Wahhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1803-1814	1077	
(i) Wahhābi raids on Basrah, Najaf, etc., and Turkish counter-expeditions	1077	
(ii) British Resident at Basrah builds himself a fortified residence at Gardilān, 1807	1079	
(iii) Wahhābi influence near Karbala, 1812	1079	
G. Aggressions of the Wahhābis on Syria, 1803-1814	1079	

PERIOD IV.

PERIOD IV.
1814—1840.

1814-1840.

FROM COMMENCEMENT OF RULE OF 'ABDULLAH-BIN-SA'ŪD IN 1814 TO EVACUATION OF NAJD AND HASA BY THE EGYPTIANS IN 1840 1080

Rule of 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd, 1814-1818 1080

(i) Operations of the Egyptians in Hijāz and Yaman, 1814-1815	1081
(ii) First invasion of Qasīm by the Egyptians and resulting treaty, 1815	1083
(a) Egyptian forces advance from Madīnah to Rass in Qasīm <i>via</i> Hanakiyah	1084
(b) Wahhābi Amīr recognises Sultān of Turkey as his overlord, 1815	1085
(iii) Second invasion of Qasīm by the Egyptians, 1817-1818	1085
(a) Egyptian victory at Jabal Mawiyah, 1817	1086
(b) Capture by the Egyptians of Khabrah, 'Anaizah and Buraidah, 1817	1086
(c) Capture of Shaqrah, Dhrumah, 'Ayainah and Dara'iyah, 1818	1087
(d) Surrender of Shaikh 'Abdullah to the Egyptians, his removal to Constantinople and decapitation there, 1818 or 1819	1089

B. Interregnum, 1818-1819 1089

(i) First occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1818	1089
(ii) Partial withdrawal of the Egyptians, 1819	1091
(a) Shaikhs of the Bani Khālīd installed as representatives of the Turkish Government in Hasa, 1819	1091

C. Rule of Mashāri-Sbin-a'ūd, 1819-1823 1093

(i) Riyādh now the capital of Southern Najd	1093
---	------

	Page.
CHAPTER VIII.	
NAJD.	
PERIOD IV.	
1814—1840.	
D. Rule of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, 1824-1834	1093
(i) Expulsion of Egyptians from Najd, 1824	1093
(ii) Assassination of Turki in 1834	1094
(iii) Proceedings of the Amīr Turki in Eastern Arabia, 1824-1834 . .	1094
(a) Wahhābi reconquest of Hasa, 1824-1834	1094
(b) Wahhābi relations with Bahrain, 1824-1834	1095
(c) Wahhābi influence in Trucial 'Omān, 1824-1834	1095
(d) Wahhābi relations with 'Omān, 1824-1834	1095
(iv) Relations of the Amīr Turki with the British, 1824-1834	1096
E. Rule of Faisal-bin-Turki (First Reign), 1834-1838	1096
(i) First mention of the founder of the Ibn-Rashīd family, 1835	1097
(ii) Egyptians re-establish their control in Najd, 1835-1838	1097
(a) Surrender and deportation of Faisal and his replacement by the puppet Amīr Khālīd, 1838	1097
(iii) Position of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1834-1838	1098
(a) Relations with Bahrain	1098
(b) Relation with 'Omān	1098
F. Interregnum, 1838-1840	1099
(i) Second occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1838-1840 . .	1099
(a) Virtual direct administration assumed by the Egyptians	1099
(b) Their forward policy in the Persian Gulf region and British opposition	1099
(c) Turkey's position in Europe and Egyptian policy, 1808- 1840. (Footnote)	1100
(ii) Egyptian intrigues in Eastern Arabia, 1838-1840	1100
(a) Egyptians relations with Bahrain. Shaikh of Bahrain agrees to pay tribute to the Egyptians, July 1839 British protest	1101
(b) Egyptian relations with Trucial 'Omān. British measures 1838-1840	1102
(c) Egyptian relations with 'Omān	1103
(d) Egyptian relations with Kuwait	1103
(iii) Evacuation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1840	1103
(a) The Amīr Khālīd left in control	1104

PERIOD V.
1840—1871.

PERIOD V.

1840-1871.

**FROM THE EVACUATION OF NAJD AND HASA BY THE
EGYPTIANS IN 1840 TO THE CONQUEST OF HASA
BY THE TURKS IN 1871**

1104

A. Rule of Khālīd-bin-Sa'ūd, 1840-1842

1104

- (i) Khālīd admits suzerainty of Porte and is appointed Turkish Wālī
of Central Arabia, 1840

1104

	Page.	
(i) Rebellion of 'Abdulah-bin-Thaunniyān and expulsion of the Amīr Khālīd	1105	CHAPTER VIII. NAJD. PERIOD V. 1840—1871.
(iii) Relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1840-1842	1106	
(iv) Relations with Britain, 1840-1842	1106	
(a) Lieutenant Jopp's mission to Hofūf, 1841	1106	
B. Rule of 'Abdullah-bin-Thaunniyān, 1842-1843	1107	
(i) Return of the ex-Amīr Faisal and surrender of 'Abdullah, 1843	1107	
(ii) Relations with Bahrain, 1842-1843	1107	
(iii) Relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1842-1843	1108	
(iv) Relations with British, 1842-1843	1108	
C. Rule of Faisal-bin-Turki (Second Reign), 1843-1865	1109	
(i) General and Internal history, 1843-1865	1109	
(ii) Relations with Turkey and Egypt	1110	
(a) Turks considered Amīr to be Qāim-Maqām of Najd and he was not averse to admit dependence on the Porte when it suited him, 1855, 1860, and 1862	1110	
(iii) Relations with Jabal Shammar, 1843-1865	1111	
(iv) Relations with Kuwait, 1843-1865	1111	
(v) Relations with Bahrain, 1843-1865	1111	
(a) Hostilities with Bahrain and agreement by latter to pay Zakāt	1112	
(b) Various attempts to invade Bahrain frustrated by British action	1112	
(vi) Relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1843-1865	1113	
(a) Activity of the Wahhābis at Baraimi and on the coast	1113	
(vii) Relations with 'Omān, 1843-1865	1115	
(a) Aggressions on 'Omān, 1845, 1853, and 1865	1115	
(b) 'Omān compelled to pay tribute	1115	
(viii) Relations with British, 1843-1865	1116	
(a) British policy as regards Wahhābi action in 'Omān, Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain	1116	
(b) Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, 1865	1118	
(c) Amīr requests that his maritime interests on the Persian Coast might be protected by the Residency	1120	
(ix) Relations with France, 1843-1865	1120	
D. Rule of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal (First Reign), 1865-1871	1121	
(i) Internal position at 'Abdullah's accession, 1865	1121	
(ii) Rupture with British Government, 1865-1866	1121	
(a) Peace arranged 21st April 1866. Wahhābis agree not to interfere with Arab Chiefs in alliance with Britain, especially 'Omān, beyond levy of customary tribute	1124	
(iii) Relations with the Turks, 1866	1125	
(a) Wahhābi mission to Baghdād to complain of British action on the Wahhābi seaboard, 1866	1125	

**CHAPTER VIII.
NAJD.**

PERIOD V.
1840—1871.

	Page.
(iv) Relations with Kuwait, 1865-1871	1126
(v) Relations with Bahrain and Qatar, 1865-1871	1126
(a) Bahrain at this time independent as regards the Island but paying tribute for dependencies in Qatar	1126
(vi) Relations with 'Omān and Trucial 'Omān, 1865-1871	1126
(a) Disappearance of the Wāhhābis from Baraimi, which was captured by 'Omān in 1869	1127
(vii) Rebellion of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal, 1870-1871	1128
(a) Flight of the Amīr 'Abdullah to Jabal Shammar and appeal by him to the Turks for support, 1870-1871	1128

PERIOD VI.
1871—1902.

PERIOD VI.

1871-1902.

**FROM THE CONQUEST OF HASA BY THE TURKS IN
1871 TO THE RECOVERY OF RIYĀDH FROM THE
IBN RASHID OF JABAL SHAMMAR, 1902 1128**

A. Rule of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal, 1871-1875 1128

(i) Turks recognise the ex-Amīr 'Abdullah as Qāim-Maqām of Najd, 1871	1128
(ii) Conquest of Hasa by the Turks with the assistance of the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1871	1129
(iii) Flight of 'Abdullah from the Turks, October 1871	1130
(iv) Political results of annexation of Hasa by Turkey	1132
(v) Policy of the British Government	1130
(vi) Requests of Sa'ūd for British assistance, 1871-1873	1133

B. Rule of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal (Second Reign) 1875-1887 1133

(i) General history, 1875-1881	1133
(a) Dissensions and reconciliations among the Āl Sa'ūd	1134
(b) Position in 1881	1135
(ii) Early hostilities between the Āl Rashīd of Jabal Shammar and the Wāhhābis, 1877-1884	1135
(iii) Continued dissensions of the Āl Sa'ūd and deposition of the Amīr 'Abdullah, 1884-1887	1136
(iv) Relations with the Turks, 1875-1887	1137
(v) Relations with the British, 1875-1887	1137

C. Interregnum, 1887-1902 1138

(i) Conquest of Southern Najd by the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, 1887-1892	1138
(a) Victory of the Ibn-Rashīd at Buraidah, 1891	1139
(ii) Ibn Rashīd professes himself a dependent of the Porte and holds his conquests at their disposal, 1888	1140
(iii) Rumoured expedition by Ibn-Rashīd against Trucial 'Omān, 1888-1889, and British protest to Porte	1140

	Page.	
(iv) Porte replied that no communication existed between Sultān and the Shammar Amīr	1141	CHAPTER VIII. NAJD.
(v) Renewal by the Al Sa'ūd of the struggle for possession of Southern Najd, 1900-1902	1141	PERIOD VI. 1871—1902.
(a) Assistance rendered by Shaikh of Kuwait to 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Faisal	1141	
(b) Defeat of Shaikh of Kuwait at Sharif, 1901	1142	
(vi) Recovery of Riyādh by the Wahhābis, 1902	1143	
(vii) The Ibn Sa'ūd represents to the Porte that the country thus recovered would be ruled by him as a loyal subject of the Sultān	1144	

PERIOD VII.

PERIOD VII.
FROM 1902.

FROM 1902.

RULE OF 'ABDUR RAHMĀN-BIN-FAISAL, FROM 1902 . 1144

A. War between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashid, 1902-1904 . 1144

(i) Ibn-Rashid appeals to the Turks for help, 1902	1144
(ii) Defeat of Ibn-Rashid in Kharj, 1902	1145
(iii) Interview at Kuwait between son of the Wahhābi Amīr and the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr, 1903	1145
(iv) Recovery of Washam and Qasīm by the Wahhābis, 1904	1146

B. Turkish Military Expedition to Qasīm, 1904 1147

(i) Battle of Bukairiyah, 15th July 1904	1147
(ii) Retreat of the Turks to Kahāfah, 1904	1145
(iii) Amicable settlement between Ibn-Sa'ūd and the Porte	1148
(a) Ibn-Sa'ūd appointed Qaim-Maqām of Southern Najd. He agrees to location of Turkish officials in Qasīm, 1905	1149

C. Pacific occupation of Qasīm by the Turks, 1905-1906 . 1149

(i) Civil organisation of the country by the Turks	1150
(ii) Visit of 'Abdul 'Aziz, the Wahhābi Amīr's son to Qatar and intended visit to the Trucial Coast, 1905	1150
(iii) Defeat and death of Ibn Rashid at Ruwaidah, 1906	1151
(iv) Peace declared between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashid, 1906	1153
(v) Attitude of the Turks with reference to the Wahhābi success, 1906	1153

D. Virtual withdrawal of the Turks from Najd, 1906 . . 1154

(i) Political results of the withdrawal	1155
---	------

E. General history of Najd after the Turkish evacuation of Qasīm, 1906-1907 1156

(i) Attitude of Shaikh of Kuwait towards Central Arabian politics	1157
---	------

	Page.
CHAPTER VIII.	
NAJD.	
F. British relations with Central Arabia, 1900-1907	1157
(i) Deputation of Muhammadan agents to Najd contemplated by Government of India, 1901	1157
(ii) British attitude and action in regard to Turkish expedition of 1904	1158
(a) A British Political Agent appointed Kuwait, 1904	1158
(iii) Deputation of a British officer to Riyādh contemplated, 1904	1158
(iv) British attitude towards Ibn-Sa'ūd's designs in the Persian Gulf, 1905-1906	1159
(v) Repeated overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd to the British, 1902 and 1906, and British reply, 1907	1159
ANNEXURE 1.	
Jabal Shammar.	
ANNEXURE No. 1.—History of Jabal Shammar or Northern Najd	1161
(i) Early history of Jabal Shammar and foundation of the Al Rashīd family about 1818 by 'Abdullah-bin-Ali-bin-Rashīd	1161
(ii) Rule of 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, 1835-1847	1162
(a) 'Abdullah appointed "Mahfūdh" of Jabal Shammar by the Wahhābi Amīr, 1835	1162
(b) Overthrow of his rivals the Bait-Ali	1162
(c) Conquest by 'Abdullah of Qasīm, Hāyat, and Jauf-al-Amīr	1162
(iii) Rule of Talal-bin 'Abdullah, 1847-1867	1163
(a) Pretends all his conquests are made in Ottoman interests	1164
(iv) Rule of Mat'ab-bin-'Abdullah, 1867-1871	1164
(v) Rule of Bandar-bin-Talāl, 1871-1872	1165
(vi) Rule of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, 1872-1897	1165
(a) Conquest of Southern Najd by the Shammar Amīr, 1877-1891	1166
(b) Raid by the Amīr on the Syrian border, 1880	1167
(c) Visits of Mr. and Lady Anne Blunt, Mr. Huber and Mr. Doughty	1168
(vii) Rule of Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Mat'ab, 1897-1906	1168
(a) Loss of Southern Najd and Qasīm and reduction of Ibn-Rashīd to dependence on the Porte	1168
(b) Defeat of Shaikh of Kuwait at Sarīf, 1901	1169
(c) Turkish occupation of Qasīm, 1905	1170
(d) Overtures made by the Shammar Amīr to the British, 1901, and British reply	1171
(viii) Rule of Mat'ab-bin-'Abdul Azīz, 1906-1907	1171
(a) Withdrawal of the Turks from Qasīm, 1906	1172
(b) Assassination in 1907 of Mat'ab by the sons of Hamūd and murder of every male descendant of the first "Mah-fūdh" 'Abdullah, except an infant son of 'Abdul 'Azīz who is now at Madīnah	1172
(ix) Rule of Sultan-bin-Hamūd, grand nephew of the first "Mah-fūdh," from 1907	1173
ANNEXURE 2.	
Qasim.	
ANNEXURE No. 2.—History of the Qasīm district	1173
(i) Early history of Qasīm	1173
(ii) Occupation of Qasīm by the Egyptians, 1815, and 1817-1824	1173
(iii) Wahhābi reconquest of Qasīm through the Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar, 1835	1174

	Page.	
(iv) Second occupation of Qasim by the Egyptians, 1837-1842 . . .	1174	CHAPTER VIII.
(v) General history, 1842-1891	1174	NAJD.
(a) Hostilities with the Wahhābis, 1842-1862	1174	ANNEXURE 2,
(b) Virtual independence of Qasim, 1862-1880	1176	Qasim.
(c) Qasim conquered by the Ibn-Rashid, 1880-1891	1177	
(vi) Qasim, a district of Jabal Shammar, 1891-1904	1177	
(a) Wahhābi reconquest of Qasim, 1904	1177	
(vii) Turkish invasion of Qasim, 1904, and occupation of the district from 1905 to 1906	1177	
(a) In 1907 there are less than 50 Turkish troops in the district	1178	

CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER IX TURKISH 'IRAQ.

HISTORY OF TURKISH 'IRAQ.

PERIOD I.

PERIOD I. 1603—1617.

1603-1617.

	Page.
REIGN OF AHMAD I, 1603-1617	1179
A. Relations with Persia, 1603-1617	1180
<i>(Continued in Period II, headings A and B (i).)</i>	
(i) Hostilities with Persia and investment of Baghdād in 1605	1180
B. Internal History, 1603-1617	1180
<i>(Continued in Period II, heading B (ii).)</i>	
(i) Baghdād in 1604	1180
(ii) The Karbala-Najaf frontier in 1604	1181
(iii) Basrah in 1604	1181
C. English relations, 1603-1617	1182
<i>(Continued in Period II, heading B (iii).)</i>	

PERIOD II.

PERIOD II. 1617—1640.

1617-1640.

REIGNS OF MUSTAFA I (FIRST REIGN), 'OTHMĀN II, MUSTAFA I, (SECOND REIGN) AND MURĀD IV, 1622-1640	1182
A. Reigns of Mustafa I (first reign) and 'Othmān II, 1617-1622	1182
(i) Peace concluded with Persia	1182

	Page.
CHAPTER IX. TURKISH IRAQ.	
B. Reigns of Mustafa I (second reign) and Murād IV, 1622-1640	1182
PERIOD II. 1617—1640.	
(i) Relations with Persia, 1622-1640	1183
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading A.)</i>	
(a) Occupation of Baghdād by the Persians, 1623	1183
(b) Attacks on Basrah by the Persians in 1624 and 1625	1183
(c) Recovery of Baghdād by the Turks, 1638	1185
(d) Peace with Persia, 1639, and common frontier fixed	1186
(ii) Internal history, 1622-1640	1186
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)</i>	
(iii) English relations, 1622-1640	1188
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading A.)</i>	
(a) Beginning of English trade at Basrah, 1635	1188
(iv) French relations, 1622-1640	1188
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading C.)</i>	
(a) First Bishop of Babylon appointed, 1688	1188
PERIOD III. 1640—1648.	PERIOD III.
1640-1648.	
REIGN OF IBRĀHĪM, 1640-1648	1188
A. English relations, 1640-1648	1188
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Provisional English Factory comes into existence at Basrah, 1643	1189
(ii) Portuguese and Dutch rivalry, 1640-1648	1189
PERIOD IV. 1648—1687.	PERIOD IV.
1648-1687.	
REIGN OF MUHAMMAD IV, 1648-1687	1189
A. Internal affairs, 1648-1687	1189
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading B.)</i>	
B. English relations, 1648-1687	1191
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Seizure of the Basrah Factory by the Pasha, 1657	1191
(ii) The "Capitulations" concluded, 1661, and amplified, 1675	1192
C. French relations, 1648-1687	1192
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading E.)</i>	
(i) Superior of the Carmelites at Basrah appointed <i>ex-officio</i> French Consul, 1679	1192

PERIOD V.

1687-1730.

CHAPTER IX.
TURKISH 'IRAQ.

Page.

PERIOD V.
1687—1730

REIGNS OF ŠULAIMĀN II, AHMAD II, MUSTAFA II, AND AHMAD III, 1687-1730	1192
--	------

A. Relations with Persia after the Afghan occupation in 1722	1192
---	------

(Continued in Period VI, heading A.)

(i) Proposed partition of North-Western Persia between the Turks and Russians	1192
--	------

B. Internal affairs, 1687-1730	1193
--	------

(Continued in Period VI, heading B.)

(i) Persian occupation of Basrah ending 1691	1193
--	------

(ii) Amalgamation of the Baghdād and Basrah Governments, 1723	1193
---	------

English relations, 1687-1730	1194
--	------

(Continued in Period VI, heading C.)

(i) Permanent English Factory established at Basrah, about 1723	1195
---	------

(ii) The Company's representative, apparently possessed Consular status in 1727	1197
--	------

PERIOD VI.

1730-1754.

PERIOD VI.
1730—1754.

REIGN OF MAHMUD I, 1730-1754	1197
--	------

A. Relations with Persia, 1730-1754	1197
---	------

(Continued in Period VIII, heading B.)

(i) Nādir Shāh's operations against Baghdād, 1733	1197
---	------

(ii) Nādir Shāh's operations against Basrah, 1741	1199
---	------

(iii) Renewal in 1746 with Persia of the Treaty of 1639 fixing the Turko-Persian boundary	1199
--	------

B. Internal affairs, 1730-1754	1199
--	------

(Continued in Period VIII, heading A.)

C. British relations, 1730-1754	1202
---	------

(Continued in Period VII, heading A.)

(i) Political and General, 1730-1754	1202
--	------

(ii) Trade, consulage and dues of the East India Company, 1730-1754	1204
---	------

(iii) Establishments of the East India Company, 1730-1754	1206
---	------

D. The Dutch in Turkish 'Iraq, 1730-1754	1207
--	------

(Continued in Period VIII, heading E.)

(i) Arrest of Baron Kniphausen and withdrawal of the Dutch Resi- dency from Basrah, 1752	1207
---	------

	Page.
CHAPTER IX	
TURKISH 'IRAQ.	
E. The French in Turkish 'Iraq, 1730-1754	1208
<i>(Continued in Period VII, heading A.)</i>	
PERIOD VI.	
1730—1754.	(i) French consular system at Baghdād and Basrah remodelled, 1740 1208
PERIOD VII.	
1754-1757.	
REIGN OF 'OTHMĀN III, 1754-1757	1208
A. French and British relations, 1755-1756	1209
<i>(Continued in Period VIII, headings C and D)</i>	
PERIOD VIII.	
1757—1773.	
PERIOD VIII.	
1757-1773.	
REIGN OF MUSTAFA III, 1757-1773	1210
A. Internal affairs, 1757-1773	1210
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Pāshas of Baghdād, 1757-1773	1210
(ii) Mutassallims of Basrah, 1757-1773	1212
(iii) Description of local administration in Turkish 'Iraq in 1758 and 1765	1213
(iv) Internal tribal affairs, 1757-1773	1215
B. Relations with the Ka'ab, 1757-1773	1217
<i>(Continued in Period IX, headings C, D, and E.)</i>	
(i) Anglo-Turkish expeditions against the Ka'ab, 1761, 1763, 1765, and 1766-1768	1217
(ii) Intervention of Karīm Khān, 1765 and 1767	1218
C. British relations, 1757-1773	1221
<i>(Continued in Period IX, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Political and general, 1757-1773	1221
(a) Basrah "Residency" raised to the status of an "Agency" on transfer of the British headquarters from Bandar 'Abbās, 1763	1222
(b) "Consulary Birat" obtained 1764 by which the Porte recognised the Agent of the East India Company as British Consul	1223
(c) Temporary establishment of a Residency at Baghdād, 1765-1766	1225
(d) Withdrawal of the Agency Staff to Bombay owing to plague, 1773	1228
(ii) Trade of the East India Company, 1757-1773	1230
(iii) Establishments of the East India Company, 1757-1773	1232
(iv) Overland communication between Basrah and Europe, 1757-1773	1237

	Page.	
D. The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757-1773 . . .	1238	CHAPTER IX. TURKISH 'IRAQ.
(Continued in Period IX, heading G.)		
(i) The French position in 1765-1766 . . .	1239	PERIOD VIII. 1757—1773.
E. Other European nations in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757-1773 . .	1230	
(i) Disappearance of the Portuguese . . .	1231	
(ii) Disappearance of the Dutch . . .	1239	
(iii) Several Italian merchants at Basrah . . .	1239	
PERIOD IX.		PERIOD IX. 1773—1789.
1773-1789.		
REIGN OF ABDUL HAMĪD I, 1773-1789 . . .	1240	
A. Situation in Europe, 1773-1789 . . .	1240	
(Continued in Period X, heading A.)		
(i) Wars with Russia . . .	1240	
(a) Annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783 . . .	1240	
B. Internal affairs and British relations, 1773-1775 . .	1241	
(Continued in headings C, D, E and F below.)		
(i) Return of the British Agency from Bombay, 1774 . . .	1241	
(ii) Principal items of public revenue in 1773 . . .	1243	
(iii) Customs and consular of the East India Company in 1763 . .	1244	
C. Occupation of Basrah by the Persians, 1775-1779 . .	1244	
(i) Withdrawal of the British Agency from Basrah to Būshehr, 11th to 15th April 1775 . . .	1255	
(ii) Surrender of Basrah by the Turks, 15th April 1776 . . .	1261	
(iii) Return of the British Agency to Basrah, May 1776 . . .	1262	
(iv) Reduction of the Agency at Basrah to a Residency, 1778 . .	1267	
(v) The "Desert Mail" despatched from Kuwait instead of Basrah, 1778 . . .	1268	
D. Recovery of Basrah by the Turks, 1779 . . .	1269	
(i) Death of Karīm Khān and evacuation of Basrah by the Persians, 1779 . . .	1269	
(ii) Return of Sulāimān from Shīrāz and his appointment to the Pashāliq of Baghdad, 1779 . . .	1271	
E. Internal affairs, 1779-1789 . . .	1272	
(Continued in Period X, heading B.)		
(i) Turkish campaign against the Ka'ab, 1784 . . .	1272	
(ii) Capture of Basrah by the Muntafik and their eventual defeat by the Turks, 1787 . . .	1274	
(iii) Trade and duties on goods, 1790 . . .	1275	

	Page.
CHAPTER IX. F. British relations, 1779-1789	1277
TURKISH 'IRAQ.	

(Continued in Period X, heading C.)

PERIOD IX.	(i) Political and General, 1779-1789	1277
1773—1789.	(ii) Establishments of the East India Company, 1779-1789	1279
	(a) Institution of a Native Agency at Baghdād, 1783	1279

G. The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1779-1789	1280
---	------

(Continued in Period X, heading D.)

PERIOD X.
1789—1807.

PERIOD X.

1789-1807.

REIGN OF SALIM III, 1789-1807	1280
---	------

A. Situation in Europe, 1789-1807	1280
---	------

(Continued in Period XI, heading A.)

(i) Wars with Russia, Austria, France and Britain	1281
---	------

B. Internal and local external affairs, 1789-1802	1281
---	------

(Continued in headings E and F below.)

(i) Resources and revenue of the Baghdād Pāshāliq in 1796-1797	1282
(ii) Death of Sulaimān Pāsha, 7th August 1802	1281
(iii) Invasions by, and expeditions against, the Wahhābi, 1789-1802	1285
(a) Sack of Karbala, 1801	1286
(iv) Relations with Persia, 1789-1802	1287

(Continued in Period XI, heading C.)

(a) Collision with the Ka'ab, 1791	1287
(b) Relations with 'Omān, 1798	1287

(Continued in Period XI, heading D.)

C. British relations, 1789-1802	1288
---	------

(Continued in heading G below.)

(i) Political and General, 1789-1802	1288
(a) Removal of the Basrah Residency to Kuwait, 1793-1795	1289
(b) Return of the Residency, 1795	1290
(c) Establishment of a British Residency at Baghdād, 1798, with a view to counteracting Napoleon's schemes on the East	1271
(d) Relative positions of the Resident at Baghdād and Basrah	1291
(ii) British official matters, 1789-1802	1295
(a) The British "Desert Mail," 1793-1802	1296
(b) A surgeon and a military guard provided for the Resi- dency at Baghdād, 1800	1296
(c) Annual cost of the Basrah Residency, 1801	1297

D. The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802	Page. 1297	CHAPTER IX. TURKISH 'IRAQ.
(Continued in Period XI, heading F.)		
E. Interregnum at Baghdād, August 1802	1298	PERIOD X. 1789—1807.
(i) Conflict between the Āgha of Janissaries and 'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah, and defeat of the former	1298	
F. Internal affairs, 1802-1807	1300	
(Continued in Period XI, heading B.)		
(i) Appointment of 'Ali Pāsha as Pāsha, 1802, and his assassination in 1807	1300	
G. British relations, 1802-1807	1301	
(i) Political and general, 1802-1807	1301	
(Continued in Period XI, heading E.)		
(a) Baraāt obtained from Porte recognising Resident at Baghdād as British Consul, 2nd November 1802	1301	
(b) Readjustment of the Turkish customs tariff, 1805	1303	
(ii) British official matters, 1802-1807	1305	
(Continued in Period XI, heading G.)		
(a) Orders regarding correspondence with India of the Residents at Baghdād and Basrah, 1806. Both placed under the immediate orders of the Bombay Government	1306	

PERIOD XI.

PERIOD XI.
1807—1839.

1807-1839.

REIGNS OF MUSTAFA IV, 1807-1808, AND MAHMŪD II, 1803-1839 1307

A. Situation in Europe, 1807-1839 1307

(Continued in Period XII, heading A.)

B. Internal affairs, 1807-1839 1308

(Continued in Period in XII, headings B and C.)

(i) Campaign in Kurdistan, 1812	1310
(ii) Hostilities with the Muntafik, 1813	1311
(iii) Further hostilities in Kurdistan, 1821	1313
(iv) First Pāsha of Turkish blood appointed, 1831	1314
(v) Tribal difficulties, 1832-1834	1316

C. Relations with Persia, 1807-1839 1319

(Continued in Period XII, heading D.)

(i) First Treaty of Erzeroum, 28th July 1823, re-establishing boundary of 1639	1319
--	------

CHAPTER IX.
TURKISH 'IRAQ.PERIOD XI.
1807—1839.

	(i) Capture and evacuation of Muhammarch by the Turks, 1837	Page. 1319
	(a) Shaikh of the Ka'ab pledges his allegiance to Basrah but not so the Shaikh of the Muhaisin	1320
D. Relations with other countries in the Persian Gulf, 1807-1839		1320
	(i) Hostilities with 'Omān, 1826	1320
E. British relations, 1807-1839		1320
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading E.)</i>		
	(i) Pāsha engages not to interfere with Residency "states and ceremonies," especially celebration of the King's birthday, 1809-1810	1321
	(ii) Decrees references surrender of British deserters and enslavement of British Indian subjects	1323
	(iii) Disregard of European treaty rights and rupture with Dawud Pāsha, 1820	1325
	(a) Temporary withdrawal of the Assistant Political Agent from Basrah to Muhammarch, 1820	1325
	(b) Attack on Agency at Baghdād by Turkish troops, 1821	1325
	(c) Withdrawal of the Political Agent from Baghdād to Basrah and thence to Būshehr, 1821	1327
	(d) Apology demanded and withdrawal from Basrah to Kuwait, 1821	1328
	(e) Final settlement, 1823	1329
	(iv) Pāsha's request for arms and military officers refused, 1828	1331
F. Relations with European countries other than Britain, 1807-1839		1333
<i>(Continued in Period XII, heading II.)</i>		
	(i) Relations with France	1333
	(a) Precedence claimed by French Consul who is informed by Pāsha that British representative is a "Resident Minister," 1819	1333
	(ii) Attitude of Russia after 1833	1334
G. British official matters, 1807-1839		1334
<i>(Continued in Period XII, headings F and G.)</i>		
	(i) Amalgamation of the Baghdād and Basrah Residencies with headquarters at Basrah, 1809-1810	1334
	(ii) Conversion of the Residency at Basrah into a "Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq," 1812	1335
	(iii) Introduction of a system of passports, 1821	1336
	(iv) "Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq" included in the "Political Agency in the Gulf of Persia," 1822	1336
	(v) Reinstitution of the "Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and reduction of Basrah to a Native Agency, 1822	1336
	(vi) "Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq" made subordinate to the Resident at Bushehr as regards the maritime Arabs and the Persian Coast, 1824	1337
	(vii) Political Agent cautioned against regarding Pāsha as independent of the Porte and exhorted to bear in mind his own subordination to the British Ambassador at Constantinople	1338

(viii) The Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq placed in 1835 under the direct authority of the Government of India, as also is the Residency at Būshehr, correspondence however being sent under flying seal through the Government of Bombay	1339
(ix) Introduction of steam navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris by a British expedition under Colonel F. R. Chesney, 1834-1837	1340
(a) Navigation Farmān of 1834	1341
(b) Navigation of the Tigris, Euphrates and Kārūn	1342
(x) Experiment in overland communication for the Indo-European mails by the Euphrates route discontinued, but Lieutenant Lynch directed to continue surveys	1343
(xi) Abolition of the "Desert Mail," 1833	1344
(xii) Organisation of a "Dromedary Post" between Bairūt and Basrah <i>viâ</i> Damascus and Hit, 1836	1344

H. Trade in Turkish 'Irāq, 1807-1839	1345
--	------

PERIOD XII.

PERIOD XII.
1839—1861.

1839-1861.

REIGN OF 'ABDUL MAJID, 1839-1861	1345
--	------

A. Situation in Europe, 1839-1861	1345
---	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading A.)

(i) Sultān confers Pāshāliq of Egypt on Muhammad 'Ali and his descendants, 13th February 1841	1346
(ii) Convention of London, 13th July 1841, by which Dardanelles and Bosphorus are closed to foreign men of war	1346
(iii) Crimean War, 1854-1856, and Treaty of Paris, 30th March 1856	1347

B. Internal Affairs, 1839-1861	1348
--	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading C.)

(i) Rebellion at Karbala, its suppression and general massacre, 1842-1843	1349
(ii) Tribal disturbances	1358
(iii) The Baghdād Pāshāliq in 1854	1368

C. Turkish administrative arrangements, 1839-1861	1371
---	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading D.)

(i) Separation of Basrah from Baghdād and its erection into a Pashaliq, 1850	1373
--	------

D. Relations with Persia, 1839-1861	1373
---	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading B.)

(i) Frontier questions and "Second" Treaty of Erzeroum, 1847	1373
(a) Terms of the Treaty	1376
(ii) Extra-territorial jurisdiction denied to Persian Consuls, 1849	1385

CHAPTER IX. TURKISH IRAQ.	E. British relations, 1839-1861	Page. 1386
------------------------------	---	---------------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading E.)

PERIOD XII.
1839—1861.

(i)	Question of British commercial navigation of the Tigris and its settlement, 1845-1846	1388
(ii)	British Indian subjects at Najaf, 1852	1391
(iii)	Commencement of British commercial steam navigation on the Tigris, 1859-1861	1391

F. British official establishments, enterprises and policy, 1839-1861	1392
---	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading F.)

(i)	Consular status of the Political Agent at Baghdād explained by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and dual nature of his charge <i>vis-à-vis</i> the Government of India specifically recognised, 1744	1395
(ii)	Baghdād post raised to a Consulate-General, 1851	1395
(iii)	British military guard at Baghdād, 1339-1361	1395
(iv)	British representation at Basrah	1396
(v)	British representation at Najaf, 1854	1397
(vi)	Formation of a British armed flotilla in Mesopotamian waters, 1839-1840	1397
(a)	Lieutenant H. B. Lynch appointed to command	1397
(b)	Reduction of the flotilla to one vessel, 1842	1399
(vii)	Question of the retention of a British armed steamer on the Tigris, 1844-1845	1399
(a)	The Nitocris replaced by the "Comet," 1852	1401
(viii)	British steamer depôts at Basrah and Baghdād, 1839-1858	1401
(ix)	British explorations and surveys, 1839-1861	1403
(x)	British archæological enterprises, 1839-1861	1404
(xi)	The British Dromedary Mail, 1839-1861	1405
(xii)	Policy of local British officers, 1839-1861	1405
(xiii)	Proposed British Euphrates Valley Railway, 1856-1857	1407
(xiv)	Grant by His Highness Mir Nāsir Khān of Sind for the clearance of the Husainiyah canal, 1836-1842	1408

G. The Oudh Bequest, 1849-1861	1409
--	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading G.)

(i)	Origin of the "Oudh Bequest," 17th August 1825	1409
(ii)	Coming into operation of the Oudh Bequest, 1849	1411
(iii)	Results locally of the bequest	1414

H. Relations with European countries other than Britain, 1839-1861	1415
--	------

(Continued in Period XIII, heading H.)

(i)	Relations with France	1415
-----	---------------------------------	------

PERIOD XIII.

CHAPTER IX.
TURKISH 'IRAQ.

	1861-1876.	Page.	PERIOD XIII. 1861—1876.
REIGNS OF 'ABDUL 'AZİZ, 1861-1876 AND MÜRAD V, 1876			
A. Situation in Europe, 1861-1876		1416	
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, heading A.)</i>			
(i) Modification obtained in 1871 by Russia of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 enabling her and Turkey to maintain armaments in the Black Sea		1417	
B. Relations with Persia, 1861-1876		1417	
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, heading F.)</i>			
(i) Visit of H. M. Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh to Turkish 'Irāq, 1870-1871		1417	
(ii) Turco-Persian frontier question, 1861-1876		1423	
(a) Turco-Persian convention of 1869		1423	
(iii) Convention of 1875 regarding the powers of Persian Consular officers and immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey		1425	
C. Internal affairs, 1861-1875		1425	
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, headings B, C and D.)</i>			
(i) Tribal difficulties		1426	
(a) Muntafik troubles, 1863-1866		1426	
(b) Khazā'il troubles, 1864-1866		1434	
(c) Depredations of the Hamawand, 1865		1435	
(d) The 'Anizah and Shammar, 1865		1436	
(ii) First "Wali" appointed to Baghdād in the person of Midhat Pāsha, 1869		1439	
D. Internal administrative arrangements, 1861-1876		1446	
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, headings B, C and D.)</i>			
(i) Basrah again reduced to the status of a Qa'im-Maqāmlīq under Baghdād, 1863		1446	
(ii) Annexation of Hasa and formation of a Wilāyat of Basrah, 1871- 1875		1446	
(iii) Regulation of the civil administration, 1869		1447	
(iv) Turkish Government steamers, 1863-1876		1448	
E. British relations, 1861-1876		1450	
<i>(Continued in Period XIV, headings L, M, N, O and P.)</i>			
(i) British commercial navigation of the Tigris, 1861-1875		1450	
(ii) Proposed British Euphrates Valley Railway, 1871-1872		1453	
(a) Views of the House of Commons Committee, 1872		1455	

CHAPTER IX.
TURKISH 'IRAQ.

F. British official establishments and enterprises, 1861-1876 . . . 1461

PERIOD XIII.
1861—1876.*(Continued in Period XIV, headings L, M, N, O and P.)*

(i) Institution of a British Mail Service between Turkish 'Irāq and India, 1862-1863	1461
(ii) Decline of the British Dromedary Post	1461
(iii) Construction of telegraphic lines, 1861-1865	1461
(iv) Attitude of Nāmiq Pāsha towards British interests and communications with the tribes	1465
(v) Removal of Government steamer depôt from Magil to Basrah, 1869-1873	1466
(vi) The British Government steamer "Comet" and recommendation by the Government of India for its abolition, 1873	1467
(a) Question of salutes by the "Comet"	1469
(vii) Question of the freedom of the Shatt-al-'Arab above Basrah for foreign warships, 1874	1470
(viii) Reconversion of the "Political Agency" at Baghdād into a "Residency," but official title of Political Agent still retained, 1873	1470
(ix) Status of the British Resident at Baghdād qua "Consul" and qua "Resident," 1874	1471
(x) British representation at Basrah, 1861-1873	1472
(a) Designation of British representative at Basrah changed from "British Agent" to "Assistant Political Agent," 1873	1473
(xi) Question of a British Vice-Consul at Baghdād, 1868	1473
(xii) Official residence of the British representative at Basrah, 1861-1875	1474
(xiii) The Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, 1865-1866	1475
(xiv) Case of Nawāb Tāj Mahall, 1875-1876	1476

G. The Oudh Bequest, 1861-1876 1477

(Continued in Period XIV, heading Q.)

H. Relations with European powers other than Britain . . . 1484

(Continued in Period XIV, heading H.)

(i) Relations with France	1484
(a) French scheme for commercial navigation on the Tigris, 1864	1484

PERIOD XIV.
FROM 1876.

PERIOD XIV.

FROM 1876.

REIGN OF 'ABDUL HAMID II, FROM 1876.

A. Situation in Europe, from 1876 1485

(i) Turco-Russian war, 1877, and treaty of Berlin, 13th July 1878	1485
(ii) The Turkish constitution of 1876	1486
(iii) The British occupation of Egypt, 1879-1882	1487

(iv) Creation of the "Public Debt Department" under international control, 1881	1487
(v) Turco-Grecian war, 1897	1487
(vi) Frontier difficulties with Britain at Aden in 1901-1902 and in Egypt in 1906	1488
(vii) Rise of the "Young Turk" party	1488
B. Features of the Period in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905	1489
(i) Effects of the Turco-Russian war, 1877-1878	1490
(ii) General state of Turkish 'Irāq about 1878	1490
(a) Foundation of a Jewish school, 1864	1491
(iii) Administrative organisation of Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905	1492
(a) Combinations and separations of the Baghdād and Basrah Wilayāts ending finally in separation in 1886	1493
(iv) Xenophobia in Turkish official circles after internal reforms	1493
C. Government, internal and tribal affairs of the Baghdād Wilayāt, 1876-1905	1495
(i) The Wālis of Baghdād, 1876-1905	1495
(ii) Internal affairs, 1876-1905	1496
(iii) Tribal affairs, 1876-1905	1499
(a) The Hamawand, about 1886	1500
(b) The Northern Shammar to 1889	1500
D. Government, internal and tribal affairs of the Basrah Wilayāt, 1875-1905	1502
(i) The Wālis of Basrah, 1876-1905	1502
(ii) Internal affairs, 1876-1905	1504
(iii) Tribal affairs, 1876-1905	1505
(a) Bani Lām troubles, 1878-1879	1505
(b) Āl Bū Muhammad disturbances, 1878-1880	1506
(c) Muntafik rebellion, 1881	1506
(d) Rebellion of the Bani Asad, 1899-1900	1508
(e) Rebellion of Sa'dūn Pāsha of the Muntafik, 1900-1905	1509
E. Relations with Kuwait and Najd, 1876-1905	1510
F. Relations with Persia, 1876-1905	1510
(i) Turco-Persian Frontier disputes	1510
(a) Question of Shalbah Island, 1877-1884	1510
(ii) Persian subjects (Arab tribesmen) on the right bank of the Shatt-el-Arab	1512
(iii) Persian pilgrimages and the Turkish quarantine service. Agreement come to in 1878	1514
(iv) Turkish fort at Fao, 1885-1905	1514
(v) Other Turkish ports on the Shatt-el-'Arab	1517
(vi) Projected Turkish quarantine station at Fao, 1891-1897	1518
(vii) Collection of Turkish customs at Fao from vessels bound for Muhammareh, 1893-1894	1518
(viii) The Mujtahids of Turkish 'Irāq and Persian affairs, 1903-1905	1519

**CHAPTER IX.
TURKISH 'IRAQ.**

	Page.
G. Piracies on the Shatt-el-'Arab, 1888-1905	1522
(i) Preventive measures by Turks and Persians and British naval ship, stationed in Shatt-el-'Arab, 1896	1524
(ii) Failure of a British attempt to promote co-operation between the Turkish and Persian authorities, 1904	1529
H. Relations with European powers other than Britain, 1876-1905	1529
(i) French, American, and German Archæological excavations	1530
(ii) Visit of Russian war vessels to Basrah, 1900	1530
I. Navigation questions in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905	1530
(i) Lynch and Coy.'s fleet, 1876-1878	1531
(ii) Turkish river steamer in 1878	1531
(iii) Question of the right of British steamers to tow barges, 1880-1881	1533
(iv) Attempt by the Turkish Government to prevent British navigation on the Tigris, 1883	1534
(v) Formation of an Ottoman Navigation Company, 1892	1538
(vi) Institution of the (Turkish) Hamīdiyyah Navigation Office, 1904-1905	1540
(vii) Application by Messrs. Lynch for permission to run a third steamer, 1905	1540
(viii) Lease of the Turkish steamers sought by Sir G. Mackenzie, 1905	1541
J. Irrigation and river control questions in Turkish 'Irāq	1541
(i) The Euphrates	1541
(ii) The Tigris	1542
(iii) Sir W. Willecock's projects for irrigation of Mesopotamia, 1903-1905	1543
K. Land communications in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1904	1543
(i) Establishment by the Turks of a camel post between Baghdād and Damascus, 1881	1544
(ii) British railway schemes, 1878-1879	1544
(iii) German Baghdād railway scheme and concession, 1898-1905	1545
L. British relations with Arabs and Persians in 'Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905	1548
(i) Case of Quāsim Pāsha az-Zuhair, 1883	1550
(ii) Applications by Muntafik tribesmen for British protection, 1899-1902	1551
(iii) Relations of British officials with the Persian Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf, 1903	1551
(iv) The Naqib of Baghdād	1553
(v) Turkish naval activity, 1898-1899	1554

PERIOD XIV.
FROM 1876.

	Page.	CHAPTER IX. TURKISH 'IRAQ.
M. British Government vessels in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905	1553	
(i) Right of British war vessels to navigate above Qūrnah or Basrah, 1881	1555	PERIOD XIV. FROM 1876.
(ii) Question of British war vessels at Basrah, 1883-1886	1555	
(iii) Question of the "Comet" proceeding above Basrah, 1885-1894	1556	
N. Official questions between Turkish and British authorities, 1876-1905	1557	
(i) Opposition to British Post Offices, 1881-1887	1560	
(ii) Question of official tours by the Resident, 1885	1560	
(iii) Direct landing from steamers at the British Residency, Baghdād, prohibited, 1888-1889	1562	
(iv) Prohibition on the importation of loaded cartridges, 1891	1562	
(v) Vexatious interference with British Indian sailing vessels on the Shatt-el-'Arab, 1893-1898	1563	
(a) Intimation to Turkish Government in regard to search of, or interference with British vessels on the Shatt-el-'Arab, 1896	1565	
(b) Settlement reached by threat to appoint a British Consular Officer at Fao, December 1896	1565	
(vi) Abuse of quarantine by the Turks on the Shatt-el-'Arab, 1890-1905	1566	
O. British official matters and interests, 1876-1905	1567	
(i) Appointment of British representative at Baghdād styled "Resident," 1880	1567	
(ii) General status and extent of jurisdiction of the British Resident at Baghdād, 1884-1888	1567	
(a) Orders of the Home Government in above connection, 1888	1569	
(b) Use of the title "Resident" when addressing Foreign Consuls and Turkish officials, 1903-1904	1570	
(iii) Question of official calls on Sultān's birthday and national fête days, 1889	1574	
(iv) Question of an Assistant to the Resident at Baghdād, 1881-1891	1575	
(v) Appointment of a Commercial Assistant to the Resident, 1904-1905	1577	
(vi) The new "Comet," 1884	1578	
(a) Question of the employment of a lascar guard from the "Comet" for the custody of prisoners	1582	
(vii) The Residency building at Baghdād		
(viii) British representation at Karbala and Kādhimain, 1876, 1903	1585	
(a) Appointment of a British Consular Agent at Karbala,	1587	
1893	1587	
(b) Appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Karbala and abolition of the Khādhimain Agency, 1903	1587	
(ix) British representation at Basrah, 1876-1898	1588	
(a) Status of Basrah post raised from a Vice-Consulate to a Consulate but to remain under the jurisdiction of His Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdād, 1879	1588	
(b) Question of detaining an exequatur for an acting incumbent, 1884	1589	

**CHAPTER IX.
TURKISH 'IRAQ.**

PERIOD XIV.
FROM 1876.

	Page.
(c) Transfer of the Basrah appointment to Her Majesty's Government, 1897-1898	1589
(d) Allowance for a medical officer at Basrah, from 1890	1590
(e) Official residence of the British representative at Basrah, 1878-1903	1590
(x) British representation at Mūsāl, 1876-1905	1592
(xi) Proposed British Consular Agency at Fao, 1894-1896	1592
(xii) British Indian post offices in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905	1592
P. Special British Indian interests, 1876-1905	1593
(i) The Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah and his affairs, 1876-1887	1593
(ii) The Khulsūm Nisa Begam's case, 1876-1879	1597
(iii) Ahmad 'Alī Khān (Ahmad Agha) Native Agent of the Baghdad Residency, from 1875	1598
(iv) Movements of Ayūb Khān, 1888	1598
Q. The Oudh Bequest, 1876-1905	1598

ANNEXURE 1.
Journey to
Baghdad, 1583.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—Journey of English Travellers to Baghdad, 1583	1616
---	-------------

ANNEXURE 2.
Establishment of
Baghdad Resi-
dency, 1798.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—Correspondence relating to the establishment of the British Residency at Baghdad, 1798	1620
---	-------------

PART II.

CHAPTER X.

**CHAPTER X.
'ARABISTAN.**

HISTORY OF 'ARABISTAN.

PERIOD I.
1604—1797.

PERIOD I.

1604-1797.

GENERAL HISTORY DURING 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES, 1604-1797	1625
--	-------------

A. Rise to power of the Ka'ab. Anglo-Turkish expeditions and expeditions by Karīm Khān Zand against them	1628
---	-------------

(i) Destruction in 1765 by Karīm Khān of Deraq and the Sābleh dam and transfer of the Ka'ab Capital from Qubbān to Fallahiyeh	1630
---	------

PERIOD II.

CHAPTER X.
'ARABISTĀN.

1797-1834.

Page.

PERIOD II.
1797-1834.

REIGN OF FAT-H 'ALI SHĀH, 1797-1834 . . . 1647

A. Relations of 'Arabistān with Persian Central Government,
1797-1834 1647*(Continued in Period III, heading A.)*

B. Internal history of 'Arabistān, 1797-1834 1648

(Continued in Period III, heading A.)

(i) Rise of the Muhaisin and foundation of Muhammareh, 1812 . . . 1648

C. 'Arabistān relations with Turkey, 1797-1834 . . . 1647

(Continued in Period III, heading A.)

D. 'Arabistān relations with British, 1797-1834; . . . 1650

(Continued in Period III, heading B.)

PERIOD III.

PERIOD III.
1834-1848.

1834-1848.

REIGN OF MUHAMMAD SHĀH, 1834-1848 . . . 1651

A. Contest for superiority between the Ka'ab of Fallāhīyeh
under Shaikh Thāmir and the Muhaisin of Muhammareh
under Shaikh Jābir 1651*(Continued in Period IV, headings A and B.)*

(i) Administrative divisions of 'Arabistān in 1834 1651

(a) Collapse of Kūt Nahr Hāshim dyke and consequent
decline of Hawīzeh 1654(ii) Capture of Muhammareh by the Turks, 1837, and further pro-
ceedings by them 1655(iii) Appointment of Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh as Persian Governor of
Isfahān, Luristān and 'Arabistān, 1839, and his operations
against the Ka'ab and Muhammareh 1657(iv) Dealings of Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh with Muhammad Taqi Khān,
Bakhti-yāri, 1840-1841 1658

(v) Muhammareh in 1843 and its political distribution at that time . . 1667

B. 'Arabistān relations with British, 1834-1848 1668

(Continued in Period IV, headings C, D and E.)(i) Mr. Layard's attempts to open province to British trade and
examination by British ships into possibilities of river navigation,
1841-1842 1670

C. 'Arabistān relations with other foreign powers, 1834-1848 . 1674

(Continued in Period IV, heading L and Period V, heading D.)

CHAPTER X.
'ARABISTAN.

PERIOD IV.

1848-1896.

PERIOD IV.

1848—1896.

Page.

REIGN OF NĀSIR-UD-DIN SHĀH, 1848-1896 . . . 1674

A. Development of power of the Tehrān Government in
'Arabistān and supersession of the Ka'ab by the Muhaisin.

(Continued in Period V, headings A and C.)

(i) Persian administration of 'Arabistān, 1848-1896	1675
(a) Nizām-ūs-Saltaneh Governor, 1887 to 1891, and again in 1895	1677
(b) Persian post office established at Muhammareh, 1891	1678
(c) Muhammareh, Ahwāz, Shushtar and Dizful connected in 1891 by a Persian telegraph line with main system at Borasjun	1678
(d) First appointment of a Kārguzar to Muhammareh, 1889	1678
(ii) Internal affairs of Northern 'Arabistān, excluding Rāmuz, 1848-1896	1679
(iii) Affairs of the Rāmuz district, 1848-1896	1680
(iv) Affairs of the Hawizeh district, 1848-1896	1680
(v) Affairs of the Shaikhdom of Muhammareh, 1848-1896	1681
(a) Death of Shaikh Jābir and succession of Shaikh Miz'al Khān, 1881	1683
(vi) Affairs of the Ka'ab district, 1848-1896	1685

B. 'Arabistān relations with Turkey, 1848-1896 1688

(Continued in Period V, heading B.)

C. 'Arabistān relations with British, 1848-1856 1689

D. Anglo-Persian War in 'Arabistān, 1856-1857 1691

E. 'Arabistān relations with British, 1857-1896 1702

(Continued in Period V, headings D and F.)

(i) Attitude of British Government towards the succession to the Shaikhship of Muhammareh, 1879, and relations with Shaikh Miz'al	1707
---	------

F. British official matters in 'Arabistān, 1848-1896 1708

(Continued in Period V, heading I.)

(i) Conflict with regard to jurisdiction over 'Arabistān between Political Agency, Turkish 'Irāq, and Political Residency in Persian Gulf	1709
(ii) Appointment of British Vice-Consul to Muhammareh, 1890	1709
(iii) Agreement with Shaikh regarding building for British Vice- Consulate, 1891	1710
(iv) British post office established at Muhammareh, 1892, and question of postal subsidy to Messrs. Lynch	1711

G. Navigation schemes in 'Arabistān, 1871-1896 1711

(Continued in Period V, heading G.)

(i) Proposals of Messrs. Gray Paul, 1871-1875	1712
---	------

(ii) Proposals of Messrs. Lynch, 1875	1713
(iii) Closer examination of Kārūn route scheme in 1881 by Captain Wells, Mr. Baring, Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir O. St. John and His Majesty's Minister, Teheran	1716
(iv) M. Vauvillier's Kārūn-Karkheh navigation project, 1883	1716
(v) Opening of Lower Kārūn to foreign navigation, 25th October 1888	1717
(vi) Kārūn river regulations	1718
(vii) Inauguration of British steam navigation on Lower Kārūn in 1888	1720
(viii) Inauguration of Persian steam navigation on the Upper Kārūn in 1889 with the "Susa," and gift of the "Shushan" to the Shāh. Customs duty to be collected at Ahwaz and Shūshtar	1721
(ix) Initial difficulties of Messrs. Lynch	1722
(x) The Persian Nāsiri Company, 1888	1726
(xi) Construction by Nāsiri Company of tramway between Ahwāz and Nāsiri, 1890	1727
(xii) Embargoes on export of grain, 1889-1896	1728

H. Road projects in 'Arabistān, 1873-1896 1730

(Continued in Period I, heading H.)

(i) Rival road project, 1873-1883	1730
(ii) Tehrān-Ahwaz road concession, 1890, and its transfer by original Persian Concessionnaire to the Imperial Bank of Persia [see also period V, heading II (ii).]	1731

I. Railway projects connected with 'Arabistān, 1871-1896 1731

(i) Conflicting railway policy of Britain and Russia in Persia, 1878	1732
(ii) Sir O. St. John's opinion regarding light railways, 1882	1733

J. Irrigation projects in 'Arabistān, 1875-1883 1733

(Continued in Period IV, heading J.)

(i) Dr. Tholozan's scheme, 1875-1883	1733
(ii) Concession to Zill-us-Sultān, 1883	1735

K. Antiquarian research in 'Arabistān, 1850-1896 1735

(Continued in Period V, heading E.)

(i) British excavations at Shūsh, 1850-1852	1735
(ii) French excavation at Shūsh, 1885-1886	1736
(iii) General concession for antiquarian research given to French Government, 1895	1737

L. French activity in 'Arabistān, 1875-1896 1737

(Continued in Period V, heading E.)

(i) French line of steamer established between Marseilles and Basrah, 1881-1885	1737
(ii) Dr. Tholozan's attempt to secure exclusive use of Kārūn, 1881	1738

CHAPTER X.
'ARABISTAN.

PERIOD V.

FROM 1896.

PERIOD V.
FROM 1896.

Page.

REIGN OF MUZAFFAR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, FROM 1896 . 1733

A. Rapid increase of political and commercial activity in 'Arabistān and growth of British interests . . .	1738
(i) Persian administration of 'Arabistān, 1896-1905 with list of Governors . . .	1738
(ii) Internal affairs of Northern 'Arabistān, 1896-1905 . . .	1740
(iii) Affairs of the Hawīzeh district, 1896-1905 . . .	1742
(iv) Affairs of the Shaikhdom of Muhammarch, i.e., of Southern 'Arabistān, 1896-1905 . . .	1744
(a) Assassination of Shaikh Miz'al and accession of Shaikh Kaz'al, 1897 . . .	1744
(b) Final extinction of the Ka'ab Shaikhdom of Fallāhiyeh .	1744
(c) Relations of Shaikh of Muhammarch with the Bakhtiyāri Khāns, 1897-1905 . . .	1746
B. Shaikh of Muhammarch's relations with Turkey, 1896-1905 . . .	1747
C. Shaikh of Muhammarch's relation with Persian Government, 1896-1905 . . .	1748
(i) Recognition of Shaikh Kaz'al by Persian Government, 1897-1898 .	1748
(ii) Transfer of customs from Shaikh to the Imperial Persian Customs, 1902 . . .	1748
(iii) Terms of above transfer, Farman of 1902 . . .	1751
(iv) Supersession of 5% <i>ad valorem</i> duties by new customs tariff, 14th February 1903 . . .	1752
(v) Grant in 1902 to Shaikh of Muhammarch in perpetuity of districts of Muhammarch, 'Abādān, Bahmanshīr, Kārūn, Fallāhiyeh, Hindiyan and Dīh Mulla . . .	1753
(vi) Titles conferred on Shaikh Kaz'al by Persian Government, 1898-1902 . . .	1754
D. Shaikh of Muhammarch's relations with British and Russians, 1896-1905 . . .	1754
(i) Shaikh's desire to be taken secretly under British protection and British reply, 1898-1899 . . .	1755
(ii) Visit to Muhammarch of Prince Dabija, Russian Consul-General, Isfahān, 1899 . . .	1756
(iii) Russian pressure on Hāji Rais, the Shaikh's negotiator at Tehrān during the transfer of the customs, 1902-1903 . . .	1757
(iv) Sir A. Hardinge's letter to Shaikh, dated 7th December 1902 .	1758
(v) Sir A. Hardinge's conversation with Grand Vizier and letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs, 5th December 1902 . . .	1759
(vi) Sir A. Hardinge's letter to Shaikh, dated 24th December 1903 .	1761
(vii) Visit of a Russian party to Muhammarch and investiture of Shaikh with "Order of St. Stanislaus" by M. Passek, Russian Consul-General, Bushire, 1904 . . .	1761
(viii) Russian Consular Agent appointed to 'Arabistān, 1902 . . .	1762

	Page.	CHAPTER X. 'ARABISTAN.
E. 'Arabistān relations with other foreign powers, 1896-1905	1762	PERIOD V. FROM 1896.
(i) Excavations by French archaeologists from 1897 onwards	1762	
(ii) Activity of Dutch engineer M. van Roggen in connection with irrigation projects [see also heading J (i) below]	1762	
F. British political cases and interests in 'Arabistān, 1896-1905	1762	
(i) Murderous attack on employé of Messrs. Lynch at Shūshtar in 1896 and office of Messrs. Hotz at Shūshtar, sacked in 1897	1763	
(ii) Attacks on the Shushan, 1902-1904	1763	
(iii) Shaikh of Muhammareh requested by Persian Government to assure order on the Upper Kārūn	1765	
G. British commercial interests, 1896-1905	1766	
(i) Embargoes on exportation of food-stuffs, 1896-1905	1766	
(ii) Operations and expenditure of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company on the Kārūn [see also for postal subsidy heading I (vi) below.]	1767	
(iii) Operations of the Nāsiri Company	1767	
(iv) Attempted abolition of Customs Houses at Nāsiri and Shūtār, 1903	1767	
(v) Oil exploitation concession obtained by Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, 28th May 1901	1768	
H. Road projects in 'Arabistān, 1896-1905	1768	
(i) Bakhtiyāri road concession, 1897. Work of construction and maintenance entrusted to Messrs. Lynch	1769	
(ii) Formation in 1904 of the "Persian Transport Company," with subsidy of £2,000 per annum for ten years, amalgamating the interests of Messrs. Lynch on the Kārūn and in the Bakhtiyāri road concession with the interests of the Imperial Bank of Persia in the Tehrān-Ahwāz road (<i>vide</i> period IV, heading H (ii))	1769	
(iii) Investigations as to measures required to carry Tehrān-Ahwāz road through Luristān	1770	
(a) Attack on Lieutenant Lorimer and Colonel Douglas	1770	
I. British official matters in 'Arabistan, 1896-1905	1771	
(i) Visits to Muhammareh of Sir M. Durand in 1899, and of Sir A. Hardinge in 1903	1771	
(ii) British Vice-Consulate at Muhammareh raised to Consulate, and a Vice-Consulate established for 'Arabistān, 1903-1904	1771	
(iii) Reasons for selection of Ahwāz as headquarters of 'Arabistān Vice-Consulate	1772	
(iv) British Medical Officer for 'Arabistān, 1904	1772	
(v) Consular guard of 12 sowars detailed for the Ahwāz Vice-Consulate, 1904	1773	
(vi) Continuance of postal subsidy to Messrs. Lynch [see also for expen- diture on Kārūn by Messrs. Lynch, heading G (ii) above.]	1773	
J. Irrigation projects in 'Arabistan, 1896-1905	1773	
(i) Mr. van Roggen's scheme, 1903-1904	1773	
(ii) Lord Curzon's views on use of Kārūn for irrigation and its effect on navigation, 1st August 1904	1774	
(iii) Deputation of Major W. R. Morton, R.E., to report on irrigation projects	1775	
(iv) Scheme mooted by Shaikh for irrigation from the Karkheh, 1905	1775	

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN
COAST AND
ISLANDS.**

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN COAST AND ISLANDS.**

PERIOD I.
1763—1779.

PERIOD I.
1763-1779.

	Page.
KARĪM KHĀN ZAND, 1763-1779	1776
A. British relations with Southern districts, 1763-1779	1778
<i>(Continued in Period II, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Establishment of a Residency at Būshehr by the East India Company, 12th April 1763, and the grant of privileges to the British by Karīm Khān	1779
(ii) Operations against Mir Mahanna, Chief of Bandar Rīg	1784
(iii) Agreement, dated 14th April 1768, with Karīm Khān and grant "in perpetuity" to the British of the "entire possession and dominion of Khārag Island" if successfully captured by them	1798
(iv) Failure to capture Khārag, May 1768	1799
(v) Unsettled relations with Karīm Khān, 1768	1801
(vi) Withdrawal of Residency from Būshehr to Basrah, 1796	1802
(vii) Satisfactory settlement with Karīm Khān and British flag rehoisted at Būshehr, 26th April 1775	1812
B. General history of coast districts, 1763-1779	1814
<i>(Continued in Period II, heading B.)</i>	
(i) Events at Rīg and Khārag, 1763-1779	1814
(a) Expulsion of the Dutch from Khārag Island by Mir Mahanna, 1st January 1766	1818
(ii) Events at Būshehr, 1763-1779	1821
(iii) Events on the Shībkūh coast and below, 1763-1779	1823
(iv) Events at Bandar 'Abbās and Hormūz, 1763-1779	1824
C. Establishments of the East India Company in Persia, 1763-1779	1830
<i>(Continued in Period II, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Powers and duties of the Resident at Būshehr, 1763-1779	1830
(a) His subordination to the "Agent and Council" at Basrah	1830
(b) Military guard and boat at Būshehr, 1763-1766	1832

PERIOD II.
1779—1795.

PERIOD II.
1779-1795.

RULERS OF THE ZAND DYNASTY AFTER KARĪM KHĀN, 1779-1795 (WITH GENEALOGICAL TREE OF THE FAMILY)	1833
A. General history of Persia, 1779-1795	1835
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading A.)</i>	
(i) Final overthrow of the Zand dynasty and death in 1795 of Lutf 'Ali Khān, the last of the line	1846

B. General history of coast districts, 1779-1795 . . .	Page. 1846
<i>(Continued in Period III, heading B.)</i>	

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN
COAST AND
ISLANDS.**

(2) Capture of Būshehr by Tangistānis, 1779 . . .	1846
(ii) Counter invasion of Tangistān in same year . . .	1849

**PERIOD II.
1779—1795.**

C. British Relations and Trade with southern districts, and East India Company's establishments, 1779-1795 . . .	1853
<i>(Continued in Period IV, headings J, K and L.)</i>	

(i) The Būshehr Residency no longer subordinate to the Agency at Basrah which had itself been reduced to a Residency in 1778 . . .	1856
---	------

PERIOD III.

1795-1797.

**PERIOD III.
1795—1797.**

REIGN OF ĀGHA MUHAMAD KHĀN, 1795-1797 (FOUNDER OF THE QĀJAR DYNASTY) . . .	1857
---	-------------

A. General history of Persia, Internal and External, 1795-1797	1857
<i>(Continued in Period IV, headings A to H.)</i>	

B. General history of coast districts, 1795-1797 . . .	1859
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading I.)</i>	

PERIOD IV.

1797-1834.

**PERIOD IV.
1797—1834.**

REIGN OF FAT-H'ALI SHĀH, 1797-1834 . . .	1859
---	-------------

A. General history of Persia (Internal), 1797-1834 . . .	1860
<i>(Continued in Period V, headings A and C.)</i>	

B. Relations of Persia with Afghanistan, 1797-1834 . . .	1866
<i>(Continued in Period V, headings A and B.)</i>	

C. Relations of Persia with Turkey, 1797-1834 . . .	1869
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading D.)</i>	

(2) The first Treaty of Erzeroum, 28th July 1823 . . .	1871
--	------

D. Relations of Persia with other States of the Persian Gulf, specially 'Oman, 1797-1834 . . .	1871
<i>(Continued in Period V, heading E.)</i>	

E. Relations of Persia with native powers in India, 1797-1834	1873
---	------

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN
COAST AND
ISLANDS.**

Page.

F. Relations of Persia with Russia, 1797-1834 1873

(Continued in Period V, headings A and F.)

(i) First Russo-Persian War and Treaty of Gulistān, 24th October 1813 1876

(ii) Second Russo-Persian War and Treaty of Turkmanchia, 21st February 1828 1878

(For modification reference passports, see page 191.)

G. Relations of Persia with France, 1797-1834 1879

(Continued in Period V, heading G.)

(i) Treaty of Finkinstein with Napoleon, 10th May 1807 1881

(ii) Draft Commercial Treaty of 1807 ceding Khārag Island to France 1882

H. Relations of Persia with Britain, 1797-1834 1884

(Continued in Period V, headings A and H.)

(i) Mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khān to Persia, 1798 1884

(ii) First Mission of Captain John Malcolm, 1799-1801 1887

(iii) Political and Commercial Treaties of 28th January 1801 1888

(iv) Failure of Governor-General of India to ratify above in 1807 1893

(v) Second mission of General Malcolm, 1808 1894

(vi) Mission of Sir Harford Jones, 1808 1896

(vii) Preliminary and Definitive Treaties of 1809 1900

(viii) Third mission of General Malcolm, 1810 1902

(ix) Appointment of Sir Gore Ouseley as Ambassador Extraordinary, 1810 1905

(x) Morier Ellis Definitive Treaty of 25th November 1814 (see also pages 1950 and 180) 1907

(a) Modification of above treaty in 1828 1909

(xi) British representatives at Teheran, 1808-1834 1908

(a) Responsibility for supervising British interests reverted to Government of India in 1823 1909

(Continued in Period V, heading I.)

(xii) British officers in the Persian Army, 1828-1834 1909

I. Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1797-1834 1910

(Continued in Period V, heading J.)

(i) Position and Jurisdiction of Shaikh of Būshehr in 1802 1911

(ii) His jurisdiction extended to Kāzarān in 1830 1917

J. British relations with Persian Coast and Islands, 1797-1834 1920

(Continued in Period V, heading K.)

(i) Connection of Persia with British operations against the Qawsūm pirates 1929

(ii) Scheme for establishment of a British Naval and Military base in a central position in the Gulf and trials made 1936

(a) At Rās-al-Khaimah in 1819 1937

(b) At Qishm in 1820 1938

(c) At Dairistān opposite Hanjām in 1820 1938

PERIOD IV.
1797—1834.

	Page.
(d) At Qais, 1821	1942
(e) At Qishm again in 1821	1942
(f) At Salagh, 15 miles west of Dairistan in 1822	1942
(g) And finally at Bāsīdu in 1822 which thus became a British station	1942
(iii) Persian protest against presence of British troops on Kishm and consequence withdrawal from Bāsīdu, 1822-1823	1944
(iv) Validity of title of Sultan of 'Omān to Kishm, 1821	1940
(v) Unauthorised negotiations of Lieutenant Bruce (Residence, Būshehr) with Prince Governor of Fārs and erroneous admissions in regard to ownership of Kishm, 1822	1945
(vi) Establishment of British Naval base first at Muḡlu and after at Bāsīdu, 1822-1823	1949
(vii) Questions of Rāhdāri, British commercial treaties, and Bast, 1827	1951
(viii) Question of establishing Residency permanently at Khārag or elsewhere in Gulf, 1827-1828	1952
(ix) Desire of Shaikh of Būshehr for British protection, 1828	1953
(x) Temporary removal of Residency to Khāragu owing to plague, 1832	1954
(xi) Claim of Shīrāz Government of British protection against maritime aggression, 1832	1954
K. British trade with Persia by the Persian Gulf, 1797-1834	1955
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading K.)</i>	
(i) East India Company deprived of their trade monopoly in 1813 and their Political Officers forbidden to engage in trade, 1822	1955
(ii) The Persian currency in 1802 to 1811	1957
(iii) Last reference to trade carried on by the East India Company with Persia, 1819	1958
(iv) Difficulties due to non-recognition by Persian Government of Commercial Treaty of 1801	1958
L. The East India Company's establishment in Persia, 1797-1834	1958

PERIOD V.

PERIOD V.
1834—1848.

1834-1848.

REIGN OF MUHAMMAD SHĀH, 1834-1848 1959

A. General history of Persia (Internal and External), up to Persian Expedition against Herat, 1834-1837 1959

- (i) Anglo-Russian understanding for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Persia, 1834 1960
- (ii) Respective position of Britain and Russia in Persia 1961

B. Persian expedition against Herat, 1837-1838 1962

(Continued in Period VI, heading B.)

C. General history of Persia (Internal), 1838-1848 1966

(Continued in Period VI, heading A.)

- (i) Rebellion of the Agha Khān, head of the Ismā'īlī Sect, 1838-1839 1966
- (ii) Appearance of Babism, 1844 1966

CHAPTER XI. PERSIAN COAST AND ISLANDS.

PERIOD IV.
1797—1834.

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN
COAST AND
ISLANDS.**

PERIOD V.
1834—1848.

	Page.
D. Relations of Persia with Turkey, 1838-1848	1968
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading G.)</i>	
(i) Commission and Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1843-1847	1968
E. Relations of Persia with other States in the Persian Gulf, 1838-1848	1969
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading H.)</i>	
F. Relations of Persia with Russia, 1838-1848	1969
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading E.)</i>	
(i) Seizure of Island of Ashwadah in the Caspian by Russia in 1840	1969
G. Relations of Persia with France, 1838-1848	1969
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading F.)</i>	
(i) French Military officers replace British in Persian Army, 1839	1970
H. Relations of Persia with Britain, 1838-1848	1970
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading C.)</i>	
(i) Withdrawal to Erzeroum of Sir J. McNeill, British Minister, and withdrawal from Persia of British military officers, 1838	1971
(ii) Lord Palmerston's demands, 11th July 1839	1971
(iii) Guarantee given by Persian Government in 1840 of immunity from punishment by Persian authorities without the knowledge of the British Minister of servants and dependents of the British Mission	1972
(iv) Return to Tehrān of British Minister, 1841	1973
(v) Sir J. McNeill's "Commercial Treaty" of 28th October 1841, and the appointments of a Consul at Tehrān and Consul-General at Tabriz and the Resident at Bushire recognised for the first time	1973
(vi) Farmān relating to Bankruptcies, 1844	1973
(vii) Farmān relating to Slave Trade, 1848	1974
I. British official matters in Persia generally, 1834-1848	1974
<i>(Continued in Period VI, headings D and L.)</i>	
(i) British Representatives at Tehrān, 1834-1848	1974
(ii) Retransfer of Tehrān Legation to His Majesty's Government, 1835, but Indian officers still appointed as Ministers	1974
(iii) Abolition of post of Assistant to the Resident at Būshehr resolved by Government of India in 1835 but successfully opposed by Government of Bombay in 1838 and again in 1841	1975
J. Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1834-1848	1976
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading I.)</i>	
(i) Garrison of 200 Persian SARBĀZ posted on Khārag Island, 1843	1980
K. British relations with Persian Coast and Islands, 1834-1848	1981
<i>(Continued in Period VI, heading J.)</i>	

	Page.
(i) Attitude in regard to armed operations of Shaikhs of the Arab Coast against the Persian Coast, and of Persian Coast Shaikhs against each other, 1837 and 1838	1981
(ii) Occupation of Khārag Island by the British in June 1838	1985
(iii) Persian obstruction to provisioning of troops at Khārag and insult to British Naval Commander-in-Chief	1987
(iv) Removal of Residency in consequence to Khrāg	1990
(v) Conflict of opinion between Political and Military authorities at Khrāg	1991
(vi) Proposed purchase of Khārag as a location for the British Residency, 1841	1993
(vii) Evacuation of Khārag by British troops and return of Residency to Būshehr, 1842	1994
(viii) Commandant of troops instructed by British Minister to inform Persian representative on Island, when evacuating, that a British officer and coal depôt would be maintained at Khārag	1994

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN
COAST AND
ISLANDS.**

**PERIOD V.
1834—1848.**

PERIOD VI.

PERIOD VI.

REIGN OF NĀSIR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, 1848-1896 1995

A. General history of Persia, 1848-1896 1995

(Continued in Period VII. heading A.)

(i) Shāh's visits to Europe, 1873, 1878 and 1889, and introduction of Austrian military officers as result of second voyage	2003
---	------

B. Relations of Persia with Afghānistān and Turkistan, 1848-1896 2006

(Continued in Period VII. heading C (iv).)

(i) Anglo-Persian agreement concerning Herat, 25th January 1853	2007
(ii) Occupation of Herat by Persia and declaration of war against latter by Britain in 1856	2008
(iii) Evacuation of Herat by Persia, 1857	2009
(iv) Herat annexed to Kābul by Dōst Muhammad Khān in 1863	2010
(v) Colonel Goldsmid's Sistan Award, 1872	2011
(vi) Ayūb Khān's attempt to gain Afghānistān, his failure and deportation to India <i>via</i> Baghdād, 1887-1888	2012

C. Relations of Persia with Britain, 1848-1896 2012

(Continued in Period VII. headings B, C and D.)

(i) Slave trade convention of 1851	2012
(ii) Withdrawal of Mr. Murray, British Minister, from Tehrān to Baghdād, 1855, in connection with Herat situation and also owing to Hāsīn Khān incident	2012
(iii) The Anglo-Persian War, 1856-1857	2015
(iv) The Treaty of Peace, 1857	2030
(a) The mutual appointment of Consuls in the dominions of the other recognized for the first time	2031
(b) Abandonment by British Government of right to protect Persian subjects not actually in the employment of the British Legation or British Consular officers, provided that no such right was accorded to or exercised by other foreign powers in Persia	2031

**CHAPTER XI.
PERSIAN
COAST AND
ISLANDS.**

PERIOD VI.

	Page.
(e) No previous Treaty or Agreement was renewed by the Treaty of Peace except the Slave Convention of 1851	2032
(v) Return of British Minister to Tehrān in 1857	2033
(vi) Request of Persia in 1860 and again in 1870 for loan of British military officers ignored	2033
(vii) Anglo-Persian Telegraphs, 1869-1871	2033
(viii) Colonel Goldsmid's Makrān Boundary Commission, 1869-1871	2034
(ix) The "Reuter" concession granted, 1872, and rescinded in 1873	2034
(x) Permanent Slave Trade Convention of 1882	2036
(xi) Foundation of Imperial Bank of Persia (with exclusive mining rights) by Baron de Reuter in 1889. Retirement in 1893 of Imperial Ottoman Bank from Persia and of Imperial Bank of Persia from Baghdād	2036
(xii) Grant of preferential rights to Britain in regard to railway construction in Southern Persia, 1889-1890	2036
(a) Similar grant in regard to tramways, 1890	2038
(xiii) The Therān-Ahwaz Road concession, 1890, <i>vide</i> also Chapter X, Part IV, heading H (ii)	2037
(xiv) Formation of Mining Rights Corporation, 1890-1894, in order to utilize the mining privileges of the Imperial Bank of Persia	2037
(xv) Lotteries and tobacco monopolies	2037
 D. British official matters in Persia, 1848-1896	 2038
<i>(Continued in Period VII. heading E.)</i>	
(i) Question of the dependence of the British Legation in Persia	2038
(ii) Legation placed under India Office, 1859, but retransferred to Foreign Office in 1860	2038
(iii) House of Commons Committee recommend Legation being placed under India Office and failing that post to be staffed by Indian Officers selected by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; 18th May 1871	2039
 E. Relations of Persia with Russia, 1848-1896	 2039
<i>(Continued in Period VII, headings B, C and D.)</i>	
(i) Anglo-Russian understanding of 1834 for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Persia re-affirmed in 1888	2039
(ii) Russia obtains interdict on building of all railways for ten years from 1890	2041
 F. Relations of Persia with other European powers, 1848-1896	 2042
(i) Treaties of Friendship and Commerce with various foreign powers between 1855 and 1873	2042
 G. Relations of Persia with Turkey, 1848-1896	 2043
(i) Question of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of Persian Consuls, 1849 and 1875	2044
 H. Relations of Persia with other States of the Persian Gulf, 1848-1896	 2045
<i>(Continued in Period VII, heading G.)</i>	
(i) Last lease of Bunder 'Abbās and its dependencies to 'Omān, 1868	2046
(ii) Pledge given by British Government in 1869 to inform Persian Government of any punitive measures it might in future be found necessary to take against Bahrain	2047
(iii) Persian intrigues in Trucial 'Omān, 1887-1888	2047

I. General history of Persian Coast and Islands, 1848-1896,
and of the administration of Fārs, 1872-1896 2049*(Continued in Period VII, heading F.)*

- (i) The last Arab Shaikh of Būshehr, 1850 2050
- (ii) Weekly Persian post established between Būshehr and Tehran, 1877,
and supersession of British arrangements 2052
- (iii) Construction in 1885 by a German firm of the "Persepolis" and
"Susa," the latter for the Kārūn, *vide* Chapter X, Period IV,
heading G (viii) 2054
- (iv) Extent of Fārs in 1872; did not apparently include Behbehān 2054
 - (a) Gradual separation of Būshehr and coast ports from
Fārs, 1882-1887 2056
 - (b) Behbehān apparently under Būshehr in 1876 2058
- (v) (a) History of Būshehr, 1872-1896 2057
 - (b) Histories of Dīlam, Hyāt Dāvud, Rūdhillah, Angāli,
and Dashtistān, 1872-1896 2066
 - (c) Histories of Tangistān and Dashti, 1872-1896 2062
 - (d) History of Shūbkūh, 1872-1896 2062
 - (e) History of Lingeh, 1872-1896, The last Arab Shaikh,
1887 2063
 - (f) History of Sirri Island, 1887-1888 2066
 - (g) History of Bunder 'Abbās, 1872-1896 2066
 - (h) History of Kishm Island, 1872-1896 2067
 - (i) See entries (viii) under next heading for Qais Island.
 - (j) See entries (viii), (ix) and (x) under heading L for Bāsīdu,
Jashk and Hanjām.

J. British relations with the Persian Coast and Islands, 1848-
1896 2068*(Continued in Period VII, heading H.)*

- (i) Outbreak of Anglo-Persian War and British flag hoisted on Khārag
Island, 4th December 1856 2070
- (ii) Capture of Būshehr, 10th December 1856 2072
- (iii) Sir J. Outram's opinion as to the value of Khārag Island 2077
- (iv) Resident instructed in 1860 to address himself in future to Kārguzār
and not to Local Governor 2078
- (v) British measures for relief of famine, 1870-1872 2079
- (vi) Requests by Persian authorities to be supplied with lists of British
subjects and dependents and replies given, 1877-1883 2083
- (vii) Affairs on Qais Island and its ownership, 1879-1880 2084
- (viii) Import free of duty by members of British mission based on Treaty
of Turkmanchai and Treaty of Peace, 1857, read together,
1888 2086
- (ix) Arab ringleaders of disturbance on board a British India ship
arrested by British man-of-war and tried and punished at
Bombay, 1891 2087

K. British commercial and general interests on the Persian
Coast and Islands, 1848-1896 2087*(Continued in Period VII, heading I.)*

- (i) Instructions of 1856 reference interference by Resident in claims
of British Indian merchants against Chiefs and other on the
shores of the Persian Gulf 2087

CHAPTER XI.		Page.
PERSIAN	(ii) Question of purchase and ownership of land in Persia by British subjects	2089
COAST AND	(iii) Embargoes and Rāhdāri, 1848-1896	2092
ISLANDS.	(iv) Persian customs, 1848-1896	2095
PERIOD VI.	(v) Status of—(a) The Malcolm Family	
	(b) The Bombay and Persian S. N. Coy.	2098
	L. British official matters on the Persian Coast and Islands, 1848-1896	2099

(Continued in Period VII, heading J.)

(i) Būshehr Residency transferred in 1873 from Bombay Government to Government of India	2099
(ii) The Residency staff and their salaries, 1848-1896	2099
(iii) The Lingeh and Shīrāz Agencies, 1848-1896	2101
(iv) Judicial and Consular powers of British Political authorities in Persia, 1848-1896	2102
(v) Resident and Assistant Resident appointed "Justices of the Peace" in 1873 and 1877	2102
(vi) Resident made a Consul-General in 1878. First Persian Coast and Islands Order in Council appeared in 1889	2102
(vii) Residency buildings, 1848-1896	2103
(viii) Residency guard and escort and Residency Steamer	2104
(ix) Affairs at Bāsīdu	2105
(α) British attitude as regards fugitive at Bāsīdu	2106
(x) Military detachment transferred from Bāsīdu to Jask in 1879	2108
(xi) Establishment on Hanjām Island of a telegraph station in 1868 and Sultan of Maskat's claim to the Island	2109

PERIOD VII.

PERIOD VII.

REIGN OF MUZAFFAR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, FROM 1896	2110
A. General history of Persia, 1896-1905	2110
(i) Shāh's visits to Europe, 1900, 1902, 1905	2111
B. Mutual opposition of Britain and Russia in Persia in general matters, 1896-1905	2112
(i) Russian and British loans to Persia	2113
(ii) Extension in 1899 for ten years of Russian interdiction regarding construction of railways, <i>vide</i> Period VI, heading E (ii)	2114
(iii) Questions relating to Customs	2115
(iv) Questions relating to Railways	2116
(v) Questions relating to Roads	2116
(vi) Questions relating to Telegraphs	2117
C. Mutual opposition of Britain and Russia in Persia in local matters, 1896-1905	2118
(i) Russian and French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1895-1905	2118
(ii) British Consulate created Kirmān in 1903 and a British native agent appointed in 1901 to Bāmpūr but afterwards transferred to Kirmān	2118

(iii) Russian activity in Eastern Persia and their quarantine methods, 1889-1905	2118
(iv) Colonel A. H. McMahon's Sistan Boundary Mission, 1908	2122
(v) Russian and British activity, Kirmānshah, 1897-1905	2124
D. Russian and British policy in Persia, 1896-1905	2124
(i) Various pronouncements by British Ministers in regard to British attitude	2125
E. British official matters in Persia, 1896-1905	2127
(i) Division of expenditure in Persia between His Majesty's Government and Government of India, 1899-1900	2127
(ii) Military Attaché appointed to Tehrān in 1899	2127
(iii) Increase of British Consular guards, 1904	2127
F. General history of Persian Coast and Islands, and Administration of Fārs, 1896-1905	2128
(i) Extent of Fārs in 1905	2128
(ii) Appointment of Mirza Ahmad Khān, Darya-Baigi as Governor of Būshehr and the Gulf ports, 1898	2130
(iii) Mirza 'Alī Muhammad Khān, Muwāḡir-ud-Dauleh, Kārgūzār of Būshehr in 1903	2131
(iv) (a) History of Būshehr, 1896-1905	2132
(b) „ Tangistān, 1896-1905	2132
(c) „ Shībkūh, 1896-1905	2134
(d) „ Līngeh, 1896-1905	2134
(e) „ Bundar 'Abbās, 1896-1905	2136
(f) „ Qishm, 1896-1905; destroyed by earthquake, 1897	2136
(g) Histories of Shaml, Mīnāb and Biyābān, 1896-1905	2136
(h) See entry (ii) under next heading for Tunb, Bū Mūsa and Sirri Islands.	
(i) See entries (v) and (vi) under heading J for Bāsīdu and Hanjām.	
G. Relations of Persia with other powers in the Persian Gulf, 1896-1905	2137
(i) Tāvunah Piracy case, 1902	2137
(ii) Status of Tunb, Bū Mūsa and Sirri Islands	2138
H. British relations with Persian Coast and Islands, 1896-1905	2139
(i) Lord Curzon's tour in the Gulf, 1903	2141
I. British commercial and general interests on the Persian Coast and Islands, 1897-1905	2143
(i) Hornūs red oxide workings, 1897-1905	2143
(ii) Embargoes on exportation of produce, 1896-1905	2144
(iii) Questions of Rahdāri, Dāllali, and Qapāndāri, 1905	2144

	Page.
CHAPTER XI.	
PERSIAN	
COAST AND	
ISLANDS.	
PERIOD VII.	
J. British official matters on the Persian Coasts and Islands, 1896-1905	2144
(i) Consular status given to the First Assistant and to the Residency Surgeon, 1904	2144
(ii) Post of Second Assistant created in 1905	2145
(iii) British Consulate created at Shirāz, 1903	2145
(iv) British Vice-Consulate created at Bundar 'Abbās, 1900	2146
(v) Affairs at Bāsīdu, 1896-1905	2147
(a) Origin of Singau village	2147
(vi) Re-establishment of telegraph station at Hanjām, 1904	2148

CHAPTER XII.
PERSIAN
MAKRAN.

CHAPTER XII.

PERSIAN MAKRĀN

PERIOD I.

PERIOD I.

MAKRĀN DURING THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES .	2150
A. Makrān under the Bulaidais, 1614-1740	2151
B. Makrān under the Khāns of Kalāt, 1740-1797	2153

(Continued in Period II, heading A.)

(i) Gwādur transferred by Khān of Kalāt to Saiyid Sultan of 'Omān, about 1784	2153
--	------

PERIOD II.

PERIOD II.

REIGN OF FAT-H 'ALI SHĀH, 1797-1834	2154
A. Cessation of Brahui (<i>i.e.</i> , Kalāt) control after 1794	2154

(Continued in Period III, heading A.)

PERIOD III.

PERIOD III.

REIGNS OF MUHAMMAD SHĀH, 1834-1848, AND	
NĀSIRUD-DĪN SHĀH, 1848-1896	2156
A. Growth of Persian influence in Makrān, 1844-1861	2156
(i) Invasion of Persian Makrān by the brother of the Agha Khān, head of the Isma'ili sect, 1844	2156
(ii) Chahbār in 1861 the property of the Sultān of 'Omān having been conquered in 1792 without reference to Persia	2157

	Page.	
B. Makrān telegraph line, 1861-1869	2157	CHAPTER XII. PERSIAN MAKRAN. PERIOD III.
(i) Persia claims all Makrān, 1861	2158	
(ii) Claims of Persia to Gwādur and Chahbār, 1863	2160	
(iii) Colonel Goldsmid's report on political rights in Makrān, 1863	2160	
(iv) Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1868	2165	
(v) Position of Persia in Makrān in 1868	2165	
(vi) Completion of Telegraph line to Jāshk, 1869	2167	
C. Perso-Kalāt Boundary Commission, 1869-1871	2169	
(i) Boundary as proposed by Colonel Goldsmid accepted by Persia, 1871	2174	
(ii) Chahbār captured by Persia, 1872	2178	
D. General administration, 1872-1896	2178	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)</i>		
E. Affairs of the Jāshk and Biyābān districts, 1872-1896	2179	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)</i>		
F. British interests in Jāshk, 1872-1896	2181	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading C.)</i>		
(i) Anglo-Persian agreement concerning the limits of and Jurisdiction in the Jāshk telegraph station, 1887	2182	
G. Affairs of districts east of Jāshk, 1872-1896	2184	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading A.)</i>		
H. British interests in districts east of Jāshk, 1872-1896	2186	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading C.)</i>		
I. British official matters in Persian Mākran, 1848-1896	2188	
<i>(Continued in Period IV, heading D.)</i>		
(i) British political arrangements, 1863-1896	2188	
(ii) British military attachment at Jāshk, 1878-1887	2188	
(iii) Telegraph subsidies to the Chiefs of Gaih, Dashtiyāri, Bāhu and Jāshk	2139	

PERIOD IV.

PERIOD IV.

REIGN OF MUZAFFAR-UD-DĪN SHĀH FROM 1896 . 2190

A. General administration of Persian Makrān, 1896-1905	2190
(i) Customs posts established at North Jāshk, Chahbār and Gwādur, 1902	2191
(ii) Affairs of Jāshk, Gaih, Qasrkand, Dashtiyāri and Bahu districts, 1896-1905	2191

CHAPTER XII.	B. General history of Persian Makrān, 1896-1905 . . .	Page. 2194
PERSIAN	(i) Murder of Mr. Graves, Telegraph Superintendent, 2nd December 1897	2195
MAKRAN.	(ii) Growth of Arms Traffic and Slave Trade, 1896-1905	2199
PERIOD IV.		
	C. British relations with Persian Makrān, 1896-1905 . . .	2199
	(i) Makrān claims, 1896-1905	2199
	D. British official matters in Persian Makrān, 1896-1905 . . .	2201
	(i) Revised arrangements for payment of telegraph subsidies, 1898	2201
	(ii) British political arrangements in Makrān, 1896-1905	2202
	(iii) British Vice-Consulate established at Bam, 1905	2202
	(iv) British military guards at Jāshk and Chahbār, 1898	2203
	E. Relations of other foreign powers with Makrān, 1896-1905 .	2203
	(i) Russian railway reconnaissance to Chahbār	2203

APPENDIX A.

METEOROLOGY AND HEALTH IN THE PERSIAN GULF	
REGION	2205

APPENDIX B.

APPENDIX B.

GEOLOGY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2212
A. MINERALS. Petroleum, asphalt, coal, sulphur, copper, red ochre, salt, gypsum, iron, building stones, and road-mending material	2217
B. Earthquakes	2218
C. Water-supply	2218

APPENDIX C.

APPENDIX C.

THE PEARL AND MOTHER-OF-PEARL FISHERIES OF	
THE PERSIAN GULF	2220
A. The pearl banks, the pearl, and the mother-of-pearl . . .	2221
B. Organisation and working of the pearl fisheries, Arabian side	2227
C. Special financial features on Persian side	2234
D. The trade in pearls	2235

	Page.	
E. The trade in mother-of-pearl	2240	CHAPTER XII.
F. Sovereignty and dues in relation to the pearl fisheries	2240	PERSIAN
G. Political questions connected with the pearl fisheries	2242	MAKRAN.
		APPENDIX C.
(i) Local questions	2242	
(a) Agreement of Shaikhs to surrender debtors, 1897	2243	
(ii) International questions on Arabian side, 1857-1907	2244	
(a) Pearl diving by Europeans	2244	
(b) Legal opinion in regard to British policy	2248	
(iii) International questions on Persian side, 1883-1907	2249	
(iv) The Sunyé and Hagens pearl fisheries concession of 1898 and the Sponge Exploration Syndicate of 1905, both possibly still in force	2250	
Annexure 1. Value of pearls exported, 1873-1906	2252	
Annexure 2. Value of mother-of-pearl exported, 1893-1903	2254	
Annexure 3. Table of boats and men employed, showing nation by which protected, 1907	2256	
Annexure 4. Table of pearl banks	2262	
Annexure 5. Table of the different classes of pearls	2281	
Annexure 6. Table of taxes levied by local authorities	2284	

APPENDIX D.

APPENDIX D.

DATE PRODUCTION AND THE DATE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2294
--	------

APPENDIX E.

APPENDIX E.

FISHERIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF	2308
---	------

APPENDIX F.

APPENDIX F.

SAILING CRAFT OF THE PERSIAN GULF	2319
---	------

APPENDIX G.

APPENDIX G.

TRANSPORT ANIMALS AND LIVESTOCK OF THE PER- SIAN GULF REGION	2323
---	------

**CHAPTER XII.
PERSIAN
MAKRAN.**

APPENDIX H.

	Page.
APPENDIX H. RELIGIONS AND SECTS OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2349
A. Historical events explaining the existence of Muhammadan denominations	2351
B. The Shiah's	2355
(i) Fiscal arrangements of Persian and Turkish Governments in connection with the Shiah's	2362
C. The Sunnis	2367
(i) The Sunnī Naqīb of Baghdād	2368
(ii) The Sunnī Naqīb of Basrah	2372
D. The Ibādhis of 'Omān	2373
E. The Wahhābis of Najd	2376
F. The Khōjahs, or Followers of the Āgha Khān	2377
G. Other Muhammadan denominations	2380
(i) Zikris ; (ii) Sūfis ; (iii) Nī'mat 'Alis, (iv) Baktasis	2380
H. The Jew	2381
I. Oriental Christians	2382
J. The Sabians	2382
K. Hindus in the Persian Gulf Region	2382
L. The Bābis	2384

APPENDIX I.

APPENDIX I.

WESTERN CHRISTIANITY AND MISSIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2386
A. Roman Catholic Missions, 1604-1905	2386
B. Protestant Missions, 1811-1891	2394
(i) The American Arabian Mission, 1891-1905	2395
(ii) Church of England Missions, 1880-1905	2398

APPENDIX J.

CHAPTER XII. PERSIAN MAKRAN.

Page.

APPENDIX J.

THE TELEGRAPHS OF THE PERSIAN GULF IN THEIR RELATION TO THE TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS OF PERSIA AND TURKEY 2400

- A. Constantinople-Baghdād line completed, 1861 2402
 - (i) Extended to Fao, January 27th, 1865, and to Khānaqīn on October 13th, 1864 2403
 - (ii) Anglo-Turkish Convention for working the whole line, 3rd September 1864 2404
 - (a) One wire between Constantinople and Fao to be reserved for Indian traffic 2404

- B. Alternative line from Būshehr to Khānaqīn *viā* Tehrān, completed September 26th, 1864 2406
 - (i) Anglo-Persian Agreement for working of the line, 6th February 1863 2405

- C. Connection of Turkish and Persian lines with Indian system by way of the Gulf, 1863-1868 2408
 - (i) Land line from Karachi to Gwādur and cable thence to Fao *viā* Malcolm Inlet, completed 8th April 1864 2413
 - (ii) Auxiliary cable laid between Karachi and Gwādur, November 1864 2413
 - (iii) Telegraph treaties with Maskat of 17th November 1864 and 19th January 1865, also Agreement with Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān 2411

- D. Duplication of Būshehr-Tehrān-Khānaqīn line 2414
 - (i) Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 23rd November 1865 [superseded by Convention of 1872, *vide* heading I (i) below] 2414

- E. Duplication of Gwādur-Būshehr line by land line to Jāshk and cable to Būshehr, 1865-1869 2416
 - (i) Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 2nd April 1868 2416
 - (a) Prolonged to 31st January 1925 2423

- F. Diversion of cable from "Telegraph Islet" (Malcolm Inlet) to Jāshk and Hanjām, 1868 2418
 - (i) Persian authorisation of the Hanjām station, 29th March 1868 2419
 - (ii) Anglo-Persian Agreement relating to the Jāshk station, 25th February 1887 2419
 - (a) Exemption of telegraph officials at Jāshk and their servants from payment of customs dues 2419

- G. Provision of an Indo-European line entirely through Persia alternative to that through Turkey 2419
 - (i) The Siemens' concessions of 1868 for a line between London and Tehran *viā* Russia and Prussia 2420

**CHAPTER XII.
PERSIAN
MAKRAN.**

APPENDIX J.

	Page.
(ii) Indo-European Telegraph Company (practically a Russian Company) formed on 8th April 1868 and the Siemens' concessions transferred to it, 24th May 1869.	2421
(iii) The concession prolonged to 1945	2424
H. Abandonment of the Tehrān-Khānaqīn-Baghdād line in 1868	2421
(i) Option to resume charge granted to British Government by Convention of 1872, <i>vide</i> heading I (i) below	2423
1. Political and general history of the Indo-European Telegraph Department and Company, 1868-1904	2422
(i) Anglo-Persian Convention of 2nd December 1872 replacing that of 1865, <i>vide</i> heading D (i) above	2423
(ii) Prolonged first to 1905 and then to 31st January 1925	2423
(iii) Indo-European Telegraph Department responsible for Tehrān-Mashad line since 1885	2424
(iv) Control of Indo-European Telegraph Department transferred from Government of Bombay to Government of India in 1871 (page 2422) and from latter to the Secretary of State in 1899	2424
J. Financial and administrative history of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, 1868-1907	2425
(i) Burāzjān 'Arabistān line opened under Persian management, 1891	2426
K. Modifications in Gulf telegraph system, 1869-1907	2426
(i) Telegraph office removed from Būshehr to Rīshehr in 1877	2426
(ii) Hanjām office closed, 11th December 1880	2427
(a) Reopened, 19th April 1904	2430
(iii) Abandonment of Gwādūr as a cable station, September 1893	2427
(iv) Jāshk-Nasqat cable laid, 1901	2427
(v) Hanjām-Bunder 'Abbās line established 31st December 1905	2431
L. The Central Persian land line, 1898-1907	2431
(i) Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1901	2432
(ii) Line completed, 9th May 1904	2433
Annexure 1. Précis of history of the Persian Gulf Section, 1906	2434
Annexure 2. List of telegraph subsidies paid in Persian Makrān	2436
Annexure 3. List of Directors-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department	2437
Annexure 4. List of Directors of the Persian Gulf Section	2438

APPENDIX K.

APPENDIX K.

MAIL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE INDIAN POST OFFICE IN THE PERSIAN GULF	2439
A. Persian Gulf and overland services between India and Europe, 1801-1862	2439
B. Mail steamer services in the Persian Gulf, 1862-1907	2441

	Page.
C. Mail steamer services on the Tigris, 1863-1907 . . .	2443
D. Establishment of Indian post offices, 1864-1892 . . .	2445
E. Discipline, control, inspection and working of the Indian Post Offices, 1864-1907	2445
F. Histories of the various Indian post offices, 1864-1907 . . .	2448
G. Political questions connected with Indian post offices in Persia, 1864-1907	2454
(i) Anglo-Persian Postal Agreement of 1878	2455
(ii) Persian proposal, that British Postmaster, Büshehr, should also take charge of Persian post office there refused, 1876	2456
(iii) Management of Persian Postal Department transferred to Imperial Persian Customs, 1902	2458
(iv) Various controversies with Persian Postal Department	2458
(v) Newspapers, forbidden by the Persian Government, liable, since 1899, to be intercepted by the Indian post office	2460
H. Political questions connected with Indian post offices in Turkish Irāq, 1868-1907	2460
Annexure 1. Table of Persian Gulf mail contracts, 1862-1914	2468
Annexure 2. Table of Tigris River mail contracts, 1863-1904	2470
Annexure 3. Table of British Indian post offices in the Persian Gulf Division	2472
Annexure 4. Postal undertaking by Shaikh of Koweit, 28th February 1904	2474

**CHAPTER XII.
PERSIAN
MAKRAN.**

APPENDIX K.

APPENDIX L.

APPENDIX L.

THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2475
A. General division of the subject	2476

APPENDIX M.

APPENDIX M.

EPIDEMICS AND SANITARY ORGANISATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION	2517
A. Cholera	2518
(i) Turkey and the Fao station, 1872-1894	2526
(ii) Paris Cholera Conference of 1894	
(a) Resolutions reference establishment of a large quarantine station at Fao and of other stations at various ports in the Persian Gulf	

**CHAPTER XII.
PERSIAN
MAKRAN.**

APPENDIX M.

	Page.
(b) Convention was signed by Great Britain without previous consultation with Indian Government, by whom a protest was in consequence made	2529
(c) Convention was ratified by Persia but not by Turkey	2528
B. Plague	2530
(i) Request by Persian Government for British assistance in maintaining quarantine, 1876	2533
(ii) Venice Plague Conference of 1897	2535
(a) Constitution and status of the Constantinople "Board of Health" and of the "Mixed Commission"	2535
(b) Proposed sanitary station at Hormūz or Kishnu	2537
(c) Convention ratified by Great Britain and Persia but not by Turkey who wanted amongst other amendments station at Koweit	2537
C. Plague and Cholera Conference at Paris, 1903	2539
(i) Hormūz definitely recommended as site for sanitary station	2540
(ii) Reservations by Great Britain	2540
(iii) Representative of Turkey was not allowed to sign, that of Persia signed "ad referendum," and representative of India abstained from signing	2541
(iv) Suggestions reference Persian Gulf frustrated by "Mixed Commission," 1905-1906	2541
D. Mission of Monsieur Faivre, 1905	2542
E. Mission of Doctor Thomsen, 1906	2542
F. Sanitary regulations and arrangements of Turkey in the Persian Gulf, 1896-1907	2544
G. Sanitary regulations and arrangements of Persia in the Persian Gulf, 1896-1907	2547
H. Preventive measures in 'Omān, 1896-1907	2551
I. Preventive measures in Bahrein and Koweit, 1896-1907	2553
J. Smallpox in the Persian Gulf	2554

APPENDIX N.

APPENDIX N.

THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION TRAFFIC IN THE GULFS OF PERSIA AND 'OMĀN	2556
A. Prohibition of the trade in Persia, 1881	2556
B. Prohibition of the trade at Gwādur by Sultān of 'Omān, 3rd March 1891	2557
C. Persian Government authorises search of Persian vessels by British men-of-war, 15th December 1897, and similar authorisation given by Sultān in regard to 'Omān vessels, 13th January 1898	2561

	Page.	
D. British ships have no general power to search even British ships for arms on the high seas	2565	CHAPTER XII. PERSIAN MAKRAN.
E. Government of India propose international action in 1902 and again in 1907 (<i>vide</i> page 2586)	2566	APPENDIX N.
F. Agreements for suppression of the arms traffic		
(i) With Trucial Shaikhs, 1902	2568	
(ii) With Bahrein, 30th April 1898	2568	
(iii) With Koweit, 24th May 1900	2569	
(iv) Kārwan Agreement, 26th May 1906	2579	
(v) Kharan Agreement, 8th July 1907	2585	
G. Situation in 1907	2586	
Annexure 1. Statistics of the arms trade, 1883-1906	2587	
Annexure 2. Arms agreement, and notification of the trucial Shaikhs, 1902	2588	
Annexure 3. Arms Agreement, proclamation and notification of Shaikh of Bahrein, 30th April 1898	2589	
Annexure 4. Arms Agreement, proclamation and notification of Shaikh of Koweit, 24th May 1900	2590	
Annexure 5. Kārwan Arms Agreement, 26th May 1906	2591	

APPENDIX O.

APPENDIX O.

THE IMPERIAL PERSIAN CUSTOMS	2594
A. Control of the Būshehr Customs by the Imperial Bank of Persia, April to August 1898	2594
B. Management of the Imperial Persian Customs handed to Belgians, 21st March 1899	2595
C. Revision of the Persian Tariff, 1901-1903	2597
(i) The Russo-Persian Trade Declaration of 1901	2598
(ii) The Turko-Persian Trade Declaration of 1902	2599
(iii) The Anglo-Persian Trade Declaration of 1903 with undertaking by Persia not to alter new tariff without British consent	299
D. The Réglement Douanier of 1904	2602
(i) Important declaration by British Minister in regard to the term "The South," used in the Réglement, as affected by the assurance of 23rd October 1897, <i>vide</i> heading I (i) below	2614
(ii) Concession by Persian Government of an alternative to the confiscation of transport and goods	2603
(iii) Immunity of Diplomatic and Consular representatives and their staffs from payment of duty	2603

CHAPTER XII.
PERSIAN
MAKRAN.

Page.

APPENDIX O.

E. The Belgian vessel "Mozaffer" (late "Selika," <i>vide</i> page 2247) purchased for prevention duty, 1903, and five armed launches ordered from Royal Indian Marine, 1904	2604
F. Imperial Persian Customs placed in charge of postal system, 1902, and of Government treasuries in 1904	2605
G. Abolition of Rahdari decreed, 30th March 1901	2607
H. Question of duty on provisions for H. M.'s and R. I. M. ships and for the military detachments at Jāshk and Chahbār	2612
I. Question of lien by British Government on customs of Southern Persia	2612
(i) Written assurance given by Persian Government that customs of Southern Persia would never be placed under foreign supervision or control, 23rd October 1897	2613
(ii) Meaning of terms "Southern Persia" and "Fars and the Persian Gulf"	2613
J. Dismissal of Monsieur Naus, 9th February 1907	2616
Annexure 1. Table of customs leases prior to creation of Customs Department	2616
Annexure 2. Table showing organisation, staff, etc., of the Imperial Persian Customs in the Gulf	2619
Annexure 3. Copy of written assurance of 23rd October 1897, <i>vide</i> heading I (i) above	2625

APPENDIX P.

APPENDIX P.

CRUISE OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON, VICEROY OF INDIA, IN THE PERSIAN GULF	2626
---	------

APPENDIX Q.

APPENDIX Q.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNTRIES BORDERING ON THE PERSIAN GULF	2663
A. British Representatives at the Court of Persia, 1807-1905	2663
B. British Representatives at the Court of Turkey, 1584-1905	2666
C. British Representation in the Persian Gulf region	2673
(i) Būshehr, 1763-1904	2673
(ii) Masqat, 1800-1904	2675
(iii) Trucial 'Omān (headquarters Sharjah), 1829-1900	2678
(iv) Bahrein, 1829-1904	2678
(v) Koweit, 1889-1905	2679
(vi) 'Arabistān	2679
(a) Muḥammareh, 1890-1904	2679
(b) Ahwāz, 1904-1906	2680

(vi) Lingeh, 1830-1900	2680
(vii) Bandar 'Abbās, 1900-1904	2680
(ix) Bāsīdu, 1870-1905	2681
(x) Persian Makrān, 1863-1905	2681

D. British Representation in Turkish 'Irāq 2683

(i) Baghdād, 1766	2683
(ii) Basrah, 1728	2685
(iii) Mosul, 1839	2689
(iv) Karbala, 1870	2690

E. Foreign Representation in the Persian Gulf region 2690

(i) 'Arabistān	
(a) Russian, 1902	2690
(ii) Būshehr	
(a) Holland, 1869	2690
(b) Turkey, 1871	2691
(c) France, 1899	2691
(d) Germany, 1897	2692
(e) Russia, 1901	2692
(iii) Bandar 'Abbās	
(a) Russia, 1904	2692
(iv) Lingeh	
(a) Turkey, 1891	2693
(b) France and Russia, 1905	2693
(v) Masqat	
(a) United States of America, 1880	2693
(b) France, 1894	2693

F. Foreign Representation in Turkish 'Irāq 2694

(i) Baghdād	2694
(a) France, 1741	2694
(b) Russia, 1881	2695
(c) Greece, 1887	2696
(d) United States of America, 1889	2696
(e) Germany, 1883	2697
(f) Austro-Hungary, 1900	2697
(g) Belgium, 1904	2698
(h) Sweden and Norway, 1905	2698
(i) Sweden only, 1906	2698
(j) Persia	2698
(ii) Basrah	2698
(a) France, 1679	2698
(b) Russia, 1899	2699
(c) United States of America, 1900	2699
(d) Austro-Hungary, Greece and Italy, 1905	2699
(e) Persia	2699

APPENDIX R.

APPENDIX R.

BOOKS OF REFERENCE	Page. 2700
------------------------------	---------------

APPENDIX S.

APPENDIX S.

EXPLANATION OF THE SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION	2700
--	------

PART III.

GENEALOGICAL TREES.

	Pocket No.
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Sa'idi families of, 'Omān and Zanzibar . . .	1
Table of the ruling Qāsīmi family of Shārjah in Trucial 'Omān . . .	2
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Falāh (Bani Yās) family of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān	3
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Falāh (Bani Yās) family of Dibai in Trucial 'Omān	4
Table of the ruling Āl 'Ali family of Umm-al-Qaiwain in Trucial 'Omān .	5
Table of the ruling Āl Bū Kharāibān (Na'im) family of 'Ajmān in Trucial 'Omān	6
Table of the Qāsīmi family formerly ruling Lingeh	7
Table of the ruling Āl Thāni (Ma'ādhid) family of Dōhah in Qatar .	8
Table of the ruling Āl Khalifah ('Atbi family of Bahrain (Sheet No. 1) .	9
Table of the ruling Āl Khalifah ('Atbi) family of Bahrain (Sheets Nos. 2 and 3)	10
Table of the ruling Āl Subah ('Atbi) family of Kuwait	11
Table of the ruling (Wahhābī) Āl Sa'ūd ('Anizah) family of Southern Najd (Sheets Nos. 1, 2 and 3)	12
Table of the ruling (Wahhābī) Āl Sa'ūd ('Anizah) family of Southern Najd (Sheets Nos. 4 and 5)	13
Table of the ruling Āl Rashid (Shammar) family of Jabal Shammar .	14
Table of the ruling Abdul Khail ('Anizah) family of Buraidah in Qasīm .	15
Table of the ruling Salaimi (Sabai) family of 'Anaizah in Qasīm . .	16
Table of the Qādiriyah (Saiyid) family of the Naqībs of Baghdād in . Turkish Irāq	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
	24

MISCELLANEOUS.

CHART SHOWING THE PEARL BANKS ALONG THE ARABIAN SHORE OF THE PERSIAN GULF BETWEEN RĀS TANŪRAH AND DIBWA (VIDE PAGE 2263 OF PART II)	25
	26
	27
	28
	29
	30

HISTORICAL GAZETTEER

OF THE

PERSIAN GULF,

'OMĀN,

AND CENTRAL ARABIA.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE APPEAR-
ANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE THERE IN 1507 TO THE
FOUNDATION OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY
IN 1600.

The Persian Gulf first became known to the nations of Europe through the efforts of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century to wrest from the Arabs of the Mediterranean and the Middle East a monopoly which they enjoyed as middle-men in the trade between Asia and Europe.

Commerce between East and West had from early times followed two principal routes,—that of the Red Sea and Egypt and that of the Persian Gulf and Syria, both of which were equally under Arab control. These routes were sometimes closed by political difficulties and disputes; and, when both were shut simultaneously, the supply of Oriental luxuries to Europe was cut off except in so far as it could be maintained by arduous and uncertain communication across Central Asia. The European states trading most extensively with the East at the beginning of the 15th century were Venice and Genoa; but Genoa lost her position in Oriental commerce through the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, and ere long the hostility of the Mamlûks of Egypt deprived Venice of the advantages which remained to her. It was evident that the discovery of some untrammelled line of access to India would confer great wealth and prestige on a nation able to profit by it; and the country which most earnestly devoted itself to the quest of a new way thither was Portugal.

Arab domina-
tion of the
trade routes
between
Asia and
Europe till
1458.

Progressive
discoveries
of the Portu-
guese, leading
to the estab-
lishment of
the Cape
route to
India in
1498.

Dom Pedro's
Mission,
1416.

Expeditions
and Missions
of De Diaz,
Rabbi
Abraham,
and de Covil-
hão, 1486-87.

Da Gama's
voyage by the
Cape to
India, 1497-
99.

The eyes of the Portuguese were early turned towards the East. It may even have been by Dom Henrique (1394-1460) known as "The Navigator" whose blood was half English, that the idea of reaching India by circumnavigating Africa was first formed ; but, if so, it remained sterile until after his death.

In 1416, before the traditional overland routes to the East had been blocked by Turkish conquests, Dom Pedro, another half English son of Dom João I of Portugal, brother of Dom Henrique, proceeded "to the Court of the Grand Turk, and to that of the Grand Sultan of Babylonia, where he met with a magnificent reception."

It was only under Dom Affonso V (1443-81) and Dom João II (1481-95), however, that the Portuguese began to push successfully southwards and eastwards. Dom João II was anxious to contract an alliance with "Prester John," a Christian potentate in the East whose existence was by some deemed fabulous, in reality the ruler of Abyssinia, a land as yet unknown to Europeans ; it was his pious desire to extend the bounds of Christendom ; and it was no less his ambition to open a new commercial highway to India and to discover the lands whence were brought pepper, cinnamon, and other spices. With these objects in view the King of Portugal sent abroad various expeditions and Missions. In 1486 Bartholomeu de Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope, but without becoming aware that he had turned the southern point of Africa. In 1487 João Peres de Covilhão and Affonso de Paiva set forth in search of the spice countries. Parting from his companion at Aden, Covilhão found his way to Cannanore, Calicut, Goa, Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Zaila, and Safala ; ultimately he returned so far westwards as Cairo. At Cairo he fell in with Rabbi Abraham of Beja, who under Portuguese Royal patronage, had lately travelled to Baghdād and Persia with Joseph of Lamego and had reported on the island of Hormūz. Covilhão and the Rabbi then re-visited Hormūz in company, after which Covilhão came again to Aden ; ultimately having found "Prester John" in Abyssinia, he settled permanently in that country.

At last in August 1498 Vasco da Gama who had sailed from Portugal in 1497, reached India *viâ* the Cape. His cruise, one of the most momentous in history, ended at Lisbon in September 1499. Its almost instantaneous result was a revolution in the trade of Europe and a great accession of importance to Portugal, whose Kings thenceforth described themselves as "Lords of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia, and Persia,"—a style presently confirmed by the Pope.

De Almeida's Indian Governorship, and alarm of the Turks and Arabs, 1505-09.

In 1505 Manoel I of Portugal, the first to bear the proud title, resolved to overthrow the commercial supremacy of the Arabian Nations once for all by seizing Aden, Hormūz and Malacca. With this design he despatched Francisco de Almeida to India as Governor of the Portuguese settlements in the East; De Almeida made Cochin his principal residence. In 1506 a Turkish and Arab armament arrived on the Indian coast to help a Muhammadan prince against the intrusive Portuguese, but the Portuguese defeated it, asserting for the first time their superiority at sea over Orientals.

De Albuquerque's proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1507-08.

Meanwhile in the same year 1506, Affonso de Albuquerque had sailed for the East carrying with him a royal letter of appointment to the Vice-royalty and Governorship of Portuguese India, which he in the beginning kept secret, but which was given him to enable him to supersede De Almeida. His first care, however, was to secure points of vantage in the seas to the west of India. With this idea he seized the island of Soqotrah, but, finding the acquisition useless, very soon left it on an expedition to Hormūz.

Having destroyed every native vessel met with by the way he at length reached Kalhāt on the Coast of 'Omān, where he was well received. On the 22nd August 1507 he left Kalhāt for Quryāt which he took by assault. No opposition was offered to him at Masqat when he arrived there; but large forces having begun to collect on shore, evidently with hostile intent, he disembarked and defeated them, afterwards burning the town and its shipping. Sohār though protected by a great fort, surrendered to him without resistance; and at Khor Fakhān where the attitude of the inhabitants was defiant, he landed and severely punished the place.

De Albuquerque on the Coast of 'Omān.

At last he reached Hormūz, to the "King"—doubtless the Shaikh—of which place, named Saif-ud-Dīn, the towns and villages already visited on the coast of 'Omān were tributary. The "king" or Shaikh when

Portuguese occupation of Hormūz, 1507.

summoned, refused to make submission ; and De Albuquerque accordingly gave battle with his small squadron to a huge fleet, partly Indian by which the island was defended. He gained a complete and easy victory. In September 1507 a treaty was concluded by which Shaikh Saif-ud-Dīn became a vassal of the Portuguese Crown ; and in the following month he even hoisted a flag bearing a cross over his palace, while the Portuguese began to build a fort for themselves which they named "Nossa Sehhora da Victoria." A demand made after this on the Shaikh by an officer of Shāh Ismā'il, the sovereign of Persia, was rejected under the orders of De Albuquerque, who added a haughty message of his own for delivery to the Shāh.

Misconduct
of De Albu-
querque's
officers and
Portuguese
abandon-
ment of
Hormūz.

Early in 1508, the Portuguese fleet being then still at Hormūz the Commanders of most of the ships combined to defy the authority of De Albuquerque and though the latter was able to bombard the town in which some Portuguese deserters were harboured, his position at Hormūz became untenable. He sailed accordingly and in November of the same year arrived in India ; but De Almeida, who had already repudiated his action at Hormūz, refused to hand over the government to him, and the dispute between them was referred home to Portugal for settlement.

In November 1509 De Albuquerque became Viceroy of Portuguese India, and later he received missions from the Shāh of Persia and the Shaikh of Hormūz at his capital of Goa. Turkish attacks from the Red Sea on the Portuguese possessions in India were frequently threatened during his Viceroyalty and provoked counterdesigns ; but De Albuquerque considered the recovery of Hormūz, which had been lost more necessary than the capture of Aden.

Indian Viceroyalty of De Albuquerque, 1509-15.

Recovery of
Hormūz by
the Portu-
guese, 1515.

In February 1515 a fleet carrying 1,500 Portuguese, 600 Malabaris, and 300 galley slaves sailed for Hormūz ; De Albuquerque in person accompanied the expedition. The Ruler of Hormūz was said to be now a native of Persia who had come to power by murdering his predecessor and was in danger of meeting a similar fate at the hands of his own nephews. The island was found in a state of revolution, and no naval or military action by the Portuguese was needed for its recovery. The fort on shore was reoccupied on the 1st April.

Perso-Portu-
guese nego-

Later an Ambassador from Shāh Ismā'il of Persia arrived with various requests, some of which were granted ; it was proposed by him

inter alia, that Portuguese shipping should be supplied* to the Persians to enable them to invade Bahrain and Qatif, that the Portuguese should help the Shāh to suppress a rebellion in Makrān by taking Gwadar for him, and that an alliance against Turkey should be formed between Persia and Portugal. On the 20th October De Albuquerque, who had fallen seriously ill, appointed his nephew Pero to be Captain of the Fort of Hormūz. He then left to India, but died on board ship at Goa without having disembarked.

tations, and death of de Albuquerque, 1515.

Relations of the Portuguese with local powers and their struggles with the Turks in the Persian Gulf, 1515-1600.

After the death of De Albuquerque trouble recurred at the Portuguese stations in Persia and Arabia ; and the danger to the Portuguese from the Turks, whose power at sea was growing rather than diminishing, not only continued to increase in Indian waters but began to extend to the Persian Gulf.

Native revolts against the Portuguese and hostilities between the Turks and the Persians, 1522.

In 1522 the appointment of Portuguese officials to the custom houses of Hormūz, Bahrain, Sohār, Masquat, and Quryāt having caused discontent among the indigenes, a simultaneous attack by land and sea upon all those places was organised by the Shaikh of Hormūz, who thought the opportunity favourable for casting off the Portuguese yoke. Much loss of life occurred among the Portuguese, whom this sudden revolt seems to have taken by surprise. The Shaikh of Hormūz himself, after setting fire to his town, retired to Qishm ; but he was murdered there by his own dependents. A Portuguese fleet soon came from India under De Menezes, which, after destroying Sohār, relieved Hormūz then governed by Coutinho. A treaty signed at Mīnāb on the 23rd July 1523, was then imposed on the new Shaikh of Hormūz by the Portuguese Commander ; it placed Hormūz not only under the protection, but also under the strict control, of Portugal.

In 1526 there were fresh native risings at Masqat and Kalhāt, due to the excesses of De Mello, who commanded at Hormūz, and to the machinations of one Rāis Sharafu, who seems to have been the Chief adviser of the Shaikh of Hormūz. They were suppressed by Lobo Vaz, who brought a fleet from India, and who at the same time recovered

1526—29.

* There is a ludicrous similarity between this and what happened in 1820. See page 23 *post*.

arrears of tribute due by the ruler of Hormūz. In 1529 Nono da Cunha, Governor of the Portuguese possessions in India, visited Hormūz and, under orders from the King of Portugal, deported Rais Sharafu and sent him to Portugal. Bahrain revolted against the Shaikh of Hormūz; and a Portuguese expedition was sent against the islands, but failed through being insufficiently equipped.

First Portuguese expedition to Basrah, about 1529.

It was about this time that the name of the Turks began to be heard in the Persian Gulf. The ruler of Basrah—probably an Arab—having undertaken to prevent the Turks from trading there if the Portuguese would help him against a neighbouring chief in Mesopotamia, Melchior Tavarez de Sousa went to his aid and ascended the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The Basrah Ruler however refused to fulfil his promises of impeding Turkish trade; and De Sousa in revenge burned two “towns” at his departure.

Turkish descent on the Coast of India, 1538.

Perhaps as a reply to Portuguese action in the Red Sea, whither the Portuguese authorities in India from time to time sent expeditions, and in the Persian Gulf, a huge Turkish fleet fitted out and commanded by Sulaimān Pasha, Governor of Egypt, arrived on the coast of India in 1538. Desperate efforts were made by it, during more than a month to capture Diu from the Portuguese, but they were not successful.

Friction between the Portuguese and the Shaikh of Hormuz, 1542

The period following was one of incessant struggles between the Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf. The relations of the Portuguese with their vassal, the King of Hormūz, were far from satisfactory; and in 1542, the latter being unable or neglecting to discharge arrears of tribute which were due from him, the Portuguese assumed direct control of his custom houses and satisfied their claims themselves.

Expulsion of the Turks from Qatif. Portuguese second expedition to Basrah, and retaliatory cruise of Pîr Baig, 1550.

Open conflict between the Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf began about 1550. In that year the people of Qatif, renouncing it would seem an allegiance to Hormūz, placed themselves under the protection of the Turks, who had only recently taken possession of Basrah. The Shaikh of Hormūz was greatly chagrined by the defection of Qatif; and the late ruler of that district, who had been expelled, appealed for help to the Portuguese. In these circumstances an armament of 19 ships, carrying 1,210 men, was fitted out in India and despatched under Dom Antonio de Noronha to Qatif, from which, with the help of the adherents of the Shaikh of Hormūz, the Turks were quickly driven out. The expedition visited Basrah also; but the Commander fearing treachery did not remain long or undertake operations there.

The Turks replied to the Portuguese attack by sending a “pirate” named Pîr Baig to cruise in the Persian Gulf with a large fleet. This

Commander captured Masqat, from which he deported the Portuguese garrison, made a demonstration against Hormūz itself and plundered the town of Qishm.

In 1551 Pīr Baig was beheaded at Constantinople on a charge of having exceeded his instructions. His successor was Murād Baig, who had previously failed to hold Qatif against the Portuguese, and who now made a desperate but unsuccessful attempt to retrieve his reputation by engaging a Portuguese fleet off the Persian Coast.

In 1553 the Turkish fleet in the Gulf was taken from Murād Baig and entrusted to 'Ali, Chalabi, an arrant boaster. On the 25th August Dom Fernando de Noronha fell in with him at sea near Masqat and took six of his ships, driving him with the remainder to Surat where he hemmed him in.

In 1556 the Shaikh of Hormūz asked the help of the Portuguese against the Turks, and Dom Alvaro da Silveira was sent to his assistance, but the Portuguese fleet was disabled by a storm after its arrival at Basrah, whither it proceeded, and returned with no achievement to its credit.

Three years later a Turkish fleet of 2 galleys and 70 barques, with 1,200 Turks and Janissaries on board, proceeded against Bahrain. Rās Murād, who commanded there on behalf of the Shaikh of Hormūz, appealed for aid to his master and to the Portuguese; and a Portuguese fleet immediately proceeded to the scene of action. The Portuguese on their arrival, assisted by Rās Murād and by 300 well armed Persians attacked the Turks, whom they found besieging the principal fort, but were drawn into an ambush and suffered severely, about 70 Portuguese being killed. Ultimately, the allies having received reinforcements from Hormūz, the Turkish forces in Bahrain were obliged to surrender. They were allowed to leave the islands after delivering up their prisoners, their artillery, their arms and horses, and a sum of 10,000 ducats.

In 1580 Portugal was annexed to Spain and did not recover her independence until 1640.

The year 1581 was signalised by a descent on Masqat organised by 'Ali Baig, a Turkish marauder, with three galleys; the place was surprised by sea and by land; and the Portuguese garrison had to retire temporarily into the interior. A Portuguese expedition was then sent out from Hormūz to chastise 'Ali Baig, but it destroyed instead the ports of Gwādar and Tis on the coast of Makrān.

In 1582 the Khān of Lār, whose family had once lorded it over the Shaikhs of Hormūz but were now regarded by the latter as their vassals,

Cruise of Murād Baig against the Portuguese, 1551.

Defeat of a Turkish fleet under 'Ali, Chalabi, off Masqat by the Portuguese, 1553.

Third Portuguese expedition to Basrah, 1556.

Invasion of Bahrain by the Turks and their expulsion by the Portuguese, 1559.

Annexation of Portugal to Spain, 1580.

Temporary seizure of Masqat by the Turks, 1581.

Demonstration against Hormūz by

the Persians
of Lār, 1582.

Journey
of the
Englishmen
Fitch
Newberie,
Deedes,
and Story
down the
Euphrates,
Tigris, and
Persian Gulf,
1583.

Portuguese
disaster at
Nakhilu,
1585.

Fort erected
at Masqat
by the
Portuguese,
1586.

occupied Shamīl and blockaded the island of Hormūz. The Shaikh and the Portuguese however disembarked a force on the mainland, recaptured the fort of Shamīl, and drove the Lāris with slaughter out of the district.

The year 1583 was remarkable for an adventurous journey* made by four Englishmen, Ralph Fitch and John Newberie, merchants, William Deedes, jeweller, and James Story, painter, from Tripoli in Syria Brejik, thence by the Euphrates to Fallūjah, and so by Baghdād, the Tigris, Basrah, and the Persian Gulf to Hormūz, where they were arrested by the Portuguese authorities on suspicion of being heretics and spies. From Hormūz they were sent as prisoners to Goa and there remained in captivity for some time. Newberie had made the journey *viâ* Aleppo and Basrah once before in 1581.

In 1585 the Portuguese suffered a serious reverse at Nakhilu, upon the Persian Coast, in attempting to punish the place for obstructing the despatch of supplies to Hormūz. Taken unawares after landing they were driven to their ships with a loss, native auxiliaries probably included, of 250 men.

In the following year warned by experience, the Portuguese erected a strong fort at Masqat.

General situation in 1600.

The general situation in the Persian Gulf, as it existed at the close of the 16th century, may now be described in a few words.

* See annexure 1 to chapter IX. The original account of the journey there given bears witness to the extraordinary unchangeableness of life and travel in the East.

NOTE.—The sources affording information in regard to the history of the Persian Gulf from 1600 to 1722, the latter part of the period during which Persia was ruled by the Safavi dynasty, are very numerous; we shall confine ourselves to an enumeration of the more important only.

The following authorities treat of events from an English and more or less official standpoint: Mr. W. Foster's *Letters received by the East India Company from their Servants in the East*, 6 volumes, 1896-1902, covering the period 1602-17; *Calendar of State Papers, East Indies*, for 1513-1616, 1617-21, 1622-24 and 1625-29, 4 volumes; do. *East Indies and Persia*, for 1630-34, 1 volume; Bruce's *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, 3 volumes, 1810, covering the period 1600 to 1708; and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600-1800*, printed in 1905, which contains (page ii) an account of the huge mass of Bombay records from which the Selections are taken.

In the *History of the Indian Navy*, 1874, by Lieutenant C. R. Low, late I. N., the naval and military operations of the English in the Persian Gulf during the whole

Portugal was still the only European nation represented in the Persian Gulf, where the Portuguese power had first as we have seen, been established in 1507, and where the Portuguese flag was as yet supreme at sea. Portuguese fortified stations existed on the islands of Hormūz and Bahrain, at Qishm, at Masqat, and probably at other places in 'Omān, the administrative headquarters being Hormūz, which remained the chief emporium of trade for a large part of the world. The power of Portugal, however, had begun to show symptoms of decline. By some an explanation of this fact has been sought in the "Sixty Years Captivity" to Spain, which, as already mentioned began in 1580 and did not end until 1640; for the Spanish Government of the day, by which Portuguese foreign policy was controlled, was centralised, partial and unwise, and, in accordance with economic theories prevalent at the time, was inclined to sacrifice every other object to the accumulation of specie.

Position of the Portuguese, at this time subjects of Spain.

The Dutch had not yet, in 1600, made their appearance in the Persian Gulf; but, emboldened by success in their long struggle for independence of Spain, they had begun to turn their attention to the East Indies. The foundations of the Dutch East India Company, not regularly constituted till 1602, were laid at Amsterdam in 1595; and, in 1596 or 1597, there "came first into India the scourge of the Portuguese pride and covetousness," in the shape of two Dutch vessels.

Position of the Dutch.

period are described; and the following works of private or semi-official writers contain useful information with reference to particular incidents: *The Three Brothers*, anonymous, 1825, which deals with the proceedings of Sir A. and Sir R. Sherley from 1599 to 1628; Mr. W. Foster's *Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe*, 1899, for the period 1615-19; *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, Volume X (reprint of 1905), which contains a *Relation of the late Ormuz Businesse* from Monnox's Journal, 1621-22; Herbert's *Some Yeares Travels*, 1677, relating to Sir D. Cotton's Embassy to Persia in 1627-28; Fryer's *New Account of East India and Persia*, 1698, referring to the years 1677-78; and Hamilton's *New Account of the East Indies*, 1739, based on personal experiences between 1688 and 1723. Writings of some European travellers, not English, cast considerable light on special events and situations, among them being: the *Travels of Pedro Teixeira*, English translation 1902, referring to 1604; the *Travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle*, English translation 1665, for the years 1623-25; Mandelslo's *Voyages Célèbres et Remarquables*, 1727, referring to 1638; and Tavernier's *Travels*, English translation of 1684, relating to 1652.

The chief authorities on Portuguese affairs are: Manuel de Fariaxy Sousa's *Portugues Asia*, English translation by Stevens 1695, bringing events down to 1640; Colonel S. B. Miles' *Portuguese in Eastern Arabia*, contained in the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report for 1884-85 and extending to 1651; and Mr. F. C. Danvers' *Portuguese in India*, 1894, covering the whole period.

Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, Volume I, and Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, will be found useful to connect events in the Persian Gulf with the general course of affairs in Persia and Turkey.

Position of
the English,
and incor-
poration of
the English
East India
Company.

In England, too, which had obtained national security by the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, and which now stood forth as the greatest free and Protestant state in Europe, an epoch of enterprise and activity had begun; and on the last day of 1600 an English East India Company was incorporated, under Royal Charter, as the "Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies." The number of the original subscribers was 217, and the amount of the subscribed capital £68,873. The commercial position in the East had before this, to some extent, been reconnoitred by individual Englishmen, among them Newberie, Fitch and their companions, whose journey in 1583 has been described.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN 1600 TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM HORMŪZ IN 1622.

Events preceding the establishment of the first English Factories in the Persian Gulf, 1600-16.

Such being the general situation in 1600, we may briefly review the course of events which ended in the establishment, in 1616, of a British Factory in the Persian Gulf.

Proceedings
of Sir
Anthony
Sherley in
Persia and
his mission
to Europe,
1599-1601.

A conspicuous part in the introduction of English influence into Persia was played by the Sherleys, a pair of adventurous brothers belonging to a good Sussex family, whose loyalty to their country or at least to their sovereign may not have been entirely above suspicion, but whose exploits were on the whole creditable, and in the end advantageous, to the English name in the East. In 1599 Sir Anthony Sherley, who had been knighted in 1597, proceeded under the advice of the Earl of Essex, but without official instructions, to the court of Shāh 'Abbās I of Persia; his principal objects were to induce the Shāh to make common cause with the Christian powers of Europe against the Turks, and to arrange for the establishment on a satisfactory basis of English commerce in the East. Accompanied by his younger brother Robert and others, he travelled to Persia by land *viā* Baghdād and was first received by the Shāh at Qazvīn. As a result of Sir Anthony's representations the Shāh seems to have dismissed, with an unfavourable answer, a Turkish Ambassador who had come to arrange a peace between Persia and Turkey; and a Farmān

issued by Shāh 'Abbās, whereby he threw Persia open to Christian merchants of all nations, exempted them from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Persian authorities, and provided for the safe custody of their property in case of death, appears to have been obtained from him by Sir Anthony Sherley.* Sir Anthony returned to Europe with a general mission—probably suggested by himself—from the Shāh to all the princes of Christendom, in the discharge of which he visited Russia, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not, apparently, England; his proceedings, however, had no solid result. A Persian, whom Shāh 'Abbās had associated with him in the mission, gave Sir Anthony much trouble from time to time by claiming to be himself the real ambassador; but this individual, having returned from Rome, was put to death by his royal master on his arrival in Persia. Sir Anthony Sherley, whose fidelity seems to have been doubted by his own Government, settled in Spain on the conclusion of his mission; and there he resided, neglecting to comply with an order to return to England, until his death in 1630.

After the departure of his elder brother for Europe, Robert Sherley remained at the court of the Shāh, apparently as a hostage. After a time the Shāh, not having received any news of Sir Anthony's embassy, began to regard Robert Sherley with less favour than in the beginning; but the Englishman, by signal services against the Turks, succeeded in regaining the Shāh's good graces and was able to secure the punishment, as already described, of the Persian commissioner who had been sent with Sir Anthony to Europe. At length, in 1608 or 1609, Shāh 'Abbās despatched Robert Sherley himself to Europe, in the same manner as he had sent his brother, to establish and confirm relations of friendship between Persia and the European powers and to announce the Shāh's intention of utterly destroying the Turks and of bringing the frontiers of Persia into contact with those of Christendom. After visiting Poland and Germany in 1609 and Italy in 1610, Robert Sherley proceeded to Madrid, where he propounded a scheme for diverting the Persian silk trade, then carried on overland to the advantage of the Turks, to Hormūz or some adjacent port in the Persian Gulf; but the scheme was coldly received by the Spanish court. He then came to England, and, on the 2nd October 1611, had an audience of King James at Hampton Court, where he exhibited his commission and delivered letters signifying "the Persian's great love and affection unto His Majesty, with hearty desire of amity with the King

Proceedings
of Robert
Sherley in
Persia and
his mission
to Europe,
1600-13.

* The date of this Farmān has been conjectured to be 1599; but, if it was obtained by Sir A. Sherley, the date is more likely to have been 1600. See *Calendar of State Papers (East Indies)*, 1513-1616, page 108; but the substance of the grant will be found more fully given in Malcolm's *History of Persia*, Volume II, pages 535-6.

“of Great Britain, with frank offer of free commerce unto all His Highness’s subjects throughout all the Persian’s dominions, etc.” During his stay in England, Sherley’s wife Teresia, a Circassian lady received by him in marriage from Shāh ’Abbās, gave birth to a son ; and to this child the Queen of England became godmother and Prince Henry godfather. His political negotiations, however, failed ; there was some doubt as to the validity or scope of his commission ; the East India merchants were opposed to his projects, which they apprehended might disturb the trade with Turkey ; and in the end Sherley, who had become Sir Robert Sherley, left England without having effected anything. Sir Thomas Roe, who was soon afterwards to play a distinguished part in the development of English commerce in the East, was a witness of Sherley’s manœuvres, and formed of him the unfavourable opinion that “as hee is dishonest, soe hee is subtile.” Finally in January 1618, Sherley, accompanied by Sir Thomas Powel who held a military command under the Shāh, left Dover for Persia in the Company’s ship “Expedition,” on which he had been provided with a passage by King James’s orders ; he was furnished apparently with royal letters, but only of courtesy, to Shāh ’Abbās. The voyage was protracted by bad weather, which detained the ship for 28 days off Dhufār on the coast of Southern Arabia ; circumstances made it inconvenient to disembark at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, as has been intended ; a plot to seize the ship by the local governor of Gwādar, who was then in rebellion against the Shāh, was very nearly successful ; but at last, in September 1618, Sherley landed on the coast of Sind, and, after visiting the Mughal Emperor Jahāngīr at Ajmir, returned by land to the capital of Shāh ’Abbās.

Establish-
ment of a
position in
India by the
English East
India Com-
pany, 1600-
13.

Meanwhile the English East India Company had begun to acquire for themselves a commercial footing in India, and, between 1600 and 1612, twelve trading fleets or “Voyages” were despatched to the East by merchant subscribers belonging to the Company. In 1608 the first English ship arrived at Sūrāt, and the commander, William Hawkins, who brought a letter of recommendation from King James, was at first well received by the Great Mughal ; but he was again virtually dismissed in 1611, in consequence of Portuguese intrigues ; and in the same year permission to trade at Sūrāt was refused to Sir Henry Middleton, the commander of the Sixth Voyage, who consequently took Hawkins away with him and made reprisals upon Sūrāt traders in the Red Sea. In 1612 Thomas Best, arriving with another fleet, succeeded in obtaining a trading agreement from the local authorities at Sūrāt, which was confirm-

ed in general terms by a Farmān of the Mughal Emperor; and shortly afterwards, apparently in January 1613, an English trading Factory was established at Sūrāt in charge of Thomas Aldworth.

The local demand in India proving insufficient to relieve the Sūrāt Factory of an excessive quantity of broadcloth which had been ordered from England, Aldworth was obliged to seek another market, and his attention was directed by his enquiries to Bahrain and to Persia. His principal informant appears to have been one Richard Steel, a trader in Persia, who had come to India in pursuit of a runaway debtor; but Aldworth may have been influenced also by Sir Robert Sherley, who told Kerridge, one of the Company's servants, that, "if the English did not come to Persia, he would bring the Dutch." Accordingly, in 1615, Steel himself and a Factor named John Crouther, having been furnished with funds for their journey and with letters of introduction to Sir Robert Sherley, left for Isfahān by land, *viâ* Ajmīr, partly to procure further information in regard to Persian trade and partly to solicit a Farmān from the Shāh "for the fair and peaceable entertainment of our men, ships and goods in all such ports as they shall arrive at;" and it was apparently intended that special arrangements should be requested for trade at the port of Jāshk. These two pioneers of English commerce were successful in their mission; they obtained a Farmān from Shāh 'Abbās, of which a copy reached Ajmīr on the 10th of February 1616, directing the governors of seaport towns in Persia to receive and assist any English vessels that might present themselves; and they remained in Persia, and continued to correspond with the Company, during a part at least of the year of 1616.

Mission of
Steel and
Crouther to
Persia, 1615-
16.

While this preliminary mission was in progress, an important step of a different kind was taken by the East India Company in London. Experience had convinced them that their commercial interests in India would be served by the residence of a diplomatic representative of the King of England at the court of the Great Mughal; they accordingly suggested that Sir Thomas Roe, a gentleman of eminent capacity with some experience of travel and of courts, might be accredited by King James as Ambassador to the Mughal Emperor; and their request was at once granted. Sir Thomas Roe, whose instructions precluded him from interference in purely mercantile matters, arrived at Ajmīr in December 1615; and the copy of the Farmān of Shāh 'Abbās, mentioned above, together with letters from Steel and Crouther which accompanied it, were opened by him there, as there was no Factor of the Company at hand.

Embassy of
Sir Thomas
Roe to India,
1615-18.

The prestige and power of the Portuguese in the East, where—as already explained—they represented Spain as well as their own country,

Affairs of the
Portuguese

and Span-
iards, 1600-
16.

were now decidedly upon the wane. In 1604, when Teixeira voyaged up the Persian Gulf, the Portuguese were in bad odour along the whole Persian coast on account of the raids committed by their vessels, and their merchant ships could not obtain supplies there; Nakhilu and Rīg were places particularly hostile to them. They still, however, retained some of their authority; and native boats running from Rīshehr to Rīg sometimes took Portuguese passes. In 1612 and 1615 their fleets were defeated by the English in encounters off Sūrāt, and their inferiority at sea began to be suspected by the Mughal government. In the Persian Gulf, likewise, their naval credit began to decline. About 1602 they were dislodged from Bahrain by the Shāh of Persia; and about 1608 their settlement on Hormūz was blockaded by the Shāh's forces and was reduced to considerable straits.

In 1613 the Khān of Lār tried to recover Bandar* 'Abbās, which the Portuguese had apparently seized and fortified in the previous year as a precaution against a blockade of Hormūz from the mainland. A force proceeded to attack the Lāris, but the ship carrying the Portuguese commander took fire and blew up; his successor in the command, however, continued the operations and in the end defeated the enemy. Ultimately the Shāh apologised to the Viceroy of Portuguese India for the action of the Khān of Lār, which he asserted to have been unauthorised. The Portuguese retained Bandar 'Abbās only until 1615, when they were expelled by the Persians after a siege of some duration.

In March 1616 the Portuguese, helped by a neighbouring tribe, attacked and took Sohār on the Bātinah Coast of 'Omān. Their object was to destroy a port which competed with Masqat and Hormūz and injuriously affected the Portuguese revenue from customs. Muhammad, the ruler of Sohār, was killed in action; and his brother, having been taken prisoner, was put to death. The Portuguese further violated the terms of the capitulation by falling on the garrison as they evacuated the place.

While fighting proceeded between the Persians and the Portuguese in the Gulf, embassies continued to be interchanged between the courts of Isfahān and Madrid. In 1613 Dānish Baig, a Persian ambassador to

* Bandar 'Abbās takes its name from Shāh 'Abbās I, by whom it was founded about this time, probably as a check upon Hormūz. To Europeans, in the 17th and 18th centuries, it was generally known as "Gombroon," "Gammeron," "Comoran," etc.; this name, according to Hamilton (see his *New Account of the East Indies*, I, 92), was first applied to it in derision by the Portuguese, being taken from a word in their language meaning a "shrimp." A different conjecture connects it with Gumūq, the Persian word for "customs."

Spain, returned to the East and was received at Goa by the Portuguese authorities and forwarded on his way to Persia with every honour; but the results of his mission must have been disappointing to the Shāh, for that monarch caused him to be put to death immediately on his arrival. A bishop from Spain had accompanied Dānish Baig to the East to propagate Christianity in Persia; but, having apparently foreseen unfortunate consequences from the failure of the Persian embassy, he wisely remained at Hormūz. Some time after this, Shāh 'Abbās, who apparently hankered after a special arrangement with some European nation in regard to the silk trade, suggested that a Spanish gentleman of note should be sent to negotiate with him instead of ecclesiastics, as hitherto, "for he should know better how to treat with such a one, and God and His Majesty would be better served, because a religious man out of his cell was like a fish out of water;" and in response to his invitation a certain Don Garcia de Silva Figueroa was despatched from Madrid with costly presents and a magnificent retinue. This Ambassador, however, on account of the hostilities which Shāh 'Abbās continued to commit against the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, and particularly of his expulsion of the Portuguese from Bandar 'Abbās in 1615, did not, so far as can be ascertained, proceed beyond Goa until the following year.

During the earlier part of the reign of Shāh 'Abbās prior to 1600, a considerable part of Persia was in possession of the Turks, who held Tiflis, Tabriz and even Nihāvand to the east of Kirmānshāh. After 1600 however, the Shāh addressed himself with much success to the recovery of the lost provinces: in 1602 he took Nihāvand; in 1603 he dislodged the Turks from Tabriz, which they had occupied for 18 years; in 1605 he invested Erivan and Baghdād; and finally in the same year, having purposely withdrawn his troops from the siege of Baghdād, he completely defeated the Ottoman forces in the field at a great battle, in which Sir Robert Sherley, fighting on the Persian side, received three wounds. Isfahān was at this time the capital of Persia, and the Shāh had a garrison at Rīshehr in the Persian Gulf.

Relations
of Persia and
Turkey.

Establishment of the first English Factories in Persia, 1616-17.

The arrival of the Farman obtained by Steel and Crouther provoked an immediate discussion as to whether, and if so in what manner, the commercial privileges conceded by the Shāh should be turned to account by the East India Company.

Before the receipt of the Farman, but after the question of opening a trade with Persia had been mooted, Sir Thomas Roe had enjoined

Cautious
policy of

Sir T. Roe,
1615-16.

caution, had proposed a thorough inquiry into the conditions of commerce in Persia, and had suggested that he himself should visit Isfahān, under a commission from King James, to arrange matters personally. The arrival of the Farmān did not alter his opinion, for he regarded the document as of little value, chiefly because it made no provision for a fortified port in the Gulf and because it contained no assurance that trade would be directed to Jāshk or to any other port with which the English might have to do. He further considered the time to be inopportune for a venture in Persia, inasmuch as Sir Robert Sherley had recently left Persia as Ambassador from the Shāh to the King of Spain with instructions to arrange, if possible, that the Portuguese and Spaniards, on being granted permission to occupy and fortify Bandar 'Abbās and other places on the coast, should purchase there all the Persian merchandise brought down for export and should send a yearly fleet to the Gulf with spices, pepper and Indian linen; the outcome of Sherley's mission could not, he thought, be predicted; and, if it were successful, the undertaking of the Company's servants would be completely frustrated. In these circumstances Roe sought to dissuade the Factors from taking any decisive step; but at the same time, by way of counteracting Sherley's designs, he wrote a letter to the Shāh, in which he thanked him for the Farmān given to Steel and Crouther, pointed out that the Shāh's negotiations with Spain were inconsistent with the terms of the Farmān, whereby freedom of trade was guaranteed to all Christian merchants, and hinted that the grant of a monopoly to another nation might oblige the English to resort to arms and so to disturb the tranquillity of the Gulf.

Decision and
action of the
Factors in
opposition to
the views of
Sir T. Roe,
October
1616.

The Factors at Sūrat, however, who evidently considered the question to be a commercial one not falling within the province of Sir Thomas Roe, took a different view. They regarded the opportunity as favourable, inasmuch as Sherley, who would be either a troublesome enemy or an expensive friend, was absent from Persia; the continuance of war between Turkey and Persia and the consequent interruption of intercourse with Europe led them to believe that silk must at the moment be superabundant, and cloth scarce, in Persia; and Jāshk, though they were aware of the insignificance of the place itself, appeared to them to afford an advantageous opening for the disposal of the surplus stocks at Sūrat, yet without any extraordinary expense to the Company. Roe's adverse opinion they dismissed with the remark, that, "in regard "his Lordship in other particulars of his said letter is far transported (in "error of opinion) concerning merchandising and merchants' affairs in "these parts, makes us assured that he is no less transported from and

"concerning this Persian employment;" and they accordingly proceeded, in anticipation of the sanction of the Company, to place Edward Connock* in charge of a commercial mission to Persia by which a factory or factories should forthwith be established in that country. Their instructions to Connock contemplated a landing at Jāshk; but cargo disembarked there was to be at once removed to a place of greater security from the Portuguese; and Connock himself, taking with him a letter from King James and suitable presents, was to travel with all speed to the Shāh at Isfāhan and there endeavour to obtain a grant of privileges. The Sūrat Factors reached this momentous decision in October 1616; and no time was lost by them in carrying it into execution.

On the 8th November 1616 the ship "James," Captain Alexander Child, sailed from Sūrat for Jāshk, carrying a considerable cargo of goods and the staff of the Company's mission to Persia, namely, Edward Connock, the leader of the expedition, Thomas Barker, the next in seniority, and George Pley,† Edward Petters, William Bell, William Tracye‡ and Mathew Pepwell, Factors. The "James" having cast anchor at Jāshk on the 4th of December 1616, the mission proceeded to Mināb; the Shāh's Farmān was exhibited to Zulfiqār Khān, the local Persian Governor; and the goods of the Company, disembarked at Jāshk, were transported by land to Mināb on camels supplied by the Governor, and under his protection against the Portuguese. On the 20th of January 1617 the "James" left for Sūrat, Connock and his companions remaining in Persia to prosecute their enterprise. The value of the Company's capital brought by them to Jāshk was £6,333-15-11, including £550 in ready money.

Despatch of
a mission in
the "James"
to Jāshk,
November
1616.

Sir Thomas Roe, much to his credit, though he entirely disapproved of the action of the Sūrat Factors and made no secret of his opinion, did his best to prevent the failure of the enterprise. With this purpose, on the 3rd January 1617, he interviewed the Persian Ambassador at the Mughal court, to whom he "generally propounded the settling of a "trade, the conditions we required, the Comoditye to his Master, and our "forwardness in sending a ship this year to lasques upon his Masters "*firmaen*;" and he also persuaded the Ambassador to warn the Shāh of the danger which might result from an exclusive agreement with Spain. A few days later he wrote to his correspondent at Isfahān, an English jeweller named William Robbins,§ asking him to explain to the Shāh

Action of
Sir T. Roe,
1616-17.

* Also Connok and Cannocke, and by Roe spelt "Connaught." The orthography of the time was unsettled, even in the matter of proper names.

† Or Plea.

‡ Or Tracy.

§ Or Robin.

that the object of the mission to Jāshk was not to form a settlement at the place, but to show the readiness of the Company to take up the Persian trade; he apologised for the pooriness of the cargo sent; and he explained that the requirements of the English were (1) a port open to themselves alone, or to all nations indifferently, where they might land their goods under the privileges granted in such cases, (2) some arrangement for fixing the prices of the imports and exports to be exchanged there, and (3) the establishment of a "staple mart" on or near the coast, to which, for convenience of trade, the Shāh's silks should be brought down. Already, before the departure of the "James" from Sūrāt, Sir Thomas had written apprising the authorities in England of the line he intended to take, and had suggested a warning to Spain, to the effect that any attempt on her part to exclude other nations from the Persian Gulf trade would be treated by England as a *casus belli*. About October 1617 Roe received instructions from the Company in London, authorising a cautious line of procedure very similar to that which he had himself proposed, also a letter from King James, approving of his endeavours to open commercial relations with the Shāh and empowering him "to perfect and conclude, or cause to be perfected and concluded, a "treaty of Commerce betwixt the said great Sophy and us, for the mutual "good of the subiectes and dominions of us both, without attending from "hence any further directions then a confirmacion only of that treaty, "which shall be by us foorthwith ratified, according as you shall in our "name undertake the same."

Journey of
the mission
to Shīrāz,
January-
April, 1617.

After the departure of the "James" the mission were detained for some time at Mīnāb by the corrupt governor of that place, who, after accepting their presents, seems to have taken bribes from the Portuguese to prevent their going further. Connock, however, pressed on to Shīrāz to interview the superior authorities; and the mission, having at length been allowed to proceed, reached Lār on the 11th of March. On the 2nd of April they arrived at Shīrāz, where they were well received by the Governor; but meanwhile Connock had left for Isfahān in search of the Shāh.

Establish-
ment of a
Factory at
Shīrāz, and
dissensions
in the
mission,
April-May,
1617.

As Shīrāz appeared to be a suitable place for a Factory, and as the case was provided for in the instructions of the mission, Barker established himself there with Bell, and professed to consider himself for the future independent of Connock's authority. From this time onwards there was serious friction between the two senior Factors; and Barker, who was supposed to stand well with Sir Thomas Roe, apparently set himself to thwart the leader of the mission by every means in his power. A majority of the Factors, however still adhered to Connock.

Early in June 1617 Connock was at Isfahān with three of his party, where a second Factory was opened; and at the end of that month he was ready to leave Isfahān for the Shāh's camp. It was not, however, until the beginning of August that he reached the presence of the Shāh, whom he found somewhere upon the Turkish frontier at a distance of 25 days' march from Isfahān; Connock was now accompanied only by Robbins, the English jeweller; but Tracye followed him, bringing gifts for the Shāh. King James's letter to the Shāh, though genuine, was old, and the body of it had apparently been written in India over the royal signature or seal,—a circumstance which seems to have occasioned Connock some anxiety; nevertheless, in spite of doubts cast on its genuineness by a Spanish friar from Isfahān, who had managed to anticipate Connock in the Shāh's camp,* the letter was accepted by the Shāh; and the Englishmen met with a very cordial reception. The Persian monarch even went so far as to style King James "his elder brother," to drink his health in a large bowl of wine, and to promise that Jāshk or any other port which they might require should be given to the English. The "grant of privileges," which Connock had been sent to negotiate, was obtained in a highly satisfactory form.

Establishment of a Factory at Isfahān and journey of Connock to the Shāh's camp, June-August, 1617.

The Shāh's Farmān † provided for the perpetual residence of an English Ambassador at the Persian Court, and for the despatch, should circumstances make it desirable, of a Persian Ambassador to England; the right of buying and selling freely in the Persian dominions was conferred on all English subjects; they were to be protected in the exercise of their religion; they were authorised to possess arms and to use them, if necessary, in self-defence; a power of appointing Agents and Factors in Persia,—who should be treated with respect and assisted by the Persian authorities,—might be exercised by the English Ambassador, when he should arrive; in criminal cases Englishmen were to be punished by their own Ambassador; and in civil suits between English and Persians, if the value of the subject matter exceeded 20 Tūmāns, the decision must be pronounced by the English Ambassador, apparently with the concurrence of Persian judges, while in smaller cases justice should be done upon the spot by the Persian legal authorities. At the time of granting this Farmān, Shāh 'Abbās also wrote "a very noble letter" to King James.

Farmān of Shāh 'Abbās I, 1617.

* Connock seems to have attributed the proceedings of this individual to the machinations of Barker.

† The text of this Farmān does not appear to be extant, but its substance is embodied in a later Farmān (1623) of Shāh Safi. (See *Letters received by the East India Company*, Vol. VI, pages 293-7.)

Proceedings
of Sir T.
Roe.

Meanwhile, in India, Sir Thomas Roe continued to disapprove of the Persian mission, as conducted by Connock, probably in consequence of information received from Barker; he deplored the diversion of the Company's best goods to Persia; and he depreciated the advice given by Connock, whom he did not regard as a "sober" man and whom he suspected to be on the way to Popery or even to Muhammadanism. The chief charge against Connock appears to have been that he styled himself "Ambassador," and it seems that he did actually pose as a sort of royal messenger from a belief, as he himself explained, that the Shāh would not condescend to negotiate, in matters of peace and amity, with a mere mercantile Factor representing the East India Company. He was also accused of wasting the Company's goods. The suspicions against Connock were no doubt strengthened by the non-receipt of news from him; for the letters which he wrote from Isfahan in May 1617 did not reach India until 1618. In October 1617, Roe proposed to send a ship to obtain news of Connock; he also issued a commission, authorising Connock, Barker, Pley and Bell to conclude a commercial treaty with the Shāh on lines specified, and he advised the Sūrāt Factors, among whom * Thomas Kerridge was now the chief, not to send any more goods to Persia while the success of the mission remained uncertain.

Fresh com-
mission des-
patched
through
Monox,
November,
1617.

Sir Thomas Roe's commission was entrusted to Edward Monox,† who left Sūrāt for the Gulf on the 14th of November in the "Bee." On arrival at Jāshk on the 6th of December Monox found Connock and Tracey there; but Pley had died four days previously. Connock, on hearing that a downward silk caravan had been detained at Mināb, hurried off in that direction; but he took ill and died at Gatān in Biyābān; and a few days later Tracey also expired. In the manner of his death Connock curiously verified one of Sir Thomas Roe's objections against him, for at the last he avowed himself a Roman Catholic. The "Bee" returned to Sūrāt in January 1618 and the authorities in India were thus at length apprised of the results of the mission.

Proceedings
of the
Portuguese
during these
events,
1616-17.

While the English mission was establishing itself in Persia, the Portuguese were engaged in fruitless attempts to propitiate Shah 'Abbās, whom already they suspected, with very good reason, of a design to expel them from Hormūz; and the Shāh, on his part, continued to treat with the Portuguese in regard to a monopoly of the Persian silk trade. In 1616 Sir Robert Sherley arrived in India as a representative of the Shāh, concluded a peace with the Viceroy at Goa, and left for Spain

* Or Kerridge.

† Also Monnox and Monoxe.

about the end of the year to settle the question of the silk monopoly; but, though he remained at Madrid until 1622, his mission was barren of results. The formal restoration of peace enabled the Ambassador Don Garcia de Silva, who had been waiting at Goa since 1615, to proceed on his way; in April 1617 he passed through Hormūz, his approach causing much uneasiness to Connock, whose negotiations were not then begun; and later he was honourably received by the Shāh. His embassy however failed in its principal object, which was to divert Shāh 'Abbās from his designs upon Hormūz.

The Portuguese, in endeavouring to conciliate the Persians, did not neglect to oppose and obstruct the English. Some of the petty devices by which they, or their sympathisers, sought to frustrate the English mission have already been noticed above; and a large fleet had been despatched from Goa to intercept the "James" on her first voyage, but, failing in its object, had returned *viâ* Masqat. The Portuguese soon stood at a disadvantage, in the matter of popularity, as compared with their English rivals, one of whom after a few months' experience of Persia remarked: "We have more courteous use of the common people than ever they had, and more respect of the great ones."

Events preceding the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormūz, 1618-22.

In Persia the representatives of the English East India Company, now headed by Barker and Monox, proceeded to turn to advantage the privileges secured by Connock; but regrettable factions still prevailed among them. In India Sir Thomas Roe, furnished with additional powers and not insensible of the value of the concessions granted by the Shāh, directed that Connock should be avowed "to have beene a Messenger sent from the King, though not with absolute Power as Ambassador to treat and Conclude;" and he ordered that negotiations should be undertaken with a view to obtaining a safe dépôt on the coast, a staple mart at Shirāz, and an arrangement with the Shāh for a supply of silk, partly on payment and partly in exchange for goods. From these facts it is clear that Roe was in favour of systematic as opposed to desultory trade; and it further appears that there was a difference of opinion between him and some of the servants of the Company, for, while he was in favour of free trade and a peaceful understanding with

Proceedings
of the Eng-
lish Factors
in Persia.

Spain, there were others who thought that the Shāh should be encouraged to drive the Portuguese out of Hormūz, and that the aim of English policy should be to establish a monopoly of Persian trade in favour of the East India Company. In 1618 some further concessions of a minor character were obtained by the Company's servants in Persia; and the Shāh "apparently" agreed that all silk leaving Persia should in future be sold to the English, and that none should be sent to Europe by way of Turkey or disposed of to the Spanish or the Portuguese. Early in 1619 Sir Thomas Roe, having finished his work in India, left for England. In the course of the following summer a letter from the King of England was delivered to Shāh 'Abbās with much ceremony; and in November of the same year Barker died in Persia. Trade continued to be carried on satisfactorily; but no new factories were established, though King James, in 1620, wrote to Shāh 'Abbās to suggest the grant of a site and privileges near Jāshk.

Proceedings
of the Portu-
guese, 1618-
23.

By the successful operations of the English the prosperity of Hormūz was seriously affected; and the arrival of a fleet of five English trading vessels at Jāshk, still used by the East India Company as their port in Persia, produced consternation in Hormūz, where buildings were demolished and other preparations made for defence. In 1619 or 1620 the Portuguese were expelled by the Persians, assisted by an Arab levy, from a *position which they occupied on the Arabian coast at or near Rās-al-Khaimah; and the † watering of Hormūz, which a Persian force now threatened from the mainland, became a matter of difficulty. In November 1620 the "Hart" and "Eagle," two of the Company's ships, having been prevented from entering the port of Jāshk by a Portuguese fleet under Admiral Ruy Freire, returned to Surat, were reinforced by the "London" and "Roebuck," and eventually entered Jāshk after an inconclusive encounter between the fleets on the 17th of December. A few days later the Portuguese squadron, after a visit to Hormūz, to refit, reappeared in greater strength off Jāshk, and on the 28th December an obstinately contested action was fought, which resulted in a victory for the English, not however without the death of their Commodore, Captain Andrew Shillinge, who died on the 6th January 1621 of a wound in the shoulder.

* Probably Rās-al-Khaimah itself. The position lost is called "Julfar" with reference to which the article "Sir" in Vol. II of this Gazetteer (page 1826) may be consulted.

† The name of the watering place on the main land is given as "Dola."

Expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormūz, 1622.

In 1621 Shāh 'Abbās I was ready to undertake the expulsion of the Portuguese from their stronghold at Hormūz, the existence of which he regarded as prejudicial both to the honour and to the prosperity of his country. His claims to Hormūz were advanced through Qambar Baig Khān of Lār, who asserted that the island had been tributary to Lār before the coming of De Albuquerque. The difference between the Persians and the Portuguese in regard to the silk trade had become acute, and the commercial operations of the Portuguese were being harassed by the Persians, who had even seized some of their merchants. A final victory over the Turks near Tabrīz in 1618 had removed all danger to Persia on that side; and the power of the Shāh for external offensive action was now so great that about 1620 he easily made himself master of Qandahār. For the capture of Hormūz, however, a naval force was necessary; and Shāh 'Abbās, as he possessed none, was obliged to have recourse to the English. The East India Company, it would seem, at first hesitated to embroil themselves in the affair; but eventually, towards the end of 1621, the President and Council of Factors at Sūrāt issued a commission to Captains Blythe and Weddell, who were then bound for Jāshk with the ships "London," "Jonas," "Whale," "Dolphin" and "Lion" and the "pinnaces"* "Rose," "Robert," "Richard" and "Shillinge," authorising them, in view of the depredations and threats of the Portuguese, to capture the ships of that nation and even, if a council of officers should consider it feasible, to attack them in their ports. On the 28rd December 1621 the English squadron arrived at Kūhistak on the coast of the Mināb district; they had apparently been prevented by the Persians, who demanded their assistance against Hormūz, from doing business at Jāshk; and, further to constrain the English to take part in the operations, one of their trading caravans from Isfahān was detained at Mināb under orders from Imām Quli Khān, Governor of Fārs, to whom the task of capturing Hormūz had been committed by the Shāh. The Governor of Fārs, on his arrival at Mināb, was waited on by Monox and Bell, the former being now the Company's principal representative in Persia, who propounded to him the several conditions on which the Company were willing to co-operate with him against

Arrangement
between the
Persians and
the English,
1622.

* The "pinnacle" of that day was a schooner-rigged vessel of 2 or 3 masts, also propelled by oars, it was mounted with guns and used in war.

Hormūz, the principal among these being : (1) that half the booty taken should belong to the Persians and half to the English ; (2) that of the prisoners those who were Christians should belong to the English, those who were Muhammadans to the Persians ; (3) that the existing fort of Hormūz with all its ordnance, arms and munitions should be made over to the English, but that the Persians should be at liberty to build another for themselves ; (4) that the customs (of Hormūz) should in future be equally shared by the Persians and English ; and (5) that the English trade (at Hormūz) should for ever be duty free. These terms were accepted by the Governor of Fārs with the modification that, until the Shāh's pleasure was known, the Portuguese Governors of Qishm and Hormūz should be the prisoners of the Persians, and the existing fort of Hormūz be occupied by the Persians and the English jointly ; also that in the future the goods of the Shāh and those of the Governor of Fārs should be exempted from customs as well as those of the English.* The arrangement as modified by the Persian Governor was apparently concluded at Mināb on the 9th of January 1622. The ships' companies at first refused to serve against the Portuguese, apparently from a fear that the expedition might be considered irregular, but they were eventually talked over by their commanders.

Position of
the Portu-
guese at
Qishm and
Hormūz.

At this juncture the Admiral of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf was Dom Ruy Freire de Andrade, a man "more politic than conscientious" and "rather feared than beloved ;" he had many enemies among his own countrymen, and, immediately before the present crisis, he had been disappointed of the Governorship of Hormūz, which was his due, and to which Simão de Mello, one of his adversaries, was instead appointed. Ruy Freire had recently built a new fort at Qishm, which he had garrisoned with 300 Portuguese and a number of Arab auxiliaries ; and, strong in the possession of this work, he now ravaged the Persian coast westwards by Khamīr as far as Nakhīlu, destroying 4 ships, 80 "great Barques" and 400 other vessels. According to the Spanish historian the new Governor of Hormūz, disregarding the remonstrances of Ruy Freire, made no adequate dispositions for the defence of that place.†

* The writer has been unable to find precise corroboration of Fryer's statement, made more than fifty years after the event, that the English undertook to "keep two "Men of War constantly to defend the Gulf" (*New Account of East India and Persia*, pages 222 and 352). It will be seen however, from a later paragraph in the text, that at some time or another an engagement was apparently given by the English to the effect that they would keep the Gulf open and bear half the cost of doing so.

† This statement is to some extent corroborated by the number of guns found unmounted at Hormūz after its fall ; but possibly the garrison had as many mounted as they could use.

Before the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agreement, while the Governor of Fārs was yet on his way from the interior to the coast, the Persians had begun to attack Qishm and had lost a large number of men without making any impression on the fort. On the 22nd of January 1622 the British squadron anchored off Hormūz, in the hope of bringing about an engagement with the enemy's fleet there, which consisted, apparently, of 5 galleons and 15 or 20 so-called "frigates;" but the Portuguese did not accept the challenge. On the 23rd, assisted by the Persians, the English began operations against the fort of Qishm, where Ruy Freire commanded; and on the 1st of February, no help having been sent from Hormūz, the garrison were obliged to capitulate. Ruy Freire would have set fire to the fort and died honourably in a sortie, but his men refused to follow him and began to desert, jumping from the walls. Only two Englishmen lost their lives in the siege of Qishm; but one of these was Master William Baffin, the discoverer of Baffin's Bay, who acted as pilot to the fleet and was killed on shore in taking ranges with his instruments for the guidance of the artillery. Seventeen guns and about 1,000 prisoners were captured, the latter including the Portuguese Admiral, who was not made over, as he should have been under the agreement, to the Persians. On the 4th of February the squadron moved over to Bandar 'Abbās, whence* Ruy Freire and four of his principal officers were sent as prisoners to Sūrat: the "Lion" and two "pinnaces" having been detached on this duty, there remained only four ships and two pinnaces to carry out the attack on Hormūz.

Siege and capture of Qishm by the English and Persians, 22nd January—1st February, 1622.

On the 9th of February 1622 the English squadron took up a position off Hormūz; and on the next day a large Persian force, landed from a fleet of 200 native vessels, entered and took possession of the town, almost without opposition. Operations against the fort were then commenced from the landward side, but their progress was slow; and the Portuguese garrison, notwithstanding scarcity and disease, made a brave and persevering defence. On the 24th of February the Portuguese flagship "San Pedro" was set on fire by the English and destroyed. On the 17th of March a Persian mine made a practicable breach in a salient angle of the fort, but the Persian storming party led by Shāh Quli Baig, were repulsed with loss by the defenders. The town was then burned by the besiegers to prevent the Persian forces from skulking in it. By the 23rd of March two more Portuguese vessels had been sunk by the fire of the English ships; and one or two others soon shared the same fate. The

Siege and capture of Hormūz by the English and Persians, 9th February—23rd April, 1622.

* He escaped from the "Lion" at Sūrat, returned to Hormūz to find the place fallen, and then he took himself to Masqat.

Persian forces were miserably armed and equipped ; they suffered severely from want of water and provisions, due to inefficient arrangements ; and their commander was guilty of various breaches of faith towards the English, especially in holding separate communication with the Portuguese, which cannot have conduced to the success of the joint operations. On the 2nd of April two more mines were exploded by officers from the English ships, but the Persians refused to attack the breaches thus opened ; the garrison, however, were by this time in great distress. On the 14th and 17th of April, fresh breaches having been effected by means of mines, the besiegers made an assault in great force ; but a mere handful of Portuguese and negroes sufficed to repulse them to a barricade, where the Persians "the whole day stood flocking together in the Sunne " without either meat or drink, which was sufficient to have killed halfe " of them ." According to Monox the Persian "Soldiers hang in a " cluster upon the breach just as a swarme of Bees upon a tree or bush " that want a Hive ; or like a flocke of Sheepe at a gappe, where none is " so hardie to enter, and the Portugals to put them out of that paine " gleaneth away foure, five, sixe, sometimes more at a shot ; insomuch " that I cannot but pittie them to see it. " On the 18th another assault was made and failed ; but on the 19th the Persians gained possession of the whole enceinte, and the Portuguese retired into some of the inner works.

At last on the 21st of April, the Portuguese, thinking it unwise to rely on Persian good faith and preferring to deal with Christians, made overtures to the English, who undertook that their lives should be spared ; and a truce of two days was arranged through Monox and the captains of the ships. On the 23rd of April the Portuguese* surrendered on condition that they should be removed from the country ; the same day they began to march out, to the number of 2,600 persons, the English protecting them to the best of their ability, but not with entire success, against injury and insult by the Persians ; and on the 27th they were despatched in English vessels to Masqat. Meanwhile Saiyid Muhammad Shāh, the native ruler of Hormūz, had been taken by the Persians ; he was subsequently deported to Shiraz, where he remained as a political détenu for some years. A number of Indian traders also fell into their hands.

*Another account says the Capitulation was on the 22nd May, but is probably wrong. According to the Portuguese authorities a surrender was first arranged by Luiz de Brito, who commanded the fort, and Simão de Mello, the Governor, then pretended to oppose the idea but afterwards incited the soldiers to mutiny and so capitulated. The same authorities make the number of Portuguese who left Hormuz 2,000 of both sexes and all ages.

No orderly division of the spoil of Hormūz, as contemplated in the Anglo-Persian agreement, ever took place ; but on the contrary there was indiscriminate pillage by the allies, beginning on the 24th of April, in which the Persians were supposed to have secured the lion's share of the plunder. The number of captured guns assigned to the English was apparently 165 ; but their value was estimated at only one-third of those retained by the Persians.

Simão de Mello was subsequently sentenced to death by the courts of his own nation for the loss of Hormūz ; but, as he had escaped to a foreign country, the punishment was inflicted on him in effigy only. Ruy Freire was exonerated from blame for the surrender of Qishm chiefly, it would seem, because his services were required ; his name was a terror to the Arabs.

The participation of the English in the attack upon Hormūz was evidently irregular from an international point of view,* for England and Spain were at peace when it was made. Complaints were addressed by the Spanish to the English Crown, and at first hopes of redress were held out by King James ; and it even seemed possible that the Company's action might be repudiated, and their servants treated as pirates, by the English Government. The Company, however, resolved "to stand on their innocence," and various grounds of defence were suggested by Monox, who had meanwhile returned to England in the "Lion,"—principally "His Majesty's commission to defend and offend," the aggressions of the Portuguese on English commerce in the Gulf, and compulsion by the Shāh, who had not hesitated to place an embargo on English trade in Persia. In the end satisfaction was refused to the King of Spain ; but the Company, probably in consideration of the behaviour of their representatives being condoned, were obliged to pay £10,000 to King James and the same to the Duke of Buckingham as Lord High Admiral. As the English share of the spoil of Hormūz, apart from what may have been secreted and carried off by individuals, was estimated at £20,000 to £25,000 only, it appears that the expedition against Hormūz, of which the expenses were no doubt considerable, must have resulted, in the first instance, in financial loss to the company. But, on the other hand, the position of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf had been totally destroyed by the fall of Hormūz, while the English had obtained a free port, and one more convenient than Jāshk, for the prosecution of their trade. The Shāh, moreover, now confirmed the Farmān

Immediate
results of the
capture of
Hormūz.

*Equally so, however, was the Portuguese attack on Shilling's fleet at Jāshk in 1620.

which he had granted to Connock in 1617, and issued new and special orders for the protection and encouragement of the English silk trade in his dominions.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE PORTUGUESE FROM HORMŪZ TO THE FIRST WAR BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH, 1622-53.

Events from the fall of Hormūz to the embassy of Sir Dodmore Cotton to Persia, 1622-26.

Efforts of the
Portuguese
to retake
Hormūz,
1622-25.

A number of the Portuguese deported from Hormūz at its fall settled at Masqat, which was now the only station of importance belonging to their country in the Gulf region; and with them came a nephew of the late native ruler of Hormūz, whose hereditary claims they may have hoped to turn to account. The Persians were anxious to follow up their success at Hormūz by taking Masqat also, but without the assistance of the English, which was withheld, they were unable to do so; they succeeded, however, in occupying Sohār and Khor Fakkān on the 'Omān coast. Under Ruy Freire de Andrade, however, who had escaped from his captivity with the English, the Portuguese once more assumed the offensive against the Persians, drove them from Sohār and Khor Fakkān, destroyed places on the Persian coast between Jāshk and Bandar 'Abbās, harried Persian shipping, and began to annoy the Persian garrison of Hormūz, whose supplies they tried to cut off; but the means at Ruy Freire's disposal did not admit either of a continuous blockade of Hormūz or of a direct attack upon the place. The desultory operations of the Portuguese Admiral continued throughout a part of 1623 and the whole of 1624; but they terminated at length in a series of engagements, fought off Bandar 'Abbās in February 1625, between a fleet under his orders and some English and Dutch ships. The Portuguese squadron commanded by Nuno Alvarez Botello, consisted of 8 galleons and 16 "frigates," while on the opposite side the English ships "Royal James," "Eagle," "Jonas" and "Star" and four Dutch vessels were engaged. Three separate actions took place, on the 1st, 3rd, and 14th of February, and were very hotly contested; the English fired some 20,000 rounds from their guns, and the "Royal James" was struck by no less than 405.

Portuguese shot, some of which were nearly 9 inches in diameter. In the final action the Portuguese were severely handled and to a great extent dismasted; but the English and Dutch, for want of ammunition, were unable to follow them when they drew off. Ruy Freire at first retired to the Arabian mainland opposite, where a few * days after the battle he was seen by the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle, probably at Khor Quwai. The English had 29 killed in all, and the Dutch a similar number including their commodore, while the Portuguese lost two captains and about 40 men in the last encounter, besides Botello and others in those that preceded. The general result must have been unfavourable to the Portuguese, for after this they made no more attempts to recover Hormūz.† In 1625 they made a peace with the Persians by which the transfer of Hormūz and Qishm to Shah 'Abbās was confirmed, but a moiety of the customs of Kung, near the modern Lingeh, was assigned to them; it was probably at this time that Bāsidu also, which they had formerly held, passed out of their possession. In 1625 the Portuguese were as unpopular as ever on the coasts of the Gulf. It was observed by the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle that they could not safely land on the Bātinah coast; and boats sent ashore for water from the Portuguese vessel in which he journeyed were repulsed with musket shots by the inhabitants of Bardistān.

Soon after the destruction of Hormūz, where, though accounts differ, it would seem that little except the fort now remained, the representatives of the East India Company settled at Bandar 'Abbās. Permission was granted them by the Shāh, in 1623 or 1624, to occupy two houses there; but they were not allowed to erect any building of their own, lest they should turn it into a castle. In 1624, owing to a combination among Persian dealers to raise the price of silk, the Company's business came to a standstill. The Factory at Isfahān was on the point of being closed, when Shāh 'Abbās intervened and by means of timely concessions induced the Factors to remain until the pleasure of the Company should be known. At Bandar 'Abbās, likewise, little or no business was done; and in January 1624, the Company in London, though not yet aware of the point that matters had reached on the spot, instructed Kerridge, who was on leave at home and whom they now appointed to the charge of the factory at Sūrat, to act as their agent in "re-settling or dissolving"

Precarious
condition of
English trade
in Persia,
1624-25.

* The 8th February (O. S.) would correspond to the 21st February (N. S.).

† The Spanish historian claims the victory for the Portuguese, who, he says, sank 3 of their adversaries' ships and chased the remainder, besides inflicting on the allies a loss of 1,000 men. On the other hand, an English captain, who was present in the fight claimed that 800 Portuguese had been killed.

their Persian trade, after making, if possible, a personal inspection in Persia. Apparently at the beginning of 1625 Kerridge arrived at Bandar 'Abbās, where he was present during the naval engagements with the Portuguese fought in February of that year; and, presumably on his advice, the Company's establishments in Persia were maintained.

Other difficulties of the English in Persia, 1624-25.

In addition to commercial difficulties, the Company's representatives had to contend with dishonesty and unreasonable demands on the part of the local Persian officials. No redress could be obtained in respect of the spoil of Hormūz, the Persian share of which had apparently been reported by the Khān of Shīrāz to his sovereign as amounting to 60,000 Tūmāns or over £180,000, nor in regard to the unfair division of the guns taken; and the Company were obliged to be content with three months' pay for their ships, which had in fact, from first to last, been employed for eight months in the Persian service. The Persians apparently agreed that the English should receive half the customs of Bandar 'Abbās in lieu of those of Hormūz, the trade of which had ceased to exist; but the proceeds received by the Company were disappointingly small, and, whereas the former customs of Hormūz had amounted to \$180,000 * a year, the Company's moiety at Bandar 'Abbās seems to have been only 225 Tūmāns (£675) in 1624 and 300 Tūmāns (£900) in 1625.

Persian requisitions for English naval assistance.

Frequent requisitions by the Persians for aid against the Portuguese were, however, the greatest cause of friction. Though not included in the Anglo-Persian agreement of 9th January 1622, some undertaking to the effect that "English shipping should clear the passages of this Gulf and sustain the moiety of the charge" had apparently been given to the Persians,† who took advantage of it to demand the co-operation of the English against the Portuguese at Masqat and in the direction of Basrah; but the request in regard to Masqat was ultimately evaded, and the other was directly refused.‡ The Persians had meanwhile fortified Bandar 'Abbās and improved the defences of Qishm, and at first they held the Hormūz fort also with a garrison of 200 to 300 men; but the latter post, till the final overthrow of the Portuguese fleet by the English and

* Probably not less than £20,000, and possibly a good deal more. One contemporary authority estimated the annual value of the Portuguese customs at Hormūz at £400,000; but this seems an impossible figure.

† See in particular *Calendar of State Papers (East Indies) 1625-29*, page 2.

‡ Fryer—see footnote on page 24 *ante*—seems to connect the failure of the English to obtain a fair share of the Bandar 'Abbās customs with their supposed default in protecting the Gulf; but this theory seems contrary to the evidence.

Dutch in 1625, was constantly attacked and in danger of being lost; and after that event, its occupation being no longer necessary, it seems to have been abandoned. The materials of Hormūz were largely utilised by the Persians to build the town which had begun to spring up at Bandar 'Abbās, but some of them were carried off by the Dutch to Batavia.

The Dutch, whose position in the East was now becoming strong, took advantage of the fall of Hormūz to establish a trade at Bandar 'Abbās, and, as we have seen, they co-operated with the English in finally defeating the Portuguese; but their intentions were much distrusted by the English Company's servants. One of the reasons given by Kerridge and his council for maintaining the English Factories in Persia was that the Dutch had intruded themselves and "scandalised our intendments unto the Sophy."* It was strongly suspected that the Dutch were intriguing with the Persians to obtain possession of the deserted settlement of Hormūz for themselves, or that they might attempt to seize it by force; and fear of being supplanted by the Dutch made the English very cautious in declining to meet Persian demands for naval assistance. Further, the Dutch declined to pay customs at Bandar 'Abbās and, though dunned by the English Factory, persisted in their refusal.

Proceedings
of the Dutch.

Meanwhile the power of Shāh 'Abbās I continued to increase, and his frontiers to extend, chiefly at the expense of Turkey. In 1623 the Persian armies overran 'Irāq and took Baghdād, of which the Persians remained in possession until 1638; Kādhimain, Karbala and Najaf with their Shi'ah Shrines, as also Hillah, came under the Shāh; but Basrah seems to have been successfully defended by its Turkish governor with the help of the Portuguese, who in 1625, a Persian army being then in the neighbourhood, kept five ships at Basrah to help the Turks. On the 23rd of March 1625, the Persians suddenly abandoned their attack on Basrah.

Increasing
power of
Shāh 'Abbās.

The embassy of Sir Dodmore Cotton to Persia, 1626-28.

Sir Robert Sherley's mission to Spain having ended in failure notwithstanding a sojourn of five years in Madrid, or the fall of Hormūz having caused him to change his views, he proceeded to England in 1622 or 1623. On the 28th of January 1624, and again on the 13th of April 1625, he had audiences of the King, at which he

Proceedings
of Sir Robert
Sherley and
embassy of
Naydi 'Al
Baig to Eng-
land, 1623-
27.

* That is the Shāh of the day, from the name of the Safavi dynasty to which he belonged.

appeared habited as a Persian and was received with much ceremony. Meanwhile, however, perhaps at the suggestion of the Company's servants in Persia, Shāh 'Abbās had despatched a Persian gentleman as Ambassador to England; this was a certain Naqdi 'Ali Baig, who left Sūrat in April 1625 but did not reach England until February 1626, some time after the "Star," in which he sailed, had been given up for lost. A singular collision occurred in London between the Shāh's two ambassadors, of whom Naqdi 'Ali Baig apparently enjoyed the countenance of the East India Company. Sir Robert Sherley, having gone with the Earl of Cleveland and others to visit Naqdi 'Ali Baig at his lodgings, was violently assaulted and knocked down by the Persian and his son; and Naqdi 'Ali Baig declared Sherley to be an impostor and his letter of credence a forgery. On the 6th of March 1626 the Persian had an audience of King Charles and presented a letter from the Shāh, in which it was stated that Naqdi 'Ali Baig had been sent "to desire nothing but " His Majesty's love, and that he would command his merchants and all " his people to come freely into his country to buy or sell or do what they " pleased, and none should dare to force any bargain upon them."

Despatch of
an English
embassy to
Persia under
Sir D. Cotton.

The English court, though inclined to trust Sir Robert Sherley, were unable to decide between the two disputants, and ultimately the King decided to send Sir Dodmore Cotton as Ambassador to Persia to reciprocate the friendly sentiments of the Shāh, to place the English trade in Persia, which as we have seen was in a depressed state, upon a better footing, and also to ascertain whether Sir Robert Sherley had really been accredited to him by the Shāh. Sherley was to accompany the mission, and the East India Company were requested to arrange for the conveyance of the Ambassador and his party to Persia. This last demand the Company sought to evade, as they wished neither Cotton nor Sherley to be brought into their affairs, but their objections were overruled. Cotton was instructed, however, not to interfere in the Company's mercantile business.

Voyage of
the English
embassy to
India, 1627.

The Company's fleet, carrying the English Ambassador, his staff,—including Sir Thomas Herbert, the chronicler of the mission,—and the rival Persian Ambassadors, sailed from England on Good Friday 1627 and reached Sūrat on the 30th of November in the same year. On the day of sighting the Indian coast, Naqdi 'Ali Baig, on whom the fear of his master's displeasure had begun to weigh,* committed suicide by

* He had torn up a commission which Sherley alleged to be the Shāh's and he had also been guilty of some irregularities in money matters. Shāh 'Abbās subsequently declared that, "if he had not thus prevented it, at his coming to the Court his Body " should first have been hacket in pieces, and then in the open Market-place burnt with " Dogs-turds."

swallowing opium. His body was sent ashore for burial, and eleven guns were fired by the "Mary," the ship on which he died.

On the 17th of December the Ambassador and his suite left Sūrāt for Persia in the "William," accompanied by the "Exchange," "Hart" and other gallant ships; and on the 10th of January 1628 they landed at Bandar 'Abbās under a salute of 100 guns from the fleet, to which the Persian land batteries replied with ten salvoes. From Bandar 'Abbās the embassy proceeded by way of Lār to Shīrāz, then the second city in Persia, where they arrived at the beginning of March and were well entertained for more than three weeks by "the merry duke," Imām Qulī Khān. On the 10th of April a triumphal entry was made into Isfahān, some Hindus being observed among the crowds that turned out to welcome them; an entertainment also was given in their honour on the fourth day by Mr. Burt, the head of the English Factory, "a very accomplished Merchant." On May Day they set forth on their way to the Persian court, which was then at Ashraf in Mazandarān.

Journey of
the English
embassy in
Persia, 1628.

The embassy reached Ashraf on the 21st of May and four days later Sir Dodmore Cotton had an audience with the Shāh. He explained that the object of his journey was to congratulate the Shāh on his victories over their common enemy the Turk, to promote trade, to obtain for Sir Robert Sherley an opportunity of vindicating himself from the charges of Naqdi 'Alī Baig, and "to desire that a perpetual "League of friendship might be continued 'twixt the two powerful "Monarchs of Great Britain and Persia." Shāh 'Abbās, rising from his seat to reply, disparaged the power of the Turks but expressed a wish that the dissensions of the princes of Christendom, by which the Turks profited, might cease; in regard to trade, he promised that the King of England should receive 10,000 bales of silk every January at Bandar 'Abbās in exchange for English cloth of equal value; he expressed, in general terms, his satisfaction with Sherley and his disapproval of the conduct of Naqdi 'Alī Baig; and, finally, he cheerfully embraced the proffered league of friendship and made the Ambassador himself heartily welcome, adding "and seeing you have done me that honour none of "my predecessors ever had before, for you are the first Ambassador "that ever came from Great Britain in that quality to my country, you "may deservedly challenge the more respect; yea, as I account your "Master chief of the worshippers of Jesus, so do I of yourself in a "superior degree to any other Ambassador now present." After the audience, in another apartment, the Shāh called for a bowl of wine and drank to King Charles's health, whereupon "the Ambassador stood up and

Proceedings
of the Eng-
lish embassy
at Ashraf,
May 1628.

“uncovered his head, which being noted by the Pādshāh, the more to oblige he lifted up his turban, and, after an hour’s entertainment, dismissed him with much satisfaction.”

Conclusion of
the embassy.

After this favourable reception matters began to go ill, in consequence of an enmity borne by Muhammad 'Ali Baig, the Shāh's favourite, to Sir Robert Sherley; and Sir Dodmore Cotton could not obtain another interview with the Shāh. The Persian court soon afterwards moved to Qazvin, whither the English embassy followed to receive their congé; but at this place Sir Robert Sherley died on the 13th of July, and Sir Dodmore Cotton followed him on the 23rd of the same month. A letter from the Shāh to the King was eventually granted to the survivors of the mission, among whom was Herbert, and with it they returned to England. The explanation of the partial failure of this embassy may perhaps be found in a remark of the Company's Factors at Isfahān, that Sir Dodmore Cotton's "extreme want in things exteriorly befitting so high a minister caused him much disrespect, of which he was very sensible, blaming Sir Robert Sherley and his own unadvisedness."

Internal and external affairs of Persia from Sir Dodmore Cotton's embassy to the first war between England and Holland, 1628-53.

Before proceeding to trace further the history of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to take a brief survey of Persian affairs during that period.

Shāh Safi,
1628-41.

Shah 'Abbās I continued to reign until 1628, towards the close of which year—or possibly at the beginning of 1629—he died and was succeeded by his grandson, Shāh Safi. Among the numberless victims of the cruelty and caprice of the new ruler was Imām Quli Khān, the erstwhile governor of Shirāz and captor, with English aid, of Hormūz. In the time of Shāh Safi, Qandahār was appropriated by the Mughal Emperor of India; the relations of the Persian and Indian courts became unfriendly; and in 1639 Mughal subjects were prohibited by the Emperor from trading to Bandar 'Abbās. In 1638 Baghdād was recovered from Persia by the Turks; and the greater part of 'Irāq, containing the Shī'ah holy places, which had been controlled by the Persians since 1623, came once more under Ottoman domination. In 1639 a Treaty defining, in somewhat general terms, the Perso-Turkish frontier was concluded between the two powers; it formed the basis of all later discussions of the subject.

Shāh 'Abbās II, the son and successor of Shāh Safi, ruled from May 1641 until after the close of the period with which we are now concerned. Peace with Turkey was maintained unbroken throughout his reign; but between 1648 and 1650 the Shāh was at war with the Mughal Emperor, from whom he succeeded in once more wresting Qandahār. According to Tavernier the wall of Bandar 'Abbās town was built about 1650.

Shāh 'Abbās II, 1641-66.

Relations of the East India Company with the Persian Government, 1628-53.

On the death of Shāh 'Abbās I, the fact, of which they were not unaware, that commercial and similar concessions in Persia expired with the sovereign by whom they were granted and must be renewed by his successor, was brought home to the East India Company. Renewal* of Shāh 'Abbās's Farmān of 1617 was obtained from Shāh Safi without much difficulty in July or August 1629, but not without an undertaking on the part of the Company's agents that they would take from the Shāh annually 20,000 Tūmāns' worth of silk, paying for one-third of the same in cash; and, to ensure observance of the Farmān after issue, it was further found necessary to disburse about £1,500 a year in presents to the Shāh and his courtiers. The exigencies of the Khān of Shīrāz, though of a different character, were so serious that in 1832 the Company's representatives in Persia pressed for permission from their masters to "occupy," that is apparently to seize and fortify without the consent of the Shāh, a place upon the Persian coast to which they might retire in an emergency; but leave does not seem to have been granted.

Renewal and grant of Farmāns, 1628-53.

Most of the privileges of the Company were renewed by Shāh 'Abbās II not long after his accession; but in 1644 some necessary Farmāns of a subsidiary character were refused on the ground that the English had diminished their purchases of silk, - a fact which could not be denied, and which, as we may remark in passing, was due to the ascendancy at the time of Puritanical influences in England.

The yield of the English shares of the customs at Bandar 'Abbās continued to be disappointingly small. In 1629 heavy loss was occasioned by the proceedings of a Mughal Ambassador from India, who, having

History of the English moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās Customs, 1628-53.

* For the terms in which the Farmān was renewed, see *Letters received by the East India Company*; Vol. VI, page 293

been conveyed in an English vessel to Bandar 'Abbās, insisted on landing two-thirds of the cargo of the English fleet there as presents to the Shāh, and consequently duty-free. In 1630-31 the Company's revenue from the customs was 550 Tūmāns,* in 1632-33 only 242 Tūmāns, and in 1633-34, apparently, 341 Tūmāns. In 1639-40 arrears to the amount of 200 Tūmāns were with difficulty recovered from the Persians, and it was hoped that 500 Tūmāns would be received on account of the current year; in 1640-41 the recoveries amounted to 700 Tūmāns. In 1643-44 the Company obtained 600 Tūmāns and in the next year 616 Tūmāns; in 1647-48 their share was 635 Tūmāns, and in 1650-51 it rose to the unprecedented figure of 750 Tūmāns, or more than £2,250, and was even described as the principal item of profit in the Company's dealings with Persia.

In some years the smallness of the amounts received was due partly to bad trade; but the frauds and negligence of the Persians, and even of the Company's own servants, and refusal of payment by the Dutch were factors of greater importance. About 1630 Captain Weddell, being accused of a serious fault in some other connection, pled that he had saved the Company £2,000 at Bandar 'Abbās by setting a guard to watch the customs, and about 1633 the position was somewhat improved by the energy and integrity of a Factor named Loftus; but in 1637-38, on the other hand, when the return was poor, it was reported that there had been collusion between the captains of the Company's ships, the Factors on shore, and the Persian officials. In 1640 some zealous employés of the Company went so far as to recommend that force should be used to oblige the Persians to deal honestly in the matter.

At various times it was estimated that the English share, if it could be recovered in full, would amount to 5,000 or 6,000 Tūmāns, that is to considerably over £15,000 a year; and according to Mandelslo, one of the embassy from the Duke of Holstein to the Shāh, who passed through Bandar 'Abbās in 1638, the English were then only receiving about one-tenth of their just dues. In 1653, the privilege of free trade at Bandar 'Abbās having some years before been extended by the Shāh to the Dutch, the Company's servants urged that this exemption should only be held to affect the Persian and not the English moiety of the customs; but it does not appear in what manner this question was settled.

*The Persian Tūmān was at this time worth more than £3 English; in 1677 it was £3-6-8.

Decline of Portuguese power in the Gulf, 1628-53.

The Portuguese, though fallen from their high estate in the East, continued for a time to be a military danger to the English.

Captain Swanley, who in 1628-29 went as Commodore of a fleet of five of the Company's ships to the Persian Gulf, to advance English trade and to land a Mughal Ambassador to Persia at Bandar 'Abbās, was commissioned to attack in the course of his voyage any Portuguese vessel or fleet which he might discover; but it is not known whether he found any opportunity of taking action on this part of his instructions.

Captain
Swanley's
cruise, 1628-
29.

In 1630 the Viceroy of Goa, having received reinforcements from Europe, attempted to prevent an English fleet from approaching Sūrāt; but the result of the actions which ensued, by sea and on land, was unfavourable to the Portuguese; and the Viceroy then transferred his attention to the Persian Gulf. A Portuguese envoy, with instructions from the King of Spain authorising him to resort to bribery, was at this time sent, or had already proceeded, to Shīrāz, where he succeeded in gaining the ear of the Persian Governor of Fārs; and, through the latter, a request for the rendition of Hormūz to the Portuguese was preferred to the Shāh and certain privileges for Portuguese trade at Kung were either secured for the first time or confirmed. At one moment it was feared that Portuguese influence in Persia was about to eclipse that of the English; but the agents of the East India Company were still able to obtain from the Shāh an order for 200 Persian troops to proceed to Bandar 'Abbās to defend the English Factory and shipping there against Portuguese attack; and ultimately, in 1631, the Portuguese were disappointed by the Persians and fell back on designs of seizing Hormūz by force. These, however, they were unable to put into execution, though to facilitate operations they established a post* at or near Rās-al-Khaimah on the Arabian Coast.

Renewed
activity
of
the Portu-
guese, 1630-
31.

In 1632 and 1633 the Persians were anxious to take the offensive against the Portuguese at Masqat, and the Governor of Shīrāz extorted a promise of naval assistance from the English, who feared that, if they did not comply, the Khān might have recourse to the Dutch; the projected expedition, however, never took shape. In 1634 the Portuguese repaired the fortifications of Masqat. In 1638, when Mandelslo visited Bandar 'Abbās, the Portuguese language was still spoken, more or less, by all the native inhabitants; but Portuguese and Spaniards

Hostility
between the
Persians and
the Portu-
guese, 1632-
38.

* *Viz.*, at "Julfar."—See footnote on page 22 *ante*.

were prohibited from entering the town, and the former frequently revenged themselves by committing petty depredations in the vicinity.

Peace between England and Portugal in the East, from 1634.

Hostilities between the English and Portuguese in the East were at length brought to an end by a truce, concluded in May or June 1634, between the President at Sūrāt and the Viceroy of Goa; explanations between the Crowns of England and Spain followed; and in 1635 instructions were issued to the Company's servants in Persia to remain neutral in the trouble between the Persians and the Portuguese. On the 20th of January 1636 the truce was replaced by a Convention signed at Goa, and amity was re-established.

Recovery by Portugal of her independence in Europe, 1640.

In 1640 Portugal was emancipated from the yoke of Spain and, under a prince of a house of Braganza, became again, after an interval of sixty years, an independent power; but this change had no very marked effect on the position of the nation in the East. The value of Masqat to the Portuguese military governor was estimated at this time at 50,000 ducats a year.

The Portuguese at Basrah, 1623-40.

On the loss of Hormūz the Portuguese had directed their commercial activity and* missionary enthusiasm largely to Basrah, where they established a commercial factory, a religious community, and a seminary of learning; and until 1640 at least, as we shall see later on, they maintained at that place a serious competition with English trade. In 1624 and 1625 they assisted the Turks to defend Basrah and its dependencies against Persian attacks, and in the latter year they kept five large vessels at Basrah for this purpose. The transfer of the Portuguese trade in the Gulf from Persia to Turkey was viewed with jealousy and dislike by the Shāh, and this appears to have been the principal cause of the Persian attempts upon Basrah.

Expulsion of the Portuguese from 'Omān, 1640-50.

The hold of the Portuguese upon 'Omān now began to relax: in 1640 the Imām having been informed by Arabs in the Portuguese Custom house that the fort was weakly manned, a native force attacked Masqat, but without success; and in November 1643 Sohār was lost, 37 Portuguese being taken prisoners and the military guard all killed. In 1648, as more fully related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, the Arabs besieged Masqat and compelled the Captain-General to agree to terms by which the power and influence of the Portuguese in 'Omān were greatly circumscribed. Besides Sohār, the Portuguese had already lost, or lost about this time, "Caurusar," "Dobar" and Quryāt. At the end of 1649 Masqat was again assailed by an Arab force, and in January 1650 the Portuguese made a complete surrender of their supposed "impregnable fortress" and evacuated the country. In 1649, before this

* See the Appendix on Religions in the Persian Gulf.

final catastrophe, orders were sent out from Europe by the King of Portugal that every effort should be made to keep Masqat and that "Cassapo" (perhaps Khasab) should be strengthened; at Masqat Shaikhs and Moors were not to be allowed to live in the town. If possible, a port should be created at "Bandaly" near "Comoras" (Bander 'Abbās).

After the fall of Masqat, a Portuguese fleet was sent to the Gulf and apparently prospected for a new settlement on the coasts of Lār (*i.e.*, probably of the modern Bastak and Lingeh districts) and on those of Hasa. The island of Hanjām seems to have been tendered by the Persians, with rights of fortifications; but the Portuguese did not accept the offer, from an impression, apparently, that a site at "Cassapo" (perhaps Khasab) or at some other point upon the Arabian coast would be more advantageous. The Portuguese Factory and privileges at Kung, founded about 1625, were maintained; but, with the cessation of the power of the Portuguese to compel vessels to call there, the prosperity of the place seems gradually to have departed. The Portuguese had thus been dislodged from their last remaining territorial foothold in the Persian Gulf, and the Portuguese flag, as familiar in Gulf waters during nearly a century and a half as that of a local power, had become the ensign of a distant and foreign nation.

Position of
the Portu-
guese in the
Gulf after
their expul-
sion from
'Omān, 1650-
53

The fall of the Portuguese was due to several causes, principally perhaps to violence and bad faith in dealing with their Oriental neighbours; but also, largely, to jealousies and dissensions among themselves. They founded no mercantile company, as did their rivals the English and the Dutch, their trade being instead inefficiently administered as a royal monopoly; and, in the end, even the military basis on which their power rested became insecure for want of discipline and of professional foresight. The low level of Portuguese naval discipline in 1624-25 was remarked by the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle, who, notwithstanding his marked sympathy for fellow-Catholics, could not forbear from contrasting what he saw on Portuguese vessels with the conditions that prevailed on board English ships. The verdict of the Portuguese historian himself is given in these words: "The ruin of our affairs "proceeds from the little regard the great ones have for the lesser sort; "and the covetousness of the small ones, which made them forget their "country and their honour..... The Portugueses can recover what is "lost, but know not how to preserve what they gain, which is the "most glorious part, it being the work of fortune to gain, and that of "prudence to preserve."*

Causes of the
decline of the
Portuguese
power.

* See *The Portugues Asia*, Vol. III, pages 382-3 (Stevens' translation of Manuel de Faria Sousa).

Growth of the power of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 1628-53.

The disappearance of the Portuguese from the field did not, it should be observed, relieve the English in the Persian Gulf from commercial and political rivalry; for, as the power of the Portuguese declined, that of the Dutch increased rapidly and became dangerous.

Methods of
the Dutch
in Persia,
1628-37.

In Persia the Dutch, resorting to bribery and paying high prices for Persian commodities, strove assiduously to oust the English from the position that they had so painfully won; and in 1633 the Factors of the East India Company did not venture to raise the question of a fresh silk contract with the Shāh, though one was desired, for fear that they should be outbidden by the Dutch. There were also traitors in the English camp. In 1637, on the death of Gibson, the English Agent at Isfahān, it was discovered that he had actually been lending money out of the funds of the East India Company to the Dutch, and so enabling them to buy silk and generally to encroach upon English trade. The speculative methods of the Dutch had, however, some disadvantages; at this time they were in debt to Armenian merchants in Persia to the extent of £100,000, and, as their stocks were deficient and they failed to reduce their liabilities at the end of the season below £65,000, a temporary embargo was placed, at the instance of the Armenians, upon their exportation of silk.

Dutch
factory, ex-
emption from
customs, and
general pro-
gress at
Bandar 'Ab-
bās, 1638-41.

In 1638, the year in which Mandelslo visited Bandar 'Abbās, the Dutch as well as the English had a Factory there, the whole spice trade was in their hands, and they had obtained an exemption from import duty. In 1639-40 Dutch shipping and stock predominated at Bandar 'Abbās; but the English Factors in Persia, unwilling to give way to their rivals, postponed compliance with orders that they had received to close the Company's establishment at Isfahān. In 1641 the Hollanders, in their efforts to "engross" or monopolise the export trade of Persia, were selling European goods in the country below cost price.

Dutch attack
on Qishm
and extortion
of privileges,
1645.

In 1645 the Dutch, whose object was now to make their influence predominant in Persia by any means whatever, not excluding even military force, sent a large fleet to the Gulf under Commodore Block.* At Bandar 'Abbās a refund of 4,900 Tūmāns was demanded of the

*See Bruce's Annals, Vol. I, page 414. Tavernier (page 94) gives a somewhat different and more elaborate explanation of the Qishm incident, but he was misinformed as to the date.

Persians on account of customs realised from the Dutch Agent,—a circumstance from which it would appear that the Dutch had not been uniformly successful in their efforts to avoid paying duty; and the prospects of a collision between the Dutch and the Persians became so serious that the property of the English East India Company at Bandar 'Abbās was removed for greater safety to Basrah, where it arrived in June 1645. In the autumn of 1645, no settlement with the Persians having been effected, the Dutch attacked Qishm; and, though they failed to take the place and lost a number of men from the heat, the Shāh at once sought an armistice and prepared to yield to their demands for trade upon more favourable terms. Block died at Isfahān, whither he had proceeded by special permission; but before his death he had a satisfactory interview with the Shāh, of which the result appeared in a license granted to the Dutch to export silk, free of duty, from any part of Persia.

The Dutch next extended their mercantile war against the English to 'Irāq and sent a fleet of eight vessels to Basrah,—a step by which the trade of the English Factory recently established at that place was for the time being destroyed. In 1649 the influence of the Dutch in the Gulf was in the ascendant, and there appeared a prospect of their obtaining further privileges from the Persian Government, who now held them in awe, but not in respect. In 1650 the preponderance of the Dutch in the Gulf continued to increase and was intensified by the expulsion of the Portuguese from Masqat; the Dutch fleet which visited Bandar 'Abbās in this year consisted of ten vessels, and the stocks landed were large. About this time, according to Tavernier, the Hollanders disposed of about 1,500,000 lbs. of pepper in Persia* and paid with the same for the whole of their silk. In the following year cargoes of an estimated value of nearly £100,000 were brought ashore at Bandar 'Abbās from eleven Dutch ships, and English trade suffered severely. In 1652-53 the Dutch sent fifteen vessels and goods worth more than £120,000 to Bandar 'Abbās, thus swamping English commerce; but a demand which they made for equality of treatment with the English was still rejected by the Shāh, on the ground that they had not performed such services to Persia as the English had. A Dutch Commissary, however, had a favourable reception at Isfahān; yet with all the advantages on his side and in spite of heavy pecuniary sacrifices, he was unable to prevent the English from obtaining a considerable quantity of silk on advantageous terms.

Increasing
predomi-
nance of the
Dutch, 1646-
53.

* From Tavernier's language it might be thought that he referred to an annual arrangement, but the quantity of pepper seems too large for this.

War between
England and
Holland in
Europe,
1652.

Meanwhile, in 1652, though news of the event had not yet reached the East, war had broken out between the English and the Dutch in Europe.

Competition of Courten's Association with the East India Company, 1663-50.

During some years of the period now under consideration, the English East India Company had to contend not only with foreign competition but also with that of "interlopers," or unchartered traders, belonging to their own nation. In December 1635, in consequence of the peace lately arranged with Spain and Portugal, an association of merchants, to trade to the Portuguese settlements in the East, was formed by Sir William Courten under a royal charter which the East India Company considered to have been unjustly granted in violation of their ancient and exclusive rights; their remonstrances being disregarded, however, they merely instructed their servants not to afford any assistance to the representatives of the rival association. Captain Weddell, formerly of the East India Company's service, was one of the principal organisers of the new corporation. In 1640 Courten's Association competed strenuously in the Persian trade, and they even made efforts to instil doubts into the mind of the Persian Government respecting the light in which the East India Company was regarded by the King of England. In 1645 one of the ships of Courten's Association visited Bandar 'Abbās, and the commander, in consideration of a promise that he would at his return take over the whole of the Shāh's silks at that port, was allowed by the Shāhbandar or chief customs officer to land his whole cargo free of duty. At last, in 1649, this unfortunate rivalry was terminated by an arrangement between Courten's Association, now known as "The Assada Merchants," and the East India Company.

Course of the East India Company's trade, 1628-53.

The Com-
pany's trade
in Persia,
1629-1632.

It remains to review the course, during this period of severe competition, of the East India Company's trade in the Persian Gulf.

The death of Shāh 'Abbās I was a serious blow to the Company's trade in Persia, for, on the occurrence of that event, the royal silk maga-

zines were plundered and local rebellions occurred, resulting, in 1631, in the dissemination of Persian silk far and wide over Turkey and Russia; the new Shāh, moreover, was addicted rather to dissipation than to business, and he did not at first maintain stocks of silk for disposal as had been the custom of his grandfather. Much difficulty, too, occurred in transporting the silk, which was collected at Isfahān, to the port of shipment at Bandar 'Abbās; and in 1631-32 no less than six English Factors succumbed to the hardships of the road, while accompanying caravans between those two places. After this a short-lived attempt was made to have the silk brought to Bandar 'Abbās by Persian agency; but the frauds committed by the native transporters were enormous, and it was found necessary to re-weigh and examine every bale at Bandar 'Abbās.

In 1633 a profitable trade was done. The conclusion was now 1633. reached that, inasmuch as private merchants in Persia had no credit and were unreliable, the only practicable method of carrying on the silk traffic was by means of a general contract with the Shāh,—an arrangement however not free from drawbacks, for there was a constant danger of the Dutch outbidding the English for the contract. In the same year also some frauds, in regard both to the quality and quantity of the silk supplied, were discovered; but redress was obtained by a representation to the Shāh, to whom the faulty silk was shown.

In 1634 it was reported that the last contract, which was for nearly 1634. £100,000 worth of silk, had been satisfactorily fulfilled by the Shāh's agent; but the Dutch were busily engaged in bribing the Persian officials, and it was feared that in future the Shāh would demur to receiving any portion of the price of his silks in kind and would insist on full payment in cash.

In 1635 the Company in London instructed their servants in India 1635. to procure pepper and fine spices, for the purpose at once of facilitating the trade in Persia and improving that in India. About the same time the commercial position was reconsidered by the Company's representatives in Persia, who were inclined to recommend that the royal contract system for silk should be discontinued and the article bought instead in the open market; but, before orders on their proposals could be given, a fresh contract was arranged by Gibson, the Agent at Isfahān, on the 16th July 1636: under this agreement the Shāh undertook to deliver 1,000 loads of silk to the English within three years at the rate of 42 Tūmāns or about £180 per load, and to accept payment for one-third of the whole amount in ready money and for the remainder in broadcloth, kerseys and tin.

1636. In 1636 President Fremlen from Sūrāt visited Bandar 'Abbās and drew up a new set of "regulations"; these were apparently adopted, but their nature is not explained.

1638. In 1638 a letter from King Charles, requesting that commercial relations might be placed on a better footing, was presented to the Shāh along with portraits of the English royal family; and by these means a new contract for silk was secured, as also a Farmān for the recovery of debts still due to the Company under a former contract. In the same year, at the time of Mandelslo's visit to Bandar 'Abbās, the exports of the English from that port were silk and cotton cloth, raw silk and raw cotton, Persian carpets, rhubarb, saffron, rosewater, etc., while their imports were cloth, tin and steel from England, and indigo and silk and cotton stuffs from India; the stuffs last mentioned were, it would appear, preferred by the Persians, on account of their finer texture and brighter colours, to the manufactures of their own country.

1639. In 1639 Fremlen's "regulations" began to produce their effect, which was apparently satisfactory; and, partly it would appear by means of a threat of withdrawing from Isfahān, an order was obtained from the Shāh for 265 loads of silk and arrears of customs at Bandar 'Abbās; but it was feared that there would be difficulty in arranging a fresh silk contract. It appears to have been really the desire of the Company at this time to close the Isfahān Factory and concentrate their business at Bandar 'Abbās; but the competition of the Dutch and of Courten's Association rendered the abandonment of Isfahān impossible. Shirāz, on account of its superior climate, was inhabited, so far as possible, by the Factors in Persia in preference to Bandar 'Abbās.

1641. In 1641 trade was depressed by uncertain markets; and outstandings not easily recoverable and presents which the Shāh required in return for every petty Farmān made serious inroads upon the Company's profits. In 1642 Persian merchants dealing with Aleppo began to undersell the Company in European goods, but the trade in Indian commodities continued profitable.

1643-44. The position of affairs about this time cannot however have been satisfactory, for in 1643 the Company were inclined to withdraw from the Persian trade altogether, first selling off their stock and recovering their debts in the country; but the design was opposed by their local representatives. In 1644 the intentions of the Company were still doubtful, but eventually they decided to remain.

1646-47. In 1646 a fall in the price of silk in Persia temporarily re-invigorated that branch of the business, which was in a drooping state; but in 1647

trade generally became more precarious than at any previous time, and the outlook was gloomy.

War between the Shāh and the Mughal Emperor interrupted communication by land between Persia and India in 1648-49, and the Company derived considerable profits from freight on goods passing between the two countries by sea. In 1649, notwithstanding a decrease of the demand for English cloth in Persia and a deficiency of spices for importation into that country, trade was unusually profitable; and the gains of the season were estimated at 4,000 Tūmāns, or more than £12,000. 1648-49.

In 1651, in consequence of Dutch competition, of the unsaleableness of English imports, and of want of funds, not much business was done by the English Factories in Persia; but two caravans of merchandise were despatched from Bandar 'Abbās to Isfahān. The English employés of the Company in Persia were of opinion that the predominance of the Dutch, which was now oppressive, could best be met by resorting to the Dutch method of bringing imposing fleets and large stocks to Bandar 'Abbās; and they recommended that this should be done by their masters, so soon as circumstances should make it possible. 1651-53.

English commercial relations with 'Irāq were first established during the period with which we are now dealing; the details of their institution are given in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Irāq. After two preliminary visits by employés to Basrah, in 1635 and 1640, the East India Company established a provisional Factory there in or before 1643; and in 1645, as related above, Basrah became temporarily the chief station of the Company in the Gulf. Up to 1645 the English merchants at Basrah enjoyed immunity from Dutch commercial competition, but in that year it became suddenly very acute and for a year or two deprived the English of all their profits. The Company's trade in 'Irāq, 1625-40.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FIRST WAR BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH TO THE INVASION OF PERSIA BY THE AFGHĀNS, 1653-1722.

Events in Europe, 1653-1722.

To render more intelligible the relations of the English, the Dutch, and others in the Persian Gulf during the period on which we now enter, it is necessary to recall some leading events of contemporaneous European history,

First war
between the
English and
the Dutch,
1652-54.

During a series of years tension had been increasing between England and Holland in consequence of commercial rivalry between the two nations, and especially of aggressions committed by the Dutch in the East against the English East India Company. In 1651 a Navigation Act was passed in England, of which the object was to destroy the Dutch carrying trade; and in 1652 Cromwell proceeded to declare war against Holland. The conflict thus begun for mastery of the seas lasted two years; but no clear superiority was gained by either belligerent in the operations, which were conducted on the one side by Tromp and Ruyter and on the other by Blake and Monk; and the military result, when in 1654 peace was made by the burgher party of Amsterdam, was open to dispute. A joint Anglo-Dutch Commission, however, which met after the war, awarded damages to the amount of £85,000 to the English East India Company; and these were duly paid by the Dutch Company, who were obliged also to afford other reparation.

The effect of this struggle on affairs in the Persian Gulf was neither distinct nor permanent; but we are obliged, by the total absence of important historical landmarks in that region between the fall of Hormūz and the end of the 17th century, to adopt the first Anglo-Dutch war as a fixed point in our narrative.

Founda'tion
of the French
East India
Company,
1664.

In 1664 an East India Company was formed in France; the authority was a charter granted by Louis XIV on the advice of his finance minister, Colbert.

Second war
between the
English and
the Dutch,
1665-67.

In 1665 the Navigation Act was re-enacted in England and a second war with Holland began. An English success off Lowestoft in 1665 was followed by a doubtful victory for the Dutch in the Channel in 1666; eventually, however, the Hollanders were driven into their ports; and the peace of Breda, in 1667, brought hostilities to an end. The reaction of this contest on Persian Gulf affairs is even less easily discoverable than that of the war of 1652-54; but in India it occasioned a blockade of the English Company's ships at Sūrāt by the Dutch.

War between
the French
and the
Dutch, assis-
ted in turn
by the
English,
1672-78.

Not long after these events the ambition of Louis XIV of France brought him into collision with both Holland and Spain; war against Holland was declared in 1672; and in 1676 the combined Dutch and Spanish fleets were destroyed in the Mediterranean by the French. The King of England (Charles II) at first made common cause with France against Holland, and in 1672 a somewhat indecisive engagement between English and Dutch vessels took place at Solebay; but public opinion in England was hostile to France, compelling a peace with Holland in 1674; and towards the end of the six years' struggle England was ranged, with

other European powers, upon the side of Holland. In 1678 the independence of the Dutch was secured by the peace of Nimeguen or Nimwegen.

In the next European contest, which began in 1688, England and Holland combined to oppose the predominance of France in Europe; but, under this new alliance, Dutch interests were altogether subordinated to English policy. In 1690 an Anglo-Dutch fleet was defeated by the French off Beachy Head, but in 1692 a French armament was destroyed off La Hogue; this last event did not, however, prevent the capture in the following year of the "Turkish fleets" of England and Holland,—an occurrence to which we shall have to refer later in connection with trade in the Persian Gulf,—and the East India Company's ship "Berkley Castle" was sunk by the French in the Channel. At length in 1697, France being exhausted and the question of the Spanish succession having begun to absorb the attention of Louis XIV, hostilities were brought to an end by the peace of Ryswick.

War between
England,
Holland and
France, 1688-
97.

In 1702 England joined, on the side of the Grand Alliance against the French, in the great European war that had now arisen through the settlement of the Spanish Succession in accordance with the views of Louis XIV; this war, in which the victories of Marlborough at Blenheim, Ramillies and Malplaquet and the capture of Gibraltar by the British were incidents, continued until 1712 and was terminated by the peace of Utrecht in 1713. No direct consequences of this struggle are traceable, however, in the history of the Persian Gulf.

War between
the English
and the
French,
1702-13.

The Old and New East India Companies, 1653-1722.

A slight résumé of the history of the East India Company during this period will be useful, and is even required, to explain the course of English trade in the Persian Gulf.

Considerable anxiety was caused to the East India Company, in the years immediately following the Dutch war, by the proceedings of a body of persons known as the Merchant Adventurers; these were apparently holders of shares in a United Joint Stock, formed in common by the East India Company and the Assada Merchants on the occasion of the agreement between them in 1649. The claim of the Merchant Adventurers was that they as individuals, like the members of the "free" Turkey and Russia Companies, should be at liberty to trade separately, on private capital, within the territorial sphere of their privileges; but the suggested arrangement was of course opposed by the East India

The Merchant
Adventurers,
1654-57.

Company, whose own operations were conducted wholly on joint-stock principles and who feared private competition. Both sides had recourse to the Government of the day, and the issue remained long in doubt. Cromwell in 1655 borrowed £50,000 from the East India Company, but simultaneously he permitted the Merchant Adventurers to equip and despatch a small separate fleet; and during 1656 the matter remained under discussion. At length, early in 1657, the Protector, on the advice of a Council of State, decided that private enterprise by individual holders in the United Joint Stock must be discontinued. The result was the accession of a majority of the Merchant Adventurers to the East India Company upon the usual joint-stock terms of membership.

Establish-
ments and
policy of the
East India
Company,
1653-98.
1661-87.

The character of the East India Company was at this time still in the main commercial; but the Company had now began to assume, partly driven by events and partly guided by experience, that political status and position which were in the end to overshadow their mercantile origin.

In 1661, in part payment of the dowry of the Infanta of Portugal on her marriage to King Charles II of England and in consideration of an undertaking by England to guarantee the safety of the Portuguese possessions in the East Indies, the island and harbour of Bombay were transferred in full sovereignty from the Portuguese to the English Crown; and in 1662 the Earl of Marlborough was sent from England with a fleet to take possession; but he was disappointed in the object of his mission by the evasions of the local Portuguese authorities. At the same time Sir George Oxinden was despatched to India as President and Chief Director of the affairs of the East India Company in Asia; and the question of how to combine or co-ordinate the rights of the King and the interests of the Company in the East began to be discussed. In 1665 or 1666 it was proposed by the Company's servants at Sūrat that application should be made for the King's permission to establish a Factory at Bombay, of which possession had now been resigned by the Portuguese; but the action eventually taken went far beyond this suggestion, for in 1668 Bombay Island was made over by the Crown to the Company on an annual rent of £10 a year in gold, and the Company were invested with authority to maintain troops and establish a civil administration there. In 1685, under the royal patent, Sir John Child was appointed by the Company to be Captain-General and Admiral of their forces in the East; and already, in 1684, it had been decided to remove the headquarters of the Company in India from Sūrat to Bombay, but this measure was not carried into effect until the spring of 1687.

In 1689 or 1690 the Court of the Company in London, in sending instructions to the Presidency of Bombay, foreshadowed the shifting of their policy in India to its ultimate basis of territorial sovereignty, and made use of these memorable words: "The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care, as much as our trade: 'tis that must maintain our force when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade; 'tis that must make us a nation in India; without that, we are but as a great number of Interlopers, united by His Majesty's Royal Charter, fit only to trade where no body of power thinks it their interest to prevent us."

As early at least as 1681, the exclusive rights of the East India Company had excited the jealousy of other would-be traders to the East, and the appearance of interlopers, or private merchants who disregarded and violated the Company's monopoly, had been remarked. An opinion soon after this became current that the Company's privileges were invalid, inasmuch as they rested on a royal grant which had not been confirmed by Parliament, and in 1693 the House of Commons passed a resolution affirming the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East Indies and elsewhere unless prohibited by Act of Parliament; the immediate result of this pronouncement was an increase in the interloping trade, which the company by legal and other means endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to combat. In 1698 a body of private merchants, by tendering a loan of £2,000,000 for public purposes, secured an Act of Parliament under which they were incorporated as the "The General Society trading to the East Indies" and by which the rights of the Old Company—after this generally described as "The London Company"—were abolished, the abolition to take effect from the 29th of September 1701. On the 3rd of September 1698 the General Society received their charter as a corporation, and it was understood that the individual members would trade separately under the charter to the amount of the capital possessed by each; * but two days later, by a second charter, a group comprising the great bulk of the subscribers to the General Society was incorporated under the name of "The English Company trading to the East Indies," and a second organised Company was thus brought into the field as a rival to the London Company. The London Company, after taking up stock in the English Company to the amount of £315,000 as a precaution for the future, prepared to compete with them to the uttermost, and a bitter struggle began; the London Company

1689-90.

Formation of a New East India Company, known as the "English Company", in opposition to the Old East India or "London" Company, 1698.

* In this respect, had no change been made, the New Company would have differed from the Old, which was, as already mentioned in the text, a joint-stock company.

enjoyed the advantage of experience and an established position in the East; but a number of their dismissed servants had found employment under the English Company. As favourites of the legislature, and apparently of the Court, the English Company were enabled to assume a more public and national character than had ever been borne by their older rivals; they procured the deputation, chiefly in their own interests, of Sir William Norris as an Ambassador from the King of England to the Mughal Emperor; and their Presidents in the East were invested with consular rank and powers.

Struggle between the New and the Old Companies in the East.

On the arrival of the English Company's representatives in India a lamentable conflict began there, which might have resulted, had the power of the Portuguese or the Dutch been still considerable, or that of the Mughals greater, in the loss by the English of their position in India. It was claimed by the agents of the English Company that the London Company's servants had no longer the right to deal directly with the native powers or to issue passes to native vessels, and they even disputed the right of the older Company's vessels to fly the union flag; but to these pretensions the London Company's employés would not at first submit, and they declined to recognise that the English Company's officers, in their consular capacity, had any authority over themselves. The contest was altogether unintelligible to the Mughal authorities, who did not fail, however, to turn it to their own advantage, and inflicted heavy injuries upon both sides. One deplorable incident of the struggle was the instigation of the Mughals by Sir N. Waite, a servant of the English Company, to detain Sir John Gayer, the London Company's Governor of Bombay, whom they had "confined and barbarously used" at the beginning of 1701, and who did not apparently regain his freedom until 1705 or later.

Steps towards amalgamation of the New and Old Companies, 1699-1707.

Before long it began to be realised in England that continuance of the struggle would probably result in the bankruptcy of both companies, and early in 1699 overtures for a union were opened by the English Company, whose financial position, notwithstanding their official advantages, was apparently the weaker; but these advances were at first repelled by the London Company, who in 1700 obtained an Act prolonging their existence as a corporation beyond 1701. The King of England having signified his desire that amalgamation should be promoted, and the state of affairs on the Continent of Europe being unsettled, negotiations were commenced, and resulted on the 27th of April 1702 in an agreement between the companies, to give effect to which a charter of union was granted on the 22nd of July following. The consequence was

a provisional union upon equal terms: the interest of the English and London Companies in the joint concern created was fixed at £988,500 each;* the common trade for seven years was to be directed by a Court of twenty-four managers, half nominated by the one Company and half by the other; during seven years the Companies were to maintain separate establishments and accounts and to dispose of their existing separate stocks; and, at the expiration of that period, final and complete amalgamation was to take place. A valuation held at this time showed the dead stock of the London Company to be worth £330,000 and that of the English Company £70,000. The arrangements prescribed were duly carried out, though not without some further regrettable friction between the representatives of the two corporations in the East. The proceedings were accelerated by the appearance in 1707 of more private merchants, who began to protest against the monopoly granted to the Companies, and by a demand made on the Companies by Government for a loan of £1,200,000.

Amalgamation was ultimately effected by an award of the Earl of Godolphin, dated the 29th of September 1708; and the Company formed by the fusion received the name of "The United Company of the Merchants of England trading to the East Indies." As it was decided that it should operate under the charter of the English (or New) Company, the United Company should perhaps be regarded technically as deriving its existence from that body rather than from the London (or Old) Company. By the beginning of 1708 the separate affairs and accounts of the Old Company in Persia had been wound up and closed.

Union of
the New and
Old Com-
panies, 1708.

It remains to notice certain charter obligations and English legislative enactments by which English trade in the East was influenced during this period. In 1693, when the East India Company received a new charter, they were required to export, in their fleet of the following season, not less than £150,000 worth of English produce and manufactures; and this condition, as we shall see later on, gave an impulse to their trade in cloth in Persia. Again, when the New or English Company was constituted in 1698, one of the conditions imposed on them was that one-tenth of the goods which they exported should be of English origin; and this provision was afterwards made applicable to the United Company which came into existence by the amalgamation of the Old and New East India Companies in 1708. The nature of English trade in the East was also affected by an Act, passed in 1699 or 1700, which

Special
charter
obligations
and English
legislative
enactment,
1693-1702.

* The balance of £23,000 in the total capital of £2,000,000 belonged to the "separate traders," a residuum of the General Society.

imposed an additional duty of 15 per cent. on "wrought silk, Bengalls, "and stuffs mixed with silk or herba or the manufacture of Persia, China "or the East Indies, and all calicoes painted, dyed, printed or stained "there, that were not made up or used before Michaelmas 1701;" the effect of this measure was to increase the Company's investments in raw materials, and to decrease those in finished tissues, from the East.

Affairs in India, 1653-1722.

Disturbances
caused by
the Marhatas.
1664-1706.

The Mughal Aurangzib, who ruled from 1658 to 1707, was Emperor of India during the greater part of the period with which we have now to deal; but his authority was disputed in parts of the country; and his wars, in particular those with the Marhatas, caused great insecurity in the neighbourhood of the English settlements upon the western coast. Thus it happened that in 1664 the Marhatas, led by Sīvāji in person, attacked Sūrāt; but the town was saved from destruction by the East India Company's servants, who fortified and defended the English Factory, so earning the gratitude of the Mughals. In 1706 the Marhatas again invested Sūrāt, and again failed to take it.

Friction
between the
English and
the Mughals,
due to inter-
ference with
the Com-
pany's trade,
1664-90.

Friction from time to time arose, in both local and general matters, between the East India Company's servants and the officials of the Mughal Empire. At one time, between 1686 and 1690, a state of open war prevailed; it may be attributed in part to the non-observance or withdrawal by the Mughals of privileges regularly granted to the English, whose claims for compensation on account of injuries now aggregated more than 6½ lakhs, and in part to a design on the part of the Company to place themselves beyond reach of ill-treatment for the future by establishing fortified stations with dependent districts. In 1687 the English, to enforce their claims, began to capture the ships of Mughal subjects at sea; the Mughals replied by seizing the Company's Factory and employes at Sūrāt; and Sir John Child, the Governor of Bombay, again retaliated by fresh seizures of vessels under the Mughal flag. The war continued until early in 1690, when the Company's servants taken at Sūrāt were at length released, and a Mughal force sent by sea from Sūrāt, which had occupied a part of Bombay Island and shut the English up in the town, was withdrawn; but the Farmān of 27th February 1690, by which this adjustment

was made, was couched in the most insulting terms and required restitution and payment of compensation by the Company. Subsequently, however, a grant of liberty to trade in the Mughal dominions, described in the language of the day as a *Hasb-al-Hukm*, was obtained from the Emperor, by whom also some compensation was promised for the injuries suffered by the Company; and, though the English had failed in their project of establishing territorial bases, it was considered that they had succeeded in rehabilitating to some extent their national reputation.

No sooner, however, had this settlement taken place, than the relations of the Company—and indeed of the English nation—with the Mughals began to be disturbed by the depredations of European and Arab pirates, for which the Emperor proposed to hold all the English, Dutch and French in India jointly accountable; and, in the years following, the position of the English in India was further compromised by the wars with France, in 1688-97* and 1702-12, and by the internecine struggle, from 1699 to 1702, between their own Old and New Companies. The first case of piracy seems to have occurred in 1691; it was attributed to an English ship, and an embargo was placed on all European shipping at *Sūrāt*; one of the pirates, however, was subsequently captured and proved to be a Dane. In or about 1695 two fresh piracies were committed on Mughal vessels by a ship under English colours; this led to the confinement of the English at *Sūrāt* and to an embargo being placed on the trade of the English, the French and the Dutch, with the design of compelling the European powers to combine for the suppression of piracy by their fellow-countrymen. Soon afterwards another piracy occurred, on this occasion in the Persian Gulf, with the result that the English Factors at *Sūrāt*, except those of the highest rank, were put in irons by the native authorities and remained in custody for a considerable time. In 1696 European piracy was rife in Indian seas; even ships from America, fitted out at New York, were now engaged in it. In 1698 an agreement was reached by the principal European nations in India, whereby the police of "Southern" Indian waters devolved on the English, the Dutch were made responsible for the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf was assigned to the French, whose East India Company, founded in 1664, had maintained a Factory at *Bandar 'Abbās* at least since 1677; this arrangement, however, seems to have been still-born. In 1699 Sir John Gayer

Friction between the English and the Mughals, due to the proceedings, of European and other pirates, 1691-1705.

* In 1692 one of the Company's ships was captured by the French within 50 leagues of Bombay.

was authorised to arrange convoys for Mughal vessels with pilgrims proceeding to the Red Sea, and the Old Company's ships were regularly commissioned to make prizes of pirates ; but as yet nothing had been effected against the latter, and the English, from this circumstance, had become at Sūrāt "as despicable as the Portuguese in India and "as odious as the Jews in Spain." The trade of the English, Dutch and French at Sūrāt was now again stopped by the Mughal Government ; and the Dutch, in despair, temporarily removed their shipping to Batavia. In 1700 Captain Gillam and 9 other pirates, who had been taken, were executed in England ; but the conflict between the English Old and New East India Companies paralysed both for action against buccaneers. In 1702, on a request from the Old and New Companies at their union, a small naval expedition was sent by the English Government to deal with piracy in the East, but its achievements were inconsiderable ; and in 1703 or 1704 a fresh piracy caused the Mughals to seize and confine once more the English Agents at Sūrāt, whose native brokers were at the same time maltreated and compelled to sign bonds for six lakhs of rupees to be paid as compensation to the sufferers. The wars with the French in Europe now stood in the way of decided action against the pirates, among whom the Masqat Arabs, encouraged doubtless by the license of European adventurers, had been conspicuous ever since 1695. Abetment of piracy was among the charges bandied by the Old and New English East India Companies against each other ; and, while on one occasion two of the Old Company's ships did actually mutiny and become pirates, it is probable that on the other hand some of the Interlopers who in the beginning supported the New Company were themselves engaged in nefarious practices.

It is clear that circumstances such as these cannot but have affected adversely the growth of English trade in the Persian Gulf ; and in fact, in 1689, it was expressly reported from Bandar 'Abbās that commerce had received a severe check through the appearance of an English corsair in Gulf waters. The crew of the vessel just mentioned plundered the Portuguese Factory at Kung, and the Company's ship "Caesar" was sent in pursuit of her, but without result.

Embassy of
Sir W. Norris
to the Mughal
Court, 1699-
1702.

The appointment of Sir William Norris, at the instance of the New Company, as Ambassador from the King of England to the Mughal Emperor has already been mentioned ; his instructions appear to have been general and his powers discretionary, but the object of his mission was undoubtedly to place the New Company's trade in India on a sound basis, by obtaining suitable Farmāns from the Emperor and, it may have

been hoped, by securing recognition of the consular character of the Presidents of the New Company. Sir William Norris arrived in India in 1699, but did not reach Sūrat—where his conduct was characterised by great severity towards the representatives of the Old Company—until the end of 1700; nor did he start on his journey to the Mughal camp until January 1701. His negotiations with the Emperor were unsuccessful. It appears that the requisite Farmāns were withheld chiefly because the English Ambassador refused to agree to a condition on which the Mughals insisted, namely, that the English should guarantee the safety of ships in the “Southern” Indian seas; and in this respect it is impossible to do otherwise than commend his wisdom, inasmuch as any such undertaking on his part might have involved the New Company in incalculable losses, besides which it would have been tantamount to official recognition of the system under which the Mughals were at this time accustomed to extort compensation for every piracy from the Old Company.

Events in Turkey, 1653-1722.

We now return to the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf.

The sovereigns of Turkey during the period under consideration were Muḥammad IV (1648-87), Sulaimān II (1687-91), Aḥmad II (1691-95), Mustafa II (1695-1703) and Aḥmad III (1703-30); but Persian Gulf affairs occupy no place of importance in the history of their reigns.

Successive
Sultāns.

Events in Persia, 1653-1722.

In Persia, on the demise of 'Abbās II in 1666, his eldest son Sulaimān succeeded to the throne and ruled thereafter until his own death in 1694; his court was splendid, but his character was depraved and his reign altogether uneventful. In 1657 there was war between the Shāh and the Mughal Emperor of India. In 1684 there were simultaneously present at his court an Embassy, headed by M. Luis Fabritius, from Charles XII of Sweden and accredited representatives of various degrees from the sovereigns of France, Germany, Russia, Poland, and the Pope. The Swedish Embassy, which was sent partly for commercial purposes and partly to set Persia against Turkey, remained at Isfahān till the end of 1685.

Shah Sulai-
mān, 1666-94.

Shah Husain,
1694-1722.

With Husain, the son and successor of Sulaimān, the Safavi dynasty of Persia virtually ended, and the country then entered on a new era of its history ; the explanation of this revolution is to be found in the decrepitude of the Safavi government and in the growing strength and aggressiveness of the Afghāns of the Qandahār district. In 1709, under a leader named Mir Wais, the Ghilzais possessed themselves of Qandahār, and the best troops at the disposal of the Persian monarch proved unequal to the task of its recovery. In 1720 the Afghāns under Mahmūd, a son of Mir Wais, assumed the offensive and, having entered Persia, attacked Kirmān ; but Lutf 'Ali Khān, a Persian commander who had been sent into the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās to recover some islands from the Arabs of Masqat, marching northwards, was able to reoccupy Kirmān and temporarily to expel the Afghāns from the country. The respite gained was, however, short. Towards the end of 1721 Mahmūd again left Qandahār to invade Persia ; on his march he assaulted, but did not succeed in capturing, Kirmān and Yazd ; after defeating the principal Persian army in the neighbourhood, he undertook a long and perilous siege of the Shāh in Isfahān ; and in October 1722 his arduous and persevering efforts were rewarded by the abdication of Shāh Husain in his favour and the submission of the capital.* Persia thus passed, for a time, under Afghān rule.

Political relations of the East India Company with Persia, 1653-1722.

Indirect
effects of the
Dutch war in
Persia, 1653-
54.

During the Anglo-Dutch war a naval success gained by the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, which will be described later, at first lowered the prestige of the English in Persia ; but subsequently it was rehabilitated by the news of a British victory off Portland.

Relations
with Persia
disturbed
by the Mer-
chant Ad-
venturers,
1656-57.

On the conclusion of the Dutch war, the position of the East India Company in Persia was unsettled by the proceedings of the Merchant Adventurers, whose history we have traced above, for rumours disseminated by the commanders of their ships in the East, that the East India Company was about to be dissolved, led the Persian Government to claim

* According to Hamilton (*New Account*, I, 110-2) the English at Isfahān helped to defend the place and were made prisoners by the Afghāns, who also plundered the English and Dutch Factories ; his version, however, contains serious inaccuracies and cannot be regarded as reliable.

that the *Farmān* of Shāh 'Abbās I in favour of the Company had lapsed and to suspend, in a measure, all concessions of later date. Trade, whether export or import, thus became for a time impossible; but the Factors continued to occupy the Company's premises at Bandar 'Abbās in order to maintain the right to the same and to the half share in the Bandar 'Abbās customs. By the absorption of the Adventurers in the Company in 1657 these difficulties were removed.

The disappearance of the Merchant Adventurers and the continuance of the East India Company on its original footing deprived the Shāh's Government of all excuse for interfering further with English trade in Persia; but the attitude of the Persians continued to be unfavourable, especially in the matter of the Bandar 'Abbās customs; and, so unsatisfactory did the position become, that the Company were led to contemplate the adoption of forcible measures for obtaining redress. In 1659 it was proposed by the Presidency at Sūrāt to establish, partly with this object, a station and garrison at Masqat; and negotiations with the local Arab authorities were undertaken, but without success. In 1660 the Court of the Company in England recommended a blockade of Bandar 'Abbās or of the Persian coast; but the Sūrāt Council found themselves unable to act upon these instructions as at least eight ships were required, whereas only two were available of which the crews had become ineffective, while fixed bases, such as were essential for obtaining water and supplies, would have to be secured. In 1663 the Court at home advised that either two or three honest and able servants should be left at Bandar 'Abbās to trade and to recover the half share of the customs on a commission to themselves of 5 per cent., the remainder of the staff being withdrawn; or that the whole establishment should be removed, and a Factor sent instead from Sūrāt once in the year to claim the moiety of the customs. Meanwhile, at Bandar 'Abbās, the demeanour of the Persians, incited by the Dutch, grew extremely insolent; under the orders of the Shāhbandar the native broker of the English Factory was so grievously beaten, and that in the presence of Mr. Craddock, that he was "carried away doubtful of life," some hundreds of Tūmāns being afterwards extorted from him; and in many ways the powerlessness of the English was made painfully apparent. The Presidency of Sūrāt considered that it would be useless, as well as very expensive, to send a representative to complain at Isfahān; but they still held that a blockade was inadvisable, inasmuch as, Persia being a land power and having no maritime interests, the blockade might have to be maintained for two or three years in order to produce the desired effect. Moreover, the

The East India Company's difficulties with the Persian Government and reduction of their establishment in Persia, 1657-64

blockade, unless it were undertaken with a great force would probably be disregarded by the Dutch ; and there was also a possibility of umbrage being given to the Mughal Emperor, the trade of whose subjects with Persia by sea would be interrupted. Eventually, in 1664, the Sūrāt Council resolved to leave two English employés at Bandar 'Abbās and not to attempt any negotiations at Isfahān : this decision they referred to their masters at home for approval.

Rolt's mission, its failure and continued annoyances, 1669-72.

In 1669 it was stated that the Company's trade in Persia had been, during several years, to a great extent relinquished ; and that only an Agent had been maintained at Bandar 'Abbās to claim periodically the English moiety of the customs. In this year the Company's Court at home sent a Mr. William Rolt to Persia, as their own special nominee, to take charge of their affairs in that country but to act at the same time in subordination to the Council at Sūrāt ; and the latter body were desired to report the number and kind of armed vessels required to protect trade in the Gulf and to enforce payment of the English share of the Bandar 'Abbās customs. By Rolt's "continued wearysome and chargeable attendance on the Persian Court" the situation, up to the end of 1671, had not been at all improved : trade for various reasons continued precarious ; the Persian Customs officer at Bandar 'Abbās was very frequently changed ; the enjoyment of even those privileges which had undeniably been granted to the English was uncertain ; an arbitrary interference in the affairs of the Company was exercised by the Shāh's Vazīr ; and applications for redress at Isfahān were as expensive as their results were transient. Rolt himself, in the end, expressed an opinion that there was no prospect of the rights and privileges of the English being vindicated or maintained otherwise than by open force ; and the Persians, on their part, began to talk of superseding Bandar 'Abbās by creating a new port at Rīg or elsewhere. The Governor of Shīrāz had nevertheless the effrontery to demand the use of the Company's ship "Advance" to transport a Persian military expedition by sea, but his request was refused. Early in 1672 instructions were given for warning the Shāh, his chief minister the I'timād-ud-Dauleh, and the Shāhbandar at Bandar 'Abbās of the serious consequences that might ensue from persistent molestation of the English ; and the Sūrāt Presidency apparently continued to discuss the possibility of retaliatory measures.

Fresh hopes and disappointments of the Company in

In 1674, hostility between the English and the Dutch in Europe having for the second time ceased, a more hopeful spirit began to pervade the management of English affairs in Persia ; a letter from King Charles II was transmitted to Shāh Sulaimān ; a collection of the Farmāns in

favour of the Company was made by the Agent in Persia and, after being translated into English, was forwarded to the Company at home; and efforts were made to obtain from the Shāh a fresh Farmān confirming those of earlier date. In 1675 it was decided that, pending further measures, the Company's merchant ships sent to the Gulf should be armed, "to give the appearance of force and commerce;" and, in 1676, effect was given to this resolution by the despatch of two armed vessels to the Gulf, freighted with broadcloth and tin, but also intended to protect trade and to recover what was due on account of customs at Bandar 'Abbās. To the Shāh it was apparently explained, on this occasion, that the English moiety of the customs at Bandar 'Abbās was claimed on account of past services at Hormūz and that separate payment must be made by him of half the charges of the vessels now sent to establish security at sea, and it seems to have been added that the refusal of either demand would be treated as a declaration of hostilities; but the outcome of these proceedings is not recorded. Meanwhile it had been represented by the Sūrat Presidency to their masters in England that, if war were declared, it should be in the name of the King and not of the Company; they pointed out that nothing beyond a naval blockade could be attempted; and they expressed a fear that a rupture between England and Persia might be utilised by the Portuguese or the Dutch to obtain a monopoly of trade at Bandar 'Abbās. With reference to a discussion which had now been carried on for several years without any conclusion being reached, the Presidency declared their own preference for peaceable negotiations over hostilities, in seeking an arrangement with Persia. In 1677 the Company's Court, probably on this advice, relinquished the idea of forcible action; but trade continued to languish; and in 1680 the question of abandoning the Bandar 'Abbās Factory was considered. In 1681 hopes of improvement were raised by the success of Mr. Pettit, the Agent of the Company in Persia, in obtaining some satisfaction in regard to the Bandar 'Abbās customs, but in 1682 they were shown to be illusive. The debts due to the Company in Persia now amounted to £1,000,000.

Persia,
1674-82.

— It was at length decided in 1682 to adopt a more spirited policy, and a letter of remonstrance was written by the Company's Court in England to the Shāh, the effect of which, it was intended, should be seconded by a naval démonstration off the Persian coast; but execution of this last measure was apparently deferred by events in other quarters. In 1683 the Company fitted out the "Charles the Second," a powerful ship of 60 or 70 guns; and her commander, Sir Thomas Grantham, was authorised to procure, by two successive seizures of Persian shipping, payment in

Abortive
expedition
of Sir T.
Grantham
to Bandar
Abbās,
1683-84.

the first place of the arrears of customs * and, thereafter, the establishment of trade on a reasonable footing. On arrival off Bandar 'Abbās however, apparently in 1684, Grantham found a strong Dutch fleet blockading the town, which was likewise defended by a strong Persian land force; and, being unable in these circumstances to carry out his instructions with advantage, he returned to Bombay.

1684-94. Meanwhile the tone of the Persian Government, who had recently suffered from the hostility of the Portuguese, became more friendly; and, even before Grantham's arrival in the Gulf, advances had been made to the English by the I'timād-ud-Dauleh, the Persian prime minister. The nature of these overtures may be inferred from the reply, which was that, on condition of the English share of the customs being regularly paid and of Persian goods being shipped exclusively in English bottoms, the Company would undertake to send first-rate vessels and sufficient stocks and to maintain the trade with Persia in a flourishing condition. In these more favourable circumstances it was ordered by the Court, in 1684, that two members of the Bandar 'Abbās Factory should always reside at Isfahān to watch over the interests of the Company at that place, and that an effort should be made to secure a preference over their Dutch competitors in the exportation of Kirmān wool; and in 1686 further instructions were given to the local agents to request special encouragement from the Shāh for English shipping, and to suggest the grant of a contract to the Company for all the silk and Kirmān wool formerly taken by the Dutch. In the latter year also, an order for the protection of English trade and a confirmation of the privileges enjoyed by the English at Bandar 'Abbās were obtained, notwithstanding Dutch intrigues, by the Company's Armenian "linguist" or interpreter at Isfahān.

Negotiations
for renewal
of grants to
the Company,
1694-97.

Nothing more of importance happened during the reign of Shāh Sulaimān. On the death of Sulaimān, in June 1694, it became necessary to obtain confirmation of the rights and privileges of the Company in Persia by his successor Shāh Husain; and, while steps were being taken towards this end, the Agent found himself obliged to make a payment to the Governor of Kirmān, who had ordered the export of wool from his province to be reduced to 700 maunds a year. A gratuity to the Shāhbandar at Bandar 'Abbās also was found to be indispensable. By acceding to the requests of the Persian Government for assistance in capturing Masqat, where they promised that the English should receive the same

* The Company, it would seem, now calculated the aggregate of the sums of which they had been defrauded in connection with the customs, at 150,000 Tūmāns; but they naturally did not expect to recover the whole of this.

privileges as at Bandar 'Abbās, the course of negotiations for the renewal of grants might, in 1696, have been accelerated; but the Company prudently abstained from committing themselves to hostile action against the Arabs of 'Omān, whose pirates had up to this time respected British shipping.

At length, after many delays, a satisfactory Farmān,* dated 18th June 1697, was signed by the Persian monarch; its general provisions were similar to those of the Farmān of Shāh 'Abbās I of 1617 and need not therefore be summarised here,† but in it was added a condition that the import and export duties payable by the Company in Persia should be the same as those levied by the Turks at Aleppo and Constantinople.

The Raqams ‡ or subsidiary grants by which the Farmān was accompanied were 20 § in number; of these 18, already existing, were now only confirmed, while the remaining two were granted for the first time. Under the old Raqams the Company enjoyed the following rights:—(1) to possess a house at Isfahān; (2) to recover goods taken from them on the road; (3) to be exempt from Rāhdāri or road dues throughout Persia; (4) to receive civil usage; (5) to export twelve horses annually; (6) to export (? in each year) 2,000 maunds of merchandise duty free; (7) to convey their goods in safety to their house at Isfahān; (8) to bring water to their house; (9) to have guards for their caravans; (10) to make, drink and export wine; (11) to employ assistants for making wine; (12) to buy what Kirmān wool they might require; (13) “to have the power of judging of the offences of their own people;” (14) to sell goods for ready money to the Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, who, however, was forbidden to compel such sales; (15) to re-occupy a house at Shīrāz, of which they had been dispossessed by the Persian Governor; (16) to refuse presents to Khāns and Governors; (17) to be protected against hindrance in landing their goods at Bandar 'Abbās; and (18) to deal free of duty in sugar and assafoetida. The two new Raqams provided (19) for the exemption of British trade in Persia, in future, from the dues known as Sad-Yak|| and Havoy,¶ and (20) for an immediate adjustment of the arrears of customs due to the English at Bandar 'Abbās.

Farmān of
the 18th
June 1697.

Raqams re-
newed or
granted in
1697.

* Also described as an 'Ahdnāmeḥ or “engagement.”

† A statement of the contents will be found in Bruce's *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, Vol. III, pages 241-3, from which also (page 243) the statement of Raqams given in the text is taken.

‡ Literally “writings.”

§ According to Bruce the number was 21, of which 19 were old, but his enumeration shows only 18 of that class.

|| Or “one per cent.”

¶ So in Bruce. It is difficult to conjecture what Persian word is intended.

Visit of the
Shāh to the
English Fac-
tory at Isfa-
hān and
results, 1699-
1700.

On the 23rd of July 1699 the Shāh, attended by the ladies of his Haram, paid a visit in state to the English Factory at Isfahān, then under the management of Mr. Bruce, where sumptuous preparations had been made for his reception. The visit was prompted by his own curiosity to examine a building of which the agreeable exterior had attracted its notice, but it did not take place until the Shāh had satisfied himself that a precedent existed, to prove its consistence with his dignity, in a similar visit by Shāh 'Abbās I to the English Factory after the taking of Hormūz. On the appointed day the Factory building and warehouses were vacated by the staff, who had also petitioned the Shāh "that directions might be given to the eunuchs to prevent persons from attempting, by means of the holes in the buildings, to look at the King and his attendants," and everything passed off happily. The expenses of the reception amounted to more than £12,000, but the results were advantageous. Not only did the Shāh testify to his gratification by presenting a robe of honour, a valuable sword and a horse to the Agent, but one year's arrears of customs were immediately paid at Bandar 'Abbās, and other solid advantages followed. The Dutch soon afterwards tried to induce the Shāh to visit their Factory likewise, but in this they were not successful. In 1700 a gift of "optical glasses of all descriptions" and a "collection of rich sword blades for his selection" were sent by the Company to the Shāh in acknowledgment of the favour shown by him to their representatives; and the Agent, now a Mr. Oliver, was instructed to present a petition for the privilege of exporting raw silk from Persia.

Prescott's
unsuccessful
mission,
1704-05.

In 1704 a Mr. Prescott was sent from England to convey a letter, accompanied by presents, from Queen Anne to the Shāh and to take charge of the Company's Factories in Persia. He died at 'Isin near Bandar 'Abbās in November 1705, three months after his arrival in the country, commemorated only by a remark of the Agents in Persia, "that an honourable Agent would have been better than a poor Ambassador."

Discredit to
the English
from the pre-
valence of
piracy, etc.,
1705-07.

The credit of the English in Persia had now again fallen to a low level on account of the dishonourable treatment to which they were being subjected by the Mughals in India and of their own failure to repress piracy; and in 1707 the Shāh proposed to send a Persian merchant as an envoy to Bombay to solicit naval aid against the pirates. The English Agent in Persia, however, fearing that the state of affairs in India did not reflect credit on his country and that closer acquaintance with them on the part of the Persians might lead to a combination between the Persians and the Dutch, dissuaded him from his intention by promising that suitable measures should be taken against the pirates as

soon as the war in Europe was over. Before this, in February 1707, the ship "Diamond" was captured by pirates on a voyage from Bombay to Bandar 'Abbās.

The invasion of Persia by the Afghāns in 1721-22 was accompanied by an incursion of Balūchis from Makrān into Kirmān and Lār, where they committed serious depredations. In November 1721 the Balūchi hordes attacked the town of Lār, and in particular a caravansarai occupied by twelve Dutchmen who were escorting treasure of the Dutch East India Company; but the Hollanders beat off the attack with great loss to their assailants and with none to themselves, and subsequently, having removed into the Lār fort, defended that also with success. On the 15th of December the Balūchi host appeared before Bandar 'Abbās; but the English and Dutch there had received timely notice of their approach and had placed the Factories in a good state of defence before their arrival. The first attack was made on the English Factory and was beaten off; and a second, attempted two days later on the Dutch Factory, which was much stronger, was equally unsuccessful; a Dutch warehouse however, within a pistol-shot of the Dutch Factory, fell into the hands of the Balūchis, who pillaged it of goods to the value of £20,000. The siege continued for 10 or 12 days, during which the Balūchis occupied the town; at their departure they reduced the place to ashes, and they did not finally quit the neighbourhood until about a month later. The garrison of the English Factory at Bandar 'Abbās, about 50 strong and consisting almost altogether of sailors, had three or four men killed and seven wounded, and one of the latter, a Factor, subsequently died; the loss of the Dutch was twelve men killed and eight or ten wounded.*

Attack by
Balūchis on
the English
and Dutch
Factories at
Bandar
'Abbās, 1721.

Several references have been made above to the English moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās customs, which continued to be a perennial cause of dispute between the East India Company and the Persian Government; but a more detailed and connected account of the question may be added here.

History of
the English
share of the
Bandar
'Abbās cus-
toms, 1653-
1722.

In 1662 Mr. Richard Craddock, on being sent to take charge of the Company's interests in Persia, was instructed to demand payment of 1,000 Tūmāns, but he was authorised at the same time to accept 400 Tūmāns or any larger sum. In the first year of his residence in Persia, probably in 1669, Mr. Rolt succeeded in recovering 850 Tūmāns; but in 1670 the Agent found himself obliged to recommend that a small naval

1662-73.

* These proceedings are fully described by Hamilton, who himself took part in them, in his *New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, pages 107-110. Malcolm makes the year 1724 and the assailants Afghāns, but the personal testimony of Hamilton must be preferred.

force should be sent to compel payment, as had recently been done with success by the Portuguese at Kung. In 1672, apparently, the amount recovered was 1,000 Tūmāns, which was much less than had been expected; and in 1673 only 650 Tūmāns were obtained, notwithstanding the outlay of a sum exceeding this by some hundreds of pounds in efforts to obtain a settlement.

1676-77. In 1676 it was recommended by the Sūrāt Presidency that one of two arrangements should be made with the Persian Government: *viz.*, either the Company should receive the fixed sum of 3,000 Tūmāns a year, the Company's ships in that case to pay the ordinary duties, or the customs on all goods belonging to or freighted by the English should be specifically assigned to the Company; but it was pointed out that the latter arrangement would be disadvantageous in time of war, when trade was stopped. The decision of the Company's Court in England in 1677 was that, if possible, 1,000 Tūmāns a year should be obtained in lieu of the moiety of customs, the other arrangements with the Persians in regard to Bandar 'Abbās to remain unchanged.*

1680-95. For the season 1680 a sum of 1,000 Tūmāns was obtained by Mr. Pettit, the Agent in Persia, and he was sanguine of recovering a similar amount for 1681. In 1689, on the plea of injuries sustained by their subjects from pirates at sea, the Persians withheld payment, and in 1690 they argued that the Bandar 'Abbās customs had been diminished by the diversion of trade, during the war between the English and the Mughals, from that port to Kung; the Agent, however, succeeded in obtaining two sums, one of 1,995 and one of 1,500 "chequins," but two years' payment still remained in arrear. Subsequently the Persians discharged what was due from them up to the 1st of March 1692; but in the following three years there were no further receipts.

1697. Early in 1697 their share of the customs for five years was claimed by the Company, but liability for one of these years was disputed by the Persian Government; a written agreement for liquidation of four years' outstandings was, however, obtained. By this time, apparently, a fixed annual payment of 1,000 Tūmāns had become established by usage, or had been agreed to by both sides, in place of the fluctuating moiety. By the end of 1697 payment for the current year had been made; but arrears were due.

1699. In January 1699 the Company's Agent obtained an order of payment for the year ending March 1699, and also for the regular discharge of

* At this time, according to Dr. Fryer, the Shāhbandar paid 22,000 Tūmāns a year to the Shāh for the farm of the Persian moiety of the customs.

the obligation from year to year; some arrears were at this time paid in silk to the amount of 1,340 maunds,—an expedient of which the Dutch complained bitterly, representing it to be an infringement of a monopoly that they then held. After the Shāh's visit to the English Factory at Isfahān in July 1699 a payment of 1,000 Tūmāns was made by the Shāhbandar on account of the Bandar 'Abbās customs, and 2,000 Tūmāns more were promised.

In 1700 arrears were due to the amount of 982 Tūmāns, and payment was obtained by means of a Raqam from the Shāh, assisted by a bribe of 50 Tūmāns to the Shāhbandar. At the union of the Old and New East India Companies in 1702 the right to the moiety of the Bandar 'Abbās customs passed to the Company formed by their amalgamation. In 1705, the year of Mr. Prescott's mission to Persia, arrears had accumulated to a large amount, and it was feared that either force or presents would be required in order to obtain satisfaction; in 1706, however, by one means or another, the Agent, Mr. Lock, was able to secure a Raqam for 1,000 Tūmāns for the current season and for 5,981 Tūmāns of arrears. Of the arrears 2,306 Tūmāns was due to the Old Company separately, and of the whole 2,219 Tūmāns was discharged by the Persians in silk. By 1708 the proportion of customs payable to the Old Company had been received and their separate account closed. 1700-08.

Proceedings of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

After news of the declaration of war between England and Holland reached India, the Dutch in the East proposed a combination between themselves and the Portuguese for the purpose of destroying English trade; but the Portuguese declined to entertain the suggestion, as also counter-proposals made to them by the English. The Dutch however, unaided, captured the Company's ships "Roebuck" and "Lanneret" off Jāshk; and soon afterwards they made a prize of the "Blessing" and drove the "Supply" on shore, where she became a total wreck. At the end of January 1654, in an action fought off Bandar 'Abbās, five Dutch vessels sank the English ship "Endeavour" and captured the "Falcon" and about 80 prisoners, in* circumstances by no means creditable to the

The Anglo-Dutch war in the East, 1653-54.

* The "Endeavour" was the only English Ship that fought well on this occasion. The "Dove" and the "Welcome" kept out of the fight altogether, and many of the "Falcon's" men deserted her thinking that she was on fire. The historian says: "The Dutch were most of them drunk, and knew not what they did, the English I think were little better, if not worse." According to one account 80 prisoners were taken with the "Falcon," and the action was fought "at Sind" not at Bandar Abbas.

English name; indeed the crews on both sides appear to have been the worse of liquor. So completely was the Gulf in the hands of the Dutch after this, that the Company's Agent at Basrah was ordered to remove to a place of greater safety, and it was thought that it might be necessary to send silk purchased in Persia to Europe by way of Isfahān. News of peace, however, at length brought this critical state of affairs to an end.

Predominance of Dutch over English trade, 1654-84.

During the remaining portion of this period, as may have been gathered from facts already mentioned, the power and activity of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf continued to be a source of disquiet to the East India Company; and the proposal to form an English station at Masqat in 1659 was made partly with the object of counteracting their influence. In 1664 the Dutch seem to have had the advantage in trade at Bandar 'Abbās, and were now accustomed to send three or four large and well-stocked ships there every year, "which makes them esteemed, but we a despised people." When Dr. John Fryer, F.R.S., visited Bandar 'Abbās in 1677, he found "the Hollanders Absolute in the Spice Trade," and so strong was their monopoly that he seems to have credited a report that on one occasion they deliberately burned four ship-loads of their own spices in order to oblige the Persian merchants to accept rates for the other two; the Dutch, before this, also dealt largely in sugar and copper; and their exports were estimated by the worthy doctor to amount to "Fifty thousand Thomands worth of Velvets, Silk, Raw and Wrought, with Rich Carpets besides many Tunn of Gold and Silver, Yearly." In 1682 the Dutch still sent two large ships annually to Bandar 'Abbās, and the contrast between these and the vessels supplying the English Factory was as yet to the entire disadvantage of the latter.

Hostilities between the Dutch and the Persians, 1684.

Disagreements between the Dutch and the Persians from time to time occurred, and, as we have already seen, a blockade of Bandar 'Abbās was undertaken by the Dutch in 1684. The Court of the East India Company censured their Agents in Persia for not having given them immediate notice of these hostilities and for having neglected "to let out the Company's ships on freight, during this war, which would have yielded considerable profit."

Dutch intrigues against the English, 1686.

In 1686 the Dutch were labouring to alienate the Persian Court from the English, but their machinations were defeated by the Company's interpreter, an Armenian, at Isfahān.

Residence of Dr. E. Kaempfer

In November 1685 the Westphalian traveller Dr. E. Kaempfer, who had come to Persia in 1684 as Secretary of a Swedish Embassy to the Persian Court, having accepted the post of Chief Surgeon to the Dutch

East India Company in the Persian Gulf, left Isfahān for Bandar 'Abbās. He remained at Bandar 'Abbās until the end of June 1688 and then sailed for Batavia, whence he proceeded on his better-known expedition to Japan. During his stay in the Persian Gulf Dr. Kaempfer, though he suffered much from ill-health, made a careful study of the natural history of the Bandar 'Abbās district; the results are contained in his *Amoenitatum Exoticarum Fasciculi* and include an elaborate monograph on the date-palm.

at Bandar 'Abbās, 1866-88.

About 1688, or from the time that Dutch interests began to be subordinated in Europe to those of England, the two countries being now in alliance and at war with France, the Hollanders began to lose credit in Persia. They were at this time endeavouring to compete with the English in the importation of Indian-made goods, but the English were able to prevent their obtaining a monopoly of Kirmān wool.

Increasing competition of the English with the Dutch, 1688-89.

In 1690 a Dutch Ambassador visited Isfahān, accompanied by a magnificent retinue and bringing valuable presents; he sought to obtain from the Shāh a monopoly for the Dutch of the Kirmān wool trade, but in this he could not succeed. On his return to Bandar 'Abbās in 1691, however, by gaining over the Shāhbandar and others, he was able to obstruct English trade in that neighbourhood to such an extent that the English Factors found it advisable to send a whole cargo of newly arrived goods direct to Isfahān.

Dutch Embassy to the Persian Court, 1690-91.

In 1695, difficulties between the Persians and the Arabs in the Gulf having become acute through repeated attacks by the latter upon Persian shipping, it was feared that the Dutch might come to the aid of the Shāh's Government and so secure preferential trading rights in Persia, but this fear was not realised; the Dutch, however, at the time enjoyed the privilege of importing 20,000 Tūmāns worth of merchandise free into Isfahān every year, as against a quantity 5,000 Tūmāns' worth only passed free to the English. In 1697 chiefly with a view to forestalling the Dutch, the Company's representatives in Persia offered the ship 'Charles the Second' for the purpose of conveying to India an Ambassador whom the Shāh had accredited to the Mughal Court.

Continued rivalry of the English and the Dutch, to the increasing disadvantage of the latter, 1695-1705.

As mentioned already in another place, the Dutch, who had at some time obtained a monopoly for the export of silk from Persia by sea, protested strongly in 1699 against part payment by the Persians in that commodity of the English share of customs at Bandar 'Abbās. It does not appear whether this protest was ultimately successful, but the Dutch found means to attach the Shāhbandar to their interest and were suspected of having instigated him to assert, as he did assert, that he had paid

1,300 Tūmāns more on account of customs to the English Agent than was admitted by the latter. The visit of the Shāh in July 1699 to the English Factory at Isfahān was a serious blow to the Dutch, for it resulted in an immediate change of attitude on the part of the Shāhbandar, who now strictly prohibited the erection by them of a fort at Bandar 'Abbās; and, though they begged that the honour of a royal visit might be conferred on their own Factory also, they did not obtain it, their argument that the Stadtholder had become King of England being apparently overborne in the mind of the Shāh by the rejoinder of the English Agent, that the Dutch as a nation had no king at all and were therefore unworthy of attention.

In 1705, the trouble from pirates still continuing, it was again feared that the Dutch might take the matter up in order to gain favour with the Shāh; but once more this expectation was not fulfilled.

Proceedings of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

Chiefly by means of their Factory at Kung, where since 1625, they had shared the customs with the Persian Government as the English did at Bandar 'Abbās, the Portuguese still clung to the remnants of their interest in the Persian Gulf; they were frequently at war with the Persians and constantly so with the Arabs; and their relations with the English, by whom they were somewhat distrusted, were not invariably cordial.

Difficulties of
the Portuguese with the
Persians,
1653-1722.

The recovery of the Portuguese share of the customs at Kung seems to have been attended by the same difficulties as those with which we have become familiar at Bandar 'Abbās. On one occasion the Portuguese, by resorting to a naval demonstration, obtained payment of some arrears; and the fact that their action was quoted in 1670 by an English Agent, as a precedent for similar measures which he recommended at Bandar 'Abbās, helps to fix approximately the date of the occurrence. In 1681 or 1682 the Portuguese, by a second naval demonstration on a small scale, intimidated the Shāhbandar into disgorging the sum of 9,000 Tūmāns which was then due to them. It is stated that after 1711 nothing more was paid to the Portuguese on account of their share of the Kung customs. About 1721 there was a small trade at Kung, carried on chiefly by Indians, both Hindus and Muhammadans; but the prosperity of the

place had suffered greatly from the proceedings of the Masqat Arabs. Kung then boasted of a church, and there were one or two priests there who subsisted on alms and perquisites.

The fear that a rupture between the English and the Persians might turn to the advantage of the Portuguese, as well as of the Dutch, was one of the considerations which restrained the East India Company from using naval force upon the Persian coast, as had been done both by the Portuguese themselves and by the Dutch. In 1676 great resentment was caused among the English by the refusal of the Portuguese to grant passes to native vessels under their control for proceeding to Bandar 'Abbās; and in the following year it was decided, in case the Portuguese should persist in their unfriendly conduct, to deny English passes for Kung to native Indian vessels requiring them; the issue of this dispute is not recorded. In 1689, as already mentioned, the Portuguese Factory at Kung was plundered by an English pirate vessel, which made a brief appearance in the Gulf and could not be captured by the Company's marine; and from 1695 onwards the visits of the Company's vessels to Kung were discontinued, apparently because they were found unprofitable.

Relations
of the
Portuguese
with the
English,
1653-1722.

As we shall see in the following paragraph, the Portuguese were at times inclined to suspect that the depredations of Arab pirates upon their shipping were deliberately encouraged by the English.

Between the Portuguese and the Arabs of 'Omān relations, ever since the fall of Hormūz, had been continuously hostile, and a virtual state of war was the rule. About 1660 Mombāsah was temporarily wrested from the Portuguese by the Masqat Arabs; but the conflict did not become serious until the last decade of the 17th century.

Relations of
the Portu-
guese with
the Arabs of
'Oman,
1653-1722.

In 1693 some Portuguese frigates were severely handled by Masqat vessels; and in 1694 or 1695 the Arabs made a maritime descent on Kung, where they inflicted damage estimated at 60,000 Tūmāns. About 1696 the Portuguese, at once less prudent and less powerful than their neighbours the English and the Dutch, consented to help the Persians against the Masqat pirates; and the immediate result was a division of the 'Omāni fleet into two squadrons, one of which swept along the African seaboard and burned the Portuguese settlement at Mombāsah, while the other destroyed the Portuguese Factory at Mangalore on the Indian coast.* The Portuguese, in 1697, attributed the aggressiveness of

1693—99.

*Hamilton, however (*vide* his *New Account*, Vol. I., page 75) makes the year of this descent 1695 and the cause a quarrel between the Arabs and "the Carnatick Rajah."

the Masqat Arabs to their having been supplied by the English at Bombay with ammunition, alleging further that the 'Omāni vessels were frequently commanded by Englishmen and flew the English flag ; and in the same year Portuguese shipping seems to have suffered severely from the operations of European pirates, who, it was asserted by the Portuguese, held passes from the English East India Company, but the Company denied connection with them and repudiated responsibility for their actions. On the 13th of May 1698 two Portuguese frigates were attacked off Rās-al-Hadd by a flotilla of eight 'Omāni vessels, commanded by the Wāli of Matrah, and a fight ensued which lasted for three hours ; the result was the defeat of the Arabs with a large number killed including their commander, while the Portuguese lost only five men killed and eleven wounded. About 1699 Mombāsah was captured by the 'Omānis,—who retained it until its temporary recovery by the Portuguese in 1728,—and a general massacre of Portuguese took place along the whole African coast.

1714-19.

After this there was apparently a lull in the hostilities until the 19th of February 1714, when the Arabs attacked a Portuguese fleet off Sūrat ; but the Portuguese on this occasion, with a loss to themselves of 28 killed and 34 wounded, drove their assailants out to sea ; and the Arab flagship was even said to have foundered, on her way home, from injuries received in the action. Shortly afterwards the Arabs, burning to avenge this disgrace, appeared with a fleet off Kung and demanded the surrender of the Portuguese Factor there by the Shāhbandar, but again they were beaten off with loss. In February 1719, circumstances being propitious, a Portuguese squadron was sent to the Gulf, and on the 4th of August it brought an Arab fleet to action off Kung ; the first day's engagement, which lasted from 9 A.M. to 7 P.M. was favourable to the Portuguese, and on the next day they undertook a pursuit of the enemy, not returning to Kung until the 8th of August. In these first encounters the Portuguese had 10 men killed and 35 wounded. Meanwhile the Arabs had retired across the Gulf to Rās-al-Khaimah, in the neighbourhood of which place the Portuguese, suspecting them to be countenanced by the English and the Dutch, again sought them out on the 29th of August, and, after more fighting, drove the last of them into port on the 2nd of September. The prisoners taken in these wars were made slaves on both sides ; the captives of the 'Omānis are said to have been the better treated.

Proceedings of the French in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

The French, as has already been mentioned, established an East India Company in 1664; and in 1677, if not earlier, they possessed a Factory at Bandar 'Abbās. In the latter year Dr. Fryer visited Bandar 'Abbās, and afterwards he placed on record these observations regarding French trade there: "The French have as little to do at this Port as in other Places; and were it not for the Credit of their Interpreter, who gets good profit by Wine (he being privileged with a Wine-press for that Nation at Siras, as well as the other Europe Nations), they could not subsist; but Monsieur makes an outside, lives retiredly, and without more Business than to visit and be visited (which Courtesy passes interchangeably among the Christians as well as Natives) lounges his time away." In 1682 the French had a small trade in cloth with Basrah. In 1698, as we have seen, in consequence of a nominal agreement—from which nothing resulted—among the principal European nations in the East, the French undertook the policing of the Persian Gulf against pirates.

Course of the East India Company's trade in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

The general state and the fluctuations of the East India Company's trade in the Persian Gulf during this period, both of which we are now about to examine, were determined in part by mercantile considerations, but in part also by the political factors that have already been described above,—namely, by the competition of the Merchant Adventurers, by the rivalry between the Old and New Companies, by the relations of England with Holland and France and of the Company themselves with the Mughal Empire and Persia, and by special charter obligations and English legislative enactments arising out of the commercial policy, at the time, of the English nation.

Determining
factors in
the Com-
pany's trade,
1653-1722.

In 1657, in consequence of war between the Persians and the Mughals and of breach of the Company's rights and privileges by the Persian Government, English trade in Persia was at a standstill. In 1661 it was ordered that a consignment of 30 or 40 Tūmāns' worth of red oxide should

The trade
with Persia,
1653-75.

be sent to India by the Company's Factory at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1674 large quantities of defective goods having been received in India, it was directed that the Kirmān wool and other articles exported from Persia should be more strictly inspected in future, by the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās, before being despatched. In 1675 Kirmān wool was in great demand, and the Bandar 'Abbās Factory was instructed to procure as much as possible.

Unfavourable
state of the
Persian
trade, 1669-
72.

In 1669 the Persian trade, in consequence of persistent disregard by the Persians of English trading rights and privileges, was in a depressed condition; but it was still considered to be of great importance, and the Agent in Persia recommended that, with a view to promoting trade between Bombay, Sūrat and Persia, grants of land should be offered to Banyans as an inducement to settle on Bombay Island. In 1672 the Company's servants were ordered to demand consulage on all English goods landed at Bandar 'Abbās and to report the names of individuals who refused payment; this order apparently referred to private speculations by the Company's servants, in connection with which there had been habitual evasion of the Company's rights. In the same year it was explained by the Sūrat Council that among the commodities which they required from the Persian Gulf were galls, red oxide, liquorice, almonds, raisins and skins, but that they disapproved of a consignment of inferior Hamadān galls which had been sent them at some time previously.

Generally low
and ultimate-
ly precarious
state of the
trade with
Persia,
1676-82.

The armed ships of the Company which made the voyage to Persia in 1676 carried large quantities of broadcloth and tin, and their return cargoes were expected to consist mainly of silk and wool; it was directed that, if possible, a pretended seizure should be made at Bandar 'Abbās of the "Siedpore", a native Indian merchant vessel which had stolen away to Persia without a pass from the Company. Dr. Fryer accompanied the next year's armed fleet to Bandar 'Abbās in 1677 and reported in the following terms on the position of English trade: "The English Company's Trade is but small here, only carrying off some few Drugs, Carmania Wool, Goats, Dates and Horses; though they make it worth their while to keep an Agent in good Port (*sic*), as well from the Allowance from the Shawbunder, as by Consulage of 2*l.* and $\frac{1}{2}$ *per Cent.* for all Foreign Goods that seek their Protection; on which score they seem to drive a Trade, and send up every Shipping Three or Four hundred Camels laden with Indian Wares; as many as the Dutch bring down to ship off on their own Stock and Ships: but this Year a great Bluster was made with English Cloth and Tin brought by our Arrival; which, however, the understanding Traffickers smile at, know-

“ing it comes better Cheap by the Caphala’s* in Exchange of other Goods
 “from Stamboule, *i.e.*, Constantinople, Smirna, Scanderoon, and Aleppo ;
 “and that Suffahaun is already over-full of London Cloath, or Sackcloath
 “Londre, as they call it.” The Sūrāt Presidency’s view of the state of
 trade in this year was, however, more favourable than Dr. Fryer’s, but
 they blamed their representatives for the past delays in shipping Kirmān
 wool ; and in 1678, in consequence of the impoverishment of the people by
 scarcity and exactions of the Shāh’s Government, the outlook again became
 unsatisfactory. About this time the English Agent at Bandar ‘Abbās
 was said to benefit largely by extending his protection, for a consideration,
 to native Persian subjects. In 1680 the Persian trade continued depressed,
 and orders were given to sell off all the Company’s broadcloth and tin at
 Bandar ‘Abbās for what they would fetch and to buy Kirmān wool of better
 quality than had been obtained in the previous year ; it was added that,
 if prospects did not improve, the Factory at Bandar ‘Abbās might have to
 be abandoned. In 1681 business continued unremunerative and the Agent
 was desired to retrench expenditure by every means in his power. In
 1682 the outstandings of the Company in Persia amounted to £1,000,000,
 and trade was still steadily declining.

In 1682 an effort was made to reorganise the Company’s trade in the
 East by a system of “round voyages.” The “Dragon” was accordingly
 sent from England to Soqotrah, where she was to be met by a fleet of
 three native vessels ; these auxiliaries, after conveying a part of her cargo
 to Mokha and obtaining cargoes of coffee and olibanum, were to rejoin
 her in the Persian Gulf, where she in the meanwhile would visit Bandar
 ‘Abbās and then Basrah, returning from the latter port to Bandar ‘Abbās ;
 after taking in Persian goods she was to sail for Sūrāt. By this scheme,
 it was hoped, different areas of trade would be linked up, profitable
 exchanges initiated, and English navigation increased ; but the project
 did not answer to the expectations of its framers and the experiment of
 1682 was not, apparently, repeated. Among the reasons assigned by the
 Agent and Factors at Bandar ‘Abbās for its failure were the miserable
 appearance of the “Dragon”, a vessel of only 180 tons, which cut a poor
 figure beside the stately ships of Holland, and the fact—probably of
 greater real moment—that the Mokha and Basrah markets could be
 more conveniently served and tapped by the Sūrāt and Bandar ‘Abbās
 Factories through Armenian dealers, etc., than by ships on circuit ; they
 recommended instead that good vessels, manned by Europeans, should be
 sent in order to give Persian merchants confidence in the Company’s

The “round
 voyage,”
 1682.

* That is Qafilahs or caravans.

shipping and to secure their custom as consigners on freight,—a branch of business from which the Dutch were said to derive enormous profits.

Gradual revival of the Persian trade 1683-90.

In 1683-84 the Company's Persian trade was disturbed by the competition of Interlopers and by a revolt of some of the Company's own military servants at Bombay under Captain Richard Keigwin, whom his enemies quaintly termed the "Oliver and Protector of the Island of Bombay"; the Company's goods in Persia also proved unsaleable, and the Agent and Factors reported that fresh stocks were needed. In 1684 there was a loss in England on nearly all the Persian commodities brought home, and no "black" Kirmān wool could be disposed of, but twice as much "red" was required. In 1685 a consignment of salt from Hormūz to Sumatra was arranged. In 1687, on account of the hostilities then being waged between the Company and the Mughal Emperor, only a limited trade with Persia could be done; but various kinds of gums were procured, and it was reported that English cloths, if they were of the proper colours and qualities, might be disposed of to the amount of 1,000 half-pieces annually; from the fact that Armenians brought cloth from Turkey and exchanged it for silk the inference was drawn that silk could be most advantageously obtained by barter for cloth. In 1688 operations in Persia continued to be impeded by the Mughal war, and in 1689 the difficulties of the situation were increased by the appearance of an English pirate vessel in the Persian Gulf itself; but in 1690 the trade to the Gulf suffered less from the war than might have been expected, arrangements were made to barter English cloth for silk and Kirmān wool and to obtain wormseeds, rhubarb and lapis lazuli, and surplus stocks were ordered to be reshipped to India.

Design of the East India Company to establish a cloth monopoly in Persia and divert the silk trade to the Gulf by the help of the Armenians, 1689-93.

The Company were at this time much impressed by the skill and success of the Armenians as merchants, both in India and Persia; and they attempted, by allowing the Armenians to send their goods to Europe in the Company's ships from Bombay in 1689 and Bandar 'Abbās in 1690, to induce them to throw in their lot, commercially, with the English; in Persia, however, the strong existing interest of the Armenians in the trade *via* Turkey was a serious obstacle to the scheme, though this was not at first realised. In 1691 the Company proposed to enter into competition in broad-cloth with the Turkey Company, who exported it to Persia by Aleppo, paying customs from which the East India Company at Bandar 'Abbās were exempt; and the Company's servants hoped to be able to push the sale of this article through their supposed natural allies the Armenians. In 1693, the year in which the East India Company were first required to export a large quantity of English home manufactures, the Turkey Company's consign

ment of cloth for the East was captured at sea by the French, whereupon the East India Company despatched £50,000 worth of English cloth by their year's fleet and decided to advance the price of that commodity in Persia by 50 per cent. It was now their object to divert the Persian silk trade from Aleppo to Isfahān, where the silk might be obtained in exchange for their cloth and then sent by caravan to Bandar 'Abbās for shipment.

In 1692 the Agent in Persia had been directed to proceed to Isfahān to confer with the leading Armenian merchants, and to make arrangements for the accommodation at that city of some young writers who were being sent from England as apprentices in the Persian trade, and who would be expected to study the language of the Armenians and their methods of business. In 1693 "insinuations" against the Armenians began to be received, perhaps to the effect that they were not sufficiently devoted to the Company's interests; but it was ordered that certain contracts which had been formed with them should nevertheless be fulfilled. In 1695 the Armenians began to make difficulties in exchanging the East India Company's English cloth for silk, alleging that the rival trade by way of Aleppo was still in full vigour; the English sub-Agent at Isfahān reported unfavourably on the character of some of the Armenian brokers; and the Agent, it would seem, was obliged to proceed to the capital to adjust matters. It now appeared that the Armenians were not really acting in the interests of the East India Company, for they equally supported the English trade with Persia through Aleppo; and in 1696 two additional East India Factors were sent to Tabriz and Mashhad expressly to undersell the Turkey Company's cloth in those markets. The Persian market, owing to this competition, was soon glutted with English cloth; but the East India Company's sales at Isfahān and Bandar 'Abbās produced 80,000 "sequins". As much cloth as possible was disposed of in 1697 at Bandar 'Abbās, Shirāz and Isfahān by underselling the Turkey Company's goods; and at the end of the year the Court of the Company decided to persevere in this competition. Meanwhile the Armenians, who seem to have preferred the Aleppo route, were successful in preventing the issue of a Raqam authorising the East India Company to export silk by way of Bandar 'Abbās; but the Company's servants, notwithstanding their opposition, were able to sell large quantities of cloth, brought by the ship "Charles the Second" to Bandar 'Abbās on 17 months' credit to Persian shop-keepers. Mr. Barwell, who went as Chief Agent to Persia in 1698, was instructed not only to continue pushing the sale of the Company's cloth but also to obtain, if possible, an entrance into the silk trade, which was evidently monopolised at this

Continued competition between the East India and Turkey Companies in the Persian cloth trade and opposition of the Armenians to the East India Company's projects, 1693-98.

time by the Armenians, and to request a Farmān for exporting silk from Bāndar 'Abbās; but silk could now be obtained in Bengal at about half of the prices current in Persia, and the matter had thus lost some of its importance. In 1698 the Armenians, who had entered into an agreement to take all the Company's cloth for the year, refused to give security for payment, with the result that the contract was annulled and that the Company's servants had to make new arrangements.

Flourishing
state of the
East India
Company's
trade, not-
withstanding
failure of
their silk and
cloth scheme,
1700-06.

In 1700, in consequence of the Act imposing additional duties on finished tissues from the East and also of a demand for raw silk in England, the Company began to give more attention to the unworked article; the Persian trade was good; and, though the only commodities saleable were looking-glasses and cloth, and fresh difficulties with the Armenians arose, a whole vessel was required to carry away from Bāndar 'Abbās the silks, chintzes and Kirmān wool that had been accumulated. In 1701, as a war in Europe was apprehended by which Italian and Spanish commerce might suffer, the Company's servants in Persia were instructed to procure all the raw silk, Kirmān wool and drugs that they could, in order to profit by the expected rise in the European market. In 1705 it was reported from Persia that 4,800 pieces of cloth could be sold annually in Persia if the trade were exclusive, and half that quantity so long as competition through Turkey and Russia continued; but it was found that the system of bartering cloth for silk would not answer, on account of the high export duties on silk, and that purchases could be made more advantageously with money: in other words the Company's scheme of diverting the entire silk trade to the Gulf, and of carrying it on without money by barter of cloth, had proved a failure. In 1706 trade in Persia was very good; the greater part of the Company's stock of cloth was sold at a profit of 16 per cent.; and larger purchases than usual of Persian produce were made.

The trade
with Turkish
'Irāq, 1653-
1722.

The proceedings of the East India Company in 'Irāq during this period are fully described in the separate history of that province. The provisional Factory established at Basrah about 1643 apparently ceased to exist in 1657; and, during the remainder of the period, trade with Basrah was maintained by ships specially sent to that port from Sūrāt in charge of servants of the Company. By the famous Capitulations of 1661, modified in 1675, the position and trade of British subjects in the Turkish Empire were placed on a sound footing.

The East India Company's Establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1653-1722.

The establishments of the East India Company in Persia fluctuated Staff. during this period according to the state and prospects of trade. Once in 1664, as we have seen, the staff in Persia was reduced to two Europeans, and, up to 1661 at least, there was no permanent European establishment in Turkish 'Irāq. In 1682, when an attempt was made to place the Persian trade on a better footing, Mr. John Gibbs was appointed to be Agent in Persia with a Council of four to assist him, of which the members were to succeed to the Agency, should it become vacant by death or removal, in order of seniority. In 1693, when the aspect of affairs had begun to improve, the staff in Persia was augmented so as to consist of a Chief Agent, four Factors and four Writers; and at this strength it appears to have stood afterwards, unless the two Factors specially sent to Tabriz and Mashhad in 1696 were, as seems not improbable, additional employés. In 1676 there was a "Chyrurgeon" at Bandar 'Abbās, a Mr. Samuell Carleton, whose relations with the other Company's servants occasioned great trouble; and, from various references to "Europe wine" sent from India for "Padres," it might be supposed that the staff in Persia were not without a chaplain; but, on the other hand, burials seem to have been generally conducted by themselves, so that by "Padres" foreign priests or missionaries may have been meant.* There is nothing to show that the Company's employés in the Persian Gulf were ever accompanied by their wives or children.

Bandar 'Abbās was at first the principal Factory in Persia, and the Stations. Factory building at that place was a gift from the Shāh, standing between the purchased premises occupied by the Dutch and the French. For a time, perhaps, the establishments at Shirāz and Isfahān were either closed or maintained on a reduced scale; but Mr. Craddock, when he was sent as Agent to Persia in 1662, was authorised to spend some months of each year at Shirāz or Isfahān, because "Death hath been so familiar in those parts, caused by ill aire, staying so long in it at Gombroon"; and in 1684 it was expressly ordered that two of the Council should remain constantly at Isfahān to watch the Company's interests there. In 1692 Isfahān was selected as the centre at which Writers in Persia were to be trained; and in 1693, when augmentation of the staff took place, the Chief Agent was given liberty to reside at Isfahān or at Bandar 'Abbās as he pleased, and

* One of these Padres, however, was named Barnaby and drew a bill of exchange upon the Company (1661).

it was laid down that the Factories at Isfahān and Bandar 'Abbas should both be permanent. In 1695 there was only a sub-Agent at Isfahān, but again, in 1697 or 1698, it was ordered that the Factory there should be treated as the Company's chief seat in Persia and the Factory at Bandar 'Abbās as subordinate to it. In 1699, as we have seen, the English Factory at Isfahān was deemed worthy of a visit by the Shāh of Persia and his ladies.

Life and
conduct of
servants.

Personal details of the Company's staff are interesting, but not of historical importance; they relate chiefly to the deaths of Factors (generally without a will), to their decent burial (sometimes with the help of the Dutch), and to the "villanies and baseness" of Hindu brokers, etc. The decease in June 1677 of Mr. Gerald Aungier, President at Sūrāt, is worthy of mention, however; for it was considered that the maintenance of the English trade in Persia, in very difficult circumstances, during the preceding sixteen years had been due mainly to his talents, integrity and zeal, and the event itself was regarded as a public calamity. In some respects the Company do not appear to have been well served by their employés in Persia. In 1662 the Sūrāt Council complained that they had received no regular accounts from Bandar 'Abbās for three years, and in 1676 a reprimand became necessary, as the books of that Factory had been withheld for four years, on the frivolous plea that paper was not obtainable.

Correspondence.

At the beginning of the period, and possibly later also, the Court of the Company in England seem to have carried on their correspondence with the East in duplicate, sending one set of copies overland by Aleppo and Basrah and the other by sea round the Cape. In 1686, when Interlopers or private merchants were securing earlier intelligence from India than the Company, arrangements were made for the despatch of information to the Court, at intervals of six weeks, by the Aleppo route.

'Omān affairs, 1653-1722.

Proposal to
establish a
station of the
East India
Company at
Masqat,
1659.

As has already been mentioned, the Council at Sūrāt contemplated in 1659 the formation of a settlement, protected by a garrison of 100 troops, at Masqat; but the consent of the native Arab powers could not be obtained, and the proposal was dropped. The object of the scheme was to establish a commanding influence in the Gulf by overawing Persia and counteracting the sea-power of the Dutch.

In 1677, when Dr. Fryer visited the Persian Gulf, the inhabitants of O'mān had already acquired the reputation of "a Fierce and Treacherous People, gaining as much by Fraud as Merchandize." By 1695 they had taken to piratical courses and acquired five large ships carrying 1,500 men; they had plundered Kung; they had captured an Armenian ship; and they had so threatened Bandar 'Abbās that a Persian customs officer on one occasion asked that the English ship "Nassau" might be detained for 20 days for the defence of the port, and the request was granted. These events led Captain Brangwin, who was at the moment the Company's Agent in Persia, to predict that the 'Omānis "would prove as great a plague in India as the Algerines were in Europe." War between Persia and Masqat being now expected, and there appearing a probability that the Dutch would offer to assist the Persians, the East India Company's servants in Persia were anxious that English aid also should be tendered; but Sir John Gayer, the Governor of Bombay, wisely decided that, as the Arabs had not yet offered any obstruction to English shipping or trade, such action would be inexpedient.

Piracy and aggressions on Persia by the 'Omānis, 1699-1707.

After this, however, a Masqat ship having been seized by Indian pirates, the 'Omānis made reprisals on English private or interloping vessels, but not on those of the Company; the first English vessel to be seized was one commanded by a Captain Morrice, who with his men was reduced to slavery and could not be ransomed; and in 1705 a rich ship under Captain Murvel, bound from Bengal to Persia, was taken through the pusillanimity of the crew, who made no resistance. In 1704-05 the Court of the Old Company announced their intention of equipping armed ships, as soon as the war with France should be over, to clear the seas and "to root out that nest of pirates, the Muscat Arabs"; but the French war continued, and in 1707 there were complaints of 'Omāni as well as of Marhata depredations in Indian waters. The aggressions of the 'Omānis upon the Portuguese, especially in 1693-99 and 1714-19, have already been noticed above.

Some years later the "Muscateers" seized certain islands off the Persian coast, among which was apparently Qishm. A Persian army under Lutf 'Ali Khān was sent into the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās to dislodge them; in consequence, however, of the Afghan invasions of Persia, which had now begun, this force returned northwards to Kirmān without having effected anything. Somewhat earlier, in 1718, a successful descent had been made on Bahrain by the Masqat Arabs; but the inhabitants to a large extent temporarily forsook the islands, and by this means the 'Omāni occupation was brought to an end.

Seizure of Persian islands by the 'Omānis of Masqat, about 1720.

History of the Persian Gulf from the Invasion of Persia by the Afghans to the removal of the British Headquarters in the Gulf from Bandar 'Abbas, 1722-63.*

Events in Europe and India, 1722-63.

During the period now to be examined, the only events in Europe affecting the position of Great Britain in India and the Persian Gulf were the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years' War, in both of which Britain took part against France.

The Silesian
Wars, 1742-
48.

In the Silesian Wars, which began in 1742, Holland, the only other European power having important interests in the Persian Gulf, joined with Britain in supporting the cause of Maria Theresa. The British victory at Dettingen in 1748 and defeat at Fontenoy in 1745 were incidents of this war, with which also was connected the Jacobite invasion of Scotland and England in 1745-46. In India Britain lost Madras to the French in 1746, but recovered it under the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.

The Seven
Years' War,
1756-63.

By the Seven Years' War, which continued from 1756 to 1763, the maritime and colonial superiority of Britain over France was definitely established. Passing over the incidents of the struggle in Europe, of which the battle of Minden in 1759 was the most important, and over events in America, we may observe that the course of operations in the East was favourable to Britain and resulted in the total overthrow of the French power there. The British Factory at Bandar 'Abbās in the Persian Gulf was, as we shall see further on, captured and destroyed

* The principal authorities relating to the period 1722-63 in the Persian Gulf are an anonymous official *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, printed in 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1905, both covering the whole period. For the general affairs of Persia Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, and for that of Turkey Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, may be consulted, as before. Apart from the semi-official authorities first quoted, the most valuable sources of historical information about the Gulf countries at this time are Niebuhr's *Description de l'Arabie*, 1774, and his *Voyage en Arabie*, 1776, referring particularly to the year 1765-66 but dealing also with earlier events. Mention may also be made of Ives's *Journey from Persia to England*, 1773, relating chiefly to occurrences in or about 1768, and of *Five Letters from a Free Merchant in Bengal*, 1777.

by a French naval force in 1759; but in India the French settlement of Chandarnagar fell to the British arms in 1757 and that of Pondichéry in 1761. Holland, in the contest in Europe, remained neutral; but in India her influence also disappeared before that of Britain.

In consequence of the decay of the Mughal Empire after Aurangzib's death in 1707, the British were drawn, apart from their wars with the French, into difficult and uncertain relations with native powers in various parts of India; and these cannot but have affected their policy in the Persian Gulf. The loss of Calcutta in 1756, to Sirāj-ud-Daulah, Nawāb of Bengal, the tragedy of the "Black Hole," and the campaign of 1757 ending in the victory of Plassey must have absorbed the attention of the East India Company at one time; and a little later, through the grant to them of the Twenty-four Parganas, their interests in Bengal began to possess a territorial character. Under the Nizām-ul-Mulk, an official of the defunct Mughal Empire, Haidarābād had meanwhile become politically the capital of the Dakkhan; and Clive, during his first governorship of Bengal in 1758-59, took measures to establish British influence there.

British
relations
with native
powers in
India.

Persian and Turkish affairs, 1722-63.

During the Afghān occupation of Persia, which lasted for seven years, the internal and external affairs of that country were plunged in confusion. Tahmāsb Mirza, a son of Shāh Husain who had escaped from Isfahān before its fall, proclaimed himself Shāh and continued the war against the invaders, at first with little success: the Afghāns, on their part, committed massacres and atrocities. On the north and east the Russians and the Turks began to encroach on Persian territory, regulating their proceedings by a treaty for the partition of north-western Persia into which they had entered in 1723, and in this manner the Russians possessed themselves of some of the districts adjacent to the Caspian Sea, while the Turks secured Kurdistān, Armenia and part of Āzarbāijān. In 1724 Shirāz was taken and plundered by the Afghāns. In 1725 Mahmūd, the original commander of the Afghan host, became mad and died: he was succeeded by his cousin Ashraf, between whom and the Turks hostilities immediately began. The Afghāns in 1726 inflicted two successive defeats on the Turks within a few marches of Isfahān; the Ottomans

Afghan in-
vasion and
occupation of
Persia, 1722
-29.

retired on Kirmānshāh; and a Treaty* followed, under the terms of which Ashraf, in consideration of his title to the throne of Persia being admitted by the Porte, acknowledged the Sultān of Turkey as his spiritual suzerain and made other more material concessions, which, perhaps, can hardly be regarded as binding on later Persian sovereigns. Meanwhile, however, a general combination among Persians had been formed to expel the Afghān intruders; Tahmāsb Mīrza had obtained the support of the rising Qājār tribe of Astarābād; and in 1727 a remarkable military leader joined his cause in the person of one† Nādir Qulī, an Afshār Turk, who temporarily changed his name, in compliment to his new master, to that of Tahmāsb Qulī Khān. As yet, however, the Afghāns had sustained no check; they succeeded in reducing the town of Yazd, which had hitherto defied their assaults; and in 1728, as will be related further on, they gave trouble at Bandar 'Abbās and plundered the British Factory there. At length, in 1729, Tahmāsb Qulī Khān defeated the Afghāns at Dāmāghān, whence they fled to Tehrān and then retired on Isfahān, sustaining another reverse at the hands of the victorious Persians before they reached the capital. Continuing their retreat south-eastwards, the Afghāns were once more defeated near Persepolis and driven into Shīrāz by Tahmāsb Qulī Khān; Ahmad Shāh, their leader, had in the meantime put Shāh Husain, the deposed Persian sovereign, to death; and Tahmāsb Mīrza had re-occupied Isfahān. At Shīrāz the Afghāns did not attempt to stand a siege, but dispersed in all directions in the endeavour to regain their native country,—an object in which but few of them were successful. Ashraf himself was slain by Balūchīs in one of the deserts between Shīrāz and Sīstān. Of his followers some found their way by Lār to the coast and, crossing the Persian Gulf, landed in Hasa, where they were immediately put to death; others were exterminated in Makrān; and others again were to be seen, in after years, earning a scanty livelihood as labourers at Masqat.

Virtual
interregnum,
1729—36.

After the cessation of the Afghān danger confidence did not long reign between Shāh Tahmāsb and his successful general Tahmāsb Qulī Khān. The latter, having received four of the northern districts of Persia to govern, at once assumed the authority of an almost independent prince, expelled the Turks from some of the places which they held, and demanded from Mahmūd I, who had recently ascended the Turkish throne, the

* This Treaty disposed of all questions of frontiers, diplomatic representation, extraditions, pilgrimages, and trade: see Aitchison's *Treaties*, 4th edition, Vol. XII, Appendix 3.

† Nādir Qulī belonged to no distinguished family and is said to have been at one time a robber.

rendition of Āzarbāijān to Persia. These measures promised success; but they were frustrated by the pusillanimous behaviour of Shāh Tahmāsb, who, after being defeated in a battle by the Turks, concluded a treaty with Ahmad Pāsha, the Turkish governor of Baghdād, whereby he resigned his claims to all the countries beyond the Araxes in favour of the Sultān and ceded Kirmānshāh and its dependencies to the Pāsha himself. Tahmāsb Quli Khān immediately denounced this treaty as a betrayal of the national interests; and not long afterwards, on the 16th of August 1732, he dethroned the Shāh, substituting for him a puppet in the person of his infant son, whom some historians have styled Shāh 'Abbās III. In July 1733 Tahmāsb Quli Khān marched on Baghdād, which he invested; but he was defeated near Sāmarrāh by Tōpāl 'Osmān, a gallant Turkish soldier, and obliged to abandon the siege. In less than three months' time, however, he renewed his invasion of 'Irāq, overthrew a Turkish army under Tōpāl 'Osmān, who was slain in the battle, and again prepared to invest Baghdād; but at this juncture a revolt broke out in the province of Fārs and recalled him to Persia.

In the spring of 1736, considering his position to be now sufficiently established, Tahmāsb Quli Khān assumed the name of Nādir Shāh and accepted the crown of Persia, which was offered to him by the nobles and military chiefs of the realm; but, before doing so, he prevailed on the electors to agree to the extraordinary condition that the Shī'ah sect should be abolished and that the people of Persia should become Sunnis.* On ascending the throne Nādir Shāh made a peace with Mahmūd I, Sultān of Turkey, by which the frontier that had bounded the two empires in the time of Murād IV was restored; this done, he gave rein

Reign of
Nādir Shāh,
1736—47.

* It was intended that the converted Persians should form a fifth Sunni sect, to be known as the Ja'fari, distinct from the already existing Sunni sects of Hanafī, Shāfi', Māliki and Hanbali; the name proposed was taken from that of Ja'far-as-Sādiq, whom Shī'ahs respected as the sixth Imām and to whom Sunnis could not object as he lived in the days before the Shī'ah schism. The recognition of the Ja'fari sect became the subject of a correspondence between Nādir Shāh and the Sultān of Turkey; but the latter, though he agreed to proposals for a release of prisoners on both sides, for free trade, and for mutual reception of Ambassadors, would have nothing to do with the religious scheme; and even in Persia the Ja'fari sect does not seem to have made much real headway. The principal objects of Nādir Shāh in his attempted innovation were probably (1) to conciliate his army, which consisted partly of Sunnis; (2) to facilitate the incorporation in the empire that he aspired to found of Sunni countries such as India, Afghānistān and Turkey; and (3) to obliterate the recollection of the displaced Safavi dynasty, under whom the Shī'ah faith had been the national religion of Persia and with whom it was closely identified. Nādir Shāh's proceedings in this respect had evidently a great interest for Niebuhr: see his *Voyage en Arabie*, Vol. II, pages 22—433. At the present day Shī'ahs in Turkey are frequently termed Ja'faris.

to his ambition in other directions. One of his first exploits was the subjugation of the Bakhtiyāri tribe, which he accomplished in one short campaign; and, as is more fully related elsewhere, his troops crossed the Persian Gulf in 1737, overran 'Omān in 1737-38, and were not finally expelled from that country until 1744. Meanwhile the Shāh had undertaken offensive operations against his old opponents the Afghāns, and in 1738 he took Qandahār, after a siege begun in 1737, and also Kābul. In 1739 he passed onwards to India, making it his pretext for an attack on the Mughals that they had countenanced the Afghāns. He defeated a Mughal army in battle near Karnāl and temporarily occupied Delhi, but he was too wise to attempt the annexation of a country so extensive and so far from his base, and after a short stay he returned to Persia. On his homeward march Nādir detached to Sind a body of troops by which that province was duly visited and the submission of its ruler obtained; and it is even possible that he accompanied this force in person. Meanwhile, as related in the separate history of Persian Makrān, Taqī Khān, Baiglarbaig of Fārs, had entered Makrān and apparently reduced a part of it to obedience to the Shāh. In 1740 Herat was added to the Persian dominions; and in the following year Mashhad became the capital of Persia. By this time hostilities were once more in progress between Persia and Turkey; but Nādir Shāh, after gaining a final victory over the Turks at Erivan in 1744, once more made peace with the Porte. Taqī Khān, the commander of the Makrān expedition and governor of Fārs, rebelled against the Shāh in 1744, but he was at once surrounded in Shīrāz; and eventually, in attempting to escape from the town, he fell into Nādir's hands and was mutilated. The mind of the tyrant had now become unhinged; he had blinded his own son Riza Quli Khān, whom he distrusted; his * severity and cruelty towards his subjects during the last five years of his reign knew no bounds; and eventually, in 1747, he was assassinated by four of his officers. Among the ambitions entertained by Nādir Shāh was, as will appear further on, the possession of a navy in the Persian Gulf, and he eventually succeeded in acquiring some 20 or 25 vessels which were ordinarily kept at Būshehr. A few of his ships are said to have been constructed at Būshehr and Rīg, but a design which he had formed of building an entire fleet with timber conveyed by forced labour across Persia from the district of Mazandarān remained unexecuted.

* The traveller Niebuhr remarked on the number of persons still to be seen in 1765, including even Arabs of Bahrain, who had been deprived of an eye in the reign of Nādir Shāh.

Terrible disorders followed the death of Nādir Shāh, and in these not only his descendants, but also the Afghāns, the Qājārs, the Bakhtiyāris and a rising individual named Karīm Khān, played a part. Karīm Khān was a Kurd and belonged to a family, known as Zand, of an obscure shepherd tribe. The first to succeed Nādir Shāh was his nephew 'Ali, who assumed the name of 'Ādil Shāh and signalised his accession by putting to death 13 sons and grandsons of Nādir, sparing however Shāh Rukh, a son of Rīza Qulī Khān. 'Ādil Shāh was soon overthrown and blinded by his brother Ibrāhīm, who was himself almost immediately assassinated, and after him 'Ādil Shāh too was slain. Shāh Rukh, whose mother was a daughter of the Safavi monarch Shāh Husain, next ascended the throne, but he was quickly seized and deprived of sight by a usurper named Saiyid Muhammad or Sulaimān, who in his turn was put to death in 1750; and Shāh Rukh was then restored, but only to be once more deposed and imprisoned.

Anarchy, and
rise of Karīm
Khān, 1747-
63.

About this time the power of an Afghān, Ahmad Shāh, Abdāli, who had possessed himself of Qandahār and who before long made himself master of Mashhad also, began to be felt in Persia; and simultaneously a movement took place in the south-west of that country, where 'Ali Mardān Khān, chief of the Bakhtiyāris, and Karīm Khān, Zand, combined to raise a Safavi to the throne in the person of Shāh Ismā'il, son of a sister of the late Shāh Husain. Ahmad Shāh, Abdāli, captured Shirāz in 1750; but, being opposed by the Qājārs of Mazandarān in the north, he did not attempt to make good his conquests in Persia, and, after placing the blind Shāh Rukh in possession of Khurāsān with Mashhad as his capital, he again retired to Afghanistan.

In 1752-53 the whole country was a prey to anarchy; its subjugation by Ahmad Shāh, Abdāli, was momentarily expected; and gangs of Afghāns and lawless Persians appeared in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās. A split occurred between 'Ali Mardān Khān and Karīm Khān; the former was assassinated; and Karīm Khān obtained undivided control of the puppet Shāh, Ismā'il, in whose name he governed Shirāz with the title of Vakīl.

After this Āzād or Asad Khān, an Afghān who had seized Āzarbāijān, defeated Karīm Khān in the field; and in 1753 this adventurer obtained Isfahān, of which in 1755 he still held possession. Continuing his operations he obliged Karīm Khān in 1756 to abandon even Shirāz and to take refuge in the mountains of Fārs; but not long afterwards the Vakīl engaged him successfully at the defile of Kumārij, between Shirāz and the coast, and recovered Shirāz. In 1758 Āzād Khān was living at

Baghdād, to which place he had retired, virtually as a prisoner of the Pāsha Governor.

In 1757 Karīm Khān was firmly established at Shirāz, Behbehān had submitted to his authority, and he carried out a partly successful expedition against the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān; but in that year the Qājārs of Mazandarān, who had offered their aid against Āzād Khān, made war upon him under the orders of their head, Muhammad Husain Khān. The Zand chief, in 1757-58, was for a time besieged in his capital of Shirāz; but the Qājār, weakened by defections from his force, was ultimately obliged to return to Mazandarān, where he was shortly after defeated and killed by members of his own tribe, assisted by the troops of Karīm Khān. The Vakīl then resumed possession of Isfahān. Karīm Khān, in his operations in the south, was joined by some Arabs from the Persian Gulf districts who accompanied him as far as Isfahān, but they did not behave so well as he could have desired. His relations with the Arab tribes in his jurisdiction were usually friendly, but he punished them with severity when they were guilty of excesses or refused to pay revenue. In 1758 Karīm Khān took Yazd, and in 1759 he granted a remission of taxes at Isfahān and appointed his brother Sādiq Khān governor of Shirāz; but in 1760 it was reported that he was not yet master of Persia.

General Persian relations and policy of the East India Company, 1722-63.

Relations
before the
accession of
Nādir Shāh,
1722-36.

With the Afghāns, unless with their marauding troops at Bandar 'Abbās in 1728, it does not appear that the British in Persia had any dealings during the Afghān occupation of Persia from 1722 to 1729; but, as Nādir Shāh gradually came to the front, a correspondence was opened between him and the East India Company. In 1733 Nādir promised that on the fall of Baghdād, against which he was then operating, the Company's privileges in Persia should be renewed; but after this a coolness arose, in consequence, it would seem, of dispositions made by the English for helping the Turks to defend Basrah against the Persians, and the Company's representatives at Isfahān and Kirmān were treated with such disfavour that the question of a withdrawal from those stations was seriously discussed. In 1735 the attitude of Nādir continued hostile, and on one occasion the Company's

representatives at Bandar 'Abbās went on board ship to escape evil consequences, reporting at the same time that Nādir would not be pacified unless the British made amends for their previous unfriendly action at Basrah by assisting him to take that place. On receiving this information the Presidency of Bombay endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to recall the "Queen Caroline," which had just sailed for Persia with their Agent; they despatched the galley "Prince of Wales" and the ships "Robert" and "Jenny" to the assistance of their staff at Bandar 'Abbās; they decided, with questionable good faith, to grant a passage to a Persian Ambassador returning from India and then, if it should appear advisable, to detain him as a hostage; and, finally, they authorised the sale, but only in an extremity, of one or two of their vessels to the Persian Government. A little later, towards the end of 1735, "a strange Raqam" was issued by Nādir, who was now expected to proclaim himself Shāh, to the effect that the British should be exempt from customs duty to the extent of 1,000 Tumāns a year or so much more as Muhammad Taqi Khān, the governor of Fārs, might think fit; but Nādir still continued to urge the Company's representatives to supply him with ships, and they were at last constrained to agree that, on condition of a deposit of 8,000 Tumāns in cash being made, they would procure him two vessels of 20 guns each. Meanwhile, on account of insults and oppressions, the Factory at Isfahān was closed; but correspondence with Nādir and his local officials on the subject of a renewal of privileges continued, and the prospect of a peace between the Persians and the Turks gave ground for hope that the difficulties of the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās would shortly come to an end.

After his accession to the throne of Persia, which took place early in 1736, Nādir Shāh made peace with the Turks and began to show a very favourable disposition towards the English.

Relations
during the
reign of
Nādir Shāh,
1736-47.
1736.

He remained firm, however, in his determination to create a Persian navy in the Gulf for general purposes; and the Company's representatives were obliged to make good their promise of supplying two ships on payment, an offer which they had not expected that the Shāh would accept. The vessels provided were the "Northumberland," which the Persians—not being good judges in marine matters—readily took over although she was in bad condition,* and the "Cowan," which was in reality a fine ship. By the end of 1736 the Shāh had apparently renewed

* This appears to have been due to the fraudulent behaviour of a Captain Mylne whose effects were ordered to be attached in case the Persians should raise any claim, but they did not.

some of the Company's privileges, but the remainder still trembled in the balance; and, rather than offend the Shāh, the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās reluctantly undertook the conveyance to India of a Persian Ambassador to the Mughal court, a service which had been demanded of the Dutch but which they, for want of a ship, had been unable to perform. Earlier in the year, from similar motives, the British had been obliged to entertain a son of Muhammad Taqi Khān at 'Isin near Bandar 'Abbās at great expense, and to give him valuable presents. A letter from the President at Bombay, congratulating Nādir Shāh on his accession, was duly delivered to that potentate and elicited assurances of favour and protection.

1737. On the 13th of February 1737, probably in connection with a Persian expedition against 'Omān which sailed on the 1st of April following, the Baiglarbaig of Fārs, Muhammad Taqi Khān, arrived in person at Bandar 'Abbās. Subject to confirmation by his master, he renewed by Raqam all the former privileges of the English in Persia except the right of receiving 1,000 Tūmāns a year from the customs of Bandar 'Abbās; he substituted for the last a right of taking one-third of the customs on goods imported in British ships, a British representative to be present at the customs house on such occasions; and he promised that British merchants should be civilly and justly treated. His entertainment cost the Agency 150 Tūmāns in presents and other expenses; and they also found it necessary to give him a bill on Kirmān for 200 Tūmāns in silver, in order that he might not prohibit the exportation of copper and Black Money * and goods other than wool from Kirmān, as he talked of doing. The Company's staff were not urged to give assistance, which they had in fact been instructed by their superiors in India to refuse, in the expedition against 'Omān; but so much pressure was brought to bear upon the Dutch that they eventually sent a ship.

1741. After this the East India Company had no dealings of consequence with Persian officials until 1740, when, as described further on, a serious mutiny occurred in the Persian naval service, and the British and the Dutch were called upon to help in its suppression: on this occasion the old claim that the English were bound by an agreement to assist the Persians in their maritime undertakings was once more advanced by the Persian Admiral. The Dutch gave the Persians some real assistance, though of an ineffectual kind; but the British confined their action to the loan of some saluting guns, a gunner, and a detachment

* Evidently "Siyāh Pāl", i.e., coined copper.

of African soldiers for equipping a Persian ketch upon which, at the insistence of the Admiral, the British flag was hoisted. The operations of the Admiral against the mutineers ended in a fiasco, and the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās, apprehending the issue of "some strange and severe orders" by the Shāh, requested that the guard of the Agency might be strengthened; but it does not appear that Nādir Shāh took any steps to express resentment.

In 1743 the British Factory at Isfahān was re-opened, but the up- 1743.
country trade was crushed by * "inland duties," and the endeavours of the Company's employés to obtain a Raqam for exemption from these were not immediately successful. The Shāh's minister at first asked that the question might be dropped; but, when hopes of a gratuity were held out to him, he promised to use his best endeavours, adding however that his efforts might fail, and that in such a case a public application to the Shāh at a cost of about Rs. 30,000 would become necessary. It was apparently considered by the Agent that a sum of 700 or 800 Tūmāns would be well laid out in securing the desired exemption.

In 1744 the question of inland duties at Isfahān was settled by the Shāh, who decided that in future they should be paid by the British at the same rates as by his own subjects. The Shāh's officers took upon themselves, besides bringing this order into force, to demand arrears of inland duties, and the Company's representatives were compelled to pay up under this name about 2,800 Tūmāns, of which it does not appear that any portion was ever refunded.

Nādir Shāh, whose capital after 1741 was at Mashhad, visited 1746.
Isfahān early in 1746; and during his stay there, according to the Chief and Council of Bandar 'Abbās, "he treated our Resident as civilly "as could be expected from the tyrannical disposition he was in the "time he was there, but we believe it was owing to the help of a "present, amounting to shahees 70,169-9, which could not be avoided "without running the risk of his resentment." Before leaving Isfahān on an expedition—apparently his last—to Sīstān, where a revolt had broken out, Nādir Shāh wrote to the Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās requesting that a European physician might be sent to him; and the Agent, learning that there was already a capable practitioner at or near Isfahān, instructed the Resident there to make the necessary arrange-

* The nature of these duties is not clear; if they were either Rāhdārī, Sad-yak or Havoy, "they ought not, under the former privileges confirmed by Nādir Shāh, to have been demanded.

ments. The relations of the Company with Nādir ended, not unpleasantly, with this incident, and with the issue to their Linguist at the Shāh's camp of "a Rogam freeing the English of the Up Country Dutys, which was well worded".

Relations
after the
death of
Nādir Shāh,
1747-63.

The death of Nādir Shāh exposed the Company's establishments in Persia to fresh dangers and difficulties, and in December 1747 an order was sent from Bombay to Bandar 'Abbās for the withdrawal of the up-country Factories at Isfahān and Kirmān ; but it is not clear, in the case of either place, that the instructions were obeyed.

1748. Early in 1748 it was reported that the Company's Resident at Isfahān had applied to the new Shāh for a renewal of the Company's privileges and had received a satisfactory reply ; and a journey by a Mr. Danvers Graves from Bandar 'Abbās to Kirmān to collect debts due to the Company, which had been in contemplation, was apparently performed as soon as the roads were clear.

1750. It might perhaps have been well if the up-country factories in Persia had been withdrawn, as directed by the Bombay Presidency in 1747, for in 1750, while Messrs. Graves and Dalrymple were at Isfahān enquiring into some irregularities that had occurred there, the Factory was attacked and plundered and the two gentlemen themselves were ill-treated, wounded, and stripped. They regained Bandar 'Abbās with difficulty in the month of October ; but Mr. Dalrymple, broken down by the hardships which he had undergone, died before the end of the year, and the factory at Isfahān was never re-opened. The outrage was ascribed to rebels against the Shāh's authority, by which expression, however, the Afghāns of Ahmad Shāh, Abdālī, were probably meant.

1750-51. In 1750 the case of Muhammad Baig, one of the Ambassadors whom Nādir Shāh had sent to the Mughal court, attracted some attention in India. This individual, having been robbed by the governor of Sūra ; under the Mughals, applied to the East India Company for their good offices and received some assistance, but not so much as he desired. He then endeavoured through Mulla 'Ali Shāh, the Persian Admiral at Bandar 'Abbās, to induce the Company to do more on his behalf ; but the Bombay Government instead raised the question of detaining, on account of sums due to themselves by the Ambassador, a ship belonging to him which they had saved from the Mughals. How the matter ended is not clear ; but it seems that in 1751 Muhammad Baig wrote a letter to Mulla 'Ali Shāh, belittling the military power of the British in India, and that the Persian Admiral in consequence adopted a very insolent tone towards the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās.

In 1755 affairs in Persia were still in a chaotic condition. Mr. Wood, an employé of the Company, obtained from Karīm Khān, who now held Shīrāz, a Raqam authorising the establishment of a Factory at the port of Rīg; and almost simultaneously Karīm Khān's principal opponent, Azād Khān of Āzarbāijān, wrote to the British Agent informing him in a friendly manner of his intention to advance upon Shīrāz. 1755.

A beginning had been made at Bandar 'Abbās in 1752 in collecting and translating all the Raqams, orders and grants of consequence relating to the Company's privileges in Persia; but the work was not apparently completed until 1756, when a box containing copies of the translations was apparently sent to the Presidency. The collection was made under orders from Bombay; and it is not a little difficult to understand the anxiety of the Company about the nature of their Farmāns at a time when no responsible government existed in Persia, and when no prospect of any being established was apparent. 1756.

In consequence of the dissolution of the central government of Persia and the troubles, to be described hereafter, which sprang up in consequence at Bandar 'Abbās, the latter place had now ceased to be a safe or eligible site for the chief British settlement in the Gulf. Question of removing the British Agency from Bandar 'Abbās, 1750-63. 1750.

The question of removal was first mooted in 1750, on the taking of Shīrāz by the Afghāns of Ahmad Shāh, Abdālī. This event led the British Agent to propose that he should be authorised to transfer the Agency to Bahrain and to seize the Persian fleet at his departure from Bandar 'Abbās, but his scheme did not find favour at the Presidency, and it was ordered that the Agent and Council should not leave Bandar 'Abbās unless there were pressing danger, in which case they might retire "till the Troubles in the Kingdom of Persia are subsided" to "any Island up the Gulph near Bundar Bushire or Bunder Rique where they are sure there is water and provisions and the inhabitants will permit them to land and join with them for their mutual defence." In no circumstances was the Agent to seize the Persian ships at his departure. The matter was then dropped for a time.

At the beginning of 1752 Nasīr Khān of Lār, who owned no superior and whose influence was now paramount in the neighbouring country, paid a visit to Bandar 'Abbās; and his proceedings there, though he professed friendship for the Company, opened up such a vista of future extortion that the Agent advocated the removal of the Bandar 'Abbās establishment to some adjacent island such as Qishm or Hanjām. In an insular position, he argued, the property of the Company would be secure without payment of blackmail to any local chief; and he anticipated that 1752.

many native merchants would settle on an island under British protection, that the new station would become the main centre of trade between Masqat and Basrah, and that the petty chiefs of the mainland, instead of charging import duties of 16 or 17 per cent. on British trade, would compete against one another to attract it. In the opinion of the Agent a force of two ships and 300 men would be sufficient to cover the operation of transfer, and he thought there was every reason to expect that the customs receipts would be large enough to defray the expenses of any military garrison that might be required. The Bombay authorities were averse from this scheme, but they seem to have called for reports on the islands of Hanjām and Bahrain, and these were furnished in the autumn of the same year by Mr. Wood, the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, who evidently disapproved of both places and was himself inclined to recommend the acquisition of a small existing fort on the south-eastern corner of Qishm Island under a grant from the Shāh or from the Khān of Lār. A few days later Mr. Wood, with the instability of whose character we shall become better acquainted hereafter, wrote to Bombay deprecating the proposed transfer altogether on the ground that the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās was perfectly safe, and that removal might lead to a rupture with the Persians and give an advantage to the Dutch. He had lost sight, apparently, of the inconvenience of extortions by local governors.

1760.

Mr. Wood's arguments, which agreed with their own inclinations, seem to have satisfied the President and his Council at Bombay that no steps need be taken; and the question of removal slumbered until 1760, when it was revived, probably by the success of the Dutch settlement founded on Khārag in 1753, by the capture and destruction of the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās by the French in 1759, and by the growing insolence of the local chiefs near Bandar 'Abbās. A report on the feasibility of obtaining another site having been required by the Presidency authorities from the Agent, the commandant of the Hormūz fort was interviewed by the latter, accompanied by a Captain Baillie, in the autumn of 1760; but the Persian official, though he agreed to a British settlement being formed on the island, could not be induced even by a bribe to surrender the fort, and the prospects of obtaining it otherwise, whether by force or under a grant from the Khān of Lār, also appeared doubtful. The Agent moreover considered that, even apart from those obstacles, Hormūz was not an eligible place, for supplies were non-existent, water scarce, and the fort and buildings so ruinous that it would cost Rs. 80,000 to put them in repair.

1761.

The President and Council at Bombay, upon receiving the Agent's report, pointed out that he had unduly restricted his enquiries, for what

they had required was his "opinion of any place of security in the Gulph he might judge proper;" and, as the constant changes and confusion at Bandar 'Abbās prevented their forming an opinion of their own on the subject, they invested him and his Council with discretion in the matter of removal, subject to the condition that, if it were undertaken, all the treasure, copper, wool, etc., then at Bandar 'Abbās should be returned to Bombay along with the artillery and garrison, except the sepoy, and that one "covenant servant" and the Linguist should remain behind to receive the wool investment. It was explained to the Agent that no scheme involving expenditure could be adopted without the sanction of the Company's Court at home, and that no hostile action could be taken against the Persians during the continuance of the war with France; but the Agent was to favour the President and Council with his "clear and explicit sentiments" in regard to the whole situation. It was added in the Presidency letter: "We still think a House with a servant at Gombroon will be necessary in order to preserve a communication with Carmania, and also to keep open an intercourse with the Caravans that may come from the Interior Provinces of Persia." About the beginning of April 1761, soon after these orders reached Bandar 'Abbās, the Agent, Mr. Alexander Douglas, proceeded to Basrah intending to view by the way all the islands in the Gulf which might seem suitable for a settlement, and on his return journey he visited Būshehr and had an interview with the local Shaikh; but he was slow in submitting his opinion, and at the end of the year the Presidency found it necessary to remind him that they "impatiently expect his sentiments about removing from Gombroon."

Mr. Douglas's opinion, when it was received at the beginning of 1762, 1762. was that trial should be made of Būshehr, to which place he advised that a covenant servant should be sent; the port was secure, being surrounded on three sides by the sea and on the fourth by a wall mounted with serviceable artillery; it was full of inland merchants, who seemed to enjoy complete liberty of trade; and the Shaikh, with whom alone it would be necessary to deal, bore an excellent character and was anxious for the presence of a British Factory. A polite letter from the Shaikh to the Governor of Bombay was enclosed, explaining that Būshehr was now the principal port for the interior of Persia, the communications with which were safe, and that there was a trade with both coasts of the Gulf; and the Shaikh promised, though the Presidency did not consider his assurance sufficiently explicit until it had been repeated, that the goods of the Company and those of their servants should be exempt from customs duty. In regard to the islands other than those near Bandar

'Abbas, the Agent reported that none had any safe anchorage in southerly winds, and that all but Qais and Shaikh Shu'aib were uninhabited. On the above information the President and Council decided that Mr. Douglas might be allowed to go himself or to send his Second, Mr. Lyster, to Būshehr with an experimental cargo; but they declined to commit themselves, without further experience, to any permanent arrangement. The Court of Directors, when the intentions of the Bombay Presidency came to their knowledge, agreed that in view of the arbitrary behaviour of the Khān of Lār it was now advisable to withdraw temporarily from Bandar 'Abbās, and they prohibited the landing of any more goods at that port; but they directed that a Linguist should remain in a small hired house to keep the British flag flying. With reference to the project of starting a new settlement, the Court prohibited the taking of any steps without their express sanction, and they suggested that in the meantime the Gulf Agency should be transferred to Basrah.

Arrange-
ments for
withdrawal
from Ban-
dar 'Abbās,
February-
March,
1763.

These instructions were issued in April 1762, but they did not take effect until the following year, when the President and Council at Bombay informed the Agent of their purport and sent the ship "Prince of Wales," Captain Court, and the ketch "Drake," Captain Lindsey, to assist in their execution. These vessels arrived at Bandar 'Abbās, where the "Swallow," Captain Nesbit, was already lying, upon the 26th of February 1763; and the Nāib* or Deputy Governor of the town, suspecting some unusual design on the part of the British, immediately sent to his master the Khan of Lār, begging him to come in person with reinforcements.

Capture of
the Nāib's
house and
the Persian
fort and
evacuation
of the
Agency.

As the Nāib, on becoming aware of what was actually intended, showed a disposition to hamper the proceedings and absolutely refused to afford any reparation for the extortions which had been practised on the Agency by himself and others in recent years, as there was a chance moreover that some compensation might thereby be secured for the Company, and, finally, as some sort of diversion was necessary in order to prevent the Persians from harassing the retirement from the Agency, which was situated at a distance from the sea and was surrounded by houses and walls, Mr. Douglas resolved—apparently on his own responsibility—to attack the Persian fort and the old Dutch Factory. In the latter building, which had been in possession of the Persians since about three years, the Nāib resided and was supposed to

* This may have been the father-in-law of Ja'far Khān, who had been placed in charge of the town on the 10th of January: see page 109 *post*.

keep his ill-gotten gains. Accordingly, on on the 4th March the "Prince of Wales" having been brought into $2\frac{3}{4}$ fathoms of water and the "Drake" and "Swallow" having taken up their stations about three-quarters of a mile off shore, a bombardment of the fort was begun ; but the range was too great for the guns of the "Prince of Wales," and the ordnance of the "Drake" and "Swallow" proved too light for battering. The only piece that did any execution was a mortar under the direction of Lieutenant Thomas Durnford, "Fire Worker," of which the quoin gave way at the first, and the whole of the bed at the twentieth discharge ; after these accidents it was still kept in action by means of rope lashings, but accurate practice was no longer possible.

In the meanwhile a weak military detachment, reinforced by parties from the ships and commanded apparently by Captain Palmer, attacked the Nāib's house, which was taken after an hour and a half's fighting. Unfortunately the Persians, during the progress of the attack, found means to remove most of the valuables through an embrasure at the west end of the building, and the Nāib's wife and family, whom it was intended to capture and hold as hostages, made their escape by the same way. Mr. Douglas was thus disappointed in his hope of being able to recoup the Company's losses.

On the morning of the 5th March the Persian garrison, unable to endure any longer the fire of the single British mortar, evacuated the fort and retired westwards to the village of Sūru. A party was then landed, who, finding it impossible to remove the enemy's guns, spiked all but two and burned the carriages. The killed in these operations were three Europeans of the "Prince of Wales's" crew, four of the military detachment, one of the train, and five sepoys. On the evening of the 7th, a body of 250 horsemen having appeared in the vicinity, the landing parties and staff of the Agency, together with all the moveable property that had been captured, were embarked on board ship.

It was determined, after due consideration, not to attack the Persian Admiral Mulla 'Ali Shāh in his fort at Qishm, one reason being that the mortar could not be used any longer, and another that the Admiral had spent all his substance during the previous three years in subsidies to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. Mr. Douglas, however, ordered Captains Court and Lindsey to seize the ship "Rahmāni", then lying off Lāft, which was in the possession of the Admiral's Qāsīmi ally ; but after arrival there, on Captain Court "representing the risque and dangers to be very great", the attempt was countermanded.

Further
Proceedings.

Two hired Trankis carrying the stock of the Bander 'Abbās Agency having been despatched to Basrah under convoy of the "Drake", and arrangements having been made for the sale of two Trankis belonging to the Company, Mr. Douglas apparently returned to Bombay, despatching ahead of him by the "Prince of Wales" all the treasure of the Agency except a parcel of Mahmūdis, which, as they would not pass current in India, he sent to Basrah with the other goods. These spirited and on the whole well-conducted operations at its abandonment are perhaps the least unsatisfactory episode in the whole history of the Bander 'Abbās Agency, and they had a considerable effect in restoring the credit of the British name in the lower Gulf, where it had been impaired by insolence and injury too long tamely endured.

Affairs at Bandar 'Abbās and in its neighbourhood, 1722-63.

General
character.

We may now turn to the local history of Bandar 'Abbās and its adjacent districts, of which the events, towards the close of the period, will be found to afford a full explanation of the withdrawal of the British Agency in 1763. The truth is that this part of Persia became, after the death of Nādir Shāh, a pandemonium of indecisive warfare among petty chiefs who had little real power, and who were devoid of all sense of dignity and administrative responsibility. The principal figures in this strife were Nāsir Khān,* the Persian chief of Lār, a district and town at some distance in the interior; Mulla 'Ali Shāh, an Arab born, but, as commandant of the Persian fleet and governor of Bandar 'Abbās under Nādir Shāh, usually regarded as a Persian official; and, during a part of the time, 'Abdul Shaikh, chief of Qishm and head apparently of the Bani Ma'in tribe, whose influence was generally predominant on that island.

Events be-
fore the
accession of
Nādir Shāh,
1722-36.

During the Afghān occupation of Persia (1722-29) affairs in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās were very unsettled. The Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah upon the Arabian coast having established a port of his own at Bāsīdu on Qishm Island in opposition to Bandar 'Abbās, Mr. Draper, the British Agent in Persia, proceeded against him in April 1727 with the "Britannia" frigate, "Bengal" galley and two Trankis, and obliged him to make good the loss which had resulted to

* The name is spelt both Nassir and Nasseer in the records and may therefore have been either Nāsir or Nasīr.

the East India Company from the decrease of trade at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1728 the Afghāns appeared at Bandar 'Abbās, took the town, and fell foul of the Dutch. Upon this, it would appear, the Dutch seized Hormūz, but were persuaded to give it up again by the British Agent and his subordinates, who mediated. The local Persian authorities then attacked and expelled the Afghāns; but the latter succeeded in re-taking the town, and on this occasion plundered the British Factory. Finally, the Persians having ousted the Afghāns and having been induced by the Dutch to believe that the British had assisted the marauders, a fine of 300 Tūmāns was imposed on the British Factory by the Persian authorities and some of the Company's premises were seized.

In the spring of 1736, Nādir Shāh having then very recently ascended the throne, the native merchants of Bandar 'Abbās were sorely oppressed by the local authorities and abandoned the place; but they were prevailed upon to return. The Persian expedition to 'Omān in 1737 and that to Makrān in 1739 were both made, in so far as movements by sea were involved, from Bandar 'Abbās as a base.

Events
during the
reign of
Nādir Shāh,
1736—47.

A mutiny occurred, in August 1740, of the Arab crews by whom Nādir Shāh's vessels in the lower Persian Gulf were manned; it was accompanied by the murder of the Admiral, a Persian named Mīr 'Alī Khān; and it was followed by a distribution of the Persian fleet, consisting of three ships, a grab and a brigantine, between the Arab Shaikhs of Qishm and Rās-al-Khaimah. The Dutch were induced to send two 20-gun vessels, which they had in port, against the mutineers; but, after a favourable opportunity of recovering the grab had been missed, their vessels returned ignominiously to Bandar 'Abbās on the 13th of September. A new Darya Baigi or Persian Admiral, "who had never seen a ship or the sea in his life," then arrived to take charge of affairs. After fitting out a Persian ketch with the help of the British and hoisting the British flag on it, as related in the last section, he set out on the 23rd of September with this ketch, two Dutch ships, a small grab and about 20 Trankis to look for the enemy; but the only action fought was a small skirmish, by which the Admiral was so terrified that he returned hastily to Bandar 'Abbās on 12th of October pursued as far as Kung by the rebels. Whether the Persian ships were ever recovered from the Arabs does not appear; but the general condition of affairs on shore was now better than previously, and some attention at length seemed to be paid at Bandar 'Abbās to the welfare of the Shāh's subjects.

1740.

In the spring of 1744 a very curious and involved affair occurred at Bandar 'Abbās. It began with the receipt by the British and the Dutch

1744.

simultaneously of Raqams from Nādir Shāh at Hamadān, requiring their co-operation in seizing Muhammad Taqi Khān, governor of Shīrāz, who had rebelled ; but these Raqams were accompanied by letters from a Sardār at Shīrāz which called upon the European Factories to assist, if necessary, one Mīr 'Ali Sultān, who had been sent with troops, in arresting the governor and customs officer of Bandar 'Abbās. The Dutch immediately sent to Mīr 'Ali Sultān inviting him to approach, and he entered the town on the night of the 27th March, when it was discovered that he had Raqams from the Shāh confirming the governor and customs officer in their appointments. The latter, on being summoned to receive his Raqam, attended, but the governor delayed, whereupon about 40 men were sent to attack his house, the Dutch at the same time opening fire upon it and upon his fort. The British, knowing that the Dutch did not intend to act upon the Shāh's Raqam of confirmation, invited the governor to surrender to them, which he did ; and the British Agent then wrote to Shīrāz reporting that, as the Shāh's Raqam had not been shown him, he had seized the governor according to the Sardār's commands. It is not known how the episode ended.

Events after
the death of
Nādir Shāh,
1747-63

Serious disturbances involving danger or inconvenience to the British Factory did not again begin at Bandar 'Abbās until 1750, or three years after the assassination of Nādir Shāh ; but from that date onwards they continued almost without intermission for thirteen years.

1750.

Towards the end of 1750 there was great anxiety at Bandar 'Abbās, for the Bakhtiyāris had occupied Fasa, Jahrum and Dārāb and threatened the whole of the Garmsīr or low country towards the Gulf from no very great distance, while Ahmad Shāh, Abdālī, whose success in taking Shīrāz had attracted thousands to his banners, sent messengers to the Persian authorities near Bandar 'Abbās requiring large amounts of grain and money. It was ascertained that Ahmad Shāh meant to extort a huge sum from the European Factories at Bandar 'Abbās ; but, as the "Drake" ketch and a large Dutch ship were then in the harbour, this demand was not openly propounded ; and the British and Dutch arranged between themselves with Mulla 'Ali, who was to send them one ship, for a joint withdrawal in case of emergency to the islands. It was fortunate that the necessity to remove did not arise, for Mulla 'Ali Shāh subsequently allowed himself to be won over by Ahmad Khān, "a sharp, cunning fellow," who arrived at Bandar 'Abbās on the 13th of December with only ten men. By this emissary the Mulla was induced to adopt a more favourable opinion of the Afghāns and to promise one year's revenue to Ahmad Shāh,

In 1751 anarchy prevailed, Persian merchants began to emigrate from the country in large numbers, and trade came to a standstill. A Balūchi raid occurred in the Shamīl district. The Hūwalah* sent a fleet of a dozen Trankis to Bandar 'Abbās, ostensibly to congratulate Mulla 'Alī Shāh, the Persian Admiral and Governor, on the marriage of his daughter, but in reality to carry off his vessels; and that astute individual, making a virtue of a necessity, presented them with a ship and two gallivats, which left him with only one ship in his possession.

1751.

At the beginning of 1752 Nāsir Khān, chief of Lār, suddenly attacked Bandar 'Abbās, captured Mulla 'Alī Shāh with his family and his remaining ship, and plundered the wealthier inhabitants of the town, one of whom died under torture. The Khān paid a friendly visit to the British Factory, where he offered to appoint as governor of Bandar 'Abbās anyone whom the Agent might desire,—a suggestion which was evaded “as genteely as possible,”—and received 100 Tūmāns as a present from the Factory. This did not prevent his extorting other 80 Tūmāns from the Hindu merchants under British protection, but no protest was made on this score as more than six times the amount had been taken from the Dutch. Soon after the Khān's return to Lār, trouble arose between him and 'Abdul Shaikh of Qishm in consequence of the sale of a Persian ship by the latter to the Imām of 'Omān; the Khān at once sent to Mr. Wood, the British Agent, requiring him to recover the ship, which had not yet sailed; and that gentleman most reluctantly complied, despatching the “Drake” and the “Rahmāni” to Lāft, by which means the surrender of the disputed vessel was obtained without the firing of a single shot. At the end of the year the Khān again visited Bandar 'Abbās in person with 2,000 Afghān and Persian soldiers and contracted at the British Factory a debt of 99,935 Shāhis, “in broadcloth, tabbies and sattins” probably “to make Apparel for his Families and Dependants, “which they by no means could avoid supplying him with, as the hazard of “a refusal would have been far greater than that of trusting to his honesty “in regard to payment.” In discharge of this debt the Agent received, as did also the Dutch Agent for purchases made at the Dutch Factory, a parcel of bad bills; and in the case of the British five unserviceable brass guns were thrown in, which were consigned to Bombay as 997 maunds of old copper. Before he left, the Khān re-appointed Mulla 'Alī Shāh to the governorship of Bandar 'Abbās, in subordination to himself. Some hopes

1752.

* Possibly those of Bahrain, but more probably those of the Persian coast, who were in the 18th century the main part of this so-called tribe. See Niebuhr's *Description de l'Arabie*, pages 271-272, in whose day most of the coast Arabs from Bandar 'Abbās to Kangūn were considered to be Hūwalah.

were still entertained by the British at this time of advantage from the Khān's protection, for, as was generally admitted, he was the only person capable of maintaining any sort of order in the districts around Bandar 'Abbās.

1753. In 1753 the Agent found himself obliged to retain the Company's ship "Guardian" at Bandar 'Abbās for a considerable period, the reason being that Nāsir Khān was at the time hard pressed by an Arab combination and in danger of being overthrown, in which case it might have been necessary to embark the Company's servants and goods. Nāsir Khān however, though a number of Persians joined with his Arab enemies, succeeded in maintaining his position as principal chief in the Garmsir or "Hot Country," as his jurisdiction was called.

1754. During 1754 the situation of Nāsir Khān continued critical. He was repulsed in an attack on Kirmān and was several times defeated by the Hūwalah, with whom he was compelled to make peace, while Mulla 'Ali Shāh, having become distrustful of his intentions, seized Hormūz and stationed a ship there, but himself remained at Bandar 'Abbās with another ship.

1755. In 1755 a new factor appeared upon the scene in the person of a lieutenant, named 'Ali Khān, of the Vakīl Karīm Khān of Shīrāz; this officer twice defeated Nāsir Khān in the field, driving him into his capital of Lār, and appointed tax-collectors to visit Mīnāb and Bandar 'Abbās. Shehryāri, the chief of Mīnāb, sent these agents away unpaid; but at Bandar 'Abbās, where they remained or some time, they were perhaps more successful. Mulla 'Ali Shāh was required by them to supply "sundries" to the value of Rs. 4,000 for the Vakīl; and it was intimated to the English and Dutch Agents, but with what result does not appear, that they were expected to send him handsome presents. The advance on Shīrāz towards the end of the year of Āzād Khān, Afghān, who had an understanding with Nāsir Khān, compelled Karīm Khān to recall 'Ali Khān from Lār, but not till he had ravaged that district "in a terrible manner". Meanwhile Mulla 'Ali Shāh had laid siege to Lāft on the island of Qishm, the stronghold of 'Abdul Shaikh, with whom he was at war, and the latter, who was 80 years of age, happening to die while the siege was still in progress, the place surrendered. Thereupon Mulla 'Ali Shāh returned home in triumph with the head of his deceased enemy; and, on his arrival at Bandar 'Abbās, he levied a contribution of Rs. 3,000 on the "Multanny* and Panksally" merchants there for the purpose of rewarding the Arabs who had joined his

* Evidently "Multāni," i.e., probably Sindis or Khōjahs.

cause. The result of his operations seems to have been the expulsion of the Bani Ma'in from Qishm.

In 1757 Nāsir Khān invaded Shamīl, but he had to return in haste to Lār, an attack on which by Karīm Khān was apprehended. Mulla 'Ali Shāh still continued to withhold from Nāsir Khān a sum of 1,000 Tūmāns and two brass guns which he had often promised to give him; and in this year, much to the indignation of the Khān, he placed himself beyond the latter's reach by retiring to Hormūz and at the same time persuaded a number of the chief inhabitants of Bandar 'Abbas to retire likewise to islands. 1757.

At the beginning of 1758 Mulla 'Ali Shāh was still at Hormūz; Lārak at this time also belonged to him; and he was strong in a matrimonial alliance which existed between his family and that of the Qāsīmī Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. In March of this year Dr. Ives visited Bandar 'Abbās with a party of the Company's servants who were on their way to Europe by way of Turkish 'Irāq; and he mentions, in his account of his journey, that the Khān of Lār had about 5,000 armed men at his disposal and that he had lately defended his capital with success against Karīm Khān. A few days before Dr. Ives's arrival Nāsir Khān, on the complaints of the British and the Dutch, sent a force against a petty chief near 'Isīn who had interrupted the wool trade with Kirmān, and the robber was dislodged from his fort and about 70 of his men were slain; but, unfortunately, a detachment of the Khān's force allowed themselves to be surprised by a party of the enemy after their success, and lost several killed. Among these last was the Khān's chief officer, and the Surgeon of the British Agency was called in to attend the wounded. At Bandar 'Abbās, at the time of Dr. Ives's visit, no inhabitants remained except the dependants of the European Factories and a few Hindu and Persian merchants. In June the fort of Shamīl was taken by an enemy of the Khān of Lār and that of 'Isīn was seized by a party sent by Mulla 'Ali Shāh; and these two incidents, both disagreeable to the Khān, were celebrated with firing of guns and distribution of presents by Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who remained on Hormūz, and whose rashly defiant conduct occasioned general surprise. Towards the end of the year Muhammad Vali Khān, a commander in Karīm Khān's army, appeared in Lār and began to plunder the country; he defeated Nāsir Khan, killing his principal lieutenant, and obliged him to fortify himself in the town of Lār; and so general was the alarm caused by his presence that even Shehryāri, the chief of Mīnāb, thought it time to levy a contribution of Rs. 30,000 from his subjects. 1758.

for the purpose of buying off an attack. While Muhammad Vali Khān's intentions remained undeclared, the ketch "Viper" was detained at Bandar 'Abbās, in addition to the ordinary guard vessel, for the protection of the British Factory; and her detention was subsequently approved by the Presidency authorities.

1759

About the middle of January 1759 Muhammad Vali Khān, who had now been appointed Sardār of Garmsir in supersession of Nāsir Khān, advanced to Mināb, and in fifteen days he entirely ruined the place, his conduct being still that of a freebooter rather than of a Governor. The Dutch Factory was finally withdrawn from Bandar 'Abbās at this juncture. A couple of months later Muhammad Vali Khān approached Bandar 'Abbās, and the Linguist of the British Agency, who was sent to wait upon him, was "received very genteely and presented with a Coat of Honour". Muhammad Vali Khān then publicly announced his intention of reducing Lār and informed Mulla 'Ali Shāh that, after Lār was taken, he would remove him from the government of Bandar 'Abbās, but that wily character, who "seemed regardless of the continent in "time of troubles, but generally returned as soon as they were blown over, "behaving with the greatest arrogance," appeared less concerned at the threats of Karīm Khān's official than at the refusal of the British Agent to lend him Rs. 4,000. In April an unpleasant incident occurred, due to the town having been deserted by its respectable inhabitants. The door, timber, etc., of some of the Agency servants' houses having been carried off by robbers, complaint was made to the Persian Deputy-Governor or Nāib of Bandar 'Abbās, who denied that the culprits could be his subjects and offered to punish them if produced. Some Arabs were accordingly arrested by the Agency employés; but, while they were being conducted to the Nāib, they drew their swords, wounded several men, and escaped; and no redress could be obtained for this outrage, as it proved to have been committed by dependants of the Qāsimi Shaikh who at the time were nominally engaged in cruising, in alliance with Arabs of Chārak, against Mir Mahanna, the piratical chief of Rīg. In June Muhammad Vali Khān was in the neighbourhood of Lār, where Karīm Khān had ordered him to remain.

Capture and
destruction of
the British
Factory at
Bandar
Abbās by
the French,
October-
November
1759.

In October of the following year the British Factory at Bandar 'Abbās was suddenly attacked, captured, and destroyed by a French fleet; the whole circumstances of the affair are minutely described in the interesting despatches below, which have been taken from the original records of the Bombay Presidency.*

* The liberty has been taken of amending the punctuation, etc., to a slight extent.

From the Agent and Council at Gombroon to the President and Governor in Council, Bombay.

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,

This address your Honour, etc., will receive *via* Muscat, and is to give you the disagreeable news of, the French having taken the Hon'ble Company's Factory; they came into the road on the 12th in the evening with four ships under Dutch Colours, one of which was a vessel of sixty-four guns, one of twenty-two guns, with the Mary belonging to Chellaby and the Mamoody belonging to Mahomet Soffy. On the 13th, early in the morning, they landed to the westward of the Factory with two mortars and four pieces of cannon, and began to batter; we, on our parts, did what the few number of Europeans we had would admit of.* As to the Topasses and seepoys, few of them would stand to the guns. About 11 o'clock, being high water, their ship of twenty-two guns hauled within about one quarter of a mile of the Factory and began to play on us; at the same time they ashore played on us with their mortars and guns from the westward.

At about half an hour past three in the afternoon a summons was sent from the French Camp, upon which the Agent called a Council of War consisting of himself, William Nash, Lieutenants Bembou (*sic*) and Evans and Ensign Johnson, wherein the strength of the House was considered, with the people we had to defend it, and our being sure of having no succour from Moolah Ally Shaw. The Military Gentlemen were of unanimous opinion that the house was not tenable, upon which it was unanimously agreed to make the best terms we could; and that night the same was agreed on as per copy of the capitulation herewith enclosed, but sorry we are to remark the same has not been observed in the manner we might have expected from Europeans. They have gone so far as to take away a few liquors we had for our use and many other things, unnecessary at present to trouble your Honour, etc., with; to be brief they comply with the articles just as they like.

The French are at present embarking the old copper and unloading the Mamoodie, whose cargoe consisting of Dates they have given to Moolah Ally Shaw, who supplies them with every thing in his power; at present, by what we can perceive, their stay here will be no longer than needs must, and will go to some Port in India.

The French had on shore, when they took possession of the Factory, according to the best accounts we could take, about four hundred and fifty Europeans and one hundred and fifty Coffrees; they had brought Bamboes with them and made scalling ladders, and were determined to have scaled the House on the 13th at night.

On the 12th we had intelligence of the French having been at Muscat and were bound further up the Gulph, upon which Lieutenant Bembou was ordered to carry the "Speedwell" to Loft, but before he could get under weigh the French appeared, and prevented his complying with orders; which being perceived, he was told to run the ship ashore, but being pursued very close by the twenty-two gun ship, and the Tide flowing and having two sails set, she floated; and the French sent people and took possession of her, so they have now five ships.

On the 12th, while the French ships were standing into the Road, Moolah Ally Shaw came to the Factory and gave the Agent all imaginable assurances of his affording us assistance, and that if the French attempted to land he would do what was in his power to prevent it; but, on his being sent to in the morning and

* According to Low, *Indian Navy*, I. 152, the garrison of the factory consisted of 16 seamen and some sepoys.

acquainted that they were approaching the shore in order to land, instead of performing his promise he remained quiet in his Fort; and, tho' about ten o'clock the Agent requested he would send a few men to our assistance, yet not a man could be got. The reason he assigned for not doing it was that one of his ships which was at anchor in the anchor (*sic*) was in their Power and that, if he afforded us assistance of men, they would certainly carry her away; tho', to be brief, he was really afraid of the French, and not long after their landing sent them such refreshments of greens and fruits as the season afforded, telling them he would supply them with whatever [was] in his Power and the Place afforded.

Out of the few number of Europeans we had, we beg leave to acquaint your Honour, etc., that Ensign Johnston and Serjeant Ranscommon were so much indisposed as to be able to do no duty the day we were attacked.

The French have sent the Europeans and Topasses on board their ships and have given liberty to the sepoys to go where they like.

According to the best Intelligence we can get, the French have positive orders to demolish the Factory, saying the English demolished their Settlement at Chandarnagore, tho' for the present to keep things smoothed with Moolah Ally Shaw they tell him they will make him present thereof; at the same time they tell our gentlemen they have no such design, and that its only done to amuse him for the present, being in want of his assistance. Messrs. Bombou, Evans, Johnston and Mainwaring now repair, at their own particular request, to Bombay.

The Two French Ships were fitted out from the Islands, and, as they say, on purpose for this place, and had been just five weeks from thence when they arrived here.

So soon as the French are gone, we shall endeavour to get down this year's investment of wool and endeavour to procure money to send the Linguist for to pay for the same; and, should any Guard Ship have left Bombay with woollen goods for this place e'er this reaches your Honour, etc., we shall take those ashore for market and afterwards send the vessel to Bussorah; at present Woolens are in demand in the inland Parts, according to the information we have received.

At present we reside at the Dutch Factory.

We were unable till now to procure a Boat for Muscat, and, so soon as we can get one for Bussorah, we shall write to the Hon'ble Company. A boat was dispatched the 12th for Bussorah.

We have wrote to Norotam at Muscat to pay the Freight of this Boat, being Rupees Three hundred (300), which we request your Honour etc., will pay to his order.

We are with respect,

Hon'ble Sir & Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servants,

ALEXANDER DOUGLAS.

WILLIAM NASH.

GOMBROON

22nd October 1759.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION WITH THE FRENCH AT GOMBROON.

Articles of Capitulation for the English East India Company's Factory of Gombroon, between Alexander Douglas, Esq., Chief of the said Settlement, and Council, and Monsieur Des Essars, Captain of His most Christian Majesty's Ship Condé, and Commander-in-Chief of the present Expedition, and Monsieur Charuyau, Captain Commandant of the Land Forces.

Article 1st.

So soon as the present Capitulation is signed, a Detachment of French Troops are to take possession of the Factory; the Keys are to be delivered to the Commanding Officer; and no Person is to come in or go out without his permission, as he will take care to prevent Disorders and Thefts.

Article 2nd.

All Effects of what kind soever contained in the Factory are to belong to the Besiegers, and are to be delivered to the French Commissary with all Books and Papers in Possession of the Besieged; the Besiegers are to be shown the Warehouses that they may place the necessary centinels over them; the Artillery, Arms, Ammunition, Provisions, Money, Merchandize and Slaves, in general everything contained within the Factory, are comprehended in this article.

Article 3rd.

The Chief, the Garrison, Factors, Writers, and all Europeans in the service of the English East India Company, in general all the subjects of His Britannick Majesty in the Factory, are to be Prisoners of War under the following Clauses only.

Article 4th

Whereas Monsieur D'Estaing, Brigadier (of) Foot and formerly a Prisoner of His Britannick Majesty, now on Board the ship Condé on his way to Europe by the way of Bussorah, being desirous of rendering more secure the Intelligence received of an Exchange having been made in his behalf between Governour Pigot, Esq., of Madrass and Monsieur Lally, Lieutenant-General, it is now agreed between the Besiegers and Besieged that Alexander Douglas, Esq., Chief of the English East India Company's Factory at Gombroon, with William Nash, Ensign Johnston, Dymoke Lyster, Lieutenant George Bembou, Lieutenant Richard Evans, and Richard Mainwaring, are lawfully exchanged for Monsieur D'Estaing, and they are at full liberty to go where and to what Places they please, in consequence of which Monsieur D'Estaing is under no other Clause than what is specified in the Sixth Article.

Article 5th.

Tho' the present Exchange of Prisoners is an unnecessary precaution in behalf of Monsieur D'Estaing, yet all persons mentioned in the preceding Article are absolutely free; but shou'd Monsieur D'Estaing have been already exchanged, as he undoubtedly is, in that case (for) the seven Persons already mentioned, who now enjoy their Liberty, a like number and of equal station of His most Christian Majesty's subjects, are to be released, whenever a Castle is made (P taken).

Article 6th.

Monsieur D'Estaing, in order to fullfil with the greatest Exactitude the Promise he made Governour Pigot that he would not take arms against the English, on the Cormandel Coast only, for the space of eighteen months reckoning from the 1st of May 1759, desires it may be inserted in the present Capitulation that, notwithstanding he is now exchanged, yet he will keep the promise made Governour Pigot of not taking arms against the English, on the Coast of Cormandel only for the space of eighteen months, but he is at free Liberty in all other Places to take arms.

Article 7th.

If it is possible to agree about the repurchasing of Gombroon Factory, it will be looked on as part of the present Capitulation, the Besiegers reserving to themselves the Liberty nevertheless to do therewith as they may think fit, should no Agreement be concluded with the Besieged.

Article 8th.

In conclusion of the Exchange of Monsieur D'Estaing, and at his particular request to Monsieur Des Essars, Alexander Douglas, Esq., Chief of the English East India Company's Settlement of Gombroon and all others mentioned in the fourth Article have liberty, and may carry away all their own effects, of what kind or sort soever, excepting Ammunition, Provisions, Marine, Military or Warlike Stores, or any thing tending thereto, or to the Art of War.

Gombroon the fourteenth day of October, at six o'clock in the morning and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty nine.

DES ESSARS.
CHARUTAU.

ALEXANDER DOUGLAS.
WILLIAM NASH.
RICHARD JOHNSTON.

Bombay Castle, 26th December 1759.

Came in a Dingey with a letter from the Agent and Council at Gombroon, dated the 8th ultimo, acquainting us that the French left that place the 2nd, and they believed were really gone to the Islands. That on the 30th October at night they went on board their ships after setting fire to the Factory, wherein they had dug mines and placed combustibles, by which means great part of it was destroyed; but, had it not been for the villainy of Moolah Ally Shaw, they believe much might have been saved, for when the French quitted it not a Door of the Compound was touched; but no sooner were they gone than he set fire thereto in order to get the Iron Work; and they also left behind upwards of 30,000 maunds of Copper and other Goods, but, notwithstanding their repeated applications to him for People to Guard them, he gave them up to a general pillage, and was so barefaced as to confess, in a visit he made the Agent, that he believed there was none but what had a share in the booty. However, they hoped he would be convinced the English could resent an injury, which might easily be done. That they concluded he had gained on the whole about 60,000 Rupees, exclusive of the guns, etc., left him by the French, and his whole tribe of Arabs had profited in proportion; and that he had entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, the obligation being signed by Monsieur D'Estaing and wrote in French, and his was wrote in Persian[s]. That they had mentioned the little regard shewn to the article of Capitulation and believe, if Monsieur D'Estaing had not been there, Des Essars would have deprived them of every common necessary, as he publicly avowed his aversion to all Englishmen and acted in such a manner as to dishonour the name of a Commander-in-Chief. That they had burnt the "Speedwell" and, [as] from what the Agent and Council could learn, they (were) bound to the Islands; and, Serjeant Ranscommon being unable to undertake so long a voyage, they had wrote to Monsieur D'Estaing for his being sent on shore, which he had granted and only desired one of his countrymen might be released in his stead, which they hoped we would comply with.*

* Low (*Indian Navy*, I. 152—3) states that d'Estaing virtually commanded the expedition and was therefore guilty of breach of parole: he adds that the French "certainly derived more profit than honour from this feat of arms, for we are" "told the account of how they laid regular siege to an almost defenceless factory was" "received with surprise and derision by all military gentlemen in India."

A few months later misfortune overtook Mulla 'Ali Shah. His fleet then consisted of two ships, one large gallivat and one armed Tranki, and he had strengthened himself in the preceding November by giving a daughter in marriage to a chief of the Persian mainland who disposed of about 400 armed men; but his personal following amounted to 200 men only, and his resources had been drained by the subsidies which he paid to his other allies, the Qāsimi Arabs. The Mulla's subjects now rose against him at Hormūz, where they made him a prisoner and confined him in the fort; but, while they repulsed an attempt at rescue made by his people and some Arabs, they refused to hand their prisoner over to the Khān of Lār. At Bandar 'Abbās however they delivered up the fort, which they had seized, to a brother of Nāsir Khān, named Ja'far Khān, who happened to be near with a couple of hundred men. The Bani Ma'in tribe thought this a good opportunity to recover the island of Qishm and prepared, with assistance from Ja'far Khān, to besiege Lāft; but that place was protected by the "Roumania", one of Mulla 'Ali Shāh's vessels.* To remove this obstacle, the Khān of Lār proposed that the Company's ship "Godolphin" should be sent to take the "Roumania", but the Agent declined on the ground that the "Godolphin" drew too much water; he contemplated, however, lending the Khān the services of the smaller vessels "Drake" and "Swallow" when they should arrive, for the disturbances had brought the trade of the Agency to a standstill. One of Mulla 'Ali Shāh's vessels, the "Faiz Rabbāni", was given up by the people of Hormūz to some Arabs of Chārak, who took it to Ja'far Khān. On the 24th of June Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who had meanwhile regained his freedom, assisted by 1,000 Rās-al-Khaimah Arabs under the personal command of their Shaikh, landed near Bandar 'Abbās and seized the town; but his forces failed to capture the fort, and on the 28th, after plundering the town, they re-embarked and withdrew to the island of Qishm. Nāsir Khān then sent a retaliatory expedition against Lingeh, and in August his people attempted a raid upon Rās-al-Khaimah; but his troops, meeting with no success at either place, instead laid waste the island of Qishm. Grave apprehensions were now entertained of an attack on the British Agency either by Ja'far Khān or by his brother, the Khān of Lār, who was in the neighbourhood with a large force; and the Agent found himself obliged, by the undefended character of the Company's temporary premises, not only to lend the Khān the "Drake" ketch to convey the Bani Ma'in from one place to another, but also to submit to his repeated demands for a loan of 1,000 Tūmāns. In September Nāsir Khān was encamped at Khamir, where he was engaged in many schemes; and to prevent the seizure of Hormūz by the Chief of

* The name is so given, but it may be a mistake for "Rahmāni."

Mināb, who had been urging the release of Mulla 'Ali Shāh's family, he sent some Bani Ma'in and Chārak Arabs to garrison that place ; but he was now most anxious to come to terms with Karīm Khān of Shīrāz in regard to the government of Garmsīr and for this purpose suddenly departed to Lār, after expressing a desire "to clap up a peace" with Mulla 'Ali Shāh—yet without doing so—and neglecting an opportunity afforded by the arrival of a Masqat vessel to his assistance of making an attack upon the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah. The loan to the Khān of Lār was approved by the Bombay Presidency on the ground that it could not have been avoided ; but they remarked that "there is no end of those impositions when once submitted to, and it is avoid them that we point out the Agent's removal to Bussorah or elsewhere, or only going with the goods for a time to other ports."

1761.

In April 1761 matters were still unsettled between Karīm Khān and Nāsir Khān ; the latter, notwithstanding many promises, had not repaid any part of the loan of 1,000 Tūmāns, and his brother Ja'far Khān, on whose attitude the safety of the British depended and whom it was therefore necessary to placate, had run up a debt of Rs. 3,718 at the Agency. It was now the opinion of the Agent and Council in Persia that, "the people of that Kingdom and its Coasts being of so bad a Disposition, Europeans would find it difficult to live amongst them as formerly, unless they were determined to resent affronts," and they described them as a race "who only regarded the present and had neither honour nor honesty, who kept troops at the expense of the industrious, and who paid no regard to the fair trade." Matters, so far from improving, still grew worse. In May, an attack by Arabs on Bandar 'Abbās being apprehended, Ja'far Khān began to construct defences of smaller perimeter than those existing ; and he so arranged matters as to bring the Agency building into the new town wall, which he insisted that the British should assist in defending. It was feared by Mr. Dymoke Lister, who then held charge, that these dispositions might cover some design of seizing the Agency, and a month's supply of wood and water was laid in, while Ja'far Khān continued to urge a disagreeable request for the loan of a couple of guns. In the autumn Nāsir Khān obtained the government of Garmsīr from Karīm Khān on condition of paying 2,000 Tūmāns a year as revenue, of maintaining 100 musketeers at Shīrāz, and of holding all his troops at the disposal of the Vakīl for operations in Garmsīr. A temporary improvement in the situation at Bandar 'Abbās followed, and the Khān even repaid in cash 50 of the 1,000 Tūmāns that were due from him and offered further payments in kind. On account partly of

his general misgovernment and partly of the complaints of the Bani Ma'in, Ja'far Khan was now recalled from Bandar 'Abbas, his place there being taken by one Hāji 'Ali who proved in all respects an excellent governor. The Bani Ma'in at Hormūz, who found it difficult to subsist on account of the scarcity of water and whom the perpetual attacks of the Qawāsīm had now reduced to poverty, were permitted to remove, and some of them apparently went to Chārak. Encouraged probably by the partial removal of the Bani Ma'in, Mulla 'Ali Shah, whose family were confined in the Fort at Hormūz, now proceeded to the Arabian coast and returned with a force of Qawāsīm; and two assaults were made upon Hormūz by him and his allies, but without success, for they were repulsed by the natives of Hormūz and by some of the Bani Ma'in who remained. In the course of these operations 2,400 bags of rice consigned from Masqat to the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās were seized by the Qawāsīm and converted by Mulla 'Ali Shāh to his own use without payment of compensation, whereby the Agent was obliged to apply to Nāsir Khān for a supply of rice, to be credited as repayment in part of the loan due from him. At the end of 1761 the restless Bani Ma'in were still on the move; those of them who had been to Chārak had now returned to Hormūz; but a number of the tribe had been induced by Hāji 'Ali to settle quietly at Bandar 'Abbās with their families.

Prospects were again altered for the worse by the unexpected return of Ja'far Khān, on the 3rd of February 1762, to resume the government of Bandar 'Abbās in supersession of Hāji 'Ali: his reappointment was a disagreeable surprise to the Bani Ma'in, who had settled there on a distinct assurance from the Khān that Ja'far would never come back, and who now "found themselves trepanned." Ja'far Khān at once resumed his oppressions, especially of persons connected with the British Agency; and in a few months the town of Bandar 'Abbās, which under Hāji 'Ali had begun to recover its population and prosperity, was reduced to a few date-stick huts. Only a few well-to-do inhabitants remained, and there were no longer any customs to be collected. Nāsir Khān also made so many excuses for not repaying the loan which he had taken from the Company that the money began to be regarded as lost; and the Agent and Council were at length forced by various circumstances to believe "that former oppressions, as well as those then practised, were with his approbation and consent." The general position was described as intolerable.

On the 10th of January 1763 Ja'far Khān was recalled to Lār; but his father-in-law, an avaricious man, was appointed in his place and it

was fully expected that the Khān of Lār, after stripping Ja'far Khān of his infamously acquired riches, would allow him to return to Bandar 'Abbās in order that he might collect more. Peace was at length concluded between the Bani Ma'in on the one side and Mulla 'Ali Shāh and the Qawāsīm on the other, the terms being that the Bani Ma'in should keep Hormūz and be placed in possession of the Lāft fort, while the Qāsimi Shaikh should retain the ship "Rahmāni," and that the revenues of Qishm Island should be equally divided for the future among the three parties to the peace. The settlement, however, promised little advantage to the general tranquillity, for it set free the Bani Ma'in to commit depredations in other quarters. Thus in January 1763 they seized Kuhistak, a port belonging to the Mīnāb chief, and pretended to hold it at the disposal of the Khān of Lār, their real object being to induce the Khān to place them in possession of Bandar 'Abbās; but to this he would by no means consent, and it was reported that on the contrary he desired them to enter his service as sailors, bringing their own ships, when, on condition of their not carrying on any trade and merely cruising according to his directions, he would grant them regular pay. Such an arrangement would, it was foreseen by the British Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, probably lead to the Bani Ma'in becoming common pirates; but at this juncture the British Agency was suddenly withdrawn, as described in an earlier section, and the interest of the Company and their servants in Bandar 'Abbās affairs came to an end.

Affairs on the Persian coast between Rīg and Kangūn, 1722-63.

Until 1755 events on the Persian coast of the Gulf above Bandar 'Abbās possessed almost no interest for the representatives of the East India Company in Persia; and we have consequently little information regarding them before that year.

Position at
Būshehr in
1755.

The government of Būshehr was seized, in the first half of the 18th century, by a family belonging to the Matārish tribe of 'Omān who were Sunnis. In the reign of Nādir Shāh, however, in hope of being appointed to command the fleet which that ruler created and stationed partly at Būshehr, the head of the family, whose name was Nāsir, became a Shī'ah along with the whole of his relations,—an act of apostasy by which he incurred the dislike of the other Arabs of Būshehr, and indeed that of

nearly all the maritime Arabs of the Persian Gulf.* About 1752 Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr in alliance with Mīr Nāsir, the chief of Rīg, reduced the island of Bahrain, possession of which during the remainder of the period under consideration he apparently retained by means of his fleet, consisting of one large vessel and a number of gallivats. In 1755 Shaikh Nāsir seems to have been imprisoned by Karīm Khān, who had required him to answer for the ships of the former Persian navy and to pay up 5,000 Tūmāns on account of the revenue of Bahrain during the previous three years.

The history of the family who in 1755 held possession of Rīg was very similar to that of the Shaikhs of Bahrain. They were by extraction Za'ab Arabs from the coast of what is now Trucial 'Omān; but the father of Mīr Nāsir, who was chief in 1752 and who in or about that year granted the Dutch permission to settle on the island of Khārag, had become a Shī'ah, and Mīr Nāsir himself had married a Persian, so that the family were no longer regarded as genuine Arabs. Mīr Nāsir was murdered, between 1753 and 1755 at the instance of Mīr Mahanna, the younger of his two sons; and this youthful monster, who was present at the crime though he did not actually participate in it, soon afterwards in a fit of fury killed his own mother also for venturing to reproach him with his father's death. Mīr Mahanna's proceedings were however arrested by the return from Bahrain, where he happened to be at the time, of his elder brother Mīr Husain; and the latter took possession of the government of Rīg.

Position at
Rīg in 1755.

Such was the position of affairs when Mr. Francis Wood, formerly Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, arrived at Rīg to establish a British Factory there. This project had been sanctioned by the Court of Directors in April 1754, and Mr. Wood's commission as Resident was issued at Bombay on the 18th of October in the same year, but he did not start from Bandar 'Abbās until March 1755. His instructions were to promote the sale of British woollen manufactures at Rīg; to take all proper measures to hinder the merchants there from dealing in French or other foreign woollens; to discourage, so far as possible, the trade of the Aleppo Adventurers in the same; to lend no money or goods to the local authorities; not to deal with native merchants except for ready money; and, finally, to insist upon the privilege of collecting the customs on all goods imported or exported by the British being granted him, "as it will be for the Hon'ble Company's Credit and Honour, and a means of alleviating their expenses." All controversy with the Dutch,

Mr. Wood
sent to estab-
lish a British
Factory at
Rīg, 1755.

* So the authorities, but it is not apparent how Nāsir could have recommended himself to Nadir Shāh by becoming Shī'ah; see page 83.

who had now a great influence in the Gulf and whose settlement on Khārag faced Rīg, was to be avoided; but it is difficult to resist the conjecture that the Rīg enterprise was in reality directed chiefly against them.

Agreement
with Mir
Husain,
Chief of Rīg,
June 1755.

Mr. Wood, though his instructions referred to Rīg only, stopped at Būshehr on his way and endeavoured to come to an agreement with Shaikh Nāsir for settling there instead; but the Shaikh would not agree to cede the customs on British goods except on condition of receiving a fixed payment of Rs. 1,500 a year. Eventually the Resident, in consequence of remonstrances and orders from Bandar 'Abbās, proceeded to Rīg where he arrived in June. He found no merchants present at the port, but the chief Mir Husain, who had been summoned to Shirāz by Karīm Khān and was on the point of leaving, postponed his departure for three days, readily granted the privileges which Mr. Wood had been directed to solicit, and assured him that "the credit of the English would very soon draw all the merchants back again to Bunderick and restore the place to its former flourishing condition."

Temporary
withdrawal
from Rīg
and return
there under a
Raḡam from
Karīm Khān,
July to
September
1755.

The demeanour of the inhabitants of Rīg became so insolent after their chief's departure that the Resident withdrew to Basrah and then to Būshehr, where he proposed to remain until Mir Husain's return to Rīg; but the receipt of a Raḡam from Karīm Khān, authorising the establishment of a Factory at Rīg, caused him again to change his mind. He returned to Rīg in September and, being well received on this occasion by the people of the place, proceeded to settle down.

Proceedings
of the Resi-
dent at Rīg,
April 1756.

On the 6th of April 1756 Mr. Wood crossed over in the "Neptune" galley to Khārag Island, where he remained until the 15th, carefully observing the methods and proceedings of the Dutch, whose guest he was. On the 20th of April Mir Husain and his brother Mir Mahanna arrived at Rīg from Shirāz, where they had both been imprisoned by Karīm Khān, and only released "in consideration of their known * poverty;" they had performed the journey home on foot in company with Qāid Haidar Khān, the ruler of Hayāt Dāvud, and with a great number of Būshehr people. Mr. Wood, finding them "quite bare of provisions, cloths and money, . . . was obliged to make them a present, consisting chiefly of rice and piece-goods, to the amount of nearly three hundred and sixty (360) Rupees, which . . . was not only necessary but quite unavoidable."

* And possibly on account of the straits to which Āzād Khān, Afghān, had at this time reduced Karīm Khān.

On the 8th of June Mr. Wood received a letter from Baron Kniphausen, the head of the Dutch settlement on Khārag, warning him that the chastisement of the Mīr had been resolved on by the Dutch and that there might therefore be trouble at Rīg very shortly. Upon this the British Resident, who believed that a pro-Dutch party had been formed in Rīg under the leadership of Mīr Mahanna with the express object of murdering himself and of displacing Mīr Husain, thought it prudent to retire once more to Basrah. His justification of his conduct was that the premises which he was building for the Company were not yet in a defensible state, and that the Factory guard were not sufficiently armed ; but he left a corporal behind with orders that the British flag should continue to be flown during his absence. On his return to Rīg, on the 27th of June, he found that a revolution had occurred ; Mīr Husain and several others had been killed by Mīr Mahanna, who was now in power, the unfinished Factory building had been almost levelled with the ground and the British flag had been lowered, but no actual injury had been inflicted on the employés of the Company. He reported these occurrences to the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās, added that in his opinion no prospect of success at Rīg remained, and solicited orders ; and in reply he received the scathing letter which follows from his official superior :—

Flight of the Resident from Rīg and murder of Mīr Husain by Mīr Mahanna, June 1756.

FROM ALEX. DOUGLAS to FRANCIS WOOD, Resident at Bunderick.*

On the 21st came to hand your letter of the 29th ultimo, and it gives me great concern to find that the troubles at Bunderick prevented your taking on shore the Consignment of Woolen Goods and Tin, Ship "Betsy" ; as, from your former advices to this Agency, had the place being in a state of tranquillity, an advantageous sale for our Hon'ble Masters might have been expected.

I observe your greatest motive for going to Bussorah was [on] the receipt of a letter from Mynheer Kniphausen, who no doubt (wishes) to engross the trade of Bunderick and Bushire to himself, wherefore our having a settlement at either of those places can't be agreeable to him ; and as much you might expect he would fling all the obstacles in his power in your way to prevent it and give you frequent alarms, though I see no reason whatever that should induce him to attempt your life, which you seemed apprehensive of when you proceeded to Bussorah, nor do I perceive by your advices that any violence was committed on the people you left behind ; therefore I think that, if your apprehensions had not been so great and that you had stay'd at Bunderick, communicating to Meer Hassain the advices which from time to time you might get of the designs his Brother or (the) Dutch had against him, in all probability he might have avoided the fatal stroke which happened to him, when our Hon'ble Master's House would have been secure ; besides I much doubt whether the Arabs would have demolished the House had you been present, but, finding it was left in charge of only a corporal, they had the less restraint on them.

The want of arms for the military and Timber and stores for finishing the house ought to have been no inducement for your leaving Bunderick, as you had indentes

* In this transcript punctuation, etc., have been slightly amended.

hither for the arms, which were sent you by the first vessel that sailed hence after it receipt, and you could have applied to the Resident at Bussorah to have procured and sent you on the Hon'ble Company's account such materials as you stood in need of.

As the Hon'ble the President and Council direct that every proper expedient be tried for making a settlement at Bunderick and conceive great hopes from the promises you formerly wrote were made you by several merchants at Bussorah, as also you having wrote hither that you doubted not but it would answer the Hon'ble the President and Council's expectations, (I) shall not give any directions for your quitting Bunderick until I receive their further orders on that head; nor would I have you take such a step unless you apprehend your and the people's lives in danger, or something very material happens that I can't at present foresee.

You ought to represent to Meer Manna the advantages it will be to Bunderick our Hon'ble Masters having a settlement there; on the other Hand that he may depend the Honourable the President and Council of Bombay will take satisfaction for any insult offered the Hon'ble Company or their Servants.

As Hussain Caun Cadjar is now in this Kingdom with a large army, and, having taken possession of Spahaun some time past and now besieging Shyrash, a revolution may soon be expected, and if his designs are to keep possession of the Country he will undoubtedly appoint proper persons to reduce these Shaiks to his obedience and give encouragement to all merchants whatever, and then it may not be in Meer Manna or the Dutch their powers to give any obstructions. A little time will show, (h)is real Intentions.

It's currently reported here that Meer Manna on your return to Bunderick from Bussorah made an offer of rebuilding the house at his own expense, which, if true, I am surprized to find no mention made thereof in your advices.

I am,

SIR,

Your Loving Friend,

ALEXANDER DOUGLAS.

GOMBROON;
4th July 1756.

In July the Bombay Government, who were still in ignorance of these events, despatched an assistant to Mr. Wood in the person of a Mr. Hughes.

Contemplated
expedition
against
Kangūn and
Rīg,
October
1765.

Meanwhile trouble had arisen between the Company and the Shaikh of Kangūn, one of the principal ports after Būshehr between Bandar 'Abbās and Rīg, the cause being aggressions committed on two vessels trading under the Company's protection. The authorities at Bombay ordered the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās to send the "Swallow" and "Drake," if they could be spared, to demand satisfaction; and Mr. Wood at Rīg, being acquainted with the details of the affair, was to accompany the expedition. Orders were accordingly sent to Mr. Wood by the Agent

apparently in October, to meet the ships at Kangūn ; and he was further authorised, after matters should have been settled at Kangūn, to take both vessels to Rīg for the purpose either of re-establishing the Factory or of exacting reparation for the destruction of the Company's building.

These instructions found Mr. Wood in a depressed state of mind. His relations with Mīr Mahanna, whom he described as a "a young indiscreet man, wholly given up to the most destructive vices, and so extremely revengefull that it's dangerous to give him even the slightest occasion of offence", had been unfortunate from the first ; the chief had begun to utilise the débris of the Factory for building a wall round the town, and the Resident could not prevail on him to desist "neither by means of presents, nor by conforming to his intemperance in point of drinking, at frequent, nay almost daily visits"; and the Mīr further refused to allow the British to collect the customs on British goods, as his brother had promised that they should do, unless they paid him Rs. 2,000 a year. At length, on the night of the 6th of November between 10 and 11 p.m., a body of Arabs sent by Mīr Mahanna appeared at the gate of the caravansarai where the Resident lodged and insisted that he and the other Europeans, including Mr. Hughes and a Mr. Purnell, should leave the place within half an hour, as the chief suspected them to be enemies and in league with the Dutch. They at first attempted to parley, but, on the Arabs preparing to use force, had to retire on board the "Dragon"; and at their departure the Topass * guard were disarmed and Mr. Wood's effects were plundered. The next day Mīr Mahanna invited them ashore again, but they refused to go. By detaining the Chief's messenger Āgha Mahmūd, and by sending two barrels of gunpowder as a present, Mr. Wood in the course of ten days succeeded in recovering most of the goods that had been left on shore ; but some private losses of his own remained which he proposed to charge to the Company in his accounts. In the meanwhile the "Swallow" and "Drake" had arrived at Rīg, and on those vessels the staff of the Rīg Factory appear to have returned to Bandar 'Abbās, where they arrived at the beginning of December 1756. Mr. Wood now strongly dissuaded the Agent from undertaking operations against either Kangūn or Rīg, representing that the force available was not nearly sufficient for the purpose, that the Arabs would be greatly exasperated, that no real satisfaction would be obtained, and that the trade of Rīg would be thrown completely into the hands of the Dutch ; he still, however, professed to consider Rīg an excellent market for British woollens and a

* Portuguese soldiers employed by the Company were called Topases.

good place for obtaining grain and wine at moderate prices ; but he insisted strongly on the necessity of providing a defensible house for the Resident, to cover the building of which he thought that a large vessel with 200 able-bodied men and two Gallivats would be required. So ended the Company's experiment * at Rīg ; and the expedition to Kangūn was abandoned. Mr. Wood seems to have received compensation from the Company, on account of his private losses, to the extent of Rs. 6,000 or more.

War between
the chiefs of
Rīg and
Chārak, 1750.

In 1759 there was war between Mir Mahanna and the Shaikh of Chārak, and the latter had apparently the support of the Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah.

Course of British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

The trade
in Persia.

The trade of the East India Company in Persia, notwithstanding the serious political obstacles which it had to encounter, the generally disturbed state of the country, and the depreciation of Persian silver, seems to have flourished during this period in a considerable degree ; but between the years 1726 and 1730 it was at a very low ebb.

1736.

In December 1736 Kirmān wool † was despatched from Bandar 'Abbās to Bombay to the amount of 392 bags ; but it was unpacked as for want of large timbers, the Company's servants had been unable to set up a press. In addition to this consignment a further quantity of 6,000 maunds had been sent off from Kirmān, which, in consequence of the impressment of transport for laying out provisions on the route of Nādir Shāh's troops marching to Qandahār, did not reach Bandar 'Abbās in time to be shipped with the rest. 14,000 maunds more, also, had been purchased. The Company's establishment at Kirmān was at this time in charge of a Pārsi named "Seawax", in regard to whom the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās were of opinion that, "tho' a very honest man", he "ought not to be trusted alone in Carmania, as being a Gaber he is liable to be fleeced by the Government, who would oblige him to make presents or lend the Company's money on any pretext, by which his Expenses might be greater than would be occasioned by the Continuance

* In March 1757 the Company still had the establishment of a Factory at Rīg in view, but no action was taken on account of difficulties which probably arose from the war with France.

† This commodity from Kirmān was always described as wool, but it seems to have been in reality goats'-hair: see page 118 *post*. Refer also to Oilver's *Voyage*, II, 459.

"of a Company's servant, which will be necessary if they send any Woollen goods up there." The chief imports at this time seem to have been broadcloth and perpets, and a merchant representing both the Shāh and the Governor of Fārs once arrived at Bandar 'Abbās and wished to buy large quantities of these. As, however, he proposed to pay for them by means of bills on the customs officer, the British Agency refused to supply him; but the Dutch did business with him on his own terms.

At the beginning of 1737 Mr. Savage, in charge of the Company's 1737 affairs at Kirmān, reported that some Georgians had arrived there from Isfahān with cloth from a * Factory which had recently been established at Astrakhan, and that, in view of this fact, not more than 1,000 or 1,200 Tūmāns' worth of the Company's woollen goods could be disposed of by him during the coming season. An obstacle to trade in Kirmān was the depreciation of the Persian silver coinage, consisting of 'Abbāsīs and Mahmūdīs, in consequence of which the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās decided to send not more than one-fifth of the year's woollen goods to Kirmān, and to take payment for the same only in 'Abbāsīs at five Shāhis, or in coined copper, or in old copper. The other four-fifths were disposed of through the broker at Bandar 'Abbās, for the sole alternative was to sell to the local governor, "who would have obliged them to take silver money at fifty per cent." A little later it was reported that the broker found difficulty in getting rid of the broadcloth and perpets which he had taken; that communication with Kirmān had been interrupted by the impressment of the Agency muleteers to carry provisions to the camp of Nādir Shāh, who was then besieging the citadel of Qandahār; and that four or five foreign merchants had come to Kirmān to buy red wool for, it was supposed, the Aleppo market.

In 1740, notwithstanding the unsettled state of Persia, there was a 1740. strong demand for English woollens; it appeared to be due to a prohibition against the importation of woollens from Turkey. The price of Kirmān wool was however so high, in consequence of its being taken to manufacture coats and caps for Nādir Shāh's army, that Mr. Savage was unable to purchase any at a reasonable price.

By the beginning of 1744 the British Factory at Isfahān, for a time 1744. in abeyance, had been re-opened, and by this means the trade from Russia into that part of Persia had been altogether stopped. Encouraged by this success the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās were inclined to send

* This must apparently have been a Factory of the (British) Russia Company, with whose operations on the Caspian and in Northern Persia (chiefly in 1742-49) the names of Elton and Hanway are associated.

Mr. Savage, when the winter should be over, from Kirmān to Mashhad, as by this means the Russia Company's goods might be driven out of Khurāsān and their only remaining market in Persia closed and the proposal was approved by the Bombay Presidency; but difficulties connected with inland duties and the generally disturbed state of the country prevented its execution. Muhammad Taqi Khān was for a time in revolt at Shīrāz, and it appeared that his proceedings might result in bad debts to the Company, notably in the case of the Kalāntar of Shīrāz, who owed them 400 Tūmāns and who was now blinded and despoiled of his goods on suspicion of sympathising with the rebellious governor. In this year dates to the value of Rs. 2,142 are mentioned as having been sold by the Bandar 'Abbās Agency to an English merchant, and the reference is one of the earliest to that commodity.

1747. After the warehouses at Kirmān had been cleared by sales, 141 bales of broadcloth and 1,000 pieces of perpets were sent there in March 1747; this left no broadcloth at all in stock at Bandar 'Abbās, and the Agent and Council requested that a supply might be sent them immediately from Bombay. The Presidency having in this year ordered a large quantity of Kirmān wool exclusive of previous indents, the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās stated that they would endeavour to obtain it through Mr. Graves, but that they were not sanguine of success because, "from the oppression of the Government, the people are obliged to sell their goats in the market to raise money for their tax, & the villages circumjacent had been plundered and their goats destroyed." From this remark it would seem that the so-called "wool" of Kirmān, at the time such an important article of export, was in reality goats'-hair: a supposition which seems to be corroborated by the fact that the favourite quality was neither black nor white, but "red."

1748. At the beginning of 1748 the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās was so short of cash that 2,000 maunds of copper were sent to Barkah* for sale, though no advices had been received thence.

1749. In 1749 the Court of the Company were pleased to order "a provision of fifty thousand pounds weight of Carmania Wool, as much of it red as may be procurable, and as cheap as possible, without any limitation as to price," and orders were given accordingly to the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās. Copper was still a leading export from Persia, but there is nothing to show from what source it was obtained.

1751. In 1751 the prospects of trade were not encouraging, owing to the anarchy that then prevailed throughout Persia and to rumour of a renewal

* *Sic*, but perhaps the name is a mistake for Baarah.

of competition from Astrakhan. From Bandar 'Abbās it was reported that "the Government in all parts was grown so bad that most of the noted merchants were afraid of risking their lives and effects under it any longer, for which reason many of them had invested their money in jewels, etc., and were gone with their families to Mecca, where they proposed to reside until the country was brought under some regular authority." Wool in Kirmān was scarce and very dear; it could not be purchased even in the villages under 60 Shāhis a maund, corresponding to more than 110 Shāhis for the picked and cleaned article, whereas in 1736 it had apparently been brought to Bandar 'Abbās at 35 Shāhis a maund, clear of all charges.

In 1752 there was still a dearth of Kirmān wool on account of the scarcity of goats; but news was received that the Russia Company had only sent one vessel from Astrakhan to Rasht during the three years preceding, and that the agents, not venturing to land, had been obliged to sell their goods for ready money on board ship. 1752.

Wool continued scarce in Kirmān in 1753, owing to the depredations committed upon live-stock by government troops and bands of robbers, but in July 900 maunds had been obtained and 1,000 maunds more were expected to be purchased; the price, however, was enhanced by the Dutch, who were endeavouring to capture the whole trade, to over Rs. 8 per maund for the article uncleaned. Communication with the interior from Bandar 'Abbās was insecure, and exactions by officials from merchants were heavy; but "broadcloth and perpets were goods so adapted to the Persian taste and so necessary for their dress in the winter season" that they continued to sell very well; and in twelve months 320 bales of cloth were sent to Kirmān and all the perpets in stock at Bandar 'Abbās were cleared out. On an indent from the Agency 500 pieces of perpets were then sent to Bandar 'Abbās, but 3,000 more were immediately required. Perpets were of the highest value in assisting the disposal of other cloths. The cloth goods stored at Bandar 'Abbās were found to suffer much from the heat, from mildew and from a kind of worm. An attempt was made to find a market for cochineal in Persia and Turkish 'Irāq, but it did not succeed. 1753.

The decision in 1754 to open a British Factory at Rīg was prompted chiefly by a desire to push the trade in British woollen manufactures, which was very profitable at this time, and to overcome competition by the French and by Aleppo Adventurers, of whom the latter sent their goods to Basrah overland. 1754.

At the end of 1755 the trade at Bandar 'Abbās was in a most flourishing condition: 1,200 maunds of Kirmān wool had been exported to 1755.

Bombay, 3,240 maunds remained awaiting shipment, 750 maunds were expected from up-country, and the funds remitted to Kirmān for investment during the year amounted to upwards of Rs. 74,000. There were also "large remains of old copper" at Bandar 'Abbās, and fresh consignments of woollen goods were earnestly desired there, before the hot weather should put an end to the trade for the season.

1756. In the spring of 1756 wool and copper to the value of 1,620,987 Shāhis were shipped to Bombay from Bandar 'Abbās, and the Agent and Council explained that silver rupees were required for purchases at Kirmān, as the merchants there would accept no other coin and bills of exchange were difficult to obtain. Between the 29th of September and the 7th of December the Agent had remitted Rs. 10,000 to Kirmān on account of the "investment" of the current year and Rs. 22,000 for that of the coming season; he had actually received 2,580 maunds of wool; and he hoped that the quantity would reach 10,000 maunds for the year then closing. "He mentioned his apprehensions that a refusal to take "the black sort of wool wou'd be attended with bad consequences, as the "Dutch made no exceptions to any colour and used every means in their "power to engross the whole investment."

1756-58. During the years 1756 to 1758 the Court of the Company in London seem to have given great attention to suiting the Persian market; they even had cloths designed and manufactured in imitation of Dutch and French fabrics which sold well in the Gulf; and they constantly asked for samples of their rivals' goods. They were not satisfied, however, with the Kirmān wool sent them; and in 1758, having lost considerably by their sales in that article, they insisted that no more of the black sort should be sent them and that an attempt should be made to buy red without either black or white; if wool could be procured at Kirmān at 70 Shāhis per maund, exclusive of charges, 20,000 lbs. of it might be purchased, but otherwise only 10,000 lbs. at a price not exceeding 80 Shāhis a maund. The Court also demurred to the building of warehouses at Kirmān and ordered that, if extra accommodation were needed, it should be hired. Dr. Ives, who visited Bandar 'Abbās in 1758, specifies the following as minor articles of export from Persia in which the Company did not deal but left the trade to private merchants,—common assafoetida and the superior sort called Hīng, dragon's blood, opopanax, sagopenum,* ruinas, cummin-seeds, almonds, seedless raisins, black raisins, pistachios, prunes and dates. He adds: "I cannot conclude this account

* Meaning "Indian madder."

“of the situation of affairs at Gombroon, without paying a just compliment to the great prudence and sagacity of the English and Dutch factories established there, who amidst all the shocks and convulsions of a civil war among the Persians, have met with little or no interruption in their trade from any of the contending parties; it being a maxim with them, to side openly with none of the competitors, and yet at the same time to keep well with all: for this end, civil letters, and sometimes presents, have been thought indispensably necessary.”

The Kirmān wool investment of 1760 amounted to 3,000 maunds, of which 2,820 maunds were red, 135 white, and 45 grey; the last quality the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās proposed to sell locally for what it would fetch. Disturbances in Khurāsān affected the trade of the Company, and much less business was done in this year than had been anticipated. Wool and copper were still the chief commodities in the export trade. 1760.

In 1761 the commercial horizon was overcast. Great oppression was exercised in Kirmān by Karīm Khān's governor, and a contribution of 30,000 Tūmāns was demanded from the province which was found, when it came to be distributed, to be equal to seven times the ordinary annual revenue. The Linguist who represented the Company in Kirmān was included in the governor's exactions, and he was informed by his superiors that, if after despatching the annual wool investment he saw no prospect of remaining “in any degree of security,” he might return to Bandar 'Abbās. The Linguist seems accordingly to have collected the wool investment of about 3,000 maunds, after which he obtained permission from the governor to leave Kirmān. There was little sale for woollen goods at Bandar 'Abbās in this year; and the Agent and Council reported that “the Kingdom seemed to go very fast unto Ruin, the Great Men paying no regard to the Subject, but only the gratifying their Soldiers and Dependents; and they much feared the Ruin of Trade would be the consequence.” The Bombay Presidency desired that, as old copper was now very low, none should be sent them, and that remittances should be made in gold or silver. 1761.

Stagnation, due to the same causes, continued in 1762. The total value of the sales at Bandar 'Abbās from August 1761 to August 1762, during which time few traders from the interior visited the place, was only Rs. 36,020. This was due largely to the state of affairs in Kirmān, where Multāni merchants dealing largely in woollens had formerly resided and carried on a trade with Mashhad and Qandahār; but they had now been discouraged by the exactions practised on them, their goods from Bandar 'Abbās being habitually seized by the local authorities at arbitrary rates, and had ceased to trade. 1762.

The trade in
Turkish
'Irāq.

The Company's trade, and commercial arrangements in Turkish 'Irāq are fully described in the chapter on the history of that country.

Establishments and general arrangements of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

Organization
and nomen-
clature.

During the first half of the 18th century the words "Agent" and "Factor," "Agency" and "Factory" appear to have been somewhat indiscriminately used to describe the Company's servants and stations in the Persian Gulf and Persia; but by degrees the head of the Company's interests in the whole of that region came to be known as "the Agent" and Bandar 'Abbās, being his headquarters, as "the Agency." The Isfahān station, before its final closure, was frequently described as a "Residency;" such also was the status of Basrah; and, as both of these places were subordinate to Bandar 'Abbās, we should perhaps understand that an "Agent", after about 1750, corresponded with the "Agent to the Governor-General" rather than with the ordinary "Political Agent" of the present day. The Company's interests in Kirmān were represented sometimes by a European employé and sometimes by a Linguist or native interpreter, and the station there did not belong to any particular class. The term "Honourable Company," referring to the East India Company, was in use in the Gulf as early as 1737, or perhaps earlier; and the fact that the Company was more than a society of merchants must have been recognized in 1762, when the Shaikh of Būshehr urged that "an English Sarkar Factory" should be established at his port. That the distinction between "covenant-ed" or superior and other servants of the Company must have been introduced before 1750 is shown by the following order issued by the Bombay Presidency in that year: "And if the circumstances of their "affairs at Spahaun absolutely requires a Covenant Servant to continue "there some time longer, Mr. Dalrimple must be appointed to relieve "Mr. Graves till such time as he can be recalled, for we would have no "Covenant Servant reside there any longer than the necessity of those "ill conducted affairs * may unavoidably require."

Personnel.

With regard to personnel we may remark on the large number of Scotsmen among the Company's employés in the Gulf,—a feature distinguishing this period from the last, which was mostly antecedent to the

* Apparently the reference is to Messrs. Pierson and Blandey's case—see page 126 *post*.

parliamentary union of England and Scotland. Thus among the civil servants of the Company we find such names as Dalrymple, Douglas, Geekie, Ross, Shaw and Stuart; among naval commanders such as Cleugh, Crichton, Douglas, Grant, Kerr, Lindsey, Milne and Nesbit; among medical officers those of Forbes and Rose; and among military officers that of Mackenzie. The predominance of Lowland over Highland names is remarkable.

Among the Agents at Bandar 'Abbās during this period the most conspicuous were Francis Wood (1752), who was afterwards deputed to open the Factory at Rīg, and Alexander Douglas, who held charge during the difficult period from 1753 to 1763 and arranged the withdrawal of the Agency from Bandar 'Abbās in the latter year. Staff, etc., in
Persia.

The Company's staff suffered severely from the climate and the following casualties in Persia are recorded in some selected letters; there were probably many others:—

1735 and 1736. The Agent had to leave Bandar 'Abbās in both years on account of ill-health.

1739. Mr. Dacres died.

1740. Mr. Rose, Surgeon, died.

1743 (19th November). Ensign Mackenzie died intestate and his effects "were sold at outcry."

1745-46. Messrs. Jones and Science (*sic*) died.

1747. Mr. Ross and a European gunner died.

1750 (11th December). Mr. Dalrymple died.

1752. Messrs. Went and Perceval died, both intestate, also Ensign Burrage (11th November), and several Topasses and sepoys; the life of Mr Wood, the Agent, was twice despaired of, but he recovered. Between March and September this was a very sickly season.

1753 (9th June). Mr. Sedgwick died.

1755. Messrs. Parsons and Secker died.

1756. Mr. Pompet died.

1758. Mr. Holmes died, and the Surgeon was invalided.

1759. (12th March). Captain Crichton died.

1760. This was another unhealthy season. Mr. Nash and most of the European soldiers died, and Ensign Nack (*sic*) was invalided. More assistants were asked for, and in the following year two Writers were sent.

1761 (7th November). Mr. W. Douglas, apparently one of the new Writers, died.

1763. Mr. A. Douglas, the Agent, after effecting the removal of the Agency from Bandar 'Abbās reported: "My constitution being "greatly impaired thro' my long residency in this unhealthy "place, which I have little prospect of recovering but in my "native climate, . . . these considerations have induced me to "return to my standing at the Presidency, etc.," and he accordingly sailed for Bombay, presumably on his way to Europe.

The average strength of the staff at Bandar 'Abbās is not ascertainable,* but it was not large, and this list evidently represents a very heavy mortality †. Regard being had to the political and military dangers of the situation, to the difficulties and disappointments of trade, to the ‡ isolation of the life, to the hardships of travel and to the unhealthiness of the climate, the manner in which the Company's interests were maintained in the Gulf during this period may well be quoted in proof of British pertinacity.

* In 1740 the covenanted servants of the Company employed in Persia and their annual salaries were: Mr. N. Whitwell, Agent, £150; Mr. St.G. Pack, Accountant and Warehouse-keeper, £40; Mr. H. Savage, at Kirmān, £30; and Mr. J. Pierson, Secretary, £15. In 1751 it was as follows:—

Residence.	Persons' names and employments.	Time of their arrival in India.	At what salary.	Present salary per annum.	Ages.	Titles.
Bandar 'Abbās	Mr. Henry Savage, Agent.	11th September 1732.	£ 5	£ 150	35	4th in Council, and 2nd Treasurer.
Ditto.	Cowan Henry Draper, Secretary.	1st October 1743.	5	15	23	Factor.
Ditto.	James Dalrymple, Assistant to Mr. Graves at Isfahān.	10th September 1744.	5	15	35	Do.
Isfahān	Danvers Graves, Resident.	9th June 1737.	5	40	29	Senr. Merchant.

† This mortality may have been due in part to habits of life which prevailed among the Company's servants. See Hamilton's *New Account* (I. 95): "The Europeans often hasten death sooner than he would come of his own Accord, by Intemperance and Debauchery of several Kinds; and they have a Burial-place near the town well stored with Tombs, but never a Christian Church in this Town," etc., etc.

‡ Between the 17th of September, 1752 and the 22nd of June 1753 no opportunity occurred of sending a letter from Bandar 'Abbās to Bombay; probably, however, this was an interval more than usually long.

Such amenities of life as were attainable were not neglected by the Company's servants at Bandar 'Abbās. They lived at a common table, which was supplied at their employers' expense with Madeira and Persian wine; the latter cost about twenty-pence the bottle and was "the best," says Ives, "I ever tasted except claret." The Agency had a country house and a pleasant garden at 'Isīn, ten miles distant; and it was to this place that a son and brother of Muhammad Taqi Khān, Governor of Fārs, invited themselves as guests at the beginning of 1730.

Public events of importance were duly celebrated by the British community at Bandar 'Abbās. At the end of 1761 the Bombay Presidency ordered the Agent and Council "to proclaim his most gracious Majesty George the third, and enclosed them copy of the Form use'd "on that occasion, and order'd them to take the oath of Allegiance to "him, and to administer both that and the oath of Fidelity to all the "Officers there, both Military and Marine."

Full information regarding the Company's establishments in Turkish 'Irāq is given in the historical chapter dealing with that country.

Staff, etc., in
Turkish
'Irāq.

Military es-
tablishments.

The Company's civil establishments were never without their military guards, whether at Bandar 'Abbās, Basrah or Rīg. At the end of 1743 the military at Bandar 'Abbās applied to be relieved, as they had served there for more than two years; and the Presidency apparently sent in their place "a sergeant, drummer and twelve topasses, as a common watch," but declined to replace Ensign Mackenzie, who had died, on the ground that the situation did not warrant the continuance of an Ensign's command. In 1744 the Agent and Council demurred to a reduction of their guard "from the uncertainty of the times," and requested that an Ensign and two or three Europeans for Corporals might be sent; the rank and file were apparently Portuguese "Topasses," whose pay was Rs. 4 a month,* and Indian sepoy. In 1747, the situation being somewhat critical after the death of Nādir Shāh, the Presidency sent the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās "two practical gunners with sundry "stores and permitted them, if absolutely necessary, to detain half a score "of men out of the "Drake," in order to defend their Factory against "any rabble that might insult them." In 1748 two of the Agency Topasses went out to the back of the town to fight, and one of them, Francis Pereira, killed his adversary, Laurence de Romade, with a stick and was sent as a prisoner to India. After 1750 the detachment at Bandar 'Abbās seems to have been generally an officer's command, and a guard-

* In 1751 the Topasses petitioned that their pay might be raised to Rs. 5 as at Bombay.

ship was sometimes kept there for the defence of the Agency, as for example the "Drake," which remained for this purpose for about twelve months from July 1750, in consequence of disorders at Isfahān and in other parts of the country. At the beginning of 1752 the Sūbahdār of the sepoy's at Bandar 'Abbās was "much out of order," and the Agent and Council recommended that he should be relieved, as also the married sepoy's, who, as their pay was handed to their families at Bombay, were unable to live on their rations, and in whose place bachelors would be preferred. In this year Lieutenant Wardman and a Sergeant returned to Bombay with a detachment; a sergeant, two corporals and a gunsmith, all Europeans, arrived; and a midshipman was taken on shore from one of the Company's ships. On the 25th July 1753, the Ensign in command having died, the garrison at Bandar 'Abbās consisted of one Sergeant and one corporal, who must have been Europeans, 24 Topass soldiers and 22 Bombay sepoy's; and there was also a European gunner who was inefficient, being addicted to drink. In 1761 the "usual detachment of military" were sent to Bandar 'Abbās in the "Drake," ketch; but the Agent was instructed not to land them except in an emergency, as experience had shown that residence on shore was injurious to their health; and he was invited to consider whether sepoy's might not be substituted for such of them as were Europeans.

Conduct of
servants.

Malversation on the part of the Company's servants in the Gulf seems to have been rare; but in 1747 grave irregularities came to the notice of the Bombay Presidency, the culprits being Messrs. Pierson and Blandey, the Company's representatives at Isfahān. Attention was first drawn to their proceedings by a bill of exchange which they drew on Basrah at the exorbitant premium of 50 per cent.; further investigation showed that they had taken up locally sums amounting to Rs. 14,300, for which they had given bonds, some at 10 and some at 15 per cent. interest per mensem; and they were found to have committed several other gross irregularities and to have been "studiously fallacious in their accounts." The case was complicated by conflicting orders sent to the Bandar 'Abbās Agency from London and Bombay, and it dragged on until 1750, in which year Messrs. Graves and Dalrymple were sent to Isfahān apparently to go into the matter on the spot, but were obliged to leave hurriedly, as we have seen, in consequence of an attack upon the Factory. Towards the end of the year Pierson confessed his guilt at Bandar 'Abbās before Mr. Graves and the Agent and Council, and his effects ("which, being only his wearing apparel and superfluous horse ornaments, etc., will not amount to a quarter part of what they deem him answerable to the Hon'ble Company") were secured and sent to India

Another bad case of misconduct, noticed in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, occurred at Basrah a few years later.

Communication with the Company's stations in the Persian Gulf was ordinarily maintained by ships from Bombay, but at times vessels with goods were sent direct from England to Bandar 'Abbās and proceeded thence to Bombay; such were the "Hector" in 1756, the "Prince Edward" in 1757, and the "Admiral Watson" of 400 tons, carrying 80 men and 24 guns, in 1758. The question of correspondence was one of some difficulty during the wars with the French. In 1748 original letters from India seem to have been sent "overland *viā* Grand Cairo" and duplicates by way of the Persian Gulf. In 1755, peace then prevailing, both original and duplicate letters from Bandar 'Abbās to London were forwarded by Basrah and Aleppo, but "by different Conveyances"; one of the packets of this year, which was at first supposed to have miscarried, was accidentally found in the desert and brought to Aleppo by a Turkish subject, and it was concluded that the messenger had died or been killed upon the road. In 1756, war with France having begun, the establishments in the Gulf were ordered to stand well upon their guard, and thereafter various precautions in regard to convoys, etc., were taken; but a number of important letters despatched from Aleppo apparently failed to reach Basrah, and the Company's Court in London could not "avoid being in pain, for fear the dispatches sent as well "from His Majesty's Ministers as Ourselves immediately upon the "Declaration of War against France" might have fallen into the hands of the enemy. About the same time the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās were ordered by the Directors to be discreet in their correspondence, and to obey the orders of the Secret Committee, of whom three were a quorum, as if signed by the whole Court. In 1761 correspondence between Bombay and London was in duplicate, one set of copies being sent *viā* Basrah, and material passages were, "as usual, disguis'd in the large Cypher." In 1762 there were again serious miscarriages of correspondence sent by Basrah which were attributed to the negligence of Mr. Shaw, the Resident there.

Communica-
tions and
correspond-
ence.

Extinction of Portuguese influence in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

During this period, or possibly before it began, the Portuguese finally disappeared from the Gulf. Direct advices from England to Bandar

'Abbās showed that in May 1740 the despatch of a Portuguese fleet from Europe to the Gulf was expected, but it never arrived. In March 1758, when Dr. Ives passed Kung, that place was in ruins and had apparently been deserted by the Portuguese.

Proceedings of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

Proceedings
of the Dutch
at Bandar
'Abbās and
Būshehr
before their
occupation of
Khārag
Island, 1722-
1752.

The Dutch, at the beginning of the period now under discussion, had factories at Bandar 'Abbās and Basrah. In Persia their attitude towards the native powers seems to have been generally more compliant than that of the English; but towards the Afghāns, as we have already seen, their conduct in 1728 was by no means subservient, and it was only in consequence of British mediation that they gave up Hormūz, which they had seized. As has been related in the history of affairs at Bandar 'Abbās, the Dutch assisted the Persian expedition against 'Omān with the loan of a ship, and in 1740 they made a show of helping the Persian authorities to suppress a mutiny of the Arab crews of the Persian navy. In 1744 they joined a Persian emissary from Shīrāz in an attempt to arrest the Persian Governor of Bandar 'Abbās; but their action was neutralised by that of the British. In 1747, at the invitation of a Sardār, the Dutch re-established a settlement at Būshehr which they had closed; the employé sent to reside there was a Mynheer Belvelt from the Basrah Residency, who took with him a supply of sugar, sugar-candy, camphire and some spices. In 1748 the Dutch began to talk of abandoning their Factory at Bandar 'Abbās, which no longer yielded much profit; and at the beginning of 1751 it was ascertained by the British Agent that they had thoughts of seizing Khārag and removing their Bandar 'Abbās Factory to that island. Early in 1752 Nāsir Khān of Lār visited Bandar 'Abbās, where he laid the Dutch and their dependents under contribution; and in April of that year a determined effort was made by the British to stifle a business in woollens at Basrah which the Dutch carried on from Aleppo, the British Resident at Basrah receiving "particular directions to undersell them and endeavour to render "this Branch of Trade disadvantageous by all fair means that he could "possibly invent." In 1752 the Dutch still continued to maintain a Resident at Bandar 'Abbās, and it was reported that they intended to raise the status of the Factory, which had been reduced, to its former level. These circumstances led the British Agent to oppose suggestion that had been made for the removal of the British Factory; and the event justified his

expectations, if not his advice, for on the 10th of November 1752 a Mynheer Scondeiwoert arrived from Batavia with a large European vessel, several assistants and a military guard, and re-established the Factory on its former footing. On the 23rd of April the grab "Nancy," belonging to Dutch merchants at Sūrāt, was totally wrecked near Old Lāft between Qishm Island and the main; and most of her cargo was seized by 'Abdul Shaikh, the native ruler of Qishm.

At this juncture, under the advice of Baron Kniphausen,* a Prussian gentleman who had served in the army of his own country and in that of France and who was now in the employment of the Dutch East India Company, the policy of the Dutch in the Persian Gulf suddenly took a new departure. The Baron, on his virtual expulsion† from Basrah, where he was Resident, paid a visit to Khārag; finding the place suitable for a commercial settlement he induced Mīr Nāsir, chief of Rīg, to give him a letter offering the island to the Dutch East India Company; and, armed with this document, he proceeded on his way to Batavia, where he succeeded in persuading the Dutch authorities that the opportunity of occupying Khārag was one that ought to be embraced. These events probably took place in 1752. On the 21st of September 1753 a Dutch vessel, the "Fortune," anchored at Bandar 'Abbās to await Baron Kniphausen, who was now expected from Batavia; another Dutch ship had passed up the Gulf in the preceding month of June and had not returned. On the 6th of October the Baron himself arrived at Bandar 'Abbās in the "Getrouwt," a very large ship, and remained there taking in provisions until the 11th, when he sailed

Occupation
of Khārag
Island by
the Dutch
under Baron
Kniphausen,
1753.

* The chief authorities in regard to Baron Kniphausen's life and character, to his expulsion from Basrah and to the Dutch settlement on Khārag are the following: a letter from Mr. Wood, the British Resident at Rīg, to the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās, dated 3rd May 1756 (No. LXXVI in Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay*); Ives's *Journey from Persia to England, 1773*, pages 207-25; Niebuhr's *Description de l'Arabie, 1774*, pages 278-9, and *Voyage en Arabie, 1776*, Vol. II, pages 149-66; *Five Letters from a Free Merchant in Bengal, 1777*, pages 146-52; and *The Island of Kharak or Charrack* in the *Asiatic Journal* for September 1838, pages 23-4. The anonymous writer of the last named article seems to have confounded Khārag Island with the port of Chārak in Shībkūh. Of Kniphausen it may safely be said that he was able, versatile and energetic; on the other points of his character no decided opinion can be expressed, but it seems probable that he was a liar and a loose liver. The Free Merchant's estimate of the Baron is vindictively depreciatory; that of Ives is friendly and favourable; the judicious Niebuhr reserves his opinion, but is apparently not free from suspicions; and the other authorities are silent on the personal question.

† The circumstances of his leaving Basrah are described in the *History of Turkish Iraq*, see page 1207, *post*.

again, ostensibly for Būshehr. The "Getrouwt" and the "Fortune" were both full of men, ammunition and timber, and two small Dutch vessels which a few days later sailed past Bandar 'Abbās without calling were reported to be laden with warlike stores. The British Agent conjectured that the Dutch intended either to attack Basrah or to seize Bahrain; but they settled instead on Khārag,* where they began to fortify a position on the north-eastern corner of the island. They were shortly joined by the Dutch representative from Būshehr, who destroyed his house and garden at that port before leaving it, but his action seems to have been due to a difference with Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr. Baron Knipphausen, not long after his arrival at Khārag, quarrelled with Mir Nāsir over the question of whether or not rent was payable by the Dutch on account of their occupation of the island; and open hostilities followed and continued almost without intermission for some years.

The Dutch settlement on Khārag under Baron Knipphausen, 1756-58.

In 1756 Mr. Wood, the British Resident at Rig on the mainland opposite, paid a visit to Khārag, where he remained from the 6th to the 15th of April, and he sent a lively account of what he had observed—also a plan of the Dutch fort, which he had "in leisure and opportunity of taking with the greatest exactness"—to the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās. The military guard consisted of 60 Dutch soldiers, who were under the strictest discipline, and of 100 African slaves armed with swords and targets; but the only vessels allotted to the station were a sloop of 10 carriage and 6 swivel guns and a gallivat mounting six 3-pounders and 4 swivels. The town was to be defended by a deep fosse without a wall, one end of which, upon the sea, would serve as a boat harbour. The goods in the warehouses comprised sugar, sugar-candy, pepper, rice, leather, spices of all kinds, tin, lead, iron, perrets of a double breadth, and broadcloth of all sorts; the two last were of kinds unsuitable to the Persian market, but some medleys had been indented for of which the patterns—Mr. Wood was very sorry to say—seemed to be exceedingly well chosen. Eight or ten boats were constantly employed in pearling round the island; but this part of their operations the Dutch conducted with great secrecy. The scale on which the Factory had been established seemed to Mr. Wood to show a complete disregard of expense; but, if the situation in Persia were to become settled, he thought that Khārag might become a populous and flourishing place.

* According to one authority of doubtful value the Dutch did not land on Khārag until January 1754, in which case it is not improbable that they had spent some time in prospecting at other places.

The Dutch intended to import 80 families of Chinese and thereafter to drive out the native Arab inhabitants.

Mr. Wood, as has been shown, was convinced that his own subsequent expulsion from Rīg was brought about by the intrigues of the Dutch on Khārag, who, he believed, were anxious to possess themselves of Rīg.

Dr. Ives and his companions visited Khārag on their way from India to Europe in 1758 and were entertained by the Dutch there from the 31st of March to the 19th of April. The staff of the Factory at this time consisted of Baron Kniphausen, the Chief, who had now reached middle age; Mr. Bosman, the Second, who was accompanied by his *wife; Mr. Robingson, an ensign in the Dutch artillery, but of English extraction; Mr. Nicoli, accountant; and Mr. Binkey, master attendant. The fort, which was of stone, was square and mounted 32 guns, and before the gate, facing the sea, was a ravelin containing 12 guns, six to eighteen pounders; the garrison of the fort consisted of 100 European soldiers. A wall had been begun which was to run from north-west to south-east behind the town, and a triangular bastion had been constructed at its north-western end. There was a small harbour, protected from southerly winds by a stone breakwater, and in it lay two or three armed gallivats of 6 to 8 carriage-guns apiece. The Baron showed much interest in the British travellers and endeavoured, but without success, to arrange for their making the journey to Aleppo by the desert route from Kuwait, with the Shaikh of which place he was in relations; he was "very inquisitive about the diving-bell and some other late discoveries made in England, for enabling men to keep a long while under water; and he commissioned Dr. Ives to buy him in England a library of all sorts of books, besides scientific and other instruments,—a task which that gentleman duly discharged.

Baron Kniphausen remained at Khārag till 1758 or 1759, when he returned to Batavia and was succeeded by Mr. van der Hulst, formerly his principal assistant at Basrah. Under Mr. van der Hulst, who governed Khārag for two and a half years, the war between the Dutch and the chief of Rīg continued. On one occasion Mir Mahanna sent over two armed vessels at night, which by the clever device of carrying noisy fowls on board and so causing themselves to be mistaken for boats

The Dutch settlement on Khārag under Mr. van der Hulst, 1759-61.

* This is the first mention with which the writer has met of a European lady in the Persian Gulf. Probably the Mr. "Bosman" mentioned here is the same as the Mr. Buschman who afterwards became Chief: see page, 132, *post*.

with supplies from Būshehr, succeeded in approaching, boarding and capturing two Dutch gallivats that lay immediately under the guns of the Khārag fort. After this exploit, Mīr Mahanna in person made a descent on the island with about 100 men and even approached the fort; but, on a party of 25 Europeans with two field guns turning out to engage him, he took flight under cover of some rocks and escaped by sea. As a precaution against the recurrence of such attempts, the fortifications of Khārag were then added to, and a wall was built to enclose some habitations and warehouses that had hitherto stood in the open. Mr. van der Hulst did not enjoy the favour of the Dutch Governor of Batavia, to whom he was subordinate, and in or about 1761 he was recalled to headquarters; but at Bandar 'Abbās he quitted the ship on which he was travelling, placed himself under the protection of the British, and returned to Europe *viâ* Bombay.

The Dutch settlement on Khārag under Mr. Buschman, 1761-63.

Mr. van derHulst was followed in office by Mr. Buschman, who had been one of the original members of the Dutch staff on Khārag, and of whose eccentric personality the traveller Niebuhr has left an interesting account. His two predecessors had been constantly on bad terms, and sometimes at open war, with their Arab neighbours, especially Mīr Mahanna; but Mr. Buschman was able, by better management, to establish more satisfactory relations. On Mīr Mahanna deputing a principal man with an armed escort to discuss matters with him—and perhaps to seize the Dutch settlement if an opportunity of doing so should present itself—Mr. Buschman made such a judiciously ostentatious display of all his military resources as led the envoy to pronounce the fort impregnable and to persuade his master to agree to the conditions desired by the Dutch.

History of the Dutch Factory at Bandar 'Abbās from 1753 till its removal in 1759.

The Dutch Factory at Bandar 'Abbās continued in existence for about five years after the foundation of the settlement on Khārag, and for a time the staff there maintained a close competition with the British in the Kirmān wool trade, sometimes offering to pay 10 Shāhis a maund more than the British Linguist would give. The British on their part neglected no means of competition but secured specimens of Dutch cloth goods which sold well, ascertained the prices, and caused imitations to be manufactured in England and the trade of the Dutch in woollens gradually ceased at Bandar 'Abbās, where after 1754 they imported no more goods of that kind. At length it became known that the Dutch intended to retire from Bandar 'Abbās, and about the end of 1758 a vessel arrived there, on which most of their goods and the treasure of their Factory were removed to

Khārag; on the 3rd of February 1759 the staff followed in a second ship; and the Factory building at Bandar A'bbās was apparently left in charge of a Linguist. The gentlemen of the British Agency, after the destruction of their premises by the French in the autumn of 1759, seem to have found a temporary refuge in the old Dutch Factory, and at the beginning of 1760 negotiations for leasing or purchasing it were opened with the Dutch Chief at Khārag; but they must either have failed or been dropped, for in 1763, as we have seen in another place, the Persians had been in occupation of the building for three years. Early in 1760 it was expected that the Dutch would endeavour to seize Hormūz, and the British Agent was ordered to take measures to forestall them; but they did not move.

Proceedings of the French in the Persian Gulf, 1722-63.

Early in the period with which we are now dealing, or possibly before it began, the French Factory at Bandar 'Abbās was withdrawn. Until 1739 the superior of the Carmelites at Basrah seems to have discharged the duties of French Consul in Turkish 'Irāq; and for a number of years after that, beginning about 1742, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Babylon, at Baghdād, was Consul for France there. In 1755 a French Residency, which at some previous time had existed at Basrah, was re-established.

Towards the end of 1735 a French vessel called at Bandar 'Abbās, sold part of her cargo, and then left for Basrah. Her stay having been somewhat prolonged, and customs at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. having been duly paid on the goods landed from her, the French before their departure received a letter from Nādir Shāh in which they were urged to re-establish their settlement at Bandar 'Abbās,—a turn of events which was viewed with some alarm by the British and probably by the Dutch, neither of whom paid customs at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1736 another French ship seems to have visited the port; for in the spring of 1737, on the arrival of the French vessel "Herene" (*sic*) at Bandar 'Abbās, her commander, M. Beaumont, sent ashore to complain of impositions to which a French subject, M. Boisroll, had been subjected in the previous year, and to inquire what treatment he might himself expect. The Governor of Fars

French
affairs in the
Gulf during
the peace
with Britain,
1728-56.

who happened to be present in the town, made many fair promises ; but in the end he only agreed to refund what was due to M. Boisroll by means of a rebate on the customs payable by M. Beaumont,—a concession by which, as M. Beaumont sold very little of his cargo, the French were little advantaged. In 1752 a small French ship sailed from the Gulf for India in company with the Company's galley "Rose" and a Bombay frigate, the object being mutual defence against Angria, the Indian pirate, and other dangers. The establishment of a Factory at Rîg was approved by the East India Company in 1754 partly for the purpose of competing with French woollens, which had apparently obtained some hold in the northern part of the Gulf ; and steps were taken, probably somewhat later, "to imitate very exactly the French Fabrick" ; but the imitation was not despatched from England until 1757, by which time hostilities between France and Britain had begun.

French -
affairs in the
Gulf during
the Seven
Years' War,
1756-68.

In February 1756, the Seven Years' War being now imminent, the King of France ordered all British subjects to quit his dominions before the 1st of March and invited his own people to fit out privateers against English commerce, promising to pay 40 livres for every British gun and prisoner captured, and to buy the privateering vessels at prime cost if an early peace should be concluded ; and the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London, though they seem to have anticipated the result of the approaching contest with confidence, enjoined extreme vigilance upon their servants at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1757, war having been declared by Britain on the 18th of May 1756, the Court of Directors instructed the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās to be guided in the main by such directions as they might receive from Bombay, but at the same time to comply most exactly with any orders received direct from the Company's Secret Committee in London.

On the 14th of January 1758 the French frigate of war "Bristol" appeared off Bandar 'Abbās, where for some days she continued to cruise between Qishm and Hormûz, eventually leaving for Basrah ; in April she was lying at Basrah with another French vessel, and civilities were exchanged between the French and the British officers there ; and in June efforts were made by the East India Company's ships "Revenge" and "Drake" to intercept the "Bristol", which was expected to leave Basrah at the beginning of that month on her way down the Gulf ; but they were not, apparently, successful. The capture and destruction by a French naval expedition in the following year of the British Agency at Bandar 'Abbās have already been described in an earlier section.

Affairs of the Arabian Coast, 1722-63.

Events on the Arabian coast during this period are described at length in the separate histories of its divisions, and in this place a brief recapitulation will suffice.

The most remarkable occurrence in the 'Omān Sultanate, or rather Imāmate, was the rise of the two factions known as the Hināwiyah and Ghāfiriyaḥ, by which the power of that state was, until the formation of a strong central Government under the Āl Bū Sa'id, greatly reduced for external action. In 1737 the armies of Nādir Shāh, the usurper of the Persian throne, invaded 'Omān, establishing an occupation which was at length overthrown by the Imām Ahmad, founder of the Āl Bū Sa'idi dynasty, in 1744. The attitude of the British in this struggle was one of neutrality. In 1758 and 1760 the Imām of 'Omān was at war with the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah.

The Qawāsim of the coast known at the present day as Trucial 'Omān played a considerable part about this time in the Persian affairs. In 1727 a small British naval expedition exacted compensation from the Qāsimi Shaikh for losses which he had occasioned to the East India Company's Factory at Bandar 'Abbās by establishing a rival port at Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm. In 1737, when the Persians invaded 'Omān, the Qawāsim at first submitted to Nādir Shāh's general; but by 1741 their attitude towards the invaders had become doubtful and they had incurred the distrust of the Persians. By 1747 an alliance had been formed between the Qawāsim and Mulla 'Ali Shāh, the Persian Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, which continued to subsist at least until 1763. Probably by means of this alliance, the Qawāsim succeeded before 1760 in obtaining a foothold on the island of Qishm; and, by a treaty concluded among the parties interested, they obtained in 1763 a third part of the revenues of the island.

Of Qatar nothing is heard during the period now under consideration. Bahrain, at the time apparently independent and governed by Hūwalah Arabs, was seized about 1753 by the Shaikh of Būshehr, assisted by the Mīr of Rīg, and thus became indirectly a dependency of Persia.

The port of Kuwait was as yet obscure and insignificant. It was governed by an 'Atbi family, with whom the head of the Dutch settlement that existed on Khārag Island between 1753 and 1766 maintained friendly relations.

Sultanate of
'Omān.

Trucial
'Omān.

Qatar and
Bahrain.

Kuwait

Affairs of Turkish 'Irāq, 1722-63.

The campaigns in which Nādir Shāh, during his brief tenure of power, sought to annex Turkish 'Irāq to the Persian empire are the only noteworthy feature in the foreign relations of the latter country between 1722 and 1763. In 1733 Nādir Shāh in person endeavoured, without success, to reduce Baghdād; and about 1735 and again in 1743 his troops advanced against Basrah, but on both occasions they were repulsed or otherwise compelled to retire. A regular Factory of the British East Indian Company was first established at Basrah in or about 1723; and continuous relations, generally unsatisfactory, between the Company's servants and the local Turkish authorities had thus a beginning; but, during the period with which we are at present concerned, there were no transactions of political importance. The Dutch, who also had established a Factory at Basrah, were obliged to leave that place about 1752 in consequence of differences between their Resident and the Turkish Governor; nor did they again return to 'Irāq. A French Residency at Basrah, after being for some time in abeyance, was re-opened in 1755.

The general and internal history of Turkish 'Irāq is given in detail in the chapter devoted to that country.

Affairs of the Persian Coast 'Arabistān and Makrān, 1722-63.

Events on the Persian Coast, within the limits of the government of Fārs, have already been disposed of in the general sections above: it only remains to refer here to the more outlying provinces of 'Arabistān and Persian Makrān.

'Arabistān.

In 'Arabistān the period seems to have been devoid of important events; but one of the chiefs of that district came into temporary and unenviable prominence at the capture of Isfahān by the Afghāns in 1722.

Persian
Makrān.

In 1739 an incursion was made into Persian Makrān by Muhammad Taqī Khān, Nādir Shāh's governor of Fārs; but it had no permanent results; and at his withdrawal the country became again, as it had been before, independent in all but name of the authority of the Shāh.

For further details the reader is referred to the separate histories of 'Arabistān and Persian Makrān.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE TEMPORARY LOCATION OF THE BRITISH HEAD-QUARTERS AT BASRAH TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA, 1763-97.*

In dealing, from a British stand-point, with the period from 1763 to 1797 in the Persian Gulf, it is important not to lose sight of certain events which were taking place at the time at a distance from the Gulf itself, in India and even in Europe. These we shall notice in passing, wherever it may be necessary to do so, in order to explain British activity or inaction in the field with which we are particularly concerned.

General affairs and British interests before the Persian invasion of Turkish 'Irāq, 1763-75.

In the Persian Gulf, in 1763, the strongest administration was that of Karīm Khān, the Vakil of Persia, who was now firmly established at Shīrāz and had extended his authority over the whole country with the exception of a few outlying districts. Among the tracts not yet fully subjugated by him, however, were some of those adjoining the Gulf, such as 'Arabistān. Turkish 'Irāq, the second in size and importance of the governments in the Gulf, was held at this time by 'Ali Pāsha, whose position at home was too insecure to allow of his exerting influence abroad, and who was fully engaged, during his short tenure of power, in coping with local rebellions. Kuwait already existed, but its 'Atbi inhabitants were not prominent in Gulf affairs; Zubārah in Qatar did not come into being until 1766, and for some years after its foundation it was not a place of any account; and the Bahrain Islands were as yet

Relative positions of the native powers in Gulf, 1763-65.

* The authorities for this period are mentioned in foot notes in the chapters following, which contain separate histories of the different divisions of the Persian Gulf. The most important for the Gulf generally are the official *Précis of Information in regard to the First Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with Summary of Events, 1600-1800*, printed in 1905.

dependent on Persia through the Shaikh of Bahrain. The only considerable power in the Gulf besides Persia and Turkey was the Imamate of 'Omān, which, having shaken off the yoke of Persia only a few years previously, was still inspired with anti-Persian sentiments and a strong feeling of nationality. The naval resources of the Imām, however small the military forces of which he disposed on land, were probably not inferior to those of all the ports of Persia combined; but he was seriously incommoded, in operations abroad, by the necessity of defending his north-western frontier against the Qawāsīm, with whom he was almost always at war.

Position of
the British
in India
1763-75.

The British power in the Persian Gulf was as yet represented, almost exclusively, by the East India Company; and the Company were at this time fairly free from embarrassments in other quarters. In India the progress of the Marāthas had received a temporary check through their defeat by the Afghāns at Pānīpat in 1761. After the battle of Baxar in 1764 the dangers to be faced by the British in Bengal were no longer so great as they had been; and in 1765 the revenue administration of that province passed into their hands. The first Mysore war, however, ended unfavourably to the British in 1769; and even the expansion of their interests in India, under Clive and Warren Hastings, must have tended to withdraw the attention of the East India Company from affairs in Persia and Arabia.

Transference
of the Persian
Gulf Agency
from Bandar
'Abbās to
Basrah, 1763.

The Agency, or principal British establishment in the Gulf, was removed at the beginning of 1763 from Bandar 'Abbās, where it had ceased, from its isolated position and the constant prevalence of local disturbances, to possess a commercial or even a political value. It was located instead at Basrah in 'Turkish 'Irāq, absorbing a Residency, which had formerly been subordinate to it; and in 1764 it was expressly recognised by the Porte as a Consulate under the Capitulations. Mr. Price, the Agent specially deputed from India to inaugurate the new arrangements, was ordered to negotiate for a Residency at Būshehr also, and did so with success; but, in spite of the foot-hold thus retained in Persia, the policy of the Agency was dominated for some years from this date by sympathy with its new Turkish surroundings, and verged on hostility towards Persia. The transference of the British Agency from Persian to Turkish soil was thus an event of decided political significance.

Overtures by
Karīm Khān
to the British

Karīm Khān, on his part, was anxious enough to maintain friendly relations with the representatives of the East India Company, for he

saw clearly that without the aid of a naval power it would be difficult to bring the tribes of the Persian Coast into thorough subjection ; and he therefore granted them, almost with alacrity, various commercial privileges in Persia and permission to open a Factory at Būshehr, which they desired. He took advantage of the opportunity afforded by this grant in 1763 to intimate that he would be glad to pay for the services of British ships in helping him to reduce Mīr Mahanna of Rīg, a predatory chief on the coast to the north of Būshehr, who would not submit to his authority ; and in 1764 he made a distinct request for the co-operation of one or two British vessels against the same rebel, at the same time offering to subsidise one or two British cruisers for permanent police duty in the Gulf, and even volunteering to hand the town of Rīg over to the East India Company. The Government of Bombay do not seem to have regarded these proposals as in the least attractive ; but they authorised the occasional loan of the services of a British vessel to the Vakil, provided that it were so managed as to be advantageous to the Company and not to upset the general arrangements for trade.

for naval
assistance,
1763-64.

In 1765 Karīm Khān, who was still engaged in consolidating the Persian kingdom by incorporating its more loosely attached dependencies, marched in person against the Ka'ab tribe of 'Arabistān, in subduing whom the Turks had promised him their assistance ; and about the same time he asked that British ships might be sent to support, along with the Būshehr fleet, some operations that his general Amīr Kuhneh Khān was about to undertake against Mīr Mahanna by land. The Vakil's application was addressed to Mr. Jervis, the British Resident at Būshehr, by whom it was forwarded to Basrah with a suggestion that the "Tartar," then at Basrah, might be lent under the authority already granted by the Bombay Government. Mr. Wrench, the Agent at Basrah, and his Council complied with Mr. Jervis's request ; but, whether from jealousy of him or for other reasons, they did so most reluctantly ; and, in their unwillingness to act as required upon this occasion, there may perhaps be traced the first germs of a prejudice against Karīm Khān that afterwards caused much mischief. Various attacks upon the island of Khārgu, to which Mīr Mahanna retired directly that danger began to threaten him at Rīg, and upon his fleet, were made by the "Tartar" and the Būshehr vessels during the month of June 1765 ; but the crews of the Persian vessels showed extreme caution, or even cowardice. The "Tartar" alone was unable to carry the matter through, and in July the expedition against Mīr Mahanna was abandoned. Meanwhile Karīm Khān had destroyed

Unsuccessful
Anglo-
Persian attack
upon Mīr
Mahanna of
Rīg., 1765.

Dōraq, the capital of the Ka'ab country, as well as an important irrigation work belonging to the tribe; but the failure of the Turks to act in concert with him, as they had promised, enabled the rebels to escape further punishment at his hands by crossing to the western side of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Unsuccessful
Anglo-Turkish
war against
the Ka'ab,
1765-66.

In July 1765, only a few days after the Anglo-Persian attack upon Mir Mahanna had been discontinued, a new and sudden turn was given to political affairs in the Persian Gulf by the seizure in rapid succession, by Ka'ab tribesmen, of three British vessels in the Shatt-al-'Arab: these were the "Sally" of two masts, an unnamed yacht belonging to the Basrah Residency, and the "Fort William" of three masts. There is nothing to show whether the motives of the Ka'ab in this case were merely piratical, or whether the tribe had come, in consequence of the Khārgu operations, to regard the British as the allies of their oppressor Karīm Khān. The Agent and Council at Basrah, though aware that the Vakīl had lately claimed the Ka'ab as his subjects by overrunning their country, applied to the Turks for redress, so manifesting a distinctly anti-Persian bias; and it was immediately arranged at Basrah that joint operations against the Ka'ab should be undertaken by a Turkish army and a British fleet. The Government of Bombay, approving of the scheme, equipped the largest expedition that had sailed, at least for very many years, from India for the Persian Gulf; it comprised four vessels of European build and small detachments of European infantry and artillery. The Turks were not yet ready to move when this armament arrived at Basrah, and the British began operations on their own account from Khor Mūsa; but in May 1766, they experienced a sharp check, which seems to have wanted but little in order to become a serious reverse. At last, after considerable delay, and under an agreement to pay 1,000 Tūmāns a month for the assistance of the British fleet if continued beyond the end of June, the Turks took the field; and concerted action followed, by land and sea, during the months of July, August, and September. On one occasion an attempt was made to recapture the "Sally" and "Fort William" from the Ka'ab, but it ended in their destruction by fire at their moorings. At length, on the 23rd of September 1766, the British attempted to storm some Ka'ab redoubts without the help of the Turks, who now pretended to be waiting for the assistance from the Persian Government; but the result was a disastrous repulse in which Captain Brewer, the military officer commanding, was killed with a number of others, and some field-guns and chests of ammunition were lost.

At this unfortunate juncture Karīm Khān interposed, asserting the Ka'ab to be Persian subjects, and insisting that both the British and the Turks should retire from Persian territory; but he promised that they should be compensated for the losses inflicted on them by the Ka'ab. The Turks, it should be mentioned, had been much harassed by the Ka'ab in recent years and had already taken partial action against them, with British support, in 1761-62, 1763 and 1765. In October 1766, in consequence of the intervention of Karīm Khān, the Turks refused to carry on the war any longer and retired, notwithstanding the earnest and repeated protests of the British Agent and Council at Basrah, within their own borders; and the joint campaign against the Ka'ab came to an end. Reinforcements as strong as the original expedition were despatched from Bombay at the beginning of 1767; but before their arrival at Basrah the question had entered on a new phase, and active operations could not with propriety be resumed.

Intervention
of Karīm
Khān
between the
British and
the Turks on
the one side
and the
Ka'ab on the
other, 1766-

The change in the situation was due to the arrival of a Persian envoy at Basrah with proposals, on the part of Karīm Khān, for the British and the Turks. In consequence of the communication to the British, Mr. Skipp of the Basrah Factory proceeded to Shīrāz in April 1767 with perplexing, if not conflicting, instructions from the Government of Bombay and from his immediate superior, Mr. Moore, who had now taken the place of Mr. Wrench as Agent at Basrah. Mr. Skipp, though the visit of a European gentleman to Shīrāz had been invited by the Vakīl, was not at first well received; but in the end he was able to arrange, provisionally, a not unsatisfactory settlement. Mr. Moore, however, who had conceived a strong aversion both for Karīm Khān and for Mr. Skipp, referred the proposed settlement to Bombay instead of immediately ratifying it; and he even went so far as to suggest a military combination against Karīm Khān between the East India Company and Mīr Mahanna. The Bombay Government, on learning how matters stood, authorised a second journey by Mr. Skipp to Shīrāz for the purpose of accepting the offered settlement, or such terms as Karīm Khān might still be willing to grant; but, subject to a condition that no hostility should be shown to Karīm Khan, the Agent was invested with full discretion to make the best arrangements that he could. Finally, on the 14th of April 1768, Mr. Skipp obtained an agreement from the Vakīl, under which, in consideration of the British reducing or making a serious effort to reduce Mīr Mahanna, Karīm Khān was to obtain compensation for them on account of the outrages committed by the Ka'ab and to transfer to

Settlement
arranged
between the
British and
Karīm Khān
1767-68.

them the island of Khārag, if it were taken in the operations. Mīr Mahanna, it should be explained, had wrested Khārag from the Dutch at the beginning of 1766, and the island was now his place of residence instead of Rīg. The agreement with Karīm Khān contained other clauses advantageous to the British besides those specified; but it did not remove certain difficulties in regard to trade of which the Company's servants complained.

Unauthorised
British
expedition
against
Hormūz
and loss of
the "Defiance,"
1767.

While these matters were under discussion it occurred to the Agent and Council at Basrah that the services of the reinforced, but still idle, British armament in the Gulf might be turned to profitable account; and a part of it was accordingly sent against the Shaikh of Hormūz in connection with a piracy, accompanied by murder, which had been committed on the British ship "Islamabad" in 1765, and in the proceeds of which the Shaikh was said to have shared. This expedition, notwithstanding the pretext alleged for it, was little better than a filibustering raid; but it was stopped, before it reached its destination, by an accidental explosion on board the "Defiance," the principal vessel sent, by which she was destroyed and almost all her crew, including about 170 Europeans, were lost. The Agent and Council professed to have acted in this case in accordance with the wishes of Karīm Khān, but Mr. Skipp denied that these had ever been ascertained; and the Vakīl, when the circumstances came to his knowledge, expressed his displeasure at the attempted interference of the British with a Persian vassal.

Ineffectual
British
attack on
Khārag,
1768.

This contretemps did not prevent the British from making an attack, under their agreement with Karīm Khān, upon the island of Khārag; but the operations, which lasted from the 20th to the 29th of May 1768, were indifferently conducted; and, after a serious accident to a watering party, they were ignominiously abandoned. In August following, Karīm Khān was prepared to make an effort in conjunction with the British against Mīr Mahanna; but the Agent and Council at Basrah at this point, summarily broke off negotiations with him, and recalled Mr Skipp from Shīrāz. Meanwhile Mīr Mahanna, who—though a noted pirate—had hitherto respected British vessels, withdrew the exception that he had been accustomed to make in their favour, and the "Speedwell," a trading vessel, was captured by some of his subjects.

Withdrawal
of the
British
Residency

At the beginning of 1769 a revolution took place on Khārag, by which Mīr Mahanna was deprived of his chiefship and driven into exile; and the Agent and Council at Basrah, who were anxious to prevent the

island from falling into the hands of Karīm Khān, made a half-hearted attempt to dictate to the new Mīr, and even authorised the commander of the Company's squadron to destroy his vessels, or those of the Ka'abs if a favourable opportunity should occur. Mr Morley, the Resident at Būshehr, foreseeing trouble with the Persian Government in consequence of these and other similar proceedings, then retired from Persia along with his whole establishment ; and direct friendly intercourse between the British and the Vakīl was at an end. The withdrawal from Būshehr happened to be consonant with the views of the Court of Directors in London, who had allowed themselves to be influenced to a great extent by the opinions of Mr. Moore, and who consequently regarded Karīm Khān as altogether untrustworthy ; but it was strongly disapproved by the Government of Bombay, and they ordered the Agent to commence negotiations for the re-establishment of the Būshehr Residency. Mr. Moore, however, found means to postpone compliance with their instructions until 1770, when a return to Būshehr was positively prohibited by the Court. The Directors were at this time indignant on account of certain restrictions which the Vakīl, in the supposed interests of Persia, had imposed on British trade in the country ; and they accepted the opinion of Mr. Moore, which was contrary to that of the Government of Bombay, that the Company's trade in the Gulf could be most conveniently and most profitably carried on from one settlement at Basrah.

In the summer of 1770 some boats from Khārag captured the "Britannia" and another vessel under British colours and carried them to Rīg, where they were detained. The Agent and Council at Basrah, having failed to obtain immediate satisfaction, reported that they believed the seizures to have been ordered by Karīm Khān and suggested, by way of remedy, that a large expedition should be sent to the Gulf, carrying 500 European soldiers and 1,500 sepoys at least, to punish the Vakīl and extirpate piracy, root and branch. But the Court of Directors, however unwilling they might be to seek a reconciliation with Karīm Khān, were still more averse to war with him ; and they therefore forbade hostile measures and suggested recourse to the protection of the Royal Navy and to a system of convoys in the Gulf. The authority of the Vakīl was now better established upon the Persian littoral than in the beginning ; Tangistān and Dashti had been visited by his troops in 1765, Lār and with it Bandar 'Abbās had been reduced in 1766, and symptoms of disregard for his authority at Būshehr and

from
Būshehr,
1769.

Piracy by
Khārag boats
on British
vessels, and
suggested
expedition
against
Persia, 1770.

Kangūn had been repressed in 1767 ; but the Ka'ab were still practically independent.

Capture of the "Tyger" by Rīg vessels and detention of Messrs. Beaumont and Green in Persia, 1773.

In April 1773, on account of an epidemic of plague which had broken out at Basrah, Mr. Moore and his staff left that place for Bombay ; but on the way down the Shatt-al-'Arab the "Tyger", one of their vessels, was boarded and captured by Rīg pirates, and Messrs. Beaumont and Green of the Basrah Factory, who were on board of her, were taken prisoners. This outrage cannot, from the accidental nature of the circumstances, have been designed by Karīm Khān ; but he allowed himself to profit by it to the extent of incorporating the "Tyger" with one of the Persian fleets in the Gulf, and of detaining Messrs. Beaumont and Green at Shīrāz as hostages for the behaviour of the British, or to compel the East India Company to come to an understanding with him. Eventually in the spring of 1774, some time after the Agent had returned from Bombay to Basrah, the two English gentlemen were allowed to leave Shīrāz for Būshehr in charge of the Shaikh of the latter place ; but there they remained until the September following, when Mr. Beaumont was allowed to visit Basrah as bearer of a proposal that, in return for his own and his companion's liberation and the restoration of the "Tyger", the East India Company should re-establish their settlement at Būshehr.

Agent and Council however, under instructions which they had received from Bombay not to treat with the Vakīl at all until both Messrs. Beaumont and Green should have been released, declined to entertain the suggestion ; and Mr. Beaumont remained a prisoner.

Difficulties between the Persian Vakīl and the Imām of 'Omān, 1769-74.

While the relations of Karīm Khān with the British followed the course above described, difficulties of an acute kind had occurred between him and the Imām of 'Omān, the chief cause being a demand by Karīm Khān in 1769 for the renewal of the tribute which had been paid by 'Omān to Persia in the time of Nādir Shāh. To this demand the Imām Ahmad, himself the deliverer of 'Omān from Persian rule, would by no means accede ; and the result was chronic hostility at sea between the two powers, from which the British, though their own relations with Karīm Khān were unfriendly, held strictly aloof. In 1770 the Imām threatened Būshehr with a fleet ; and in 1773, helped by his usual enemies the Qāsīmī Shaikh and the Shaikh of Hormūz, he did some damage upon the Persian coast. At the end of 1773 a Persian fleet, including the captured British vessel "Tyger," were got together at Kangūn for service against the Imām ; but the Ka'ab, who had been summoned, neglected to appear, and other tribal contingents which had

joined refused to put to sea. The Shaikh of Būshehr, whom Karīm Khān early in 1774 had placed in charge of the negotiations on his part, consequently found himself unable to effect any settlement. Shortly before this, overtures for naval co-operation had been made on behalf of Karīm Khān both to the British and to the Turks; but the British had refused to entertain them, and the Turks, though they made fair promises, were careful to do nothing.

General affairs and British interests during the siege and occupation of Basrah by the Persians, 1775-1779.

At more than one time since the end of 1773 a war between Persia and Turkey had been considered imminent; and in March 1775 hostilities were begun by Karīm Khān, who sent his brother Sādiq Khān in command of a large force against Basrah. The motives of the Vakil in declaring war cannot be stated with certainty. The reason which he himself alleged was the ill-treatment by the Turkish Government of Persian pilgrims to the Shī'ah shrines in 'Irāq; but he had also recent defeats by the Turks in Kurdīstān to avenge, and he may have been influenced besides by a not unnatural desire to extend the frontiers of Persia. There are also indications of a belief on his part that possession of Basrah would enable him to reduce 'Omān, of which the trade was largely with that port, to submission, and to defeat a policy which the British Agent and Council at Basrah had lately adopted of boycotting the Persian Ports and endeavouring to attract all trade to Basrah.

Cause of war between Persia and Turkey.

Basrah was invested by the Persians on the 7th of April 1775 and held out gallantly under Sulaimān Āgha, the Turkish Mutasallim, until the 16th of April 1776, when it surrendered. The conduct of Mr. Moore and his associates in connection with the siege, for which event public opinion at Basrah seemed to hold them responsible, was as ill-considered and erratic as might have been expected from their former treatment of Karīm Khān. They at first gave out that their attitude would be strictly neutral, and this would no doubt have been a proper line of policy to follow; but no sooner did a Ka'ab fleet appear in the river to assist the Persian army than they sent cruisers to attack them; and for a few days they supported the defence so energetically that the Mutasallim was encouraged to defy the Persians with what afterwards appeared to have been unnecessary vehemence. On the approach of the

Conduct of the East India Company's representatives and of the Imām of 'Omān with reference to the war between the Persians and the Turks.

Būshehr fleet from below Basrah to join that of the Ka'ab, which had already gone above the town, the Agent and Council became alarmed; and on the 11th of April 1775 they quitted Basrah for Būshehr, leaving the Company's Factory and the goods in it unprotected. On their way to the Gulf they engaged the Būshehr fleet, which was on its way up the river, and drove them into the mouth of the Kārūn.

More useful assistance was received by the Turks from the Imām of 'Omān, whose strong fleet in August 1775 defeated a part of the Persian navy, opened the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and enabled the defenders of Basrah to reprovision the town.

Re-institution
of friendly
relations
between the
British and
Karīm Khān,
1775.

Meanwhile, on the very day that the siege of Basrah began, Mr. Garden arrived at Būshehr on a mission from the Government of Bombay to Karīm Khān. For the sake of restoring good relations, if this could not be done in any other way, he was authorised to re-establish a British Factory at Būshehr, though this was contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors; and by an intelligent use of his powers he succeeded, not only in procuring the release of Mr. Beaumont and the return of the "Tyger," but also in arranging for the security of the Company's property at Basrah in case the town should be taken by the Persians. But he did not so much as refer to the still outstanding claim for damages on account of the Ka'ab piracies of 1765, perhaps from a consciousness that it was now too old to be revived with decency or any chance of success.

Position of
the British at
Basrah and
Būshehr
during the
Persian occu-
pation of
Basrah,
1775-79.

On the capitulation of Basrah the representatives of the East India Company were at once replaced in possession of the Factory, which was found undamaged; but the form of government established by the Persians,—a purely military occupation in face of hostile surroundings,—was unfavourable to trade, and the violence of the Persian Governor under Sādiq Khān gave frequent cause for complaint. Karīm Khān, it is true, was always ready to correct abuses when brought to his notice; but the outlook at Basrah was so disheartening that the Court of Directors of the East India Company at one time contemplated an entire withdrawal from the place, and the Agency there was actually reduced to the status of a Residency.

At Būshehr, where the local administration was as favourably disposed as the Vakīl himself, everything proceeded smoothly until the end of Karīm Khān's reign.

Effects of the
Persian occu-
pation of
Basrah in

A noteworthy consequence of the Persian occupation of Basrah was the migration of a number of merchants to Kuwait and the removal of others, who did not feel themselves secure even there, from Kuwait to

Zubārah in Qatar. The trade and general growth of both Arab seaports were strongly stimulated by these events; and the effect upon Zubārah, in particular, was so marked that the attention of the Persians was attracted to it; and in 1777 and the following years they tried, but without success, to obtain possession of the place.

other parts of the Gulf, and various matters, 1776-79.

At the end of the period, in 1778-80, the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah had already begun to indulge in those indiscriminate piracies by which, a few years later, they were to acquire great notoriety; but it does not appear what relation, if any, their lawlessness bore to the general political situation in the Gulf. Trouble between the Ka'ab and the subjects of the Shaikh of Būshehr in 1777-78, and hostilities at various times from 1775 to 1779 between the Imām of 'Omān and the Shaikh of the Qawāsim and the Shaikh of Hormūz, also figure as detached incidents.

General affairs and British interests after the retirement of the Persians from Basrah, 1779-97.

With the death of Karīm Khān in 1779 Persia at once ceased to be the predominant state of the Persian Gulf; and before long it had become one of the feeblest and most disorganised. The heirs of Karīm Khān fought among themselves for the succession to the throne, and no less than seven rulers of his family followed one another in eighteen years. They had no influence abroad; and even the provinces and districts of Persia itself passed steadily out of their control, to be recombined under the first monarch of the Qajār dynasty, by whom they were succeeded in 1797.

Decline of Persia after the death of Karīm Khān.

Basrah was evacuated by Sādiq Khān immediately that he received news of his brother's death; for he wished to assert his claims to the throne in person, and the troops forming the Basrah garrison were required by him for the purpose. The place thereupon reverted peacefully, as Sādiq Khān seems to have intended that it should, to Turkish jurisdiction. An important duty was performed by the British Residency, between the departure of the Persians and the return of the Turks, in supporting an Arab administration which undertook temporarily the management and protection of the town.

Loss by Persia of Basrah in 1779, of Bahrain in 1783, and (virtually) of Bandar 'Abbās and dependencies in 1794.

The next dependency lost to Persia was Bahrain, which was first attacked by Arabs from the mainland in 1782. Reprisals on the adjacent Arab settlement of Zubārah were then attempted by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who was governor under Persia of Bahrain; but they failed; and the victorious 'Utūb at once crossed over into Bahrain, followed by a horde of other Arabs, obliged the Shaikh's garrison to surrender, and took possession themselves.

The lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies was transferred in 1794 from a Persian vassal to the Sultanate of 'Omān; and the districts and islands which it comprised thus came, for practical purposes, under the jurisdiction of a foreign power.

Internal state
of Persia,
Turkish 'Irāq
and 'Omān.

In Persia disorders and civil war broke out on the death of the Vakil and were as rife in the Gulf districts as in other parts of the country. Būshehr was seized and partially plundered in 1779 by the Khān of Tangistān, who was quickly destroyed in his turn by a combination of the maritime chiefs between Rīg and 'Asalu. In 1780 there was fighting between the chiefs of Hormūz and Chārak, and also between those of 'Asalu and Tāhiri. In 1791-92 the Mīr of Rīg and the Khān of Khisht espoused the cause of Lutf 'Ali Khān, the rightful ruler of Shīrāz, and the Shaikh of Būshehr that of his enemies, with the result that the districts between them became a scene of raids and counter-raids.

In Turkish 'Irāq there were one or two rebellions against the Pāsha of Baghdād, and in 1787 the town of Basrah was for some months usurped and governed by the Shaikh of the Muntafik; but the power of Sulaimān Pāsha, the governor, gradually became consolidated; and political conditions were on the whole more stable than in Persia. Some annoyance was caused by the Ka'ab, from the direction of Persia, in 1784 and 1791; but a more disquieting feature was the aggressiveness of the Wahhābis upon the western frontier. In 1784, after about a generation of growth and expansion in Najd, these fanatics first began to make themselves felt upon the borders of the Baghdād Pāshaliq; and between 1793 and 1795 their raids against Kuwait caused some alarm. By 1795 they had conquered a part of Hasa from its Bani Khālid rulers.

The Imamate of 'Omān was broken up in 1793 into three separate principalities; but the chief of these, becoming a Sultanate with its capital at Masqat, carried on the naval traditions of the Imamate with undiminished prestige. The ruler, Saiyid Sultān, was even able to add the Makrān ports of Gwādar and Chahbār to his dominions proper, and

to extort from Persia a lease of Bandar 'Abbās, Mināb, and the adjacent islands.

During this period a series of inconclusive wars in India threw a heavy and almost continuous strain upon the resources of the East India Company, thus hampering their action in the Persian Gulf. Among these contests were the first and second Marātha wars, from 1775 to 1782, by which the British gained little advantage; the second Mysore war, from 1780 to 1784, which resulted in a mutual restitution of conquests; and the third Mysore war, from 1790 to 1792, after which Tipu Sultān was stripped of half his dominions, yet remained a dangerous enemy.

At home also the East India Company had to contend with various adverse occurrences, such as the movement which produced Fox's India Bill of 1783, and the trial of Warren Hastings on an impeachment by Fox, Burke and Sheridan, which opened in 1788 not to close before 1795.

From 1778 to 1783, in consequence of the French having taken the side of the British North American colonies, then in revolt against the mother country, there was war between Britain and France in the East. Pondichéry, restored to France by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 on condition of remaining unfortified, was again captured by the British in 1778 and retained until 1783; and in 1781, during the progress of the second Mysore war, there was severe fighting with the French under Suffren in Indian waters.

In 1793, the French Revolution having taken place in the meanwhile, war was declared by Britain against France in Europe; and hostilities in India followed. Before the end of the year Pondichéry once more succumbed to a British force, and the other French settlements of Chandarnagar, Kārikāl and Mahé surrendered; but meanwhile French war-vessels and French privateers from the Mauritius had begun to ravage British commerce in the eastern seas; and in the winter of 1793-94 a British naval squadron was sent to deal with them in Javan waters. In 1795 Holland became a party to the war on the side of France, with the result that in 1795-96 a British expedition wrested Ceylon from the Dutch. In 1796-97 French agents made their appearance in Persia and the Persian Gulf; and in 1797 the British still continued to operate against the possessions of the Dutch in the East Indies.

These difficulties in India with various native powers and with the French afford, together with the instability of the Persian Government, a sufficient explanation of the British policy in the Persian Gulf at the time, which was wanting in strength and decision. The British relations with

Difficulties of the East India Company in the East and at home, 1779-97.

Hostilities between the British and the French in the East, 1778-83 1793-97.

British policy and relations with the Persian Gulf, 1779-97.

the states in the Gulf were on the whole not unsatisfactory, but the unfavourable circumstances of the time made it impossible that they should be close or continuous. Ja'far Khān, who ruled at Shīrāz from 1785 to 1789, was well disposed to the East India Company and in one year granted two Farmāns for the protection of British trade in Persia; and his son, Lutf 'Ali Khān, followed in his footsteps. From 1791 to 1793 there was tension between the British Resident at Basrah and the Pāsha of Baghdad, and in 1793 the Residency was removed to Kuwait, where it remained until 1795; but the difference was somewhat of the nature of a private quarrel, and after its settlement friendship was renewed and maintained. A serious symptom for the future was the commission of two daring crimes at sea by the Qāsīmī tribe, who in 1797 captured the British vessel "Bassein" and attacked the British cruiser "Viper;" but the significance of these events, which were the precursors of a reign of terror soon afterwards established by the Qāwasim, was not appreciated at the time.

Dutch interests and proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1763-66.

Khārag, the only Dutch settlement, 1763.

The time had now arrived for Dutch influence and trade to disappear, like those of the Portuguese at an earlier date, from the waters and coasts of the Persian Gulf. After the withdrawal of the Dutch from Basrah about 1752, from Būshehr in 1753 or 1754, and from Bandar 'Abbās in 1758-59, their only remaining station in the Gulf had been the fortified settlement which they established on Khārag in 1753; and this Factory, though it was maintained on a liberal and even extravagant scale, especially in the matter of naval and military defences, does not seem to have been commercially of much advantage to the Dutch East India Company.

Loss of Khārag by the Dutch, 1766.

In 1765 the Dutch on Khārag became involved in hostilities with Mir Mahanna of Rīg, which they had hitherto carefully avoided; and at the beginning of the following year their fort was captured, and they themselves expelled from the island, by that desperate character. Probably in view of the unprofitableness of the Khārag settlement, as well as of the dangers to which it was exposed, no attempt to re-establish it was made by the Government of the Dutch East Indies.

French interests and proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1763-1797.

During the period that elapsed between the end of the Seven Years' War and the French Revolution, France appears to have been, as before, without any official representative in Persia. At Basrah she had in 1765 a Resident or Consul who did not trade, whose salary was irregularly paid, and whom the Mutasallim in 1765 decided to treat on ceremonial occasions as inferior in rank to the British Resident. The Latin Bishop of Baghdād was generally a Frenchman; and before the French Revolution he ordinarily discharged, in addition to his episcopal duties, those of French Consul at the headquarters of the Pāsha's Government. After the Revolution, at least in 1796-97, the French representative at Baghdād was a layman, who was described as "le commissaire des relations commerciales", but whose position probably did not differ in any essential point from that of an ordinary Consul.

French political establishments, 1763-97.

Through their Consul at Baghdād, and through agents in Mauritius, the French Government at this time generally maintained a friendly intercourse with the ruler of 'Omān; but mutual amenities were in abeyance from 1781 to 1790 in consequence of the unauthorised seizure by a French privateer of a war-vessel belonging to the Imām. In 1785 a French mission from Mauritius sought permission to establish a French Factory at Masqat, but their efforts met with no better success than the similar endeavours of the British about the same time.

Dealings of the French with the 'Omān Sultanate, 1763-92.

After the declaration of war by Britain against France in 1793 and the union of Holland with France in 1795, a period of unrest and intrigue in the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf began; but up to 1797 there was no decided action in this region by the British, who had enough to occupy them in India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies.

French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1763-92.

The most important political mission sent to the Middle East by France at this time was one which consisted of Citizens Bruguière and Olivier, two eminent naturalists. It remained five years, from 1793 to 1798, in Turkey, Egypt and Persia; and its proceedings are fully related by M. Olivier in his book * of travels.

Mission of MM. Bruguière and Olivier to Turkey and Persia, 1793-98.

The delegates, who, except during their short visit to Persia, seem to have been engaged rather in the study of politics, trade, and natural

* Dr. G. A. Olivier's *Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse*, Paris, 1801-1807.

history than in practical negotiations, arrived at Constantinople in May 1793 and remained there until the following November. A French Envoy-Extraordinary, in the person of Citizen Descorches, was then present in the Turkish capital; but, as a nominee of the revolutionaries, he was not recognised by the Porte; and the French community at Constantinople were much divided among themselves by political questions. The greater part of 1794 was spent by MM. Bruguière and Olivier on the Turkish islands of the Levant; and from December 1794 till May 1795 they were in Egypt. At the end of August 1795 they left Constantinople, to which they had returned, for Persia; they were supplied by Citizen Verninac, the successor of M. Descorches, with the necessary funds and with letters for the Pāsha of Baghdād and the Prime Minister of Persia; and they were the bearers of a verbal communication from the Porte to the Government of Persia. The travellers remained at Aleppo from the middle of November 1795 to the end of February 1796, the delay being partly due to warnings which they received from their friends that, if they attempted to continue their journey otherwise than in company with a regular caravan, they might be destroyed by Bedouin hirelings of the British Consul at Aleppo; and the case of * M. Borel du Bourg seems to have been cited to them as an instance in point. MM. Bruguière and Olivier reached Baghdād at the beginning of April 1796, stayed there for about six weeks, and were brought into contact during their visit with Sulaimān Pāsha, whom they were fortunate enough to cure of an alarming complaint. At Baghdād they had opportunities of conferring with their fellow-countrymen Citizens Rousseau and Outrey, of whom the former was French "Commissioner for Commercial Relations" at Baghdād, while the latter was at once a merchant and court physician to the Pāsha; and here too they provided themselves with an interpreter in the shape of a young French clerk, named Caraman. They left Baghdād again on the 18th of May 1796 and reached Tehrān on the 2nd of July; but Āgha Muhammad Khān, the ruler of Persia, had gone to Khurāsān, and they decided to await his return in one of the villages near the capital, prosecuting in the meanwhile their botanical and zoological researches. Āgha Muhammad Khān arrived at Tehrān on the 20th of September, and two days later the French delegates had the first of a series of interviews with Hājī Ibrāhīm, his Prime Minister, to whom they presented their letter of introduction

* For the case of M. Borel du Bourg, see the chapter on the history of Kuwait.

from M. Verninac and one from the Pāsha of Baghdād. On the 14th of October, having transacted their business with the minister and collected a quantity of valuable materials relating to the recent history of Persia, they set out on their homeward journey; from the middle of December 1796 to the beginning of May 1797 they halted at Baghdād, waiting for the formation of a caravan; and in October 1797, after a tour to Cyprus and through part of Asia Minor, they regained Constantinople. Here they were detained for some time by the necessity of collecting their valuable specimens, which had been left in deposit at various places; and the death of the French Ambassador, M. Aubert du Bayet, placed a difficulty in the way of their obtaining a secure means of transport by sea to France, which Mr. Smith, in charge of the British Embassy, declined to remove by furnishing them with special safe-conducts. They did not sail from Constantinople until the 30th of May 1798, and, still loitering by the way, they only reached Ancona on the 19th of September. On the 3rd of October M. Bruguière died of fever at Ancona, and M. Olivier returned to France alone.

It is obvious from the leisurely way in which this mission proceeded, and from the large amount of attention which it devoted to matters only indirectly, or not at all, connected with politics, that it cannot have had any immediate or definite task to perform. Its object at first, in so far as that object was political, seems to have been to discover in the Ottoman Empire some field in which the activities of the French nation might be deployed with advantage; and, in this connection, the * occupation of Egypt by the French was strongly recommended by the members of the mission. The journey to Tehrān in 1796 was no part of the original scheme, and it was probably made under specific instructions, which, from various remarks by M. Olivier in his *Voyage*, we may conjecture to have been: first, to arrange an alliance between Persia and Turkey against Russia, and, second to revive French influence in Persia. As the French delegates obtained a promise that a Persian Ambassador should be sent to Constantinople, they may be considered to have partially attained the former of these objects; but in regard to the other, if it were what we assume it to have been, they were not so fortunate. At the time of their visit to Tehrān two treaties between France and Persia already existed, of which the later had been signed at Paris by a Persian

* In one passage in his *Voyage* (II, 133) M. Olivier seems to claim for the reports of his colleague and himself the credit of having brought about the subsequent expedition to Egypt under Bonaparte.

Ambassador, but no steps were taken to have these treaties renewed; nor was anything done towards establishing or re-establishing French settlements at Isfahān, at Shīrāz, and in the Persian Gulf, or toward acquiring the island of Khārag for France,—measures which it seems clear that M. Olivier had at least revolved in his mind. M. Olivier* explains that his colleague and he deliberately abstained from raising these questions on account of the unfavourable impression that they had formed of Persia as a state; but the fact that the † presents for the Persian Court had not arrived when they were needed, and the further fact that MM. Bruguière and Olivier had not apparently any audience of Āgha Muhammad Khān himself, suggest that there may have been other reasons ‡ also for the negotiations ending where they did.

Precautions
taken by
the British
against
French de-
signs,
1796.

The British Resident at Basrah had early information, probably from the British Consul at Aleppo, of the presence of MM. Bruguière and Olivier at the latter place in the beginning of 1796, and he reported to the Government of Bombay that the intention of these gentlemen appeared to be “to penetrate in the assumed character of naturalists and botanists by the way of Baghdad through Persia into India.” Accordingly on the 1st of July 1796 Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, wrote to Mr. Hankey Smith, the British Resident at Būshehr, ordering him to co-operate with the Company’s representatives at Basrah in tracing the movements of MM. Bruguière and Olivier and, if possible, in arresting them and forwarding them to Bombay along with their papers. That

* See his *Voyage*, Vol. III, pages 88—89.

† The presents consisted of jewels, which should have followed the mission from Constantinople, being sent as far as Baghdād in the charge of an Indian nobleman, and beyond it under arrangements to be made by the French Commissioner for Commercial relations there.

‡ See also a footnote in Kaye’s *History of the War in Afghanistan* (II. 44—45), which presumably refers to the mission of MM. Bruguière and Olivier. The author states, apparently on the authority of Sir J. Malcolm, that the objects of the mission were (1) to induce Āgha Muhammad Khan to seize Baghdād and Basrah, (2) to persuade him to help Tipu Sultān against the British, and (3) to obtain his consent to the re-settlement of the French at Bandar Abbas; and he attributes its failure chiefly to the non-diplomatic character of the agents to whom it was entrusted. M. Olivier was a very intelligent man and a deserving public servant, but it must be admitted that his arrival at Tehrān without suitable and sufficient presents betrayed the political novice.

other French agents were moving about in the Middle East at this time is shown by the instructions given to Lieutenant Skinner, in whose vessel the orders for Mr. Hankey Smith were sent; for he was directed to make close enquiry regarding the presence at Masqat of persons of French nationality or in the French service, and, if any such were found, he was to try to get them handed over to him by the local authority. The three individuals whose arrest was chiefly desired were M. Descorches, perhaps the former Envoy-Extraordinary of France at the Porte; Mr. Humphries, an English renegade, who was his fellow-traveller; and the Abbé de Beauchamp, probably a priest of that name who had lately been the representative of France at Baghdād. All of these were supposed to be on their way to Mauritius, where the Abbé had been designated for an official appointment; and Lieutenant Skinner was authorised to offer the Governor of Masqat a sum not exceeding Rs. 8,000 for the surrender of each of them, as well as Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000 a head for the surrender of any other Frenchmen who might be there. Nothing seems to have resulted from Lieutenant Skinner's cruise, unless that in January 1797 Saiyid Sultān wrote to Bombay that a report which had reached the Governor of the Presidency, that three Frenchmen were living in 'Omān territory and supplying their Government with information prejudicial to the East India Company, was without foundation. In 1797 there were rumours of French and Dutch vessels being allowed by Saiyid Sultān to frequent Masqat under Arab colours, and the Governor of Bombay seems to have reprimanded the native agent of the East India Company there for negligence in reporting the fact, and also to have expostulated with the Saiyid himself on the subject. In what manner the Saiyid could be supposed to prevent Europeans from abusing his flag upon the high seas, which was the real cause of inconvenience to the British, is not clear. An American, Captain Crouch, whose ship the "Latchmi" made a voyage from Batavia to Masqat, and thence to Mauritius, seems to have come under suspicion of helping the French. In 1798, through two sons of Mr. Hankey Smith, the British Resident at Būshehr, who were captured by the French in the * "Lanal" and carried to Mauritius, the existence of French arrangements for obtaining information by means of Arab visitors to Masqat was brought to light. The movement of British vessels between India and the Persian Gulf was naturally one of the principal subjects of study of the French spies.

* *Sic*: perhaps the "Latrel."

Activity of native Indian powers in the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

Haidar 'Ali
and Tipu
Sultān of
Mysore.

The rulers of the state of Mysore in India, namely Haidar 'Ali until 1782 and his son Tipu Sultān from that year onwards, did not neglect the field afforded by the Persian Gulf for the extension of their political influence; and that influence, in view of the fact that they were three times at war with Britain during the period, and that on the last of these occasions Tipu Sultan was shorn of half his dominions and had to pay an indemnity of £3,000,000 besides, cannot but have been hostile to British interests. At the beginning of 1774 an ambassador from Haidar 'Ali visited the court of Karīm Khān at Shirāz with presents, and tried to obtain for his master, in consideration of naval aid to be afforded to Persia, a matrimonial alliance with the family of the Wakil and a trading settlement in the Gulf. It was stated that Karīm Khān in his answer, while he rejected the proposed intermarriage, offered Bandar 'Abbās to the Mysore ruler; but the proceedings had no visible outcome; and it was thought that, had it been otherwise, the Mysoreans would have found the Shaikh of Hormūz a troublesome neighbour to their new station. In May 1776 the same or another ambassador from Haidar 'Ali was known to be present at Masqat. About the same * time, a person described as a "Mughal Envoy" was sent to Masqat by Tipu Sāhib, then Governor of Mangalore, and was well received by the Imām, who granted him a site for a house. This mission to Masqat was evidently intended to be permanent, and it was not withdrawn during the period with which we are now concerned; but by 1797 the Envoy had come to be spoken of as "Tipu Sultān's Wakīl," which was no doubt a more correct description of him. There was evidently some trade between the Mysore territories and Masqat, for five or six vessels under Mysore colours used, about 1797, to visit the 'Omāni capital every year.

The Mughal
Emperor.

In this connection we may also notice a visit which was paid to the court of Ja'far Khān, the ruler of Southern Persia, about the end of 1786, by two Englishmen, Major John Morrison and Captain George Biggs. The Major was an elderly man, formerly on the East India Company's

* The date is uncertain, and the "Mughal Envoy" who thus settled at Masqat may have been identical with either (or even both) of the Mysorean ambassadors to Persia.

Bengal establishment, who represented himself as being in the service of the Mughal Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam, and as having come on his behalf to arrange a treaty of commerce with Persia, assisted by one Ghafūr Baig, whose arrival from Delhi he professed to be expecting. The younger officer seemed to be merely the travelling companion of the elder. These two gentlemen had left England in August 1785 and had journeyed by Constantinople, Baghdād and Isfahān to Shīrāz. There was evidently something suspicious about their conduct, and they were very closely watched by the British Resident at Būshehr, who ascertained that Major Morrison had made proposals of some kind to Ja'far Khān and had supplied him with a list of officers' names; but the Resident also learned that the Khān, whatever Major Morrison's scheme, "had made reflections on it by no means advantageous to the understanding of that gentleman, and had not returned any answer to it." Towards the end of January 1787, Major Morrison, who had at first talked of continuing his journey to Delhi by way of Sind or Gujarāt, left Būshehr for Basrah with Captain Biggs, evidently with the intention of returning to England.

British administrative and official arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

After the reduction of Basrah from an Agency to a Residency in 1778, as already described, the establishments of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf consisted of two Residencies, administratively independent of one another, at Basrah and Būshehr, and of a Native Agency at Masqat, where the institution of a Residency was desired by the British authorities but was not permitted by the Masqat Government. In 1783 a Native Agency at Baghdād was added.

Establishments of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

Goods imported by British merchants into Turkish 'Irāq or Persia paid duties to the East India Company, by whose local representatives they were collected, exclusive of those taken by the Government of the country. In Turkey the right of collecting such duties by way of "consulage" was conceded by the capitulations, and recognition of the Company's Agent at Basrah as a Consul was regularly obtained so early as 1764. In Persia the right was admitted in practice, or at least not contested, by the native authorities. In the Company's accounts the

Customs and consular of the East India Company, 1763-7.

receipts from duties were divided into "customs" and "consulage," of which the former ordinarily amounted to 3 per cent. *ad valorem* and went into the public treasury, while the latter was at the rate of 2 per cent. and was equally divided between the Governor of Bombay and the * Agent or Resident at the port of collection. About 1773-75, however, the total of the duties taken by the Company at Basrah seems to have been 6 and not 5 per cent.; and from 1784 onwards half of the consulage seems to have been carried to the credit of the Company themselves, instead of to that of their officers.

Formation of the Secret and Political Department of the Bombay Government, 1785.

On the 11th of January 1785 the Government of Bombay resolved to separate the secret and political part of their work from the rest; and a Secret and Political Department, distinct from the Public Department, was on that day established, with Mr. James Beck as its first Secretary. Of the signatures appended to the resolution constituting it, one was that of the Hon'ble Mr. R. H. Boddam, Resident and Governor, probably the same who† visited Masqat in 1769, and another that of Brigadier-General Nilson, doubtless the officer who commanded the land troops in the British attack on Khārag in 1768. All subordinates, including those in the Persian Gulf, were immediately informed of the new arrangement.

Services rendered by the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf.

The occasional employment of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf, in support of the East India Company's marine, seems to have begun during this period. The action of the Shaikh of Būshehr in 1770, when he invited the Company to re-establish the Residency withdrawn from his port in the previous year, was attributed by the Agent and Council at Basrah to "his apprehensions on hearing of the arrival of one of His Majesty's ships in the Gulph"; and in 1771, on the Agent and Council clamouring for a strong expedition to be sent to the Gulf to chastise Karīm Khān and suppress piracy, the Court of Directors in London passed the following remarkable, because novel, order: "If all efforts to put an end to the piratical views of the Persians and other powers in the Gulph, and to procure reparation of injuries, without having recourse to arms, shall prove ineffectual, you are to represent the same to the Presidency, that they may lay it before the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Ships in the East Indies and endeavour to obtain such protection and assistance in the circumstances as the case shall require".

* During the time that Būshehr was a Residency under the Basrah Agency, however, half of the local share went to the Resident at Būshehr and half to the Agent at Basrah.

† See chapter on the history of the 'Omān Sultanate.

In April 1773, a few days before the first temporary withdrawal of the Company's Factory from Basrah, that port was visited by the "Swallow", sloop-of-war, which, though she brought some bales of piece-goods on freight from Sūrat, would appear from the name of the Commander (Sir John Clerke) to have been a Royal Navy vessel. But the only King's ship of whose visit to the Gulf at this time full* details have been preserved was the "Seahorse", Captain George Farmer, which arrived at Būshehr from Bombay and Masqat on the 12th of May 1775, after the commencement of the siege of Basrah by the Persians and the second temporary withdrawal of the British Factory from that place. Captain Farmer had received orders from his Commodore, Sir Edward Hughes, "to assist the East India Company in any place where he "should happen to be, where the Company had any settlement or factory "if it was requested by the Company's servants;" and, in consequence of these instructions he offered his services for convoying British vessels to Basrah and protecting them there, notwithstanding the siege; but the offer was declined by the British Agent, who had arrived at Būshehr. That there was feeling on the subject of co-operation between the officers of the Royal Navy and the Company's representatives seems to be indicated by Captain Farmer's precaution in taking the traveller, Mr. Parsons with him to Mr. Moore, as "an attesting witness" of his having obeyed his orders. On the 15th of July the "Seahorse" left Būshehr with several vessels which Captain Farmer had undertaken to protect against the Marāthas on the voyage to India; and on the 31st she arrived at Masqat, her crew of about 170 men having suffered severely on the way down the Gulf from bad water shipped at Būshehr and from extreme heat. The men frequently fell down on deck from sheer weakness, and the number on the sick list at one time rose to over 50. None died, however; and, some days after leaving Masqat, Mr. Parsons, who was a passenger on the "Seahorse", was able to remark: "It is a great pleasure to see with what alacrity our seamen "go aloft. and perform their duty, as well as to observe the change of "their complexion, which, from being pale and languid, is become fresh "and lively: they are so much recovered in strength, as to be able to do "twice the duty required of them, whereas before we quitted Muscat, "we could scarcely find men sufficient to do the ordinary duty on board

* But a most important detail escaped the knowledge or notice of contemporaries. Horatio Nelson belonged to the "Seahorse" at this time and probably took part in this cruise. See foot note, page 1260, *post*.

"the ship, from the excessive heat; now every man on board can very well bear, and indeed does wear a cloth coat or waistcoat."

The "Desert Mail."

From the time of the Seven Years' War with France the route between India and Europe by way of Basrah and Aleppo had been highly prized and much used by the East India Company, and even by the British Government, as a safe and speedy line of communication. This overland post, or "Desert Mail" as it was called, seems to have been managed by the Company's representative at Basrah and the British Consul at Aleppo jointly; and, in the troubled close of the eighteenth century, its efficient maintenance was regarded as one of the most important duties of the former of those officers. During the Persian occupation of Basrah in 1776-79, and again during the sojourn of the Basrah Residency at Kuwait from 1793 to 1795, the eastern terminus of the line was located at Kuwait instead of Basrah; and the working, for various reasons, was not so satisfactory as under the ordinary conditions. The friendly relations which were generally maintained by the British Agent at Basrah with the chiefs of Arab tribes, such as the Muntafik, and even with the Wahhābis of Central Arabia, whose rise had already begun to have a politically disturbing effect, sufficed as a rule to ensure the safety of the British despatches.

Marine passes and convoys, 1767-71.

The alarming prevalence of piracy in the Gulf in the years that followed Mīr Mahanna's successful defiance of the British and the Persians in 1765 and the unfortunate expedition by the British and the Turks against the marauding Ka'ab tribe in 1766, stimulated after 1769 by the war between Karīm Khān and the Imām of 'Omān, obliged the representatives of the East India Company to consider various expedients for the protection of sea-borne traffic in general.

In 1767 the Agent and Council at Basrah, whose heads had been turned by the location of a strong squadron in the Gulf under their orders, actually introduced, without reference to superior authority, a system of granting British colours and passes to all owners of native vessels who applied for them and agreed to pay Rs. 100 a year per vessel; it was evidently anticipated by the local officers that these passes would, without occasioning serious inconvenience to the Company, give sufficient protection against the depredations of the subjects of petty maritime chiefs and bring in a considerable revenue. The Resident at Būshehr, on being ordered to do his part in establishing this system, went further and proposed that the duties payable to the Company by British merchants should be realised also from such native

merchants as took British passes; but his suggestion was negatived by the Agent in Council, who considered that the native traders, as they already paid 8 or 9 per cent. on the value of their goods in customs to the Persian administration, could not reasonably be expected to pay anything more. The whole plan of the Agency, however, as soon as it came to the knowledge of the Court of Directors, was condemned by them in the following terms :—

In your letter under date of the 15th November you mention a resolution you have taken, and put into execution, of giving passes under the Company's seal to the vessels and boats trading in the Gulph, for which they pay one hundred rupees yearly, in order to protect them from being plundered by the several Arab Shaiks. This may be very well for them, but with respect to your employers it appears to be a destructive and unwarrantable measure; for, though Meer Mahana now says he shall have regard to the passes, you may judge he will not long remain in that disposition, as the consequence would be fatal to him, his principal dependence being the plunder he is to get from those very people whom you wish to protect; besides he is only one of many others (*sic*) lower in the Gulph who follow the same trade, and will now be more induced to do it than ever, seeing the bad success we have had with our forces at Bussorah, which is the first time they have known such an instance. You must expect constant complaints that no regard has been paid to the passes, which you have no power to redress, unless the fleet was kept whole year(s) in the Gulf; besides this we must be in a general state of war with all Arabs, and, if no notice is taken of the insult, our credit is lost. Upon the whole it appears the most extraordinary transaction that could have occurred to you and (been) executed without any orders from your superiors.

It can hardly be doubted that in consequence of these strictures, passed on the 2nd of March 1768, the Agency scheme of granting colours and passes must have been withdrawn from operation; but there may have been some delay in communicating the orders of the Court, for in September 1769 the Agent and Council at Basrah themselves enquired of the Bombay Government "Whether our cruisers were to give "convoy and protection to the ships and vessels of any power whatever, "if at variance with the* Caun, unless such ships and vessels were furnished with English passes and colours; and how far the furnishing "such ships and vessels with such passes was compatible with the "interests of the India Company?"

Protection of trade generally, in so far as it was undertaken by the Company at this time, at length came to depend on a system of convoys.

* Karīm Khān, Vakil of Persia.

which was maintained for two or three years while the state of the Gulf was at its worst, about 1769-71, and of which the mercantile public were allowed to avail themselves. Already in the spring of 1769 the East India Company's local squadron was divided into two parts, of which one was wholly employed on convoy duty in the waters of the Gulf; and later the Government of Bombay issued instructions that the "Drake" should be specially stationed at Masqat in the months of April and December to protect Indian vessels from that port all the way to Basrah. In the autumn of 1769 the Agent and Council at Basrah decided not to make special arrangements for convoying the annual coffee fleet, then at Masqat, from that place to Basrah, lest offence should be given thereby to Karim Khān, who was at war with the Imām; they thought that the Imām himself was in a position to provide proper protection, and that, if this were not the case, the fleet might at least wait until the next visit of the "Drake" to Masqat in the ordinary course. In the summer of 1771, after the piracy committed on the "Britannia," a large number of vessels were employed on convoy duty in the Gulf, including the "Resolution", "Expedition", "Bombay", "Dolphin" and "Fox"; and the "Expedition" and "Fox" were once specially sent to Masqat to fetch some upward-bound vessels thence.

Conduct of
the East
India Com-
pany's ser-
vants, and
conditions of
service.

It was during the second Governorship of Clive in Bengal, from 1765 to 1767, that private trade and the acceptance of presents by the East India Company's servants in India were first prohibited, and that a large addition was made to their pay out of the proceeds of the salt monopoly. These reforms were not immediately extended to the Company's establishments in the Persian Gulf, doubtless because the employés in that region had no executive or administrative duties to perform, and there was not therefore the same necessity for a change; and private trade continued to be carried on openly by the servants of the Company for a number of years after the close of the period. Serious allegations of corrupt dealing which had been made against Messrs. Shaw and Garden and Mr. Skipp of the Basrah Agency were investigated in 1761-68 and 1768-69; but in both cases it was found that no dishonest act had been committed, and that the charges were due to private malice. In 1767 the following curious order, originating evidently from past abuses, was issued by the Governor and Council at Bombay to the Agent and Council at Basrah:—

Great irregularities having been found to arise from the Commanders of the vessels in Persia being allowed to keep a table at the Honourable Company's expense without

any limitation, we have determined that they shall be allowed to charge at the rate of two rupees per day for every person, whether Europeans, Turks or Persians, they may be under the necessity of entertaining at their tables, which you are to make good to them accordingly, and finally adjust all accounts relative to their vessels before their return to India.

Foreign trade of the Persian Gulf, 1763-97.

The period now under consideration was distinguished, on the whole, by an absence of commercial prosperity in the Persian Gulf; but this was due largely to political and other causes of a non-permanent character. The rise of piracy, in which the Ka'ab, the followers of Mir Mahanna and other petty chiefs of the Persian Coast, and the Qawāsīm now indulged; the extinction of the Dutch trading settlement on Khārag; a great dearth of specie both in Persia and in Turkish 'Irāq; the ravages of plague in Turkish 'Irāq, in 1773; the siege and capture of Basrah by the Perisians and their manner of governing the town from 1776 to 1779; last but not least the almost continuous civil wars which raged in Persia after the death of Karīm Khān in 1779: these were all factors of importance in restricting commercial enterprise and intercourse. The growth of piracy had the effect, it is true, of increasing the freights obtained by ship-owners, but at the same time it tended to prevent the navigation of the Gulf by unarmed or weak vessels. The scarcity of specie was a more natural phenomenon, but not perhaps less detrimental to trade, than piracy; it was due in part to economic causes, such as the non-production locally of exportable goods sufficient to balance imported goods, and in part doubtless to hoarding, the ordinary result of political insecurity. Even in the time of Karīm Khān the deficiency of money in Persia was so serious that he prohibited its exportation; and the results of his policy, shown in a balance of trade temporarily less unfavourable to Persia, were considered by some to have justified its adoption. At a later date, about 1790, it was reported that* nine-tenths of the merchandise imported into Persia from India were paid for in specie; and it was estimated that, through the enormous

Unfavourable
character of
the period in
regard to
foreign trade.

* But Captain J. Malcolm in 1800 estimated the portion paid for by Persia in specie or bullion at only eight lakhs of rupees, or four-tenths of the whole. He placed the annual export of specie and bullion from Basrah at ten lakhs of rupees out of total exports worth 30 lakhs,

drain on the monetary resources of Persia which this represented, the depredations of Nādir Shāh in India had been nearly redressed. Turkish gold was hardly obtainable; the exchange was unfavourable to Turkey; and remittances to foreign creditors were made by Turkish and Arabian merchants, to a great extent, in gold of Venetian, Dutch and even Hungarian mintage. The misfortunes which affected Basrah from 1773 to 1779 diminished its trade, and partially altered its commercial character, by keeping away those up-country merchants who had been accustomed to resort to it as a purchasing market and to bring cash with them from other parts of the Turkish Empire. Still more impoverishing, in their effect upon the Gulf region as a whole, were the wars which for many years discouraged industry and interrupted communications in Persia. The Shi'ah pilgrimages to Najaf and Karbala were generally regarded as tending to deplete Persia of wealth without bringing in any return; but it is obvious that, in this case, what was lost to Persia was merely transferred to Turkish 'Irāq and not withdrawn from the general trade of the Gulf.

Articles of
export from
the Persian
Gulf.

The most precious export of the Persian Gulf consisted at this time, as it does still at the present day, in pearls; but the annual value of the proceeds of the fishery, which as yet was almost entirely concentrated in the Bahrain Islands, was estimated in 1790 at only * half a million of Bombay rupees. In regard to this branch of trade it was remarked: "The principal part of the † pearl is conveyed from Bahreen direct to Sūrat, and from Bahreen to Mocha (*viâ* Muscat), Bushire, Scindy, Surat and Calcutta, from which four last mentioned places it is circulated through Candahar, Multan, India, Tartary and China. "The remainder supplies the markets in the Persian Gulf, and in "part finds its way, through the channels of the Levant, to those of "Europe."

The true exports of Persia were old copper, drugs, rosewater, dried fruits, raw silk, raw cotton, sulphur, and rock-salt. Those of Turkish 'Irāq were dates to the value of more than half a million of Bombay rupees a year, old and new copper, gall-nuts, tobacco, opium, gum, catgut and pen-reeds, besides many horses to Sūrat and Gujarāt in India. There was besides a large transit trade through Basrah, in

* Captain J. Malcolm, however, writing only ten years later, estimated the annual export of pearls at one million rupees.

† In old commercial phraseology, by what seems to us a curious affectation, the word "pearl" is generally treated as a collective singular.

numerous manufactured and other articles, from Europe and the Turkish provinces beyond Baghdād to the countries of the Gulf and to India.

The leading articles imported by way of the Gulf into both Persia and Turkish 'Irāq were Bengal piece-goods, Coromandel chintzes, Madras long-cloth, cotton yarn, and various cotton manufactures of Malabar, Broach, Cambay, Sūrat and Gujarāt; English woollen goods; silks; Arabian coffee; sugar and sugar candy; spices, condiments and perfumes; indigo; drugs; chinaware; and metals. Of the Indian goods, muslins and fine cotton cloths were from Bengal and Madras, and coarser cloth for the use of Arabs was from Sūrat. The sale of English woollen goods at Basrah had declined by 1789 to about one-fourth of what it had been twenty years earlier, and by 1796 it had almost entirely ceased, the principal * reasons for this being apparently its expensiveness and the rivalry of cheaper and equally good French stuffs. The silks of Bengal were preferred in Turkish 'Irāq to those of China, and even to those of Gilān. The trade in coffee was one of great volume and importance; half the produce of Yaman, it was estimated, found its way to the Gulf; and from the Gulf not only the whole of the surrounding countries, but even parts of Europe, were supplied with the berry. American sugar, when its price was not too high, was preferred to East Indian; but Batavian and Bengal sugars also commanded a certain sale. Indian indigo was at this time expelling the American article from the Persian Gulf market, and local production of the dye had began at Shūshtar in 'Arabistān.

Articles of
import into
the Persian
Gulf.

Light is thrown on the distribution of the foreign trade about this time by a report from the pen of Captain J. Malcolm, written in 1800, not long after the close of the period and before any marked change in the situation had taken place. The total trade of the Gulf, export and import, was placed by this authority at 160 lakhs of rupees a year, mostly with India. The annual imports from India into Persia were

Distribution
and organi-
sation of
foreign trade
in the Gulf.

* These are the reasons adduced by the French traveller, M. Olivier. He adds that the former sale of English woollens was only due to the British East India Company being under an obligation to the British Government to dispose of a fixed quantity of British manufactures (See page 51 *ante*), and that to satisfy this obligation they took and sold so much woollen cloth at a loss every year. When these woollens ceased, in consequence of altered arrangements, to be sold at a loss, they also ceased, according to this authority, to be saleable at all in opposition to French woollens. In regard to this explanation the present writer can only say that he has met with nothing to corroborate it in British official or unofficial sources of information. According to M. Olivier French woollens, satins, velvets, gold and silver cloth and Lyons lace had a good sale in the Gulf region, and most of them went as far as Qandahār.

estimated at 20 lakhs of rupees, with return exports of 12 lakhs in goods and 8 lakhs in specie and bullion. The Indian imports into Turkish 'Irāq amounted to 30 lakhs annually, paid for by merchandise to the value of 20 lakhs and by specie and bullion to the value of 10 lakhs. Bahrain and the rest of the Arabian coast of the Gulf took 10 lakhs' worth a year of Indian goods, and exported pearls to an equal extent. The value of the Arabian coffee brought to the Gulf every year was estimated at 20 lakhs of rupees.

The two principal ports of foreign trade were Masqat and Basrah, through one or other of which passed the great bulk of the goods that either entered or left the Gulf. It was calculated that more than half of the Indian imports at Būshehr and Basrah and the bulk of those into Bahrain were received through Masqat; and, similarly, the goods arriving by land from Europe, Asia Minor, etc., were distributed from Basrah as a centre. Būshehr was now practically the only port of Persia, as Basrah was of Turkish 'Irāq; Bahrain served Hasa and Central Arabia through Zubārah and Qatif; and Masqat was almost exclusively a port of transit. Būshehr and Kuwait were sometimes used as bases from which to smuggle goods into Turkish 'Irāq and even across Turkish 'Irāq to Europe.

The transport of goods between India and the Gulf was carried on partly by vessels which were the property of European merchants in the East, partly by vessels owned by Muhammadan merchants of Sūrat, and partly by vessels belonging to Arab merchants of Masqat. The distribution of goods from Masqat was at first conducted by means of Masqat shipping; but, after the Arab occupation of Bahrain in 1783, the 'Utūb threw themselves successfully into the carrying trade, securing a large proportion of that between Masqat and Basrah, and even began to make voyages on their own account to and from India. The 'Utūb also made themselves respected at sea by repelling some piratical attacks of the Ka'ab upon their vessels. The mercantile marine of Masqat continued as yet, however, to be the most important belonging to any state in the Gulf; it consisted of "dows, dingies and square-rigged vessels, belonging to Arabs"; and the people of Masqat were reckoned "active and enterprising, though not very skillful seamen."

Commercial
communications.

It was considered, even in these days of sailing ships, that the passage from India to Basrah, or *vice versa*, was one that might be safely attempted at any season of the year; but from June to September, on account of the prevalence of the south-west monsoon, a direct passage

could not be made from India to Masqat, and the voyage required perseverance, skill, and a well-found ship; and during June and July, owing to the persistence of northerly winds, the passage up the Gulf from Masqat was likely to be "boisterous and tedious".

In 1790 there was a practically fixed tariff for the carriage of goods by river boat in Turkish 'Irāq and 'Arabistān, the unit of calculation being a bale of 300 to 400 pounds' weight English. The rates per bale from Basrah were 12 Bombay rupees to Baghdād by the Tigris, 15 Bombay rupees to Hillah by the Euphrates, and 4 Bombay rupees to Shūshtar by the Kārūn, and they included the customs payable to local authorities by the way as well as freight proper. The cost of sending goods from Hillah to Baghdād by land, on mules or camels, was 4 Bombay rupees per bale.

Merchandise could at this time be conveniently forwarded from Kuwait or Basrah to Aleppo by caravan; and the charge per camel load of 700 English pounds, covering presents to Shaikhs by the way, was 130 Bombay rupees for piece-goods and 90 Bombay rupees for "gruff" or heavy merchandise. The rates for carriage to Baghdād were half those to Aleppo. The journey from Kuwait to Baghdād by caravan occupied about 30, and that from Kuwait to Aleppo about 80 days.

Our knowledge of the circumstances of Persian Gulf trade at this time is derived largely from a report on trade furnished by Messrs. Manesty and Jones of the Basrah Residency in 1790, and a summary of their recommendations for increasing British trade may be interesting to the reader.

Recommendations for promoting British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1790.

Some of these referred to specific articles of import and export. The compilers of the report did not apparently despair of the future of the British woollen trade, but they emphasized the necessity for comparative cheapness, for absolute suitability of colour, and for the receipt of the year's consignments on the spot by October at latest. They believed that hardware and glass might be imported at a profit, and that a market might be found for English carpets of moderate price. Among valuable exports they mentioned the drugs of Persia, which they thought had not received sufficient attention; but they did not consider that Kirmān wool, on account of its increased use for shawl-making and prohibitions against its export by Ja'far Khān, could now be obtained in a quantity greater than 3,000 Tabriz Mans per annum. They mentioned the production of wine as an industry capable of great development; and they suggested an inquiry into the dyes employed by Persian carpet-makers, which were more durable than those then known to the manufacturers of Wilton and Axminster.

In regard to methods of trade, they proposed that in future the absolute rule against allowing credit to native customers, as also that against bartering goods for goods, should be relaxed, and that the Company's servants in the Gulf should instead be invested with a certain discretion in regard to both matters. By this means it would be possible to secure orders from reliable merchants, who could not afford to pay immediately in cash in the great scarcity of specie that prevailed. With respect to the consulage of 2 per cent. collected at Būshehr and Basrah, which was formerly divided between the local Resident and the Governor of Bombay, but of which half had since 1784 been credited to the Company's own receipts, they suggested an important modification. Consulage had hitherto been levied only on the goods of British merchants trading to the Gulf, and since 1780 the number of these had become greatly reduced, with the result that the consulage revenue had suffered diminution; and Messrs. Manesty and Jones advised that the Armenian and Muhammadan merchants residing in the Company's settlements in India, by whom the greater part of the trade under the British flag was carried on in vessels commanded and officered by Englishmen, should be made liable to consulage. They pointed out that the imports at Basrah and Būshehr from ships under British colours had been worth nearly 20 lakhs of rupees in 1787, and that therefore, especially if peace were to revive trade, the Company might derive substantial advantage from the extended consulage.

Recommendations as regards establishments.

The report of 1790 also suggested several changes in the Company's official establishments. The Resident at Būshehr, it was recommended, should in future be "Resident in Persia" with liberty to establish himself either at Būshehr or at Shīrāz, the capital of the country; a Writer should be given him to carry on routine duties at Būshehr; and a surgeon skilled in drugs should be posted to the Residency as an adviser in the drug trade. A British Factory should be established at Masqat, if possible, as it was a trade centre of the highest importance and an excellent place at which to study the commerce of the whole Persian Gulf. A formerly existing Factory in Sind should be reinstituted, and a travelling servant should be attached to it, whose duty it would be to visit Multān and, if necessary, Qandahār: this recommendation had reference to a trade from Masqat to Afghānistān by way of the Indus valley which had recently been opened up with some success by Būshehr merchants, and the articles proposed for experiment were woollens and metals. A civil servant from Bombay, it was also advised, should be sent to Persia to study at first hand the exportable products and the requirements in imported goods of all the provinces of the country, and to report fully thereon.

It does not appear to what extent, if at all, the recommendations of Messrs. Manesty and Jones were accepted by the East India Company. Among the concluding remarks of the authors stood the following sentence :—

The framers of the present report beg leave, previous to its conclusion, to give it as their decided opinion that the success of the British general commercial intercourse with Arabia and Persia, and of the particular plans for its increase which they have pointed out, must ever principally depend on the propriety of the conduct of the gentlemen under whose management they may be prosecuted ; and to express a hope that, as the duties of their stations must necessarily often place them in situations replete with delicacy and difficulty, their Hon'ble Employers will fix their intentions, not their success, as the criterion by which to judge of their merits.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF DURING THE NAPOLEONIC ERA IN THE EAST, 1798-1810.

The Napoleonic era in the East, if we may so term the period at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries during which the policy of Britain in Asia was regulated chiefly with reference to France, was of shorter duration than the corresponding period in Europe : it lasted only from Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798 to the expulsion of the French from Mauritius at the end of 1810. During its continuance the Government of India, as well as His Majesty's Government, had to cope with very grave difficulties in the form of systematic depredations by French war vessels and privateers upon British sea-borne commerce, and with still greater anxieties arising from the supposed designs of the French and from their actual proceedings, especially in Persia. They had also to deal with a serious state of local affairs in the Gulf, due to the appearance and rapid growth of piracy by sea-faring Arab tribes, for which the arrival of the rapacious and fanatical Wahhābis of Najd upon the coast-line of the Gulf may have been in part responsible.

Depredations of the French upon British sea-borne commerce in the East, and British defensive arrangements, 1798-1810.

The Persian Gulf was only a small part of the field over which the Anglo-French struggle in Eastern waters was fought out, the base used by the French in their operations being the island of Mauritius, from which various important routes of communication by sea were easily assailable. One of the earliest seizures made by the French in the Persian Gulf was that of the "Pearl" in 1799, which is mentioned in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate; it was attended by an encounter between a British and a French war vessel in which both were destroyed by fire and the explosion of their magazines; but the French succeeded in carrying their prize to Masqat. In 1803 the East India Company's small cruiser "Fly" was captured off the island of Qais and brought to Būshehr by the French privateer "La Fortune," Captain Surcouff, of much greater strength, as described in the history of the Persian Coast; and the "Fly" was not the only vessel taken by this Frenchman in the course of his raid in the Gulf.

There was no want of vigilance on the part of the British Government or of the East India Company; but their efforts, so long as the French retained Mauritius, were by no means completely successful. In 1798 a squadron of the Royal Navy watched the straits of Bāb-al-Mandab, while another was stationed on the Malabar coast. In 1799 a British naval force was sent to cruise in the Red Sea, and the island of Perim was occupied from 3rd May to 1st September by troops from Bombay, which were afterwards transferred to Aden and remained there until March 1800. Later in 1800, however, two armed French vessels began to stop and examine native shipping in the neighbourhood of Aden, and fears were entertained of their visiting the Persian Gulf, for which they were said to be bound, but they did not make their appearance in that quarter. The removal of the French army from Egypt in 1801 made little difference in the situation in Indian waters; and in 1807 alone the damage caused by the French to Calcutta shipping was computed at £300,000. At last, with the surrender of Mauritius on the 3rd December 1810 by General de Caen to a naval and military force despatched from India under General Abercromby, the vexatious activity of the French in the Eastern Seas came to an end.

Supposed designs and actual proceedings of the French in the East, and counteractive measures taken by the British and Indian Governments, 1798-1810.

More disturbing, however, than the real injuries suffered by British commerce at sea were the apprehensions aroused by Bonaparte's insatiable ambition, especially after his invasion of Egypt in 1798, when the opinion that he meditated* Asiatic conquests first began to gain ground. There were solid indications, in the shape of French political missions and other circumstances, which showed that the countries of the Middle East were included in his designs; and the audacity and phenomenal success of his career in Europe made caution necessary in assigning limits to what he might achieve, or at least attempt, in Asia.

In India, where Tipu Sultān of Mysore was still a dangerous enemy to the British Government and other native princes were disaffected, circumstances were at the beginning of the period propitious to anti-British intrigue. The disquiet in India was intensified by annual threats of invasion on the part of Zamān Shāh, the ruler of Afghānistān, whose incapacity to carry them out and the precariousness of whose own position at home were not as yet realised by the British authorities; and it was feared that, should he enter the country, he might be welcomed by some of the Muhammadan powers as a deliverer from the British and from the Marāthas. A letter from Bonaparte to the Sultān of 'Omān, written at Cairo in January 1799, was intercepted by the British at sea; it contained an enclosure for Tipu Sultān in which hopes of French assistance against the British were held out to him. Tipu Sultān on his part was active in seeking aid against the British wherever he thought that it might be found; and, shortly before his death, he despatched embassies to the courts of Kābul, Tehrān and Constantinople, which all arrived together at Masqat, then the seat of a political representative of the Mysore Government, in April 1799. The Kābul mission proceeded from Masqat to Sonmiani, and we have no information

Circumstances
of the time in
India and
Afghānistān,
1798-1799.

* On the 27th September 1800 Captain Malcolm wrote from Isfahān: "Those rascals the French will persuade the Turks that they are their best friends before they have done; and if they succeed in establishing themselves in Egypt on any terms, we must look to every quarter, and to none with more care than the Persian Gulf."

as to its further movements. Those destined for Tehrān and Constantinople were carried in a vessel owned by the Sultān of 'Omān to Būshehr and Basrah, respectively, where they disembarked; but the envoys to the Porte were persuaded by the British Resident at Basrah to return to India on account of the death of their master, which had meanwhile occurred at the fall of Seringapatam in May 1799; and those accredited to the Persian monarch, though apparently received by him as a matter of form, were unable for the same reason to enter upon the business for which they had been sent.

Establishment
of a British
Residency at
Baghdād,
1798.

In the summer of 1798, before any overt step had been taken by the French in the Middle East, a British Residency was established at Baghdād under Mr. (afterwards Sir) Harford Jones of the Bombay civil establishment. The object of this measure was, by acquiring an ascendancy over the Pāsha of Baghdād, to check the extension of Bonaparte's influence eastwards. The British and Turkish Governments were now informally united against the French, and in 1799 a regular defensive alliance was concluded between them, having as an immediate object the expulsion of the French from Egypt. Meanwhile, under orders from the Porte, the French Consul and the subjects of the French Government at Basrah were arrested and sent as prisoners to Constantinople; but there is nothing to show that the British were in any way responsible for this unusual and unjustifiable proceeding on the part of their Turkish allies.

Mission of
Mehdi 'Ali
Khān to the
Persian Gulf
and Persia,
1798-1799.

Soon after the creation of the British Residency at Baghdād, a further step for the protection of British interests in the Middle East was taken in the deputation from India to the Persian Gulf of Mehdi 'Ali Khān, a Persian protégé of the Governor of Bombay. This Envoy, besides promoting British trade in the Gulf, was to arrange for the prevention, if possible, by means of a Persian military movement upon Herāt, of any attempt at an invasion of India by the ruler of Afghānistān, and for the exclusion of French influence from 'Omān and Persia. In so far as they related to encouraging hostilities by Persia against Afghānistān, the instructions given to Mehdi 'Ali Khān were superfluous, both on account of the enmity already existing between the two rulers and of the real powerlessness of Zamān Shāh; but they were productive of useful results in 'Omān, where an agreement was obtained from the Sultān on the 12th October 1798 binding him to the British side in the Anglo-French contest, excluding the French from his territories during its continuance, and granting the British a right to settle at Bandar 'Abbās, which he held on lease from Persia. The Shāh of Persia, also

was induced to issue an edict for the arrest of any Frenchmen who might be found in his dominions.

The mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khān was immediately followed by another under Captain J. Malcolm of the Indian political service, of which the scope and objects were almost precisely similar : its despatch was due to the initiative of Lord Mornington, Governor-General of India. On the 17th January 1800, Captain Malcolm obtained a renewal of the agreement given by the Sultān of 'Omān in 1798, as also a further concession for the establishment of a political agency in charge of a European officer at Masqat, to which Dr. Bogle was immediately appointed ; and, very shortly after, the political representative of the late Mysore Government disappeared from Masqat. In January 1801 Captain Malcolm concluded a political treaty with Persia of which the effect, so far as the French were concerned, was to deny them a footing in the country and to provide for joint operations against them by the British and the Persians in case they should succeed in establishing themselves there by force or fraud. A commercial treaty arranged by Captain Malcolm at the same time contained no articles of note ; and, though he returned to the Persian Gulf by way of Turkish 'Irāq, his dealings with the Pāsha of Baghdād did not go beyond an exchange of formal courtesies.

In 1802 a Persian merchant named Hājī Khalīl Khān proceeded to India on the part of the Shāh of Persia to obtain the ratification by the Governor-General, which was still required, of the treaties made with Captain Malcolm in the previous year. This Persian Envoy was accidentally and most unfortunately killed at Bombay in a brawl between his own servants and a native guard of honour supplied by the Bombay Government ; and the negotiations, though the Envoy's death was very calmly received by the Persian Government, were interrupted.

In 1805, another Persian merchant, Muhammad Nabī Khān, was sent to India as the successor of his relative the deceased Envoy ; but the Government of India, of which the head had changed, were no longer possessed by the sentiments which had inspired the mission of Captain Malcolm ; and in 1807, His Majesty's Government to whom the matter had been referred having shown themselves equally apathetic, the second Persian Envoy returned home leaving the treaties still unratified.

Meanwhile a correspondence, which ended in the establishment of regular diplomatic intercourse, had been opened between France and Persia. The first overtures, which proceeded from the French Government, seem to have been made through agents of doubtful respectability and to have been regarded in consequence with some degree of suspicion

First mission of (Captain) Malcolm to the Persian Gulf and Persia, and location of a British Political Agency at Masqat, 1799-1801.

Missions of Hājī Khalīl Khān and Muhammad Nabī Khān to India, 1802 and 1805-1807.

Intrigues of the French in Persia ; Missions of Colonel Romieu, M. Jaubert,

and Mirza
Muhammad
Riza ; Treaty
of Finkin-
stein ; and
British
rupture with
the Porte,
1801-1807.

by the Persians. In 1804 a proposal by France for joint action by herself and Persia against Russia, with whom Persia was now at war, was still rejected by the Shāh, although properly authenticated. The reason for its rejection may have been a lingering hope of British assistance, which he would have preferred, on the part of the Shāh. In 1805 Colonel Romieu visited Tehrān on a regular mission from Napoleon ; and he was followed in the next year by M. Jaubert, who induced the Persian monarch to send a high official, named Mirza Muhammad Riza, to Europe to treat with Napoleon. The result of Mirza Muhammad Riza's mission was the treaty of Finkinstein, whereby, in May 1807, France and Persia became allies on equal terms against their common enemy Russia ; but in 1807-1808, the Persian Government twice took measures to persuade the British Resident at Būshehr that their close relations with France did not imply any unfriendliness towards Britain.

Early in 1807 a rupture occurred between Britain and the Porte in consequence of an intimacy which had sprung up between the Turkish and the French Governments, and in Europe Britain and Turkey were nominally at war until the beginning of 1809 ; but the Pāsha of Baghdād, partly perhaps on account of the despatch of a strong British naval squadron to the Persian Gulf in 1807, decided to ignore the quarrel between his master and the British power, and in Turkish 'Irāq matters remained on a perfectly amicable footing.

Relations of
France with
the 'Omān
Sultanate,
1803-1808.

In 'Omān also the French entertained political views, which were no doubt connected with their larger schemes in Persia ; but their policy here was at first frustrated by the steady adherence of Saiyid Sultān to his Agreements of 1798 and 1800 with Britain. In 1803 M. de Cavaignac was specially deputed to Masqat by General de Caen, the French Governor of Mauritius, to establish a French Consulate and Political Agency ; but Saiyid Sultān declined even to discuss the matter, and the French emissary returned disappointed to his head-quarters. In 1807-1808, however, Saiyid Sultān's son and successor Saiyid Sa'id entered into treaty relations with France, and a French Consular Agency was instituted at Masqat under M. Dallons.

Second
mission of
(General)

The success of the French with the Shāh placed His Majesty's Government and the Government of India both on the alert, and the *

* Here we are concerned only with the Persian Gulf field ; but it may be mentioned that in 1808 the Government of India sent missions also to the rulers of Lahore, Kābul and Sind. All of these had reference, at first, to the supposed French danger ; and the treaties concluded by the two last contained anti-French articles. The mission to Sind was begun by Captain Seton, Resident at Masqat, who mismanaged it, and was carried through by Mr. N. H. Smith, Resident at Būshehr. The Lahore and Kābul missions were headed by Messrs. Metcalfe and Elphinstone respectively.

consequence was the simultaneous organisation of two separate British missions to the Persian Gulf and Persia, which came into virtual competition with one another. The preparations for the mission despatched from England under Sir H. Jones were the earlier begun ; but the Indian mission under General Malcolm, starting from a point nearer to the scene of action, was the first in the field. General Malcolm, after touching at Masqat, reached Būshehr in May 1808 ; but he had not the patience to overcome gradually the adverse influence that a new French mission under General Gardanne had by this time established at Tehrān ; and, being required to open his negotiations with the Prince-Governor of Shirāz, he refused to do so and left again for India in July. The instructions given to General Malcolm by Lord Minto seem to have been of a somewhat indefinite character, but it was intended that he should study the political situation in Persia, arrange for the expulsion of the French from the country, should that be possible, and devise military measures for frustrating any attempt that might be made by them to form a settlement in the Persian Gulf. He was invested, for the period of his employment in the Gulf, with full control over all the office* and establishments of the Government of India in that region ; and he was also accredited to the Pāsha of Baghdād.

Malcolm to the Persian Gulf, 1808 ; proposed British occupation of Khārag ; and mission of Sir H. Jones to Persia, 1808-1809.

When the news of General Malcolm's failure reached India, Sir H. Jones, who had been waiting at Bombay, was authorised by the Governor-General to leave for Persia, which he did without delay. New orders to remain at Bombay, which were sent him instantly on General Malcolm's arrival at Calcutta, did not reach Bombay until after he had sailed. The Government of India then turned their attention to a scheme, which had already been considered, for the acquisition of an island in the Persian Gulf ; but, whereas it had formerly been discussed with a view to commercial advantage and to an agreement with the Persian Government on the subject, it was now treated rather as a military question and dispositions were made for carrying it out with a high hand. Already in 1799 the Government of Bombay had suggested the establishment of a British station on Khārag or Hormūz, and in 1800-1801 Captain Malcolm had endeavoured, in adjusting the Commercial Treaty with Persia, to obtain a cession of the islands of Qishm, Hanjām and Khārag ; but he had been defeated by the obstinacy of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who regarded the proposal with intense suspicion. It was

* The egregious Mr. Manesty, British Resident at Basrah, protested against his subjection to General Malcolm in inflated terms.

now resolved that Khārag should be occupied by a force under General Malcolm without the consent of Persia, partly as a precaution against a forward movement by France or Russia, between whom since the pacification of Tilsit in July 1807 instead of war a close political understanding had existed, and partly as a guarantee for observance by the Persian Government of a more respectful attitude towards Britain than that displayed in their recent treatment of General Malcolm. In the spring of 1809 Captain Grant, an officer on General Malcolm's staff who was sent in advance of the intended Khārag expedition, explored Persian Makrān and travelled thence by land to Bandar 'Abbās; the object of his mission was to report on the military aspects of the country traversed with reference to the possibility of a European attack on India.

Meanwhile Sir H. Jones had arrived in Persia, where a change of circumstances very favourable to British interests had taken place, for it had become evident to the Shāh that no decided step would be taken by France to restrain her Russian ally—the power which he chiefly dreaded and with which he was now at war—from aggression on Persia. The influence of General Gardanne at Tehrān was rapidly on the wane, and Sir H. Jones had little difficulty in reaching the capital and carrying his negotiations to a successful conclusion. His chief embarrassments, or what he himself esteemed as such, were the projected descent by General Malcolm upon Khārag, of which the Persians had by some means become aware, and distinct orders to retire from Persia which he received from Lord Minto; but he took measures which would probably have ensured provisional submission by the Persians to the British occupation of Khārag, even if General Malcolm's expedition had not in the end been countermanded by the Government of India in consequence of news of the difficulties in which Napoleon had become involved in the Peninsula, and he simply disregarded as *ultra vires* the commands of the Governor-General to suspend the mission, now fairly entered on, with which he had been charged by His Majesty's Government. Complete success rewarded his determined behaviour; and on the 12th March 1809 a Preliminary Treaty was concluded with Persia, whereby the Shāh annulled all his previous arrangements, whatever they might be, with other European powers, and undertook to refuse a passage through Persia to a European army proceeding against the British dominions in India, while Britain on her part engaged to assist the Persian Government with troops, or in lieu thereof with a subsidy, individual British officers and military stores, against any European invader of Persian territory.

The obligation imposed on Britain in case of an invasion of Persia was to hold good even if the invading power were at peace with Britain, but in such circumstances Britain might first endeavour to bring about a settlement by friendly intervention between Persia and the aggressor. Provision was also made in the Treaty against the worn-out bogey of an Afghān invasion of India. Mr. Morier, the secretary of the mission, was at once sent to England to obtain ratification of the Treaty, which he carried with him : he was accompanied by a Persian Envoy, Mirza Abul Hasan, whose duty it was to inform himself, for his master's satisfaction, of the channel through which the subsidy mentioned in the Treaty would be paid, in case it became due. About the end of April 1809 the last of the French diplomatic agents quitted Tehrān ; and by the end of 1810 the French Consular Agency established at Masqat had been withdrawn. Notwithstanding the alarm, almost amounting to panic, which the activity of the French at first excited in British India, it seems probable that Napoleon's proceedings, at least after the collapse of his Egyptian enterprise, were designed to keep Britain occupied and anxious in the East rather than to prepare the way for any serious campaign against her Indian possessions.

Early in 1810 General Malcolm was again deputed to Persia by Lord Minto, partly as evidence of the Government of India's approval of the Treaty arranged by Sir H. Jones, partly to restore the credit of the Indian Government in Persia, which was supposed to have suffered by the repulse of their last mission, followed as it immediately was by the triumphant success of the rival Envoy, and partly, it would seem, in order that the Governor-General might have a representative on the spot ready to assume the duties of permanent Envoy at the Persian Court, in case, as he had recommended in correspondence with the Home Government, the appointment of the Envoy at Tehrān should be left to himself. General Malcolm was also directed to make a geographical study, so far as feasible, of Persia and the countries adjacent to it ; and to enable him to carry out this duty, and also to add to the impressiveness of the mission, he was provided with a large and brilliant staff of officers. His Majesty's Government had decided, however, that the appointment of Envoy at Tehrān should for the future be filled from England ; and General Malcolm accordingly, after a purely formal visit to the Shāh, returned to India. On this occasion again he passed through Baghdād on his homeward journey, but an internal revolution was at the time in progress at the headquarters of the Pāshāliq and prevented the transaction of any political business with the local Government.

Third mission
of (General)
Malcolm to
Persia, 1810.

Disturbed condition of the Persian Gulf, 1798-1805.

While Great Britain concentrated her attention on the real or imagined schemes of Napoleon in Turkey, Persia, Afghānistān and Arabia, a state of general disorganisation and insecurity was fast coming into existence in the Persian Gulf, the remedying of which was destined to cost her in the end far more, both in military effort and in money, than the short-lived scare of French aggression upon India. The causes of unrest were various; but the principal among them seem to have been the natural turbulence and rapacity of certain maritime Arab tribes, particularly the Qawāsīm,* the alarming growth in Najd and ultimate appearance in the Persian Gulf of the Wāhhābi power of Central Arabia, the ambition and naval resources of the Saiyid of 'Omān, and the weakness of the Arab principality of Bahrain. Had the Government of India, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, understood the real seriousness of the local situation, had they given more attention to the earliest symptoms of maritime disorder in the Persian Gulf and less to problems of high policy at the capitals of the Middle East, had they in short taken a close rather than a comprehensive survey of the position, it is possible that the immediate interests of the British Empire would have been better served by their action. The case, however, was probably one in which to be wise before the event required more than human foresight; and it is possible that, if the great political missions of the period to the Persian Court had never started, the position of Britain in Persia at the present day would have been much less considerable than it is.

Development
of the
Wāhhābi
power in Najd
and its extension
to the
Red Sea and
Persian Gulf,
1798-1805.

The Wāhhābi movement, as explained in the chapter on the history of Najd, had its beginnings in Central Arabia about the middle of the eighteenth century; and, though it was in its origin religious, it quickly assumed a political and secular shape. The result was the formation of a

* The term "Qawāsīm," it should be observed, was at this time used in a wide sense to designate all the tribes of the coast of North-Western 'Omān (including the Qawāsīm proper) who engaged in piracy: in other words, apparently, the inhabitants of all the ports of that coast except Dibai and Abu Dhabi.

fanatical and at the same time aggressive and even predatory state, which found in pious principles a warrant for the plunder and pillage of its neighbours, and against which those neighbours, for want of enthusiasm and a proper military organisation, were unable effectively to contend. Before the opening of the period now under consideration the Wāhhābis had begun, in opposite directions, to make war on the Sharif of Makkah and to harass the Shaikh of Kuwait, and had partially conquered the principality of Hasa, governed by the Bani Khālid, on the western side of the Persian Gulf. An expedition despatched against them in 1798 by the Pāsha of Baghdād, whose frontier towards the Arabian desert had already for some time been exposed to their ravages, reached the Hasa Oasis; but it was unable to expel the Wāhhābi garrisons there, or to proceed any further on its way to the Wāhhābi capital of Dara'iyah. The Turkish commander, in his retirement upon Turkish 'Irāq, was beset by a large Wāhhābi force and concluded a six years' truce with the son of the Amīr: it was afterwards ratified by the Pāsha of Baghdād but it was not respected by the Wāhhābis. In 1800 the capture of the port of Qatif completed the conquest of Hasa by the Wāhhābis and brought them down to the shores of the Persian Gulf; in the same year they occupied the oasis of Baraimi, from which they commenced to threaten both the Pirate Coast and the 'Omān Sultanate; and by 1803 they had established their supremacy over the whole Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, between Kuwait and the 'Omān Sultanate, on neither of which last, however, they had as yet made any serious impression. In 1801 the outlying town of Karbala in Turkish 'Irāq was surprised and sacked in a few hours, with its sacred Shī'ah shrine of Husain, by a Wāhhābi host, who at the same time perpetrated a frightful massacre of the unarmed inhabitants; and the incident was of some general importance, for it provoked deep indignation in Persia against the Pāsha of Baghdād for his want of vigilance. In 1802, by way of reprisals, a second expedition against the Wāhhābis in their own territories was organised by the Pāsha of Baghdād; but, like the first, it ended abortively. Meanwhile, in 1801-02, the Wāhhābis, whose energy at this time was equal to the most distant, diverse, and extraordinary enterprises, had possessed themselves of Makkah; in 1804 Madīnah also submitted to their yoke; and they then proceeded to subjugate other parts of the province of Yaman. Around, upon the circumference of the Wāhhābi empire thus extended, perpetual terror reigned; and the rulers of Turkish 'Irāq, Kuwait and 'Omān no longer knew a moment's repose.

Difficulties
between the
states of
'Omān,
Persia,
Turkey and
Bahrain,
1798-1805.

There were also dissensions and difficulties among the principal states of the Gulf, notwithstanding the fact that the territorial integrity, and even the independence, of most of them except Persia were threatened by the progress of the Wāhhābis. In 1798 there was tension between the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Pāsha of Baghdād, arising out of a pecuniary claim by the former against the latter, and the Saiyid made preparations for blockading Basrah; but a settlement was in the end reached by mutual agreement without the assistance of the British Resident at Basrah, whose good offices were at first invoked by the Turks. In 1799 the Saiyid of 'Omān, encouraged by the Persian Governor of Fārs, made an attack upon the shipping of Bahrain, which Shaikhdom he was ambitious of subjecting to his own authority; but the ruler of Bahrain was induced by the Shaikh to Būshehr to place himself under the protection of Persia. Saiyid Sultān then proceeded to indemnify himself for the deception practised on him by the Persians by occupying Khārag Island, which belonged to Persia and was generally held by the Shaikh of Būshehr as a part of his government; and he contrived to retain possession of it until the next year. In 1800-01 the ruler of 'Omān successfully seized, and for a time administered, the Bahrain Islands; and in 1802, having been dislodged, he again managed to establish himself in possession; but he ultimately failed to make good his footing, and on his departure the Shaikhdom came under the domination of the Wāhhābis. At the end of 1804, on the death of Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, the Persian port of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which he held on lease from the Persian Government, were seized by the Bani Ma'in, an Arab tribe but Persian subjects; and another dispute, dangerous to the peace of the Gulf, thus came into being.

Outbreak of
piracy in the
lower Persian
Gulf, 1798-
1805.

It was in these circumstances of disturbance and confusion that Arab pirates, who may hitherto have been employing themselves quietly in harrying native shipping, were emboldened to turn their attention to British vessels and so became conspicuous. The seizure of the "Bassein" and the unprovoked attack on the "Viper" by the Qawāsim in 1797, already referred to, were premonitory symptoms of trouble; and it cannot but be supposed that the negligence with which both cases were treated by the British authorities encouraged the commission or further offences. The next instances of lawlessness were not precisely piratical; they consisted in the plunder, in 1803, of the British ships "Hector" and "Alert", which had gone ashore on the Persian Coast, by the Arab Shaikh of Nakhīlu and his subjects; and in these partial

redress was obtained, after the lapse of two years, through the Persian Government and the Shaikh of Būshehr. In 1804 the crew and passengers of the "Fly", which had been captured, as already mentioned, by a French privateer, were piratically attacked while on their way to India in a native vessel that they had purchased at Būshehr and were carried off by the Qawāsim, who did not readily restore them to liberty. In 1805 the "Shannon" and "Trimmer", two merchant vessels owned by Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, were taken by Qāsimi pirates; and in the same year a fleet of Qāsimi vessels attempted to seize the East India Company's large cruiser "Mornington", but were beaten off with loss.

First British expedition against the Qawāsim and treaty of peace, 1805-06.

The loss of the "Shannon" and the "Trimmer" was an affair too serious to be ignored; and the Government of Bombay now directed Captain Seton, the British Resident at Masqat, apparently at his own suggestion, to assist the Sultān of 'Omān, who also had grievances against the Qawāsim, in chastising that unruly tribe. At the beginning of June 1805 Captain Seton, in the "Mornington", joined Saiyid Badar off Qishm; but, before taking action against the Qawāsim, the allies recovered by force the Persian leased seaport of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which had been lost to 'Omān, as already mentioned, on the death of Saiyid Sultān. This was a proceeding open to misconstruction by Persia, and one that made it evident, whatever reasons Captain Seton might allege in justification of his conduct, that his attention was not so firmly fixed as it ought to have been on the sole object of the joint expedition as sanctioned by Government. At length, in the beginning of July, an opportunity presented itself, and was promptly utilised by the allies, of blockading a considerable flotilla of Qāsimi vessels in the anchorage of Qishm; but the Sultān of 'Omān appeared indifferent to the advantages of a full and immediate settlement with the Qawāsim, and the British Resident perhaps gave too much weight to their evasive pleas and promises of amendment. The Government of Bombay, who probably overestimated the effect of the lesson on the tribe, were at first inclined to insist on a very drastic and comprehensive settlement; but, when it was shown to be impossible of attainment with-

out a continuation of hostilities, they allowed themselves to be placated by the restoration of the hulls of the "Shannon" and "Trimmer", from which everything of value had been removed; abandoned a just claim to compensation for incidental injuries; and accepted a bond for future good behaviour, volunteered by the Qawāsim, without sureties. The so-called treaty embodying these conditions was dated 6th February 1806. A serious feature of the case was a doubt as to the connection with it of the Wāhhābi Amīr, whose dictation appears to have been alleged by the Qawāsim as an excuse for their misdeeds, and to whom Mr. Manesty had already appealed in vain for restitution through a special messenger. An exaggerated idea of the power of the Amīr was at this time current in the Persian Gulf, and the Qawāsim were evidently acute enough to profit by it in prevailing on the British authorities to be satisfied with an incomplete settlement.

The outcome of these perfunctory proceedings, in which the Resident was moreover hampered by directions intended to prevent a collision with the Wāhhābis, the Persians or the Turks, and even by a conflict of opinion with the British Residents at Basrah and Būshehr, was of course only to postpone the inevitable reckoning with the tribes until the piratical spirit had found a fresh opportunity of asserting itself.

Temporary cessation of piracy followed by its revival on an increased scale, 1806-1809.

For about two years the Qawāsim remained quiescent; but their better conduct was probably due, in part at least, to the stationing of a large British squadron in the Gulf in 1807-08 in connection with the rupture in Europe between Britain and Turkey. The policy of the Government of Bombay, who under the benevolent Mr. Duncan even prohibited the officers of their marine from firing first when the ships under their command were approached by Arab vessels in a threatening manner, cannot but have encouraged the Qawāsim to resume their piratical courses; and a series of melancholy and disgraceful affairs was the result of their forbearance. In April 1808 the "Lively" was attacked off the Gujarat coast by four large Arab vessels, but defended herself with success; and an opportunity of punishing some of the offenders, who were afterwards discovered at Sūrat, was unaccountably neglected. During the same year a score of native Indian

craft fell victims to Arab pirates in Indian waters. In September 1808 the "Minerva", another trading vessel owned by Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, was captured by the Qawāsim. Most of her officers and crew were barbarously put to death, while the wife of Lieutenant Taylor, a political officer in the Gulf, was carried into captivity and had to be ransomed, and the second mate and the carpenter, who were taken to Rās-al-Khaimah, were never again seen. In October 1808 the "Sylph" cruiser, accompanying Sir H. Jones's mission to Persia, was overpowered and had most of her crew massacred by Arab pirates; but she was almost immediately retaken by H. M. S. "Néréide", which opportunely appeared upon the scene. About the same time four pirate vessels fell upon the Company's cruiser "Nautilus", proceeding up the Gulf; but the latter, her commander having wisely disregarded the standing orders of the Bombay Government against forestalling attack, proved more than a match for her assailants. The Qawāsim now possessed 63 large vessels and a huge fleet of small ones; they had, it was reckoned, about 19,000 men afloat; and their Shaikh insolently suggested that the Bombay Government should pay him blackmail, in return for which he would guarantee the safety of British commerce in the Gulf. In June 1809 the "Deria Dowlut", a British vessel under British command, was taken by the Qawāsim. Piracies were also freely committed by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, an 'Atbi freebooter of Qatar, but he showed remarkable prudence in abstaining from offences against vessels under the British flag.

Second British expedition against the Qawāsim and its results, 1809-10.

The measure of Qāsimi iniquity was now full, and in September 1809 the Government of India despatched a combined naval and military expedition from Bombay under the joint command of Captain Wainwright, R.N., and Colonel L. Smith of the British military service. The chief object of the operations was to put an end to piracy by the destruction of all piratical craft and the conclusion of an arrangement with the piratical tribes whereby the safety of navigation in the Gulf might for the future be assured. The force employed consisted of two vessels of the Royal Navy, ten vessels of the East India Company's

marine, 1,000 European troops, comprising the 65th and part of the 47th Foot and some artillery, and an equal strength of native sepoy. The first point of attack was the Qāsimi capital of Rās-al-Khaimah, which was bombarded on the 12th November 1809 and captured the next day by house to house fighting with little loss, some thirty large war vessels being afterwards destroyed in the harbour. On the 14th, in consequence of an alarm that a force of Wāhhābis, with whom the commanders of the British expedition had been cautioned against coming into conflict, was approaching, the troops were hurriedly re-embarked; and the enemy, whose spirit was still unbroken, defiantly re-occupied the town.

A visit was then paid to Lingeh on the Persian Coast, where some piratical Arab war vessels were destroyed, after which operations were undertaken against the fort of Lāft on the island of Qishm and resulted in its evacuation by the enemy. The fighting at Lāft was the most severe in the course of the campaign and involved a loss to the British of 11 killed and 55 wounded.

In January 1810 Colonel Smith at the instance of the Saiyid of 'Omān, the restoration of whose authority at certain places where it had been overthrown was one of the secondary objects of the expedition, made a successful attack, with the help of an 'Omāni contingent, upon the port of Shinās, which was desperately defended by a strong garrison in the Wāhhābi interest. The Saiyid did not venture to re-occupy the position thus recovered; and, on the withdrawal of the British and himself on board ship at the conclusion of the operations, a Wāhhābi general from Baraimi fell upon and routed some of his forces which remained on shore. How Colonel Smith justified his direct action in this instance against the Wāhhābis, which was contrary to his general instructions, is not clear: possibly the prohibition applied only to that part of his duty which was connected with the Qawāsim and with piracy.

After the Shinās affair the British armament revisited both the Pirate Coast and the Persian littoral, and some vessels were found and destroyed at Rams; but the fleets of 'Ajmān and Shārjah eluded discovery, except four vessels belonging to the latter which were detected and burned at Mughu. The ports of Mughu, Nakhilu, Chārak, Kung and Band Mu'allim on the Persian side, which all belonged to the guilty or suspected class, were apparently found empty of large shipping.

Part of the expedition returned to India in February 1810, immediately on the conclusion of these proceedings; and the remainder left

the Gulf in April, after operations against Rahmah-bin-Jābir of Qatar, suggested by the British Resident at Būshehr, had been disallowed by the Government of India. No formal admission of defeat or written engagement for future good conduct was obtained from the piratical tribes; and the real work of pacification, as the event showed, yet remained to be done. The Wahhābi Amīr, to whom a communication was addressed, in reply professed neutrality towards the British and stated that he had forbidden his followers to attack their vessels.

British trade in the Persian Gulf, 1798-1810.

The subject of British trade in the Persian Gulf during this period is dealt with at length in the histories of the Persian Coast and Turkish 'Irāq, and it is therefore unnecessary to enlarge on it here. In Persia especially there was a general revival of commercial activity, due to the establishment of order by the Qājars after many years of virtual anarchy; and a not unsuccessful effort was made by the East India Company to resuscitate their trade in that country. The mission of Mehdi 'Alī Khān to Persia in 1798-99 had an important commercial aspect; so also had that of Captain J. Malcolm in 1799-1801; and exhaustive reports on the Persian Gulf trade were furnished by Messrs. Maister and Fawcett, two experts at Bombay, in 1799, and by Captain Malcolm during his stay in Persia in 1800. Horses, some of them for the King's and the Company's mounted troops in India, were at this time a not unimportant export from both Turkish 'Irāq and Persia. The trade carried on by native merchants in Turkish 'Irāq was oppressed by heavy import, export, and transit duties; and the Turkish currency became hopelessly depreciated, the value of the piastre falling from one-tenth of a pound sterling at Basrah in 1783 to one-twenty-fifth at Constantinople in 1811.

British political establishments in the Persian Gulf, 1798-1810.

There is little to notice in connection with British official matters in the Persian Gulf, during the period, besides the exceptional employment of Mehdi 'Alī Khān, a Persian gentleman, as Resident at Būshehr

Employment
of Mehdi 'Alī
Khān in
Persia by the

Government
of Bombay,
1798-1803,
and his subse-
quent treat-
ment, 1803-
04.

and Envoy to the Persian Court, and the manner in which his services were recognised. Mehdi 'Ali Khān was a personal protégé of Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, and the principal facts of his history are related elsewhere in connection with his mission. During his tenure of the Būshehr Residency he presumably drew the ordinary pay of the appointment, and he was allowed in addition a percentage on the increased profits which might accrue to the East India Company's trade through his exertions, also commission at the rate of ten per cent. on supplies furnished to the Company's cruisers ; but he received no special remuneration on account of his mission to the Shāh, which appears to have been suggested by himself, his actual expenses in connection with the same being however refunded. In 1801, while still Resident at Būshehr, he was deputed by the Government of Bombay on a mission to Mokha in the Red Sea ; and during his absence the following peculiar dispositions, made by himself and sanctioned by Government, took effect at Būshehr :—

He appointed Omdutettejaur Aka Mahomed Jafar, Zubdutettejaur Aka Mohamed Hossein, and Khoja Aratoon to take care of and protect the property of the Company with instructions to pay the utmost and most unremitted attention to the details of their service, Omdutettejaur being to exercise the duties of Neabut or of Deputyship, and Zubdutettejaur those of Wazarut or Stewardship, and Khoja Aratoon those of Tehveeldauree, *i.e.*, to hold the immediate charge and custody of all the articles, whether of money or goods. It was incumbent on them to exert themselves in the sales of the latter, as soon as the plague was dissipated, considering the prices the same as those of the previous year and not liable to the variation of a single Deenar. It would greatly redound to their credit if they should be able to procure the vend of a considerable quantity of the goods previous to his return ; and in the event of the plague reaching Bushire they were to transport the Company's goods to wherever the property and families of Mullukettejaur Haji Kheleel and of Haji Ismail might be removed to and remain deposited. With respect to the delivery of the goods that should have been sold, it was necessary that the authority and order for all issues of this kind be given conjointly to the sepoy from all the three persons above named ; and all receipts from the merchants of the prices of the goods, which were to be carefully recovered as they fell due, must be immediately lodged under the charge of Khoja Aratoon in the Treasury, over which the Company's sepoy must day and night remain constantly stationed as sentinels, and each of the three persons above named (was) to keep accounts of the receipt of all sums of money on account of the Sarkar. As long as Captain Malcolm remained in Persia, whatever requisition he might make or order he might issue (was) to be considered as (that) of Government itself, and every attention paid that not a hair's-breadth of deviation take place in the execution of any of his commands.

It was added, no doubt in accordance with the customs of the Residency, that,—

Every Sunday, from sunrise to sunset, the flag was to remain hoisted ; and, whenever any ship appeared in the offing displaying the English colours, it was to be immediately answered by the hoisting of the Residency (flag); and on the three festival days, *viz.*, Christmas, New Year's Day, and His Majesty the King of Great Britain's Birthday, the usual ceremonies were to be observed and the accustomed gratuities be bestowed on the sepoy, etc.

In 1803, as mentioned elsewhere, Mehdi 'Ali Khān was compulsorily retired from the service, his phenomenal mendacity, though faithfully exercised in his employers' interest, having become, it would appear, a cause of scandal and even of diplomatic difficulties. On his retirement he received a pension of R800 a month ; and, when he died in July 1804 leaving little or no property, it was continued at the reduced rate of R500 a month to his heirs. The financial responsibility of sending his corpse to Najaf for interment at an estimated expenditure of R20,000 was undertaken, in case a grant for the purpose should not be sanctioned by Government, by his friend Mr. Duncan, who apparently caused the body to be accompanied by a Mr. Henshaw. Mr. Duncan referred to his own conduct on this occasion as "a mark of attention, which I can never regret to have shown to the last solicitations of an extraordinary man, whose uncommon talents have during a period of about eighteen years been in various instances ably applied to the promotion of the British interests in that quarter of Asia extending from the Ganges River to the Caspian and Red Seas, of which the Company at home have more than once expressed their sense, accompanying their latest mention of the subject in relation more particularly to the beneficial operation of his great proceedings in that quarter and to the increased vend he had made such progress in introducing, and was so likely to establish, for our British woollens with the expression of a desire that some complimentary token of their approbation might be bestowed on him by this Government"; and he added "As no good opportunity occurred of carrying this part of their orders into effect, they may perhaps be pleased to consider it the more allowable to be put to some expenses in procuring for him a coveted grave."

The state of the Residency building at Būshehr in 1798 is sufficiently explained by the following request addressed by Mr. Hankey Smith to Government after the local disturbances which occurred in that year: "I

Miscellaneous
matters.

"beg leave to iterate my solicitations for reinforcement of sepoy's as absolutely necessary to defend this old ruin from the attempts its appearance seems to invite with impunity to the beastly rabble which have of late inhabited this place." Basrah continued to be, at the beginning of the period, the channel through which the most recent European news was received by the British in India; and thus we find the Resident remarking, in closing a letter to the Governor and Council of Bombay on the 10th October 1799:—"I have also the honour to transmit you the" "Lloyd's Evening Post from the 12th to the 29th July and Journal de" "Francfort from the 22nd July to the 9th August, containing very interesting intelligence, to which I beg leave to make a respectful reference."

Subjection of the British establishments in the Persian Gulf to the Government by Bombay, 1806.

In 1806 the Residencies at Baghdād and Būshehr were made in all respects subordinate to the Government of Bombay, and the Residents were prohibited from corresponding direct with the Government of India, which previously, it would seem, they had been at liberty to do.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE END OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA IN THE EAST TO THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF, 1810-1836.

The next period in the history of the Persian Gulf was distinguished by immunity from the disturbing influences of European politics, and by the close and beneficial attention which Britain devoted to local questions, especially the repression of piracy. The Perso-Russian war of 1804 closed indecisively with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813. Danger from France no longer existed; in India, apart from the Gurkha war of 1814-1815 and the Pindāri and Marātha troubles of 1817, peace and security generally prevailed; and it was not until towards the close of the period that Russia, having defeated both Persia and Turkey in the field, and having obtained by the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828 and that of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833 a commanding influence in those countries, began to be suspected by British politicians of designs* on India similar to those formerly attributed

* Illustrations of the Russophobia which came into existence at this time will be found in the works of various contemporary writers, e.g., in Wellsted's *Travels in Arabia* (I, 400—04) and Mignan's *Winter Journey* (II, 144—171).

to France. A treaty founded on the treaty of 1809, but directed, though general in its terms, against Russia rather than against France, was concluded between Britain and Persia in 1814, the year after the treaty of Gulistān between Persia and Russia. This treaty, which bound Persia to assist in preventing a European attack upon India and Britain to give active support to Persia in repelling an invasion of her territory by a European power, underwent a serious modification in 1828, whereby Britain was released from the last-mentioned condition, with the consent of Persia, in consideration of a money payment. Finally in 1834, on a change of sovereign taking place in Persia, Britain and Russia agreed mutually to respect the independence and territorial integrity of that country but the understanding was the prelude to a sharp and even dangerous crisis between them in Persian affairs.

Maximum development, decline, and temporary extinction of the Wahhābi power, 1810-1819.

In 1810, immediately after the second British expedition against the Qawāsīm, the general power of the Wahhābi state and its influence in Persian Gulf affairs, reached their highest point; but a decline of both, though as yet unforeseen, was near at hand. The Wahhābis at this time held undisturbed possession not only of all Central Arabia, but also of the greater part of Hijāz, including the sacred cities of Makkah and Madīnah; and portions, at least, of Yaman were under their control. In the direction of Syria they had, it would seem, made themselves masters of the oasis of Jauf-al-'Āmir; and their armies from time to time still threatened the Pāshāliq of Baghdād, and even its capital. Kuwait continued to defy their occasional efforts for its reduction; but Hasa, Qatar and Bahrain had fallen entirely under their sway and were formed in 1810 into a province of the Wahhābi empire, governed by a Wahhābi official who was stationed in Bahrain. The Wahhābis had recently strengthened their hold upon the 'Omān Promontory by occupying, from their advanced base at Baraimi, some forts in the Shamailiyah district; and their local prestige upon the Pirate Coast had been little if at all shaken by the British capture of Rās-al-Khaimah, though it took place almost

Position of
the Wahhābis
in 1810.

under their eyes, or even by the expulsion of their own garrison by a British and 'Omāni force from the port of Shinās, which they had lately seized. Their attitude towards the Saiyid of 'Omān was menacing in the extreme.

Advance of
the Egyptians
in Western
Arabia and
gradual
relaxation of
Wahhābi
pressure in
the Persian
Gulf,
1811-1815.

In 1811 Muhammad 'Ali, Pāsha of Egypt, began his operations for the recovery of the Turkish Red Sea districts usurped by the Wahhābis; and the effect of his movements was felt at once even on the opposite side of Arabia, their hold upon which the Wahhābis found themselves obliged partially to relax. Before the end of the year Qatar and Bahrain, attacked by the Saiyid of 'Omān, were evacuated by their garrisons; but Mutlaq, their able and energetic commander at Baraimi, was nevertheless able to invade the 'Omān Sultanate and to capture the fort of Samāil in the heart of that country. In 1811 or 1812 a symptom of anxiety, or at least of a willingness to abandon his policy of haughty isolation, was shown by the Wahhābi Amīr in despatching an envoy to the Persian Government of Fārs; but the mission had no visible results. In 1812, after one serious disaster, the Egyptians succeeded in expelling the Wahhābis from Madinah; and in the following year they recovered Makkah, Jiddah and Taif; but an expedition which they made against Turabah ended in failure. The Hajj or public pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah, closed by the Wahhābis since 1802, was now thrown open once more to the Muhammadan world. Notwithstanding the reverses sustained by the Wahhābis and some military assistance lent by Persia to the Sultān of 'Omān, the Wahhābi commander at Baraimi was again able, in 1812-1813, to invade the Sultanate with success, to overrun the districts of Masqat, Eastern Hajar and Ja'alān with fire and sword, and to attach permanently to the Wahhābi interest, by their conversion to Wahhābi principles, two of the leading tribes in the eastern part of the country. Towards the end of 1813, however, after a profitable inroad into the Bātinah district, Mutlaq was killed in operations against a tribe in the interior of 'Omān; and the weakened position of the Wahhābis in Eastern Arabia could then no longer be disguised. In 1814 the Wahhābi state suffered a still greater loss in the death of the Amīr Sa'ūd, a chief of diplomatic and administrative ability; and after this their affairs, partly for want of his intelligent guidance, and partly on account of the obstinate perseverance of the Egyptians in their attacks from the west, went steadily from bad to worse. In September 1814 the Wahhābis, under a local leader achieved a victory over the Egyptians in Zahrān; but this was their last triumph. In January 1815 the

troops of the Amīr were overthrown at the decisive battle of Bisal a place on the inland confines of the Hijāz district; the capture of Turabah followed; and even the remote settlements of Ranyah and Bishah were visited by an expedition.

The scene of action then shifted to the northwards, where Tūsūn Pāshah, son of Muhammad 'Ali, considering the opportunity favourable, advanced from Madinah with a small force of about 1,000 men to Rass in Qasim. The movement, which was undertaken in defiance of Muhammad 'Ali's orders, was a dangerous one; but the Wāhhābi Amīr was overawed and agreed, in consideration of the Egyptians retiring from Qasim, to relinquish his claims to Makkah and Madinah, to acknowledge the Sultān of Turkey as his suzerain in a general sense, and to accept a line passing through Hanakiyah as the boundary between his dominions and the country under the direct rule of the Egyptians. Tūsūn Pāsha's expedition into Central Arabia lasted from the middle of March to the end of June 1815, and his halt in Qasim was of only four weeks' duration. The treaty arranged with the Wāhhābis was not ratified by Muhammad 'Ali, possibly from pique at his son's disobedience and success, but perhaps because he did not think its terms sufficiently favourable.

First invasion
of Qasim by
the
Egyptians,
1815.

In the next year, 1816, Muhammed 'Ali despatched Ibrāhīm Pāsha, another of his sons, from Egypt in command of a large force with express orders to crush the Wāhhābis by advancing to their capital of Dara'iyah. The operations did not commence until 1817, when Ibrāhīm Pāsha reached Hanakiyah and began to act against the hostile tribes in that vicinity and in the direction of Jabal Shammar. The first regular engagement of the campaign took place at Jabal Mawiyah, where the Amīr 'Abdullah attacked an Egyptian force and suffered a serious defeat. Ibrāhīm Pāsha then pushed on to Rass, which he besieged for three or four months, but failed to take, notwithstanding heavy losses in killed and wounded and a vast expenditure of ammunition. He obtained possession, however, without difficulty, of Khabrah, 'Anaizah and Buraidah; and Qasim as a whole then submitted to him.

Second
invasion of
Qasim and
conquest of
Najd by the
Egyptians,
1817-1818

Shaqrah in Washam was taken in January 1818, after a short siege, it being the first place in Southern Najd to fall; and a massacre was committed by the Egyptian troops at Dhrumah, but not without some provocation in the shape of an irregular attack which was made upon them. On the 6th April 1818 the operations against Dara'iyah were begun; and they continued with varying success, the besieging Egyptian force being itself at times reduced to the utmost straits, until the 9th

September. The Amīr 'Abdullah then surrendered and was sent a prisoner to Constantinople, where, contrary to the hopes with which he had been amused, he was executed. Dara'iyah, after being plundered, was razed to the ground; and fortifications of every sort were destroyed throughout the whole of the conquered districts.

Egyptian
occupation of
Najd and
Hasa,
1818-1819.

The Egyptians, after the destruction of the Wāhhābi capital, annexed Hasa, where, as well as in Najd, military posts were established by them at various points. They also undertook a number of expeditions against refractory tribes; but they did not establish anything approaching to effective control of the country; and, for the most part, they failed even to understand their political environment. The strain of a general occupation having become too great to be endured, the Egyptian troops in July 1819 evacuated Hasa, which was made over to the chiefs of the Bani Khālid, the original rulers of the district before the Wāhhābis, to be held in dependence on the Porte; and in the following month Ibrāhīm Pāsha himself, accompanied by the bulk of the Egyptian army of occupation, which never so far as is known amounted to more than several thousand men, withdraw from Najd to Hijāz. Some Egyptian garrisons, however, seem to have remained in Najd until 1824, after which none are mentioned; but the sovereignty of the Sultān of Turkey was not expressly repudiated after their departure, and a nominal tribute even continued to be paid him by the Wāhhābi Amīr.

Revival of piracy and various events in the Persian Gulf, 1811-19.

The effects of the punishment of the Qawāsīm by the British expedition of 1809-10 soon passed away; and the rapid revival of piracy thereafter, occurring at a time when the Wāhhābis were in a depressed condition and when their local influence was weakened to such an extent that it had almost ceased to exist, seemed to prove that the innate greed and ferocity of the Arab tribes, not Wāhhābi instigation or compulsion, were the true causes of maritime disorder in the Persian Gulf.

Action of the
Sultan of

The only native power in the Gulf which served as a check upon either the Wāhhābis or the Qawāsīm was that of the 'Omān Sultanate,

which remained almost continuously at war with both. In 1811 Saiyid Sa'id took an active part in compelling the Wāhhābis to relinquish their hold on Qatar and Bahrain; and the Wāhhābi governor stationed in Bahrain was at the same time actually made a prisoner by him, or by his allies the Āl Khalifah of Bahrain. It is possible that the Āl Khalifah, as afterwards asserted by the Sultān of 'Omān, were moved, whether by gratitude or by considerations of expediency, to admit their political dependence upon Masqat. From 1813 onwards the 'Omāni ruler was in correspondence with Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha of Egypt in regard to measures to be taken against the Wāhhābis and the Qawāsīm; and in that year and in the next, having failed to secure the active support of the British, he made efforts on his own account to reduce the Qāsimi capital of Rās-al-Khaimah; but the only result was a treaty, soon disregarded, by which the Qawāsīm bound themselves to refrain from preying on the inhabitants of certain coasts claimed by the Sultān as under his protection.

'Omān against the Wāhhābis in Qatār and Bahrain, 1811, and war between him and the Qawāsīm, 1813-1814.

The attitude of the Government of India towards the Wāhhābis and the Qawāsīm during the critical years immediately following the expedition of 1809-10 was undecided; and, largely in consequence of their indecision, the fruits of that considerable effort were in the end altogether lost. The Wāhhābi envoy who visited Persia in 1811 or 1812 did not fail to make overtures to the British Resident at Būshehr for the establishment of mutual amity and commercial relations between their respective states; but the Government of India seemingly hesitated to pronounce on the question until 1814, when they decided, without prejudice to the maintenance and even encouragement of friendly intercourse, to avoid entering into a treaty with the Wāhhābi Amīr. The Sultān of 'Omān, before embarking on his expedition of 1814 against Rās-al-Khaimah, tried to persuade the British authorities in India to make common cause with him against the Qawāsīm, and argued that the Agreements of 1798 and 1800 between himself and the British power constituted an offensive-defensive alliance under which it was impossible for them to ignore his request; but the validity of his contention was not admitted, and no naval or military assistance was afforded him. The British Resident in the Persian Gulf, however, under orders from Government, accompanied the 'Omāni fleet to Rās-al-Khaimah upon two occasions; but no opportunity apparently presented itself, as had been hoped, for intervention by him with advantage to British interests. Towards the end of 1814, in connection with demands made by the British Resident for reparation in a particular case, an emissary bearing letters from the Wāhhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of

Attitude of the British Government towards the Wāhhābis and the Qawāsīm, 1811-1814.

the Qawāsim appeared at Būshehr; and a preliminary agreement for the discontinuance by the Qawāsim of their attacks upon vessels under the British flag, for the restitution by them of certain specific property, and for their adoption of a distinguishing flag was executed; but it remained a dead letter.

Piratical
offences com-
mitted by the
Qawāsim,
1811-1816.

In these circumstances, of unsuccessful action by the Sultān of 'Omān and practical inaction on the part of the British Government, piratical offences by the Qawāsim recommenced and rapidly multiplied. The years 1810 and 1811 passed quietly, but in 1812 signs were perceived of a revival of piracy.

1813.

In 1813 several large native vessels belonging to Basrah and Kangūn were attacked and robbed by Qawāsim; some others owned by British Indian subjects and flying the British flag met with similar treatment; and others again remained confined to port in India, not venturing to sail on account of the increasing danger at sea.

1814.

In 1814 the "Ahmad Shāh," a native vessel under British colours, was plundered while aground near Qais Island by the Shaikh of Chārak, and part of the booty was carried to Rās-al-Khaimah by Qawāsim who were probably concerned in the crime: this was the case which led to the correspondence, in the same year, between the British Resident at Būshehr and the Wahhābi and Qāsimi chiefs. About the same time a Persian vessel was captured between Masqat and Bandar 'Abbās. In August 1814 some native craft under the British flag were taken by Arab pirates at sea off Porbandar; and a boat which the Resident sent with a communication in this case to the Qāsimi Shaikh was actually, notwithstanding the preliminary agreement very recently concluded by the emissary of that chief at Būshehr, seized in the Rās-al-Khaimah harbour and confiscated.

1815-1816.

This last act was virtually a declaration of war, and we are consequently not surprised to observe that a great increase of maritime offences affecting British vessels occurred in 1815 and 1816. In the former year a ship belonging to the Sultān of 'Omān, and carrying property of the East India Company, was seized by the Qawāsim at Mughu with the assistance, or at least the knowledge, of the inhabitants of that place; half a dozen native Indian vessels were captured in Indian waters; the Sultān of 'Omān's flag-ship "Caroline" was all but taken, the Saiyid himself being wounded, in an encounter with a large Qāsimi fleet off Quryāt; and a British Indian vessel was overpowered near Masqat, of which the crew were all either killed or kidnapped. In January 1816 the East India Company's small armed vessel "Deriah

Dowlut," with a wholly Indian complement, was captured by Rās-al-Khaimah corsairs near Dwarka, and the bulk of her people were either slain or wounded; and in the same month a considerable Qāsimi squadron engaged the Company's cruiser "Aurora" while conveying a treasure vessel for the Sultan of 'Omān in the Persian Gulf, but suffered defeat and heavy loss. Attacks which were next made by Qāsimi pirates upon the American ship "Persia," the "Macaulay," and the "Cintra" were unsuccessful; but a French schooner, on her way from Mauritius to Basrah under convoy of a French ship, was daringly plundered. Among the victims of Arab lawlessness, which now followed one another in rapid succession, was a ship of unknown name under British colours, which was never seen again and of whose crew none survived; also the Company's armed boat "Turrarow." Later in the year three native Sūrat merchantmen were taken by Qawāsim in the Red Sea, this affair involving a loss to the owners of about twelve lakhs of rupees, besides which almost the entire crews were massacred.

The above list of outrages is probably not exhaustive even in regard to British and Indian vessels, and it takes almost no account of the depredations upon ordinary Arab and Persian shipping, which the British authorities did not at this time regard as a matter affecting themselves. The spectacle of the offences committed by the Qawāsim with profit and impunity did not fail to demoralise a number of the Arab Shaikhs upon the Persian Coast opposite, and the Bahrain Islands became a great market and distributing centre in the Gulf for the stolen property which the Qawāsim acquired by their violence.

An expedition by the Sultān of 'Omān against Bahrain provided, in the summer of 1816, an interlude in the harrowing drama of Qāsimi outrages. In 1811 Saiyid Sa'id had taken action in Bahrain as the friend of the 'Atbi ruling family and their helper against the Wahhābis; but now, on their denying the political allegiance which he claimed from them as his due, he appeared once more on the scene as the ally of Persia and of their mortal enemy, the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, while they on their part sought the aid of their former oppressors the Wahhābis and of the piratical Qawāsim. The Sultān encouraged the idea that his action was countenanced, and would even be supported, by the British Government; but the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who visited Bahrain while the 'Omāni attack was impending, found means to convince the Shaikh of Bahrain, though not without the execution of an unauthorised agreement, that the attitude of the British towards him was one of benevolent

Attack by the Sultan of 'Omān upon Bahrain and proceedings of the British Resident in connection therewith, 1816.

neutrality. Saiyid Sa'id, disregarding an offer of British mediation, soon afterwards made a descent on the island of Muharraḡ; but he was driven again to his ships with heavy loss. The feebleness of the Bahrain principality, however, continued to invite aggression by its stronger neighbours.

British
demand on
the Qawāsim
for repara-
tion, 1816.

The serious Red Sea case, constituting as it did a warning of the extent to which piracy might be expected to spread if it were allowed to flourish unchecked in the Persian Gulf, led to an unconditional demand for reparation being made on the Qāsimi Shaikh, at the end of November 1816, under orders from the Government of India. The demand was presented by the Resident in the Gulf, who took with him to Rās-al-Khaimah one vessel of the Royal Navy and three of the East India Company's marine, but it was rejected by the Shaikh with such obstinacy and even insolence that the Resident was provoked, though no coercive action was sanctioned by his instructions, to undertake an immediate naval attack upon Rās-al-Khaimah. This enterprise, however, which was carried out on the 1st December 1816, resolved itself into a futile long-range cannonade, and was abandoned without any advantage having been obtained. Two vessels were then sent with demands for satisfaction to the ports of Shārjah, Lingeh and Chārak, where it is probable that they met with no greater success than had attended the visit of the whole squadron to Rās-al-Khaimah. The marauding fleet of Rās-al-Khaimah alone consisted at this time of about 60 large vessels, and the piratical ports of Shārjah, Rams, Lingeh and Chārak boasted some 40 others of a smaller size: of all these a great proportion were constantly at sea, and they were frequently sighted by the British cruisers, which however were seldom able to come up with them on account of their superior sailing qualities.

Continued
depredations
by the
Qawāsim,
1817-1819.

The demonstration against Rās-al-Khaimah was not, perhaps, altogether without effect: at any rate there was a diminution during the next two years in the number of attacks committed by the Qawāsim upon British vessels. Towards the end of 1817, however, a Qāsimi fleet raided Shaikh Shu'aib Island, and threatened 'Asalu, Kangūn, and Daiyir in such a manner as to cause a serious panic at Būshehr; and about the same time the Qawāsim captured two native ships off Diu, besides the "Mustapha," an Arab vessel under British colours and command, at a point only 70 miles from Bombay. At the end of 1818 the East India Company's cruiser "Antelope" in a spirited action fought with considerable risk to herself, saved the Sultān of 'Omān's ship "Rahmany" and a Baghlah from capture by a group of Qāsimi vessels

with which she found them engaged ; and other encounters, too numerous to be mentioned, took place between the Qawāsim and His Majesty's and the East India Company's ships.

Third British expedition against the Qawāsim, settlement, and connected occurrences, 1819-20.

At length, various internal troubles in India having been successfully surmounted between 1814 and 1817, it was resolved by the British Government of that country to make an end of piracy in the Persian Gulf.

In the spring of 1819 Captain Sadleir was sent in advance from Bombay to arrange for the co-operation with the British against the Qawāsim of the Sultān of 'Omān, and, if possible, of the Egyptian forces then occupying Najd and Hasa, to whose commander he was authorised to offer possession of Rās-al-Khaimah as an incentive to joint action. A satisfactory understanding with Saiyid Sa'id was reached ; but from the first there was no chance of an agreement with the Egyptians, who, before the season fixed for British action arrived in the autumn of 1819, had withdrawn entirely from their acquisitions in Hasa and partially even from Najd. Dr. Jukes was sent on a special mission to the Persian Governor of Fārs to reassure him as to the objects of the British expedition, and suitable explanations were also offered to the Shāh of Persia through the British Envoy at Tehrān.

Preparations
for the ex-
pedition,
1819.

The British armament, which left India at the beginning of November 1819 and was under the command and political control of General Sir W. Grant Keir, consisted of three vessels of the Royal Navy, six of the East India Company's marine, and a land force of over 3,000 men, including a company of European artillery, the 47th and 65th Foot, and a battalion and some details of native Indian infantry ; and it was joined before Rās-al-Khaimah by the Sultān of 'Omān with two ships and 600 men. An 'Omāni army also marched by land to the scene of

Operations for
the expedi-
tion, 1819-20.

operations, but arrived too late to be of service. Lieutenant Bruce, the British Resident at Būshehr, was attached to General Grant Keir's staff as his political adviser. A landing was made on the 3rd December 1819, and on the 9th the town was occupied without resistance, after a short siege in which the artillery played the principal part. The enemy suffered heavily in the fighting; but the British losses were, by comparison, very slight. The hill fort of Dhayah near Rams was taken on the 22nd December, when nearly 400 fighting men laid down their arms and became prisoners of war; and serious operations were then at an end. In January 1820 a fort having been constructed and a British garrison established at Rās-al-Khaimah, the other ports of the Pirate Coast were visited, and a clean sweep was made of their military defences and of their larger war vessels. A squadron also repaired to Bahrain and obtained the surrender and destruction of several piratical craft which had found refuge there; and similar measures were taken at Lingeh, Mughu, 'Asalu and Kangūn upon the Persian side.

Settlement
with the
Qawāsim and
General
Treaty of
Peace, 1820.

These decisive proceedings quickly resulted in the submission of all the Arab chiefs of the Pirate Coast; and on the 8th January 1820 a General Treaty of Peace was framed, to which on various dates they severally became parties, and to which the 'Atbi Shaikhs of Bahrain also adhered. By this Treaty the Arab signatories bound themselves and their subjects to abstain for the future from "plunder and piracy" as distinguished from lawful and open warfare, by sea; and various arrangements were prescribed for ensuring a strict observance by them of their new obligations, among these being the adoption by the tribe of a common distinctive flag, and the institution of a system of ships' papers for purposes of identification. The Treaty also contained articles directed against the inhuman practice, hitherto common, of butchering prisoners of war, and against the slave trade. It was clearly recognised, however, at least by the commander of the British expedition, that security in the future would depend less upon the paper engagements subscribed by the Qawāsim and other tribes than upon the ability and alacrity of the British Government to punish violations of the same. The policy involved in this view having fortunately been accepted by the British authorities in India, who never again allowed a piratical proceeding in the Persian Gulf to pass without instant notice and punishment, the old régime of lawlessness and violence at once became obsolete; but for some years vigilance and occasional action continued to be required in order to prevent its return.

The Sultān of 'Omān did not neglect the opportunity afforded by his close association with the British in the expedition of 1819-20 to reassert * his claims to suzerainty over the Bahrain Islands; and the Āl Khalifah joint Shaikhs of that principality, though the British authorities were careful to avoid even the appearance of supporting Saiyid Sa'id's pretensions, were eventually intimidated by him into sending a representative to Masqat, through whom they promised an annual tribute of \$30,000. The Persian Government of Fārs, on whose support the Saiyid had hitherto leaned in his enterprises against Bahrain, were much chagrined by this settlement, in which they had no part.

Submission
of the Shaikhs
of Bahrain
to the Sultān
of 'Omān,
1820.

Period of special precautions against piracy immediately following the expedition, 1820-23.

It had for some years been regarded as desirable that the British Government should possess a permanent base of action in the Persian Gulf. This project was first raised in connection with the question of trade and the supposed designs of European powers in Persia; but, with the rise of piracy, greater stress came to be laid upon its military advantages in relation to the smaller and more turbulent of the Gulf powers. In 1801 an ineffectual effort † was made, as we have seen, to obtain the cession of some islands by Persia, which would have made the realisation of the scheme possible; in 1808-09, the seizure of Khārag was contemplated, and all but carried into execution, by the Government of India; and the commanders of the expedition of 1809-10, against the Qawāsim were ordered ‡ to select a suitable island for a British settle-

Presence of a
British
military
garrison in
the Persian
Gulf, 1820-
22.

* *Vide* page 193 and page 195 *ante*.

† *Vide* page 175 *ante*.

‡ The orders on this point, in 1809, were worded as follows:—

“The Governor in Council would also be happy to be favoured with your opinion in respect to the most eligible island in the vicinity of the Joasmee ports which it would be advisable for us to occupy as a maritime station or Residency in preference to Muscat, with the view of more effectually commanding the entrance of the Gulph and checking the future depredations of the pirates, accompanied by your sentiments in respect to the force that may be necessary to maintain [the] possession not only against the native powers in the Gulph but also with reference to such European force as (may) occasionally visit that quarter, and which it is not to be supposed will ever exceed two French frigates at the utmost, so long as we maintain our maritime superiority. The removal of the Residency from Muscat is the more desirable from the lamentable casualties that have occurred at that insalubrious station, at which perhaps every object we have in view would be attainable through the agency of the native broker, controlled by the presence of the Resident at a vicinal port.”

ment, but no action appears to have been taken by them on this part of their instructions. The project of a British "central station" in the Persian Gulf, which might ultimately supersede for all purposes, the East India Company's settlements at Būshehr and even Basrah, was revived in connection with the expedition of 1819-20; and General Sir W. Grant Keir, at his departure from India, was instructed to report on the question with especial reference to the islands of Qishm and Hanjām. In the end, as Rās-al-Khaimah, where arrangements were at first made for installing the permanent British garrison, was found to be unsuitable, the General recommended the transfer of the troops to Qishm; but he deprecated the immediate removal, which had been suggested, of the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf to the same place. Advantage was accordingly taken of a claim asserted by the Sultān of 'Omān to possession of Qishm in his own right—and not as a leaseholder under the Persian crown, which he was in the case of Bandar 'Abbās,—to obtain from him written permission to occupy that island; and in July 1820 the British detachment left at Rās-al-Khaimah was transferred to Qishm town. The new station, however, proved intolerably hot and unhealthy; and, after Dairistān and Salagh on the south coast of the island had been tried and found unsuitable, the garrison, early in 1822, was established at Bāsīdu.

The occupation of Qishm provoked, as seems to have been foreseen, extreme resentment on the part of the Persian Government, who absolutely denied the title of the Sultān of 'Omān to independent sovereignty over Qishm, and who even, by way of rejoinder, claimed the Sultān's dominions in Arabia as an appendage of Persia. Dr. Jukes, who was sent to Shirāz in the summer of 1821 to explain matters, seems to have succeeded in reconciling the Persian Governor of Fārs to the accomplished fact of the British occupation of Qishm; but no argument which the British representative at Tehrān could adduce had any effect on the mind of the Shāh or his ministers; and they continued to demand, as they had done from the first, the withdrawal of the British detachment. Eventually the authorities in India arrived at the conclusion that it would be better to evacuate the island than to be constantly at issue with Persia in regard to it; but a sudden rupture of relations between the Persian monarch and the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān, which occurred in the spring of 1822, made it inexpedient to appear to comply with the wishes of the Persian Government until the end of that year or the beginning of 1823. Then at length the Qishm detachment, which really served no useful purpose, was removed to India.

A small but serious and unnecessary war which took place in 1820-21 served to illustrate one of the dangers attendant on the presence of a moveable British force in the Gulf under the orders of a political officer with large discretionary powers. The Bani Bū 'Alī of the Ja'alān district in 'Omān, who were at the time in rebellion against the Sultān, having murdered a messenger sent by Captain Thompson, the British political representative and military commander on Qishm, to interview them in regard to a case of piracy, that officer was induced to make common cause with Saiyid Sa'id, and joined him, with a force of about 400 Indian sepoys, in an attack upon the Bani Bū 'Alī capital, situated in the interior behind the port of Sūr. The result was a grave disaster in which the small British force was practically destroyed, along with its officers, and the Sultān's levies were either dispersed or cut up, and from which Captain Thompson himself and Saiyid Sa'id were fortunate in escaping with their lives.

Two British expeditions against the Bani Bū 'Alī in tribe of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1820-21.

The Government of Bombay, as soon as they became aware of the facts, removed Captain Thompson from his appointment; but at the same time, thinking it necessary to vindicate the military reputation of Britain in 'Omān, they despatched an expedition to Sūr under General L. Smith, who had had previous experience of Arab warfare at Rās-al-Khaimah in 1809-10. The military force, which consisted of about 1,300 Europeans, drawn from the Bombay Artillery, His Majesty's 65th Foot, and the Bombay European Regiment, and of over 1,500 native sepoys, arrived in 'Omān at the end of January 1821 and advanced in February on the head-quarters of the Bani Bū 'Alī, where, on the 2nd March, a bloody engagement was fought upon the very scene of the previous encounter. The British casualties in killed and wounded were nearly 200, but the loss of the enemy amounted to considerably more than that number in killed alone; and the result was the complete submission of the tribe, a number of whom were temporarily deported to India.

While the British were thus engaged, in the lower Persian Gulf and Gulf of 'Omān, in making secure the pacificatory results of the expedition of 1819-20, a crisis occurred in Turkish 'Irāq which, but for the personal influence of Mr. Rich, the Resident at Baghdād, might have had serious consequences. The cause was the arrogant behaviour of the Pāsha of Baghdād, who persisted in disregarding the treaty rights and privileges of British subjects in the Pāshāliq, and who ultimately presumed so far as to levy double the legitimate duties upon British trade. In 1820, in consequence of his arbitrary proceedings, the British Factory

Rupture of British relations with the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1820-22.

at Basrah was temporarily transferred to Muhanmarih; and in the spring of 1821 the Residency at Baghdād was for a short time besieged by Turkish troops with the apparent purpose of intimidating the Resident, or even of seizing his person. Mr. Rich was able, however, by firm and judicious action, to extricate himself from his dangerous situation at Baghdād, and retired *via* Basrah to Persia, where he remained until his death from cholera in the autumn of the year. A demand for satisfaction and for the removal of grievances was enforced by Mr. Rich's successor, Captain Taylor, under instructions from the Indian Government, by a transfer of the whole British political establishment from Turkish 'Irāq to Kuwait, where it remained from the end of 1821 until April 1822. The settlement secured by these means was such as effectually to safeguard British interests in the Pāshaliq, and in 1823 a document in which it was formally recorded in detail was obtained by Captain Taylor from the Pāsha.

Complaints
by the Persian
Government
against the
British Resi-
dent at
Būshehr,
unauthorised
agreement
executed by
the latter,
and his remo-
val from
office, 1820-
22.

Simultaneously with these difficulties in Turkish 'Irāq, trouble arose between the Persian Government and the British Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, at Būshehr: it was due to the success of the Sultān of 'Omān in extorting an admission of dependence from the Shaikhs of Bahrain, which the Persians wrongly attributed to the exercise of influence by Lieutenant Bruce during a visit paid by him to Bahrain in the course of the expedition against the Qawāsīm. Lieutenant Bruce was able to clear himself, to the satisfaction of the British authorities, of the various charges upon which the Persian Government demanded his recall, and it was decided to maintain him in office without regard to their complaints; but in 1822, after his return to Persia from a visit to Bombay, he allowed himself to be drawn by the Shīrāz Government, possibly from a hope of conciliating them, into executing a foolish and unauthorised agreement which had to be repudiated by the Government of Bombay, and which necessitated his own removal from Būshehr. This invalid agreement, more fully noticed in the histories of the Persian Coast and Bahrain, dealt in a manner contrary to the established British policy, and most unfavourable to British interests, with questions such as the political status of Bahrain, claims for compensation arising out of the British expedition of 1819-20, etc.; and it would have committed the Government of India to assisting the Persian authorities, on their demanding it in certain circumstances, with a naval force.

Naval mea-
sures adopted
by the British

On the evacuation of Qishm by the British detachment for a time stationed there, recourse was had to purely naval precautions against a

revival of piracy. The essential feature of the new system was continuous cruising off the Pirate Coast by three or four vessels of the East India Company's marine, of which six in all were now allotted to the service of the Gulf. It was ordered that, in cases of piracy committed by denizens of the Persian coast, direct action should not be taken in future by British political or naval officers, but that application should be made to the Persian local authorities, or in case of need to the Persian Government, who since the punishment of the Qawāsīm had professed themselves able and willing to deal effectually with such offences when committed by their own subjects. Masqat was at first the place of rendezvous of the Indian Government vessels employed in, or visiting, the Gulf; but it was found too distant from the principal field of British naval activity to be convenient, and a resolution was taken to substitute Mughu, where a depôt of stores would be located and a native political agent appointed. The Mughu arrangement possibly came into force for a short time; but in the autumn of 1823, on account of apprehended objections on the part of the Persian Government, Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm was adopted instead as the British naval base in the Persian Gulf.

for the preservation of order at sea, 1822-23.

On the withdrawal of the British detachment and its commanding officer from Qishm, the political supervision of the whole Persian Gulf on the part of the Indian Government devolved on the British Resident at Būshehr; and special instructions were given to Lieutenant McLeod, the successor of Captain Bruce, as to the manner in which his duties as Resident, particularly under the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, should be performed. It fell to him to explain the requirements of the Treaty, which were not so well known or understood as might have been expected, to the signatories; to give effect, so far as possible, to certain of its provisions—such as that rendering obligatory the use of a distinctive flag—which had been neglected; and to make it evident that the withdrawal of the British military garrison hitherto maintained in the Gulf did not proceed from any loss of interest on the part of Government in the maintenance of security at sea. He was also directed to establish personal touch with the various Shaikhs of the Arab coast, to investigate closely the political conditions prevailing, and to make arrangements for obtaining regular information of passing events. These tasks were admirably discharged by Lieutenant McLeod, who in January 1823 made a voyage—almost of discovery—along the Arabian littoral, visiting the chief ports of the Pirate Coast, Qatar and Bahrain,

Special instructions to the Resident in the Persian Gulf and tour by him on the Arabian coast, 1823.

and who, in a full and able report, explained for the first time the working of local politics. Various questions of the interpretation of the settlement of 1820 were raised by Lieutenant McLeod as a result of his tour, and were at once decided by Government; and political business may be said to have fallen about this time, or shortly after, into the general course which it has since followed. A Native Agent of the Būshehr Residency seems to have been installed at Shārjah in 1823, being transferred thither on Lieutenant McLeod's recommendation from Qatif, where he had previously been posted.

Period of the progressive establishment of good order at sea, 1824-36.

Later history
of piracy,
1824-35.

Piratical offences were still, after this, occasionally committed; but, as a rule, such mishaps as occurred affected native vessels only, and so belonged to a class of which, before the expedition of 1819-20, it had not been customary to take account at all. Few of the later cases are of sufficient importance to merit separate notice; and a number of them, though not justifiable as acts of regular warfare, were the less blameworthy in that they were committed by crews which political disturbances, not greed of plunder, had induced to put to sea. There were, moreover, scarcely any of a serious character in which the culprits escaped punishment altogether.

In 1827 some tribesmen of Qatar and Bahrain perpetrated a piracy, accompanied by murder, upon a Būshehr vessel bound for Dilam, which they stopped off Ganāveh; but the ringleader in the affair, having been captured in the following year upon the Persian coast, was handed over to the British Resident. After he had been transferred to the keeping of the Shaikh of Būshehr, however, he unfortunately escaped from custody during a political revolution. Another heinous offence was one committed in 1828 by a Rās-al-Khaimah Batil upon a Sohār boat, in which the crew of the latter, fourteen in number, were drowned by being thrown overboard and the boat herself was sunk after being plundered: in this instance the Shaikh of the Qawāsīm was obliged by the British political authorities to arrest and punish the criminals—one of whom he even caused to be put to death, to deliver up the piratical vessels for

destruction, and to restore as much of the stolen property as could be recovered. The only crime against a British vessel was the unceremonious boarding of the "Sunbury" in 1829 at Shārjah, to the Shaikh of which place her cargo had been sold; but it was expiated, though due in part to a misunderstanding, by the burning of a boat implicated and the flogging of a conspicuous offender under orders from the Shaikh. In 1831 the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who was then at war with the inhabitants of Sohār, began to raid indiscriminately vessels from all places in the 'Omān Sultanate and captured more than a dozen which did not belong to Sohār; but in 1832 he was called to account by a British naval force which visited his port and obliged him to make full reparation to the sufferers by his wrongful seizures. In 1834 the British squadron in the Persian Gulf was reduced to two vessels; and, partly no doubt for this reason, but partly also in consequence of the passionate excitement aroused by a bitter struggle in 1833-34 between Shārjah, the greatest of the Pirate Coast Shaikhdoms, and Abu Dhabi, the next in strength, the hitherto blameless Bani Yās tribe of the last mentioned principality betook themselves to piracy. After committing a series of atrocious massacres and robberies at sea, the Bani Yās proclaimed their intention of trying conclusions with the slender naval force maintained by the East India Company in the Persian Gulf; but the British were equally eager, and with better reason, for the encounter; and on the 16th April 1835 the Company's sloop-of-war "Elphinstone" engaged and utterly defeated a piratical Yāsi fleet of six vessels, severely damaging two, and rescuing a large Persian ship which they had recently taken. The humiliation of the tribe was so extreme that they agreed, without further coercion, to a most stringent settlement under which they surrendered fifteen captured vessels and a considerable amount of cargo, paid up \$10,000 as compensation in cash, and gave ample security for the payment of an additional sum of \$1,600. They also released all the prisoners that they had taken, and delivered up two of their own number who had been ringleaders in the recent outrages, one of whom was afterwards convicted of piracy at Bombay and sentenced to transportation for life. Several piracies were committed in 1834-35 by the Bani Yās of Dibai, as well as by those of Abu Dhabi; but in these cases also satisfaction was rigorously exacted.

The stern punishment inflicted on the pirates in 1835 may be regarded as the death-blow to piracy in the Persian Gulf, for it never again showed itself there in any formidable shape,

History of the
pirate
Rahmah-
bin Jabir,
and his
proceedings
1824-26.

No account of events in the Persian Gulf at this period would be complete which did not mention the 'Atbi freebooter Rahmah-bin-Jābir, an extraordinary and desperate character to whom more than one reference has already been made. He narrowly escaped punishment as a pirate, as we have seen before, during the British expedition of 1809-10, against the Qawāsīm. At that time, and for several years afterwards he was closely associated with the Wāhhābis; but his ruling motive was enmity towards the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs of Bahrain; and, when in 1816 the Sultān of 'Omān prepared to attack Bahrain and the Wāhhābis took the part of the Āl Khalifah, Rahmah broke with his former allies and connected himself with the 'Omani ruler. The Wāhhābis in consequence, in the same year, expelled him from his principal fort of Dammām on the coast of Hasa and obliged him to retire to Būshehr, where he remained under Persian protection until 1818. He then returned to Hasa to help the Egyptians in their operations against the Wāhhābis, and was rewarded by the latter, when victorious, by being replaced in possession of Dammām. In 1819 Rahmah was expected, both as a political ally of the Sultān of 'Omān and as an enemy of the Wāhhābite Qawāsīm, to assist the British expedition which sailed in that year against Rās-al-Khaimah; but instead of doing so he proceeded, early in 1820, to join the Persian Governor of Fārs in an abortive scheme of forestalling the designs of the Sultān of 'Omān upon Bahrain by means of a Persian descent on those islands. An order for the destruction of Rahmah's vessels was then passed by the commander of the British expedition, but was recalled on the ground of his being a dependent of Persia; and in April 1820 he declined, on the plea of his connection with Persia, an offer of admittance as a party to the General Treaty of Peace between the British Government and the Arab chiefs of the Gulf. In 1822 the Āl Khalifah of Bahrain and Rahmah-bin-Jābir submitted their differences to the arbitration of the British political representatives in the Persian Gulf, and, after ineffectual attempts to reconcile them had been made by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett and Lieutenant McLeod, a settlement was at last arranged by Colonel Stannus in February 1824. Rahmah then turned his attention to the port of Qatif, blockading it and attacking its shipping in order to compel the inhabitants to pay him tribute, or rather blackmail; and these proceedings he continued into the year 1825, disregarding the remonstrances and even the threats of the British political officers, by whom they were regarded as savouring more of piracy than of regular warfare. A new quarrel having broken out at

this juncture between Rahmah and the Āl Khalifah, and the British Resident having declined to intervene except on a condition--to which Rahmah would not agree—that the people of Qatif should be included in any peace arranged, hostilities were resumed and ended with the destruction of Rahmah and his vessel in a set combat with a ship commanded by one of the Āl Khalifah. In his closing years Rahmah was rather a petty territorial ruler, with head-quarters at Dammām, than a pirate; and he had always carefully abstained from offences against the British Government and British subjects; but his death none the less conduced to the establishment of a more settled state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.

On the withdrawal, in or about 1824, of the last of the Egyptian garrisons from Najd, the power of the Wahhābis and their influence in Persian Gulf affairs began to revive; but their name no longer inspired an almost superstitious terror as formerly, and their policy and aims now resembled very closely those of ordinary mundane states. In 1825 the Shaikh of Shārjah professed to be seriously alarmed by the progress of the Wahhābis and sought British support; but it was not until 1830, when, after a contest with the Banī Khālid lasting about six years, the Wahhābis recovered possession of Hasa, that they became once more an important factor in the Persian Gulf. At the end of 1830 a threatened combination between them and the Sultān of 'Omān so alarmed the Shaikhs of Bahrain that, after vainly soliciting help from the British Government, they made submission to the Wahhābi Amīr and undertook to pay him tribute in future; and there was much excitement upon the Pirate Coast, where the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain openly professed themselves partisans of the Wahhābis, but these latter did not make any immediate attempt to profit by the situation. Friendly advances, which reflected his moderate and civilised character, were made by the Wahhābi Amīr Turki-bin-'Abdullah to the Bombay Government in 1831; and, though no treaty was concluded in accordance with his suggestions, he did not fail to receive a courteous answer to his communication. In 1833 the Sultān of 'Omān, having failed to enlist the active co-operation of the British in resisting the encroachments of the Wahhābis upon his dominions, followed the example of the Bahrain Shaikhs by becoming tributary to the Wahhābi Amīr, with whom he also entered into a compact for mutual aid against rebellious subjects; and in 1834 the Wahhābi representative at Baraimi interfered in a struggle which was in progress between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, the two

Revival of
Wahhābi in-
fluence in the
Persian Gulf,
1824-33.

leading chiefs of the Pirate Coast. Simultaneously, however, there was a decrease of Wāhhābi prestige in the direction of Babrain, the Shaikh of which principality in 1833 repudiated his allegiance to the Wāhhābi Amīr and in 1834 wrested from him the island of Tārūt and blockaded the ports of the Hasa coast.

Difficulty between the Sultān of 'Omān and the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1825-26.

At the beginning of the period of Wāhhābi revival, a difficulty occurred between the Sultān of 'Omān and the Pāsha of Baghdād: the cause was a subsidy, claimed by the Sultān as having been granted to his grandfather for helping the Turks to defend Basrah against the Persians in 1775-76, which was withheld by the Pāsha. A naval blockade of Basrah, contemplated in 1825, was actually enforced by Saiyid Sa'id in 1826; and the Pāsha, who had at first denied the claim, and who had refused British mediation, found himself obliged to comply with the 'Omāni ruler's demands and to pay up considerable arrears of the subsidy which were due.

Application by the Pāsha of Baghdād to the British authorities for military assistance, 1827-28.

In 1827 the Pāsha of Baghdād, having been directed by the Porte (in consequence of the danger to the Turkish Empire from Russia) to organise an efficient army in Turkish 'Irāq, had recourse to the British authorities in India, from whom he requested help in the form of a loan of British officers and non-commissioned officers to act as instructors and as superintendents of technical departments, a supply of arms and military stores, and three war vessels of considerable size. The conditions which he proposed were such that the Government of India would not, if they complied, be involved in any expense. The application of the Pāsha was strongly supported by the Government of Bombay, but it was rejected by the Government of India, partly on the ground of unsatisfactory relations which they supposed to exist between the British Government and the Porte,—a decision greatly regretted by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, who thought that the opportunity, except in so far as the Pāsha's request related to naval matters, ought certainly not to have been neglected. The advantages which they considered had been foregone by the refusal of the Government of India were the establishment of British influence in Turkish 'Irāq and the acquisition of a coign of vantage from which the proceedings of Russia in the Middle East might have been carefully watched. The Pasha did not, as the Directors hoped that he might, renew his proposals.

Disturbance in the Persian Coast, insults

While the Wāhhābis were endeavouring to re-establish their position upon the western coasts of the Persian Gulf, the Persian government, favoured by hostilities between the Sultān of 'Omān and the ruling Arab

family of Būshehr and by dissensions among the members of that family, were exerting themselves, not entirely without success, to obtain direct administrative control of the town of Būshehr and its dependencies.

to the British
Residency at
Būshehr, and
proceedings
of the Sultan
of 'Omān,
1826-32.

In September 1826 the Shaikh of Būshehr was captured at sea by the Sultān of 'Omān, who kept him a prisoner at Masqat until May 1827 ; and during the Shaikh's detention a conflict took place among the members of his family for the Governorship of Būshehr. An accidental consequence of this broil was an insult to the British Resident, who had attempted to mediate among the Shaikh's relations. The Residency was withdrawn for a short time from the town of Būshehr to a place in the neighbourhood ; but, on reparation being promised by the Persian Governor of Fārs, it was immediately re-established ; and in 1827 a Persian official was deputed by the Shāh from Tehrān to inquire into and redress the grievances of the British political representative.

About the end of 1828 Timūr Mirza, a son of the Prince Governor of Fārs, was appointed Governor of Būshehr in supersession of the hereditary Shaikh and called upon the Sultān of 'Omān, who had recently married his sister, to help him in establishing his authority. In 1830 the Shaikh was restored to his former position by the Persian Government, and Saiyid Sa'id had then to be restrained by the British authorities from affording active assistance to Timūr Mirza, who was apparently disposed to resist the orders displacing him. In 1832, however, Riza Quli Mirza, a brother of Timūr Mirza, was sent by his father to assume direct control of Būshehr ; and a naval demonstration subsequently made against the town by the Qāsimi Shaikh in the interests of the Shaikh of Būshehr was stultified by the action of the British Resident, who compelled the Qawāsim, by threats of force, to withdraw. Early in 1833 the Persian princeling was obliged to quit Būshehr by a rising against him, headed by one Jamāl Khān of Būshehr and the hereditary chiefs of Tangistān and Dashtistan ; but later in the year, the insurrectionary combination having broken up, the royalists repossessed themselves of the town without serious difficulty. The influence of the British Resident was exerted, throughout this contest, to prevent the commission of excesses ; and a practical appreciation of the value of British support was shown by both sides,—by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who in 1828 made overtures for British protection, and by the Persian Governor of Fārs, who in 1832 advanced an absurd argument, with reference to the Qāsimi demonstration against Būshehr, that it was the duty of the British Government “under treaty with Persia” to protect the Persian Coast against maritime attacks by whomsoever made.

Attack by the
Sultān of
'Omān upon
Bahrain and
resulting
disturbances
at sea in the
Persian Gulf,
1828-29.

In the autumn of 1828 the Sultān of 'Omān, unassisted on this occasion either by the Wahhābis or by the Persians, but accompanied by a contingent of Bani Yās from Abu Dhabi, made a serious attempt to reduce the Shaikhs of Bahrain, who had long since repudiated the position of dependence on Masqat accepted by them in 1820. The Āl Khalifah, however, presented a firm front to Saiyid Sa'id's attack and repulsed it with a loss to the invaders, among whom the Bani Yās were afterwards alleged to have acted treacherously towards their allies, of two vessels and about 500 men.

The extent to which the powers of the Persian Gulf now depended upon British protection against one another in maritime matters was illustrated by a complaint which the senior Shaikh of Bahrain, as a party to the General Treaty of Peace, immediately brought against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who was also a signatory, in respect of the Sultān of 'Omān's descent upon Bahrain. He was informed in reply that the incident must be regarded as one of legitimate warfare and therefore as not coming within the scope of the Treaty ; and the result was the equipment by him of a fleet for the purpose of making reprisals upon the Sultān of 'Omān. As was common in such circumstances, whether from excitement or through mistake, actions practically indistinguishable from piracy followed, the principal being the plundering and sinking of a neutral Murbāt vessel by the 'Atbi squadron ; and it became necessary for the Resident to enforce, by means of armed demonstration, the payment of partial compensation by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the sufferers in the case of the Murbāt vessel. In 1829, not without pressure applied to the Shaikhs of Bahrain by the British Resident, a reconciliation took place between them and the Sultān of 'Omān, of which a principal condition was the recognition by Saiyid Sa'id of the independence of Bahrain.

Rebellion in
Qatar
against the
authority of
the Shaikh
of Bahrain,
1835.

Another event by which the security of the Gulf was considerably endangered occurred in 1835, when the people of Huwailah in Qatar, then a dependency of Bahrain, rebelled and joined with some disaffected members of the Bahrain ruling family and a number of Wahhābi subjects in committing maritime irregularities. The immediate consequence was the secession of a body of Āl Bin 'Ali and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribesmen, under a daring and energetic leader named 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, to Abu Dhabi where they came for the time being, under the restrictions of the General Treaty of Peace.

The first
Maritime
Truce, 1835,
and Restriction

The General Treaty of Peace of 1820, while it prohibited "plunder and piracy" at sea, was no bar to regular naval hostilities and it was

therefore inadequate—in a region where warfare between petty Arab states was frequent, and where, as many examples showed, fighting of any kind was apt to give rise to piratical practices affecting neutrals—to ensure the maintenance of security at sea in a full and proper degree. The disadvantages of a system of mutual rapine was quickly perceived by the more intelligent among the signatories of the Treaty as soon as under its provisions they began to enjoy, in however limited a degree, the blessings of peace; and a desire sprang up, on the part of some of them, for further restrictions upon the use of force. When maritime war prevailed in the summer months, it was apt to disturb, and even to prevent, those pearl diving operations which were the principal resource of all the sea-faring Arab tribes; and it was clear that, if hostilities could be confined to the pearlers' off-season, the change would be a notable boon to all, even to the combatants. Accordingly in 1835, immediately after the final outbreak of piracy among the Bani Yās, the question was taken up by Captain Hennell, the Resident at Būshehr; and he ultimately succeeded in arranging a Maritime Truce, to be observed by the leading Shaikhs of the Pirate Coast and their subjects, from the 21st May to the 21st November of that year. The Truce was received with acclamation by all of those whom it principally concerned. It proved to be the first of a series of Truces, the enforcement of which, together with that of the General Treaty against piracy, in the end brought about a state of perfect maritime security in the Persian Gulf; and from the year 1835 the tract hitherto described as the "Pirate Coast" may legitimately, and even more appropriately, be referred to as "Trucial 'Omān."

tive Line,
1836.

In 1836 an additional limitation was imposed by the British authorities, without treaty, upon hostile operations at sea, which the Arab tribes were required to conduct for the future, at such times as no Truce existed, exclusively in certain defined waters adjoining their own coasts. Notwithstanding an opinion expressed by the Court of Directors of the East India Company so lately as 1834, that it could be inexpedient to assume that general protectorate over the Arab tribes "which would be implied in our prohibiting wars and becoming the arbitrators of all their disputes," the chiefs adhering to the Truce were given to understand that infringements of the same should be reported to the British political authorities, by whom they would be punished in the same manner as acts of piracy had hitherto been; but the success of the measure justified the departure, if such it were, from the established policy of the Company.

British enter-
prise in Tur-
kish 'Irāq,
1834-36.

The development of Turkish 'Irāq seems to have become, about this time, an object of concern to the British Government. Their motives in the matter appear to have been partly economic, but partly also political. They were anxious to discover the best line for postal communication with India, and this they seem to have supposed might be afforded by the Persian Gulf and the great water-ways of Mesopotamia, rather than by the Red Sea and the Egyptian overland route; but it is probable that they were also influenced by considerations connected with the apprehended competition of Russia for political influence in the Middle East. A report on the administrative and economic position in Turkish 'Irāq was submitted to the British Government at the end of 1834 by the traveller Mr. J. B. Fraser, who had been commissioned by them to investigate it upon the spot. Early in 1835 an expedition under Colonel F. R. Chesney, R.A., left England for Turkish Arabia to make an experiment, for which the permission of the Porte had been obtained, and for which the British Parliament had granted £20,000 and the East India Company £5,000, in the direction of introducing steam navigation upon the Euphrates. Two river steamers were launched upon the upper Euphrates in the course of 1835-36; but one of them, the "Tigris," was unfortunately lost in a storm within a few weeks after her completion. The remaining vessel, the "Euphrates" navigated on the rivers Euphrates, Shatt-al-'Arab and Tigris, of which surveys were made, during the rest of the year; but in December the expedition was broken up, and the "Euphrates" was then transferred on a valuation from the British Government to the East India Company. The experiment, in so far as it related to the establishment of rapid and certain communication between England and India, cannot be described as a success; and in 1837 the Red Sea route, which was better suited for the conveyance of passengers and goods, was officially adopted.

British Trade in the Persian Gulf, 1810-36.

In regard to commerce, the period with which we are now concerned was chiefly remarkable in the Persian Gulf for the cessation of the trade hitherto carried on by the servants of the East India Company for the Company's benefit, as well as of that in which they had hitherto been permitted to engage on their own account. Restrictions upon private

trade by the Company's servants are first mentioned in connection with the Residency at Masqat, where such trade was forbidden as early as 1805, and where the prohibition was expressly renewed in 1809 on the appointment of a new Resident; but it was not, apparently until 1822 that an order for the discontinuance of private trade by "Political officers of all ranks and descriptions" was issued and became applicable to the Būshehr Residency, where it had up to this time been permitted. A reasonable time was allowed to the officer affected by the new order for closing their business transactions, and the official salaries of some of those affected by the change were increased by way of compensation. The trade monopoly of the East India Company in their corporate capacity was abolished, in its application to India and the countries immediately dependent thereon, in 1813; and, from a quotation in official correspondence, it would seem that the trade of the Persian Gulf had then already been thrown open to all by a Resolution of the Bombay Government dated 2nd July 1811. Some business continued, however, to be conducted in the name of the Company until 1819, when it was reported that sales of their goods were made periodically—instead of day by day, as formerly—at the Būshehr Residency. After 1819 there are no references to the East India Company's trade, and it seems probable that it came to an end with the private trade of their servants, after the closing of which the company must frequently have been represented by officers without mercantile knowledge or experience.

British establishments and official organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1810-36.

At the beginning of 1810 four separate and independent political Residencies were maintained by the Government of India at Baghdād, Basrah, Būshehr and Masqat, of which those in Turkish 'Irāq and Persia had been since 1806, and that at Masqat from an earlier date, entirely subordinate to the Government of Bombay. The Residency at Masqat, however, was vacant at this time, through the recent death of an incumbent. All business of a character in any sense local to the Gulf, such as the expedition against the Qawāsīm in 1809-10, was as yet left to the handling of the Bombay Government.

Absorption of
the Masqat
Residency
into that of
Būshehr, and
of the
Baghdād
Residency
into that of
Basrah.

The question of a reduction of the British political establishments in the Gulf came under consideration in 1809-10 in consequence of the cessation of danger from France ; and it was resolved by the Government of India that their political representation in the Gulf region should ultimately, if it were found possible, be concentrated in one Residency ; but the desired reduction was obviously too considerable, notwithstanding the supposed extirpation of piracy by the late expedition against the Qawāsīm, to be effected all at once. In January 1810 General Malcolm, then starting on his third mission to Persia, recommended that the Residency at Masqat should be abolished, the representation of British interest in the 'Oman Sultanate and on the Arab coast generally being entrusted thereafter to the Resident at Būshehr, who should be furnished with such assistance as would enable him to undertake the work thus imposed on him in addition to his former duties. The suggestion seems to have been accepted at once by the Government of India ; and Mr. Hankey Smith, Resident at Būshehr, who accompanied General Malcolm on the voyage from Bombay to the Gulf, was ordered to take Masqat under his charge and was provided with two Assistants, Messrs. Babington and Williams of the Civil Service, in addition to his existing Assistant (Lieutenant Bruce) at Būshehr ; but he was not employed, as had been proposed by General Malcolm, to negotiate with the Arab tribes on the conclusion of the anti-piratical expedition then in progress, the reason, however, probably being that the necessity for a regular settlement with the tribes was not as yet properly appreciated. On the 1st May 1810 Mr. H. Smith informed the Government of Bombay that "the pernicious effect of the climate of Maskat obliged him to resign all further charge of the duties of that station," at which—it may perhaps be inferred—he had been instructed to reside ; but Government, in permitting him to relinquish it, directed his Assistants Messrs. Babington and Williams to remain at Būshehr, and exhorted them to qualify themselves... "for future employment in the Gulph by acquiring a thorough and practical knowledge both of Persian and Arabic." Meanwhile search was to be made for a station more healthy than Masqat from which the affairs of 'Oman might be supervised. The horror in which Masqat was held at this time by the East India Company's servants is not difficult to understand if it is remembered that the climate had already proved fatal to all the four Residents who had held office there since the foundation of the Residency in 1800. On Mr. H. Smith's withdrawal to Būshehr, where he remained as Resident for about a year longer, British concerns in 'Oman were probably left to the care of a Native Agent, as formerly.

Meanwhile the Residency at Baghdād, instituted in 1798, was done away with; and the Resident at Basrah became responsible for all political duties in Turkish 'Irāq; but this change, as the remaining Resident made Baghdād his head-quarters, was in effect an abolition rather of the Residency at Basrah, where from this time onwards a European Political Assistant was generally stationed.

On the 29th March 1811 Mr. H. Smith, who belonged to the Civil Service, resigned the Būshehr Residency; and the question of appointing a successor to him had to be faced. The opinion of the Bombay Government in 1810, in view at first of General Malcolm's presence in Persia on his third mission to the Shāh and later of the appointment of Sir Gore Ouseley to represent the British Government at Tehrān, had been that the Būshehr appointment might be deprived of its political character and reduced to the status of a Commercial Residency, held by an officer on pay lower than that of Mr. Smith. Acting on these principles, they at once cut down the military guard at Būshehr on Mr. Smith's departure and suggested to Lieutenant Bruce, the Assistant who remained there in charge, the propriety of his corresponding with themselves in future instead of with the Government of India,—a hint with which that officer did not, apparently, consider it his duty * to comply. The Government of India, who intended that Lieutenant Bruce † should be appointed to the vacant post on a salary less than that enjoyed by Mr. Smith but greater than that allowable to a purely commercial Resident—for, they pointed out, a number of political functions must still be discharged by the officer at Būshehr—having inculcated the necessity of liberal treatment on the Government of Bombay, the latter, misunderstanding the intention, proposed a scheme for placing the Būshehr Residency “upon a basis of equal efficiency and respectability with the several Political Residencies in India.” The Government of India found themselves compelled to protest against some expensive proposals by the Government of Bombay, involving the appointment of a Civil Servant to Būshehr, to which this misconception gave rise, and to combat an analogy which it had been sought to establish between Būshehr and Baghdād, and they continued to urge the

Reduction of
the status of
the Bushehr
Residency,
1811.

* From this it would appear that the orders of 1806 must have been rescinded, perhaps in consequence of the general powers with which General Malcolm, the Envoy of the Governor-General, was invested on his Second Mission in 1808.

† Lieutenant Bruce had been more than twelve years Assistant at Būshehr and had acted, during a great part of that time, as Resident.

selection of Lieutenant Bruce; but the Government of Bombay, while they consented to reduce the emoluments of the post as proposed by themselves, apparently insisted on conferring it on a Mr. Flower of the Civil Service, remarking: "The orders of the Honourable Court and the claims of the * Civil Service are a bar to whatever expectations Mr. Bruce may have formed of being advanced beyond the station of an assistant at Bushire, and it is only out of consideration to the length of his services in that capacity that we are restrained from abolishing the situation of assistant at that Residency." Mr. Flower, however, did not in the end proceed to the Gulf; and the office of Resident at Būshehr appears to have been filled continuously by Lieutenant Bruce from the departure of Mr. Smith in 1811 until his own removal in 1822, during which period he had charge of the British political interests in every part of the Gulf except Turkish 'Irāq. With effect from the 4th July 1812 the Būshehr Residency came under the control of the Bombay Government, to whom the expenses of maintaining it were thereafter debited.

The scale of pay prevailing at this time in the political service in the Persian Gulf appears from the correspondence in this case between the Government of India and the Government of Bombay, and it may be quoted for comparison with the rates in force at the present time. The regular salary of the Resident at Būshehr in his commercial capacity was only Rs. 600 per mensem; but Mr. Smith, as Political and Commercial Resident, drew a salary of Rs. 1,500 a month exclusive of allowances amounting to Rs. 1,200 monthly "for contingencies† and table expenses," to which a supplementary salary of Rs. 500 a month, making Rs. 3,200 in all, was added on the suppression of the Masqat Residency. The expenditure originally proposed by the Bombay Government in 1811 was Rs. 2,950 a month; but it was subsequently reduced to Rs. 2,300, of which Rs. 1,690 represented the salary and personal allowances of the Resident. The emoluments solicited by Mr. Bruce were the salary of a Commercial Resident, or Rs. 600 per mensem, and allowances at the same rate as Mr. Smith's, or Rs. 1,200 per mensem, making Rs. 1,800 a month altogether. The salary of a Political Assistant in the Gulf seems to have been ordinarily Rs. 400 or Rs. 500 a month; and the Assistant at Būshehr was apparently authorised, while the public trade of the Company continued, to charge a commission of two per cent. on Persian produce procured through him.

* Lieutenant Bruce was an officer of the East India Company's marine.

† These apparently included house rent, servants, etc.

In 1812 the title of "Resident at Basrah," being no longer in accordance with the facts, was changed to that of "Political Agent in Turkish Arabia," and the holder was authorised to reside either at Baghdād or at Basrah, as he might find advisable, and to station his Assistant at whichever place he did not select for his own head-quarters. The Political Agent, however, who under these orders made his abode at Baghdād, was almost always described as "Resident at Baghdād."

Conversion
the Basrah
Residency
into a Political
Agency in
Turkish
Arabia, 1812.

In May 1822 orders were issued for carrying into effect the long-contemplated economy and reform by which all British concerns in the Persian Gulf and in Turkish 'Irāq were to be brought under the control of a single officer. Mr. Rich, Resident at Baghdād—or, more correctly, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia—having died, Captain Bruce, Resident at Būshehr, was directed to assume charge of the combined Residencies as soon as he should have wound up the commercial business in which, like other political officers of the day, he had been engaged on his own account, but which, under an order applying to the whole Political Department, was prohibited for the future. In consideration of the loss which he must suffer in being thus debarred from trade, his salary, apart from allowances, was raised (probably from Rs. 600) to Rs. 1,200 per mensem, and Captain Taylor, the acting Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who became his Assistant for affairs in that country, received an increased salary of Rs. 600 a month for the same reason. The new "Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia," as he was styled, was authorised to make either the island of Qishm, where a British military detachment was at the time stationed, or Basrah his head-quarters; and, in case of his removing from Būshehr, as contemplated in his instructions, he was to leave a Native Agent at that port. On the 1st November 1822, however, possibly before the arrangements ordered had come into force, Captain Bruce was removed from his post on account of an unauthorised engagement into which he had recently entered with the Government of Shirāz, and the amalgamation of the Residencies was countermanded by the Government of Bombay "in consideration of the removal of "our troops from Kishm, and the necessity that will exist for "Lieutenant McLeod's directing his whole attention to the conciliation of the Arab tribes." Political powers were exercised, it should be noted, by the military officer in command of the British military detachment which was maintained on Qishm from 1820 to 1822.

Temporary or
nominal
reorganisation
in 1822.

The Political Agency in Turkish Arabia (or "at Basrah," as it was also called) was then re-established, and Captain Taylor was appointed

Re-establish-
ment of the

Political
Agency in
Turkish
Arabia, and
its subsequent
history,
1822-32.

Agent on a salary of Rs. 800 a month, with a table allowance of Rs. 600 a month which in 1824 was increased to Rs. 1,000. In 1824 the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia was made subordinate in some respects to the Resident at Būshehr, with whose instructions in all matters affecting the maritime Arabs and the Persian Coast he was directed to comply, and whom he was ordered to furnish with copies of all his despatches; but in the affairs of Turkish 'Irāq he retained freedom of action, subject to a proviso that without the sanction of the Resident at Būshehr he should undertake nothing by which British interests in the Gulf generally might be compromised. After 1828 the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia sometimes resided at Baghdād, where political business could be more easily transacted than at Basrah; and from 1832 onwards Baghdād seems to have been his regular head-quarters. The actual expenses of the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia were Rs. 60,068 for the year from 1st February 1828 to 31st January 1829, when it was still located at Basrah; they included the staff and regimental allowances of a European military officer by whom the Residency guard was then commanded, and the allowances of a Civil Surgeon.

History of
the Būshehr
Residency,
1822-34.

The Būshehr Residency, on account of the conspicuous duties which the Resident had to perform in connection with the repression of piracy, enjoyed at this time much higher prestige and consideration than the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia, which was, as we have seen, in some respects subordinate to it; but the emoluments of the Resident at Būshehr did not differ greatly, on the average from those of the officer at Basrah or Baghdād. For Lieutenant McLeod, who died of fever in 1823 within a year of his appointment, a fixed travelling allowance at the rate of Rs. 500 a month to be drawn by him while absent from head-quarters was sanctioned: the object of this allowance was to encourage active touring by the Resident, especially to the ports of the chiefs who were signatories of the Treaty of 1820. Colonel Stannus, who succeeded Lieutenant McLeod, received a salary of Rs. 1,500 a month and a table allowance of Rs. 600 per mensem; and in November 1831, in consequence of orders from the Court of Directors of the East India Company that the Residency should be conferred upon a Civil Servant, it was given to Mr. Blane, whose personal allowances while holding the appointment aggregated Rs. 2,800 a month. Mr. Blane replaced Dr. McNeill of the Bombay medical establishment apparently the same officer who afterwards rose to the high post of British Minister at Tehrān. The cost of maintenance of the Būshehr Residency from 1st

May 1829 to 30th April 1830 was Rs. 78,524; and at Būshehr at this period, as in Turkish 'Irāq, the Residency guard was commanded by a British officer, and there was a Civil Surgeon. From 1823 to 1834, it should be observed, the office of British Envoy at Tehrān was filled by nominees of the Government of India, not of the British Government,—at first Sir J. Macdonald Kinneir and then Sir J. Campbell; and, perhaps in connection with this change, a scheme was propounded by the Court of Directors in 1834 for diminishing the political expenditure in the Persian Gulf by reducing the status of their officer at Būshehr from that of Resident to that of Assistant to the British Envoy at Tehrān; but the Assistant was to be invested with considerable discretion (besides power to refer, in an emergency, to the Government of Bombay) in matters concerning the Arab powers of the Gulf. The Bombay Government, however, protested strongly against this anomalous arrangement, which they considered must lead to the nomination of officers of insufficient experience to the difficult position of British representative at Būshehr,—a position that was likely to become even more difficult if, as had been proposed by the Governor-General of India, the duty of watching over the maritime peace should hereafter be transferred from the Indian to the Royal Navy; they foresaw no advantage from the Arab tribes being brought under the surveillance, even indirect, of the British Envoy at Tehrān; and they were unwilling to incur the divided responsibility which might be forced upon them by a reference from the officer at Būshehr upon the occurrence of a crisis in Gulf affairs. In deference to their objections, evidently, the project was abandoned.

The idea of establishing a British station on an island in the Gulf, despite the unfortunate experiences of the British detachment on Qishm, was not yet dead. In 1827, doubtless in consequence of the disturbances which had recently occurred at Būshehr, Major Wilson, the Resident, was ordered to visit and report on several places in the Gulf to which the Residency might in case of need be transferred. He recommended Khārag, and his recommendation was supported by the Governor of Bombay, Sir J. Malcolm, who had for nearly twenty years strongly advocated the British occupation of Khārag. A Civil Finance Committee, appointed in 1830 to enquire into the finances of British India, however, condemned the Khārag plan as likely to entail an increase, rather than to facilitate a reduction, of expenditure; and their view was justified by an estimate framed by the Acting Resident in 1831, which showed that, while a saving of half a lakh of rupees a year in civil

expenditure would be compatible with the occupation of Khārag, there would be an inevitable increase in the military budget of two lakhs of rupees annually, exclusive of an initial outlay of one lakh upon buildings and the cost of periodical repairs to the same. The Khārag scheme, therefore, was again quietly laid upon the shelf.

The possibility of an amalgamation of the Būshehr and Basrah or Baghdād appointments, contemplated in 1810 and for a short time realised, or all but realised, in 1822, had meanwhile been kept in view; and the Civil Finance Committee of 1830 pronounced in its favour, and were apparently supported in this, as in the rest of their recommendations, by the Government of India; but the Court of Directors of the East India Company, when the general question of administrative reorganisation in the Persian Gulf finally came before them in 1834, decided that, in view of the political situation in the Middle East, the abolition of the separate Agency in Turkish Arabia was for the time being impracticable.

Administra-
tive charges
in 1835.

In 1835, in which year the general charge of British interests in Persia was retransferred from the Indian to the Home Government and Mr. H. Ellis proceeded as British Ambassador to Tehrān, the British political representative in Turkish 'Irāq, who since 1806 had been (with an interval, perhaps, from 1808 to 1811) subordinate to the Government of Bombay, came instead under the direct orders of the Government of India. Such being already the position of the Resident at Bushehr, all the British establishment maintained in the Persian Gulf were from this date under the immediate control* of the Government of India. It was proposed in 1835, to abolish the post of Assistant to the Resident at Būshehr, but the change was at first postponed and then vetoed.

Marine and
river surveys,
1810-36.

It was during the period with which we are now concerned that the first regular marine survey of the Persian Gulf was made. Charts of a kind for the guidance of vessels in the Gulf already existed in 1785, and these Lieutenant John McCluer, a self-taught surveyor of the East India Company's Marine, had devoted himself assiduously to correcting during a period of three years' service in the Gulf, the result of his voluntary labours being a chart of the whole north-eastern side of that sea and of the Shatt-al-'Arab up to Basrah, accompanied by a memoir, besides plans of the harbours of Masqat, Basrah, and other ports. The south-western or Arabian shores of the Gulf, however, remained for the most part practically unknown; and in 1810, giving the commanders of the British expedition against the Qawāsim

* Correspondence, however, was apparently sent under flying seal through the Government of Bombay, *vide* page 1339, and complete control was not transferred to the Government of India until 1873, *vide* page 265.

detailed instructions for the visitation of piratical ports, the only map with which the Government of Bombay could supply them was a "topographical sketch" by one Saiyid Taqi, showing roughly the positions of eight or nine piratical places to the south-west of Ras-al-Khaimah. In 1811 a surveying officer was placed on board the East India Company's cruiser "Benares" in the Persian Gulf, but the nature of the duties on which the vessel was employed made systematic operations by him impossible. Towards the end of 1815 orders for a regular survey were issued by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, but danger from pirates made their execution impracticable. In 1817 a memoir on the ports and pearl banks of Bahrain, together with surveys, was prepared by Lieutenant Tanner of the Bombay Marine; but it was not until 1820, on the conclusion of the third expedition against the Qawāsīm, that a proper survey of the southern and western waters of the Gulf, beginning at Rās Musandam, was undertaken by Captain P. Maughan in the "Discovery," assisted by Lieutenant J. M. Guy in the "Psyche." Lieutenant Guy succeeded to the direction of this survey in November 1821, and he had carried his operations as far as the promontory of Qatar when, in February 1823, his place was taken by Lieutenant G. B. Brucks. Lieutenant Brucks completed the survey of the Arabian coast, which occupied him until 1825; and early in 1826 he began work on the Persian coast and islands, to which the following two years were devoted. In 1828 operations were begun in the Gulf of 'Omān under his command, and were continued by Lieutenant S. B. Haines, who finished the Makrān coast to Karāchi in 1829: the 'Omān side had previously been completed down to Masqat. This first marine survey of the Persian Gulf, partly from the smallness of the vessels employed, was a most arduous and painful service; and a lamentably large proportion of the officers employed on it either died or broke down in health from the effects of climate and hardship.

A survey, for purposes of navigation, of the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, made by Colonel Chesney's expedition in 1836, is noticed in another place.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY TO THE INSTITUTION OF REGULAR STEAM COMMUNICATION AND MAIL SERVICES, 1836-62.

The period which followed the extirpation of piracy in the Persian Gulf was one of transition, during which that sea and its shores emerged from the barbarous obscurity that had enshrouded them since the connection of

Britain with their affairs began into the comparative civilisation and notoriety which they enjoy to-day. The arts of peace and of war, the requirements of commerce, of diplomacy, of military strategy, had all a part in promoting this great change.

Conflict of Russian and British policy in Persia and Afghanistan, to 1842.

Reference has already been made to the concern which the activity of Russia beyond the Caucasus and the Caspian had begun to arouse, at the close of the last period, in those responsible for the defence of British India or connected therewith as military or naval officers.

Objects of
British and
Russian
policy in
Persia and
Afghanistan.

The design generally attributed to Russia was one of breaking down the Persian and Afghan kingdoms, which formed a barrier athwart all paths leading from her territories in the direction of British India. She was careful not to proceed too fast or too openly ; but to doubt that she really entertained some such scheme would be to disregard many palpable indications and to impeach of inexcusable errors and folly all the statesmen by whom British policy in the East was directed. It is probable that neither Russian nor British politicians had at this time any adequate conception of the difficulties, physical and political, which interference in the vast, rugged, uncivilised zone separating the frontiers, as they then were, would involve ; for of the region in question nothing was as yet known by practical experience, save from the standpoint of the isolated traveller. The scheme on both sides was to press forward and forestall the adversary in the acquisition of political influence ; this was with a view on the part of Russia to aggressive, on that of Britain to defensive action.

Discussions
on the sub-
ject of
British policy
in Persia, to
1836.

In 1834 Dr. J. McNeill, the physician of the British Legation at Tehran, proceeded to England and there initiated journalistic and literary discussions of Russian expansion in Asia which soon attracted general attention. He was assisted by Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Bailli Fraser, the traveller, the latter of whom remained for some time afterwards as a sort of "Oriental reporter" at Downing Street. Shortly before his return to Tehrān, where he was at this juncture appointed British Minister, Dr. McNeill published a pamphlet entitled "The Progress of Russia in the East," in which he argued that it was to the interest of Britain to preserve, at all costs, the integrity of Persia.

The chief cause to which the Russian question, existing in a latent form since 1828 or even since 1804, owed its appearance in the field of public debate was probably the accession to the throne of Persia in 1834 of Muhammad Shāh, whose conduct gave the impression of his being subservient, or likely to become so, to Russian policy. Fat-h 'Ali Khān, notwithstanding the Treaty of Turkmanchai, resisted successfully to his dying day the establishment of a permanent Russian Mission at Tehrān; but his grandson was more compliant. The new Shāh, after a Russian Minister had been definitely established at his Court, seemed to consult him no less freely and intimately than he did the British representative. It is possible that the Shāh's cousins, the sons of the Farmān-Farmā of Fārs, were countenanced by the British Government as potential rivals to Muhammad Shāh; and their reception in England in 1835 probably made an unfavourable impression on that ruler and contributed to his estrangement from Britain.

Immediate cause of a Russo-British crisis in Persia, 1834-36.

The relative strength of British and Russian influence at the Persian Court and the dissimilar manner in which the designs of the Shāh upon Herat were viewed by the British and Russian representatives at Tehrān are described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast and Islands. Muscovite influence was decidedly in the ascendant, and Russia favoured the idea of a Persian attack on Herat. That town and its districts were a part of Afghanistan, but they formed a principality which was politically detached from the rest of the country, being still governed by a branch of the Sadozai family; and they seemed not unlikely to go down before a military effort of even such moderate strength as Persia might be expected to put forth. If Herat were annexed to Persia, it would come *ipso facto* under Russian influence and might be made the seat of a Russian political agent for the prosecution of further designs in Afghanistan. If, on the other hand, Persia failed at Herat, she would be weakened and would fall more completely into the hands of the foreign power predominant at her capital. In any case Britain could not but oppose all acts of Persian interference in Afghanistan and must so, of necessity, make herself disagreeable to the Shāh. British influence was as a matter of fact exerted to prevent the Herat enterprise, though without success; and British representations contributed to its abandonment in the end by the Shāh, not however until weight had been lent them by the occupation* of Khārag Island in

Persian expedition to Herat and British occupation of Khārag Island, 1837-38.

* Sir H. Rawlinson (*England and Russia in the East*, p. 59) seems to question the existence of any real connection between the British occupation of Khārag and the Persian withdrawal from Herat; but in this he seems to stand alone among eminent authorities. There can of course be no doubt that the determined character of the defence of Herat, inspired by Pottinger, was a more important factor than any other in the failure of the Persians.

the Persian Gulf by a force from India, and perhaps by rumours that a British invasion of Afghanistan was being prepared.

Burnes' Mission to Kābul and First Afghan War, 1837-42.

The development of events on the Afghan (side) had no very direct connection with Persian Gulf affairs, but it must be mentioned. In 1837 Lieutenant Burnes, afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes, was deputed to Kābul by Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, chiefly to negotiate an understanding with Dōst Muhammad Khān, the Bārakzai ruler of North-Eastern Afghanistan. This British Mission, from various causes, failed in its principal object; while a less formal Russian Mission to Kābul, conducted by one Witkewitch or Vicovitch, who was afterwards disowned by the Russian Government and committed suicide, achieved an apparent but only temporary success. Lord Auckland then determined to remove the reigning Amīr of Kābul from power in the interests of Shah Shujā', an ex-ruler of Afghanistan belonging to the old Sadozai dynasty, who had resided in India for many years as a political refugee and pensioner of the British authorities. A British invasion of Afghanistan and the First Afghan War (1838-42) ensued, resulting in the occupation of Kābul and other points in the country, and in the surrender and removal to India of Dōst Muhammad Khān. The occupation of Kābul, however, ended disastrously, and field operations were renewed in order to rehabilitate the prestige of the British arms in the East, an object which they in a considerable degree effected. The notion of imposing a Sadozai ruler on the Afghan people having been abandoned, Afghanistan was ultimately evacuated by the British troops and Dōst Muhammad Khān replaced in possession of Kābul and its dependencies, while Qandahār and its territories continued under the government of other members of the Bārakzai family,—to be annexed, however, some years later by the ruler of Kābul.

The First Afghan War, which was fought under precarious conditions across the whole breadth of the then independent states of the Punjab and Sind, has been condemned as a political blunder * of the first magnitude; and it is not impossible that, with reflection, some less dangerous and costly expedient for counteracting Russian intrigue in Afghanistan, on its first appearance, might have been found. But the principle on which the war was fought, the exclusion of Russian influence from the vicinity of India, must be admitted to have been sound; and it might also be argued that the military experience and political knowledge gained by Britain, to say

* The Duke of Wellington is said to have been a severe critic of the policy followed.

nothing of the plain warning held out to Russia, formed an adequate return for the bloody and expensive campaign of 1838-42.

To return to Persia : the withdrawal of the Persian army from before Herat did not end the tension between Britain and Persia. The British Government had other specific grievances against the Government of the Shāh besides the Herat expedition ; and, in the undefined state of relations between the two countries, fresh ones quickly came into existence, of which two arose from events at Būshehr. It was not until late in 1839, after the failure of a Persian Mission to Europe by which various Foreign Offices besides that in London had been approached, that the Shāh began to manifest a conciliatory disposition ; and it was only in 1841, that a full and satisfactory settlement was arranged,—including the signature of a Treaty of Commerce, which had until then been obstinately refused,—or that the British Minister was able to return to Tehrān, which he had quitted. Kharag was evacuated early in 1842, a proposal for its purchase by Britain having previously been negatived by Her Majesty's Government on the ground of the pretext which might be afforded to Russia for corresponding action in the north.

Continued friction and ultimate settlement between Britain and Persia, 1838-41.

As the prospect of success in her designs grew smaller, the hostile attitude of Russia towards Britain in Persia and Afghanistan was relaxed. In 1838 Russia renewed the pledge, given originally in 1834, to abstain from aggression on Persia ; and later a Russian Minister professed that the Tsar had counselled the Shāh to submit to Britain's demands for a settlement. Nevertheless the Russian Government feigned to believe that the Āghā Khān's rebellion against the Shāh in 1838-39 had been instigated from Bombay, and that the British traveller Layard was responsible for the revolt of a Bakhtiyāri chief in 1840-41. The British disaster at Kābul at the end of 1841 seemed to offer a good opportunity for the resumption by Russia of a forward policy in Persia and Afghanistan ; but the magnitude of the British operations in Afghanistan had impressed her, as had also their apparent failure, which she took as a lesson to herself ; and she had, besides, difficulties of her own in the Caucasus and with Khiva.

Diminished opposition of Russia to Britain after 1838.

During the remainder of Muhammad Shāh's reign Britain and Russia actually co-operated with a view to the delimitation of the Perso-Turkish frontier ; and at his death their representatives in Persia acted in harmony in order to prevent a dispute over the succession.

Endeavours to establish communication between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, and incidental opening up of Turkish 'Irāq, 1837-61.

Towards the close of the last period, as has been mentioned, an expedition under Colonel Chesney had been fitted out at the expense of Her Majesty's Government and the Honourable East India Company with a view to the institution of communication between Europe and India, if possible, by means of steamers on Euphrates. It was characteristic of the age that one ground on which the undertaking was recommended was that it might indirectly strengthen Turkey and Persia against Russia. Colonel Chesney's great experiment gave disappointing results, but the scheme of through communication was not immediately abandoned.

Unsuccessful effort of the East India Company to utilise the Euphrates as a steamer route, their armed flotilla, and the British stationnaire at Baghdād, 1837-42.

A steamer surviving from Colonel Chesney's expedition was made over at the beginning of 1837 to the East India Company, by whom in 1840 three additional steamers for river work, all iron-built and heavily armed, were placed on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq. The remarkable flotilla thus formed,—the existence of which does not seem to have disquieted the Porte,—was done away with in the summer of 1842, a thorough examination of the Euphrates from Basrah to Maskanah by two of the steamers during the previous year having shown that the river was for practical purposes unnavigable by vessels of their class. One steamer of the flotilla was retained on the Tigris, however, as a stationnaire or yacht for the British Political Agency at Baghdād. Before the removal of the bulk of the flotilla to India, the lower Kārūn as well as the Euphrates and Tigris had been explored by its vessels.

Question of British rights of commercial navigation on the Tigris, 1845-46.

The presence of Government steamers on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq suggested the idea of commercial navigation by private steamers, and British merchants at Baghdād began to study the question. They were not able to take practical steps in the matter at once, but their intentions gave greater importance to a question which arose in 1845 regarding the title of British vessels to navigate the internal waters of Mesopotamia under the British flag. In 1846 a Vizirial letter was obtained through the exertions of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of which the meaning, according to the most favourable construction, was that British-owned vessels, without distinction of class, should continue to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates under their national colours, as they had done in the past.

In 1856-57, with countenance of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the support of the Hon'ble East India Company, a British Company was formed for the construction of a Euphrates Valley Railway connecting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf, and even obtained from the Porte a concession for the undertaking. Subsequently the promoters, among whom were Mr. Andrew, the originator of the scheme, and Colonel Chesney, the leader of the Mesopotamian expedition of 1835-37, sought a financial guarantee for the enterprise from the British Government of the day; but they failed to secure one, and the concession lapsed.

Proposed Euphrates Valley Railway, 1856-57.

This was not, it may be observed, the first project for a Railway to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. Another had been propounded previously in or about 1840.

In 1861 the "City of London," the first steamer to ply on the waters of Turkish 'Irāq for commercial purposes, was placed on the Tigris by Messrs. Lynch & Co., a British firm at Baghdād, but associated in this matter with other shareholders under the name of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Limited. As the Vizirial letter of 1846 seemed an insufficient basis on which to risk a considerable amount of capital, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had endeavoured in 1859-61 to obtain a regular concession or Farmān for steam navigation in the name of the Company. A document was granted, but it was not of the sort desired and, while it contained nothing new, it added materially to the confusion and uncertainty in which the question of British rights of internal navigation was involved.

Introduction of commercial steam navigation on the Tigris, 1861.

The largeness and almost exclusiveness of the part played by Britain in the opening up of Turkish 'Irāq by navigation, and by explorations and surveys to be mentioned later, begot in the minds of the local British officers about this time a habit of regarding the province almost as a British protectorate.

Disturbance of the political equilibrium of the Persian Gulf by Central Arabian factors, 1839-53.

During the period now in question Central Arabia became, during a few years, a focus from which disturbing influences radiated to different parts of the Persian Gulf.

Egyptian
aggressions,
1839-40.

The expansion of Egypt, a process initiated in 1831, began in 1839 to threaten seriously the districts bordering on the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding an assurance previously given by Muhammad 'Ali to the British representative at Cairo that his conquests would not take an easterly direction. In 1838 the Egyptian forces had overrun Najd, installing an Amīr subservient to Egypt; and towards the end of that year, or early in the next, the maritime province of Hasa and its ports were occupied by them. An Egyptian political agency was established at Kuwait, probably as an outpost in the direction of Turkish 'Irāq; and the proceedings of the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief in Najd soon showed that it was his aim to reduce Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate to dependence upon Egypt.

The Government of India, aware that the encroachments of Muhammad 'Ali in Western Turkey were regarded unfavourably by Her Majesty's Government, at once took steps through the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to frustrate the Egyptian designs in the Gulf. The defence of the Bahrain Islands by a British naval force was authorised; the Shaikhs and tribes of Trucial 'Omān were encouraged to combine against the intruders, a British officer even visiting Baraimi to infuse courage into the Na'im of that place, whose attitude of all the tribes was the most decidedly hostile to the Egyptians; and an alliance was promoted, with a view to resisting Egyptian aggression, between the Saiyid of 'Omān and his relative the ruler of Sohār. Certain local chiefs, however, among whom the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi were conspicuous, showed a disposition to submit to the Egyptians, whom they imagined to be irresistible because they had defeated the Wahhābis; and the Shaikh of Bahrain even entered into a secret agreement with the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief and became a tributary of the Cairo Government.

In the spring of 1840 a British blockade of the Hasa coast was about to be enforced, when the Egyptians, alarmed by the prospect of coercion at the hands of Britain and other European powers in the Mediterranean, suddenly evacuated Hasa and Najd. The excitement which their restlessness had caused in Eastern Arabia then at once died away.

The accumulation of difficulties caused in 1839-40 by uncertain relations with Russia, a great war in Afghanistan, a diplomatic crisis in Persia, and Egyptian aggression in Syria and the Persian Gulf, must have been embarrassing to the British Government; and it cannot but be admitted that they confronted the situation with energy and success.

After the Egyptians had retired, their policy of dictation towards neighbouring Arab principalities in the Persian Gulf was resumed by the

Wahhābi
aggressions,
1844-1853.

Wahhābis; but the proceedings of the latter were less dangerous, on account of their more limited and less organised resources and of their ignorance of the politics of Europe, and were consequently regarded by the British Government with equanimity though not with indifference. In 1843 the Na'im of Baraimi were informed that Britain was not concerned to support them against the Wahhābis as she had done against the Egyptians. British influence was probably exerted, however, to prevent a civil war in Bahrain (1842-43) from throwing that Shaikhdom into the power of the Wahhābis; but in 1844 the Wahhābi Amīr was permitted to possess himself of Dammām on the mainland to the detriment of Bahrain. In 1845 and 1853 British naval demonstrations were made upon the Arabian coast and enabled the representatives of the Saiyid of 'Omān to obtain better terms from the agents of the Wahhābi Amīr, who were demanding increased tribute from Masqat and who seemed inclined to proceed to extremities.

In 1861 it became necessary to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain by forcible means from aggressive action against the Wahhābi coast; and advantage was taken of a semi-rupture which occurred between him and Britain to compel the signature by him of a Convention, bringing Bahrain within the circle of the petty Arab principalities which looked to Britain for protection against attack from without and for adjustment of maritime disputes among themselves, and which were bound to abstain from disturbing the peace at sea.

Convention
of the Shaikh
of Bahrain
with the Bri-
tish Govern-
ment, 1861.

Frontier and other disputes between Turkey and Persia, and European intervention, 1836-52.

Early in the period now under review the relations of Turkey and Persia along their common border became exceedingly tense; and Britain and Russia, as soon as their mutual distrust arising out of Persian and Afghan affairs had been to some extent laid aside, took steps to avert a violent collision which seemed to be threatened between the two Oriental states.

Among the principal causes of difficulty were the undefined nature of the frontier, a temporary occupation of Muhammāreh by the Turks in 1837, a temporary occupation of Sulaimāniyah by the Persians in 1840, reprisals by the Turks in the direction of Ardilān in 1842, a massacre by Turkish troops at Karbala in 1843 in which many Persians suffered, and continued ill-treatment of Persian subjects and oppression of Persian interests in Turkey.

Difficulties
between
Turkey and
Persia, 1836-
43.

Joint Commission and Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1843-47.

A joint Turko-Persian Commission for the settlement of all difficulties, on which Britain and Russia as mediating powers were also to be represented, had already been arranged when the massacre at Karbala occurred. For a moment war after the massacre seemed imminent; but the deputation of a British officer to Karbala, representing the Russian as well as his own Government, enabled the crisis to be peacefully surmounted; and the joint Commission held sittings at Erzeroum during 1843-44, after which, on account of the intractability of the Turkish Commissioner, the negotiations were conducted in Europe. In 1847 the Second Treaty of Erzeroum was signed. It settled all disputed points in principle, but it left most matters of detail for future adjustment, and it had to be amplified by assurances on the part of the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople before Turkey finally consented to ratify it.

Attempted delimitation of the Turko-Persian frontier, 1848-52.

An attempt was then made, by means of another joint Commission formed in 1848, in which British and Russian representatives were again included, to define the Turko-Persian frontier on the spot. Very little was effected, however, the unreasonableness of the Turkish delegate being again the principal obstacle to progress; and in 1852 the Commission broke up, not having done much more than collect information and survey a belt of territory within which the true frontier line was considered to lie.

The treatment of Persian subjects by the authorities in Turkish 'Irâq remained, notwithstanding the provisions of the Treaty of Erzeroum, almost as unsatisfactory as before.

Difficulties between Britain and Persia, Anglo-Persian War, and Treaty of Peace, 1853-57.

The endeavours of Britain, in conjunction with Russia, to obtain fair treatment of Persia by Turkey were quickly followed by a diplomatic and military rupture between Russia and Turkey, leading to one between Russia and England, to which yet a third between Britain and Persia succeeded.

The Crimean War, 1854-56.

The Crimean war, due primarily to excessive Russian demands upon Turkey, created much excitement in the Middle East. Strong efforts were made by Russia, before the entry of France and Britain into the fray, to induce Persia to act with her against Turkey; and at one time they promised to be successful. Turkey on her part, inspired by hopes of becoming master of Muhammareh, as Persia may have been by dreams of securing Karbala and Najaf, would not perhaps have regarded a Russo-Persian coalition against her with any greater dismay than a war with Russia only; but

a small demonstration by British armed vessels in the Persian Gulf and Shatt-al-'Arab at the beginning of 1854 availed to keep peace unbroken between the two Muhammadan powers. Among the European nations engaged in the Crimean struggle war continued until 1856.

Meanwhile, chiefly in consequence of a revived ambition on the part of Persia to annex Herat,—an ambition the realisation of which was still regarded by British statesmen as likely to be injurious to British Indian interests,—the relations of the British and Persian Governments were deteriorating. In 1852 Persia occupied Herat; but in 1853 she was induced by Britain, not without difficulty, to sign an Agreement relinquishing Herat and undertaking not to interfere with it in future.

In 1854-55 the conduct of the Persian Government towards the British Minister at Tehrān, perhaps in consequence of an idea that Britain was too much hampered by the Crimean war to resent it, was extremely insulting; and at the end of 1855 the British diplomatic representative was withdrawn from Persia. In 1856, presuming probably on the absence of the British Mission and on the supposed difficulties of Britain in Europe, the Persians again occupied Herat.

A short but decisive war followed, in which Persia was quickly beaten to her knees. The attitude of the Turks, who perhaps hoped that one result might be the transfer of Muhammareh to themselves, was neutral, but benevolent towards Britain; and it was noticed that the issue of the operations had a salutary effect in Turkish 'Irāq, where it inspired additional respect for the British name. The war was ended by a Treaty by which Persia recognised the independence of Afghanistan, and in particular of the Herat province, and bound herself to submit any future differences which she might have with the ruler of Herat to British mediation. All other questions pending between the British and Persian Governments were settled also, in principle or in detail, by the Treaty.

At this point occurred the great Indian Mutiny of 1857-58; but, except in a very rapid withdrawal of the Persian Field Force to India after its work was done, no effect of the Mutiny was perceptible in the Persian Gulf.

The Herat question and other disputes between Britain and Persia, 1852-56.

Anglo-Persian War and Treaty of Peace, 1856-57.

The Indian Mutiny, 1857-58.

French activity in the Persian Gulf region, 1836-61.

The only European power besides Britain and Russia which during this period displayed any interest in the countries of the Persian Gulf was France, and her activity was superficial and mostly confined to the years 1839-48.

The French Government declined in 1839 to support the Shāh in the difficulties in which he then found himself with the British Government; but they enabled the Shāh's envoy to obtain French in place of British military instructors for the Persian army. In the same year, or in the year following, a French diplomatic Mission proceeded to the Persian Court; and in 1840 representatives of French art and religion, as well as of French military science, were much in evidence in Persia. The French Mission, though its efforts were continued for some years, failed to secure a ratified Treaty of Commerce with Persia, which was its principal object: such a Treaty, it will be remembered, was only obtained by Britain in 1841 after great difficulties. Most of the French military instructors quitted Persia within ten years; but in 1855 a Franco-Persian Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was at last secured.

In the 'Omān Sultanate the efforts of France were more quickly successful, and there a Commercial Treaty was carried through in 1844.

Between 1841 and 1848 the French Consul-General at Baghdād asserted himself somewhat vigorously and showed an interest even in local affairs, especially in such as related to Persia; and there were other indications that France aimed at establishing large political and material interests in Turkish 'Irāq. Perhaps in consequence of the divergence of British and French policy in regard to Egypt and Turkey, the attitude of the French representatives in Persia and at Baghdād seems to have been one of distrust and hostility towards the British; but their influence, except in so far as it was sustained by the interests of Latin Catholicism, had no root in actuality, and it quickly withered away.

British naval arrangements in Persian Gulf, 1836-61.

The execution of British naval policy and naval duties in the Persian Gulf continued, throughout the period now being dealt with, to be confided to the Indian Navy.

The first steamer seen in the Persian Gulf seems to have been the I. N. S. "Hugh Lindsay," which visited the coast of Trucial 'Omān on duty in 1838 and caused no small sensation by her novel appearance and evolutions.

First steamer
in the Per-
sian Gulf,
1838.

A dispute probably having arisen in regard to the relative position of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Commander of the Indian Naval Squadron there, instructions on the subject were issued by the Government of Bombay at the beginning of 1841 to the Superintendent of the Indian Navy. The most important paragraph of the Government letter ran as follows: "In the first place the Honourable the Governor in Council declares the authority of the Resident to be paramount in the Persian Gulf, and places the entire Indian Naval Squadron which may at any time be stationed in that quarter at the disposal of the Resident for any service which he may deem it advisable to assign to it, either wholly or in part, and this officer is responsible for his acts to no other authority than to that of the Government whose representative he is."

Relative position of the Political Resident and the Commander of the Indian Naval Squadron, 1841.

On the other hand the Commodore on the Station was to remain "absolute master of the internal details, discipline, equipment and organisation of every vessel under his command."

It was added that there was nothing in the rules laid down derogatory to the honour or independence of the Indian Navy, because the Resident was the representative of Government, and that it was essential to the public interest that a good and perfect understanding should always exist between the two officers.

The following extract from a letter addressed by the Government of Bombay to the Resident in the Persian Gulf at the end of 1843 casts much light on the difficult conditions under which naval duties were carried on there at the time :

I am directed to inform you that the Superintendent of the Indian Navy has recently brought to the notice of Government the evils which have resulted from the practice of detaining vessels of the Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea for the immoderate period of two or three years.

Orders regarding the undue detention and immobilisation of Indian Navy Vessels in the Persian Gulf, 1843.

The Honourable the Governor in Council, having taken this subject into consideration, is satisfied that the practice is destructive of the best interests of the service, ruinous to discipline and efficiency, prejudicial to the health of the crews, and a fertile source of discontent.

In illustration of these evils, the case of the H. C. Sloop-of-War "Elphinstone," lately returned to Bombay, has been cited. This vessel reached Bombay in a most inefficient condition, her crew debilitated by her long detention in the Persian Gulf, aggravated by her having been injudiciously detained in a sickly port, instead of being constantly kept in motion, which in itself is one of the best preservatives of health and energy. On her arrival, from the above causes, she appeared more like convalescent ship than an effective sloop-of-war.

The Governor in Council entirely disapproves of the practice which seems now to prevail of keeping the vessels of war temporarily placed at your disposal stationary in port, instead of keeping them constantly in motion and thus securing the chief object for

which they are detached—the continued suppression of piracy, and the protection of British commerce.

Government is further of opinion that, keeping the vessels of war in the Gulf constantly moving in a circle, each vessel in its turn should be directed to proceed to Bombay for the purpose of refit and the promotion of discipline.

As a general rule, therefore, the Governor in Council has resolved that a vessel detached from the Gulf, shall not continue on service there for a longer period than twelve months, and that on the expiration of this period, whether relieved or not, she shall return to Bombay, unless under the pressure of some great and overriding emergency of such a nature as will justify the Resident in the Persian Gulf detaining her on his own responsibility, but with the understanding that the discretion is not to be lightly exercised, and shall under all circumstances be immediately reported to Government.

Maintenance and growth of maritime security, 1836-61.

Maritime security had been definitely established in the Persian Gulf at the close of the last period, but it had still to be watched over and perfected during the period now under consideration.

Periodical
Maritime
Truces,
1836-42.

The system of Maritime Truces, happily introduced in 1835, continued to develop. These Truces, under which every kind of violence at sea by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and their subjects was prohibited and penalised, were at first arranged to cover the pearl fishing season only and were a matter of annual arrangement; later they were made for twelve months at a time and were practically continuous; and finally, in 1848, a Truce for ten years was concluded among the usual signatories.

In 1836 successful punitive and deterrent action was taken by an Indian Naval Squadron at Dōhah, Wakrah, and 'Odaid against Bani Yās pirates and their harbourers; and in 1841 a few shots fired into Dōhah by another similar squadron brought about the surrender of a piratical vessel, which was immediately destroyed. In 1845 an expedition to Jinnah Island resulted in the capture of another vessel which had been employed for piracy. These were the principal occasions on which forcible action was required; and not only were such offences against good order at sea as now occurred confined within Arab circles, but the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast began to show a true appreciation of their responsibilities and to co-operate with the British Government in bringing offenders to justice.

The matter of wrecks was one in which progress was slower. The settlement of some claims that arose from the plundering of a vessel stranded at Hanjām in 1838 occupied three years; and it was only completed in the end by means of seizures of Qishm vessels in Indian ports.

In 1853 the régime of Maritime Truces was made permanent by the conclusion among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān of a Perpetual Treaty of Peace, of which the terms were the same as those of the periodical Truces.

Perpetual
Treaty of
Peace, 1853.

At the end of 1854 the delivery up and destruction of a piratical craft was enforced at 'Anik on the coast of Hasa by energetic naval action. The owner seems to have been the last of the race of professional pirates in the Persian Gulf, and the disappearance of piracy as a calling is marked by the replacement of the word "piracy" in official correspondence about this time by the milder term "maritime irregularity." In 1855 an Arab vessel in difficulties near Khor-al-'Odaid was attacked and one of the crew killed; and an Indian vessel from Bombay met with bad treatment at Shārjah; in 1856 there was a technical breach, on a large scale, of the maritime rules at Abu Dhabi; and in 1860 a case of wreck, worse than that of 1855, occurred at Rās-al-Khaimah. In these cases substantial compensation for the injured parties was recovered, and in a majority of them severe punishment was inflicted, over and above, on the offending places or individuals. The only grave case of the period, one in which two Arabs lost their lives, resulted *inter alia* in the surrender of one of the chief criminals, who, being an 'Omāni subject, was executed at Masqat by order of the Sultān of 'Omān.

Maritime Surveys, 1836-62.

In so far as officers and ships permitted, the work of surveying the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān was carried on by the Indian Navy concurrently with their duties of watch and ward.

A survey of the south-east coast of Arabia, begun by Captain Haines in 1833, was discontinued in 1837 owing to the exigencies of the service; and from 1839 to 1844, in consequence of the war in Afghanistan and want of money for general purposes, marine surveys by the Indian Navy were almost entirely in abeyance. In 1839, however, perhaps in connection with the occupation of Khārag, a report on the harbour of Kuwait was made by an officer of the Indian Navy. The survey of the south-east coast of Arabia was resumed in 1844 and completed in 1848. In 1857, it having been decided to revise the Persian Gulf survey of 1820-28, in which errors and omissions were known to exist, Captain C. Constable, assisted by Lieutenant A. W. Stiffe, was appointed to carry out the work. He completed it in 1860, the vessels employed being at first the "Euphrates" and later the "Marie," and the result of the labours of

the two officers was a general chart of the Persian Gulf in two sheets, of which the essential features were reliable, but which Captain Constable himself described in 1862 as not being on nearly a large enough scale. Meanwhile a survey of the harbour of Bahrain was made by Lieutenant Whish, I.N., in 1859.

Land and river surveys and explorations, 1836-61.

The land and river surveys initiated by the Chesney Expedition of 1835-37 were continued with great energy during more than twenty years by the officers of the Indian Navy employed with the British Mesopotamian flotilla or the stationnaire of the Baghdād Political Agency; they extended to 'Arabistan and, elsewhere, to the confines of Persia with 'Irāq. The following is a synopsis of the principal achievements of those officers :

Commander Lynch (1837-43)—the Tigris from Mūsāl to Ctesiphon; the Euphrates below Maskanah; and connection of Nineveh, Baghdād, Ctesiphon and Babylon by triangulation.

Lieutenant Campbell (1841-42)—the Tigris below Baghdād; and connection of the upper Euphrates with the Mediterranean chronometrically;

Commander F. Jones (1843-54)—Zohāb; the old Nahrwān Canal; the old course of the Tigris above Baghdād; the country between the Tigris and the Persian hills from Baghdād to Mūsāl (trigonometrical); and the country from Musaiyib to Najaf (lost in the India Office).

Commander Selby (1841-42 and 1855-61)—the Kārūn River with its branches and affluents; and the Euphrates district from Babylon to Samāwah (trigonometrical, lost in the India Office but reconstituted).

In 1862 the principal survey still required was one of the Shatt-al-'Arab from Basrah to the sea; charts of this river had been prepared by Commander F. Jones and Lieutenant Collingwood, but had been lost in the offices of Government.

Archæological research, 1836-61.

The systematic examination of ancient sites in the Persian Gulf region began during this period under British auspices. The most celebrated

among the early excavators were Layard, Rawlinson, and Loftus; the sites attacked were those of Assyria, Babylonia, and Susiana; and the years of most active investigation were those from 1845 to 1850.

British official organisation and arrangements, 1836-62.

On the 1st November 1858, under an Act of the British Parliament for the Better Government of India passed in the same year, the administration of India passed from the Hon'ble East India Company to the Crown, and the Governor-General received the new title of Viceroy.

Assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, 1858.

The right of nominating to the British Legation at Tehrān together with the control of its activities, which since 1855 had been vested in Her Majesty's Government instead of the Government of India, was transferred in 1859, as a compromise, from the Foreign to the India Office. The only incumbent during the continuance of the arrangements thus introduced was Sir H. Rawlinson, formerly Political Agent at Baghdād, who shortly resigned the post on its being replaced under the Foreign Office.

Temporary transfer of the British Legation at Tehrān to the India Office, 1859-60.

In 1840, to meet the danger of Egyptian intrigues in 'Omān, a British Resident was appointed to Masqat, where there had been none for a generation. The emergency had passed, however, almost before his arrival at his post; and, as the Sultān of 'Omān now generally resided at Zanzibar, the British political officer with him was transferred to that island.

British representation at Masqat from 1840, and separation of Zanzibar from the 'Omān Sultānate, 1861.

In 1861, by arbitrament of the Viceroy of India to whom the *de facto* rulers of 'Omān and Zanzibar had referred some questions in dispute between them, 'Omān and Zanzibar became separate Sultānates and a subsidy of \$40,000 a year was made payable by the Sultān of Zanzibar and his successors to the Sultān of 'Omān and his successors, as compensation to the latter for the smaller pecuniary value of the share assigned to them in the family possessions. In consequence of this change a separate British political representative was again appointed to Masqat.

In Turkish 'Irāq, where British interests continued to increase throughout the period, a British Vice-Consulate was established at Mūsāl at the end of 1839, and the office of Agent at Basrah was made a European appointment in 1851.

British representation in Turkish 'Irāq 1839-51.

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF FROM THE INSTITUTION OF REGULAR STEAM COMMUNICATION AND MAILS TO THE ASSUMPTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA OF THE DIRECT CONTROL OF POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS, 1862-73.

The feature differentiating the period on which we now enter from those that preceded it was a great and sudden improvement, due entirely to British initiative, in the means of communication within the Persian Gulf and between the Gulf and the outside world. No later change in the local conditions of life and work has been so radical, and it may therefore be said that the modern history of the Persian Gulf begins in 1862.

Internal and external communications, 1862-73.

Steamers and
mails, 1862-
68.

It seems incredible, but it is true, that before 1862 letters from Baghdād for India ordinarily passed by Syria, Egypt and the Red Sea ; and, more extraordinary still, letters for India from Būshehr often followed the same route after being sent from Būshehr to Baghdād *viâ* Tehrān. This untoward state of affairs, which was due to the infrequency and irregularity of naval communication between the Gulf and Bombay after piracy had been suppressed, was remedied by a mail steamer service, subsidised by the Government of India and organised by the British India Steam Navigation Company in 1862. Bombay and Basrah were the terminal ports, and the stipulated number of voyages was at first eight a year, but in 1866 the runs became fortnightly. Baghdād was not long in benefiting by the improved conditions ; for in 1863 a mail steamer service between Basrah and Baghdād, subsidised by the Government of India, was arranged through the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. The sailings were at first six-weekly, then fortnightly, and before long at the rate of three a month.

To deal with the correspondence for which carriage was thus provided, British Indian post offices were opened at various places, the first of the series at Masqat and Būshehr in 1864, and the last at Basrah and Baghdād in 1868.

Telegraphs were of slightly earlier inception, but did not become so quickly ready for use as passenger and mail services. After the completion of a telegraph line between Constantinople and Baghdād in 1861, under British auspices, there was a pause in the operations. Land lines and cables were carried from Karāchi to Gwādur and thence to Fāo, and from Būshehr by Tehrān to Khānaqīn in 1862-64; but it was not until 1865 that a gap between Basrah and Baghdād was closed, giving direct communication between India and Europe *via* Fāo, Baghdād and Constantinople. The whole of the technical and a large part of the political arrangements, in both Turkey and Persia, devolved upon British officers; and in 1869 British subsidies were granted to the chief of Persian Makrān for the protection of the land line passing through their districts.

Telegraphs,
1864-69.

Schemes for railway communication followed hard upon the improvements just described.

Railway and
navigation
projects,
1871-73.

Mr. Andrew had not ceased to push his project for a railway between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, which the occurrence of the Indian Mutiny and the construction of the Suez Canal had invested with greater importance than before. The salvation of Persia from Russia was still mentioned as an object recommending the scheme; and the Porte were believed to favour it, while regarding a change of alignment to the northward desirable. A strong Parliamentary Committee, formed by the British Government in 1871, investigated the scheme and reported in 1872 in its favour; but they gave a cautious opinion with reference to the desirability of aiding its execution by means of a financial guarantee on the part of the British Government; and in the end no effectual action was taken.

In 1871-73 a suggestion for the construction of a railway from Shūshtar by Isfahān, or from Dizfūl by Khurramābād, to Tehrān, under a guarantee from the Persian Government, was made by a British merchant at Būshehr; but the economic conditions of the day in Southern Persia militated against its favourable reception.

Connected with this last project was a proposal that steam navigation should be instituted on the Kārūn River with the assistance of the Persian Government.

Persian affairs and relations, 1862-73.

Internal
state of
Persia.

During the earlier part of the period Persia was visited by scarcity, and the political state of the country, from this cause, was somewhat unquiet; but, by the personal energy of the Shāh and his close attention to public affairs, more settled conditions were by degrees established.

British
relations
with Persia.

The result of the Anglo-Persian war continued to influence the relations of Britain and Persia, though at times the Shāh's Government seemed in danger of forgetting the salutary lesson that they had received. To speak generally, however, the period was one of improving relations; and solid progress was made in eliminating that fertile source of discord,—the undefined frontiers of Persia.

Herat, 1863.

The troublesome question of the Herat province, which had remained in virtual vassalage to Persia notwithstanding the Treaty of Peace of 1857, disappeared on the consolidation of Afghanistan into a single Amirate by Dōst Muhammad Khān, the last step in which process was the annexation of Herat to Kābul by force of arms in 1863.

Sīstān, 1863-72.

One consequence of the unification of Afghanistan was friction between that country and Persia on the border of Sīstān, part of which district, formerly belonging to Herat, was effectually occupied by Persia between 1864 and 1867. An equitable partition was effected in 1872 through British mediation.

Makrān,
1862-72.

But the question of Persian boundaries in which Britain was most directly concerned arose in Makrān, a region where sovereign rights were exceedingly ill-defined, and in regard to the geography and conditions of which neither Power at first possessed information. In 1861-62 Persia was understood to claim the whole of the coast region lying westward of Sind, and in 1863 she formulated distinct pretensions to the ports of Chahbār and Gwadur. In 1864 the attitude of the Shāh's Government was aggressive in Makrān; and in that year, and again in 1868-69, a Persian invasion of Kalāt, a state under British suzerainty, was apprehended. At length, after repeated and thorough investigations by British officers, negotiations were initiated at Tehrān which resulted, in 1870, in the formation of a mixed Boundary Commission including British, Persian, and Kalāt representatives. Finally, in 1871, the proposals of the British Commissioner were accepted by the Shāh, with one reservation in regard to Kōhak. The actual delimitation of the frontier agreed upon took place in 1872.

In 1872, the Persian Government made good their claim to Chahbār—which lay to the west of the boundary arranged between Persia and Kalāt but was claimed by the Sultan of 'Omān—by expelling the 'Omān representative in possession.

The attitude of the British Government in regard to Persian affairs generally throughout the greater part of the period was one of indifference and neglect, and more than one request by the Shāh's Government for British aid in reorganising the Persian army was ignored, with the result that the direction of Persian military matters passed into other hands. In 1870-72, however, great efforts were made by private British and Indian philanthropists, with the help of the British official establishments on the spot, to mitigate the effects of a famine prevailing in Southern Persia; and in 1872, a Persian Prime Minister very favourably disposed to Britain having come into power at Tehrān, a gigantic industrial concession and monopoly, known as the "Reuter Concession," was granted to a British capitalist. This concession, unfortunately, besides being unworkable, made a very regrettable impression both in Persia and in Russia; and its inevitable revocation left behind a vexatious consequence in the shape of a large British claim for compensation, satisfaction of which was immediately obtainable.

General matters.

Turkish affairs and relations, 1862-73.

While Persia continued to make moderate progress in the path of good order and administration, or at least maintained her position, Turkey, in spite of pretended reforms at home and a specious policy of territorial expansion abroad, seriously lost ground.

The Crimean war, of which the issue was seemingly favourable to Turkey, in reality injured her. At its close she found herself invested with a position in Europe which for many reasons she was incapable of filling; and her abuse of the resources of the European money market, now open to her, carried her rapidly along the road to ruin. She was led, by the conditions in which she found herself placed, to adopt an attitude and a policy that were founded on an over-estimate of her own importance and strength; and before long she fell into dire financial straits. By 1866 matters had reached such a pass that even in the remote province of Turkish 'Irāq recourse was had to the extreme measure

General state of Turkey

of sequestrating military pay and civil salaries. The unsatisfactory character of the local administration throughout the Empire, which in most respects remained unimproved, was aggravated by these new financial difficulties.

Government
of Turkish
'Irāq

The political state of the province of Turkish 'Irāq was at first hardly better—it could not possibly have been worse—than it was during the preceding period. The chief cause of disorder was the same as before, *viz.*, the obstinacy of Turkish officials in attempting, with insufficient means of compulsion, to govern the Arab tribes with a high hand. In 1863-64 an ineffectual effort was made to reduce the Muntafik; in 1864-66 the Khazā'il were coerced with some success; in 1865 the Hamawand (Kurdish) and 'Anizah (Arab) tribes defied the authority of the Turkish Government with impunity.

In 1869-72 much better order was temporarily established by Mid-hat Pāsha, the first "Wāli" of Baghdād, and the whole system of local administration was recast in accordance with a system of reform then being extensively applied throughout the Ottoman Empire. The improvements realised, however, though for the moment there was great activity in the administration, and though the forms of business introduced were destined to become permanent, were mostly superficial. They hardly outlasted Mid-hat Pāsha's tenure of power.

From 1863 onwards the Turkish Government possessed steamers on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, and after 1867 these seem to have been worked chiefly for commercial purposes in imitation of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, but under the management of Ottoman officials.

Notwithstanding strenuous opposition on the part of the Turkish authorities, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company succeeded about 1864, with the support of the British Government, in increasing their fleet by the addition of a second steamer. The attitude of the Turkish Governor of Baghdād towards British interests at this time was uncompromisingly hostile; it seemed to be prompted largely by a fear that the British representative might acquire undue influence with the mismanaged Arab tribes; and it extended to the operations of the British staff employed on the construction of the Turkish telegraph lines, as well as to British navigation on the Tigris.

Annexation
of Qatar and
Hasa by
Turkey,
1871.

The principle of territorial expansion by which the Turkish Government, notwithstanding the precarious state of the Empire, were inspired was well illustrated by their restless proceedings with regard to Eastern Arabia. One of its chief exponents was Mid-hat Pāsha, the reforming

Wali of Baghdād. In 1866, there were indications that the Porte intended to assert and enforce their authority over Kuwait; in 1869 they intimated that they regarded Bahrain as belonging to them; and early in 1871 it was understood that an attempt would presently be made to establish Turkish sovereignty over Central Arabia, Bahrain, Masqat, and the Arab tribes of Southern Arabia generally. An appeal made by a displaced Amīr of Southern Najd to the Turkish Government for restoration to power in dependence upon Turkey quickly provided them with an opportunity for open action; and in the summer of 1871 Hasa was occupied by Turkish troops sent by sea from Basrah; while Kuwait, from which armed assistance and marine transport had been borrowed for the operations in Hasa, was considered to have been incorporated in Turkey on the same occasion. Riyādh in Central Arabia had been the original objective of the Turkish expedition to Hasa, of which latter province the direct administration was undertaken by Turkish officials towards the end of 1871 to the disappointment of two contending Wahhābi Amīrs; but no advance was made from Hasa to Riyādh. A warning from the British Government, to which point was given by the stationing of a British political officer in Bahrain in 1871-72, sufficed to prevent actual Turkish aggressions, though not Turkish threats, against that principality; but the Turkish flag was hoisted at Dōhah in Qatar, a Turkish military detachment later occupying that place; and Mid-hat Pāsha, in his official gazette, included the chief towns of Trucial 'Omān in an enumeration of those belonging to the conquered province of "Najd," a province which his troops had not entered at all, though they had taken possession of one of its outlying dependencies (Hasa). About the same time that direct Turkish rule in Hasa began, a Turkish Consulate was established at Būshehr in Persia on the opposite side of the Gulf, possibly with an eye to Bahrain affairs.

The British Government did not admit the title of the Porte to any territory in Eastern Arabia except Hasa, which had been actually occupied; but the annexation of Hasa, even by such a power as Turkey, was a sufficient evil in itself and greatly increased the difficulty of maintaining maritime security in the waters of the Persian Gulf.

Relations of Turkey and Persia, 1861-72.

The most noteworthy incident in the relations of Turkey and Persia during the period under consideration was a visit which the Shāh paid to

Turkish 'Irāq in the winter of 1870-71, as a pilgrim to the shrines of Kādhimain, Karbala, Najaf, and Sāmarrah.

No progress was made in defining the Turko-Persian border, though Britain and Russia in 1869 urged the advisability of a settlement upon the Turkish and Persian Governments. Meanwhile, the zone of acute frontier differences had begun to extend further southwards; and a Convention prescribing the maintenance of the *status quo*, which was itself unknown, was resorted to by the two Powers chiefly concerned as a temporary expedient. In 1871, on the occasion of the Shāh's visit to Turkish 'Irāq, negotiations took place for the extradition to Turkey of the rebellious Hamawand tribe, which had migrated *en masse* to Persia about 1865; but they were fruitless.

Affairs and relations of the Western Coast of the Persian Gulf, 1861-73.

Until their expulsion from Hasa by the Turks in 1871 the Wāhhābis were the predominant power on the western side of the Persian Gulf, and their proceedings sometimes caused trouble to the British Government, who were interested in the maintenance of general good order in the Gulf and along its shores.

British
rupture with
the
Wāhhābis,
1865-66.

In 1864 the Wāhhābis began to harass the ruler of the 'Omān Sultānate with demands for increased tribute, and British mediation was tendered for the purposes of adjusting the difficulty, but the offer was not even acknowledged by the Wāhhābi Amīr. In the spring of 1865 the British Resident in the Persian Gulf visited the Wāhhābi ruler at his own capital; but the position in which Colonel Pelly found himself at Riyādh precluded discussion of political business there. After the Resident's return to the Gulf the pressure of the Wāhhābis on the 'Omān Sultānate was renewed; and a serious affair, attributed to their incitement, in which British Indian subjects were among the sufferers, occurred at Sūr. Another Wāhhābi outrage having been committed on the coast of the 'Omān Sultānate, a British ultimatum was despatched to the Amīr at the beginning of 1866; and it was arranged that, in default of a satisfactory reply by a given date, British naval action should be undertaken upon the coast of Hasa, while the Sultān of 'Omān, provided with British guns and ammunition, should advance against the Wāhhābi outpost of Baraimi. This last movement

was prevented by the assassination of the Sultān by one of his own sons and the operations of the single British vessel sent to Qatif and Dammām were inconclusive; but the local confederates of the Wahhābis at Sūr itself were severely punished. Later, it appeared that the Amīr was willing to accept British mediation in the dispute between himself and the Sultān of 'Omān and that the time allowed him for replying had been too short. In 1866, suitable assurances for the future having reached the British representative in the Gulf from the Amīr, peace was re-established.

In the autumn of 1867 a sudden and treacherous descent was made by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi upon Dōhah and Wakrah in Qatar, places then dependent on the principality of Bahrain. The two towns were wholly destroyed, the inhabitants being at the same time driven forth and despoiled of all their property. There was some delay on the part of the British authorities in taking action, due to the Abyssinian war and to other causes, during which the injured tribes themselves attempted to retaliate upon Bahrain; but in the latter part of 1868 severe if tardy chastisement was inflicted upon the two principal delinquents, the Shaikh of Bahrain being deposed in favour of a brother, while his war vessels and fort of Abu Māhur were annihilated, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi being compelled to pay a fine under threat of bombardment of his port.

At intervals between 1862 and 1869 the Persian Government put forward claims to ownership of Bahrain, but they were academic and of no political importance.

In 1869 the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, aided by several desperate associates of mark and a host of Bedouin tribesmen, invaded the main island. The reigning Shaikh was defeated and killed in battle, and the principality remained in the hands of the usurping coalition for two or three months. Towards the end of the year a British naval squadron appeared upon the scene and quickly overcame their attempted resistance. Several of the ringleaders in the invasion, including the ex-Shaikh, were then captured and deported to India; and Bahrain was left in possession of a son of the deceased Shaikh.

In 1869 the Wahhābis, who had abstained from interference in the events in Qatar and Bahrain just described, were expelled from Baraimi, an outpost on the border between Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultānate from which they exercised influence over both, by a new and energetic Sultān of 'Omān. Civil war in Najd and the subsequent annexa-

Destruction of Dōhah and Wakrah by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and British action, 1867-68.

Persian claims to Bahrain, 1862-69.

Invasion of Bahrain from the mainland and British action, 1869.

Expulsion of the Wahhābis from Baraimi, 1869.

tion of Hasa by the Turks prevented any effort being made by the Wahhābis for its recovery.

Wahhābi,
appeals for
British
assistance,
1871-73.

During the two years following the annexation of Hasa by the Turks the Wahhābi Amīr more than once claimed British assistance on the ground that the Turkish descent on his seaboard had been a violation of that maritime peace which Britain was pledged to maintain; but in reply he was reminded that, not being himself a party to any Treaty with the British Government, he was not entitled to expect British intervention on his behalf.

Affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1862-73.

The affairs of the Omān Sultānate, no doubt in consequence of the appointment of a British political officer to Masqat, received greatly increased attention from the British Government during this period. The interposition of Britain in the difficulties between the Sultān and the Wahhābi Amīr in 1864-66 has already been mentioned.

The Zanzibar
Subsidy.

On the separation of the 'Omān and Zanzibar Sultānates in 1861 under an arbitral award by the Viceroy of India, a subsidy of \$40,000 a year had become payable by the ruler of Zanzibar to the ruler of 'Omān in perpetuity; and the regular discharge of this obligation was a matter which from time to time called for attention on the part of the British Government. From 1868 to 1871, 'Omān being then held by a usurping ruler whom the British Government did not recognise, payment of the subsidy by the Sultān of Zanzibar was excused; and on the accession of an approved candidate to the throne of 'Omān in 1871 the subsidy was made a charge upon the British and Indian Treasuries in equal shares.

The Sultān of
'Omān's
Bandar
'Abbās fief,
1866-68.

Another matter in which the ruler of 'Omān received support from the representatives of the British Government was that of a fief of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies in Persia, to hold which he considered himself entitled by custom. In 1866, the existing grant having terminated through the death of a Sultān of 'Omān, the districts were resumed by the Persian Government, and it was not until two years later that a fresh lease of them for eight years was obtained at Shirāz by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. The new lessee being expelled almost immediately by a rival, and his successor in the Sultānate not being favourably regarded by the British authorities, the lease then lapsed and was never renewed.

Foreign Powers other than Britain, in the Persian Gulf, 1862-73.

Except Russia, whose general influence in Persia and Turkey was great and incessant, but whose attention had not yet been turned specifically to the Persian Gulf, the only foreign power besides Britain having any political interest in the countries adjoining that sea was France.

In 1862, France and Britain signed a joint Declaration binding themselves to respect the independence of the 'Omān and Zanzibar Sultānates. This instrument, which must have passed almost unnoticed at the time of its execution, for the Government of India remained in ignorance of its existence until 1871, was afterwards to be found an inconvenient restraint by both signatories.

Anglo-French Declaration regarding 'Omān and Zanzibar, 1862.

There is some reason to think that the journey of the British traveller Mr. W. G. Palgrave across Central Arabia in 1862 was undertaken at the instance of the Emperor of the French, with political objects.

Central Arabia.

In 1864, a French company was understood to have applied for navigation facilities on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, similar to those enjoyed by the (British) Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, and to be claiming equality of treatment with British merchants in matters purely commercial.

Turkish 'Irāq.

A French Vice-Consulate was reinstituted in 1870 at Basrah, where there had been no French representative for many years.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1862-73.

About the end of 1862 the vessels of the Indian Navy serving in the Persian Gulf were recalled to India; this was a measure preparatory to the abolition of the service to which they belonged. On the 30th April 1863 the Indian naval flag was hauled down at Bombay, and the Indian Navy ceased to exist. It was understood at the time of the change that the duties performed in the past by the ships of the Indian Navy would devolve in future on those of the Royal Navy; but some years elapsed before a practical method of working with the substituted force was devised, and in the interval British political interests suffered severely in the Persian Gulf, in the Red Sea, and elsewhere.

Abolition of the Indian Navy and difficulties arising therefrom, 1862-68.

The chief disadvantages of the new system were that, owing to the extent of the East Indian naval station and the relatively small strength in ships of the East Indian Squadron, it frequently happened that no vessel was at hand when required; that, calls upon ships from different quarters being numerous, no vessel could remain long in one place; that the officers were, by traditions and training, less suitable for the performance of political duties than their predecessors of the Indian Navy; and finally that, as the officers and vessels belonged to a Royal instead of a local force, their services could not be so freely requisitioned by the political authorities. Her Majesty's Government seem at first to have intended that the Political Residents in the Persian Gulf and at Aden should be deprived altogether of the use of vessels for general purposes, a change which the institution and improvement of mail steamer services may have seemed to warrant, as well as of control over the employment of vessels of war; and, though the "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose," two ships of the Bombay Marine which partially supplied the place of the Indian Navy, were left provisionally in the Persian Gulf, their withdrawal as soon as the laying of the telegraph cables in the Gulf should have been finished, was contemplated.

1864. In 1864, the Resident in the Persian Gulf reported that he had reason for believing the slave trade to be still in full vigour, but that he no longer possessed the means of dealing with slaving craft.

1865. In 1865, he observed that, while Government had expressly constituted the holder of his office arbitrator in all difficulties arising among the chiefs of the Arab coast, whether at sea or on land, he was in reality powerless to perform his functions in the absence of suitable means of locomotion; that in the season of the pearl fishery, from April to October, when disputes were frequent, the ships of the Royal Navy were forbidden by the standing orders of the Admiralty from cruising in the Gulf; and that the Arabs would not be slow to take advantage of the Resident's inability to move about at will, with the result that the Gulf might in time become as insecure as ever it had been in the past.

1866 The operations against the Wahhābis at Qatīf and Dammām were undertaken in haste, with rather disappointing results, because H.M.S. "Highflyer," the only vessel available, could not remain long in the Gulf. The case also brought into prominence "the disadvantages under which commanders of Her Majesty's ships cruising in the Persian Gulf labour for want of officers acquainted with the local politics, the habits and feelings of the maritime tribes, and the navigation of this difficult arm of the sea." A remedy for the first difficulty was sought in the appointment of two Political Assistants in the Būshehr Residency; but it is obvious

that they cannot have supplied the deficiency felt in regard to local information of a marine character.

The crisis at Masqat in 1866 illustrated the dangers inseparable from the want of a local naval force. Had the "Berenice," a ship it would seem of the Bombay Marine, not been at hand, it might have been impossible to provide in time for the safety of British subjects; for it was not until the "Berenice" with the refugees aboard her had reached Khor-ash-Sham that H.M.S.S. "Highflyer" and "Octavia" appeared at Masqat. It being contrary to the orders of the Admiralty to employ Royal Navy vessels as guardships for telegraph stations, the "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose" of the Bombay Marine were stationed at Gwādur and Khor-ash-Sham to afford protection required in consequence of the revolution in 'Omān.

A little later in the same year H.M.S. "Pantaloön" was compelled to leave the Gulf suddenly, as a demand for her services had arisen on the coast of East Africa; and the progress of peace negotiations with the Wahhābis and the investigation of numerous maritime irregularities that had occurred were both perforce interrupted.

These occurrences drew from the Resident, in correspondence with the Government of Bombay, the following observations:

The way to provide for the maritime police of the Gulf is to have an armed vessel at the disposal of your representative in the Gulf—such vessel to be adapted for coasting work, to be efficiently armed and manned from England, *and to be under the orders of the Indian Government.* Her Majesty's troops come out to India for long terms, and serve under the Indian Government; work would be much facilitated if the same rule obtained in regard to Her Majesty's ships of war. If this cannot be, then the next best thing might, perhaps, be to have an Indian Naval Staff Corps serving aboard vessels built for the Indian Government, but built in England with all the modern fittings and improvements of the English Dockyard.

The great disturbance of the peace which occurred on the coast of 1867-68. Qatar in October 1867 exhibited the deficiencies of the new naval system, or want of system, in a glaring light. Except the Bombay Marine gunboat "Hugh Rose," which could only steam for eight hours at a time and was manned entirely by natives of India, the first vessel to become available was the "Sind," also of the Bombay Marine, which arrived on the spot in an inefficient condition in May 1868; and in the following month there were symptoms of a renewal of trouble on a large scale. Only at the end of July or beginning of August 1868 did H.M.S. "Vigilant" reach the Persian Gulf and make possible those punitive and repressive operations which ought to have been undertaken many months earlier,

† Introduction
of Royal
Navy
arrange-
ments,
1869-71.

At length in 1869 arrangements facilitating the co-operation of the Royal Navy with the Indian political authorities, were introduced. In consideration of the payment of a subsidy of £70,000 a year by the Government of India, and of certain stipulations in regard to expenditure on shore and the docking and repair of ships, the British Admiralty undertook to appropriate six vessels of the Royal Navy's East India Squadron to special service under that Government. Three of the six were to be steam gun vessels or gunboats and were to be detached for constant and exclusive service in the Persian Gulf, where they were to perform police duties and prevent the Arab chiefs from rendering navigation and commerce insecure by piratical expeditions and from engaging in the slave trade. The officer in command of the Persian Gulf flotilla was to consider himself at the disposal of the Political Resident and the other political officers for the support of British authority ; and he was not to adopt aggressive measures without the sanction of the political representatives, who were better acquainted than he with the habits of the people and better qualified to judge of the course to be pursued in dealing with native chiefs and their subjects. A general rule under which hostilities could not be undertaken without reference to the Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron was relaxed with reference to the Persian Gulf.

1871-72.

These arrangements came into force in 1871-72, in which year* H.M.S.S. " Bullfinch," " Magpie," " Vulture," " Lynx " and " Nimble " served in Persian Gulf.

Naval ambi-
tions of Per-
sia, 1865-69.

During the period that British naval prestige was at its lowest in the Gulf the Shāh of Persia conceived the idea of taking upon himself a part of the duties left derelict, and proposed to acquire several small ships of war which would be commanded by British officers and manned by Indian and Arab crews. His idea seems at first not to have been discountenanced by H.B.M.'s Minister at Tehran, but it encountered opposition from the Government of India, and a partial re-creation of the Indian Navy was discussed, only to be negatived. It was apprehended that a Persian navy might be used for the prosecution of Persian designs upon Bahrain ; but, as it was also feared that the Shāh, if disappointed of British assistance, might have recourse to France, it was resolved to give him—if unavoidable—one ship. His Persian Majesty, however, did not persevere in his naval projects ; and, with the institution of an efficient naval police by means of vessels of the British Royal Navy, the matter dropped temporarily into oblivion.

* A list of the British vessels employed in the Persian Gulf from 1863 to 1905 will be found in Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis on Naval Arrangements in the Persian Gulf*, 1862-1905, printed in 1906, pages 6-10.

British marine surveys in the Persian Gulf, 1861-73.

The abolition of the Indian Navy caused the same lamentable disorganisation in the matter of marine surveys as in that of naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf.

It appears to have been deemed a natural corollary of the placing of India under the Crown in 1858, as well as of the subsequent abolition of the Indian Navy, that the hydrographical work of the Indian Government should be transferred to the British Admiralty,—the India Office and the Government of India being retained, however, as media of communication and control in matters of importance. Some action seems to have been taken with this view in 1861, but it is not clear that the Admiralty were ever informed of the decision that in future “the surveys of the Indian seas would be conducted by the Royal Navy at the expense of the Imperial Government,” though in 1862 the Admiralty Hydrographer was supplied with a memorandum by Captain Constable and three other leading surveyors of the Indian Navy on the state of the Indian marine surveys and a list of such as required to be undertaken. It was shown that large scale plans of Masirah Island and Straits (made in 1846), of Khor-al-Jarāmah, Bandar Khairān, and Bandar Jissah (made in 1848-49), of Būshehr harbour (made in 1857), and of the Daimāniyāt Islands (made in 1858) had not been published. There was no survey of the Shatt-al-‘Arab, and the chart of its entrance from these a was old and inaccurate. Outer soundings of the Makrān coast were wanting. In the result, during the following ten years, no fresh surveys were undertaken, and many original drawings and memoirs, the fruit of expensive surveys, were lost.

In 1871 the Government of Bombay, having awakened to the necessity for new surveys, consulted Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Colonel Herbert, the Political Agent in Turkish ‘Irāq; and a general discussion of the subject was initiated. Both officers drew attention to the desirability of surveys being made of Kuwait harbour and Khor ‘Abdullah, with reference to the contingency, which then appeared not remote, of a railway port being required in that quarter; and the Resident in the Persian Gulf also dwelt on the need of a revision of the Persian Gulf charts in certain places. The upshot was that Mr. Girdlestone, formerly a midshipman in the Indian Navy, was deputed to the

Total discontinuance of marine surveys, 1861-71.

Resumption of survey work, 1871.

Persian Gulf in 1871 to make a survey of Bahrain and Qatar waters, apparently under the auspices of the Government of Bombay; and in 1872-73 operations were in progress in those seas.

British policy and official matters in the Persian Gulf, 1862-73.

Colonel
Pelly's
Musandam
Scheme, 1863.

The period was one of great economic and commercial expansion in the Persian Gulf, due chiefly to the introduction of steam communication, posts and telegraphs; and the growth of British interests of every sort was on a corresponding scale.

As the Political Residentsip of Colonel Pelly in the Persian Gulf covered almost the whole of the period, it will not be amiss to illustrate here, by means of somewhat copious extracts from his official despatches, the views upon general questions of that able officer and incisive writer.

In 1863, he propounded a remarkable scheme for the consolidation of British influence in the Persian Gulf. It can best be described by reproducing the *ipsissima verba* in which he recommended it to the Government of Bombay—

Memorandum enclosed in letter no. 1-A., dated 12th January 1863.

The question of the development of the Persian Gulfline of Steam and Telegraphic communication is under the consideration of Government, and I beg respectfully to submit the following remarks bearing on that question in its relations to the Political Residentsip for the Persian Gulf. In order to avoid occupying the time of Government longer than may be absolutely necessary, I offer what I have to say in the form of *results* of thought. It will be easy for Government, map in hand, to trace the steps which led to these results.

1. The principal objects in establishing a Political Residency in the Persian Gulf were the suppression of piracy, the suppression of the slave trade, and the development of trade.

2. Piracy on a large scale is now checked, but the maritime Arab chiefs require to be constantly watched, and their disputes at sea to be promptly and justly arbitrated: otherwise they would at once resume their old habits.

3. The slave trade still obtains.

4. Trade, which was in the first instance contemplated on a comparatively limited scale, may now be expected on an ever-increasing and extended scale. This trade is, and

will be, composed of goods entering the Gulf in square-rigged vessels from Europe, from territories to the eastward of India, from India itself, etc.; of goods in Native crafts coming from Western India, Muscat, East Africa, and the Aden coast line of Arabia, of goods in caravans coming from Meshed, Herat, and other points in Southern Central Asia, down through Seyd, to Bunder Abbas, the natural outlet for all such trade; of goods coming in caravans by way of Tehran, Ispahan, and Shiraz, down to Bushire; of goods coming down the Tigris, whether by river-steamer or boat, to Basreh, and there being transhipped into sea-going steamers or craft for transit down the Gulf of a pearl and fishery trade in the Gulf itself, especially along its western and Arab shore; and of a trade in dates and miscellaneous goods coming from and to the ports of the western coast line between Khewait or Graine to the northward, and Ras-al-Khyma to the southward.

5. The Residency was first established at Bushire, probably for political reasons, and because it was not then safe to establish it on the opposite Arab shore, which was, moreover, reputed of deadly climate.

6. That Bushire was not geographically considered by any means the most convenient point for effecting the objects which its establishment had in view, is shown from a glance at the map. For it is plain that, as the series of buccaneers to be overawed were settled along the lower western coast line of the Gulf between Khuteef, Bahrain, and Cape Mussundoom, any point along that shore would have had advantages over Bushire provided the climate and political status had admitted of such an establishment.

7. That Bushire was not a well-selected point, viewed from a naval point of view, is implied in the fact that the squadron had to find a Head Quarter station elsewhere, apart from the Political Resident. Bassadore on the unhealthy island of Kishm, was selected and has since remained the Naval Head Quarters, although we have, I believe, no title to it other than the verbal permission of the Imam of Muscat, who, by a treaty subsequently entered into with Persia in 1856, has resigned his own pretensions to sovereignty over Kishm, and consented to farm it from the Shah for a term of years; and to hold this farm under certain treaty conditions, which may any day bring our occupation of Bassadore into question. Again, that Bushire roads are not convenient for shipping is equally obvious from the facts that the anchorage is confined, shallow, and exposed, as from the facts that communication with the shore by boat is slow, hazardous, sometimes impracticable for days together. The distance of the anchorage from the shore is nearly four miles.

8. That Bushire was not well selected for the prevention of the slave trade is shown from a glance at the map. The strategic point for throttling this trade, if by force it can be suppressed, being (*sic*) obviously the narrow strait between Capes Jask and Mussundoom, at the entrance of the Gulf. One steam vessel lying there, with her boats out as flanking parties, might visit every craft entering the Gulf more effectually than could a dozen such vessels cruising in the Gulf after craft, which, having once entered it, would hug shallow dangerous shores, with slave ports always at hand.

9. Viewed from a war point of view, a station at Cape Mussundoom would, in respect to the naval command of the Gulf, have possessed as many advantages over Bushire, as does, in respect to the command of the Mediterranean, Gibraltar possess over an anchorage like that of Algiers or Tunis.

10. That the element of a telegraphic communication is now introduced, and that it would be convenient to have the main station or the one from which, in the contingency of breakage in the line on either side, communication could be most readily supplied by steam, at the same point with the Residency and Coal Dépôt.

11. That a Coal Dépôt is an element which must now be considered on an increased and an increasing scale, and that it would be advisable to have this dépôt at the entrance

of the Gulf for the following reasons :— that the colliers would thereby be saved the risk, delay, and cost of working up the Gulf against its prevailing wind, a nor-wester ; that coal taken in at the mouth of the Gulf would be sufficient in every steamer (even when well laden) to run her up to her extreme possible terminus of Busreh or Koornah and back ; that the entrance of the Gulf is the point first reached by a steamer coming in from a distant port, and liable therefore to be short of coal ; that the entrance of the Gulf is conveniently situate half way between Western India and Busreh ; that the great difficulty ships coming to the Gulf trade experience, is *not* arrival at the entrance, but the sailing up and down it ; and that, consequently, it may be expected that, as trade developes, it might become convenient for it to be carried by sailing craft to Cape Mussundoom, and thence to be distributed round the Gulf, and up the Tigris line by steamers, which, in like manner, would collect goods along the Gulf shores, and bring them to the central entrepôt at Mussundoom.

12. That even (*sic*) political consideration, Persian territory is not so convenient for our purposes of a Residency, a Telegraph Station, a Coal Depôt, and a free port of trade, as might be some other point in the Gulf. The Persians have some good qualities, but they are jealous and small-minded beyond any people I ever came across in the course of my twenty-two years travel. Almost any Government in the world affords privileges of wholesome lodging to foreign representatives, but what is the fact at Bushire ? They would not allow the Resident to build a house, although such a house was essential to his health ! When the question was referred to England, the Resident was reluctantly allowed to build a house of the dimensions of his tent ! The Physician in charge of the Residency venturing to do the same, his house was pulled down by the order of the Persian Government, and in contempt of the Resident. I give these facts simply in illustration of our political relations with Persia, after forty years' diplomacy and great expenditure. The simple truth is, if I may be allowed to judge from my experience in the Legation at Tehran, and here in the Residency, there will never be real political confidence on the part of Persia towards England, so long as we attack her when she aggresses eastward, and so long as we decline a defensive treaty with her to the westward. So situate, our relations with Persia may be disturbed suddenly and overawed by Russia, or from her own jealous temperament, Persia might interrupt our eastern communication *viâ* the Gulf in her jurisdiction, before force or diplomacy could intervene to save them.

13. That at the present moment, and while all our relations with the Gulf are under consideration, it would perhaps, be worthy the time of Government to solve permanently, the following problem :—To find a point somewhere in the Persian Gulf which shall offer following advantages :—

1st.—*Centrality*, as a free port, where trade may concentrate, where re-shipment may take place, and where goods transhipped may be most conveniently distributed.

2nd.—Which shall possess centrality as a telegraphic station, and most readily afford means of maintaining on either hand communication by steamer in the event of accident to the cable.

3rd.—Which should be the most central and convenient point for a Coal Depôt.

4th.—Which should be the most dominating point for keeping the sea police along the Pirate Coast, and for settling or preventing quarrels among the maritime Arabs with the least possible delay, with the minimum cost of fuel, and without taking the Resident to any great distance from his Head Quarters.

5th.—Which should enable the Resident of the Gulf to manage, without embarrassment, the relations in the (*sic*) Muscat as well as those in the Gulf, for the territories of Muscat are so mixed up with those of Persia and the Arabs, and its political relations are so interwoven with the politics of the Gulf, that it would

be obviously, and apart even from reasons of finance, it would be (*sic*) very desirable that they should be under one and the same superintendence.

6th.—Which might become a colony, or rather the inoculation, with an atom of civilized life, in the body of barbarism along the Arab coast, tending to expel that diseased barbarism by the wholesome, healthful and slow, but natural, means of introduced civilization. I think you would find such means more permanent, and in the long run more successful, both towards suppressing piracy and slavery, than you will even find ships of war or menaces, etc., and visits of state from your Resident.

7th.—Which shall be as secure as practicable from political difficulties.

8th.—Which may afford us an indisputable title to the ground we occupy.

9th.—Which may be sufficiently healthy, possess good water, and means of supply.

10th.—Which may afford calm and sufficient anchorage.

11th.—Which, in the event of war, should show us with the key of the Gulf in our hands.

My opinion is, that some point near Cape Mussundoom, under the Sultanate of our ally of Muscat, is the spot which all considerations indicate as that which should be our port, our political Residence, our Central Telegraph station, our main Gulf Coal Depôt, our anti-slavery station, and our fulcrum of general influence over the Gulf, over the Pirate Coast, over Western Mekran, and over the Muscat coast, climate being sufficiently favourable.

Lieutenant Stiffe, I.N., just arrived at Bushire, assures me that such a point is findable just west of Mussundoom; that a few weeks ago, when on telegraphic duty, he visited a headland called, I think, Ras Sheikh, which slopes up in tongue-like shape to the height of 1,000 feet, with good water and some cultivable ground at its base, with ample and land-locked anchorage, leading to a narrow neck of land some 400 yards wide, on the other side of which is a second inlet looking east of Mussundoom.

I consider such a position, if sufficiently healthy, would be the best possible for your Gulf and Muscat Residency, and the Political business of both might thence be more efficiently managed than either can be separately from Bushire and Muscat. At all events, in the present conjuncture of your Persian Gulf affairs, it would be well, I think, for Government to go to some little trouble and expense to test accurately the climates around Cape Mussundoom during the approaching hot season. And I am sure I am ready to aid personally in the experiment.

Finally, if the plan now pointed at be adopted, I should consider we did not lose much at Bushire, commercially, and when the Gulf and Tigris line shall be fully developed Bushire should not drain much trade beyond the arrondissement of Shiraz. Politically, it forms part of the charge of Her Majesty's Mission at Tehrân, and I do not think that Government in the least gains much by having the Residency in the town of Bushire, where there is little of real importance to transact, and where subordinates gossip and have likings and dislikings, and these come to injure the Government business in the long run.

The Residency at Bushire might be sold or disposed of, as Government please. All that would be lost would be some little personal conveniences to the Resident and his establishment, and the possibility of retreat to the neighbouring hills.

The immediate gains are, I think, obvious on reading the scheme, map in hand. What the future gains might be would become manifest should a crisis ever occur in our Red Sea line of communications.

Letter No. 2-A, dated 1st February 1863.

In a memorandum appended to my letter No. 1-A, of the 13th January 1863, I suggested the concentration of this Political Residency, Main Telegraph Station, and Coal Depôt at some spot near Cape Mussundoom, where a free port and depôt might be developed at a point central between the Slave Channel at the entrance of the Gulf and the Pirate coast.

2. Some of the principal arguments recurring to me in favour of the scheme were summed up in the memorandum itself. And subsequent reflection tends to strengthen my conviction that it is possible for Government to create, supposing climate to be sufficiently bearable, near Cape Mussundoom, a settlement which, from its geographical position, under a free rule, would, before many years elapse, become of considerable importance, and lend to our interest and to our status, whether commercial or political, in the Persian Gulf a character and a developement which they do not at present possess, and which, perhaps, they would not readily attain unless under some arrangement such as that proposed.

3. I believe that in a settlement of the nature suggested would be found the best means practicable for preventing slaves entering the Gulf; of preventing piracy and disturbance in the Gulf itself; of civilizing the maritime Arabs; of extending a healthful influence into Arabia on the one hand, and into Western Mekran on the other; of offering to many Indians and other merchants now scattered round the shores of the Gulf an unmolested refuge for the free prosecution of commerce; and finally, of giving to the ports of the Gulf, in general, an impetus and an example which it might be expected, would in the end induce or compel the Governments of these ports either to imitate our system or risk the loss of their trade.

4. If Government should approve the proposal, among matters of detail to come under consideration would be the following:—

1st.—A clear and valid written title should be obtained from the Sultān of Muscat for the land; and the conduct of this preliminary measure should, I think, be entrusted to cool and experienced hands: so conducted it would probably be easily arranged. But if any eccentricity were committed in this part of the business, much delay might ensue.

2nd.—The neighbourhood of Mussundoom should be carefully examined, in view to selecting a spot suitable to the objects we have in view, in respect of water, extent of ground, non-command of position, calm and land-locked harbourage, etc.

3rd.—The ground should be laid out with forethought, to meet possible distant future requirements; the public stores and offices should be as compact as possible, and their site uncommanded whether by land or sea. Cuttings or seeds from trees found indigenous in the neighbourhood should, without loss of time, be planted along the proposed roads and in groups near the watering places and landing points. Emancipated slaves, at present agented by a 30 Rupees moonshee at Bassidore, might aid in the public works as free men.

4th.—The old scantling of our camp houses at Bushire, still available *I am told* at Bombay, might be sent up for use.

5th.—Moving buoys should be laid down in the anchorage for the general convenience of shipping; the moorings for Her Majesty's ships being a little apart from the others.

6th.—If practicable, a serviceable road* should be made from the settlement along the coast line to the so-called Pirate Towns and Forts. A good caravansarai should be erected at the settlement terminus of this line, for the convenience of all travellers, and I believe that the free, frequent, friendly, and beneficial interchange of visits which would then ensue, as between the maritime Arabs and the settlement, would do more to civilize the former and to open up Arabia to commerce and progress, than would do all the menaces that a Resident might fulminate from Bushire, and than all the annual visits of state that could be made before the year 1900; a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump; and strong healthy life expels disease by its very nature.

7th.—Notification should be made of the freedom of the port, and all people should be invited to settle there without any other condition than that of paying rent or purchase money for the ground they might secure, and of becoming subject to any municipal rules which the community might impose on itself.

8th.—No Turkish wall, no works with plunging fire would be required. Persons entering the settlement must come unarmed, and if any outrage occurred, punishment, severe but prompt, should be administered, and no further altercation or retaliation dreamed of.

9th.—The officer entrusted with the charge of the settlement should have full powers until all was settled. He could never have a fair chance of success if subordinates, whether afloat or ashore, were allowed to cavil or offer the *vis inertiae*.

10th.—The Naval force should consist of two handy screw steamers. Vessels on the more recent plan as to engines, would be most efficient and cheapest in the long run. The title of Commodore or Senior Naval Officer (which in practice is only another name for Commodore, with the extra inconvenience of the officer by reason of his real want of rank being more than commodorely jealous of his dignity) should have no place in this little armament. The vessels should be attached to the chief of the settlement, and should be wholly at his disposal whether for anti-slave work, telegraph communication, suppression of piracy, conveyance of the chief to other points of Gulf, and for miscellaneous cruising and maintenance of peace along the pearl bank. As a general rule, one vessel should be on the move, the other in harbour ready to relieve or to meet accidents.

11th.—The functions of Government, and the actions of Government servants in the settlement should be limited to the removal of obstacles, to the maintenance of the peace, to the protection of commerce, in so far as to render its development really free and unmolested, and to the erection of remunerative public works, such as telegraph office, a post office, bridges, wells, etc. For the rest, the settlement should be allowed to grow of itself.

12th.—Muscat, whose interests and territories are thoroughly interlaced with those of its neighbours about Mussundoom, should form part of the Mussundoom charge; there might be a Native Agent in the town of Muscat; and the one now at Sharga might go there.

13th.—There should be a Vice-Consul under the Minister at Bushire, and who, though directly subordinate to the Foreign Office, might correspond upon Gulf affairs with the chief at Mussundoom.

5. The proposed settlement would flourish, I think, under any officer who would use common sense on its administration, and leave commerce and people in general to manage

* From the hasty glimpse I had of this coast in 1857, I fear that a road could not be made between the Elphinstone Inlet and Ras-al-Khyma. But the distance is short by sea; and, from Ras-al-Khyma northward, along the Pirate Coast itself, the coast is low and easily traversed.

their own business. Perhaps, however, an officer who had been trained in a good school for general administration would be preferable to a mere diplomatist or a pure soldier, for the former is, perhaps, a little too prone to fancy work done when he has given the last polish to his despatch; and the latter, perhaps, occasionally forgets that Martial Law and the Habeas Corpus Act cannot co-exist in one and the same jurisdiction.

It does not appear that Colonel Pelly's suggestions, ingenious and well thought out though they were in many respects, were taken into serious consideration by superior authority. If they had been, the whole subsequent history of the Persian Gulf might have followed a different course.

Colonel Pelly was also the author of a series of striking reports on the trade of the Persian Gulf in its political aspects, two interesting extracts from which follow below :—

Colonel
Pelly's
reports on
politico-
commercial
questions,
1866-69.

Letter No. 55, dated the 12th May 1866.

1. It is agreeable to me to submit that all is quiet in the Gulf as usual and trade seems thriving.

2. Nevertheless, at the hazard of being held disproportionately to intrude my local charge on the imperial care of Government, I would venture most respectfully to submit that these regions cannot with safety be any longer regarded as they were in years gone past. When your interests here were first represented, your frontier was behind Sind and the Punjab; the influences of European Government had scarcely shown themselves in Central Asia; steam was unknown; and our trade was by native craft on our coasts, or between these and England by our own square-rigged vessels. Your interests here were considered from this point of view, nor did any radical change in this view have place, unless for the suppression of piracy, by the detachment of a squadron of the Indian Navy.

3. When I arrived in the Gulf in November 1862, the Government summarized its estimate of its interest in the following paragraph, thus evincing a desire to curtail and withdraw, rather than to extend, in this direction; and this apparently on economic grounds :—"It appears to His Excellency the Governor in Council that British interests on the Persian shores of the Gulf will be amply represented by the appointment of a Political Resident at Bushire with Consular powers, in lieu of a Resident and Assistant Resident. The reduction of the Indian Naval Establishments in the Gulf will relieve the Political Officer stationed at Bushire of most part of his duties as a disbursing officer, and the post of Treasurer to the Residency (Rs. 120 per mensem) can be abolished, the Accountant being entrusted with the reduced duties in addition to his own."

4. Yet events have shown that precisely from that period our interests in the Gulf line have taken an unexpected and unprecedented start. Trade, which in 1846 was represented in the gross by somewhat under half a million sterling, is now upwards of five millions. The Resident, whose duties were assumed to be limited to British interests on the Persian shores of the Gulf, has been shown to find his heaviest and most responsible duties on the Arab Coast. The abolition of the Assistant Residency has entailed on the Resident those travels which

	£
To and from Bombay, Madras and Calcutta	3,000,000
To and from Batavia, Singapore and Mauritius	1,500,000
To and from Kurachi and Red Sea, etc.	500,000
Grand total	5,000,000

22nd February to 23rd March 1863.
 15th July to 10th September 1863.
 2nd December 1863 to 11th January 1864.
 3rd to 30th September 1864.
 1st November to 23rd December 1864.
 12th January to 25th March 1865.
 30th March to 22nd April 1865.
 14th October to 21st December 1865 and from
 28th December 1865 to 21st April 1866.

might otherwise have devolved on the Assistant, to the end that periods as per margin have been passed by me in the open or on boardship. The reduction of the Indian Navy Establishment, which was regarded simply as relieving the Resident as a disbursing officer, has, in fact, given him no option other than to persuade by moral and individual power 1,500 miles of predatory coastal tribes, who had previously been coerced, or lawless at will. The Treasury Department, relieved of the Naval disbursements, has received those of the Telegraph and other miscellaneous items. The Consular powers with which it was proposed to endow the Resident were found to be inadmissible under our Treaty engagements with Persia; and in point of fact there is not, in so far as I am informed, any Legislative Act or Resolution of Government which would bear me out in the exercise of any magisterial authority, or in the practical execution of my engagements as Arbitrator of the Maritime Truce. Simultaneously with your telegraphic development, the postal and steam communication opened up, and steam, as usual, was followed by increased traffic of goods and passengers. The cotton crisis in Bombay gave a sudden excitement to the export of cotton in Persia, which suddenly increased a hundred-fold. It was further found out here that, if opium could pay a duty of Rs. 1,600 a chest in Bombay, Persia could lay it down of an equally good quality and free of duty; hence a trade through Batavia with China sprung up. The vast cultivation of cotton in our own provinces seems to have decreased; the growth of corn the littoral of the Gulf found it could supply us; hence a recent corn trade. Meantime, Russia has been pushing on from the northward telegraph lines, and other European speculations have been contemplated or executed; and all these material effects of civilization are accompanied by European Agents, whose manners and customs awaken thought, and with increased vitality inoculate Asiatic despotisms with increased irritation. The general result at the present moment is comparative restlessness, inquisitiveness, and what we should term radicalism, requiring on the part of all authorities concerned a watchfulness and state of preparation, which would have been premature so long as these regions remained in a condition of social and political stagnation. This is the drift of my argument.

5. On the other hand, I am sensible of the forcible argument which might be advanced in favour of the English Government abstaining from foreign relations and holding itself fortified within its own Indus Frontier. But I fear that with States, as with individuals, it requires almost superhuman wisdom and strength of will to stand permanently isolated and alone. An individual, indeed, may, perhaps, succeed, having the requisite staff within himself; but the life of a State involves a succession of Rulers, and if he who succeeds lacks those qualities upon which is based the policy of his predecessor, there is risk that the State will have to regain by force or convulsion the status to which it would otherwise have naturally grown.

Part of letter No. 104, dated the 19th June 1869.

* * * * *

11. Government are probably informed of the asserted intention on the part of the French to open a line from Suez to Bussorah so soon as the Lesseps canal shall admit. A French Agent who recently toured from Muscat to the Shut-ool-Arab reported, I under-

stand, very favourably on the productive powers and facilities for trade of the regions at the head of the Gulf.

12. There is in prospect, also, the opening of some line, whether of rail entire, or of rail combined with river and canal communication, between the head of the Gulf and the Mediterranean, and I have recently had an interesting conversation on this subject with the Turkish Director of Public Works in the Pashalik of Baghdād.

13. No one who has observed and studied the development of trade and progress and of political events since the time when I first served in Sindh in 1841, can be blind to the great potential importance of the line connecting Kurrachee with Europe *viâ* not the so-called Euphrates line without deviation, but *viâ* some line connecting the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean by the Tigris or Euphrates, or by canals, or by one or other, or by all of these combined, with connecting intervals of rail.

14. I forbear troubling Government with statistical statements, because I know how figures mislead, unless they are based on reliable accounts, and such are not at present available in these regions for the general trade.

15. But the constant increase in the number of steamers, the comparative small falling-off in native craft, the contentment of the merchants, the increased rate of mule hire, the increasing number of solid houses at the ports, and the inconvenient rise in house-rent and general prices, while they do not constitute statistical statements, are yet facts which could not, perhaps, exist, unless the statistics of trade were favourable, whether tabulated or not.

16. On the other hand, it should never be forgotten that this line is, perhaps, singular in one respect, *viz.*, that while, on the one hand, civilization and trade are increasing more than we could have expected, we have, on the other hand, constantly to watch on the Arab littoral tribes who have immemorially been accustomed to dwell in a condition wherein every man's hand was ever prone to be raised against his neighbour. To keep the maritime peace along the strongholds of these littoral Chieftainships is no child's play. It is not alone by the sudden and occasional appearance of a man-of-war that this can be thoroughly done. What is required is uniform vigilance and pressure. The position of the Resident as arbitrator of the maritime truce may be aptly compared with that of an officer holding a civilized frontier against lawless borderers. Those borderers would never be kept quiet or reduced to order and industry by intermittent sallies from a garrison, accompanied by tardy retaliation; what is wanted is the constant pressure of watchful outposts ready at any moment to put down raids, and uphold the peaceful and well inclined. The tribes so dealt with gradually come to perceive that the object of the civilized Power in patrolling is not vengeance, but the general good and the maintenance of peace and progress. The tribes thus come to learn also that raids and piracy are unsuccessful in practice. Our light gun-boats are such outposts and patrols for the Arab coast; and my respectful and earnest recommendation to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is to keep the small sea force available for the Gulfs of 'Oman and Persia under one head, and to permit that head to patrol, detach, or concentrate it as he may deem the necessities of the moment to dictate. The telegraph runs through these regions, thus giving the Resident instant intelligence of whatever happens; although, as a rule, the littorals of Mekran and Muscat are entirely peaceful, and it is only along the Arab Coast of the Persian Gulf, between Cape Mussendoom and Koweit, that the maritime Arabs require habitual watching. But all that I could write on the principle involved in this agreement (*sic*) may be found better expressed in the writings of the General who first taught to meditate similar problems. I allude to those of the late Colonel John Jacob,

The difficulty in which the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was placed from 1862 to 1871, through there being no naval force properly at his disposal, have been described. As will be apparent from the passages quoted above from his writings, they were severely felt by Colonel Pelly, the only Resident to suffer from them; and in his opinion they were increased by a ruling of the Government of India in 1865, following upon strong action which he had taken in Bahrain, that the Resident was not in future to seize vessels belonging to native chiefs on his own responsibility. With reference to this order he reported on 23rd April 1866:—

Restrictions
on the action
of the
Political
Resident in
the Persian
Gulf,
1862-71.

Although loath to trouble Government with petty details, I would venture to append a few specimens of the complaints that reach their representative from the littoral of the Persian Gulf; and these should not be considered as *selected* specimens, for I have taken them one by one as they have to-day turned up, and the records show thousands of such cases.

Formerly, the Resident would have despatched a vessel of the Gulf Squadron, with an Assistant or Agent on board, to enquire into the cases, and with instructions, failing satisfactory arbitrament, to blockade, fine, or otherwise punish. But under the more recent expression of views by the Indian Government, I do not feel at liberty to use any coercive measures, or to levy any fine, unless under the explicit instructions of Government.

* * * *

In the meantime, I most respectfully solicit the instructions of Government as to the means by which I should proceed, and as to the manner in which I should proceed with the particular cases now submitted.

* * * *

On the whole, I fear that in the long run Government will find it almost necessary to maintain peace at sea in the Gulf, and to protect the persons and property of their subjects residing in the sea-board trading marts; and to do this it seems almost essential that your representative should be in possession of:—1st.—The means of enforcing his arbitraments and maintaining peace; and 2nd.—Either discretionary power, or else clear instructions as to the manner in which he should use the means at his disposal.

Specimens of complaints from the littoral of the Persian Gulf.

Translated purport of a letter from Khumees bin Esau Seyhatee, to the Resident, Persian Gulf; received at Bushire 23th March 1866.

I beg to inform you that a boat belonging to me was broken up at sea between Bahrain and Kateef, and seven men who were on board of her were murdered. They blame Feysul for this act, as the sail of the boat was found in his possession. Feysul has denied the charge, and has accused Abdoollah Omanee of the deed. Abdoollah Omanee, who was with Feysul, hearing of this accusation, sought protection with the

Chiefs of Bahrain. The Chiefs of Bahrain now demand blood-money for the murdered men. This act was committed on the high seas, and obtainment of reparation for the same rests with you. I claim blood-money for the seven men and the value of the boat and gear, worth 55 dollars. It was my duty to inform you of this occurrence, as obtainment of reparation for the deed rests with you, and there is no excuse to be made in the matter. The boat is owned by me, Khumees bin Esau Seyhatee.

Translated purport of a letter from Khaled bin Sultan, Chief of Shargah, dated the 2nd Ramzan 1282 (20th January 1866). Received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

Informes that his bugla from Bussorah encountered a storm and had to put into Ejman, and in entering the creek she struck. Her cargo was taken out by the boats of the place, and only a portion restored. The owners of the stranded bugla then wished to float her, but were hindered from doing so until the waves broke her up, when again the owners tried to save portions of the wreck, but were again prevented. This is the order at sea now-a-days. If the Sirkar consent to our acting in like manner, let us know; but if the Sirkar intends doing justice to us, we require all that was taken from the bugla, as also all loss that has happened to the bugla since she struck.

Translated purport of a letter from Mahomed Ali, to Hajee Yacoob, late Shargah Agent, without date. Received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

I beg to inform you that the Ahl-Boo Soomait, Saad bin Mahomed, attacked my people in three boats on the Pearl Banks and attacked them, breaking one man's teeth. We know that the Sirkar has command of the sea, not the Ahl-Boo Soomait. Please inform Resident of this, for we can act just as the Boo Soomait have done, but it is not the part of any but the Sirkar to afford us our rights.

Translation of a letter from Mahomed Busheer, acting as Shargah Agent, to the Resident, Persian Gulf, dated the 13th Shawul 1282 (1st March 1866). Received 28th March 1866.

Reports his failure to obtain from Ejman Sheik property taken from the Shargah bugla stranded at that port, or the wreck of the bugla itself. Property of Lingah people 5,780½ Krs : property of British subjects 2,100½ Krs.

Translated purport of a letter from the Chief of Mogoo, to Sheikh Mahomed Busheer, Lingah Agent, dated none. Received at Bushire 28th March 1866.

The Ahl-Boo Soomait attacked my people at sea with firearms, and took from them forcibly one diver. Mahomed bin Nair, who is bearer of this letter, will inform you of particulars.

Translated purport of a letter from Mahomad Busheer, acting for Shargah Agent, to Lingah Chief, dated the 13th Shawul 1282 (1st March 1866). Received 28th March 1866.

Demands compensation for one man's teeth and forcible removal of one diver from a Marzoogee boat by the Ahl-Boo Soomait, else Resident will be informed of the circumstance; and if a ship of war be sent to demand redress, he should not feel grieved at Agent having reported the matter.

Translated purport of a letter from Bunyas, residing at Kishm, dated the 3rd April. Received 18th April 1866.

They are 30 families residing at Kishm, but owing to bad treatment they wished to leave and return to their country, but the Sheikh of Kishm prevented them. Beg Resident will arrange to get permission for them to leave Kishm, as they are British subjects, and do not wish to remain any longer in Kishm.

Translated purport of a letter from Tursoo, Bunya, dated the 29th Zilkaada 1282 (16th April 1866). Received 16th April 1866.

Informes that their bugla with telegraph stores on board suffered from bad weather and put into Bahrain for repair, but the Sheik would not permit them to repair their bugla at Bahrein, and forced them to put to sea and proceed to Fao: but on their way thither were obliged to put the bugla on shore at Ashan Coast, where she broke to pieces, and her wreck was taken away by Amaier tribe, 180 planks, and three boats from the Boo Felsa tribe took portions of the wreck; rest has been brought to Koweit. This information has been corroborated by one Sheik Mahomed-ul-Mugheyzee of Koweit and Abdoollah bin Sleyman Kateef, both of whom are now in Bushire.

It does not appear, however, that the Government of India thought it necessary to modify their former instructions or to issue any new order.

In 1870-71 a Committee of the House of Commons, appointed to report on the subject of the British Diplomatic and Consular services, considered anew the question of the dependence of the Tehrān Legation, which still remained in all respects subject to the Foreign Office, though to a large extent maintained out of Indian revenues. They inclined to the view that the Mission should be placed under the Secretary of State for India, and recommended that, if such a change were considered impracticable, its members should generally be selected from the Indian services, and that the proportion of the cost of the Legation borne by the Government of India should be reduced. This resolution had, however, no result in practice.

Dependency
of the British
Legation at
Tehrān,
1870-71.

In 1863, in connection with telegraph construction and the boundary dispute pending between Kalāt and Persia, a European Assistant Political Agent was stationed at Gwādur. The post was maintained during the rest of the period.

Appointment
of an Assist-
ant Political
Agent at
Gwādur
1863.

British political and official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1862-73.

The development of civilisation in the Persian Gulf had its counterpart on a smaller scale in Turkish 'Irāq, where, as already shown, British commercial navigation continued to make progress, and where, perhaps in consequence of the rapid growth of British interests, the attitude of the local Turkish authorities was, during the earlier part of the period, extremely unfriendly.

Station-
naire of the
British
Political
Agency at
Baghdād,
1869-70.

In 1869, the assent of the Porte to the replacement of the stationnaire of the British Political Agency, a surviving relic of the British Mesopotamian flotilla though not one of its original vessels, was obtained ; but the presence of the stationnaire was believed to be regarded with disfavour by the Turkish authorities ; and in 1870 the Government of India were inclined, chiefly it would seem from considerations of expense, to acquiesce in its disappearance. On the advice of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, however, it was decided not to abandon the long-established British privilege of maintaining an armed Government steam-vessel at Baghdād.

The Oudh
Bequest.

In 1849 a large pecuniary benefaction appropriated to the towns of Karbala and Najaf by a deceased King of Oudh under an Agreement with the Government of India, of which the founder had directed periodical distribution to be made through Mujtahids resident at those places, came into operation. The British Political Agency at Baghdād, as representing the Government of India in Turkish 'Irāq, became the channel of payment ; and the magnitude of the " Oudh Bequest," as it was styled, which already amounted to Rs. 7,334, a month—some £750 at the rate of exchange then prevailing—and which would be increased later by the falling-in of certain life interests in the deceased King's estate, invested it with political importance. At first it was feared that the nature of the Bequest, which was to be enjoyed by Persian and Indian Shi'ahs, might be misunderstood by the Sunni Government of Turkey and so lead to friction ; but this danger did not materialise. The British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, however, chiefly with a view to the avoidance of political difficulties, was authorised by the Government of India to exercise " a judicious superintendence " over the expenditure of the money.

In the course of time serious embarrassments, to which the loss from view of the authentic Agreement sealed by the King of Oudh contributed not a little, arose in connection with the practical administration of the Bequest. Arrangements were made to secure to destitute Indians at Karbala, Najaf and Kādhimain, a share in the proceeds of the Bequest ; and these arrangements became interlaced in a highly inconvenient manner with certain dispositions for non-official representation and protection of British Indian interests at Karbala and Kādhimain. The disbursement of the money having been left, apart from the safeguards introduced in the interest of Indians, entirely to Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf, the funds were to a large extent misappropriated or wasted. In 1866, the question of correcting this abuse was raised by the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, a publicspirited Indian nobleman of the Oudh royal family settled at

Baghdād; and in 1867 the Political Agent, in consultation with the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, apparently recommended that the whole revenue of the Bequest should be made payable in future to Indian Mujtahids, and that their distribution of the money should be conducted through a Committee of respectable resident Indians, under the supervision of the British Political Agent. The Government of India, however, in view of the wording of the Agreement with the King of Oudh, as then known to them, negatived these proposals.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD NORTHBROOK, MAY 1872 TO APRIL 1876.

From this point onwards, conditions in the Gulf having assumed substantially their present shape, the most convenient division of time into periods will be one agreeing with the terms of office of the successive Viceroys and Governors-General of India.

Transfer of the direction of British political interests in the Persian Gulf from the Government of Bombay to the Govern- ment of India, 1872-73.

The British Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq was brought under the direct control of the Government of India in 1843*; but the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf remained for nearly thirty years longer subordinate, as in the past, to the Government of Bombay. At length in 1872 the Government of India became desirous that the Government of Bombay should be deprived, in their favour, of the direction of "the relations of the British Government with the foreign powers and states to the West of India, *viz.*, Muscat, Zanzibar, those on the coast of Arabia, and those on the littoral of the Persian Gulf." In recommending the change to Her Majesty's Government, the Government of India observed on the 1st March 1872 :

In consequence of increased facilities of communication, the extension of commerce, the closer relations into which the affairs of Asiatic countries have been drawn with Europe, and from other causes, our political relations with these countries have of late years acquired an importance which they never before possessed, and have given rise to questions the most difficult and delicate of all that occupy our attention in the Foreign Department. Wars, revolutions, and dynastic changes have in some of these countries

* *Vide* page 1394 post, and in this connection see also pages 220 and 1339.

succeeded each other with great rapidity, and in all of them the march of events has been such as to demand a prompt decision on questions of the greatest international importance. We have, indeed, repeatedly found ourselves called on, in matters which had apparently been long settled, to consider questions involving the past, present, and future policy of Government, to decide rapidly, and to act promptly.

Nearly all of these questions have been of a purely imperial character, such as no authority but the highest in India could venture to decide. Some of the most momentous of them have arisen from the attitude assumed towards neighbouring Powers by the Governments of Turkey and Persia in matters closely affecting the most important interests of the British Empire. They have involved correspondence with Foreign Powers, judgments on the acts and policy of nations represented in the Councils of Europe, and action in important international affairs, which no local Government has either the knowledge of or the influence to enable them to control, and the settlement of which, even if they had, could not, consistently with what is due to powerful independent nations, be left in the hands of any authority subordinate to Her Majesty's Government of India.

In former years, when steam communication was in its infancy and telegraphs were unknown, it may have been thought desirable to leave a larger voice in these questions to the subordinate authorities, with whom communication with those countries could be most rapidly and regularly maintained. But such necessity has long passed away. There is no part of the countries referred to which cannot be communicated with as quickly through the telegraph, and nearly as quickly through the post, by the Government of India as by the Government of Bombay. The reasons for the exceptional course hitherto followed have therefore ceased, and the control of purely political relations with Foreign Independent Powers ought consequently to revert to the authority to which they properly belong, and by which alone they can be conducted with safety and advantage to the interests of the Empire. Indeed, the necessity for this change has been so strongly felt of late, that when matters of extraordinary importance or urgency have arisen—such, for instance, as the Turkish expedition to Nejd—we have not hesitated to communicate instructions direct to the Representative of the British Government on the spot, sending a copy to the Government of Bombay for their information. But even on such occasions—still more of course, on other occasions, when the entire correspondence, telegraphic or other, is conducted through the medium of the Local Government we find that a speedy and full comprehension, by the local British Agents, of the line of policy which the Government of India desires to pursue, and the receipt of timely information by ourselves of the state of affairs, are seriously impeded by the interposition of a local Government.

A number of particular cases were cited in the Government of India's despatch to illustrate the inconveniences which they held to be inseparable from the interposition of the Government of Bombay between themselves and the British political officers in the countries in question.

Later in the year, a personal change having meanwhile taken place in the Governorship of Bombay and no reply having as yet been received from Her Majesty's Government, the Government of Bombay of their own accord proposed that the control of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agency in Zanzibar should be transferred from them to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, only such information as they might find of value or urgent importance being

communicated to them in future by the local political officers. The Government of India on the 23rd January 1873 accepted the proposal, subject to the sanction of Her Majesty's Government; directed that it should be carried into force at once; and issued the necessary instructions to all concerned. At the same time they ordered that copies of all communications passing between Būshehr and Zanzibar and themselves, or *vice versa*, should be supplied to the Government of Bombay, to such extent as that Government might desire, for information and with a view to remarks and suggestions being made thereon by the Governor of Bombay.

The arrangements were duly sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government and, along with the political control of Persian Gulf and Zanzibar relations, the patronage of the political posts maintained by Britain in those regions passed definitely to the Government of India.

Affairs in Persia, 1872-76.

In Persia the power of the central Government, or rather of the monarch, continued to consolidate; and in 1873 the Shāh was able to venture on the striking innovation of absenting himself from his kingdom on a tour in Europe.

Russian policy was eminently hostile to British interests, chiefly in the direction of Central Asia, and schemes for promoting the penetration of counteractive British influence into Persia from the south were considered. In 1875-76 representations were made to the Persian Government in the interests of a British firm who were anxious to place steamers on the Kārūn River, and whose projects the Government of India were inclined to assist with a subsidy; but neither a special concession nor the opening of the river to general navigation, though the latter course was discussed by a Persian Commission, could at the time be obtained.

Affairs in Turkey, 1872-76.

In Turkey political conditions steadily deteriorated, owing to the prodigality of the Court and Government of Constantinople and to misgovernment in the Balkan districts.

The province of Hasa, annexed by the Porte during the last period, was found difficult and unprofitable to administer; and in 1874 the Turks

sought relief from the difficulties and expense in which they found themselves involved by appointing a local Shaikh to be Turkish Governor, and by withdrawing the bulk of the Turkish garrison. Within a few months, however, a relative of the Wauhābi Amir invaded Hasa and temporarily overturned the Turkish administration, besieging the Turkish nominee in a fort at the provincial capital. The situation was saved, from the Turkish point of view, by the prompt arrival of Nāsir Pāsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, from Basrah with a large force. On the Shaikh's return to Basrah in 1875, after a ruthless "pacification" of the revolted province, a Wilāyat of Basrah was formed by detaching some districts from the Wilāyat of Baghdad and adding Hasa to them; and Nāsir Pāsha himself became, though by birth a tribal Arab, the first Governor of the new charge.

Ill-success did not deter the Turkish Government of the day from prosecuting their fatuous policy of territorial expansion. In 1872 they seized Jauf-al-'Āmir on the confines of Najd by means of a small force sent from Palestine; but they were able to retain possession of that oasis for two years only. Turkish intrigues with 'Odaid on the border of Qatar, but situated in Trucial 'Omān, began; and during the period the Turkish flag was sometimes hoisted at the place, while occasional tribute also was believed to be paid by the inhabitants to Turkey. It was about this time that the Turks first began to show jealousy of imaginary British influence in Central Arabia.

Relations between Turkey and Persia, 1872-74.

The epoch now under review seems to have been one of an attempted rapprochement between Persia and Turkey.

The Shāh's pilgrimage on Turkish soil in 1871 was cast into the shade by a personal visit which he paid to the Sultān at Constantinople in 1873; and in 1875 certain long-contested points relating to the powers of Persian consular officers and the immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey, as also to those of Turkish consular officers and subjects in Persia, were settled by a Convention.

The question of the Turko-Persian frontier, however, still remained an obstacle to a perfect understanding. To dispose of it, a purely Turko-Persian Commission met at Constantinople in the winter of 1874-75; but the members could agree in nothing. A new Commission, including

British and Russian representatives, was then formed and sat at Constantinople during 1875-76; its duty, like that of its predecessor, was to trace a boundary on the map prepared by the Delimitation Commission of 1848-52; but its proceedings were delayed by excessive claims on the part of the Turkish delegate in the beginning, and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-77 brought them to an end while still unfinished.

Affairs and relations of the West Coast of the Persian Gulf, 1872-76.

Along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf quietness as a rule prevailed, the Turks continuing in possession of Hasa, as already described, and Britain maintaining little correspondence and almost no relations with any local authority except the Shaikh of Bahrain. Bahrain had fallen under the influence of the British Government to such an extent that the Shaikh was accustomed to conform to their advice in external affairs and looked to them for protection against attack from without. In 1874 a Bedouin invasion of Bahrain from Qatar was threatened, but was averted by a British naval demonstration; and in the following year the Shaikh, under British advice, dis-severed his interests from those of the people of the mainland, where he had until then claimed to exercise authority.

Affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1872-76.

In the Sultanate of 'Omān, as in Bahrain, the influence of the British Government tended to increase and the relations of their representatives with the native Government to become more intimate. British naval aid arrived too late to save the Sultān from submission to the demands of a rebel force of tribesmen which threatened Masqat at the beginning of 1874, but a month or two later a revolt in Bātinah was suppressed chiefly by British war vessels, which compelled the insurgents to withdraw from Masna'ah and Suwaiq.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1872-76.

Russian influence and opposition to British aims in Persia was, as usual, a dominant factor in the general situation; but there were still no symptoms of Russian activity in the Persian Gulf region.

Interest on the part of France was manifested only in an attempt to obtain from the Shāh a large concession for irrigation works and industrial enterprise in 'Arabistān. This movement, which was associated with the name of Dr. Tholozan, physician to the Shāh, was defeated by a British claim of prior right to compensation under the abrogated "Reuter Concession."

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1872-76.

In 1874 it was arranged by the British naval authorities, with a view to the vessels of the Royal Navy detailed for service being kept in an efficient state by constant relief and change, that as a rule current duties should be carried on by two of the three special ships, the third being always absent on a trip to Indian waters. Each vessel was, if possible, to be allowed ten days or a fortnight in port at Karachi or Bombay every four months; on her return to the Gulf she was, as a rule, to call at Gwādur or Chahbār for the purpose of reporting her arrival and receiving orders as to her destination. The Political Resident was to be kept informed of the movements of ships; and it was added in the naval instructions: "The requisitions made by the Political Resident and Agents of course must be most carefully attended to, but should they materially interfere with the system of relief, Commanding Officers should point out to these officers what appears to them the best means for meeting both requirements, informing them that these orders have been given with the view of affording an efficient squadron, and requesting their co-operation in attaining this object."

Later in the same year, in connection with the threatened descent by Arab tribes of the mainland upon Bahrain, the Resident in the Persian Gulf telegraphed to the Senior Naval Officer that the presence of a vessel of war was urgently required. Ten days passed before the vessel detailed for service left Karachi, and three weeks before she arrived on the spot; and meanwhile the crisis had to be met, as best possible, by stationing the Bombay Marine vessels "Hugh Rose" and "May Frere" off Bahrain. The Resident consequently requested that the cases might be defined in which relief routine should be considered to over-ride requisitions by the political authorities, and it was ruled by the Government of India that the Resident himself must decide in every instance whether the system of relief must give way to political exigencies; but he was required to report

by telegram to the Government of India every instance in which he exercised his power of interference with the relief programme, in order that the justifiability of his action might be reviewed. The Government of India attached great importance to the relief of the ships in rotation, and they considered that in the Bahrain case the Resident's estimate of the seriousness of the situation had been exaggerated. It appeared, moreover, that the delay complained of was due to the vessel at Karachi having had to wait for new boats from Bombay, she having recently lost three in a cyclone.

In 1874 the Wālī of Baghdād protested against a visit paid by a British war vessel to Qūrnah, on the ground that the Shatt-ul-'Arab above Basrah was an internal Turkish water.

Maritime security, 1872-76.

There was only one serious infraction of maritime security during the period. It occurred in the Turkish port of Basrah, where the British mail steamer "Cashmere" was boarded by pirates while at anchor one night in June 1872. One of the native crew was killed; two Europeans were seriously injured; and property, chiefly specie, to the value of between £4,000 and £5,000 was carried off. The case was prosecuted by the British political authorities in Turkish 'Irāq with great energy, both in Turkish territory and in the adjoining Persian province of 'Arabistān, with the result that in the course of 1872-73 seven of the principal offenders were publicly executed at Basrah and about three-quarters of the pecuniary loss was made good, nearly half of the recoveries taking place in Persia.

Suppression of the slave trade, 1872-76.

Various agreements in restraint of the slave trade had been concluded by the British Government at different times with the powers and principalities surrounding the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān; but few seizures of slaves had been effected by British vessels in those waters. It was only in 1873 that effective naval arrangements were made in East Africa and the Persian Gulf for the forcible suppression of the traffic; but by 1876 the importation of African slaves into the countries of [the Persian Gulf on a large scale, which had hitherto been the rule, had temporarily ceased.

Marine Surveys and investigations on land, 1872-76.

The survey of the waters of Bahrain and the Hasa coast, resolved on in 1871, was carried on during the years 1872-74 by means of the schooner "Constance." The operations began in the neighbourhood of Bahrain. On their being subsequently extended towards the mainland, some opposition on the part of the local Turkish authorities was experienced ; but it was eventually withdrawn in consequence of representations made to the Wāli of Baghdād, and the survey completed without obstruction.

In 1875 the Resident in the Persian Gulf made a journey to Shirāz and submitted to the Government of India a valuable statistical and administrative description of the Persian province of Fārs.

Communications, 1872-76.

The Persian Government in 1875 established an internal postal service of their own, which at a later period partly supplemented and partly superseded British postal arrangements existing in Persia.

British interests and official matters in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1872-76.

No change of importance took place in British interests and political arrangements in the Persian Gulf or Turkish 'Irāq during the period.

Complaints of abuses in the administration of the Oudh Bequest in the latter country continued to be received ; but the British authorities, on the information which they then possessed, still held that intervention by themselves would not be warranted under the terms of the Bequest.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD LYTON, APRIL 1876 TO JUNE 1880.

The years following 1876 were characterised by an acute revival of the Afghan difficulty, in other words by a renewal of serious tension between Britain and Russia in Central Asia. This crisis followed a war between

Russia and Turkey by which the position of the latter power was greatly weakened, but which did not otherwise much affect the position in the Middle East. On the death in 1863 of Dōst Muhammad Khān of Kābul, the consolidator of Afghanistan, the provinces of Herāt and Qandahār again broke away from the central Afghan government; and five years elapsed before Sher 'Ali Khān, the son and successor of Dōst Muhammad Khān, succeeded with British support in re-incorporating them with his dominions. Meanwhile the frontiers of Russia in Central Asia were being rapidly pushed forward, and at length a political correspondence between Tashkend and Kābul came into existence.

On a breach occurring in 1878 between Britain and the Afghan Amīr, consequent on the refusal of the latter to receive a Mission from the Government of India headed by Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly, formerly Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Second Afghan War began. It lasted from 1878 to 1879. Sher 'Ali Khān, having fled to the northern part of his dominions, died at Mazār-i-Sharif in February 1879; his son Ya'qūb Khān was installed in his place under the Treaty of Gandamak (May 1879); and a British Envoy was established at Kābul in the person of Sir Louis Cavagnari. This *quasi*-appropriation of Kābul by the British Government ended, like the more pronounced occupation of 1839-41, in a massacre of the British representative, his suite and escort. The Third Afghan War followed, with the result that Ya'qūb Khān became a political *détenu* in India, while Kābul and Qandahār were placed temporarily under British administration.

The Second
Afghan War,
1878-80.

And the end of the Second Afghan War the policy of the Government of India was still to maintain the unity of Afghanistan; but the Third Afghan War caused them to change their views and to recommend instead a disintegration of the troublesome Afghan state. The transfer of Herāt and Sīstān to Persia was contemplated, and negotiations with the Shāh for the cession of the former to Persia on certain stringent conditions even reached an advanced stage. In 1880, Herāt being still held by Ayūb Khān, a son of the late Amīr Sher 'Ali Khān, Qandahār was detached from Kābul by the British and conferred on a Sardār of the Bārakzai family; and the question of constructing a railway from Qandahār to Herāt and of affording financial aid to Persia were mooted. Ultimately, however, before any irreversible step had been taken, British policy in Afghanistan reverted to lines more in accordance with the traditions of the past; and by the end of 1881 'Abdur Rahmān, who had been installed as Amīr under an agreement which subjected him to British political suzerainty, was master of Qandahār and Herāt as well as of the rest of Afghanistan.

Third
Afghan War,
and contemplated
dis-
memberment
of Afghan-
istan, 1879-
80.

Persian affairs and relations, 1876-80.

Internal
state of
Persia.

The Persian throne remained stable, and order was generally maintained throughout Persia, during this period. In 1878 the Shāh again visited Europe.

British policy
in regard to
communica-
tions in
Persia.

The political interests of Britain in Persia being closely bound up with her political interests in Afghanistan, it became an object of British policy to acquire means of penetration into Persia from the southward, preferably through 'Arabistān and presumably with a view to counteracting Russia from a new direction. In the opinion of Sir O. (then Lieutenant-Colonel) St. John, who held political charge at Qandahār as Resident in Southern Afghanistan during 1880-81, the events of the Afghan War had so increased British influence and prestige in Persia that the Persian Government were at last convinced of Britain's being a safer ally than Russia; and the same authority held that the opening of "the Shūshtar route" and the construction of roads inland from Būshehr would, while they increased the material prosperity of the south of Persia, tend to produce stability in Anglo-Persian relations by enabling the British Government to exert pressure on the Court of Tehrān through the Persian Gulf. The possibilities latent in the situation seem to have been perfectly comprehended by Russia, who opposed the construction of British railways in the south of Persia with a tenacity equalled only by that of Britain in resisting Russian railway projects in the north.

1877-79.

Between 1877 and 1879 persevering efforts were made by the British Government through Her Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehrān to secure the opening of the Kārūn River to steam navigation; but the attitude of the Shāh on this point was one of obstinate resistance, dictated it would seem by a fear lest the growth of Muhammareh in value as a port should lead to its seizure by Britain,—a consummation to which close relations between the Shaikh of Muhammareh and the British representative at Basrah, together with mischievous articles in the European press, appeared in His Persian Majesty's eyes to lend probability. The question of roads was at first allowed to slumber; but schemes for a railway to connect 'Arabistān with Central Persia were recommended to notice by the British diplomatic representative in Persia with the same total absence of results as that for the opening of the Kārūn.

1879-80.

These unsuccessful negotiations, it may be observed, all took place before the exhibition by Britain of a benevolent attitude towards Persia in connection with the proposed partition of Afghanistan. Subsequently

when the question of Herāt was discussed, the Shāh would have been willing, in return for the advantages offered him, to concede the free navigation of the Kārūn and the construction of waggon roads from Būshehr to Tehrān and from Shūshtar to Isfahān.

Turkish affairs, 1876-80.

The disastrous crash towards which Turkey had for some years been trending along a path of financial extravagance, territorial ambition, internal misgovernment and unreal reforms, was reached in 1876. In May of that year the ruling Sultān was deposed by a group of politicians, among whom Mid-hat Pāsha, the first "Wālī" of Baghdād, was a prominent figure; and the reign of his immediate successor lasted only three months. At the end of 1876 the grant by the Sultān of a liberal constitution to the whole of the Ottoman Empire was suddenly announced, partly, it would seem, by way of evading the demands of a European Conference for concrete administrative reforms in European Turkey.

Grant and revocation of a constitution in Turkey, and Russo-Turkish war, 1876-80.

Russia, however, unimpressed by the guarantees which the new constitution afforded for the cessation of tyrannical government in the Balkans, declared war on Turkey in 1877; and in less than a year her armies were at the gates of Constantinople. In the course of 1878 an International Congress at Berlin detached the greater part of European Turkey more or less completely from the Ottoman Empire; while Britain agreed—on certain conditions which Turkey afterwards neglected to fulfil—to take part in defending the Asiatic dominions of the Sultān from future aggression, and received in return the island of Cyprus.

The Turkish constitution was revoked; and the country, despite a show of reform in finance, military matters and general administration, remained sunk in the abyss of misgovernment from which it had never really emerged. The inefficiency and corruption of the official class, which had now for about a generation been drawn from a lower social stratum than formerly, were extreme; and their growing dislike and even hatred of Europeans, seemed to increase with the degree in which they collectively imitated European political methods and individually adopted European ways of life.

The conditions which obtained throughout the Ottoman Empire generally were well exemplified at the time in the province of Turkish 'Irāq, where the normal course of events was as little disturbed as anywhere by political vicissitudes at the capital and an unsuccessful war. Some progress had been

Affairs in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-80.

made during the preceding twenty years in breaking the power of the Arab tribes ; and administrative councils, partly elective, had been associated everywhere with the executive officials and were not without their uses. Nevertheless the state of affairs was still such that Mesopotamia could not be described as enjoying the benefits of orderly government. At Karbala and Najaf rebellions occurred in the summer of 1877 ; the rising at the former place was not suppressed without recourse to military operations in the environs of the town. In the winter of 1877-78 there were grain riots at Baghdād itself, and the mob had their way. The large Shammar tribe were divided under rival chiefs ; and only a small portion appeared inclined to follow the course marked out for them by the Turkish authorities and settle down to agriculture. In 1878-79 rival chiefs of the Bani Lām were at war with one another, endangering the navigation of the Tigris, and could not be reduced to order. The Āl Bū Muhammad, too, were internally at feud, and the followers of one of their Shaikhs, who was at variance with the Turkish Government, committed serious offences upon the same river. The last and most serious of the Āl Bū Muhammad outrages, occurring in 1880 just after the close of the period, was an attack upon the British mail steamer "Khalifah" ; two natives on board were killed and the European officer in command was dangerously wounded.

The usual Turkish panacea of reorganisation was applied. It took the shape, this time, of the formation of a new Mūsāl Wilāyat by a reduction of the area of the Baghdād Wilāyat in 1879, followed by the combination in 1880 of the remainder of the Baghdād Wilāyat and the whole of the Basrah Wilāyat into a single charge.

Steam navigation on the Tigris continued to prosper. Most of the vessels of the Turkish navigation flotilla were commanded at this time by European captains.

Affairs in
Hasa, 1876-
80.

In the summer of 1878 a serious rising against Turkish rule took place in Hasa ; it was headed by members of the Wāhhābī ruling family and continued with partial success until the end of the year, when it was at length suppressed by troops from Turkish 'Irāq.

At the same time, without regard to the precariousness of the Turkish position in Hasa, the Porte formally advanced pretensions to the ownership of 'Odaid in Trucial 'Omān.

Turko-Persian relations, 1876-80.

The period was one of virtual stagnation in Turko-Persian relations.

Affairs and relations of the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1876-80.

Chiefly, perhaps, in consequence of the continued exclusion of the Wāhhābis from the coast-line of the Persian Gulf by the Turks, and of the difficulties of the Turks themselves in Hasa, the period was one of political inactivity along the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. The capture of Zubārah in Qatar by hostile tribes in 1878 deprived the Shaikh of Bahrain of his last foothold of influence on the mainland. This event, while it removed a cause of frequent complications, was accompanied by risks to the Bahrain principality which British naval vigilance had to be called in to parry ; and its accomplishment left Bahrain more exposed for the future to the danger of sudden invasion from the mainland. The internal state of Bahrain about the same time became so disturbed that in the spring of 1879 a British political officer with a military guard was sent to reside on the main island for a time.

Affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1876-80.

In 1877 rebels against the authority of the Sultān of 'Omān occupied Matrah and invested Masqat, but they were obliged by British naval action to retire without having secured any material advantages. They had committed some excesses, however, during their stay in Matrah ; and the situation at one time appeared so dangerous that all the British Indian subjects at that place were embarked and removed from it by water.

European powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1876-80.

France maintained consular representatives, as she had done for some time past, at Baghdād and Basrah ; and important archæological researches were initiated at Tallo in 1877 by a titulaire of her Basrah Vice-Consulate. Otherwise there were no evidences of French interest in the Persian Gulf region. The concession for irrigation and other purposes in 'Arabistān sought by Dr. Tholozan was granted by the Shāh in 1878 after his visit to Paris ; but the French Government seemed to attach no importance to it, and presently it was cancelled by the giver in consequence of British

diplomatic representations, with the assent of the concessionaire himself. The French flag began to be employed by slave traders in the Gulf of 'Omān as a cover for their operations; this was a serious development, though almost unnoticed in the beginning, and was destined to cause much trouble at a later time.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf remained on the same footing as in the previous years, but were occasionally defective. During the summer of 1879 there was no British war vessel in the Gulf.

Maritime security in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880.

An outbreak of piracy occurred in the waters adjoining the coasts of Hasa and Qatar in 1878 and rapidly attained alarming proportions; many lives were taken, and many boats and much property were carried off. The pirates were mostly Bani Hājir of the mainland, and their lawlessness seemed to be connected in its origin with the Arab rebellion against the Turks in Hasa. The suppression of the pirates was a matter of difficulty because the coast of Hasa was now nominally under the Turkish flag, and because it was uncertain how far to the southward the territorial pretensions of the Porte extended or should be admitted. Efforts were made locally and at Constantinople to stimulate the Turkish authorities into taking effective action against the pirates; but their feeble endeavours to respond soon died away without result. In 1878 a number of piratical vessels were captured by a British man of war off Qatif and handed over to the Turkish executive officials there; but in 1879, from considerations of international comity, it was ordered that action by British vessels on the coast of Hasa should be suspended. The disagreeable state of affairs which had arisen was thus prolonged, through no fault on the part of the British political or naval authorities, into the next period.

A serious case of river piracy occurred in the Shatt-al-'Arab in 1880, the Superintendent of the British telegraph station at Fāo being among the sufferers; but it was strenuously followed up by the British authorities, and partial reparation and a penalty were extracted in Persian territory through the Shaikh of Muhammareh.

In 1879 the conclusion of an agreement for the mutual surrender of fraudulently absconding debtors was brought about, under British auspices among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Its effect was greatly to reduce the number of the disputes from which such maritime irregularities as still happened on the pearl banks and in the lower Gulf ordinarily sprang.

Maritime and other surveys, 1876-1880.

In 1876 or 1877 the inlet of Khor-al-Hajar on the coast of the 'Omān Sultanate was surveyed by one of Her Majesty's ships; but no marine survey work of importance seems to have been carried out during the period.

Communications in the Persian Gulf region, 1876-1880.

Means of communication with and in the Persian Gulf remained almost unchanged. In 1878-79 a project for a British railway to connect the Persian Gulf with Europe *via* Kuwait, Baghdād, Mūsā and Diyārbakr was discussed. This "Tigris Valley Railway" was recommended by the Duke of Sutherland and supported by Mr. Andrew, well-known for his former strong advocacy of a Euphrates Valley Railway; but it came to nothing, like the project which had preceded it, for want of a financial guarantee from the British Government.

In 1878 opposition on the part of Turkey to the existence of British post offices in Turkish 'Irāq began to declare itself.

At the end of 1880 the British telegraph station on Hanjām Island was abolished, technical improvements in telegraphy having rendered an intermediate station between Jāshk and Būshehr no longer necessary for practical purposes.

British official matters in the Persian Gulf, 1876-1880.

Since the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1863, a Government steam vessel had generally been held at the disposal of the Resident in the Persian Gulf to carry him on his political tours, as a despatch vessel, and for

miscellaneous duties; but in October 1876 the last of the series of these ships, which had included the "Berenice" and the "Hugh Rose," was withdrawn, leaving the Resident dependent on the gunboats of the Royal Navy as his sole means of locomotion in the Gulf. A steam cutter was about the same time added to the establishment of the Būshehr Residency, but it was given for quarantine work, and it was fit only for harbour duties. In May 1877, on a request from the Officiating Resident, the Indian Government steamer "Dalhousie" was sent to the Persian Gulf; but, being required for the transport of troops, she was withdrawn again in the following August. The want of a vessel seriously hampered the Resident in his political work, and in 1878 it was suggested by him that a steamer should be supplied in exchange for one of the three naval vessels detailed for service in the Persian Gulf.

The status of Bāsīdu, commonly regarded as a British possession, was subjected to close scrutiny by the Government of India in 1878, but no final conclusion as to its nature was drawn by them from their enquiries.

In 1878 the British telegraph station at Jāshk was provided with a small military guard; and in the following year the British military headquarters in the Persian Gulf district was virtually transferred from Bāsīdu to Jāshk, which thereafter was ordinarily garrisoned by about 90 Indian infantry.

In 1879 the European Assistant Political Agent at Gwādur was withdrawn and a Native Agent substituted; and in the same year the supervision of affairs in the 'Omāni dependency of Dhufār, on the southern coast of Arabia, was transferred from the British Resident at Aden to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1880.

In 1877, after the post had remained entirely vacant for five years, a European officer was appointed for the first time to the British Vice-Consulate at Mūsāl; and in 1879 the consular status of the British representative at Basrah was raised from that of Vice-Consul to that of Consul.

A technical flaw in the management of the Oudh Bequest was removed in 1877 by the formal transfer to the British Political Agency at Baghdād, for the exclusive benefit of Indians, of about one-third of the proceeds of the Bequest which had been customarily so applied, but without written authority from the Mujtahid-Distributors, for nearly twenty years.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD RIPON, JUNE 1880 TO DECEMBER 1884.

The next four years were unmarked by any signal changes in the Persian Gulf region, events continuing to move leisurely along lines already traced out.

Affairs in Persia, 1880-84.

The question of communications in southern Persia became in 1881-82 the subject of exhaustive study by British experts, but no practical action resulted. The general conclusions reached were, apparently, that the opening of the Kārūn River to navigation was highly desirable ; that the construction of a railway from the south coast to the interior was practicable, but that the route which such a railway ought to follow was, on existing information, doubtful ; and that, if a railway were made from 'Arabistān northwards, an alignment by Dizfūl and Khurramābād would present certain technical advantages over others. In 1881 the Persian Government, alarmed by an incursion from Turkish territory into their own, and desirous of obtaining the support of the British Government, professed willingness to consider the desirability of opening the Kārūn and making a road from 'Arabistān to Tehrān ; but in 1882-83, the danger which had rendered them conciliatory having disappeared, their attitude on the subject of Kārūn navigation again became impracticable.

Navigation,
railway, and
road projects.

Affairs in Turkey, 1880-84.

For the Ottoman Empire at large an important occurrence was the formation, in 1881, of a Department of Public Debt by which the finances of Turkey were brought, to a large extent, under international control.

In 1881 a serious revolt against Turkish authority took place on the part of the Muntafik, the largest and most important Arab tribe in Turkish 'Irāq ; it seems eventually to have died out rather than to have been suppressed. In 1883 the left bank of the Tigris was disturbed, and the safety of navigation on that river was for a time endangered.

State of
Turkish
'Irāq.

The Turkish administration of Hasa, as will become further apparent in treating the question of maritime security, was in a state of mere chaos.

State of
Hasa.

In 1880 the 'Ajmān tribe attacked the Hasa Oasis, but were repulsed; and dissensions among the Turkish officials in Hasa came to a climax with the imprisonment of the civil Governor by the military Commandant,—an unusual proceeding which was subsequently condemned by higher authority.

Relations between Turkey and Persia, 1880-84.

Turko-Persian relations presented no salient features during the period under review.

Affairs and political relations on the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

Bahrain.

Bahrain was still the only principality on the Arabian side of the Gulf of which the affairs demanded serious attention on the part of the British Government. At the end of 1880, when Turkey had for some years been manifesting a disposition to meddle in Bahrain affairs and had in particular taken up, though tardily, the cause of the leaders in the Bahrain rebellion of 1869, preparations were made by a Bahrain refugee, who had become a pensioner of the Ottoman Government, to invade the islands. A Bedouin force collected under his leadership upon the coast of Qatar, but was unable to obtain boats in which to cross over to Bahrain, and before long British naval vessels arrived upon the scene and rendered the situation secure. Advantage was taken of the crisis by the Resident in the Persian Gulf to obtain from the Shaikh of Bahrain an Exclusive Agreement by which he bound himself to hold no political relations with any power but the British Government.

Qatar.

In 1882 the Shaikh of Dōhah, whom the Turks had appointed to govern Qatar in their name, but whose position as a Turkish official was not recognised by the British Government, Qatar being in their view independent of Turkish authority, expelled a number of British Indian traders from Dōhah. Direct compulsion having been applied to the Shaikh under the orders of the British Government, he allowed the traders to return, and paid, as demanded, a substantial indemnity in compensation of their losses. A Turkish protest followed, in reply to which the Porte were informed that their claims to Qatar were not admitted, and that the British Government would continue to hold direct communication with the chiefs of that coast.

Affairs and political relations of the Sultānate of 'Omān 1880-84.

In 1883 a determined attack was made upon Masqat by rebels from the interior, but was repulsed by the Sultān of 'Omān with some support from a British war vessel in the harbour. A large proportion of the British Indian subjects at Masqat and Matrah were obliged to take refuge afloat until it was clear that the assault had failed.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq, 1880-84.

The only European power besides Britain as yet claiming influence in the Persian Gulf region was France ; but Russia now made a first appearance in that political field.

In 1881 there was a revival of Dr. Tholozan's scheme for irrigation and other enterprises in 'Arabistān ; and, possibly in connection therewith, a subsidised line of French steamers began to run between Marseilles and Basrah, while French commercial agents, whose antecedents did not appear to be commercial, settled at Muhammarah and initiated a trade in arms and ammunition at that port besides engaging in speculations in grain. There was reason to think that these French undertakings enjoyed the countenance of Russia, who would gladly have seen British influence in 'Arabistān neutralised by any agency whatever. Again in 1883-84 a French engineer surveyed the Shīrāz-Fīrūzābād-Būshehr route in connection with a project for a railway from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf. Nothing came, however, of the 'Arabistān irrigation scheme ; and in the course of the next few years the other evidences of French activity one by one disappeared. The French Vice-Consulate at Basrah was closed in 1888. France.

The first and at the same time the only clear sign of Russia's attention having been drawn to the Persian Gulf was the institution of a Russian Consulate at Baghdād in 1881. Russia.

British naval arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

The system of naval arrangements introduced in 1871-72 continued in force ; but there were occasional complaints that the vessels supplied for Inefficiency
of the
Persian Gulf
flotilla.

service in the Persian Gulf were inefficient. Thus in July 1883, when a British vessel was wrecked in the south coast of Arabia and it was desired to send a ship of war to her assistance, neither of the two vessels then in the Persian Gulf could be despatched on this duty because both were incapable of steaming against the south-west monsoon.

Salutes and
flags, 1879-
1882.

In 1879 the naval regulations in regard to the firing of salutes by vessels in the Persian Gulf were changed ; this was in consequence, partly, of a general international reduction of saluting which had taken place on the introduction of rifled artillery, and partly of a want of uniformity in practice which had prevailed in the Persian Gulf. About the same time the question of the flying of flags by political officers when cruising on board men-of-war was also brought under discussion. It seems to have been decided in the first instance, after consideration by the departments concerned, that naval salutes in honour of British political officers and of native rulers or authorities should be practically abolished, but that the flying of the Viceroy of India's flag by political officers holding responsible positions should be permitted to continue. The East India station standing orders of 1882 show, however, that the general restrictions on saluting were ultimately relaxed in favour of certain native chiefs in the Persian Gulf.

In 1883 the Shāh's scheme for the creation of a Persian navy was revived, after having been dormant for many years, and a beginning was made by ordering two small vessels from Germany.

Maritime security in the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

Piracies off
the coast of
Hasa.

Disorder at sea in the neighbourhood of the Hasa coast, which had become a serious problem during the last period, was unabated ; and it was clear that no co-operation in repressing it was to be looked for by the British on the part of the Turkish authorities. One of the latter, the Wālī of Baghdād, whose seat was distant hundreds of miles from the disturbed waters, finally took refuge in a denial of the fact that piracy existed. An effort was then made to secure the adherence of the Porte to arrangements under which action by British vessels in Turkish territorial waters would be regularised ; but the negotiations were barren of result. Finally in 1881 the British Government, finding no alternative, absolved their naval commanders in the Persian Gulf from the obligation of respecting the three mile limit upon the Turkish coast in their operations for the suppression

of piracy ; but a caution was given against raising avoidable disputes with the Porte, and against encroaching more than might be necessary upon the sovereign rights of Turkey. After the new order had been issued there was, for a time, a considerable diminution in the number of offences committed by pirates from Hasa territory.

The arms trade in the Persian Gulf, 1880-84.

This period witnessed the commencement of a trade in fire-arms and ammunition with the Persian Gulf which was later to attain vast dimensions and give rise to large political questions. The attention of the Government of India was first drawn to the traffic towards the end of the wars in Afghanistan, when steps were taken to impede its continuance through Indian ports. In 1881 the Shāh of Persia took alarm, and the entrance of arms and ammunition into Persia was prohibited ; nevertheless importations were made at Muhammareh in that year by French merchants.

Beginning
of the arms
trade.

Communications of the Persian Gulf region, 1880-84.

No improvement was made in the means of communication already existing in the Persian Gulf region ; but the Turkish Government instituted an overland mail service between Turkish 'Irāq and Syria in imitation of and in competition with the British post on that line, and their opposition to the British postal services in Turkish 'Irāq became more pronounced. During the whole of the period the Porte continued to press for the abolition of the British post offices at Baghdād and Basrah, and in some cases their local officials resorted to unseemly obstruction of the working of the British post, but without success.

Turkish
jealousy of
the British
Post Office.

British official matters in Persia, 1880-84.

In 1883 the British station of Bāsīdu, continuously occupied for marine purposes since 1823, was practically evacuated for climatic reasons, a Native Coal Agent only being left in charge of the settlement.

Virtual eva-
cuation of
Bāsīdu, 1883.

Despatch
vessel for the
Persian Gulf
Political
Residency.

It was at length resolved in 1884, after an interval of eight years, to provide the Būshehr Political Residency once more with a despatch vessel, apparently without reducing the number of the Royal Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf; but the necessity of building a ship occasioned delay.

British interests and official matters in Turkish 'Iraq, 1880-84.

The period was one of extreme discomfort to British interests in Turkish 'Irāq, anti-European feeling in Turkish official circles being now characterised by an intensity which it had never before possessed.

Unpunished
murder
of a
European
British sub-
ject at
Baghdād,
1881.

In 1881 an inoffensive British engineer in business at Baghdād was murdered in the public street, and the local Turkish authorities threw every impediment in the way of the criminals being brought to justice. Strong and sustained pressure by the British Embassy at Constantinople ultimately failed to secure the conviction of the accused, who were acquitted again and again by the Turkish tribunals to which the case was successively transferred.

Turkish
attempts to
put an end to
British com-
mercial
navigation of
the Tigris,
1883.

In 1883, in connection with steps by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company for adding a new vessel to their fleet, the Wālī of Baghdād suddenly denied the right of the Company to navigate the Tigris at all, as they had been doing for more than twenty years, and took high-handed measures to bring about a cessation of their business. Passengers and cargo were denied access to the British steamers by Turkish police, and the landing of passengers, cargo, and even mails was similarly prevented. More than a month passed before the British navigation of the Tigris was freed of this arbitrary embargo, the Company in the meantime sustaining heavy loss; and this result was not attained without energetic representations at Constantinople, enforced by the appearance of a British gunboat at Basrah. It was thought not impossible that the Russian Consul at Baghdād might have encouraged the Wālī in his obstruction of the chief British commercial interest then existing in Turkish 'Irāq.

The Oudh
Bequest.

Complaints of maladministration of the Oudh Bequest by unworthy Muftahid-Distributors were received as in the past, and seemed to be well-founded, but no remedy was suggested or discussed.

British official matters of general importance, 1880-84.

Transfer of
the superin-
tendence of

It remains to mention a British official change of general importance which had for some time been gradually approaching, and which was not

without importance in the Persian Gulf, though not directly affecting it; this was the transfer of British interests and relations in Zanzibar from the care of the Government of India to that of Her Majesty's Government.

Zanzibar
from the
Government
of India to
Her
Majesty's
Government,
1883.

The origin of the Government of India's control over British affairs in Zanzibar is to be traced in the facts that Zanzibar was at first a dependency of the Sultanate of 'Omān, with which that Government were in relations, and that the last ruler of the undivided state of 'Omān-*cum*-Zanzibar had his headquarters in Zanzibar. A certain degree of connection between Zanzibar, Aden, and the Persian Gulf always existed; and in 1881 the Government of India expressly permitted its representatives in all three places to furnish each other with copies of such letters on matters of common interest as they might address to superior authority in India, provided that the letters were not of a peculiarly confidential nature.

But, though the trade of Zanzibar was largely in British Indian hands, the mercantile Indian community settled in large numbers in Zanzibar and on the East African coast was of older standing than the British Political Agency in Zanzibar; and the principal question of importance in Zanzibar, on which many other questions depended, was that of the slave trade, which was an Imperial and in no sense a specially Indian concern. Sir Bartle Frere, in 1873 or 1874, severely criticised what he described as "the inherent vice of the present arrangement, which is, that the Government of India is called on to control affairs and deal with questions which very remotely concern any one east of Aden."

The Government of India had been for some years disposed to relinquish control of the British establishments in Zanzibar; and in 1882, when the cost of representation there and of the subsidy payable by the Sultān of Zanzibar to the Sultān of Masqat, which last in the course of negotiation concerning the repression of the slave trade had become a charge on the British authorities, was borne in equal moieties by the Home and Indian Treasuries, the Foreign Office in London proposed a scheme of transfer. It was, in outline, that the Imperial Government should assume the patronage, control and payment of the Zanzibar establishment, with its incidental costs and pension liabilities in consideration of the Indian Government's making itself responsible for the payment of the subsidy, so long as the subsidy should continue to be payable. The proposals of the Foreign Office did not commend themselves, in this shape, to the Government of India, who pointed out that more than half of the Zanzibar expenditure, at the rate then in force, would be thrown upon themselves by the proposed change; they foresaw, moreover, that the subsidy was not unlikely to be a perpetual charge, and that, if it should be discontinued, it might be necessary to

release the Sultān of 'Omān from obligations under which he lay to abstain from attempting to recover Zanzibar by force.

Ultimately, however, the transfer of Zanzibar to Her Majesty's Government took place, with effect from the 1st September 1883, on the basis proposed by the Foreign Office. Decision of the question of the perpetuity of the subsidy, and of its incidence in case it should be permanently continued, was postponed until the demise of the reigning Sultān of 'Omān.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD DUFFERIN, DECEMBER 1884 TO DECEMBER 1888.

The period next to be entered on was signalised by renewed tension in Anglo-Persian relations, arising from Russian progress in Central Asia.

Crisis in
Anglo-
Russian
relations,
1885

In February 1884 the Russians occupied Merv; and in March 1885, while the Amir of Afghanistan was in India, news was received of a serious violation of the Afghan frontier by a Russian force at Panjdeh near Herat,—an event which brought Russia and Britain within measurable distance of war. Among the results of the crisis were an addition to the Indian Army of 30,000 men, increasing the Indian military budget by £2,000,000 per annum; the formation of Imperial Service Troops in the Native States of India; and a prompt extension of the Indian railway system to and beyond Quetta in Baluchistan, which had been retained when Qandahar was evacuated in 1881.

Movements
of Ayūb
Khan.

In 1887 Ayūb Khān, a member of the Bārakzai family that ruled Afghanistan who had defeated a British column at Maiwand in 1881, and who had been detained under observation in Persia since 1884, escaped from surveillance and, after a last unsuccessful attempt to assert his pretensions in Afghanistan, threw himself on the mercy of the British Government at Mashad and was removed to India, where he remained as a British political pensioner.

Affairs and relations in Persia, 1884-88.

Russian political jealousy of Britain paralysed, almost until the close of the period, the development of communications in Southern Persia. There was no longer any talk of constructing roads; and the only result of a

seemingly ill-considered British scheme for a railway from Ahwāz to Tehran which was put forward in 1887, was the extortion by Russia from the Shāh in the same year of a promise that he would consult the Tsar before permitting any foreign company to construct a railway or water-way in Persia.

In 1888 British diplomacy at last triumphed over Russian opposition and other obstacles to the extent of obtaining, after many years of patient effort, the opening of the lower Kārūn River to general navigation. Prospects were at the same time held out by the Persian Government of an arrangement for the construction of a road for wheeled traffic being made without delay to connect the head of navigation on the Kārūn with the Persian capital.

Opening of
the lower
Kārūn River
to navigation,
1888.

Certain measures of administrative reorganisation taken by the Shah's Government in Southern Persia about this time were not devoid of practical significance. So early as 1882 a transference had begun to take place of ports and districts on the Persian coast from the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Fārs to the personal control of the Amīn-us-Sultān, a Court favourite. In 1887 the remainder of Fārs was conferred upon the same official; but simultaneously the most important towns of the littoral were removed from his charge, together with the districts and islands depending on them, and formed into a new administrative division styled "the Gulf Ports," which was placed under a Governor of its own, in the first instance a member of the Persian royal family. Probably in the next year, Jāshk and its districts were detached from the Governor-Generalship of Kirmān and included in the Gulf Ports division.

Formation of
the Persian
Governorship
of the Gulf
Ports, 1887.

These changes, probably inspired by the Amīn-us-Sultān, were accompanied by an outburst of Persian political activity in the Persian Gulf such as had never been witnessed there before. In 1887 the Arab port of Lingeḥ, hitherto under tribal government, was made subject to direct Persian administration, and the Persian flag was at the same time hoisted on the island of Sirri, which had close relations with Lingeḥ. Persian encroachments and intrigues in various directions followed. The withdrawal of the British military detachment at the Jāshk telegraph station was requested and obtained, but not until the immunities of the station and staff had been recorded in a formal Agreement between the British and Persian Governments. Official support of false allegations against the British political representatives at Būshehr and Lingeḥ and vexatious and insulting proceedings in the Būshehr custom house seemed to form part of a set policy for the reduction of British prestige, but were checked by sharp diplomatic remonstrances at Tehrān. In 1887-88 efforts were made to induce the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to place themselves under the suzerainty of Persia,

Activity and
intrigues of
Persia in the
Persian Gulf,
1887-88.

but without success, and Persian machinations seem to have been on foot even with reference to Qatar and Bahrain. The crop of anti-British manifestations quickly withered away, however, leaving few traces behind.

Affairs in Turkey, 1884-88.

There was no change in the general situation in Turkey during the period.

Turkish
'Irāq.

In Turkish 'Irāq tribal disorder had become less universal than formerly ; nevertheless in 1886 the Hamawand were in revolt against the Turkish Government and infested the roads in their neighbourhood ; and about the same time savage fighting took place between the Dilaim and the Shammar at no great distance from Baghdād.

Central
Arabia.

A disposition to push their influence in Central Arabia was still shown by the Turkish Government. In 1886 a Turkish mission visited Hail, the capital of the Amīr of Northern Najd, but failed to obtain his consent to the establishment there of an Ottoman mosque and school ; and shortly afterwards, when the hegemony of Central Arabia began to pass into the hands of Ibn Rashīd, the relations between him and the Porte had become such that rumours were current of a design on the part of the Amīr to invade Trucial 'Omān in their interest.

Relations between Turkey and Persia, 1884-88.

The only dealings of importance between the Turkish and Persian Governments at this time related to the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Shalḥah
Island
dispute,
1884.

The small island of Shalḥah towards the Persian side of that river, formed about 1870, occupied by a Turkish subject in 1876, evacuated again in 1877 in consequence of pressure put upon Turkey, and taken possession thereafter by cultivators from Persia, came into direct dispute between the Wālī of Basrah and the Shaikh of Muhammareh in 1884. The Wālī on this occasion would have occupied the islet unawares ; but the Shaikh was vigilant, and the arrival of a Turkish gunboat was forestalled by a *levée en masse* of the tribes on the Persian side.

Construction
of a Turkish

It was clearly the object of the Turkish Government to assert their authority over the whole breadth of the Shatt-al-'Arab ; and, having been

foiled in their design of seizing Shalhah, they proceeded at the end of 1885 to construct a fort on the Turkish bank of the river at Fāo, below Shalhah, commanding the entrance from the sea. Their action in this respect was contrary, if not to the letter, at least to the spirit, of the Second Treaty of Erzeroum as amplified by the explanation of the Ambassadors of the mediating powers, which seemed to imply that the opposing banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab would not be fortified by either Persia or Turkey; and the British Government also regarded the erection of the fort with disapproval for general reasons. In 1887 diplomatic remonstrances on the subject were addressed to the Porte through His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; they were founded partly on the British construction of the Treaty and partly on considerations affecting British interests. In 1888 the Turkish Government returned an unsatisfactory reply, and, had it not been for the annoyance then recently caused to Russia by the opening of the Kārūn to navigation, a British naval demonstration would probably have taken place in the neighbourhood of Fāo.

fort at Fāo,
1885-88.

Affairs and relations of the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1884-88.

Some unrest prevailed during the period upon the western shores of the Persian Gulf; it was due chiefly to misconduct on the part of the principal Shaikh of Qatar, but it was intensified by Turkish and Persian intrigues.

In 1886 the Shaikh connived at excesses by Bedouins at his port of Dōhah, his object being to bring about by indirect means the removal of the British Indian traders settled there; but a denial of complicity and an apology by him were accepted as sufficient amends by the British political authorities. In 1887 there was renewed disorder at Dōhah for which the Shaikh was responsible; this time the British subjects at Dōhah were temporarily removed to a place of greater safety, and valuables belonging to the Shaikh were sequestered in Bahrain with the result that he paid compensation to the sufferers. These proceedings elicited a protest from the Ottoman Government, which His Britannic Majesty's Government refused to entertain on the ground that they did not recognise the existence of any Turkish rights in Qatar.

Ill-treatment
of British
Indian
subjects
in Qatar,
1886-1887.

In 1887-88 Turkey and Persia both manifested an undue interest in the affairs of Bahrain and Trucial 'Omān, the Shāh having revived his claim to

Turkish and
Persian
intrigues in
Bahrain, etc.

Bahrain, possibly at Russian instigation ; as a safeguard an Agreement was taken by the British authorities from all the Arab Shaikhs concerned, by which the signatories bound themselves not to enter into relations with other powers other than Britain and not to grant concessions to such powers. In 1888, when there appeared a danger of foreign intrigues assuming a practical shape, a British vessel of war was stationed off Bahrain with instructions to repulse, if necessary, any attempt at a landing on the islands by Turks, Persians, or Arabs from the mainland. A warning on the subject was also addressed to the Turkish Government ; but in the case of Persia, which possessed no means of direct interference with the Shaikhdom, none was considered to be required.

Trucial
'Omān.

Early in the same year the Turkish Wālī of Basrah had visited Dōhah and established a military garrison and a coal dépôt there ; and a little later, in the course of hostilities which had long been in progress between the Shaikh of Qatar and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, a son of the former was killed in battle. An anxious period followed, during which an invasion of Trucial 'Omān by the Shaikh of Qatar and the Amīr of Northern Najd under Turkish auspices was apprehended ; but, though some commotion was caused among the Trucial Shaikhs, no actual movement of the sort took place. The attitude of the local Turkish authorities towards the Shaikh of Bahrain at this time was insulting, and they persisted in addressing him in terms which implied that he was officially subordinate to themselves ; but their vagaries were ignored.

Affairs and relations the of 'Omān Sultanate, 1884-88.

Limited and
conditional
guarantee
given by the
British
Government
for the
safety of
Masqat and
Matrah,
1886.

In 1886, in order to prevent rebel attacks on Masqat such as had occurred in the past with serious detriment to local British interests as well as to those of the Government of the country, the British Government caused to be announced a resolution which they had formed of assisting the Sultān of 'Omān to repel unprovoked attacks upon his capital and the neighbouring port of Matrah. This guarantee, the duration of which was expressly limited to the lifetime of the reigning Sultān, and which was qualified by a condition that the Sultān should govern in a manner approved by the British Government, emphasised and consolidated the special position which Britain had acquired in 'Omān.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1884-88.

Symptoms of Russian activity at this time became apparent in the Persian Gulf region. In the spring of 1887 Captain Vonblumor, a Russian officer of Cossacks in the service of the Shāh, visited Isfahān, Shīrāz, and Būshehr on a tour of inspection. In the winter of 1887-88 a Russian Cossack ex-officer appeared at Būshehr and caused some excitement in Persian circles by openly discussing the anti-British policy of his country, and an alleged arrangement between Russia and Persia to make common cause against Britain in the Persian Gulf; his presence at Būshehr synchronised with a short period during which, as has been shown, the activity of the Persian Government in the Gulf was unusually great and was characterised by hostility to Britain. Russia.

French undertakings were limited during the period to a continuation of the archæological investigations already begun at Tallo in Turkish 'Irāq, and to the excavation of Shūsh in 'Arabistān in 1885-86, where nothing had been done since the British operations in 1852. France.

American archæologists began work at Nifar in Turkish 'Irāq in 1888, and in the following year an American Consulate was established at Baghdād. America.

Evidence that the attention of European nations generally was now engaged by the Persian Gulf in a greater degree than formerly was afforded by the visits of American, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian public vessels between 1886 and 1888.

British naval arrangements, 1884-88.

In 1884 a discussion arose as to the possibility of a reduction in the number of the six vessels of the Royal Navy allotted by the Admiralty for particular services under the Indian Government in accordance with the arrangement of 1869. The question seems to have been complicated by the fact that the "Sphinx," a Royal Navy gunboat specially designed for duty in the Persian Gulf, as also the "Lawrence," a despatch vessel for the Persian Gulf Residency, were under construction at the time, and that the Royal Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf were frequently all employed for four months in the year in operations for the suppression of the slave trade, which was not a special service under the Government of India. An

additional element of uncertainty seems also to have been imported into the calculations by an at first imperfect understanding on the point whether the "Lawrence" was to be armed or not. The Government of India were in the beginning of opinion that five vessels of the Royal Navy, besides the new political despatch vessel, would be required for performing the necessary services ; but other authorities inclined to the view that a smaller number would suffice.

Eventually in 1887, by which time it had been decided* that the Persian Gulf despatch vessel should be practically unarmed, though fitted for receiving an armament in case of war, when she might, under the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884, be attached to the Royal Navy, the Government of India arrived at the conclusion that the number of the Royal Navy Vessels at their disposal might be reduced to four, of which one should always be on duty in the Persian Gulf and one in reserve at Bombay, chiefly to meet demands in the Persian Gulf.

Reduction
of the Indian
special
service
flotilla and
of the
subsidy
paid by the
Government
of India
to the
Admiralty,
1888.

This arrangement was accepted by the Admiralty in 1888, together with a reduction of the ordinary naval subsidy paid by the Government of India from £70,000 to £35,500 a year ; but the Government of India were made responsible for the payment of certain minor charges in addition to the reduced subsidy, and the whole agreement was treated as provisional in view of the possibility that newer vessels carrying more expensive complements might before long be assigned to the East India Station. The practical result was the substitution in the Persian Gulf of a modern gunboat of the Royal Navy (the "Sphinx") and a political despatch vessel (the "Lawrence"), both steaming 12 knots, for three obsolete naval gunboats of the inefficiency and slowness of which there were constant complaints.

Persian
Navy.

A Persian naval force came into existence in the Persian Gulf in 1885 with the arrival of the "Persepolis" and "Susa," which had been built to the order of the Persian Government in Germany. The latter, which was a very small craft, was appropriated to service on the Kārūn River, and the possession of the "Persepolis" was of advantage to Persia only within her own territorial waters.

*Her Majesty's Government ruled that, "should any fighting be necessary in ordinary times in the Persian Gulf, it must be done by Her Majesty's ships of war stationed there. It would be almost certain to produce complications if the civil officer were placed in a position to make war, as it were, from his own yacht. On the other hand it will be advantageous that vessels should be so constructed as to be capable of being useful in time of war."

Maritime security, 1884-88.

Piracy continued to some extent along the coast of Hasa, and the year 1887 in particular was distinguished by numerous offences, but of no great gravity.

The arms trade, 1884-88.

In 1884, disregarding a previous warning, a native firm under British protection at Būshehr embarked in the illegal arms and ammunition traffic, which had begun to be remunerative; and in 1887 a Parsi-English firm doing no other business imitated their example and opened an agency at Būshehr.

British marine surveys, 1884-88.

No systematic marine surveys were undertaken in the Persian Gulf during the period under review. In 1886 or 1887 the inlet of Khor Bani Bū 'Alī was discovered by a British naval vessel; and at the end of 1888, in connection with the opening of the Kārūn to navigation, the *Bahmanshīr* was partially examined by the Persian Gulf Residency steamer "Lawrence."

Communications, 1884-88.

The only feature of the period in respect of communications was the abolition, in 1886, of the old established British overland post between Baghdād and Damascus, which had ceased to be of practical importance. The Turkish Government mail service on the same route was suppressed in 1887, but re-instituted in 1889. The Turkish line of communication between Baghdād and Constantinople when the Syrian route was not in use seems to have lain by Mūsāl and Diyārbakr.

British official matters in Persia, 1884-88.

The R. I. M. S. "Lawrence" provided as a despatch vessel for the Persian Gulf Residency arrived in 1887, removing a serious difficulty under which the Resident had laboured in the discharge of his political duties during more than ten years.

The total removal of an Indian military detachment from the British telegraph station at Jāshk in 1887 has already been mentioned.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1884-88.

Official obstruction of British activity in Turkish 'Irāq still continued, but it had diminished in intensity.

Turkish
official
obstruction,
1885-86.

In 1885 the Porte protested against a tour made by the British Resident on the Tigris above Baghdād in the Residency stationnaire "Comet"; but, when it was pointed out that he had merely gone to visit a part of his consular district, they made no rejoinder. Later in the same year, however, the Turkish Government raised objections to a tour which the Resident intended to make, for official purposes, to Karbala and Najaf; and it was not until 1886 that their objections were withdrawn and that the Resident regained freedom of movement within the bounds of the province.

Abolition of
Mūsāl Vice-
Consulate,
1887.

In 1887 the British Vice-Consulate at Mūsāl, where British subjects and interests were few or did not exist, was abolished.

Oudh
Bequest.

After the death of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, at the end of 1887, abuses on the part of the Mujtahid-Distributors under the Oudh Bequest at Karbala and Najaf increased with the cessation of his salutary influence.

British official matters in general, 1884-88.

Jubilee of
Her
Majesty
Queen
Victoria,
1887.

In 1887 the Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress Victoria was celebrated at different points in the Persian Gulf with gratifying indications, in many instances, of good will on the part of the local authorities and of the Arab or Persian population, as well as of loyal enthusiasm among European and Indian British subjects.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD LANSDOWNE, DECEMBER 1888
TO JANUARY 1894.

The dominant note in political affairs during the period about to be entered on was still opposition between Russia and Britain; but its principal manifestations were transferred from the region of Afghanistan, where a strong administration had been established by the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān, to that of Persia. The removal of the Afghan pretender Ayūb Khān from Persia *viâ* Baghdād to India in 1888 may be taken as marking the time of this change.

Affairs in Persia, 1888-94.

In Persia political interest turned chiefly on the duel between British and Russian influence, in which railway construction and other ostensibly economic matters, such as commercial concessions, were utilised as fighting ground. The advantage, except in regard to railways, seemed to rest with Britain, who had also been successful at the close of the last period in enforcing her wishes for the opening of the Kārūn River to navigation.

Politico-economic contest between Britain and Russia.

The immediate rejoinder of Russia to the success of Britain on the Kārūn was to wring from the Shāh, in March 1889, an agreement reserving railway construction in Persia for the next five years to a Russian company; this was countered by an engagement obtained by Her Majesty's Government, ante-dated for obvious reasons September 1888, by which preferential rights of railway construction in South Persia were conferred on Britain. A copy of this engagement having been communicated by the British to the Russian Legation at Tehrān in 1890, the Russian Minister in the following month induced the Shāh to give another agreement preventing railway construction in Persia altogether for the next ten years. Even this move, however, did not remain unanswered. Britain secured as a set-off a preference over other powers in regard to tramway construction in Southern Persia.

In matters purely commercial, British successes were rapid and considerable. In 1889 a British Bank—the Imperial Bank of Persia—was established with a monopoly of issuing bank notes, and with certain mining rights, under a concession of 60 years' duration. This Bank in the next

year acquired a concession for constructing and exploiting a road between Tehrān and Ahwāz which also was to hold good for a period of 60 years. A monopoly of lotteries and another for the sale of tobacco passed into the hands of British capitalists in 1891; but both of these were subsequently cancelled,—in the one case without, in the other case subject to, payment of compensation by the Persian Government.

Public order
in Persia.

Order in Persia was generally well maintained; but in 1888-91 there was some unsettlement of conditions in Northern 'Arabistān, due originally to trouble in the adjoining Bakhtiyāri country.

In 1892-93 a state almost of war prevailed between the inhabitants of the Persian coast and those of the peninsula of Qatar on the Arabian side of the Gulf; but no cognisance was taken of it by the Persian Government, and after a time it ceased.

Affairs in Turkey, 1888-94.

The Turkish Empire, notwithstanding the absolute and centralised rule to which it was now subject, exhibited symptoms of increasing disorganisation. Albania and Yaman became, after 1892, seats of frequently renewed trouble.

Turkish 'Irāq.

In Turkish 'Irāq, in 1892, the Āl Bū Muhammad tribe on the lower Tigris rose once more in insurrection, and the navigation of the river became for a time uncertain and unsafe. There were signs, however, of increased attention to economic questions. In 1890 a barrage built by a foreign engineer in the service of the Turkish Government for the purpose of obliging the Euphrates to return partially to its Hillah channel, which it had entirely deserted for that of the Hindiyah, was completed; and the object in view was to some extent attained. Again in 1892 the formation of an Ottoman Company for the prosecution of steam navigation on the Tigris was announced and an Imperial Iradé on the subject appeared; but obstacles delayed, or even prevented the commencement of operations by the company.

Hasa and
Qatar.

The difficulties of the Turkish administration in Hasa, which for a while had not been serious, were suddenly augmented at this time. About 1890 petty disturbances became rife, and in 1892 a savage attack was made by Bedouins on a valuable caravan proceeding from Hofūf to the coast under a Turkish military escort; in the latter affair many lives were lost and much property was plundered. In the autumn of 1892 the Wālī of Basrah arrived in Hasa to restore order; but his proceedings, though help was obtained

from the Shaikh of Kuwait, seem to have been ineffectual. In the spring of 1893 the Wālī moved to Qatar, the principal Shaikh of which district it had evidently been resolved to coerce into greater submissiveness towards the Turkish Government ; but an attempt to capture that chief by surprise ended in a Turkish military disaster, the force employed being driven back with loss upon the town of Dōhah, while the Wālī sought safety on board a Turkish man-of-war in the harbour. British mediation between the Turks and the Shaikh was proffered and was readily accepted by the latter ; but the Turkish authorities declined to avail themselves of it. In the end the Wālī returned to his headquarters at Basrah leaving the affairs of Hasa and Qatar in no better state than he found them ; and ultimately, in Qatar, a settlement by no means favourable to Turkish prestige was patched up through an influential Ottoman subject from Basrah.

Relations of Turkey and Persia, 1888-94.

The years 1891-93, in spite of the embarrassments which weighed upon Turkey in Hasa, were marked by a renewal of Turkish aggressiveness towards Persia over the question of Muhammareh and the Shatt-al-'Arab, —in other words the question of their common boundary at its southern end. In 1891 there were signs that the pretensions of Turkey to Muhammareh were about to be revived, but it was only in 1893 that Turkish officers at Fāo suddenly began to collect customs duty on the cargo of vessels from abroad bound up the river to Muhammareh. The Turkish authorities at Basrah, so far from disavowing the action of their subordinates at Fāo, declared that they had received orders to treat Muhammareh as a Turkish port. At the request of the Shāh, and apparently after consultation with Russia, His Britannic Majesty's Government caused a strong protest to be made at Constantinople, and the result was instant cessation of interference by the Turks with freedom of navigation.

Turkish interference with the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, 1891-93.

In the matter of the fort which they had begun at Fāo some years before, the Porte showed themselves less pliable, while the Persian Government displayed inexplicable nonchalance. In 1889, after the failure of a British protest in the previous year, the Persian Ambassador addressed the Turkish Government on the subject ; but his remonstrances were unheeded. In 1890, when three British vessels of war were assembled at Fāo, a British naval party, including officers, was fired upon from the fort when landing ; but the British Officer Commanding was subse-

Turkish Fort at Fāo, 1890-94.

quently admitted to the fort, and punishment was asserted to have been inflicted on the author of the insult. In 1892-93, after an interval, work on the fort was resumed by the Turkish military authorities with the result that, in 1893, a very strongly worded request for its discontinuance was addressed to the Porte. In reply satisfactory assurances were received, but work on the fort did not actually cease until the middle of the next year.

Meanwhile in 1891 or 1892, the Turkish Government had appointed a Consular Agent at Lingeh on the Persian coast, but he was not officially recognised by the Persian authorities.

Foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf, 1888-94.

Franco-Russian joint activity.

A sudden revival of French activity in the Persian Gulf region distinguished the period, and there were indications of the adoption of a joint policy adverse to Britain in the Middle East by France and Russia, between whom close relations existed from 1891 onwards, though they were not described as an "alliance" till 1895. In the Persian Gulf the execution of the supposed common designs of the two Governments devolved at first on France alone, and there was no increase, for the time being, of direct Russian interference.

The use of the French flag by slave-traders had become not unfrequent in the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān, and the immunity from search by British men-of-war which it conferred caused it to be eagerly sought after by native ship-owners. France was thus provided with a valuable instrument for the extension of her local influence. A French Vice-Consulate was also established at Būshehr.

America.

-- The rôle of America, the only remaining power as yet possessing fixed interests in the Persian Gulf region, continued to be pacific and non-political. The American excavations at Nifār in Turkish 'Irāq were still being prosecuted; and in 1891 the Arabian Mission, a Protestant body affiliated to the Reformed (Dutch) Church of America, opened a station at Basrah, to which was added in 1893 another in Bahrain.

Affairs and relations of the principalities on the western coast of the Persian Gulf, 1888-94.

The principalities on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf became exposed at this time to unwonted threats or solicitations on the part of foreign

powers, but the final result was that they were drawn into closer relations with the British Government than before.

In 1890 an attempt was made by the Turkish Government to establish a Turkish official at 'Odaid in Trucial 'Omān; but their designs in that direction were not fully realised. In 1891 two Frenchmen, one a well-known intriguer, frequented the Trucial Coast for a time and recommended the French flag to the notice of the Trucial Shaikhs, from whom they also seemed to be trying to obtain concessions. In the winter of 1892-93, or about the time that the Turkish pretensions to ownership of Muham-mareh and control of the Shatt-al-'Arab were advanced, it was said that the Porte had finally decided on the annexation of Bahrain to the Turkish Empire. The "reversion" of Bahrain—and also of 'Omān—to dependence on Turkey was officially proclaimed at Qatif, where Turkish flags were forced upon the acceptance of Bahrain boat-owners; but British diplomatic representations availed to secure the withdrawal of the proclamation and the abatement of other annoyances. The British Government also, in a controversy regarding the status of Bahrainis in the Ottoman dominions, informed the Porte that Bahrain was under British protection and firmly maintained the right of Bahrainis to British protection in Turkey. But the principal outcome of the Turkish intrigues described was an Exclusive Agreement with the British Government signed by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Bahrain, by which the establishment of any sort of relations between the Shaikhs and foreign powers was rendered impossible.

Turkish ag-
gressions, and
Exclusive
Agreement of
the Shaikhs
of Trucial
'Omān and
Bahrain with
Britain.

Affairs and relations of the 'Omān Sultanate, 1888-94.

When French influence began, as already explained, to revive in the Persian Gulf, the 'Omān Sultanate was the chief field of its manifestation. In 1891 the French Embassy in London complained, under a misapprehension of the facts, that pressure had lately been employed by Britain to obtain a modification of the rule of succession to the throne of 'Omān. In 1893 a guarantee was given by the French Government, at the instance of the French Colonial party, that a French Vice-Consulate would be established at Masqat; and ministerial silence confirmed an impression that the principal duties of the new post would be to promote the use of the French flag and support Russian policy in the Persian Gulf. Also in 1893, one of the French adventurers whose presence in Trucial 'Omān had contributed to the conclusion by the Shaikhs of the Exclusive Agreement with Britain

French acti-
vity.

endeavoured to obtain a footing on shore at the port of Sur. In the same year a Russian volunteer cruiser visited Masqat, and reports of secret Russian negotiations with the Sultan became current.

Agreement of
the Sultan of
'Omān with
Britain,
1891.

Meanwhile the adoption of measures to prevent the intrusion of disturbing foreign influences into 'Omān had been considered by the British Government; and it seems not improbable that, but for the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, which placed such a step out of the question, the Sultanate of 'Omān might in 1890 have been declared a British protectorate. Instead, in 1891, an agreement with the British Government was signed by the Sultan under which he bound himself and his successors never to make any alienation of territory, whether temporary or permanent, in favour of any power but Britain.

British naval arrangements, 1888-94.

In 1892, notwithstanding the decision that her ordinary character should be non-combatant, the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence," the despatch vessel of the Būshehr Residency, seems to have carried a part if not the whole of the armament for which she had been fitted. The Indian Marine Act, passed in 1887, had been construed by the Government of India as a warrant for arming the "Lawrence" for particular service; but the question of the actual use of the "Lawrence" for combatant purposes seems not to have been raised until 1892. In that year the Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote :

The fullest possible advantage of the "Lawrence's" presence in the Gulf is not taken so long as she is considered to be a non-combatant vessel. With only one man-of-war on the station, often for considerable periods outside the Gulf, it is evident that the police duties of the upper waters must be inadequately performed, especially during the hot weather when they are most likely to be required, and when Her Majesty's ships require a cooler climate. The piracies committed by the Beni Hajir are petty it is true; but they require watching lest they should develop into something more serious, and patrolling the neighbourhood of Bahrain would no doubt act as a check upon them. A patrolling ship, however, must have the power to act if necessary, and his under present conditions the "Lawrence" legally has not.

After discussion of the circumstances of the case, in obedience to the principle "that no sea-going armed vessel belonging to the State should be in commission unless she is under the control of the Admiralty," the disarmament of the "Lawrence" was ordered by Her Majesty's Government and duly carried into effect.

Maritime security, 1888-94.

During this period there was a considerable diminution in the number of piratical offences off the coast of Hasa, but in 1888-90 attacks upon vessels in the Shatt-al-'Arab became a serious evil.

The arms trade, 1888-94.

About 1890 there was an influx of arms and ammunition from Zanzibar into the Persian Gulf, due to restrictions imposed on the traffic in East Africa ; and a direct trade in fire-arms between Europe and the dominions of the Sultān of 'Omān was initiated. This was the beginning of the growth of Masqat into the greatest market of arms of precision in the Middle East, which it afterwards became ; and from the first a large proportion of the arms imported at Masqat were re-exported to other places in the Persian Gulf. The traffic was not yet regarded as of political importance ; but the Government of India, for special reasons, induced the Sultān of 'Omān to prohibit importation at Gwādur in 1891 ; and in the same year the Shāh's edict of 1881 against the introduction of arms and ammunition into Persia was re-enacted.

British marine surveys, 1888-94.

In 1890 the approaches of the Shatt-al-'Arab and Bahmanshīr from the sea were surveyed by British vessels. With the assent of the Persian Government, the Bahmanshīr was examined and sketched in the same year and its impracticability for ocean steamers demonstrated. By permission of the Shāh and of the Sultān of 'Omān British tidal observatories were established at Būshehr and Masqat in 1892 and 1893.

British official matters and interests in Persia, 1888-94.

In Persia the attention of the British officials in the south was occupied chiefly by operations of British subjects which the opening of the lower
British enter-
prise on the
Kārun.

Kārūn to navigation had invited. The only British firm which seriously took advantage of the concession was the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch), whose steamers had plied for more than a quarter of a century on the Tigris; and a subsidy was presently granted at the joint cost of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India to enable them to persevere with their enterprise in the face of difficulties which existed. These difficulties were great and varied. They included official obstruction on the part of the Persian Government, especially by imposing arbitrary embargoes on the exportation of grain and withholding the means of obtaining ordinary accommodation and business facilities; unfair competition by native merchants and local authorities; an obligation to maintain a service on the upper Kārūn, which proved unprofitable, in the name of the Shāh; and popular prejudice and fanaticism. The export trade of the country, however, rapidly increased; and, from the fact that Messrs. Lynch did not abandon their enterprise, it may be inferred that their gains in ordinary trade more than compensated for the steady loss which, in spite of the British subsidy, was understood to be the result of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's operations.

British consular appointment, etc.

In connection with the development of navigation and trade there were established at Muhammareh a British Vice-Consulate in 1890 and a British Indian Post Office in 1892.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1888-94.

Hostility of the Turkish administration to British interests.

The usual disfavour towards British enterprise in Turkish 'Irāq continued to be manifested by the local authorities; and in 1893-94, when the Porte were endeavouring to assert undivided authority over the whole waterway of the Shatt-al-'Arab, vexatious interference with British Indian sailing vessels and blackmailing of the crews on various pretexts became common, especially at Fāo. This matter had some connection with, but did not entirely depend on, the Turkish claim to Muhammareh; consequently the annoyances in question did not entirely cease with the abandonment of that claim.

Obstruction to the movements of the R. I. M. S. "Comet."

Attempts were made to interfere with the movements of the Baghdād Residency steamer "Comet" even on the lower Tigris; and in 1894, shortly after the close of the period, a voyage which she made to Sāmarrāh on the upper Tigris formed the subject of an official protest by the Porte, who now formally denied her right to navigate the river above Baghdād.

Additions were made to the British establishments in Turkish 'Irāq, the consular post at Mūsāl being revived in 1893 in the shape of a Consular Agency, while a Consular Agency was also created at Karbala in the same year in order to regularise and render more efficient the protection of the British Indian community there and at Najaf.

British consular appointments.

The period was a stormy one in the history of the Oudh Bequest. Very great abuses in its administration by the Mujtahid-Distributors came to light ; and strenuous efforts were made by more than one British Resident at Baghdād to rectify them, but in vain. Admonitions to the Mujtahids concerned, exaction from them of accounts, finally the institution of committees of supervision—the two last of which measures were held to require the concurrence of the Mujtahids themselves—were among the expedients unsuccessfully tried. The proceeds of the Bequest still continued to be dissipated without benefit to those whose misery should have been relieved by it. The state of matters having been represented to the Government of India, the terms of the Bequest were brought under careful examination. The only conclusion reached, however, was that intervention was impracticable, or at least undesirable, for the time being ; but that it would probably be well that the appropriation of a separate share of the revenue of the Bequest to Indian beneficiaries, which had been customary, should cease.

The Oudh Bequest.

VICEROYALTY OF LORD ELGIN, 1894-99.

The period next to be considered was one of incipient movements, gathering force, which were after its close to invest the Persian Gulf with a prominence that it had never before enjoyed in general politics. The chief factors were the understanding between Russia and France, which eventually became an alliance ; strained relations between France and Britain ; and foreign schemes for a railway to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. Towards the end of the period the power of the Government of India to observe and deal with developments in the Persian Gulf, where the security of British interests depended upon their vigilance and foresight, was somewhat impaired by difficulties in India, among which were the appearance of bubonic plague in a deadly form in 1896 ; sedition, due partly to the enforcement of sanitary measures against plague ; and a tribal rising of unprecedented extent and seriousness on the North-Western Frontier in 1897.

It will be convenient to deal with the history of the period under the following main heads, rather more detailed than were required in earlier and less eventful periods :—affairs in Persia and Turkish 'Irāq and general British relations with those countries; activity in the Gulf region of foreign powers other than Britain; affairs in the Arab states and principalities of the Persian Gulf separately, and British relations with each; finally questions of an administrative and official order chiefly concerning Britain.

Affairs in Persia and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

Decadence of Persia under Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh.

With the accession of a new Shāh to the throne in 1896 Persia entered on a path of decline not altogether unlike that which Turkey had already been following for more than a generation, one of the causes being financial extravagance. In Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh those qualities of intelligence and character were lacking, the possession of which had enabled his father to maintain general good order throughout Persia, to accumulate treasure instead of incurring public debt, and to preserve a fair measure of independence *vis-à-vis* of foreign powers. Individual ambitions and ministerial factions, almost unknown under a Shāh who had been generally his own Prime Minister, now became a serious danger to the country.

Conflict of British and Russian interests especially in regard to communications, loans, and Customs.

In foreign relations the ruling note was still the familiar one of discord between Russian and British policy in Persia; and the conflict was in process of extending to new areas. The question of railways had been postponed by Russian action, as before explained; but a fresh success was gained by Britain in the matter of road construction, a concession for a road to connect Ahwāz with Isfahān *via* the Bakhtiyāri country being turned into account by the native concessionnaires in 1897 through a British company, not however without corresponding advantages being obtained by Russia in the north.

Entirely new was the question of financial loans. Some money for public purposes had been borrowed in the European market before the assassination of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh; but it was only in 1898 that the requirements of the new sovereign obliged his Ministers to seek a large supply of money wherever it could be found.

The question of loans brought up the question of guarantees for repayment; and in this manner the state of the Persian Customs came under examination, with the result that in 1898 Belgian experts were obtained for the purpose of reorganising them. A matter closely connected with loans

and guarantees was that of utilising as a financial pledge the customs of Southern Persia, which from the British point of view it was essential should not in any circumstances be alienated to Russia. Steps for guarding against this danger had been taken by the British Government as early as 1892, when first the possibility of a loan being made by Russia to Persia had been foreseen; and in 1898, when an advance was drawn by Persia against the intended British loan of that year, the custom house of Bûshehr was actually placed for a short time under British control. During this period local contests were waged between British and Russian political influence in various provinces,—in Khurāsān and Sistān, and even in Central and Western Persia,—which are described more particularly in another place.

With these preliminary remarks we pass to local questions in the Persian provinces adjoining the Gulf.

In Northern 'Arabistān there was some failure of good order even before the end of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign, and in the first years of his successor the state of matters there grew worse. In 1894 the Dizfūl-Khurramābād road was closed, and in 1895-96 the surroundings of Dizfūl itself were disturbed. From 1896 to 1898, with one brief interval, the districts of Northern 'Arabistān lay at the mercy of Arabs and Bakhti-yāris, and even in the towns of Dizfūl and Shūshtar the rule was that of armed and disorderly elements.

Northern
'Arabistān.

In Southern 'Arabistān the period was characterised by the final disappearance of the Ka'ab Shaikhdom of Fallāhiyeh, which was absorbed in the Muhaisin Shaikhdom of Muhammareh, the latter thus becoming co-extensive with the sub-province. The attitude of the Shaikh of Muhammareh had, for various reasons, been one of hostility to the British since the opening of the Kārūn to navigation in 1888; but in 1897, on the assassination of Shaikh Miz'al and the accession of Shaikh Khaz'al to power, there was a change. The new Shaikh not only showed himself very well disposed towards British interests and representatives, but presently, made anxious by the general course of events in Persia and still more so by an obvious intention on the part of the central Government to do away with his local autonomy, secretly endeavoured to place himself under British protection. In response to his overtures he was informed that the British Government could not undertake to maintain his independence either against Persia or in the case of a dissolution of Persia; but promises of friendly advice and support were given him.

Southern
'Arabistān.

The general weakening of authority throughout Persia extended to the Persian Coast and Islands. In 1897-98 nine different Governors of the

Persian Coast
and Islands.

Gulf Ports succeeded one another in the brief space of fifteen months. In 1897 there was a riot, due to superstition, in which British survey apparatus was destroyed at Rîshehr; and in the following year a murderous outrage was committed there, by followers of the chief of Tangistân, at the house of a British protégé. These incidents necessitated special arrangements for the protection of British life and property at Rîshehr; and it does not appear that adequate satisfaction was obtained in either case. In 1898 a member of the ex-ruling family of Lingeh repossessed himself of that place in defiance of the Persian Government, which had been administering the port and district through their own officers; but he was ejected again early in 1899, after the close of the period.

Persian
Makran.

Of all the provinces in Persia with which we are concerned, however, Makrân was the most disturbed. There absolute anarchy prevailed; and at the end of 1897 a series of offences committed by bad characters against British subjects came to a climax with the murder of Mr. Graves, a British telegraph official, by a gang of Balûch robbers. A punitive expedition followed, conducted by a Persian commander with Persian forces, but under the supervision of British officers and with the backing of a small naval party and Indian military detachment, neither of which however took an active part in the operations. No serious fighting took place; but in the end the murderer of Mr. Graves was killed and two of his other assailants were captured, one of whom was punished.

Affairs in Turkey and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In Turkey disorganisation proceeded apace. Persecutions and massacres of the Armenian subjects of the Sultân began, and in 1894-96 were at their height. Crete became refractory, and Cretan affairs led to a war between Turkey and Greece in which Turkey was easily victorious, but derived no real permanent advantages from her victory.

In Turkish 'Irâq quiet generally prevailed; and Turkish schemes of aggrandisement in Central Arabia and the Persian Gulf seemed, with certain exception to be noted later, to have been laid aside.

Relations of Turkey with Persia, 1894-99.

Turko-Persian relations were stagnant.

Activity of foreign powers other than Britain in the Persian Gulf region, 1894-99.

As political paralysis gradually overspread Persia and Turkey there was a notable increase in the activity of foreign powers besides Britain in the Persian Gulf region, especially France and Russia.

In November 1894 a French Vice-Consulate was established at Masqat; and the function of the new French representative was clearly to undermine British influence in the Sultanate of 'Omān and to create French interests which it should be beyond the power of the native ruler to control. The chief means resorted to was the grant of the French flag to vessels owned by subjects of the Sultān; it was contended by the French authorities that the possession of the flag placed the vessels to which it was granted and all persons connected with them under French protection even as against the Sultān. In 1894 there were more than a score of 'Omāni vessels flying the French flag, and Sūr, the port to which they belonged, was becoming a focus of French influence. In 1897 the French Vice-Consul at Masqat successfully enforced against the Sultān the extreme rights which he claimed of protecting French flag holders.

France.

In 1895 visits of French war vessels to the Gulf began, the first being that of the "Troude," which called at Masqat.

Commercial enterprises were also utilised to push French influence, but with less considerable results. In 1896 the Messageries Maritimes Company instituted a subsidised steamer service between Bombay and the ports of the Persian Gulf; but, owing to vessels of unsuitable draft being employed, the venture was not a success. In 1898 the French Vice-Consul at Būshehr visited Muhammāreh, and the re-institution of a French subsidised line calling at that port, which had been* withdrawn some fifteen years before, appeared to be contemplated; but nothing came of the supposed project.

In 1895 a monopoly of antiquarian research in Persia was obtained by France, and under its operations at Shūsh were renewed in 1897.

Russian proceedings in the Persian Gulf and its neighbourhood were still of a tentative character; but their scope was evidently wide. In 1898 an officer of special ability, Mr. Krongloff, was appointed to Baghdād, where a Russian Consulate, after being abolished in 1886 in favour of representation through France, had been re-established in 1889. In 1897 a Russian Consul-General was appointed to Isfahān, where Russia had no material interests.

Russia

* See page 283 ante.

A first indication of the strategical importance attached by Russia to the straits forming the entrance of the Persian Gulf was afforded by the journey of a Russian engineer officer, who came by Kirmān and Bandar 'Abbās, to Hormūz in the spring of 1895; he remained for two days, made a survey of Hormūz, and at his departure gave it to be understood that the island would be made a Russian coaling station.

After 1896 the existence of bubonic plague in India provided Russia with a new pretext for intervention in Gulf affairs. In 1897, in pursuance, it cannot be doubted, of a plan which in other parts of Persia served admirably to obstruct British interests, two Russian medical agents, MM. Ost and Marc, the latter being the physician of the Russian Legation at Tehrān, were deputed to study plague at Būshehr, where the disease did not then exist, and where it did not appear until two years later. In 1898 these doctors were followed by two others, MM. Rodzewitz and Kornajewski; and they in their turn were succeeded by M. Paschkowski, who made Būshehr his headquarters in 1898 and 1899, and who displayed considerable professional activity during a slight outbreak of plague there in the latter year. It was a significant fact in connection with the designs of Russia at the mouth of the Gulf that all these medical men paid visits to Bander 'Abbās as well as Būshehr; and MM. Rodzewitz and Kornajewski visited Basrah also. The fact that the sanitary precautions on the southern coast of Persia against the introduction of plague had been officially entrusted by the Persian Government to British agency, together with the short duration of the single small epidemic that occurred at Būshehr, rendered the Russian medical missions inefficacious for the purposes which they were really intended to serve; and a threat made by the Russian Legation at Tehrān in 1899, that Cossacks would be sent to Būshehr—as they had been to Sīstān—to form a plague cordon, remained unexecuted.

The action taken at Baghdād in 1898 was connected with a scheme for the establishment of a Russian port in the Persian Gulf, on which subject the new Russian Consul at Baghdād had orders to report; and the fact that in 1898 Count Kapnist, a Russian of good family, applied to the Porte for a concession to construct a railway from Tripoli in Syria to Kuwait in the Persian Gulf seemed to show that Kuwait was the point then specially in view.

Germany.

During this period Germany for the first time made an appearance in Persian Gulf affairs. She had, though the fact was not yet known abroad, railway designs on the country between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. In 1894, in which year the German war vessel "Cormoran" visited Masqat, a German Consulate was established at Baghdād by means of a German resident of private means; and in 1897 a German Vice-Consul was

appointed to Būshehr, the total number of German subjects in the Gulf ports being at the time only six. A Bremen firm also commenced operations at Būshehr; but the voyages of some specially chartered steamers which were sent out from Germany were unsuccessful. In 1898 formal confirmation was granted of a preferential right already conferred by the Porte on the (German) Anatolian Railway Company to construct a railway from Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf; but the fact did not immediately become public.

American activity remained non-political in its character.

America.

Affairs in the Sultanate of 'Omān and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

The period was marked in the Sultanate of 'Omān by the beginning of a crisis in the relations between the Sultān and the British Government, due partly to internal events, partly to the non-renewal in favour of the new ruler of the policy of armed support which Britain had maintained from 1886 to 1888, and partly to French intrigues.

In February 1895 the Sultān's capital of Masqat was treacherously seized and occupied by armed rebels, who remained in possession of it for three weeks, while the British representative observed an attitude of virtual neutrality; but they were in the end ejected by a process of fighting, of negotiation, and finally of concession. This unfortunate occurrence greatly embittered the Sultān against the British Government, whom he considered as having deserted him in the hour of need, and whose claims for compensation to British subjects on account of injuries suffered in the rebellion he regarded as vexatious; and it greatly undermined his authority throughout his dominions. The continuance to him of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, which had not been withdrawn as it might have been on his failing to govern in a manner approved by the British Government, a small gift of artillery, and offers of British naval assistance for the recovery of the revolted district of Dhufār in Southern Arabia seemed to have no effect in mollifying his resentment. Indeed the situation after the rebellion of 1895 was so unsatisfactory that proposals for the annexation of Masqat and Matrah, or the declaration of a British protectorate over the whole Sultanate, or an intimation to the leading Shaikhs of the country that they would not be allowed upon any pretext to attack Masqat or Matrah were discussed; and the third course, that of giving a modified assurance of support, which did not involve any principle inconsistent with the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, was adopted by Her Majesty's Government. In 1896 the question of arranging for a modi-

Occupation
of Masqat by
rebels, and of
alienation of
the Sultān
from Britain,
1895.

fication of the declaration 1862 with a view to the establishment of a British protectorate was further discussed, but the time was held by Her Majesty's Government to be unpropitious for negotiations with France on the subject.

In 1895-97 loans were granted to the Sultān by the Government of India on the security of the "Zanzibar" subsidy; it was held that to require him to place his customs department under British management would be a violation of the Declaration of 1862.

Grant by the
Sultan of a
coaling sta-
tion to
France, 1898.

In 1898 visits were paid to Masqat by the French gunboats "Gabès" and "Scorpion" in succession; and in the course of the year, in disregard of his Agreement of 1891 with the British Government, the Sultān made a grant of a coaling station to France, but without assigning any particular place. The spot most likely to be occupied appeared to be Bandar Jissah, a harbour not far from Masqat; and naval dispositions were made there by the British Government to anticipate, if necessary, a French attempt at occupation. French influence was now powerful in the Sultanate, the port of Sūr being one of its principal seats; and the Sultān's attitude towards the interests of British subjects, and towards the British representative, was little short of insulting.

Affairs in Trucial 'Omān and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In consequence of the Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikhs with Britain formed in 1892, of the well-established supremacy of British influence, and of the remoteness and general political unimportance of the tract, there was no unsettlement of conditions in Trucial 'Omān during this period.

Affairs in Qatar and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In Qatar there were no developments worthy of note, if we exclude an attempt to invade the Bahrain Islands from Zubārah, which was frustrated by British naval action and will be noticed in connection with Bahrain affairs. Respect for the authority irregularly exercised by the Turks in Qatar was at an end among the inhabitants of the peninsula in consequence of the successful local rebellion of 1893. In 1894 a Turkish representative at Dōhah was murdered, and in 1898 there was a rising at that place in which several Turks were killed. The Shaikhs of Qatar in 1898

intimated their willingness to be included in the same political circle as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān who had treaty relations with the British Government ; but no steps for their admission to it were taken in response.

Affairs in Bahrain and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

In Bahrain affairs the harbouring of aggressive designs by Turkey and the maintenance of a protective attitude towards the Shaikhdom by Britain continued to characterise the situation. The secession of a mal-content tribe from Bahrain to Zubārah in Qatar was followed by the establishment of a hostile settlement at that place with the active assistance of the principal Shaikh of Qatar and of the Turkish authorities in Hasa. In 1895 preparations on a large scale for the invasion of Bahrain were begun at Zubārah and were actively promoted by a Turkish official who had recently appeared there. A Turkish gunboat also arrived upon the coast for the purpose of covering the tribal operations. A British naval force was then concentrated in Bahrain waters, and, after ineffectual remonstrances had been addressed to the Porte, proceeded to forcible action. Over 40 vessels of the native fleet assembled for the invasion were disabled or destroyed, and 120 others were seized and carried over to Bahrain, where most of them were subsequently burned as the owners neglected to ransom them by paying a fine. This striking demonstration completely assured the safety of the islands, and a protest made by the Turkish Government only provided the British Government with an opportunity of emphatically re-stating their views in regard to Turkish pretensions in Qatar and Bahrain.

Attempted
invasion of
Bahrain
from the
mainland
frustrated by
British ac-
tion, 1895.

In 1897 a proposal to establish a sanitary post of the Constantinople Board of Health in Bahrain was rejected at the instance of Her Majesty's Government ; and in 1898 a request by the Porte that a Turkish exequatur should be obtained for any British representative appointed in Bahrain was refused by the British Government.

Turkish
designs on
Bahrain,
1897-98.

Affairs in Kuwait and relations with Britain, 1894-99.

Several causes conduced to the sudden rise of Kuwait into political importance during this period.

Endeavours
to enforce
Turkish
authority
over Kuwait,
1896-97.

In 1896 an internal revolution occurred at Kuwait resulting in the accession of Mubārak, a new Shaikh, to power; the circumstances were such as to place bitter enmity between him and some members of his own family and to render his position at first extremely insecure. The attitude of the Turkish authorities, who regarded Kuwait as a Turkish possession, towards Mubārak was at first neutral or equivocal; they acquiesced in, and subsequently recognised, his usurpation of the chief power, but seemed inclined to attribute it to British machinations; and ultimately they endeavoured to profit by the Shaikh's weakness in order to substitute authoritative control over him for the indefinite influence which was all that they had previously wielded at Kuwait. In 1897 a sanitary official representing the Constantinople Board of Health was appointed to Kuwait; and the Shaikh at once made overtures to the British Government for political protection, but they were at first repulsed.

Decision of
the British
Government
to enter into
relations with
the Shaikh
of Kuwait,
1898.

The original suspicions of the Porte in regard to the existence of an understanding between the Shaikh and the British Government were indeed perfectly without foundation. It was only upon the Shaikh's addressing them that that Government began to debate the possibility and desirability of entering into relations with him. Up to this time Her Majesty's Government, in so far as they had considered the question at all, had been inclined to regard Kuwait as a dependency of the Turkish Empire, and an admission to this effect seems even to have been made by their Ambassador at Constantinople in 1893; but they now found it necessary to reconsider their impressions in this respect on account, firstly, of some of the Shaikhs' subjects being charged with participation in piracies on the Shatt-al-'Arab and, secondly, of supposed Russian design on Kuwait in connection with a projected Mediterranean railway. Their decision was hastened by seeming preparations on the part of the Turks for military action against Kuwait, the grounds of which were unknown; and it was decided to obtain from Shaikh Mubārak an Agreement, similar to that signed by the Sultan of 'Oman in 1891, which would preclude any cession of territory by him to a foreign power without British consent.

British naval arrangements, 1894-99.

Revision of
the naval
arrangements
between the
Government

In 1895 the arrangement between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India in regard to the vessels of the Royal Navy placed by the Admiralty at the disposal of the latter Government was revised, the

number of vessels being retained at four, but the amount of the annual subsidy paid for their services being enhanced to £100,000. In addition to the subsidy, the cost of coal and repairs for H.M.S. "Sphinx" was in future to be borne by the Government of India and that vessel continuously employed in the Persian Gulf. The coal of the other ships, also, was to be paid for by the Government of India whenever they were employed on special services. The vessels allotted for work under the Government of India were H.M.S. "Marathon," 2,950 tons, "Brisk," 1,770 tons, "Pigeon," 775 tons, and "Sphinx," 1,130 tons, of which only the first was at all heavily armed.

In 1898 Commander Baker, H.M.S. "Sphinx," landed a force in Makrān during the Persian operations there without the approval of the British political representative; and later in the year the same officer attempted to pursue suspected slave traders on land on the coast of 'Oman by means of a boat party, whereby a protest was elicited from the Sultan. Commander Baker's proceedings were in the first instance approved by the Admiralty; but eventually Her Majesty's Government ruled that naval officers should take no active measures on land without the previous approval of the responsible political officers, and that—save in exceptional circumstances—all intercourse between naval officers and native chiefs or officials should be carried on through the medium or with the knowledge of the political officers.

Restrictions
on the action
of the naval
authorities
on land,
1898.

In 1896 the question of the salutes to be fired by ships of the Royal Navy in honour of native rulers was examined and the existing general rule re-affirmed that only vessels classed as saluting vessels, of which kind the "Marathon" and the "Brisk" were the sole examples among the ships at the disposal of the Government of India, might fire salutes; but it was added that two exceptions to the rule, especially authorised for the Persian Gulf, were still in force,—*viz.*, that smaller vessels might fire any salute on a particular requisition by a political officer, and that they might fire salutes not exceeding five guns without a requisition.

Salutes.

Maritime security, 1894-99.

Piracy at sea, even off the coast of Hasa, and maritime irregularities in the Gulf as a whole had now almost entirely ceased; but in 1895 some atrocious offences of a piratical character were committed in the Shatt-al-'Arab or near its mouth. In 1896 the Persian and Turkish authorities at Muhammareh and Basrah were stimulated through the British representa-

Piracies on
the Shatt-al-
'Arab and
counter-
active
measures,
1895-97.

tives at those places to take action for assuring the safety of the river, and there was an immediate and satisfactory improvement in the state of affairs. In 1897 a relapse into insecurity occurred, to remedy which a system of water police was instituted on both banks by the local authorities under British pressure, a British gunboat being moreover stationed in the river during the winter of 1898-99 with excellent results.

The arms trade, 1894-99.

The arms and ammunition trade continued to expand ; and the Persian Gulf finally became a market to which the tribesmen of Afghanistan and the North-Western Frontier of India resorted in order to supply themselves with the means of fighting each other and of resisting constituted authority. This fact was conclusively established for the first time in 1898.

About 1896 the growth of the traffic became alarming. In 1895-96 the estimated number of rifles imported at Masqat was only 4,250, in 1896-97 it was 20,000 ; and in 1897 no less than 30,000 rifles were believed to have been landed at Būshehr. All the weapons brought to the Gulf were now breech-loaders ; and in Southern Persia, in particular, nearly the whole male adult population were armed with weapons of precision and made free use of them. It was ascertained that in 1896 the proportion of the arms and ammunition entering the Gulf and absorbed by Persia was about three-fifths of the whole, while about a quarter was taken by countries under Turkish domination and the remainder was disposed of in Arab states and principalities. The great majority of the imports were of British manufacture.

In 1897, as a preparation for dealing with the evil, the British Government armed themselves by formal agreement with power to search vessels navigating under the flags of Persia and the Sultanate of 'Oman for arms destined for Persia and to seize and confiscate such as might be found ; and early in 1898, under this arrangement, a British steamer was stopped near Masqat and a large consignment of rifles and cartridges removed from her. The action of the British authorities was contested, by the British firm who suffered, in a court of law in the United Kingdom ; but without success. About the same time the Shaikh of Bahrain sequestered a large stock of rifles and ammunition belonging to the same firm in the island of Bahrain ; and his action was upheld, though it had not been suggested, by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. In this case also the firm

Remarkable
growth of
the trade,
from 1896.

British
repressive
measures,
1897-98.

failed to establish any claim to compensation; but after great delay the arms seized were voluntarily returned to them by the Shaikh in a damaged condition. Ultimately the firm became bankrupt.

In 1898, after the case just mentioned, the Shaikh of Bahrain was induced to prohibit the arms and ammunition trade in his dominions under pain of confiscation, and to authorise action by British men-of-war against Bahrain vessels suspected of carrying consignments.

Sanitary organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1894-99.

The appearance of bubonic plague in India in 1896, which was the principal cause of the assembling of an international Sanitary Conference at Venice in 1897, having been held to necessitate the institution of quarantine in the Persian Gulf, various measures were taken there which the jealousies of rival powers invested with political significance. The Convention of Venice, ratified by Britain and Persia but not by Turkey, contemplated the establishment of a sanitary station at the entrance of the Gulf and of another at Basrah. Turkey had vainly urged the substitution of Kuwait for the station which it was intended to create at the mouth of the Gulf; and the Constantinople Board of Health, immediately after the Conference, proposed a scheme by which posts under their control would come into being in Bahrain and Qatar, as well as at Kuwait, Qatif, and 'Oqair; but its execution was prevented except at Kuwait, and at Qatif and 'Oqair which were admittedly Turkish possessions. A further effort was made by Turkey to secure, for political reasons, the transfer of the Basrah lazaret to Fāo; but it failed. In 1899 a Turkish suggestion for establishing in Bahrain a sanitary station to be controlled from Constantinople was again rejected.

Results of
the Venice
Sanitary
Conference,
1897.

The Persian Government, by an agreement with Britain, confided all quarantine arrangements at their ports to British agency; and British medical subordinates were immediately posted to Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, and Muhammareh. There was already a commissioned British medical officer at Būshehr, to whom was entrusted the management of the quarantine at that place and the direction of the sanitary operations elsewhere upon the coast of Persia. The activity of the British medical staff gave rise to slight popular disturbances at Būshehr in 1899.

Sanitary
arrange-
ments on
the Persian
coast en-
trusted to
British
agency.

The Sultān of 'Omān and the Shaikh of Bahrain at first rejected British assistance and made, or proposed to make, quarantine arrangements of their own.

Arrange-
ments in the
Sultanate of
'Omān and
Bahrain.

British maritime surveys, 1894-99.

In 1894 telegraphic observations were undertaken at the Būshehr and Jāshk telegraph stations with a view to the determination of longitudes.

British interests and official matters in Persia, 1894-99.

Difficulties
attending
British enter-
prises in
'Arabistān.

British enterprise in 'Arabistan continued to be hampered by different obstacles, of which the greatest was now the disordered state of the country. In 1895 Messrs. Lynch's representatives at Nāsiri were seriously assaulted by Persian soldiers; in 1896 an employé of theirs at Shūshtar was the victim of a ferocious attack by a Persian subject; and in 1897 a mob, after pillaging a caravan belonging to Messrs. Lynch near Shūshtar, looted the offices of a Dutch firm under British protection there. No compensation could be obtained for any of these outrages. The profits of British navigation continued to be affected by corrupt or malicious interference with the exportation of grain and by the unfair competition of Persian associations, and in 1894 the subsidy from the British and Indian Governments enjoyed by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company was renewed to them, as they professed that in its absence they would be obliged to withdraw from the Kārūn.

The murder of a British telegraph official in Persian Makrān and the proceedings which resulted from it have been mentioned already under the head of Persian relations with Britain. In consequence of the disturbed state of the province the Indian military guard withdrawn in 1887 was reinstituted at Jāshk in 1898, and another was at the same time located at Chahbār.

British interests and official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1894-99.

Turkish
interference
with British
navigation
of the Shatt-
al-'Arab.

The attitude of the Turkish Government in regard to interference with British Indian sailing vessels at Fāo, which began during the last period, was extremely obstinate. British representations having been disregarded and British remonstrances defied by the Porte, arrangements for the appointment of a British Consular representative at Fāo were made by Her Majesty's Government; but the Porte intimated that no such official

would be recognised by them. A British war vessel was then sent to Fāo whereupon the aggressions complained of ceased ; and the Turkish Government tardily admitted the principle that British vessels from the open sea bound for Muhammareh or any other place in Persia must be allowed to pass Fāo without Turkish interference. The understanding thus arrived at was violated by the local Turkish authorities in 1893 ; but threats of a renewal of the demand for British consular representation at Fāo induced the Porte to order a discontinuance of the annoyances, which were made this time on sanitary pretexts.

In 1898 the Government of India, finding difficulty in providing a permanent representative at Basrah, voluntarily transferred the patronage of the post to Her Majesty's Government ; but its charges continued to be defrayed by the Indian Treasury.

Transfer of H. B. M.'s Consulate at Basrah from the Government of India to H. B. M. Government as regards personnel.

The question of the Oudh Bequest disappeared temporarily from view at this time, a system having been introduced at the beginning of the period with the sanction of the Government of India, under which Supervisors were appointed by the Resident at Baghdad as a check upon the proceedings of the Mujtahid-Distributors.

The Oudh Bequest.

British official matters in general, 1894-99.

The Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen Empress Victoria was celebrated by the British officials and subjects at Būshehr, Shirāz Muhammareh, Masqat, and other places in the Persian Gulf on the 22nd June 1897.

VICEROYALTIES OF LORD CURZON, JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905 (DIVIDED BY THE TEMPORARY VICEROYALTY OF LORD AMPHILL, APRIL TO DECEMBER 1904).

A critical period in the history of the Persian Gulf began in 1899 almost simultaneously with the first Viceroyalty and Governor-Generalship in India of Lord Curzon, whose control of affairs continued, with an interval of a few months in 1904, until late in the year 1905. The

Critical nature of the period.

activity and ambition of France and Russia in the Persian Gulf, which had been increasing for some years, received strong encouragement from the diplomatic embarrassments and military difficulties in which Britain seemed to be involved by war in South Africa from 1899 to 1902.

Views of
Lord Curzon.

The crisis was in one respect well-timed from the stand-point of British interests, for Lord Curzon at the time of his appointment to the Indian Viceroyalty was already an expert in Persian affairs, had travelled in Persia, and had made a particular study of the question of the Persian Gulf, the importance of which he recognised. His personality, moreover, was forceful in a rare degree; he courted rather than feared responsibility; and his methods were rapid and energetic. In a book entitled "Persia and the Persian Question," published in 1892, Lord Curzon—then the Hon'ble George Curzon, M.P.—had expounded his views on the Persian Gulf and epitomised them as follows:—

I have now completed the entire periplus of the Persian Gulf, and have shown the Persian Government along its northern shores exercising a more vigorous and undisputed sovereignty than at any period since the reign of Shah Abbas; upon its southern coast the Turks endeavouring to extend a precarious influence over Arabia; and small Arab states, retaining either wholly or only in part their original independence; while between all parties intervenes the sworded figure of Great Britain, with firm and just hand holding the scales. It is no exaggeration to say that the lives and properties of hundreds of thousands of human beings are secured by this British Protectorate of the Persian Gulf, and that were it either withdrawn or destroyed both sea and shore would relapse into the anarchical chaos from which they have so laboriously been reclaimed. That the Persian Government has been enabled to reassert its authority upon the north littoral; that the pirates of the opposite coast have been taught that rapine is not a safe religion, and, where they once swept the sea with laden slave-dhows now dive harmlessly for pearls; that the Arab tribes, instead of being subjected to the curse of pashas, retain the liberty they so dearly prize, is due to the British Government alone. The very soundings of the channels and surveys of the shores, by which navigation has been rendered easy for the vessels of the world, were the work of the officers of the old Indian Navy, and have been transferred without acknowledgment to the charts of other countries navigating these seas. These considerations, to which I draw special attention from a belief that they are not generally recognised in England, are essential to an understanding of the attitude taken up by this country with regard to the future control of the Persian Gulf, and of her resistance to the possible intrusion of an enemy into the waters for whose security she has, both in treasure and in life-blood, spent so much.

Every claim that can be advanced by Russia for the exclusive control of the Caspian sea could be urged with tenfold greater force by Great Britain for a similar monopoly of the Persian Gulf. Hundreds of British lives and millions of British money have been spent in the pacification of these troublous waters. Where the Russians in the north have scared a few penniless buccaneers, the British in the south have effectively destroyed a pirate combination and fleet that recall the last century of the Roman Republic and the exploits of Pompey. A commerce has been fostered and multiplied that, if it is advantageous to Great Britain and India, is also the source of great wealth, and almost of livelihood, to Persia, to Arabia, and to Turkey. Thousands of British subjects peacefully ply their trade under the armed protection of the Union Jack. England, however, makes no

arrogant pretention as Russia has insisted upon in the case of the Northern lake. She does not demand that the Persian Gulf should be a *mare clausum* against foreign trade. She does not impose treaties upon humiliated foes, wresting from them the right to fly their own flag in their own waters. The merchant navies of the world are free to plough these wares, and to fill their holds with incoming or outgoing treasures. But at least she must and does claim, in return for the sacrifices to which she has submitted, and the capital which she has sunk, and for the sake of the peace which she is here to guard, that no hostile political influence shall introduce its discordant features upon the scene. A Russian port in the Persian Gulf, that dear dream of so many a patriot from the Neva or the Volga, would, even in times of peace, import an element of unrest into the life of the Gulf that would shake the delicate equilibrium so laboriously established, would wreck a commerce that is valued at many millions sterling, and would let loose again the passions of jarring nationalities only too ready to fly at each others' throats. Let Great Britain and Russia fight their battles or compose their differences elsewhere, but let them not turn into a scene of sanguinary conflict the peaceful field of a hard-won trade. I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the *status quo*, and as an intentional provocation to war; and I should impeach the British minister, who was guilty of acquiescing in such a surrender, as a traitor to his country.

In the first year of his Viceroyalty, in a monumental despatch dated the 21st September 1899 which dealt exhaustively with the whole Persian problem, Lord Curzon, after describing the interests and position of Britain in the Persian Gulf in terms similar to those used in his book, submitted to Her Majesty's Government proposals in regard to the policy which should be jointly pursued by the Home and Indian Governments in Persia, especially in Southern Persia and in the Gulf. It was evident from his recommendations that closer and more responsible contact with the problem and increased experience had only confirmed him in the opinion that the maintenance of British political supremacy in the Persian Gulf was a matter of vital importance to the British Empire.

Division of
the subject

In relating the events of the next seven years we shall deal in succession with the following matters: the internal affairs, both general and local, of Persia and Turkey; the nature and objects of foreign activity in the Gulf, principally Russian, French, and German; the significance of certain Muhammadan forces and movements; the affairs of the Arab principalities and other territorial divisions in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of 'Omān with special reference to British and foreign interests and relations; the response of Britain, in its more purely diplomatic and military aspects, to foreign activity; and, finally, British official arrangements, dispositions and undertakings in the Persian Gulf, many of which were influenced, stimulated, even suggested, at this time by the competition of foreign powers. Such an arrangement of the subject seems to be that best lending itself to orderly and logical exposition.

Persian Internal Affairs, 1899-1905.

Increasing
political dis-
organisation
of Persia.

The decline of Persia under the unworthy successor of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, proceeded apace. From 1898 to 1903 an able though unscrupulous minister virtually ruled the country in the person of the Amīn-us-Sultān or Aṭabaig-i-A'zam; but his position was precarious from the first, in consequence of strong political combinations against him; and at length he was driven into exile by adverse influences at court, religious opposition, and popular discontent. The year of his downfall, 1903, was characterised by widespread disorder in Persia, accompanied in places by massacres of Bābis, a sect whose progress the distressed state of the country seemed to favour. Financial difficulties, attributable largely to the extravagance of the Shāh and his Court, had become the chief bane of Persian Politics. In 1900, in 1902, and again in 1905, the Shāh visited Europe; and the loans to which his ministers were obliged to resort reduced Persia to a state of serious indebtedness, mainly to Russia but partly also to Britain, beginning in the year 1900. Towards the end of the period doctrines of representative Government began to gain a footing in Persia and completed, however excellent in themselves, the disorganisation of the political life of the country.

Improvement
of the
Persian
Customs
Department.

While most branches of the administration decayed, if decay may be predicated of things already rotten, the department of Customs, placed under the management of Belgian officials in 1899, rapidly became more efficient and successful in its working. Such hopes of the regeneration of Persia as could reasonably be entertained seemed, indeed, to depend upon that department. The Persian customs of the Persian Gulf, previously farmed out and execrably mismanaged, began to come under Belgian control in 1900; but the process of transfer was not completed until two years later. The reform of the customs was not, however, free from drawbacks. Its execution by foreign agency, the only manner in which it was possible, made it unpopular with Persians; the centralising and levelling tendencies of the department as re-organised inspired local officials and hereditary governors, whose authority it curtailed or threatened, with fear and distrust of the Tehrān Government; and, last but not least, it furnished fresh subjects of controversy between rival foreign powers in Persia. The behaviour of the Belgian officials employed was often arrogant and highhanded; and the transfer to them of administrative functions not properly belonging to customs employes gave some ground for apprehending that the department might in the end become

too powerful and even, to state an extreme view, absorb into itself the whole executive government.

In the districts of Northern 'Arabistān disorders which had their 'Arabistān. beginning in the last period remained unabated, and were even intensified, until the arrival in 1905 of a strong Governor, the Sālār-i-Mukarram, by whom they were suppressed. The steamer "Shushan", run on the upper Kārūn by a British company on behalf of the Persian Government, was attacked by raiders in 1902, in 1903, and again in 1904; and it was only by the efforts of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, whom the central Persian Government persuaded to intervene, that navigation was kept open until the appearance of the Sālār-i-Mukarram upon the scene.

The Hawīzeh district, occupying a doubtful position between Northern and Southern 'Arabistān, defied the authority of the Shāh until 1904, when its reduction was undertaken by the Shaikh of Muhammareh, to be completed in the following year by the Shaikh and the Sālār acting in concert.

Southern 'Arabistān, under the rule of Shaikh Khaz'al of Muhammareh, continued undisturbed; but difficulties were threatened from time to time between that powerful chief and his neighbours the Bakhtiyāri Khāns.

The Governments of Fārs and the Gulf Ports changed hands frequently during the period; and, in the prevalence of unsettled conditions, the Persian Coast and Islands reflected the state of Persia at large. Early in 1899, before the Persian administration had grown so weak as it afterwards became, the hereditary Arab Shaikh who had repossessed himself of Lingeh was again expelled to make way for a Persian official; but elsewhere Persian authority was to a great extent in abeyance and anarchy prevailed, especially in the districts of Tangistān, Shamīl, Mīnāb, and Biyābān, where local power was in dispute among rival chiefs.

Persian Coast
and Islands.

The state of Persian Makrān was even worse than that of the Persian Coast and Islands; and petty wars between unimportant rulers, internal revolutions in their principalities, racking taxation, scarcity, and depopulation were the order of the day.

Persian
Makrān.

Turkish Internal Affairs, 1899-1905.

The political course of Turkey still tended downwards. By 1903 the state of Macedonia had become critical, and everywhere throughout the Ottoman Empire discontent due to maladministration prevailed. The evils of the day were at the time generally attributed to the administrative methods of the reigning Sultān, 'Abdul Hamīd, which were arbitrary and

Misgovern-
ment and
approaching
revolution.

secret; and towards the close of the period a political party had begun to take shape in Turkey whose object was the establishment of representative government. It was not apparent then that, as later events demonstrated, the causes of Turkish decline lay deeper than in the "absolutism" of the administration.

Turkish 'Irāq

In Turkish 'Irāq there was a recrudescence of the tribal disorders which had temporarily ceased, for no ascertainable reason, during the last period. In 1899-1900 the lower Tigris was disturbed by the depredations of the Bani Asad. In 1903 the Al Bū Muhammad tribe in the same neighbourhood came into conflict with the Government, and a massacre was committed among them by Turkish troops. From 1900 to 1905 Sa'dūn Pāsha, the Shaikh of the great Muntafik tribe on the lower Euphrates, was almost continuously in rebellion against the Porte, whom he successfully defied. Three military expeditions were launched against him in vain, with serious consequences on one occasion to a detachment of Turkish troops.

The economic condition of the province, however, continued to improve, — chiefly it is true in consequence of the slow, natural, inexplicable process by which commercial interests assert themselves amidst military and unsettled surroundings. Direct official efforts at amelioration were also not entirely wanting. In 1904 a great impulse was given to steam navigation on the Tigris through the acquisition by the Administration of the Sultān's Civil List of all the Turkish steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia; a new department, styled the Hamidiyah Navigation Office, came into existence; and effective competition with the operation of the (British) Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company was created, by which general trade did not fail to benefit. Sir William Willcocks, a British irrigation engineer who had gained a high reputation in Egypt, about the same time turned his attention to the problem of irrigating Mesopotamia. A vast scheme elaborated by him was brought to the notice of the Turkish Government in 1905, but failed to obtain immediately their practical support. The need for action in irrigation matters had been emphasized by the failure of the original Hindiyah barrage, with results disastrous to a large tract of country, in 1903.

Hasa.

Hasa showed no signs of progress in security or civilisation, though it had now been under Turkish administration for thirty years. In 1902 a large caravan moving from the interior to a port on the coast was captured by Bedouins when one march short of its destination; a considerable military escort which accompanied it was virtually annihilated; and the value of the booty that fell into the hands of the raiders was estimated

at thousands of pounds. Reprisals were made on the Arabs, and the Turkish garrison of the province was increased, but without lasting results. In 1906, after the close of the period, alarming attacks upon caravans and military guards were renewed, and eventually Arab tribesmen assailed the provincial capital and inflicted much loss on the troops holding it. Trade by British Indian merchants in Hasa, which had flourished before the Turkish occupation, had by this time been practically extinguished by insecurity and official interference.

Turkish affairs in Najd and Kuwait, being really external to the Ottoman Empire, are dealt with further on. Najd and
Kuwait.

Russian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

We now approach the subject of foreign activity in the Persian Gulf. It may be remarked at the outset that the operations of Russia,—who, though from of old she was the chief rival of Britain in the Middle East, had previously confined her opposition to remote parts of Persia,—were those which now most seriously menaced the established position of Britain in that sea.

But first it is necessary to examine the situation, as between Britain and Russia, in Persia as a whole. When Persia fell into financial difficulties early in the reign of Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh, negotiations were set on foot for a joint British and Russian loan to the Shāh's Government; but in 1900 they were stultified by a separate Russian loan of large amount which was obtained by Persia on conditions that freed her from her obligations to other foreign creditors, only to bring her into strict financial bondage to Russia. Further Russian loans followed and were the means of securing for Russia important advantages in various political questions between her and Britain in Persia. In 1903 the liabilities of Persia to Russia were estimated at four million pounds sterling; and, though in 1903 and 1904 Persia was persuaded to accept considerable advances of British money, a vast superiority in the matter of financial obligation remained on the side of Russia. Russian
policy, in
Persia
generally.

In 1899 Russia obtained an extension for ten years of the arrangement by which railway construction in Persia was blocked; and meanwhile her own railway system was being extended towards the Russo-Persian frontier, which it eventually reached at Julfah in 1904.

Russian influence was also in process of consolidation or extension in various parts of Persia. A quarantine cordon established in Khurāsān in

1897, on the pretext of plague being prevalent in India, provided Russia with an excuse for introducing Russian sanitary officials and even Russian troops into the province, and by this means her political influence at Mashad was greatly enhanced. In 1900 a Russian Vice-Consulate was established in Sīstān, and its establishment was followed by strong efforts on the part of Russia to overthrow British prestige in that district, so important to the safety of India ; but, though persisted in for some years, their end was failure. On the frontier between Khurāsān and Afghanistan, on that between Sīstān and Afghanistan, and even on that between Persia and the state of Kalāt, Russia laboured between 1902 and 1905 to create difficulties for Britain by fomenting boundary disputes, but without success.

Even in Central and Western Persia Russian influence was being pushed, in opposition to British, from consular bases at Isfahān and Kirmānshāh.

In 1901 a bold attempt was made by Russia, by means of a Trade Declaration, to procure permanent advantages for her trade in Persia over that of all rivals. A new Persian Customs Tariff, which needless to say favoured Russian trade, was arranged by Russia and Persia in consultation without the knowledge of Britain ; and, but for a satisfactory counter-Declaration between Britain and Persia which followed in 1903, the Tariff would have been liable to subsequent revision by agreement between Russia and Persia alone.

Russian
designs in
the Persian
Gulf.

In the Persian Gulf region, to which we again turn, the principal objects of Russia were the creation of a naval base in the Gulf and the construction of a railway across Persia by which the military resources of the Russian Empire could be brought to bear for its support. The advantages to be derived by Russia from the establishment in such a manner of a strong position in the Gulf were obvious : besides enhancing her prestige and giving her access to another ocean it would greatly extend and consolidate her hold on Persia and increase her power of offensive action against the British Empire in the East. The design was bold and entirely new, going far beyond anything that Russia in the past had seemed actually to contemplate ; but the moment appeared favourable for its execution. The position of Russia in Manchuria was supposed to be secure, and presently the commitments of Britain in South Africa furnished the partisans of a Russian forward policy in Persia with specious arguments in favour of immediate action.

Russian
quest of a
naval base in
the Persian
Gulf.

During the year 1899 warnings of impending danger reached the British Government from divers quarters. In March the “ Servet ”, a

Turkish newspaper at Constantinople, announced that Russia was about to seize Qishm Island in order to forestall Britain. In August His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān reported the existence of reasons for believing that Russia had acquired, in regard to a port in the Persian Gulf, certain rights which it might not suit her to enforce immediately; and in October the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador at Constantinople confidentially that there was ground to suppose that the Russian Government were negotiating with the Persian Government for a port in the Persian Gulf to form the terminus of a trans-Persian Russian railway, or even that the two Governments had already reached an understanding on the subject. Almost simultaneously a striking article appeared in the St. Petersburg "Viedomosti," edited by Prince Ukhtomski; it advocated the acquisition of the port of Bandar Abbās, together with the islands of Qishm, Hanjām, Lārak and Hormūz, in order to provide a terminus for a Russian railway across Persia; and special reference to the excellent but little-known anchorage off Laft on the island of Qishm proved that the scheme was based upon good local information. In this article a scheme for a trans-Persian railway to Chahbār Bay was also mentioned, but was treated as of secondary importance. The Persian Government strenuously denied the existence of negotiations between themselves and Russia on the subject of any port in the Persian Gulf; but later developments, as will be seen, made the truthfulness of their disclaimer appear very doubtful.

In 1900 the Russian cruiser "Gilyak" visited the Persian Gulf, and the circumstances of her visit seemed to point to an intention on the part of the Russian Government to establish a coaling station at Bandar 'Abbās. This vessel, which was *en route* to the China station, left Aden for the Persian Gulf on the 7th February 1900 after a voluminous telegraphic correspondence between her commander and the Russian Government. She arrived at Bandar 'Abbās on the 14th February and was joined there by the "Waddon", a British merchant vessel which had been specially chartered at Suez to carry coal for her to Bandar 'Abbās, and which left Aden two days after she did. The object of these peculiar arrangements, which might have been obviated by coaling at Bombay or Karachi, can only be conjectured. The 300 tons of coal brought by the "Waddon" was more than the "Gilyak" could receive into her bunkers, and, after the greater part of the surplus had been piled on her deck, a small residue of about 16 tons remained; this small quantity, insignificant in itself but sufficient for the foundation of a depôt, the commander of the "Gilyak" would, with the permission of the Persian Deputy-Governor of Bandar

'Abbās, have deposited on shore. But the British Government, apprised beforehand of the "Gilyak's" probable intentions, had arranged that wherever she went in the Gulf she should be preceded by a British vessel of superior force, though in no ostentatious or offensive manner; and in conformity with these orders H. M. S. "Pomone" was lying at Bandar 'Abbās before the "Gilyak's" arrival and remained there until she left. Secret instructions for action had also been prepared by the Admiralty for the guidance, in the crisis which was feared, of the British Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf. The presence of the British ship of war at Bandar 'Abbās, however, possibly caused the situation to develop along lines which it might not otherwise have followed; for the Russian coal, instead of being landed, was eventually transferred to two native boats. This averted the principal danger. The secret instructions prepared for the guidance of the British naval commander were not issued; and on the 24th February, the "Gilyak" having left Bandar 'Abbās and arrived at Būshehr, the orders for shadowing her were cancelled. On the 23rd of February M. Muravieff assured the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the Russian Government had not the slightest desire or intention of acquiring a coaling or other station in the Persian Gulf; but he added that the commander of the "Gilyak" had been warned not to entertain any such idea,—a remark which seemed to betray the previous existence of some project. In any case the belated assurance, given after an attempt to land the coal had been frustrated, cannot be regarded as of much value. The "Gilyak" did not call at Bandar 'Abbās on her return voyage, and after some time had elapsed the coal was taken in charge by the Persian Deputy-Governor who sealed it up in a small warehouse connected with the "Kulāh-i-Firangi", his own official residence.

Russian
naval demon-
strations in
the Persian
Gulf.

The tour of the "Gilyak" in the Persian Gulf was the first of what cannot be regarded otherwise than as a series of Russian naval demonstrations made with a political object, for Russia had no material interests in the Gulf, and the Gulf lay off the track of her men-of-war proceeding to the Far East.

The "Gilyak", which was a sloop of war with a convenient draught of only 10 feet, but heavily armed, proceeded from Būshehr to Basrah, where she lay from the 5th to the 17th of March. She had been met at Muhammareh by the Russian Consul from Baghdād, who obtained a relaxation of the quarantine rules of the Basrah port in her favour and arranged a display in honour of her visit. On her return voyage she called at Kuwait, reached Būshehr again on the 19th March, and left that place on the 21st for the China station. At Basrah and at Kuwait she

was anticipated by a British vessel of war, and on her way down the Gulf she did not call at any place below Būshehr.

The next demonstration was made by the "Varyag", a new protected first-class cruiser of 6,460 tons built in America. On her way to the Gulf she called at Aden, where she caused annoyance by an unmannerly use of her search-lights in harbour. On the 10th December 1901 the "Varyag" arrived at Masqat; and on the following two days ceremonial visits were exchanged, under the auspices of the French Consul, between her officer and the Sultān. On her departure from Masqat, on the 12th of December, trace of her was temporarily lost; it had been given out that she was returning direct to Aden, but on leaving harbour she headed northwards and on the 16th December made her appearance at Būshehr. On the 21st December she left Būshehr southward bound, carrying the Russian Consul-General, and touched at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās; she remained at the former place from the 26th to the 27th, and at the latter from the 28th to 31st December.

The Russian flag was shown in the Gulf for a third time by the "Askold", a protected first-class cruiser of 5,905 tons. As the natives of the Persian Gulf then imagined that the strength of a ship depended on the number of her funnels, and as the "Askold" had five, her appearance made a strong impression. This ship arrived at Masqat on the 3rd December 1902 and sailed for the Persian Gulf on the next day. M. Adamoff, the Russian Consul from Basrah, was present on board during a part of the cruise. On the 14th of December the "Askold" was at Kuwait, and on the 17th at Lingeh, which she left the same evening for Bandar 'Abbās.

A fourth trip was made in the Persian Gulf by the second-class protected cruiser "Boyarin" of 3,200 tons, in company with the French ship "Infernet" of 2,452 tons. This demonstration was intended, apparently, to prove the solidarity of Russian and French policy in the Gulf. Both ships arrived at Masqat from Jibūti, but independently, the "Infernet" on the 21st and the "Boyarin" on the 23rd February 1903. During their stay at Masqat the French and Russian naval officers had audiences of the Sultān. The two vessels left Masqat together on the 24th of February and arrived on the 28th at Būshehr, where M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General, after civilities had been interchanged with the local Persian authorities, embarked on the "Boyarin." From Būshehr the Gulf was crossed to Kuwait, where the "Boyarin" and "Infernet" remained from the 5th to the 8th March; and on the 14th, after a visit to Lingeh, they returned to Masqat, the Russian Consul-General being still

on board. The Sultān visited both ships in harbour on the 16th, after which they took their departure separately.

Russian rail-
way recon-
naissance in
Southern
Persia, 1900.

The visits of these ships to the ports of the Persian Gulf were generally characterised by much ceremony ; profuse salutes and formal courtesies were resorted to to give *éclat* to the proceedings ; and on more than one occasion the ship herself was thrown open to inspection by the riff-raff of the Arab or Persian populace. "A little more reserve," the British Consul at Basrah remarked, "would have produced a greater impression on the Oriental mind."

In 1900 a Russian railway reconnaissance was carried southwards from Central Persia to several points on the coast of the Gulf, a proceeding in itself sufficient to explain the nature of Russian designs in southern Persia and the manner in which the Russians hoped to support the naval base of which they were in search. The expedition by which the reconnaissance was carried out consisted of nearly a dozen Russians, not including some Russian or Russian-speaking servants. They reached Tehrān in March 1900 and left again for Isfahān about the 6th of April, accompanied by the Secretary of the Russian Legation in Persia and by some 60 Persian Cossacks. On arrival at Isfahān, on the 18th of April, the expedition was found to have diminished in numbers, some of the members having evidently been detached to examine branch routes. Of those who reached Isfahān all but one left again on the 24th of April in the direction of Shirāz, while the remaining member, M. Tomiloff, started alone for Shūshtar *viā* the Bakhtiyāri country upon the following day.

The scattered party eventually reached the coast at four different places. The first to emerge were M. Sakhanski, in charge of the whole expedition, who reached Būshehr before the end of May, and M. Tomiloff, who arrived at Muhammareh from Nāsiri on the 18th of that month. M. Sakhanski remained at Būshehr until the 3rd of June, when he returned to Europe by sea. M. Tomiloff made his way by sea from Muhammareh to Būshehr, whence he travelled by road to Shīrāz and back again, returning to Būshehr on the 12th of June ; he was then conveyed by the Darya Baigi in the Persian steamer "Persepolis" to Muhammareh and returned northwards by Nāsiri. The third party to complete their work arrived at Bandar 'Abbās on the 7th of June, having travelled thither from Shīrāz *viā* Fīrūzbād ; on arrival it consisted of three Russians, one of whom was Dr. Sakhanski, a nephew of the leader of the expedition ; another Russian who had started with them from Isfahān had shot himself accidentally in the course of the journey and had been sent back from Qumisheh to Tehran for medical treatment. The fourth party, composed originally of three Europeans, was the last to arrive at

the coast and suffered severely from the heat ; they left Kirmān about the 12th of June and made *viâ* Bampūr, Qasrkand and Dashtyāri for Chahbār, where two of them, Captain Rittich and M. Palmgren, arrived on the 27th of June, preceded on the 26th by the corpse of their companion, M. Ilün, who had succumbed to the heat ; M. Palmgren, a Swede by race and an elderly man, was much exhausted. The two unfortunate explorers were succoured by the British Telegraph officials at Chahbār and eventually reached Masqat in safety in a native boat.

The expedition which carried out this extensive reconnaissance was described by the Russian Consular officials in Persia as a "geographical mission," but the head of it, M. Sakhanski, was referred to in the Russian press as "Director of Persian Railways." Some doubt prevailed at the time as to the nature of the Russian Government's connection with the undertaking, but it was in part removed by later information which came into the possession of His Majesty's Government in 1903. The expedition was then proved to have been a Railway Commission, charged with ascertaining the best route for a Russian railway from Transcaucasia across Persia to the sea ; and it was found that the leader of the Chahbār party had been Captain P. A. Rittich of the Russian General Staff, the author of a pamphlet on "Railways in Persia" which had made some stir in Russia in the early part of 1900, when the Russian press was full of Persian railway projects and was apprehensive lest the access of Russia to the sea should be barred by a junction between a German railway to Baghdād and the Indian railway system. It seemed that the Commission—or at least Captain Rittich—had condemned the Būshehr and Bandar 'Abbās routes as ending in the Persian Gulf, where the power of Britain was for naval reasons supreme, and at places which were incapable of conversion into ports, and that Captain Rittich had recommended the construction of a railway by way of Rasht, Qazvin, Tehrān, Qum, Kāshān, Yazd, Kirmān, Bam and Bampūr to Chahbār Bay at an estimated cost of £19,696,000 of which £1,575,000 was for the construction and armament of a port at Chahbār. The fact that the railway could not be supported by local, and must depend upon intercontinental, traffic had been clearly realised ; and it had been proposed that special customs duties should be applied in Persia—presumably after the establishment of exclusive influence there by Russia—to prevent the railway from becoming subservient to British commercial interests.

Chiefly no doubt with a view to the creation of solid interests in the Persian Gulf, but partly perhaps with the object of providing colourable grounds for political interference there, resort was next had by Russia to subsidised commercial enterprises. The first hint that Russian commercial

The Russian
Steam Navigation
and
Trading
Company and
other Russian

commercial
enterprises
in the Persian
Gulf, 1900-

operations were about to be undertaken with official support was given by a Russian doctor at Būshehr who stated, at the beginning of July 1900, that a Russian line of steamers would begin to run to the Gulf in the following autumn.

The actual execution of this scheme was preceded, however, by a tour of enquiry made by MM. Siromiatnikoff and Pellenberg, who arrived at Būshehr from Bombay on the 19th of June 1900, and from whom the information of the Russian doctor at Būshehr was probably derived. M. Siromiatnikoff was afterwards found to be a member of the editorial staff of the St. Petersburg newspaper "Novoe Vremya." M. Pellenberg travelled from Būshehr *via* Bandar Dīlam, Fallāhiyeh, and the Fallāhiyeh canal to Muhammareh, which he reached on the 18th of July and subsequently proceeded to Ahwāz. M. Siromiatnikoff meanwhile visited Basrah and Baghdād and, like M. Pellenberg, devoted himself to genuine commercial enquiries. In the course of his tour, however, M. Siromiatnikoff managed to visit Kuwait and proffered his services to Shaikh Mubārak for the purpose of obtaining a Russian decoration, but the proposal was courteously declined. Towards the end of August the travellers met again at Būshehr; they then passed a week at Bandar 'Abbās; and from Bandar 'Abbās they made their way to Lingeh, where they embarked for Europe towards the end of September.

On his return to St. Petersburg M. Siromiatnikoff was ordered by the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovitch to draw up a report of his mission and did so; the report was submitted for consideration to M. de Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance. M. Siromiatnikoff stated that there was a good opening for Russian products in Southern Persia, chiefly for sugar, but also for cotton and woollen goods, grain, spirits, and other Russian merchandise; but in his opinion the trade could only be started by means of a Russian line of steam-ships, which it would be necessary to subsidise in view of the strong position of the existing British lines. Return cargoes of rice and dates would be obtainable. M. Siromiatnikoff advocated the opening of a Russian bank at one of the Persian Gulf ports, the establishment of coal depôts at Būshehr and Basrah, and the inauguration at those places of a Russian Consulate and Vice-Consulate respectively, protected by strong guards of Cossacks. He also urged that at least one Russian war-vessel should be constantly present in the Gulf. A special committee was appointed by the Minister of Finance to examine the report, including representatives of various administrative Departments and commercial bodies: it met at St. Petersburg on the 11th December 1900. The Committee adopted M. Siromiatnikoff's proposals almost without

modification. They recommended that a regular line of steamers should be established, subsidised at the rate of 3 roubles per sea mile, to run at intervals of two months from Odessa to Būshehr and Basrah ; that the Russian Black Sea Navigation Company should be charged with the maintenance of the line ; and that the Company should be bound to establish coal depôts at Būshehr and Basrah. The Russian duties on rice should be lowered in the case of rice imported from Persia by the Persian Gulf route. A Russian Commercial Bank and a Russian Consulate should be established at Būshehr and a Russian Vice-Consulate at Basrah. Finally the Minister of War should be requested to provide a military guard at both places for the protection of the Consular establishments, and the Minister of Marine to station a vessel of war in Persian waters for permanent service. The recommendations of the Committee appear to have met with immediate if provisional acceptance, for the "Exchange Gazette" of the 15th (28th) December 1900 announced that an experimental run from Odessa to the Persian Gulf would be made early in the following month by a steamer of the "Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company," and that favourable rates had been arranged for the conveyance by rail of goods, destined for this route, from the commercial and industrial centres of Russia to Odessa. Reductions in the railway tariff were subsequently notified in the "Messenger Officiel" of the 12th (25th) January 1901.

The first steamer of the new Russian line to visit the Persian Gulf was the "Korniloff." She was an antiquated vessel built in 1869, of small carrying capacity, and unsuited by her draught for work in the Persian Gulf. On her first cruise in the Gulf she mounted six machine guns "for defence against pirates," and the crew were said to receive instruction in their use. After touching at Masqat, Jāshk, Bandar 'Abbās, and Lingeh the "Korniloff" arrived at Būshehr on the 21st of March 1901. At Masqat she saluted the Sultān's flag with three guns, and the salute was returned gun for gun with an intimation that, as she was a merchant vessel, the compliment could not be repaid on any future occasion. At Būshehr she was met by Prince Dabija, the Russian Consul-General from Isfahān, who had come there on the 4th of March to await her arrival and had been received by the Persian Governor, acting under instructions from Tehrān, with much distinction at his entry into the town. From Būshehr the "Korniloff" proceeded to Basrah, where she arrived on the 4th and remained till the 15th of April ; she then began her return voyage down the Gulf. At the beginning of April the Dutch firm of Messrs. Hotz & Son at Būshehr, which had enjoyed British protection

there for 15 years, transferred themselves to Russian protection and became the local agents of the new Russian line. The cargo of the "Korniloff" consisted on this occasion of about 1,000 tons of general cargo, and she brought ten passengers from Europe. At Bandar 'Abbās she discharged 600 bags of sugar, and at Būshehr 7,500 cases of kerosine oil, besides a quantity of sugar, cotton, silk, piece-goods and crockery, which two Russian agents remained on shore to sell. At Basrah were landed about 5,000 cases of oil, wood ready sawn for about 50,000 date boxes, also some piece-goods and sugar; the two last-named commodities did not meet with a ready sale. At Basrah the "Korniloff" might have obtained a return cargo of grain for Jiddah, but her excessive draught prevented her accepting it as it would have had to be lightered over the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab. On his return to Europe the commander, M. Klassing, was summoned to St. Petersburg to give an account of the voyage. The results were evidently regarded as inconclusive, for the drawing up of a contract between the Company and the Russian Government was deferred. A subsidy for the voyage was paid at the rate, it is believed, of 4 roubles per sea mile. In July 1901 the organ of the Russian sugar industry at Kieff drew attention to the new opening in the Persian Gulf, and announced that the Ministry of Finance would shortly publish a practical guide book to the Gulf compiled by a person who had been specially deputed to study the conditions of trade on the spot.

The "Korniloff" sailed from Odessa for the second time on the 11th of September 1901 and reached Masqat on the 4th of October. Here, disregarding the intimation made by the Sultan on the last occasion, she proceeded to fire a salute of 9 guns and demanded that it should be returned on the ground that she was a "Government vessel." The Sultan was inclined to refuse, but gave way upon a second salute of 21 guns being fired and the Russian flag sent ashore for a return of the compliment. This matter having been arranged to the satisfaction of the Russian commander, he weighed anchor and left Masqat precipitately without discharging any cargo. The "Korniloff" subsequently called at Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, Būshehr, Failīyeh (near Muhammareh), and Basrah; she left Lingeh homeward bound on the 23rd of November. At Būshehr the newly constituted Russian Consulate-General, which owed its creation in part at least to the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company's venture, was now in existence, having been opened in September 1901, and was able to assist the "Korniloff" in her operations. On this second voyage the "Korniloff" obtained a full cargo at Odessa and was obliged to decline further offers at Constantinople and Port Said; she carried six passengers

and her cargo consisted of about 650 tons of timber and planks, besides about 1,000 tons of kerosine in cases, sugar, flour, and manufactured goods. At Bandar 'Abbās she discharged about 5,000 cases of kerosine, at Lingeh a small quantity of cotton goods, at Būshehr 12,000 cases of kerosine and 100 cases of glassware, at Basrah 16,500 cases of oil and about £1,500 worth of wood, chiefly beams for building which were intended to compete with the Jāwi wood ordinarily imported at Basrah from Singapore. This time she secured a good return of cargo at Basrah, chiefly of dates in skins and bags, consigned to the Levant and Constantinople; at Būshehr she obtained 4,600 bags of tobacco for Bairūt, 60 cases of gum-tragacanth for London and Odessa, some bales of raw cotton for Odessa, and a small quantity of opium for Alexandria; to these were added at Lingeh 3,500 bags of tobacco for Jiddah and 20 bales of Persian carpets. Passages booked at Basrah by native passengers for Jiddah, Egypt and Constantinople brought in about £230 and over 30 Muhammadan pilgrims were embarked at Lingeh. It is probable that on this voyage the "Korniloff's" expenses were more than covered by her earnings, in which case the subsidy, understood to be now fixed at 50,000 roubles for the round trip, represented a clear gain to the owners. The cruise was thus not unprofitable, but an immense amount of time had been wasted in discharging and collecting cargo.

While the "Korniloff" was making her second voyage in the Gulf another Russian vessel, having apparently no connection with the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, was also engaged there. This was the "Sigrid" from Batoum, an English-built vessel of 1,300 tons and 16½ feet draught; she was understood to belong to a Company which owned 13 other similar vessels and received no subsidy, but was reimbursed by the Russian Government the amount of the dues paid by their ships in passing through the Suez Canal. The "Sigrid" discharged 18,000 cases of kerosine oil at Būshehr and 45,000 at Basrah. On her return voyage she obtained about 3,000 tons of grain and general cargo at Basrah at a low freight, and a small quantity at better terms at Būshehr; she completed her cargo with 620 tons of red oxide for London, which she loaded at Bū Mūsa Island. For at least part of her cruise the "Sigrid" appears to have been chartered by Hāji Allana, a merchant of Bombay. An agency for the Company owning the "Sigrid" was accepted by an Armenian merchant at Būshehr, but the Gulf was not again visited by any of their steamers.

The first cruises of the "Korniloff," being of special interest, have been described in some detail; but her subsequent voyages and those of the "Azoff" and "Truvor" which followed her, call for no remarks. The

new line secured without difficulty the date and passenger traffic between the ports of the Persian Gulf and those of the Levant and Black Sea, for on this run there was no competing company ; but the trade thus obtained was limited in amount and was restricted to certain seasons of the year. In the general carrying trade between Europe and the Gulf the new line made little headway, and after the first some difficulty seemed to be experienced in obtaining full cargoes for the outward voyage. Wood, kerosine and sugar continued to be the chief exports brought out by the Russian steamers ; for their other cargo there was little sale, their cottons being undersold by Indian manufactures and their chintzes outclassed by others. In January 1903 there was still no regular contract between the Company and the Russian Government, but under an informal agreement with M. de Witte the Company continued to send out four ships a year and to receive an annual subsidy of 200,000 roubles (£21,000). At this time negotiations were on foot for the establishment of a regular contract for 20 years, but the matter was held over for consideration by the Department of Merchant Shipping then in course of formation under the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. At length, at the end of March 1903, it became known that the relations of the Company and the Russian Government had been placed on a clear footing by a contract. Under the agreement an annual subsidy of 200,000 roubles was granted by the Government for 12 years in consideration of the despatch of four steamers to the Gulf in each year by the Company. The Suez Canal dues paid by the Company were also to be reimbursed by the Russian Government. Control over the selection of the Company's principal representative in the Gulf was reserved by the Russian Government to themselves. This contract, recommended by the Council of the Empire, was sanctioned by the Tsar in April 1903, and shortly afterwards it was announced in the " Odesski Listok " of 25th April (8th May) that two new steamers would be specially built for the Persian Gulf service in Russian yards. A notice issued from the head office of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company at Odessa which reached Būshehr in June 1903 explained the local organisation and working of the Company. The chief office in the Gulf had been established at Būshehr under a M. Pavloff, and subordinate agencies had been, or would shortly be, created at Masqat, Jāshk, Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, Muhammareh and Basrah. Cargo and passengers would be carried direct by the steamers of the Company's line to and between these ports, also to Aden, Jibūti, Jiddah, Suez, Port Said, Jaffa, Bairūt, Smyrna, the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and would be accepted for transshipment to other places in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. In consequence of the reorganisation Messrs. Hotz & Son lost their position as the Company's agents at Būshehr, and

further information showed that the new staff in the Gulf was likely to be entirely of Russian nationality. In 1903 some Batoum firms sent travellers to the Persian Gulf and steps were taken for the establishment of museums of Russian products and manufactures at Būshehr and Basrah. In November 1903 the Russian Government decided to station a war vessel permanently in the Persian Gulf, and the construction of a gunboat was subsequently provided for in the Russian naval programme of 1906. Towards the end of 1904 the Russian Government, in order to assist the operations of the Company, annulled their general prohibition of trade between Europe and Persia by the Batoum-Baku route in respect of certain kinds of British merchandise, notably Indian tea, if carried by the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company's steamers from Odessa to Batoum, and certain reductions of custom duty were granted in favour of the same articles.

Further aid was rendered to Russian trade in Southern Persia and the Gulf by the despatch of two Russian commercial missions to those parts in 1904 and 1905, the second under the auspices of the Russian Department of Mercantile Shipping. The first mission consisted of five members, and both were headed by Prince Anatouni, a Caucasian Armenian of good birth. Members of the first mission were seen at Shīrāz, Būshehr, Muhammareh, Shūshtar, and other places, the Prince himself visiting the two last in person in August 1904; the chief object then appeared to be the establishment of Russian Banks at Būshehr and Shīrāz. On the second occasion Prince Anatouni was still described as "Secretary of the Russian Bank," but he was also charged with the inspection of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company's staff, which now consisted of one senior and seven junior agents stationed at the Persian Gulf ports enumerated in the Company's prospectus of 1903. This duty cannot have been very thoroughly performed, for the Prince, who arrived at Būshehr on the 27th of September 1905 in the Company's steamer "Truvor," left in the beginning of October for Shīrāz, where he remained till the end of the month, and then departed for Isfahān and Tehrān.

Concurrently with the development of the Russian naval, military, and commercial schemes described above, there were additions to and improvements in the consular staff maintained by Russia in the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf. These will be noted in their proper places in dealing with the detailed political history of the Gulf.

Little political advantage was derived by Russia from the "plague missions" which, as mentioned in the history of the last period, she occasionally sent to the shores of the Persian Gulf. The fact that the sanitary

Increased Russian consular representation in the Persian Gulf region.

Russian sanitary agents and policy in the Persian Gulf.

measures at Persian ports had been committed by the Persian Government to British management, together with the short duration of a single small epidemic of plague that occurred at Būshehr, defeated the real purpose of these Russian deputations; and a threat made by the Russian Legation at Tehrān in 1899, that Cossacks would be sent to Būshehr as they had been to Sistān to form a plague cordon, remained merely a threat. When attempts were made in 1903 and 1904 to encroach upon the powers of the British sanitary executive, they appeared to proceed from the Persian Government and the doctor of the French Vice-Consulate at Būshehr, nor is there any proof that they were instigated by the representatives of Russia at Tehrān or elsewhere. Russia, however, still continued to regard the sanitary organisation of the Gulf as a field in which the predominant influence of England might advantageously be challenged; and in 1905 the Russian delegate on the Board of Health at Constantinople unsuccessfully urged the creation of a sanitary station, under the authority of the Board, near the Straits of Hormūz, a project of the Paris Conference of 1903 which Great Britain had accepted subject to conditions but was known to regard with disfavour.

French activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

While Russia was striving to create for herself a naval and commercial position in the Persian Gulf, the French Republic, though its schemes were of a less grandiose character, was somewhat similarly employed.

A local understanding between the two powers had early been detected by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, who on the 7th June 1899 placed the Political Resident at Būshehr in possession, by telegram, of his views on this subject. Co-operation between Russia and France in the Persian Gulf was recommended in an article which appeared in the St. Petersburg "*Novoe Vremya*" of the 13th (26th) September 1901; and the amenities exchanged between French and Russian naval officers in the Gulf itself pointed, on more than one occasion afterwards, to the existence of a common policy. The joint tour of the Russian cruiser "*Boyarin*" and the French cruiser "*Infernet*" to Masqat, Būshehr, Kuwait and Lingeh in 1903 was obviously intended as a display of united action.

At the same time it would be a mistake to suppose that France had no separate ambitions of her own in the Persian Gulf. The facts on the contrary indicated that she aimed at the establishment of a French protectorate

Concerted
action of
France and
Russia.

Projected
French naval
base in the
Gulf of

or quasi-protectorate in some part of eastern 'Omān, and that she was in search of a naval *point d'appui* in the same neighbourhood. Persevering endeavours were made, as in the past, to create by wholesale grants of the French flag, especially to natives of Sūr, a class of maritime Arabs dependent on French protection and subject to French authority; and an attempt by France to obtain the valuable harbour of Bandar Jissah near Masqat for occupation was very nearly successful. Both of these important questions are dealt with at length elsewhere; and here it is enough to remark that the flag question became so acute in 1903 as to bring France and Britain,—a fact which fortunately did not become public,—within measurable distance of a rupture. There is, indeed, no reason to doubt that France entertained designs, unconnected with the furtherance of Russian policy, upon the 'Omān coast between Masqat and Ras-al-Hadd, and possibly upon the hinterland as well, for the French Vice-Consul during a period of years maintained intimate relations at Sūr with the Banī Bū 'Alī and Jannabah tribes who occupy also a large part of the interior.

'Omān and indiscriminate conferment of the French flag on native vessels.

A free use of war vessels was made in the Gulf by France during the time of her greatest political activity there. In 1900-01 the French men-of-war "Drome," "Catinat," and "Achéron," in 1901-02 the "Catinat," "Jean Bart," "Infernet," and "Chasseloup Loubat," in 1902-03 the "Infernet," and "Friand," and in 1904 the "Infernet" were seen in the Gulf of 'Omān, some of them visiting the Persian Gulf also. Lieutenant Jules Viaud of the French Navy, better known as "Pierre Loti," Academician, sentimental politician, and author of "L'Inde sans les Anglais," was in the Persian Gulf in April 1900; he spent a day at Masqat, where he had an interview with the Sultān, and thence went to Būshehr.

French naval demonstrations in the Persian Gulf.

A malicious press campaign against British proceedings in the Persian Gulf, conducted in Arabic as well as in French and Russian journals, was a singular accompaniment of the contest between France and Britain.

Early in 1899 there settled at Masqat a certain Antoine Goguyer, a Frenchman of energy and ability, to whose manœuvres some reference must be made. The antecedents of M. Goguyer, who spoke Arabic like a native, were shady; he was an inveterate *mécontent*, and in the past he had had trouble with the French Foreign Office. At one time he was obliged to leave Tunis on account of his misdeeds, and at another he was imprisoned by M. Lagarde, the French representative in Abyssinia, doubtless not without cause. M. Goguyer's affairs at Masqat, in so far as they relate to his dealings in arms, are dealt with elsewhere; in this place we are only concerned with the political side of his conduct.

Journalistic attacks of French origin on British proceedings in the Persian Gulf.

M. Goguyer had not been long at Masqat when he opened an attack

upon Britain in the French newspapers, his favourite organ being the "Dépêche Coloniale," in which one article was even printed over his signature; virulent communications clearly traceable to the same source appeared also in Russian journals and in the Arabic press of Egypt. M. Goguyer's tirades showed bitter animus and an unscrupulous disregard of truth, but their style was pungent and some of them were undeniably witty; they were chiefly directed against British policy as personified in the British Political Agent at Masqat; but the Sultān of 'Omān also came in for a share of ridicule and abuse. Two British coal-prospecting expeditions made from Sūr in 1901 and a speech delivered by Lord Curzon in Darbar at Shārjah in 1903 were savagely reviewed in French prints, and an Arabic article on British policy in Central Arabia which appeared in the "Ahrām" of Cairo in September 1904 showed that M. Goguyer had not neglected to acquire information during a then recent visit to Kuwait; an earlier article in the same Egyptian newspaper in 1902 had dwelt on the insolence of the English and "their slaves the Hindus" at Masqat. The object of the writer was obviously to create strong feeling in France and elsewhere, partly, it may be, as a means of forcing the hand of the French Foreign Office. In the circumstances it was not wonderful that in 1903, after M. Goguyer had been at work for three years, a report that Britain was about to annex Masqat caused disquietude in France and provoked an interpellation in the French Chamber.

The Sultān of 'Omān was not allowed to remain in ignorance of M. Goguyer's attacks; on the contrary he was regularly supplied with translations or copies of the same by unknown correspondents in Europe. In the beginning of 1901 the Sultān consulted the British representative at Masqat as to the possibility of action being taken against M. Goguyer, and the matter was referred to His Majesty's Government, who decided to ascertain in the first instance whether M. Goguyer possessed any official status at Masqat. The reply of the French Ambassador was somewhat ambiguous, for he merely stated that M. Goguyer "was believed to be the representative of a shipping agency, and that there was no reason for thinking that he had any official position, although he might have been employed by the French Vice-Consulate as a clerk." In 1902 M. Laronce, who in the previous year had succeeded M. Ottavi as French Vice-Consul at Masqat,—an estimable gentleman but one who stood in awe of M. Goguyer's scurrilous pen—was persuaded by the British Political Agent to ask his Government whether he might agree to M. Goguyer's deportation from Masqat by the Sultān. The reply of the French Foreign Office was unfavourable, but a warning to M. Goguyer that he should exercise more circumspection in his writings was authorised. Soon after he had repelled

this mild rebuke with open defiance of the Vice-Consul's authority M. Goguyer proposed to fly the Russian commercial flag over his premises in virtue of his connection with the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, but he was interdicted from doing so by M. Laronce.

Meanwhile a case had occurred between M. Goguyer and an Arab merchant, 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali of Bandar Jissah, from whom M. Goguyer claimed Rs. 20,000 on account of joint transactions in arms and ammunition ; the claim was urged upon the Sultān by the French Vice-Consul ; and in the end, supported by the presence of a second-class cruiser, the "Friand," which called at Masqat towards the end of October 1902, the French arguments prevailed and the money was paid. Subsequently it was discovered that M. Goguyer had received in this way Rs. 7,500 more than his due, and M. Laronce, under a decision of the French Court of Appeal in Bourbon, called on him to refund the amount. This M. Goguyer at first refused to do, nor did he submit until a month after the Vice-Consul had attached a large portion of his stock in trade.

In April 1904, M. Goguyer's newspaper attacks still continuing, the Sultān with the approval and assistance of M. Laronce wrote to M. Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting that Masqat might be relieved of M. Goguyer's presence. M. Delcassé's reply, dated the 26th of May 1904, was that M. Goguyer was not a man of violence but an honest trader, that he had influential employers who had formally made themselves answerable for his conduct, and that in future he would be restrained from writing against the Sultān and from interesting himself in the internal affairs of 'Omān ; for the present M. Delcassé was not prepared to go further. M. Goguyer thus remained at Masqat and his anti-British fulminations continued.

Another and by no means creditable feature in the French campaign against British influence in the Gulf remains to be described. It consisted in the systematic dissemination throughout the Muhammadan world of intelligence and opinions politically injurious to Great Britain by means of an Arabic newspaper purporting to be written by Muhammadans for Muhammadans. The title of this print, originally the "Fath-al-Basāir" or "Opening of Eyes," was changed in 1902 to the "Murshid-al-Albāb" or "Preceptor of Hearts."

About April 1900 the paper in question began to reach Masqat, where it was delivered gratuitously and post paid to several of the leading Arab residents ; and the fact that some of the copies were addressed by name to leading Shaikhs in the interior of 'Omān betrayed a command of local information by those engaged in the enterprise. In May 1900 copies were

received by Muhammadan inhabitants of Aden, and the mail which reached Bombay on the 7th of July contained copies for Lingeh, Būshehr and Bahrain. Eventually in 1905 it was ascertained that nine copies of the paper were then being regularly sent to the French possessions in the Comoros, Réunion and Madagascar, 21 to East Africa, 20 to Masqat, 1 to Dibai, 3 to Bahrain, 2 to Kuwait, 3 to Basrah, 7 to Tehrān, 6 to Būshehr, 2 to Bandar 'Abbās, 7 to Lingeh and 17 to British India, the last including four which were addressed to Aden. Among the addressees at Masqat were the Sultān, his eldest son, some of his principal officials, and the members of a rebellious family in Sharqīyah; the addressee at Dibai was the Shaikh of that place; two of the Bahrain copies were destined for the Shaikh of Bahrain and the notorious Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, who was an acquaintance of M. Goguyer; the copies posted to Kuwait were for Shaikh Mubārak and Ibn Sa'ūd, the chiefs respectively of Kuwait and Central Arabia; at Basrah two of the intended recipients were connected with the Naqīb of that place; the addressees at Tehrān were principally high officials of the Persian Government; those at Būshehr included the Governor and the Kārguzār; at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās the Persian Deputy Governors were among those to whom copies were sent. The postmark was almost invariably that of the French post office at Bairūt in Syria, but one issue of the paper which reached Bombay on the 14th of July 1900 had been posted at Tangier.

The tone of the "Fath-al-Basāir" was calculated to inflame Muhammadan feelings everywhere against Britain, whose policy was represented in an odious light. Such phrases as "The greatest of all sedition-mongers are the English" and "The devils of this epoch are the English" were of frequent occurrence in its columns. The paper dwelt exultantly on British discomfitures in any part of the world, from whatever cause proceeding; the South African war, while it lasted, provided a favourite topic. Some brochures of similar appearance and tendency to the "Fath-al-Basāir," but differently entitled, also reached the Gulf from time to time.

In June 1900 the Sultān of 'Omān signified a wish that the "Fath-al-Basāir" should be prevented from circulating in his territories, and the Government of India immediately arranged for its elimination at Bombay from the Masqat mail. Eventually in 1901 special treatment of copies intended for Aden was authorised, and in 1903 arrangements were made both at Aden and Bombay for dealing with all copies contained in the mails transhipped at those places or destined for Indian ports. The adoption of closed covers in September 1900 by the managers of the journal, the occasional despatch of the paper by French or Italian mail steamers in 1901, and the change of title in 1902, were all difficulties in the way of effective

interception, and at the beginning of 1904, a few copies still occasionally found their way to Masqat.

The origin of the "Fath-al-Basāir" was discovered in 1902, through the strange experiences of an Arab named Salīm Qamri, the son of a Zanzibar merchant. Salīm Qamri, who in 1902 was about 30 years of age, had been at one time employed as a clerk in the service of the Sultān of Zanzibar, and had subsequently visited Jibūti, Hodaidah and the Persian Gulf on his own account. Eventually in 1900 he settled at Lahaj near Aden under the protection of the Sultān of that place, and in 1901, he became a student in the school of the United Free Church of Scotland's Mission at Shaikh 'Othmān; here he was converted to Christianity and in 1902 was baptised. In March 1902 he received through the French Consul at Aden an advantageous offer of employment at Paris, which he accepted; it emanated from a M. Piat, formerly French Consul at Būshehr. Salīm Qamri reached Paris about the beginning of June and found that he was to be employed there as native editor of the "Fath-al-Basāir" under M. Piat, who was then working in the French Foreign Office. The minute account which he gave of the *modus operandi* and of the contents and distribution of the paper, tallying as it did in every respect with what was already known from other sources, was enough in itself to place his veracity beyond suspicion. After falling in for a short time with the wishes of his employers, who kept him under close surveillance, Salīm Qamri struck work from conscientious motives; and on his persisting in his refusal to assist in the production of the paper, he was medically examined, pronounced insane, and consigned about the middle of July to the Sainte Anne Lunatic Asylum in Paris. Meanwhile, however, he had succeeded in communicating by post with the Revd. Dr. Young, head of the Scottish Mission at Aden, and with the Revd. Mr. Brechin, a Scottish clergyman in Paris; and in August he addressed an appeal for help to the British Embassy in Paris. Eventually Dr. Young, who came to Paris for the purpose, succeeded with official assistance in obtaining Salīm Qamri's release from the asylum—where he had been confined on the ground of "erotic mania, prostration and depression"—and brought him back to Aden.

His formal deposition taken by a Magistrate at Aden on the 15th and 16th of December 1902, added something to what was known of the "Fath-al-Basāir" bureau and its operations. According to his statement a letter had been issued to the Somali Mulla in the name "all Muhammadans and their teachers" promising him aid in arms and ammunition, from Jibūti, in his struggle against the English; a second "from all Muslim teachers" had been sent to the Shaikh of Kuwait, urging him to break off

relations with England and submit to the Sultān of Turkey ; and a third had been addressed to Najm-ud-Dīn, the " Addah Mullah " of Afghanistan, on the part of "all Muhammadans," which promised support in a war with England and counselled him to side with Russia.

Independent confirmation of Salīm Qamri's story was also forthcoming, inasmuch as envelopes containing the " Fath-al-Basāir " which had been seized by the Indian Post Office were identified by Mr. J. Bolton, stationer, of 39, St. George's Place, Knightsbridge, whose trademark they bore, as having been specially made for the French Embassy in London, whence, according to Mr. Bolton's information, they had been forwarded to Paris. In 1902, it may be remarked, M. Piat was shown in the official directory of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "employed on special service." The opinion of Sir E. Monson, British Ambassador at Paris, on Salīm Qamri's case is worth quoting : it ran as follows :—

From enquiries which I have caused to be made at the Consulate-General as to the circumstances under which Mr. Atlee visited and succeeded in rescuing this unfortunate man, I have come to the conclusion that his story, romantic and unusual as it appears, is no invention or hallucination ; and, with the knowledge that his Majesty's Government possess of the unscrupulous character of many of the men employed by France on official foreign service in the East, it is not difficult to believe that M. Piat's action, recklessly cruel as it undoubtedly was, has not been exaggerated in the description given by his victim * * * * * I am at the same time quite ready to believe that some of the high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not be disposed to close their eyes to the commission of grave irregularities to the prejudice of British interests in the East.

It is not apparent that the proceedings of M. Goguyer or M. Piat in any way advanced French interests or undermined British influence in the Persian Gulf ; and their campaigns had the tendency, common to all campaigns of such a nature, to become less and less effective the longer they were maintained. It has been thought well to describe them, however, to show in what spirit and with what weapons the contest with Britain was waged on the part of France. In 1905 the circulation of the " Murshid-al-Albāb " still continued, notwithstanding an improvement in the relations between Britain and France, which took place about 1904 and effaced the bitter memories of Fashoda which had inspired French policy at the beginning of the period.

French commercial enterprises in the Persian Gulf.

Some efforts by French representatives to establish French trade in the Persian Gulf may be mentioned, but they were of little importance. An article by M. Ottavi, the French Vice-Consul at Masqat, in the " Moniteur Officiel du Commerce " of the 29th of March 1900 advocated the establishment by French enterprise at Masqat of a " grand magasin de nouveautés

ou bazar," having a branch at Paris or Marseilles ; the object of the proposal was to create direct trade between France and the Persian Gulf which, the writer argued, would compete on favourable terms with existing British trade through Bombay, inasmuch as the sea voyage would be shorter and the payment of customs and middlemen's profits at Bombay would be avoided ; nothing, however, resulted from the suggestion. In March 1903 M. M. Dumas and Castlelin, the former a partner in a Marseilles firm, came provided with letters of recommendation by the French Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, to Bahrain and made preparations for settling there ; in consequence, however, of an outbreak of plague they hurriedly quitted the place in the month of May following. They had brought with them numerous samples of French manufactures, and M. Dumas during his sojourn made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a concession for pearl-fishing from the Shaikh. Again, at the beginning of August 1903 M. Jouannin, General Secretary of the " Comité de l'Asie Française," arrived at Masqat with an assistant and remained for about a month exhibiting French goods and making commercial inquiries. Early in September M. Jouannin visited Bahrain, where he stayed for three weeks, employing his time in the same manner as at Masqat ; during his stay he mooted the foundation of a Bank in Bahrain, but his overtures were rejected by the Shaikh. After an unsuccessful endeavour to arrange for a journey to Central Arabia he left Bahrain and proceeded to Basrah and Baghdād. No political character was attributed to a visit which was paid to Bahrain in August and September 1905 by Mme. Nattan, the widow of a Paris jeweller, accompanied by a daughter and a nephew. The party were accompanied by a son of the notorious Anglophobe M. Goguyer, and they were subsequently joined by M. Goguyer himself, but it appeared that they had no serious object beyond the purchase of pearls.

The French archæological excavations at Tallo in Turkish 'Irāq ceased in 1900, but those at Shūsh in 'Arabistān continued throughout the period.

German activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

To the circle of European powers taking an active interest in the Persian Gulf was added, about this time, the German Empire. Germany stood in high favour at Constantinople, partly on account of her having abstained—which other powers did not—from remonstrances with Turkey on the subject of the Armenian massacres of 1895, partly on account of a visit

paid by the German Emperor, William II, to the Turkish dominions and capital in 1898 ; and during the period her influence was in the ascendant in the innermost and most influential Ottoman circles.

The "Baghdād" Railway.

A concession for the construction of an Ottoman Railway from Konia in Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf *viâ* Baghdād was definitely secured by Germans in 1899 ; and in 1900 a German technical commission, headed by the German Consul-General at Constantinople, travelled along the proposed alignment of the railway in Turkish 'Irāq and reported upon all questions connected therewith. The original idea of the concessionaires was to bring the line down to the coast in Kuwait Bay ; but eventually the choice of a terminus in the Persian Gulf was postponed, as the selection of Kuwait was opposed by Britain, whose interest was then popularly supposed to lie in obstructing the whole project until she had been admitted to a large share in it, and who could not in any case have agreed to the formation of a railway port in the Gulf except under conditions ensuring its innocuousness to her own military position. A final Convention for the building of the Konia-Persian Gulf line by a new " Baghdād Railway Company," to be formed by the existing Anatolian Railway Company, was signed in 1903 ; but nothing was done under it in the Persian Gulf region up to the end of the period with which we are concerned.

Possibly in connection with the Baghdād Railway project, the German war vessel " Arcona," in returning from the Far East in 1899, was ordered to visit Basrah. She called at Masqat, Lingeh, and Būshehr, arriving at the last-named place at the end of March; but from there, having learned that her draught was too great to allow of her crossing the bar of the Shatt-Al-'Arab, she returned southwards leaving the cruise uncompleted.

Beginnings of German trade in the Gulf.

German trade in and with the Persian Gulf may be said to have had its real beginning about this time. In 1899 a party of Germans visited Bandar 'Abbās to study the commercial situation there. A German named Toeppen, who became a convert to Muhammadanism, sometimes suspected of being a political intriguer but really a mercantile adventurer, was in evidence at various places in the Gulf from 1899 to 1904. A representative of a Hamburg firm who had traded in mother-of-pearl shells at Lingeh for some years established himself in Bahrain in 1901 ; he had also business relations with Trucial 'Omān, and his dealings with the Trucial Shaikhs were considered to have some political significance. In 1906 the (German) Hamburg-America line began a service of steamers between Europe and the Persian Gulf, and the German merchant already mentioned was appointed their Agent in Bahrain.

In Turkish 'Irāq Germany had secured a practical monopoly for the

excavation of ancient sites ; and work at Babylon, begun in 1898 by a German mission, continued throughout the period.

The actual interests of Germany in the Persian Gulf were thus, it will be seen, small as yet ; but her prospective interests, dependent on the Baghdād Railway and on an expansion of trade, were very considerable.

Belgian activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

A small Belgian enterprise in the Gulf deserves mention as showing the readiness of all nations to participate, if a profitable opening could be found, in business operations there. M. Simais, formerly Commercial Attaché of the Belgian Legation at Tehrān and in 1901 Director-General of the Persian Customs of the South, was undoubtedly interested in the proceedings ; he had visions of a Belgian trading syndicate which would establish a bank in Persia and a line of steamers in the Gulf in competition with existing British institutions.

Projected
Belgian
syndicate.

The prospecting operations of M. Simais' friends were carried out by a small Belgian steam yacht, the "Selika" of Antwerp, commanded by M. Adrien de Gerlache, who had once led a Belgian expedition of discovery in the antarctic regions. The party consisted, besides M. de Gerlache, of a military officer, an artist, a doctor and two men of science, the last being, it was said, of French nationality. After leaving Masqat, where she arrived on the 7th of March, the "Selika" cruised along the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl and was not seen again until she appeared at Bahrain on the 11th April. According to statements by the party travelling on her she had called at Dibai, had been detained a fortnight by an accident to her machinery at the island of Arzanah, and had spent two days at Dōhah ; but the length of time during which she had lingered in the neighbourhood of the pearls banks appeared suspicious, especially as the remainder of her cruise was short and as M. Simais stated that she came in connection with a pearl fishing concession granted by the Persian Government two years previously. On the 21st of April the "Selika" left Bahrain for Qatif, and on the 23rd she reached Būshehr, whence she took her departure for Bombay. It was subsequently ascertained that the travellers in the "Selika" had purchased or otherwise obtained about 3,000 francs' worth of small pearls which they sold at a high profit on their return to Europe.

Cruise of
the "Selika."

In November 1901 M. de Gerlache reappeared at Bahrain, but without the "Selika," and his pearl-dealing operations were this time unsuccessful.

M. Simais died, and the project of a syndicate were abandoned. The "Selika" was subsequently purchased* in Europe by the Persian Government for their Customs service and became the "Muzaffari."

American activity in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

The form of American activity in the Persian Gulf remained unchanged. Archaeological work was prosecuted by Americans at Nifār in Turkish 'Irāq until 1900. In that year an American Consular Agent was appointed at Basrah. At one time the affairs of the (American) Arabian Mission in Bahrain gave some trouble to the British authorities, who were responsible for the safety of the missionaries, and the Government of India would gladly have seen the latter withdrawn; but ultimately the dangers due to the presence of the Mission, such as they were, passed away.

Muhammadan forces and movements, 1899-1905.

Certain Muhammadan forces and movements, chiefly religious and journalistic, claim attention as having had at this time points of contact with British policy in the Persian Gulf.

The Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf.

The most important of these were the proceedings of the Mujtahid fraternity of Karbala and Najaf, who then were, and for some years longer remained, a political factor of no mean power in politics. In 1903, when the state of Persia became troubled, certain of the Mujtahids threw in their lot with the critics of the Persian Government and by their pronouncements encouraged, to some extent, opposition to the Shāh and his chief minister, the Atabaig-i-A'zam. The immense prestige which the Mujtahids enjoyed in Persia and the authority with which the masses invested their opinion, even in purely secular and political affairs, made this development a matter of serious anxiety to the Persian Government. Steps were first taken to conciliate them, but without success. At length in 1904 measures for repressing their activity were adopted by the Porte at the instance of Persia, and the desired effect was produced.

Through the Oudh Bequest, of which certain of their number were Distributors, the British Government were to some extent in relations with the Mujtahid body; and his Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān thought

* *Vide* page 2604, *post*.

that the circumstance might be turned to account to moderate their interference in Persian politics, to render them less hostile to Christians and Europeans as such, and even to draw them into a sort of alliance with the British Government for defeating Russian designs in Persia. Steps were taken in 1903 in the direction suggested, but they were ineffectual, the Mujtahids showing no inclination to enter into cordial dealings with the British political representatives ; and in the following year advantage seems to have been taken by the Persian Government of the British negotiations with some of the Mujtahids to prejudice the Porte against them as persons holding relations with a European power : hence the action, already mentioned, of the Turkish Government.

Manifestations of hostility to British policy in the Persian Gulf were from time to time remarked in the press of more than one Muhammadan country, and some of them were genuine, being inspired by genuine religious or racial feeling ; but such were difficult to distinguish from the emanations of the pseudo-Islamic bureau maintained in the French Foreign Office. This difficulty was felt especially in regard to an Arabic anti-British leaflet, posted at Cairo, which reached Bombay on the 12th of December 1903 ; copies were found addressed to Masqat, Dibai, Kuwait, Basrah, Muham-mareh, Bûshehr and Lingeh ; and its interception by the Indian Post Office was authorised. The tract purported to be the work of one 'Abdul Muham-mad-bin-'Abdullah ; it related to a tour by Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India in the Persian Gulf ; and its object was to dissuade the inhabitants of the Gulf from attaching importance to the demonstration, and from putting faith in the British Government.

Arabic and
Persian press.

The " Liwa," " Muaiyid," and other newspapers published in Egypt set themselves in 1904-05 to disseminate mendacious accounts of British action in the Persian Gulf and North-Eastern Arabia, and the effects, as they had some influence, were unfortunate. These papers were believed to be largely responsible for a strongly Anglophobe attitude exhibited by most of the Turkish officials in the Basrah Wilayat in 1905 ; and, on the other hand, it was suspected that the Egyptian journals were themselves directly inspired from Constantinople.

Belonging to a somewhat different class was the " Habl-ul-Matîn," a Persian newspaper published at Calcutta, which frequently took advantage of the freedom of the press in British India to disparage the Government whose protection it enjoyed. In this print there appeared a false and anti-British account of a crisis in Bahrain in 1904 which made it necessary to arrange for a *démenti* by a respectable newspaper at Tehrân. The " Habl-ul-Matîn " offended upon other occasions also, but its attacks had not the importance attaching to those of the Cairo press.

Affairs and foreign relations of the 'Oman Sultanate, 1899-1905.

The general affairs and foreign relations of the different territorial divisions of the Persian Gulf region call next for notice.

Rupture between the Sultān and Britain, and settlement of the French naval base question.

The period opened with a serious rupture between the British Government and the Sultān of 'Omān, of which the general causes, though specific reasons were not wanting, were the generally hostile attitude of the Sultān to Britain and his increasing intimacy with France. The presentation of an ultimatum requiring him to settle certain claims of British subjects and give satisfaction on various other points had already been authorised when the discovery, mentioned in the history of the last period, was made—that in disregard of his Agreement of 1891 with the British Government the Sultān had granted a coaling station to the French ; and the cancellation of this grant was added to the other demands embodied in the ultimatum. After a week of unsatisfactory discussions, following its presentation, the Sultān on the 16th February 1899 at last submitted, but not until actual dispositions had been made for an immediate bombardment of his palace and forts by a British man-of-war. A French coaling station was ultimately provided at Masqat itself by dividing, in accordance with a suggestion made by the British Government, the site used by British vessels for storage of coal there into two portions, either of which the French authorities were at liberty to choose. This was the end of the French scheme for a naval base in the Gulf of 'Omān.

Settlement of the French flag question.

The question of the French flag in the 'Omān Sultanate, though its importance had been greatly diminished by the frustration of the project for a French naval base, continued to give trouble for some years. Encouraged by British support the Sultān, from 1899 onwards, strenuously resisted the conferment of French flags on subjects of his and denied the validity of such grants when made without his concurrence. Contrary views were maintained by the French authorities with great pertinacity ; and in 1903, in consequence of an attack on a vessel flying the French flag at Sūr and the punishment by the Sultān for a quarantine offence of some individuals connected with another vessel of similar status, matters took a grave turn. Two of Her Majesty's ships and a French man-of-war were presently collected in Masqat harbour, and, while the British Government sustained the action of the Sultān in regard to the quarantine breakers the French authorities sought to intimidate him into reversing it. A crisis not devoid of danger was at length terminated by an agreement between Britain and

France to refer the question of the Frānch flag in 'Omān to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal ; and that Court at length, in 1905, arrived at a finding by which such restrictions were imposed on the grant and continued use of French flags as robbed the tricolor of its value as an instrument of French political aggression in 'Omān.

After the rupture of 1899 the relations of the Sultān with the British Government became satisfactory, and the smoothness of their course was not again disturbed. In 1902, the Sultān gave an undertaking that he would not permit certain coal fields in the hinterland of Sūr to be worked by any foreign Government or company until the British Government had been allowed an option of working them in conjunction with himself. In 1905, after two years' consideration, it was decided that negotiations should be undertaken for the conclusion of a new British Commercial Treaty with the Masqat Government to take the place of that of 1891.

Improved
relations of
the Sultān
with Britain.

In 1904, in the course of a general adjustment of political differences which took place between Britain and France, the question of a British protectorate over the Sultanate of 'Omān was again considered ; but France was unwilling to relinquish any of her rights under the Declaration of 1862.

Russia seems to have recognised that she did not possess any vital interests in the Sultanate of 'Omān, and consequently to have left the furtherance of any policy there in which she may have been a partner entirely to her French ally. In 1901, however, two Russians arrived at Masqat on the 9th March and remained a week ; one of them was a brother of Count Leontieff of Abyssinian fame and had made the voyage from Marseilles to Aden with his better known relation ; his companion at Masqat was a M. Ermtère. The pair paid several visits to the French Vice-Consulate and had more than one interview with the Sultān, but their conversation was so mysterious that the Sultān, an intelligent man, was unable to understand the drift of it. Eventually, the day before their departure, they petitioned His Highness for written permission to deal in arms at Masqat, and were informed in reply that the trade was free to all, and that no written permission to engage in it was required.

Russian
agents, etc.

A few months later a rumour, current once before in 1899, became rife, that the Russian Government intended to establish a consulate at Masqat, and the Government of India recommended that definite instructions should be given to the British Political Agent at Masqat as to his attitude in regard to this question. His Majesty's Government accordingly directed that the Sultān, in case of his applying for advice, should be counselled to discourage the project upon commercial grounds.

The Russian cruiser "Varyag" arrived at Masqat on the 10th of December 1901, and on the following day complimentary visits were exchanged between the officers and the Sultān, the French Consul acting as intermediary. The Sultān was much impressed by the appearance of the "Varyag" and subsequently remarked that it was the finest war-vessel that he had seen in the Gulf. At the farewell visit of the "Boyarin" to Masqat about the middle of March 1903, M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr, in conversation with the Sultān broached the topic of a Russian consular officer for Masqat; the Sultān however ignored his remarks and M. Passek did not attempt to return to the subject.

Affairs and foreign relations of Trucial 'Omān, 1899-1905.

During this period the right of the British Government to represent the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in external affairs was clearly affirmed and admitted upon more than one occasion.

France and the representation of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān by Britain in their foreign relations.

In 1903 a native vessel flying the French flag was wrecked at Dibai, and the French representative at Masqat at first took steps for a settlement of the case, in which compensation was claimed, between the Shaikh and himself direct. However, on the special relations of the Trucial Shaikhs with Britain being explained and the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 communicated to the French Government, the latter in 1904 agreed that the case of their *protégé* should be disposed of through the British political representative in the Gulf, and action was taken accordingly.

Persia and the same.

But it was chiefly through matters affecting Persia that the virtual suzerainty of Britain over Trucial 'Omān was brought into prominence. In 1899 the Persian Government, being apprehensive of an Arab descent on Lingeh from the ports of Trucial 'Omān, appealed to the British Government to prevent the movement they feared, and the requisite steps were taken by the British political authorities; but this did not prevent Persian intrigues with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in 1900-01, in which however the chief object on the Persian side was probably to assure the safety of Lingeh. In 1903 the title of Britain to present claims which the Trucial Shaikhs entertained against the Persian administration of the coast opposite to their own was affirmed by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, and appears to have been admitted by the Persian Government on their being made aware of the Exclusive Agreement.

The most significant instance of British political intervention with a foreign power in the interests of a Trucial Shaikh occurred however in 1904, when an attempt was made by Persia to annex the islands of Bū Mūsa and Tunb. The decline of trade at Lingeh after the establishment of a post of the reorganised Persian Customs there in 1902, leading as it did to suggestions by merchants that a new *entrepôt* of trade should be established on Bū Mūsa, caused the Persian Government to cast covetous eyes on that island and on the island of Tunb. Russian incitement also may have been at work, for Russia, after a visit paid by the Viceroy of India to the Persian Gulf in 1903, seemed to apprehend the creation by Britain of a naval station or stations at the entrance of the Gulf. In the spring of 1904 a Belgian officer of the Persian Customs visited Bū Mūsa and Tunb, removed flags which had been hoisted there by the Shaikh of Shārjah under the advice of the Government of India in the previous summer, substituted Persian flags, and installed Persian custom guards on both islands. Diplomatic remonstrances by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān resulted, however, in the removal of the Persian flags and the replacement of the Shārjah colours. One of the inducements employed by the British Legation in this case was a hint that the ownership of Sirri Island, which had been annexed by Persia in 1897 but was claimed by the Shaikh of Shārjah, would be called in question by Britain if Persia claimed Bū Mūsa and Tunb.

Attempted
annexation to
Persia of Bū
Mūsa and
Tunb
Islands.

Affairs and foreign relations of Qatar, 1899-1905.

The political position of the Qatar promontory remained indeterminate throughout the period, the Turks still affecting to treat it as a part of the Ottoman dominions, whilst the British Government regarded it as an independent Arab territory and themselves, consequently, as entitled to maintain direct relations with its Shaikhs.

At the end of 1902 the Porte attempted to assert their authority over Qatar by appointing Turkish administrative officials to Wakrah and Zubārah, as well as to 'Odaid, which place, though situated in Trucial 'Omān, they persisted in treating as a dependency of Qatar; the new Ottoman officials were in addition to a representative whom the Turkish Government already maintained at Dōhah. A Turkish Mudīr actually made his appearance at Wakrah in the spring of 1903; but later, on

Relations of
Turkey with
Qatar.

Relations of
Britain with
Qatar.

representations being made by His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, the Porte undertook to maintain the *status quo* in Qatar, cancelled the appointment, and withdrew from other projected encroachments.

Meanwhile, since 1900, Ahmad, one of the Shaikhs of Qatar, had been in correspondence with the British representative in Bahrain, his object being to obtain British protection in return for an undertaking on his part to maintain maritime security near the coast and co-operate generally with the British Government. It was considered, however, in 1903, that the promise given by the Porte to abstain from disturbing the *status quo* in Qatar involved a corresponding obligation on the part of Britain not to enter into a fresh agreement with any Qatar Shaikh ; and the negotiations ended in nothing.

Affairs and foreign relations of Bahrain, 1899-1905.

The principal event in Bahrain affairs during the period was a rupture between the ruling Shaikh and the British Government, which various causes contributed to bring about.

Maladministration of the
Bahrain
customs.

In 1899 it was calculated that the trade of Bahrain had increased in less than ten years, under the fostering protection of Britain, by 40 per cent. ; but the Shaikh owing to mismanagement of the Bahrain customs, which he invariably farmed out to merchants, had benefited little by the prosperity of the port. He was strongly and repeatedly advised to adopt a better system but obstinately evaded doing so, and his pecuniary difficulties, by which the administration of his principality suffered more than he did personally, remained unrelieved.

Disorder
in Bahrain
and rupture
between the
Shaikh and
Britain.

This controversy somewhat disturbed the relations of the Shaikh with the British political representative in Bahrain ; but the open breach, which occurred in 1904, had nothing to do with the customs question. For some years the Shaikh had been on bad terms with one of his nephews, named 'Ali ; and the latter, of whom the Shaikh was really afraid, had taken to evil courses and began to trouble the public peace by his behaviour. At length, in September 1904, a serious aggression was committed by 'Ali on a German firm at Bahrain ; and in November a riot and general attack upon the Persians in Manāmah town occurred, for which his servants and dependents were responsible. The Shaikh was at once called to account for these outrages, and in the case of the German firm a satisfactory settlement was reached without serious difficulty or delay. But in the case of the Persians the course in which the Shaikh persisted showed that he had

no intention of doing them justice. Ultimately, on the 25th February 1905, the Shaikh was presented with an ultimatum, made effective by the presence of three British vessels of war, which required him to arrange for the infliction of certain punishments, the payment of certain compensation, and, among other matters, the surrender of 'Ali, for deportation by the British authorities. The Shaikh complied on the following day with most of the conditions; but 'Ali, whether with or without the Shaikh's connivance, had escaped to the mainland and was consequently not surrendered. The submission made by the Shaikh being regarded as sufficient, however, the incident was declared closed and official relations returned to a normal footing. A few months later 'Ali voluntarily came in and was removed to Bombay for a term of years.

After this crisis the relations of the Shaikh with the British Government, though his internal administration remained in many respects unsatisfactory, were very much better than they had been; and trade expanded in an extraordinary manner, attaining in 1905-06 the unheard of value of £3,000,000 sterling.

Improved relations of the Shaikh with Britain and prosperity of Bahrain.

An Assistant Political Agent, a European officer, was appointed to Bahrain in 1900, and in 1904 a Political Agent was substituted as the British representative.

Among foreign powers having relations with or interests in Bahrain, Turkey must — on account of her proximity, traditions, and claims to ownership — be given the first place. In 1900 Bedouins massacred on the mainland a member of the Bahrain ruling family and a number of persons who accompanied him. As the offenders were nominal Turkish subjects, the Shaikh of Bahrain's demands for satisfaction were ressed by the British Government on the attention of the Porte; but it soon became evident that the local Turkish authorities in Hasa could or would do nothing against the guilty Arab tribe to enforce a settlement; and eventually the case dropped. The Turkish Government, by way of reminding the British Government of their own pretensions to sovereignty over Bahrain, made frequent requests for information concerning the crisis between the Shaikh and Britain in 1904-05, and in the end it was intimated to them that discussion of the subject could not be continued by His Majesty's Government.

Turkey and Bahrain.

The Persian Government, while they concurred in the steps taken by the British authorities in Bahrain to obtain redress for their subjects injured in 1904-05, and even expressed gratitude, soon afterwards renewed their claims to possession of Bahrain. Arguments on the subject continued until after the close of the period at Tehrān, where the pretensions

Persia and Bahrain.

of Persia were firmly declared by His Britannic Majesty's Minister to be inadmissible, and where the principal argument used by the Persian Government was conclusively refuted.

German
interests in
Bahrain.

The only European power besides Britain possessed of fixed interests in Bahrain was Germany; and the only local representatives of her trade were a single German firm who began business there in 1901. The firm have been mentioned already in connection with the crisis of 1904-05, when satisfaction for the aggression committed on them was obtained by the British political authorities. Later, in 1905, when the German Vice-Consul at Būshehr sounded the Resident there on the subject of German representation in Bahrain, he said he understood that the foreign relations of Bahrain were in the hands of Britain and that direct communication between himself and the Shaikh was open to objection; in reply he was told that such were the facts, and that the good offices and, if necessary, the protection of the British Government would be extended to German subjects in Bahrain. Previously, in 1902, when the firm proposed to acquire premises in Bahrain, it had been held by the Government of India that the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 was no bar to their doing so; but it had been explained to the firm's manager, and also to the Shaikh of Bahrain, that no claim to extra-territorial rights or to the intervention of a non-British consular representative could be founded on the possession of immoveable property in Bahrain.

France and
Bahrain.

Visits of French merchants to Bahrain have already been mentioned above, but no political interest in the principality was ever shown by France. In 1904, apparently in connection with a project on the part of some French subjects of engaging in the pearl fisheries of the Gulf, the French Government enquired of His Majesty's Government whether Bahrain might be considered as included in the French Vice-Consular district of Būshehr; but the question seems to have remained unanswered, owing to its not having been pressed by the French Government.

Russia
and Bahrain.

Bahrain was not unvisited by Russian travellers, but it appeared to be regarded by the Russian Government with less solicitude than even Masqat. In October 1899 two Russian travellers were ascertained to be present in Bahrain and their stay was prolonged into the month of December. In May 1902 a Russian marine zoologist visited Bahrain, spent about a fortnight in collecting specimens there, and had an ordinary interview before his departure with the Shaikh to whom he had brought a letter of introduction from the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr. This traveller, whose name was M. Bogoyavlevski, appears to have been really a scientist without political interests: he also visited Kuwait. About a

year later the thanks of the Imperial Natural History Society of Moscow for the courtesy shown to their representative were conveyed to the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr, who probably welcomed the opportunity afforded of entering into friendly correspondence with the Shaikh.

Affairs and foreign relations of Central Arabia, 1899-1905.

Events in Central Arabia, which since the Turkish occupation of Hasa in 1871 had very little affected the course of Persian Gulf affairs, at length began to make their influence felt again in the Gulf.

About 1891 a great internal revolution had taken place in Central Arabia by which the whole of Najd had been brought into subjection to Ibn Rashīd, the northern or Shammar Amīr, not excluding even the territories of Ibn Sa'ūd, the southern or Wāhhābi Amīr, his former overlord. About 1900 the power of the Wāhhābi began to revive, and a struggle followed into which the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turkish Government were drawn, with perceptible and even conspicuous results on the coast of the Gulf itself. Early in 1901 the Shaikh of Kuwait joined Ibn Sa'ūd in an invasion of the debatable district of Qasīm, between Southern and Northern Najd, which the Wāhhābi Amīr was endeavouring to wrest from his Shammar rival. The invasion in the end failed; but the Shammar Amīr, alarmed by its partial success, sought help of the Porte, whose vassal he professed himself to be. He also applied to the British Government for protection. The Government of Turkey were in no wise loath to interfere, and they began by trying to intimidate the Shaikh of Kuwait into abandonment of Ibn Sa'ūd's cause and into submission to themselves; but their efforts were foiled by British support of the Shaikh. It was arranged that the Turks should restrain Ibn Rashīd from fighting with Ibn Sa'ūd on condition that the British Government on their part should oblige the Shaikh of Kuwait to remain quiet.

War between the Amirs of Southern and Northern Najd.

Meanwhile the Wāhhābi arms were making rapid progress in Najd, and by the end of March 1904 Ibn Sa'ūd had not only recovered his hereditary dominions proper but had also possessed himself of Qasīm. The Turks were then tempted into marching from Turkish 'Irāq to the assistance of Ibn Rashīd; but shortly after their arrival in Qasīm they were defeated by the Wāhhābis and retired northwards. Early in 1905 a Turkish force larger than the first penetrated from Turkish 'Irāq into the neighbourhood of Qasīm; and in the meantime it had been amicably arranged between the

Turkish invasion and short-lived pacific occupation of Qasīm.

Porte and Ibn Sa'ūd, in negotiations at Basrah, that each of the two Amīrs should in future govern his ancestral dominions as a vassal and official of the Sultān, while the intervening district of Qasīm should be occupied by Turkish troops with the free consent of all concerned and so brought under direct Turkish control. This scheme was actually carried into effect ; small Turkish garrisons were established in Qasīm ; and an imaginary partition of the country into Turkish administrative districts took place. But Ibn Sa'ūd, who was now much stronger than Ibn Rashīd, had no intention of allowing himself to be restrained by the Turks from further victories. After the end of the period with which we are concerned Ibn Rashīd fell in battle with the Wahhābis, and the Turkish pacific occupation of Qasīm, which depended on an exact balance of power between Northern and Southern Najd, came to an ignominious end.

The Amir of
Southern
Najd and
the Trucial
Shaikhs.

In the summer of 1905, while the Wahhābis, probably impressed to some extent by the Turkish annexation of Qasīm, were militarily inactive, the son of their Amīr appeared in the deserts of Hasa and Qatar and wrote thence to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to apprise them of his intention of visiting their country in the following year. His letters seemed to reawaken a danger that had lain dormant for fully a generation, and there was some consternation among the Trucial Shaikhs ; but remonstrances were addressed to him indirectly through the Shaikh of Kuwait, and no action followed his correspondence.

Britain and
Central
Arabia.

Chiefly through their effects at Kuwait, the stirring changes in Central Arabia drew the attention of the Government of India to Najd for the first time in many years, and there was some renewal of the occasional intercourse with that country which had taken place in earlier times. In 1901 it was proposed to send Muhammadan agents from India to Central Arabia to study the conditions prevailing there ; but the time was held to be inopportune. In the following year Ibn Sa'ūd attempted to enter into correspondence with the British authorities, but his advances met with no encouragement. In 1904, for reasons of policy at Kuwait, the British Government requested the Porte not to send the Shammar Amīr against the Wahhābis ; but their dissuasion was ignored. Ibn Sa'ūd again sought British protection, and the idea of sending a British officer to the Wahhābi capital to discuss the situation with Ibn Sa'ūd himself was considered, but only to be rejected, for His Majesty's Government saw clearly how undesirable it was that they should be involved in any degree in Central Arabian politics.

No other European power showed the slightest interest in the affairs of Najd, if we except Russia, whose Consul-General at Būshehr had an

interview with a son of the Wahhābi Amīr at Kuwait during a visit to that port in 1903.

Affairs and foreign relations of Kuwait, 1899-1905.

As has already been explained, the principality of Kuwait was brought within the political purview of Britain by the prospect of its becoming the terminus of a railway from the Mediterranean. During the period under consideration the importance of Kuwait to the British Government was still the same; and eagerness to make themselves masters of the place, which may or may not have been due to its value for railway purposes, began to be evinced by the Turks. At the beginning of 1899 Shaikh Mubārak, the ruler of Kuwait, signed an Exclusive Agreement which debarred him in the same manner as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān were debarred) from receiving representatives of foreign powers other than Britain, and also (like the Sultān of 'Omān) from alienating any part of his territory to foreign governments or subjects without the previous approval of Britain. He received in return a written assurance of the continued exercise, on certain conditions, of British good offices in his favour. Both documents were so drawn up as to bind, and apply to, the Shaikh's heirs and successors as well as himself.

Exclusive
Agreement of
the Shaikh
with Britain.

The Agreement, which was in the first instance secret, had no sooner been concluded than the Turks endeavoured to assert their authority over Kuwait by various means. One expedient was the despatch of a harbour master from Basrah with a small military guard to take charge of the port of Kuwait, but the Shaikh did not suffer him to remain in the place. There was talk of forcible Turkish action against Kuwait, and a strong warning was addressed to the Porte through His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, which elicited an ample disclaimer, accompanied, however, by assertions that Kuwait belonged to Turkey. A few months later, in 1900, the Turkish Government were given to understand in unmistakeable terms that Britain could not consent to any alterations of the *status quo*, or cession of territory to foreigners, at Kuwait. In 1901, after the Shaikh's return from his unsuccessful expedition into Najd, the Turkish Wāli of Basrah visited Kuwait and endeavoured to cajole the dispirited ruler into accepting a Turkish garrison at Kuwait; but Mubārak had sufficient firmness of mind left to refuse. The attempt was renewed later in the year through the commander of a Turkish gunboat, but again it failed, a British

Threatened
Turkish
aggressions
on Kuwait.

vessel being present in the harbour ; and the Porte and the British Government then mutually agreed that the *status quo* at Kuwait should be respected. Before the end of the year, in disregard of this agreement, an attempt was made by the Turks, by means of an ultimatum, to compel the Shaikh to receive their troops. This time the Shaikh wavered, but in the end, supported by the presence of British vessels of war, returned a negative reply. The Porte then asserted that the ultimatum had not been authorised by themselves ; but a few weeks later there were various indications that a combined attack upon Kuwait by the Turks and Ibn Rashīd was imminent. Ibn Rashīd had already, for some time, been threatening the place from a distance. A British naval force of five vessels was accordingly concentrated in Kuwait Bay, and arrangements were made to assist the Shaikh, both on sea and land, to repel the expected assault. This crisis, which happened at the beginning of the year 1902, passed harmlessly over.

Turkish encroachments on Kuwait territory.

Foiled in their design of seizing Kuwait town, the Turks resorted to piecemeal encroachments on Kuwait territory. Early in 1902 they established military posts at Safwān and Umm Qasr and on Būbiyān Island, their object being clearly to secure possession of Khor 'Abdullah and its branches ; nor could their withdrawal from these places be obtained. In the summer of 1902 arrangements were made at a base in Turkish territory for a piratical descent on the town of Kuwait from the sea, but they were divulged, and the vessels of the expedition were scattered by a British gunboat at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab. In the winter of 1902-03 a demonstration was made against Kuwait by Ibn Rashīd, after which external alarms ceased ; but the Shaikh had still to endure various persecutions at the hands of the Turks which his ownership of large estates in Turkish 'Irāq enabled them to inflict on him.

Appointment of a British political officer to Kuwait.

In 1904, after a visit paid by the Viceroy of India to Kuwait at the end of 1903, it was decided to appoint a British political officer to Kuwait to watch Kuwait and Turkish and Central Arabian affairs, but, in consequence of a complaint by the Porte that the creation of this post amounted to a violation by Britain of the *status quo*, it was, after the lapse of some months, left temporarily vacant.

German interest in Kuwait.

It should be observed that Germany, on account of her railway schemes, took almost as close an interest as Turkey in Kuwait. The visit of a German railway commission to Kuwait early in 1900 was the occasion of one of the warnings addressed by Britain to Turkey in regard to interference with the Shaikh ; and the German Ambassador at Constantinople was plainly informed, at the same time, that the Shaikh was not free to grant lands to the Baghdād Railway Company without the permission of the

British Government. Again in 1901 a German diplomatic protest was made in London, in support of one by Turkey, on the subject of British intervention in Kuwait. The shifting of the focus of interest in Kuwaito-Turkish relations in 1902 from Kuwait Bay to Khor 'Abdullah may plausibly be ascribed to changed advice given by Germany to Turkey in regard to the site of the Gulf terminus of the railway.

At the opening of the period the Russian Government were believed to entertain designs of establishing a port at Kuwait, and early in 1899 several Armenians of Russian nationality were sent to Kuwait by the Russian Consul at Baghdād, who seemed to be the chosen instrument of Russian policy in this part of the world. A month later M. Krouglow visited Kuwait himself in the "Gilyak" and interviewed the Shaikh, but the door had already been closed to foreign political enterprise at Kuwait by the Shaikh's Exclusive Agreement with Britain; and the Persian side of the Gulf after this claimed most of Russia's attention. During the crisis between himself and the Turkish authorities in 1901, the Shaikh of Kuwait communicated with the Russian representative at Baghdād, to what effect is not known; and at the end of the year the Russian man-of-war "Varyag" visited Kuwait. Her help was offered to the Shaikh for the purpose of maintaining his independence, which was then still threatened, but it was not accepted. In 1902 the Russian Vice-Consul at Būshehr came to Kuwait in the Russian war vessel "Askold;" and in 1903, when the Russian cruiser "Boyarin" and the French cruiser "Infernet" visited the port in company, the Russian Consul-General was on board the former; but the interest of Russia in Kuwait had by that time become platonic.

Russian
interest in
Kuwait.

Affairs and foreign relations of Turkish 'Irāq, 1899-1905.

Affairs in Turkish 'Irāq have been anticipated in dealing with the internal affairs of Turkey above, and the foreign relations of the province were confined to commercial and ordinary matters.

Consular representation underwent some expansion, the most important changes being made, among foreign nations, by Russia, who in 1899 established a Vice-Consulate at Basrah, charged with the protection of French as well as of Russian interests, and in 1901 raised the status of the Russian post at Baghdād to that of a Consulate-General. British representation was strengthened also, but for independent reasons, not by way of rejoini-

Increased
attention of
European
powers to
Turkish
'Irāq.

der. In 1903 a British Vice-Consul was substituted for the British Consular Agent at Karbala; and in 1905 an Assistant for Trade and Commerce was added to the staff of the Political Resident at Baghdād. In 1905 a new Residency built and owned by the British Government, came under occupation by the British establishments at Baghdād.

Affairs and foreign relations of 'Arabistān, 1899-1905.

Some of the events of the period in 'Arabistān have already been described in relating the internal history of Persia, and it only remains to notice those which were specially connected with external politics.

The Shaikh
and the
Imperial
Persian
Customs.

Interest centred chiefly in an effort made by the central Persian Government, possibly at Russian instigation, to reduce the power of the Shaikh of Muhammāreh,—a design which was frustrated principally through support lent by the British Government to the Shaikh. In 1900 it became known that the Shāh's Government intended to place the customs of 'Arabistān, hitherto farmed to the Shaikh, under the direct administration of the reorganised Customs Department; and the Shaikh was greatly alarmed at the prospect, mostly because of the further inroads on his executive authority which it seemed to him to portend. In 1901 the transfer of the customs was actually ordered, but Shaikh Khaz'al was successful in obtaining a respite and sent an agent to Tehrān to negotiate there on his behalf in consultation with British Legation. At length an arrangement was effected whereby the Shaikh retained the nominal headship of the customs, while their technical administration was placed in Belgian hands, and various financial advantages and the continuance of certain traditional immunities enjoyed by the Shaikh and his subjects in regard to customs were conceded to him. In 1903 and 1904 the Persian Government showed a tendency to encroach on the position which they had granted to the Shaikh with reference to the Customs; but the Shaikh, with British diplomatic encouragement, successfully opposed their moves.

British
support of
the Shaikh
against
Russia and
the central
Persian
Government.

The customs question was only one aspect of a larger one,—that of the Shaikh's political position *via à vis* of the central Government; and it was in the wider field of conflict that he benefited most by British support. At the end of 1902, in view of the aggressive action of Tehrān, His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia was authorised to inform the Shaikh, who was much dismayed by threatened Russian interference in the case, that the

British Government would protect Muhammareh from naval attack by a foreign power, and would afford him their general good offices and support, so long as he continued loyal to the Shāh's Government and conformed to such advice as might be given him by Britain. The British Minister also entered into communication with the Persian Government on the subject of Southern 'Arabistān and intimated to them that Britain, while she fully recognised the sovereignty of Persia over Muhammareh and its dependencies, could not regard with indifference any political changes there which might prejudicially affect British interests or afford foreign powers an opportunity of interfering in local affairs. A satisfactory reply was received, at the beginning of 1903, from the Persian Government; and a little later the favourable arrangements arrived at in regard to the 'Arabistān customs was made public, the Shaikh's chief anxiety being at the same time set at rest by a formal grant to him and his subjects from the Shāh, in proprietary right, of the districts of Muhammareh, Fallāhiyeh and Hindiyān, of which he had feared that he and they might be arbitrarily deprived by the Government. Renewed apprehensions on the part of the Shaikh were relieved at the end of 1903 by fresh assurances from His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia, who had then lately visited Muhammareh.

The attitude of Russia during the contest, thus happily concluded, had been consistently adverse to the Shaikh. In 1899, not long after the visit of the "Gilyak" to the Shatt-al-'Arab, the Russian Consul-General at Isfahān had come to Muhammareh and endeavoured to intimidate the Shaikh, whom he informed that Russia was about to acquire a port in the Persian Gulf and would enter into political competition with Britain in that part of the world. In 1902 the Russian representative at Tehrān had actively supported the displacement of the Shaikh by the Belgian customs administration, and during the progress of the negotiations at the capital the Shaikh's agent there had been bullied by the Russians to such an extent as to cause fears of his master's succumbing entirely to Russian influence,—a prospect which was the immediate reason of the important assurance given by Britain at the close of that year. A Russian Consular Agent was appointed in 'Arabistān in 1902 in the person of a Dutch merchant at Nāsiri (Ahwāz). In 1904 Russian travellers made a tour in Southern 'Arabistān, a Russian decoration was conferred on the Shaikh through the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr, and a Russian trade commissioner visited Muhammareh and the Kārūn; but Russian policy in 'Arabistān had by this time been decisively checked.

Russian
policy in
Arabistān.

The Shaikh's relations with Turkey, in which country he had great possessions on the western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, were characterised by dignity and reserve; they were not entirely friendly.

The Shaikh
and Turkey.

British
commercial
interests in
'Arabistān.

The principal British interests in 'Arabistān were still, as in the past, those represented by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and Messrs. Lynch. There was a continuance of vexatious opposition to British steam navigation and of arbitrary grain embargoes. The British subsidy of the Company was renewed, on the expiration of the period for which it was granted, in 1899 ; but the Government of India decided to contribute to it for only one year longer, their decision being dictated by principles in regard to a division of financial burdens in the Middle East between themselves and Her Majesty's Government, not by any doubt of the importance of British interests on the Kārūn. In 1902 the Persian Government, to the detriment of British trade, closed custom houses which existed at Nāsiri and Shūshtar and insisted on the payment of all duties at Muhammareh ; but in 1903 they were persuaded to reconsider and reverse this step.

At the end of 1899 the road connecting Ahwāz with Isfahān *viâ* the Bakhtiyāri country, work on which had been begun during the last period, was opened for traffic and materially facilitated trade. In 1904 efforts were made to arrange for the opening of the Khurramābād-Ahwāz road, a concession for which was held by a British corporation ; but they were brought to a standstill by an attack in the Dīrakwand Lur country upon two British officers engaged in studying on the spot the political conditions of the enterprise.

In 1905 arrangements were concluded between an important British Oil Company and the Bakhtiyāri Khāns for the exploitation, on the borders of Northern 'Arabistān, of a concession which the former had obtained for working mineral oil in Persia.

Question of
Kārūn
irrigation.

In 1903-04 the question of irrigating a portion of 'Arabistān from the Kārūn, of which nothing had been heard for some years, was resuscitated by a Dutch engineer. It was followed with close attention by the British authorities who foresaw that, if the scheme were carried out under foreign auspices, it might put an end to British navigation on the Kārūn without any compensating advantage to British interests ; and eventually in 1905 it was investigated on the ground by a British irrigation engineer from India, who found it to be unpractical, and who was charged with the preparation of a more satisfactory project in case one should be required.

British
official
matters in
'Arabistān.

The visit of the British Minister in Persia to 'Arabistān in 1903 has already been mentioned ; another, to Northern 'Arabistān only, had been paid by his predecessor in 1899. In 1904, to meet a need for improved British representation in the country, the British Vice-Consulate at Muhammareh was made a Consulate, and a British Vice-Consul for

Northern 'Arabistān, to whom an Indian military escort was allowed, was appointed to Nāsiri (Ahwāz).

Affairs and foreign relations of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1899-1905.

The history of the period in the Persian Coast and Islands has already been noticed, in more than one of its aspects, in what precedes. Only a few matters of external interest connected with it remain to be mentioned.

Russian attention was for some time directed to the lower part of the Persian coast and its islands. In September 1900 M. Siromiatnikoff, whose commercial mission will engage attention later on, arrived at Bandar 'Abbās in a native boat from Lingeh along with some other Russians and asked to see the coal left behind by the "Gilyak," but the Persian Deputy-Governor feigned to be ignorant of its existence. The coal remained in the same place until 1904, notwithstanding a proposal for its removal by the Belgian Director of Customs, and it was locally regarded as being still Russian property.

Russian
movements
on the
Persian
Coast.

On the 26th of December 1901 the Russian cruiser "Varyag," on return from her cruise in the Persian Gulf, called at Lingeh and exchanged salutes with the Persian battery ; on the 27th the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr, who was on board, disembarked and inspected the town and its environs ; and on the same evening the "Varyag" left again for Bandar 'Abbās. At Bandar 'Abbās salutes and official visits were exchanged and the public were freely admitted to the ship. On the last day of the year the "Varyag" left Bandar 'Abbās for Karachi, but the Russian Consul-General remained behind and occupied himself in visiting Qishm and in collecting information at the Bandar 'Abbās custom house until the arrival of the up-mail enabled him to return to Būshehr.

In February 1902 a Russian, M. Ritman, who appeared to be a military officer, arrived at Lingeh from Būshehr, having apparently made the journey between the two places by land ; from Lingeh he proceeded to Bandar 'Abbās, visiting Bāsīdu, Lāft and Qishm town on the way, and on the 19th of March he left Bandar 'Abbās for Kirmān. In March 1903 the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr again visited Lingeh, this time in the Russian cruiser "Boyarin," and made enquiries about the representation of the British Government at Bāsīdu and the flying of the British flag there.

British cases
and interests
on the
Persian
Coast.

Claims for compensation on the part of British subjects and British protected persons had been accumulating for a number of years when, in 1900, an attempt was made to bring them to a settlement. Including some which had arisen in 'Arabistān and Persian Makrān as well as in the Persian Coast and Islands, more than a hundred claims were found to exist, and their aggregate value was between £25,000 and £30,000. Proceedings between the British and Persian authorities continued until 1905, but no progress was made towards a settlement, the reason being the adoption of dilatory tactics by the Persian Government.

Careful supervision was exercised by the British authorities over the affairs of the British coal station and settlement at Bāsīdu, which was to some extent utilised as an asylum by refugees from Persian territory; and in 1904 the island of Hanjām was re-occupied, ostensibly for telegraphic but really for political reasons, with the result that in the following year the Persian authorities took steps, which the Arab inhabitants at first found alarming and seemed inclined to resist, for strengthening their position there. In 1905 a serious demonstration was made by a mob against the British Agency at Lingeh, but satisfactory reparation was obtained.

Foreign and
British
consular
represent-
ation on the
Persian
Coast.

Foreign activity on the Persian Coast was manifested chiefly in the creation of new consular posts. In 1901 a Russian Consulate-General was instituted at Būshehr; and in 1904 a Russian Consular Agency, subsequently raised to the rank of a Consulate, was opened at Bandar 'Abbās. The French Vice-Consulate founded at Būshehr in 1889 was still maintained, as was also a German Vice-Consulate which had existed there since 1897. In 1905 there was a Consular Agency at Lingeh which represented both Russia and France; as a French institution it dated from 1899, when an attempt had been made at Lingeh to promote the use by native vessels of the French flag.

There was a corresponding expansion of British political representation, necessitated chiefly by the activity of foreign powers. In 1900 a British Vice-Consul (and Assistant to the Resident) was appointed at Bandar 'Abbās; and in 1904 the post there was made a Consulate and its consular district extended, certain tracts on the Arabian side of the Gulf being at the same time placed under the political supervision of the incumbent. In 1903 a British Consulate was established at Shīrāz under a European officer. In 1904 consular status was conferred on certain members of the British Residency staff at Būshehr; a Commercial Assistant was at the same time added; and in 1905 the Resident was provided with a Second Assistant.

Affairs and foreign relations of Persian Makrān, 1899-1905.

Even Persian Makrān was affected by the political activity of the period. In 1900 a Russian, described in the Russian press as a professor of natural science in the College of the Cadet Corps at Moscow, an individual whose scientific curiosity invariably carried him to fields of political interest and who had already visited Bampūr and Persian Balūchistān in 1898, attempted to penetrate from Sistān into British Balūchistān, but did not succeed. After 1900 Chahbār became a principal objective of Russian railway policy in Persia; and in 1904 the Russian representative at Lingeh was engaged in enquiries regarding the customs of Gwādur.

Russian
designs in
Persian
Makrān.

A British Vice-Consulate was established at Bam in 1905, but was not long maintained. Some progress was made in Persian Makrān during this period, at meetings between British and Persian officials, in the settlement of numerous claims of British subjects to compensation for injuries and crimes against them. The proceedings held in the years 1904 and 1905 were the most satisfactory.

British
affairs in
Persian
Makrān.

British response to the activity of foreign powers in the Persian Gulf region, 1899-1905.

From what has gone before it will be clear that in 1899-1900 the predominance of Britain in the Persian Gulf, between which and the security of British India an intimate connection existed, was seriously threatened by the policy of foreign powers, especially by that of Russia, France, and Germany. The naval designs of Russia in the Persian Gulf and her railway schemes in Persia, the French project of a naval base in the Gulf of 'Omān, and the powers acquired by Germany for constructing a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf were all circumstances of serious import, though the full significance of the last was not as yet generally realised. To guard against the possible consequences to herself of these developments Britain had recourse to precautions, some of a diplomatic or parliamentary, some of a naval or military order, which we now proceed to describe.

The first diplomatic measure taken by His Britannic Majesty's Government was the delivery to the Persian Government in April 1900 of a reminder concerning the priority of British railway rights in Southern Persia under the Shāh's assurance* of 1889; it was prompted by the

Railway
rights in
Southern
Persia.

* *Vide* page 2036, *post*.

assembling at Tehrān of the Russian survey mission which in 1900 overran the whole of Southern Persia, headed by an official who in the Russian press was described as "Director of Persian Railways." In carrying out the instructions of Her Majesty's Government the British representative at Tehrān forwarded to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of the autograph letter of the late Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh to which his reminder referred; a translation of that document will be found elsewhere in this Gazetteer. The authenticity of the promise was readily admitted by both the Sadr-i-A'zam and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was not possible, in consequence of the weak health at the time of the reigning Shāh, that the British representative at Tehrān should bring the question personally to His Persian Majesty's notice; but various steps were taken to ensure that he should be made aware of the existence of the document, and they were such that in the end no doubt remained that Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh had both seen it and admitted its binding force. The Russian Minister at Tehrān also, in conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires, stated that he was aware of the Shāh's promise regarding railways in the south. If the Russians were at that time inclined to attempt a practical encroachment on the railway rights of Great Britain in Southern Persia, the production of Nāsir-ud-Dīn's written promise and its recognition by his son and successor may have operated as a deterrent, and may have been the cause of their ultimately taking no action.

Control of
the Customs
of Southern
Persia.

The second British diplomatic measure related to the control of the customs of Southern Persia, upon which there was a danger that Russia might establish some lien. Discussion of the subject began in 1899 on the basis of a pledge given by Persia to Britain in 1897 that the Southern Customs would never be placed under foreign supervision or control. It was prolonged until 1904 when the Persian Government with apparent reluctance at length admitted that in pledging part of their customs revenue as security for Russian loans in 1900 and 1902 they had not consciously contravened the guarantee of 1897 in any particular. The British Government in taking note of this admission, which they did not regard as satisfactory, officially informed the Shāh's Ministers that the assurance of 1897 must still be considered as valid, and that in the event of any attempt on the part of Persia to ignore the rights of Britain thereunder, the necessary steps would be taken by the British Government to ensure that they were respected. The firm attitude which the British Government maintained throughout the long controversy on this question had undoubtedly a salutary effect; and it is not impossible that, if that attitude had been less inflexible, some alienation of the Southern Customs, including those of the Gulf, might actually have occurred in favour of

Russia or of Russian creditors of Persia. In the result the customs of "Fārs and of the Persian Gulf" were specifically excluded from those pledged as security for the Russian loans, and the question which remained was that of the precise meaning of the phrase "Fārs and the Persian Gulf,"—an expression which His Majesty's Government contended must, under the guarantee of 1897, be regarded as synonymous with "Southern Persia" and as including Muhammāreh.

A third British diplomatic measure, already referred to above, was the signing of a Trade Declaration between Britain and Persia early in 1903, whereby the new Persian tariff secretly arranged between Russia and Persia in 1901 was made inalterable without British consent. This step prevented the continuance of a procedure which might otherwise have been maintained to the increasing disadvantage of British trade.

Anglo-Persian
Trade
Declaration.

The fourth measure was of a parliamentary character. It consisted in an announcement made on the 5th May 1903 by Lord Lansdowne, speaking as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in reply to a question by Lord Lamington. The passage referring to the Persian Gulf was reported as follows in the "Times" of the 6th of May:—

Exposition in
Parliament
of the
British
policy in the
Persian Gulf
combined
with a
warning to
European
powers.

I now pass to the closely-connected subject of the Persian Gulf. I feel sure that the noble lord's interest in the Baghdād railway scheme was because he felt it did closely affect our interest in the Persian Gulf. I do not yield to the noble lord in the interest which I take in the Persian Gulf, or in the feeling that this country stands with regard to the navigation of the Persian Gulf in a position different from that of any other Power. The noble lord told your lordships with absolute truth that it was owing to British enterprise, to the expenditure of British lives and money, that the Persian Gulf is at this moment open to the navigation of the world. It was our ships that cleared those waters of pirates; it was we who put down the slave trade; it was we who buoyed and beaconed those intricate waters. Well, at this moment, out of a total trade in the Gulf ports of £3,600,000—the figures are those for 1901; we have none later—£2,300,000 represents the commerce of this country; so that it is clear that, up to the present, at all events, we have succeeded in preserving a liberal share of that commerce. But there is no doubt that in the Gulf, as in other parts of Persia, we are feeling very keenly the competition of other Powers. That, I am afraid, is our fate not only in Persian waters; nor can we expect, because we have been in the development of commerce throughout the world the pioneers of that form of civilisation, that we shall always be able to maintain the position of superiority which we at first enjoyed. The noble lord asked me for a statement of our policy with regard to the Persian Gulf. I think I can give him one in a few simple words. It seems to me that our policy should be directed in the first place to protect and promote British trade in these waters. In the next place I do not think that he suggests, or that we should suggest, that these efforts should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other Powers. (Hear, Hear.) In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with

all the means at our disposal. (Cheers.) I say that in no minatory spirit, because, so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf. I at least have heard of none; and I cannot help thinking that the noble lord waxed almost unnecessarily warm at the idea of such a foreign intrusion, with which, so far as I am aware, we are not at present threatened.

More than a year before, at an informal interview which he had on the 19th of March 1902 with the French Ambassador in London, Lord Lansdowne had remarked with reference to the Persian Gulf that Great Britain "entertained the strongest objection to, and would certainly oppose, any attempt on the part of other Powers to create strategical bases or fortified harbours in those waters;" and his statement of the 5th May 1903 was therefore the expression, not of sudden resolve, but of the deliberate and fixed policy of His Majesty's Government. The statement did not escape notice in the quarter to which, doubtless, it was principally addressed. On the 6th of May the Russian Ambassador remarked to Lord Lansdowne that he had read it with interest, and that he saw nothing in it to which exception could be taken. He added that Lord Lansdowne probably had Russia in his mind when he spoke, but that Russia had no idea of establishing a naval base in the Persian Gulf.

Selection of British naval bases in the Persian Gulf in view of possible contingencies, and connected matters.

The apparent intention of the Russian Government in 1899 to establish a naval station in the Persian Gulf together with the proceedings of the French in regard to Bandar Jissah in the same year, obliged the British Government to consider what counteractive measures would be required in case of a Russian, or of a combined Russian and French, scheme being carried into effect.

To enter in detail on the inquiries which were held, on the discussions which followed, or on the decisions which were finally reached would be inexpedient; suffice it to say that the attention of the British Government was directed to harbours, anchorages and land positions near the entrance of the Gulf, and especially to certain points on the islands opposite Bandar 'Abbās and on the Ruūs-al-Jibāl promontory, between which lie the Straits of Hormūz. In 1902 the situation was considered in its strategical bearings at a conference between representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office and India Office in London; and at a later date the military policy of His Majesty's Government was finally laid down by the Committee of Imperial Defence. We shall confine ourselves to describing some more or less overt naval precautions which were taken, chiefly through the agency of the Government of India, between the years 1900 and 1905.

In 1900 preliminary reports upon a number of the principal harbours and anchorages of the Gulf were submitted by Commander H. A. Phillipps, R.N., Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and were duly considered by the Admiralty and India Office. In 1903 a survey was made of the whole Persian coast of the Gulf and of a part of the coast of Persian Makrān; it was conducted by commander H. B. T. Somerville, R.N., specially deputed from England for the duty, in conjunction with commander T. W. Kemp, R.N., Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf. The object of the survey was to ascertain the points offering the greatest advantages for the establishment of a defended port on the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf by a foreign power strong upon land; and special notice was given to the facilities that existed at each place for connecting the port, when established, by rail with the interior of Persia. At the end of 1903, during the tour of His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, in the Persian Gulf, much time and attention were devoted by the Viceroy in person and by Rear Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, the Naval Commander-in-Chief who accompanied him, to the study of the strategical problem upon the spot; remarks on the places visited were embodied by the Admiral in a report; and early in 1904 the views of the Government of India were placed before His Majesty's Government in a special despatch. These proceedings related particularly to the defensive measures which it might be necessary to take at the mouth of the Gulf; but in the course of the cruise Khor Mūsa and Khor 'Abdullah, which were important for reasons of a different order, were visited, and subsequently formed the subjects of separate despatches addressed by the Government of India to his Majesty's Government. Khor Mūsa had been roughly surveyed by H. M. S. "Sphinx" in May 1903, and Khor 'Abdullah was similarly surveyed by the same vessel in July of the next year—without landing of shore parties, but not without protests on the part of the Turkish Government. A more exact survey of Khor 'Abdullah, proposed by His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief in 1904 and sanctioned by His Majesty's Government in the same year, was placed on the programme of the Royal Indian Marine Surveying Ship "Investigator" for 1905-06.

A survey less important, but political rather than commercial in motive, was one of the waters between Bahrain, Hasa and Qatar which was made by the "Investigator" in 1901-02. In the course of the operations poles were erected on the mainland and a party landed to connect the triangulation with that of Bahrain,—proceedings which came to the knowledge of the Porte and which provoked remonstrances on their part.

The British
station of
Bāsīdu.

Interest in the British settlement of Bāsīdu on Qishm Island was revived by the situation which now existed. Enquiry in 1901 showed that the relics of former British military and naval occupation comprised the remains of two double-storeyed dwelling-houses, an Assistant Surgeon's house, the house and store-room of a contractor, a workshop, a small barrack, a small caravanserai, a cemetery, and three water-tanks; but all of these were in bad repair, and all the buildings, except one of the dwelling-houses, were unrepairable. The Coal Agent in charge of the British flag-staff and flag and his assistant were found to be occupying quarters of their own in the neighbourhood which were not the property of Government. It was decided that, as the Government buildings were not required, no attempt should be made to repair them. In order, however, to emphasize the British position at Bāsīdu it was ordered that the flag, which hitherto it had been customary to hoist only on Sundays, on holidays, and on the arrival of a ship, should be flown in future every day from sunrise to sunset.

In 1902 the extent of the British station at Bāsīdu was investigated, and it appeared that the limits had never been defined. The adjoining villages of Singau and Old Bāsīdu (the former uninhabited since 1883, the latter known also by the alternative name of Nakhlistān) had at one time, it was believed, formed part of the British station; but they had at a later period come to be regarded as situated outside—Singau since 1864, and Old Basidu since 1874 at least—and taxes had been collected at both by the Persian Zabīṭ of Qishm. The Government of India, on consideration of the evidence, directed that Singau should be treated as included in, and Old Basidu—where revenue was still taken by the Persian authorities—as excluded from, the British station; they suggested however to the Secretary of State for India that it was possible, and might be advisable, to claim for the British station the same limits as had belonged to the earlier Portuguese settlement, which apparently included Nakhlistān and Qal'eh Hāji Karīm.

In 1901 attention was directed to a channel which leads from the open sea to Bāsīdu along the southern and western coasts of Qishm and which, it was thought, might be found deeper and more convenient for steam vessels than the ordinary direct approach. A survey of this channel was accordingly ordered, but want of time prevented its execution in the season 1901-02, and, though it was examined by the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Lawrence," and traversed by Lord Curzon in 1903, it was not included in the survey programme of 1904-05. Eventually it was arranged that, unless more important work interfered, it should be carried out in the cold weather of 1905-06.

The possibility of immigration into Bāsīdu, especially from Lingeh where the régime of the Imperial Persian Customs was now pressing heavily upon trade, began in 1902 to demand consideration. A merchant of Qishm town, agent for a Hindu rice-exporting firm at Calcutta, applied for permission to land 10,000 bags of rice at Bāsīdu and build a godown near the landing place; and similar enquiries, made from time to time by inhabitants of Lingeh and others, some of which are mentioned in the history of the coast of Fārs, indicated that Bāsīdu, if the British Government were prepared to countenance the scheme, might possibly develop into a customs-free trade distributing centre of considerable importance. The opinion of a meeting of representatives of the Admiralty and India and Foreign Offices, held in London in July 1902 to consider questions connected with Bāsīdu and other places, was, however, adverse to the encouragement of immigration on account of the political complications which it might entail. Orders had already been issued by Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and had been confirmed by the Government of India, that British subjects should not be prevented from settling at Bāsīdu if they wished to do so, but that any buildings erected by them should be temporary only, and that the sites should be allotted by the Resident. In May 1905 the Government of India further directed that the immigration of non-British settlers should be discouraged so far as possible, and that the Resident should keep a watch upon the arrival of new settlers, British or foreign, who might erect huts or appear to be more than passing visitors. These instructions sufficed to prevent, if prevention was really required, an influx of merchants and others into Bāsīdu.

Bāsīdu was visited in April and May 1901 by a native official of the Persian Imperial Customs who stated that a Customs employé would shortly be posted at Old Bāsīdu for the prevention of the arms trade. No action followed his visits, but it was laid down by the Indian authorities that no Persian official should be allowed to reside in the British station without the express consent of the British Government.

M. Ritman's visit to Bāsīdu in 1902 and the enquiries of M. Paşsek in 1903 about the British position there have already been mentioned as evidences of Russian activity near the entrance of the Gulf.

In 1904 the British telegraph station on Hanjām Island, abandoned since 1880, was re-established; and an extension of telegraphic communication was arranged, partly by cable and partly by land line across Qishm Island, from Hanjām to Bandar 'Abbās. At one time it was proposed by the naval authorities to locate the new telegraph station at Bāsīdu, but Hanjām was ultimately preferred.

Re-occupa-
tion of
Hanjām as
a British
telegraph
station.

Britain and
the Ruūs-al-
Jibāl pro-
montory.

The attention of the British authorities was necessarily engaged, from an early stage of the strategical discussion, by the great inlets of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl headland. The question of practical measures was in this instance complicated by an uncertainty, not finally dispelled until 1905, as to the political status of the territories concerned and the action taken was in consequence not free from inconsistency.

The principal indentation in Ruūs-al-Jibāl is Khor-ash-Sham or Elphinstone Inlet, which opens into the peninsula from the Persian Gulf and is divided from Malcolm Inlet, a corresponding arm of the Gulf of 'Omān, only by a slender isthmus known as Maqlab. From 1864 until 1868, under the Masqat telegraph conventions of 1864 and 1865, a land line of the Indo-European Telegraph Department had traversed the isthmus of Maqlab and a British telegraph station had existed upon a small island in Khor-ash-Sham. In 1902 it was regarded by the Government of India as uncertain whether the Ruūs-al-Jibāl tract pertained to the Sultanate of Masqat or was connected with Trucial 'Omān, and whether its rude inhabitants, the Shihūh and Dhahūriyīn, were legally as well as virtually autonomous. If Ruūs-al-Jibāl were a part of the Sultān of 'Omān's dominions, it must be treated as subject to the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 and action by Great Britain inconsistent with that declaration must be avoided ; if, on the other hand, it belonged to one or more of the Trucial Shaikhs, or were completely independent, the British Government would be free to take such steps as they wished without risk of international complications.

The first recommendations of the Government of India, made in 1902, were compatible with all possible views as to the ownership of Ruūs-al-Jibāl. They were that Telegraph Islet in Khor-ash-Sham should be re-occupied, the British flag being hoisted and a Native Agent stationed there as at Bāsīdu, and that the strip of littoral from Dibah to Khor Kalba on the eastern side of the 'Omān promontory should be recognised by the British Government as a dependency of Shārjah, and therefore as subject to the agreements existing between the Shaikh of Shārjah and the British Government. Both recommendations were accepted by His Majesty's Government.

In 1904, shortly after Lord Curzon's cruise in the Persian Gulf and examination of the various inlets of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, the Government of India, who at this time inclined to the view that the district did not belong to the Sultān of 'Omān, suggested that, under arrangements with the neighbouring tribes, flagstaffs should be planted on the Maqlab isthmus and on Ghanam Island as well as on Telegraph Islet, the British flag being hoisted on them when required. The proposal was in the first instance

approved by His Majesty's Government, and the flagstaffs, consisting of tubular iron poles 38 feet in height, were erected by H. M. S. "Sphinx" in the positions selected for them on the 21st and 22nd of November 1904.

Early in 1905, however, in connection with the French flag arbitration proceedings at the Hague, fresh facts came to light which made it impossible to regard the Ruūs-al-Jibāl promontory otherwise than as a part of the Sultanate of 'Omān. This in itself might not have necessitated the abandonment of the new flagstaffs, but a further difficulty had arisen at the end of 1904 in regard to the pattern of flag to be flown; and the Admiralty, influenced chiefly by the consideration that the protection of the flags would devolve on the Royal Navy; and that their presence, unaccompanied by the proclamation of a protectorate or by formal annexation, would not avail to prevent foreign powers from hoisting similar flags in adjoining positions, opposed the retention of the flagstaffs. Meanwhile the erection of the staffs, though carried out with all possible secrecy, had not escaped notice, and an article referring to that on Ghanam Island,—probably from the pen of M. Goguyer at Masqat,—appeared in the "Ahrām," an Arabic newspaper at Cairo, on the 21st June 1905. The removal of the flagstaffs was decided on, but was deferred until the conclusion of the proceedings at the Hague; it was eventually carried out in part on the 18th October 1905 by the telegraph steamer "Patrick Stewart." The staff on Ghanam Island was found intact, but that on Maqlab had been thrown down and stripped of its fittings by the Arabs of the neighbourhood. The staff on Telegraph Islet was left *in situ* pending further consideration of the question.

In 1904 it was proposed by the Government of India to establish a light-house, partly in the interests of navigation and partly in order to strengthen the political position of Britain in the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district, either upon the extremity of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl promontory or upon one of the three islands known as the Quoins (Salāmah wa Bināt-ha). Preparations were even made for proceeding with the work; but in consequence, it would seem, of the altered views of the British Government as to the ownership of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, the scheme was not pursued, though it was still strongly advocated by shipping interests in the Gulf.

British light-house scheme.

British naval demonstrations.

An effective rejoinder to Russian and French displays of naval force was made on various occasions, at the instance of the Government of India, by the despatch of British vessels of superior strength to the Gulf;

and the tour of Lord Curzon, as Viceroy of India, at the end of 1903, constituted a demonstration of power and splendour which no foreign nation could hope to rival in Persian Gulf waters.

In 1901 H. M. S. "Highflyer," the flagship of Rear-Admiral Bosanquet, commanding the East India Squadron, made a cruise in the Gulf, visiting Sūr, Masqat, Būshehr, and Bandar 'Abbās; she was the largest ship and carried the heaviest guns yet seen in the Gulf.

The cruise of the Russian "Varyag" in December 1901 was answered by a visit from H.M.S. "Amphitrite," Captain Windham, a first-class cruiser of 11,000 tons, which was diverted to the Persian Gulf on her way from England to China. The "Amphitrite," which arrived at Aden on the 1st of June 1902, anchored in Rīsūt bay on the evening of the 4th June and made use of her electric lights after dark; on the 5th of June she coasted along the district of Dhufār and halted for the night off one of the Kuria Muria islands; on the 6th she stopped off Rās Madrasah and landed a party for musketry practice. On the 8th of June the "Amphitrite" arrived at Masqat and saluted the Sultān's flag with 21 guns, and on the following day a visit was paid by her officers to the Sultān. On the 10th the Sultān made a return visit and was shown heavy gun practice at sea outside the harbour; the firing was good and he was greatly impressed. Some of the inhabitants of Masqat were allowed to come on board and were shown over the ship. The same afternoon, after landing the Sultān, the "Amphitrite" proceeded to Sūr carrying Major Cox, the Political Agent at Masqat, who remained on board during the rest of the tour. From Sūr the "Amphitrite" returned to Masqat, touched at Sīb and Barkah, and on the 13th of June reached Bandar 'Abbās; the following day a salute of 21 guns was fired and visits were exchanged with the Persian Deputy-Governor of the place. On the night of the 14th the "Amphitrite" anchored off Hanjām, and on the 17th she reached Būshehr. A visit to Bahrain, which had been contemplated, was abandoned on account of the dangerousness of the approach for a ship of the "Amphitrite's" draught. At Būshehr, on the 18th, the Persian flag was saluted and a visit paid to the Governor. The "Amphitrite" then crossed to Kuwait, where a cordial reception was given her in the Shaikh's absence by Shaikh Jābir, his eldest son. On her way down the Gulf the "Amphitrite" anchored within sight of Dōhah in Qatar, visited the coast of Trucial 'Omān on the 22nd of June, and rounded Musandam on the evening of the 23rd. In the Gulf of 'Omān she anchored off Bidyah in the Shamailiyah district, and on the 25th she concluded her cruise, by disembarking Major Cox at Masqat. The sight of this fine ship made everywhere a profound impression.

The immediate reply to the cruise of the Russian "Askold" in December 1902 was the despatch to the Gulf, in the following month, of His Majesty's first-class battleship "Renown," which had brought His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught to India for the Coronation Darbar at Delhi and was for the moment unemployed. This was by far the largest and most powerful vessel which had ever been seen in the Persian Gulf. The "Renown" left Bombay on the 25th of January 1903 and visited Masqat, Būshehr, Lingeh, Bandar Abbās and Jāshk, but her great draught rendered a visit to Kuwait impossible. At Masqat the Sultān, and at Bandar Abbās the Persian Deputy-Governor, with a number of officials were entertained on board.

The incidents of Lord Curzon's historic cruise in the Gulf in 1903 are fully recorded elsewhere.

British Naval and Military Arrangements, 1899-1905.

While the question of permanent dispositions for naval action in the Gulf, in case of certain contingencies, was attentively studied by the British and Indian Governments, the important matters of ordinary organisation and of material and personnel in time of peace were also brought under examination.

British Naval
arrangements
in the
Persian Gulf.

Under the arrangement concluded in 1895 for a period of ten years expiring on the 31st March 1906, and in consideration of the payment by the Government of India of an annual subsidy of £100,000, four vessels of the Royal Navy, of which two were cruisers and two were gunboats, had been placed at the disposal of India for special duty in local waters; but of these one only, the gunboat "Sphinx," was permanently affected to the Persian Gulf, for service in which she had been particularly constructed. In practice, however, it was found that one vessel was insufficient for the work of the Persian Gulf, and from 1897 to 1902 inclusive the number of His Majesty's ships present in the Gulf at all seasons of the year was ordinarily either two or three. In 1902, with a view especially to more effective patrolling of the Gulf of 'Omān as a check on the exportation of arms and ammunition from Masqat to the Persian side, the Government of India recommended that the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Lawrence" should be armed for employment, when required, as an auxiliary to H.M.S. "Sphinx" and other vessels of the Royal Navy, and should be placed for combatant purposes under the orders of the naval authorities; but

the scheme was considered by His Majesty's Government to involve legal and other difficulties and was not carried into execution.

In 1903 the Admiralty, in the interests of British naval efficiency in general, proposed a change which was accepted by the Secretary of State for India and by the Government of India on an understanding that there should be no increase in the naval subsidy payable by India. The change involved the formation of a flotilla of three gunboats for constant service in the Persian Gulf; the exemption of larger vessels from regular service in the Gulf, where their usefulness was restricted by their greater draught; and an annual cold weather cruise of the East Indies Squadron in Persian Gulf waters, during which the permanent gunboats should be withdrawn to India to refit and in order that leave might be given to their crews. One result was a reduction of the number of vessels supplied in return for the Indian subsidy from four, of which two were large and two small, to three, all small; but, in the view of the Government of India, the increase of suitable vessels in the Persian Gulf was of enough importance to justify the abolition of special service vessels elsewhere. In October 1904 the new arrangement was brought into effect with the gunboats "Sphinx," 1,130 tons, "Lapwing," 805 tons, and "Merlin," the last of these being a temporary substitute for H.M.S. "Redbreast," 805 tons; and the "Fox," 4,360 tons, and "Perseus," 2,135 tons, were removed from the Gulf. The number of European officers and men serving on board ships of war in the Persian Gulf was at the same time reduced from about 716 to about 124, the reduction being due largely, however, to the substitution of Asiatics for Europeans in respect of stoker ratings. The limits of the waters within which the subsidised ships might be employed was defined as an imaginary line running from Aden south of Soqotrah to Bombay, and it was arranged that during the five summer months each of them should proceed in turn to Colombo for change and musketry practice. The assent of the Government of India to these modifications, proposed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief was provisional only; and it was represented to the Secretary of State that the Gulf of Aden (but not Soqotrah) should be excluded from the beat of the Indian special service vessels, and that the reduction of the gunboats by one in summer should be counterbalanced by the addition of a special light draught vessel for work in the neighbourhood of Bahrain and in the shallow creeks and inlets at the head of the Gulf. In making the last suggestion the Government of India dwelt on the fact that three ships were ordinarily required in the Gulf,—one to check piracy at the head of the Gulf in the date season, another to police the pearl banks and the shallow waters round Bahrain, and a third to patrol the seas between Masqat and Bandar Abbās.

In April 1905 a new project was brought forward by the Admiralty. It was that the existing arrangements should be terminated, that the duties carried on in Indian waters by ships of His Majesty's Navy should be made to devolve on ships of the Royal Indian Marine, and that the "Sphinx," "Lapwing," and "Redbreast" should be handed over to the Government of India for incorporation with that Marine. The plan was not acceptable to the Government of India. They foresaw certain advantages from it in the shape of more immediate control by themselves over a portion of the Naval force in Indian waters, in the formation of a body of officers possessing special local qualifications, and in an enhancement of the status of the Royal Indian Marine; but they held that these would be outweighed by loss of prestige in the Persian Gulf, where the regular war vessels of other European nations were now frequently seen, by decreased naval efficiency, by a serious sacrifice of economy, by imperfect cooperation between the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine, by the difficulty of arranging reliefs and consequent prejudice to the health of crews, and by a cessation of direct interest in the Persian Gulf on the part of the British Admiralty. They therefore adhered to the opinion which they had expressed in 1902, that the true remedy for the difficulties of the situation was to arm particular ships of the Royal Indian Marine, when necessary, as auxiliaries to, but not as substitutes for, ships of the Royal Navy. The scheme of the Admiralty was not in the end adopted, and the arrangements introduced in 1904 consequently continued in force. The special light-draught vessel suggested by the Government of India was not, however, provided.

In June 1903 the British political representatives at Būshehr, Masqat, Bandar Abbās and Lingeh were made responsible for informing the Admiralty by telegram in future of the arrival, departure and destination of foreign men-of-war and transports which might touch at their ports.

The question of the official salutes to be fired by vessels of the Royal Navy in the Persian Gulf was settled in 1900, the following scale receiving the sanction of His Majesty's Government:—

Occasion.	Time.	Number of guns.
Birthday of Her Majesty the Queen (everywhere in the Persian Gulf).	At noon on the 24th May in each year.	31
Proclamation day of Her Imperial Majesty the Queen-Empress of India (everywhere in the Persian Gulf).	At noon on the 1st January in each year.	31

Occasion.	Time.	Number of guns.
Birthday of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia (in Persian ports only).	21
Official visit by His Highness the Sultan of Masqat.	At termination of visit.	21
Do. by His Excellency the Governor of Bushehr.	Do. . .	17
Do. by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.	Do. . .	13
Do. by the Political Agent at Masqat .	Do. . .	11
Do. by the Agents, Consuls-General and Commissioners and Consuls-General.	Do. . .	11
Do. by Consuls-General	Do. . .	9
Do. by Consuls	Do. . .	7
Do. by the Shaikh of Kuwait . .	Do. . .	5
Do. by the Shaikh of Bahrain . .	Do. . .	5
Do. by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi .	Do. . .	5
Do. by the Shaikh of Dibai . . .	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of Sharjah . .	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of 'Ajman . . .	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain	Do. . .	3
Do. by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah .	Do. . .	3

The salutes of the Persian Governors of Muhammareh, Lingeh, and Bandar 'Abbās were fixed on this occasion at five guns each.

In 1902 it was decided that the British Assistant Resident at Bandar 'Abbās, though as a Vice-Consul he was not entitled to any salute, should be saluted for local reasons with seven guns. The salute of the British representative at Masqat, as a Consul, was only seven guns, but as a Political Agent of the Government of India he was accustomed to receive eleven; and in 1903 it was decided, notwithstanding certain difficulties with foreign consular representatives to which the practice had given rise, that his customary salute should not be reduced.

British
military and
marine
establish-
ments in the
Persian Gulf.

A statement of the Indian Army and Royal Indian Marine establishments maintained in the Persian Gulf in 1905, with their cost, will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this Chapter. In 1904 the British consular guards in Persia were increased, about 130 Indian cavalry being distributed

among 12 British Consulates, the Indian infantry guards at various consular and telegraph stations in the Gulf were maintained.

British official undertakings of a general or commercial character in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

Some marine surveys of which the objects were naval rather than commercial have already been mentioned ; but others of a more ordinary character were undertaken also. The principal points in the Gulf at which it was sought to increase the conveniences for merchant shipping were Būshehr, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab. The survey of the southern approach to Basidu, already alluded to under another head, was in part commercial in its object.

British
Marine
Surveys in
the Persian
Gulf.

A resurvey of Būshehr harbour was recommended by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf in 1902, chiefly for the purpose of ascertaining whether large vessels could not be brought into the inner harbour (Khor Dairah) and the necessity of coaling at a distance of seven miles from land obviated. In September 1903 Persia consented to the proposed resurvey on condition that a Persian representative should be admitted to watch the proceedings, and that any marks which might be required on shore should be erected by employes of the Persian Government. In September 1904, before the operations had commenced, the Persian Government were seized with sudden apprehensions and enquired whether they were expected to contribute to the cost of the work. They received a reassuring reply ; but in the following month they intimated that, whatever the result of the investigations might be, they would neither arrange to deepen the Būshehr harbour themselves nor permit it to be deepened by the Government of India. The Royal Indian Marine surveying vessel "Investigator," Commander Heming, was selected for the duty ; she left Bombay in October 1904 and finished her work at Būshehr on the 22nd November. The soundings showed that the configuration of the harbour had changed very little since 1857, and that, while the deepening of the inner anchorage and the approach to it from seawards for ships of heavy draught would be of little use so long as the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab continued to regulate the size of vessels employed in the Persian Gulf, the dredging of a channel for vessels of moderate size from the inner anchorage to the wharves on Khor Sultāni would be an advantageous and probably not a difficult operation. The portion of the harbour between Khor Dairah and Khor Sultāni was surveyed in greater detail than the

Būshehr
harbour.

rest ; but, to avoid exciting the suspicions of the Persian delegate, no separate large scale plan of it was made.

Kuwait
harbour.

Early in 1903 a resurvey of Kuwait harbour was advised by Commander Kemp, Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and his proposals having received the support of the Government of India, were sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. In the summer of 1904, under a new mail contract, British steamers began to call at Kuwait ; and in November of the same year the survey there was begun by the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Investigator," immediately after she had finished her work at Būshehr. The operations were interrupted, however, by an outbreak of beriberi on board, which attacked 34 out of a crew of 70 and necessitated the return of the vessel to Bombay on the 12th December. The "Investigator" was at Kuwait again at the end of February 1905, but the survey of the harbour could not be finished before the end of the season, nor was it finally completed till two years later. In the course of the survey steps were taken to ascertain whether the boat harbours of the town, which were dry at low water, could be improved ; but it was found that no improvement could be made without extending the existing breakwaters for a distance of a quarter of a mile seawards, a process of which the results could not be expected to justify the expenditure involved. The operations led, however, to a fuller knowledge of the advantages of Bandar Shuwaikh, a well sheltered anchorage about 3 miles west of the town. In May 1905 the Government of India sanctioned the construction at their own expense of an improved beacon on Rās-al-Ardh, to serve as a guide to vessels entering Kuwait Bay, in replacement of a private beacon which had been erected there by the British India Steam Navigation Company. The British survey of Kuwait harbour was not allowed by the Turks to pass without objection, and their protests in this case were accompanied by reckless misstatements of fact and by imputations of political intrigue.

Bar of the
Shatt-al-
'Arab.

In July 1904 it was suggested by the Naval Commander-in-Chief that the positions of some buoys laid down by the British India Steam Navigation Company, to mark the entrance of the Shatt-al-'Arab should be altered, and that the charge of the buoys should be undertaken for the future by the Government of India. Accordingly, in April 1905, the buoy on the bar and two inner buoys were moved by the "Investigator" further to the eastward to indicate the actual deepest channel ; but the Government of India, fearing international complications, declined to take over the buoys from the British India Steam Navigation Company, though the latter were willing, and even anxious, to transfer them to Government on certain conditions.

H. M. S. "Redbreast," Commander H. B. T. Somerville, was employed during the winter of 1904-05 in examining the Khor-al-Qalai'ah islet of Bahrain Island, which it was hoped might afford harbour facilities superior to those of the exposed anchorage off Manāmah. The survey, however, showed that the entrance was difficult and the holding-ground poor, and no steps were taken for the utilisation of the inlet beyond the erection of a permanent beacon to mark the entrance. A fresh survey of Manāmah harbour and its approaches had already been made by the Royal Indian Marine Ship "Investigator" in 1901-02.

Khor-al-Qalai'ah,
Bahrain.

The increased importance of the Persian Gulf after 1899 caused the need of a geographical and historical handbook of that region for the use of political officers to be felt. The compilation of the present Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Omān, and Central Arabia was accordingly ordered by Lord Curzon in 1903 and begun in the following year. In the winter of 1904-05 the writer, assisted by Mr. J. C. Gaskin, afterwards Commercial Assistant to the Resident at Baghdād, and by Lieutenant C. H. Gabriel, a candidate for the Political Department of the Government of India, to which he was subsequently appointed, toured in the Gulf and collected information for the Gazetteer. Among the places visited by the writer at this time were Masqat, Sohār, Shārjah, Bahrain, Kuwait, Basrah, Baghdād, Karbala, Hillah, Muhammareh, Būshehr, Bandar 'Abbās, and Jāshk; he had previously accompanied the cruise of Lord Curzon in the Persian Gulf at the end of 1903. Detailed surveys of different districts in the Gulf were made during the cold weather of 1904-05, in connection with the Gazetteer operations, by a party from India under Surveyor Sher Jang, K.B.; they resulted in large scale maps of the Bahrain Islands, of the country about Kuwait and between Kuwait and the Turkish frontier, of the Būshehr peninsula, and of the tract in 'Omān forming the immediate hinterland of the towns of Masqat and Matrah.

Compilation
of the
Persian Gulf
Gazetteer.

Various other explorations were made, both independently of and in connection with the Gazetteer. In 1901 Captain P. Z. Cox, then Political Agent at Masqat, with Captain H. H. Dowding of the Military Intelligence Branch, Simla, ascended Wādi Tāyīn in the 'Omān Sultanate from the sea to its head, returning to Masqat *via* Wādi Samāil; and in 1902 Major P. Z. Cox, unaccompanied by any European, made a tour of 400 miles across the whole breadth of 'Omān from Abu Dhabi to Masqat and obtained much new information regarding the districts of Dhāhirah and 'Omān Proper. The course of the Jarrāhi River in 'Arabistān, till then very imperfectly known, was observed in 1904 by Major Burton, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, who also investigated the geography of the

Journeys and
explorations
by British
officers,
partly in
connection
with the
Gazetteer.

Fallāhiyeh district and the nature of the principal land approaches to Khor Mūsa. In the following year two British naturalists, Colonel Bailward and Mr. Woosnam, travelled in 'Arabistān. Valuable explorations were made in 'Arabistān by Lieutenant D. L. R. Lorimer, His Britannic Majesty's first Vice-Consul at Ahwāz in 1904 and the following years. In the cold season of 1905-06 a number of most productive journeys were undertaken by Major P. Z. Cox, as resident in the Persian Gulf, chiefly for the purpose of solving topographical problems connected with the Gazetteer. In 'Arabistān Major Cox visited Dilam, Behbehān, the Hindiyan River, Ma'shūr, the Jarrāhi River, Buziyeh, Fallāhiyeh, the Bahmanshir, and Qubbān, determining carefully the course of the Hindiyan and casting much light on the connection of the important inlet of Khor Mūsa with the Kārūn River and Bahmanshir, which till his journey had been very imperfectly understood. In 'Omān he travelled by land from Rās-al-Khaimah to Sohār *via* Baraimi, Lieutenant C. A. Scott of the Royal Indian Marine accompanying him to determine accurately the position of the Baraimi Oasis, which was found to be misplaced in all existing maps. In 1905 Captain Knox, the Political Agent at Kuwait, made a tour to the southward from that place; and in the next year, soon after the close of the period, the same officer reached Hafar, a famous landmark, in the interior distant 160 miles from Kuwait, which, though mentioned by previous European travellers in Arabia, had not been reached by any of them. Between 1903 and 1905 the geography of many large and almost unknown tracts in Eastern Arabia was elucidated by political officers through native information, the largest shares in this very difficult work being taken by Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, and by Major Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf.

Geological
reconnais-
sance of the
Persian Gulf.

A general geological reconnaissance of both sides of the Gulf, combined with a closer examination of localities where the existence of minerals was suspected, was carried out in the winter of 1904-05 by Mr. G. Pilgrim of the Indian Geological Survey, the results of whose expedition are summarised by himself in an Appendix to the Gazetteer. Some coal seams in the country behind Sūr in 'Omān had previously been scientifically examined in 1901 by Drs. von Krafft and Oldham of the Geological Survey of India.

Antiquarian
research.

The attention of the Government of India was drawn in 1904 to the prehistoric tumuli of the Bahrain Islands, and arrangements were made for the excavation of some of the mounds. A cursory inspection was also made, through native agency, of ancient sites near Ganāveh on the Persian coast.

The acceleration of the Persian Gulf mail steamer service in 1904 was a notable achievement of the period ; it resulted from the establishment by the British India Steam Navigation Company in return for an increased subsidy, of a fast mail line in addition to an existing slow cargo and mail line. The extra subsidy on account of the rapid service, borne entirely by the Government of India, was Rs. 3,00,000 per annum ; and the average speed of the fast line was fixed at 13, and of the slow line at 8 knots an hour. Kuwait was for the first time definitely included among the Company's ports of call, and Dibai, though not entered in the schedule of the contract, was henceforth regularly visited by the Company's vessels.

British steam communications and postal services in the Persian Gulf.

A postal subsidy of Rs. 24,000 a year paid by the Government of India to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company for a weekly mail service in both directions between Basrah and Baghdād was renewed for ten years with effect from 1904.

The period was also remarkable for the first considerable extensions of the telegraph system of the Persian Gulf made since 1869 ; they were dictated by considerations of policy and strategy as well as of commercial advantage.

British telegraphs in the Persian Gulf.

The inadequacy of the communications between Masqat and the outside world was remedied, first of all, by the laying of a cable from Jāshk to Masqat which was opened for traffic in November 1901 ; in this enterprise, approved though it was in principle by His Majesty's Government, no financial assistance was rendered to the Government of India by the British Treasury.

Jāshk-Masqat cable.

A second and perhaps more important scheme was propounded by the Government of India in 1900 along with the first, but its realisation was delayed by the refusal of the Home Government to undertake a share of the cost and by doubts of a technical nature as to the best means of carrying it into effect ; its object was the inclusion of the port of Bandar 'Abbās in the circuit of the Persian Gulf cables. This it was originally intended to arrange by looping one of the existing cables between Jāshk and Būshehr into the bay of Bandar 'Abbās ; but in 1902 a proposal by the Naval Commander-in-Chief, that telegraphic communication should be extended to Bāsīdu, suggested the alternative of landing a cable on Hanjām, where a British telegraph station had existed from 1869 to 1880, and of constructing a branch thence to Bandar 'Abbās. This alternative project was finally accepted by His Majesty's Government on the advice of Lord Curzon after he had personally visited Hanjām in 1903 ; and in April 1904 one of the Būshehr cables was relanded on the island and the telegraph station there re-occupied without notice to the Persian Government,

Bandar 'Abbās connection.

under a former concession which had never been revoked. Subsequently in May 1905 the permission of the Shāh was obtained by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān for the construction of a line from Hanjām, partly aerial (across Qishm Island) and partly submarine, to Bandar 'Abbās. This line, which was to be worked by Persian operatives and on repayment of the cost of construction was to become the property of the Persian Government, was completed before the close of the year.

Central
Persian
telegraph
line.

An addition to the means of telegraphic communication between Persia and India was undertaken in 1902 in the shape of a Central Persian telegraph line ; but its bearing on the Persian Gulf was slight.

British tele-
graph
subsidies in
Persian
Makrān.

In 1899 an important change was made in connection with the telegraph subsidies paid to local chiefs in Persian Makrān for the protection of the land line traversing their districts. It consisted generally in a redistribution of the money among a greater number of recipients than before, some of the small chiefs in the immediate vicinity of the coast from whom services were mostly required being now included, while the shares of larger chiefs in the interior were correspondingly reduced.

British
Commercial
Missions to
the Persian
Gulf region.

In view of the increased mercantile activity of foreign nations in Persia and the Persian Gulf region, special attention was devoted by His Majesty's Government and the Government of India to British and Indian trade in those parts, and two commercial missions were charged with the study of trade questions on the spot.

Mr.
Maclean's
mission.

The first involved the despatch from England by the Board of Trade's Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence, of Mr. H. W. Maclean, who had been not long before Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Tehrān and Honorary Attaché of His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Persia, and who by his experience of Persia and intimate acquaintance with its trade was admirably qualified for the part he had to perform. Mr. Maclean left England at the beginning of 1903 and called at Bombay on his way to Persia. The Government of India, who had been asked, and who had willingly agreed, to grant him all the facilities and aid in their power, suggested that he should study with special care the trade in tea, coffee, indigo, and Indian cotton manufactures, as well as the general effect of the new Persian customs tariff, and should work out the rates *ad valorem* on the products of various countries when, as in the case of cotton textiles, there was but one specific duty for grades and kinds differing much in price. In the course of the enquiries made under his original instructions Mr. Maclean visited the principal trade centres of Turkish Arabia and Persia including, it would seem, Bandar 'Abbās, Būshehr, Basrah, Baghdād, Kermānshāh, Hamadān, Tabriz, Mashhad, Tehrān and Isfahān ; and, when

he was about to leave Tehrān for London in November 1903, his orders were changed and he was directed to return by way of Masqat, where a commercial mission of the "Comité de l'Asie Française" had in the meanwhile made a rather prolonged stay. Mr. Maclean submitted in all three valuable reports. The first, dated 5th December 1903, from Tehrān, consisted of a note on the new Persian customs tariff; the second, completed at Rasht on the 20th December 1903, dealt with the whole subject of British trade in Persia; the third, which related to 'Omān, Trucial 'Omān, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and which embodied the result of the enquiries made by Mr. Maclean after the extension of his tour, was submitted in London on the 12th April 1904.

The second British commercial mission was sent from India under the auspices of the Indian Government. It was supplementary to that of Mr. Maclean, and the particular field of its labours was South-Eastern Persia, which lay outside the scope of Mr. Maclean's investigations, but which was a region of special importance to Indian trade.

Mr.
Newcomen's
mission.

The despatch of this Indian mission was originally suggested by Major P. M. Sykes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kirmān, who himself decided the routes to be followed, made all the arrangements in Persia, and postponed taking leave which was due to him in order that the mission might be rendered a success. The cost of the mission was undertaken by the Government of India and by the Chambers of Commerce of Upper India and Bengal. The Chambers of Commerce of Bombay and Karachi were consulted also in regard to the duties of the mission, but they declined active participation in the arrangements. As finally constituted the mission consisted of Mr. A. Gleadowe-Newcomen of Cawnpore, assisted by Messrs. Luffman and Ryan. Mr. Newcomen, who besides having seven years' practical experience of tea-planting was well versed in other branches of Oriental trade, was formally recognised by the Government of India on the 8th October 1904 as President of the mission and as representative of the Bengal and Upper India Chambers of Commerce and of the Indian Tea Cess Committee. The arrangement as to expenditure was that the salaries of the delegates for a period of six months and the cost of samples should be borne by the commercial bodies in whose interests they were sent, while the cost of the journey to and from Persia, the actual travelling expenses in Persia, and the price of outfit, including tents, furniture and horses, should be defrayed by the Government of India.

The mission sailed from Bombay on the 13th October 1904, and on the 21st reached Bandar 'Abbās, where they were detained in quarantine until the evening of the 25th. Notwithstanding that arrangements had been

made with the Persian Government for facilitating their journey in Persia, they experienced incivility and obstruction at the hands of M. Cattersel, the Belgian Director of Customs at Bandar 'Abbās. This was, however, the sole instance of discourteous treatment of which they had to complain in the course of their tour, and suitable notice was taken of M. Cattersel's conduct by the Persian Government, who shortly afterwards, on the complaint of the British Minister, removed him from Bandar 'Abbās to another appointment. At Bandar 'Abbās the mission were met by Khan Bahādur Asghar 'Ali, the British Consular Agent designate for Bam. They were accompanied on the march by Hospital Assistant Tafazzul Husain, placed on duty with them by the Government of India, and by a small escort of Indian cavalry who were proceeding on relief to Kirmān, as well as by a Persian military escort. From Bandar 'Abbās the mission journeyed to Saidābād, where they arrived on the 25th November; they were met near that place by Sartip Mīrza Riza Khān, whom the Persian Government had sent from Tehrān to receive them. On the 27th November they were joined by Major Sykes, and on the 16th December the whole party arrived at Kirmān.

It had been intended that from Kirmān the mission should travel to Sistān, returning to the coast at Gwādur *via* Magas and Kōhak; but, as it appeared that this route would be unprofitable, the programme was modified with the assent of the Government of India, and operations in Persian Balūchistān were restricted to a tour from Kirmān to Bam and Jiruft. Bam was reached on the 14th January 1905, and on the 20th February the mission returned to Kirmān. From Kirmān the mission marched to Yazd, arriving there on the 16th March; Shīrāz was reached on the 18th April; and from Shīrāz Mr. Newcomen and his companions travelled by the ordinary route to Būshehr, whence they sailed for India on the 19th May.

At Kirmān Messrs. Luffman and Ryan were laid up with fever, and at Yazd Mr. Newcomen had the misfortune to fracture one of his legs above the ankle. On the 31st March the advanced party of the mission escort was fired on at Mīhrābād, between Yazd and Shīrāz, and one of the Persian cavalry guard received a severe flesh wound through the thigh. These were the principal difficulties which attended the work of Mr. Newcomen and his associates.

In their journey the mission confined themselves strictly to commercial enquiries, in which they were aided by the British consular officials. Their relations with the local Persian representatives were everywhere most friendly, and in more than one place they were received with considerable distinction. The representatives of Russia in Persia did their best, however,

to let it be thought that the mission was a political one, inspired by sinister motives ; and a complaint was on one occasion received by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān that the members took photographs and made sketches, that they showed too much interest in the strength of Persian military garrisons, and that they were themselves military officers. The uneasiness of the Persian Government was easily removed, however, by assurances from the British Legation.

The tour was in every respect a success. A very large amount of valuable commercial information was collected by the indefatigable energy and industry of Mr. Newcomen. British goods, especially tea, were exhibited and advertised in some entirely new markets. A careful itinerary also, maintained during the whole arduous journey of 1,790 miles, threw much new light on the state of commercial communication in Southern Persia.

Miscellaneous British proceedings in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1905.

The peace of the seas was practically undisturbed during the period except on the coasts of Qatar and Hasa and in the Shatt-al-'Arab, in other words except in those parts of the Gulf where the shore was actually under Turkish jurisdiction or Turkish jurisdiction was claimed.

British measures for the maintenance of Maritime Security in the Persian Gulf.

A number of piratical offences occurred off Qatar, where tranquillity had prevailed for several years, in 1899 and 1900 ; but pressure by the British authorities upon the principal Shaikh of Qatar, though he pleaded helplessness on account of the Turkish occupation of Dohah, resulted in their cessation.

Off Qatar.

Along the Hasa coast, which also had been unusually quiet for some time, there was in 1899 a serious recrudescence of piracy ; and from then until the end of the period the state of matters in that quarter grew progressively worse. The principal pirate was an exiled member of the Bahrain ruling family who was also connected by blood relationship with a marauding Arab tribe on the mainland, and whose bases of operation were, after the first, places in Turkish territory. Remonstrances by the British authorities proved entirely ineffectual, being either disregarded or rudely repulsed by the local Turkish officials to whom they were addressed. H.M.S. "Sphinx" visited Qatif in 1902, but without satisfactory results ; and later in the year the Turks, after capturing the pirate leader already mentioned, negligently or intentionally allowed him to escape ; and his

Off Hasa.

activity was renewed with lamentable results. In 1905, the British Political Agent in Bahrain twice visited Qatif and interviewed the Turkish representative there, but could obtain no satisfactory assurances.

On the Shatt-
al-'Arab.

In the Shatt-al-'Arab, after an interval of two years' quiescence, piracy in 1900 again became a scourge in the river and about its mouth. Numerous cases, some of them very serious, occurred; the sufferers were chiefly British Indian, Bahraini, and Persian vessels. Efforts were made to induce the Turkish and Persian authorities to co-operate for the restoration of security, and direct action was on some occasions taken by British vessels. The Shaikh of Muhammareh made some response to the appeal of the British authorities; and in 1905, principally in consequence of action taken by him, there were signs of improvement. No compensation was obtained, however, for numerous injuries to British subjects navigating the river.

The arms
trade; its
repression
undertaken
by Britain
in the Per-
sian Gulf.

The trade in arms and ammunition showed an alarming increase, and its evil effects began to appear not only in the Persian Gulf, where the possession of rifles by their subjects was rapidly undermining the authority of the Persian and Turkish Governments in their own territories, but also on the North-West Frontier of British India, where arms and ammunition obtained from the Persian Gulf made their appearance in large quantities among the hill tribes, greatly increasing the difficulty of an already difficult border administration. From time to time changes were remarked in the course of the trade; and it may perhaps be reckoned an advantage that the methods of those engaged in it became by degrees more systematic, and consequently more easily followed and understood. The greatest place of importation was Masqat, where the trade, under treaties with European nations and America, was free; and it was considered impracticable to secure the assent of France, the power after Britain chiefly interested, to any revision of the Sultān of 'Omān's commercial engagements which would enable that ruler to exclude the trade from his dominions. A secondary base of the traffic had been formed at Kuwait, where a nominal—but only nominal—prohibition of it was enacted by the Shaikh under British advice in 1900: Kuwait was the market from which the warring powers in Central Arabia and the Arabs of Turkish 'Irāq principally obtained their supplies of rifles and cartridges. An interdict of the trade in Trucial 'Omān, arranged in 1902, narrowed the question to one of preventing the exit from Masqat of the arms and ammunition which could not after 1902 be lawfully landed at any other place in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of 'Omān except Qatar, which was unimportant and where there was no ruling chief in relations with the British Government. Dispositions were made, in consultation with the Sultān of 'Omān, for checking the export of arms

from Masqat ; but the task seemed hopeless. On the Persian coast, however, preventive action was not altogether impossible ; seizures of contraband arms were occasionally made by the Turkish Government ; and the establishment of a British Vice-Consul at Bandar 'Abbās in 1900 had some effect in discouraging the operations of the Afghan arms dealers who had begun to make use of that port. About 1901 Persian Makrān showed signs of becoming the chief thoroughfare of the Afghan trade, and in the next year an arrangement was formed between the Persian Governor-General and the British Political Agent in Kalāt for preventing the introduction of rifles and ammunition into the Makrān districts, where the local market was already glutted and continued importation implied the existence of a transit trade to the countries beyond. The development of the trade across Persian Makrān appeared so serious, regard being had to the facilities which it afforded the Afghan tribes of the North-West Frontier of India for providing themselves to an unlimited extent with war material, that in 1905 a discussion arose as to whether exportation from Masqat should not be combated by British naval agency. The discussion did not bear fruit during the period with which we are concerned ; but it resulted in the establishment, at a later time, of a British naval blockade of the arms trade in the Gulf of 'Omān.

A great blow was dealt to the slave trade, which still lingered in a reduced shape, through successful anti-slaving operations by the Portuguese authorities in East Africa in 1902 ; and it had a powerful indirect effect in the Persian Gulf region, where the 'Omāni town of Sūr, the home of a large number of the slave-traders captured in East Africa, was plunged into mourning.

The slave trade.

Bubonic plague still continuing in India, responsibility for sanitary arrangements in the Persian Gulf continued to devolve on the British political authorities there, especially in Persia where full control of the necessary arrangements had been conferred on them by the Persian Government.

British sanitary organisation in the Persian Gulf.

In 1899 a British medical expert was deputed from India to deal with a small outbreak of plague which occurred at Būshehr, but his proceedings or proposals caused a tumult among the ignorant and excitable populace, and no measures could be enforced. The epidemic, fortunately, soon died away. In 1903 the Persian Government, influenced by Russian advice, suddenly became desirous of transferring the sanitary control of their ports from the British medical staff hitherto employed to their own Customs Department ; and in 1904, chiefly through the physician of the French Vice-Consulate at Būshehr, strong efforts were made to undermine the authority of the British Residency Surgeon at Būshehr in sanitary matters. Repeated

In Persia.

vigorous protests made by the British Legation at Tehrān resulted, however, in the Customs being prohibited from interfering with the work of the British sanitary agents at the various ports.

In the Sultānate of 'Omān.

The attitude of the Sultān of 'Omān in sanitary questions was at first, on account of other difficulties between him and the British Government, extremely unsatisfactory; but in autumn 1900, he at length handed over the sanitary administration of the port of Masqat to the British Agency Surgeon, at the same time placing under him qualified subordinates whom he had brought from India on his own account.

In Bahrain.

The Shaikh of Bahrain continued to resist the introduction of proper measures against plague in his dominions; and in 1900 the abuses of a sanitary system which he had set up were so much greater than its advantages that the Government of India found themselves obliged to insist upon its abolition. In 1905, had an epidemic of plague which appeared in Bahrain not suddenly ceased, the necessary steps would have been taken there by the Government of India through an agent of their own.

British dispensaries at Kuwait and in Bahrain.

In 1904 a dispensary was opened at Kuwait in connection with the British Political Agency established there; and in 1905 the maintenance of a Victoria Memorial Hospital in Bahrain, which had been founded by private subscription in 1901, was undertaken by the Government of India.

British official matters, 1899-1905.

Death of Her Majesty Queen Victoria and Coronation of His Majesty King Edward VII.

The news of the decease of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress Victoria on the 22nd January 1901 occasioned universal demonstrations of grief and sympathy at all stations in the Persian Gulf. At Būshehr most of the British subjects, European and Indian, paid special visits of condolence at the Residency, and expressions of sorrow were transmitted to the Resident by the Shaikh of Bahrain. At Masqat, where the Sultān put an end to the *I'd* rejoicings and caused the shops to be closed and 101 minute guns to be fired, the general feeling seemed akin to consternation. The Coronation of His Majesty the King-Emperor Edward VII was celebrated at all places in the jurisdiction of the Persian Gulf Residency on the 1st January 1903.

Division of expenditure and patronage between the Home Government and the Government of India.

In 1900 the financial relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India arising from political and consular representation in Persia were readjusted, and a rule was established that future increases in expenditure should be divided equally between the two Governments. In 1904 Sir Mortimer Durand of the Indian Civil Service relinquished charge of His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Persia, which he had held

for six years. From 1899 to 1901 the functions of Military Attaché and Oriental Secretary in the Legation were combined in a British officer of the Indian Army ; but after 1901 the Military Attachéship was the only post at Tehrān filled by an officer from India.

Conclusion.

To resume. An attack on the political predominance of Britain in the Persian Gulf may be considered to have begun with the first visit of a Russian surveyor to Hormūz in 1895, but it did not become serious until 1899, when the French sought to secure a naval base in 'Omān. A great impetus was given to foreign activity by the South African war of 1899-1902, especially in its earlier stages, when a false appreciation of Britain's future place in the world became current. Those years accordingly witnessed preparations by Russia for establishing a naval station in the Persian Gulf and for constructing a railway across Persia to the sea, as well as the foundation of a Russian line of steamers and trading company for operations in the Gulf, and intensified efforts by France to push her influence in 'Omān. Unmistakable symptoms at the same time showed that, in the Gulf, Russia and France were actuated to some extent by a common policy. The more serious manifestations of foreign ambition were accompanied by Russian and French displays of naval force and were attended by an increase of Russian consular representation in the Gulf region.

As the British Empire gradually and without loss of stability emerged from the South African difficulty, some revulsion of feeling and change of policy on the part of foreign nations became perceptible. The more dangerous enterprises of Russia were suspended, and eventually little remained to differentiate the situation in the Gulf from that which had existed before the crisis, except the mercantile undertaking to which the Russian Government had committed themselves and their inflated consular establishments. By the end of 1903 political tension between European nations in the Persian Gulf had entirely ceased.

The assault on British predominance was energetically met and repelled at every point. Nothing was conceded even at the period when the state of international politics was most favourable to the adversaries of Britain, and British activity continued unabated even after the causes which provoked it had been withdrawn. Effective diplomatic barriers were raised against dangers from Russia which threatened in Persia. French intrigue

in 'Omān was checked by firm action at Masqat, and the question of the French flag in 'Omān was carried before the Hague Tribunal, by which it was ultimately decided in favour of Britain. In Bahrain the authority of the British Government was proved and emphasised by strong and successful measures for the protection of foreign subjects, and trade flourished in an unprecedented degree. Kuwait was saved from falling under Turkish domination, was defended against the menaces of the Amīr of Northern Najd, and became for the time being a British protectorate except in name. In 'Arabistān intimate relations were formed with the Shaikh of Muhammāreh which assured the predominance of British influence in his councils. On the coast of Persia throughout its length British interests were maintained with success, and an important position was secured at Hanjām; while in Persian Makrān, notwithstanding internal anarchy, British subjects and property were adequately protected. The strategical position was examined from the British and Indian points of view, and dispositions were made for meeting every emergency. The British naval arrangements in the Gulf were reorganised; new marine surveys were carried out; foreign demonstrations were answered by counter-demonstrations of superior force. The number of the British political representatives in the Gulf was increased, and steps were taken simultaneously to add to their dignity and prestige. At the same time the general efficiency of British action in the Gulf was enhanced by improvements in passenger, postal, and telegraphic communications; the interests of British and Indian trade were promoted by the despatch of commercial missions; and the political history and geography of the Gulf region were brought under close investigation.

It is not possible, by any analytical process, to separate the effects of these measures from other factors by which the cessation of the assault on the British position in the Gulf was brought about; and it is hardly easier to distinguish the policy of the Government of India from that of His Majesty's Government, with which it was blended and in which it was absorbed. Changes in the international situation in Europe and elsewhere were undoubtedly elements of first-rate importance; but had British policy in the Gulf been supine during the time of crisis, such changes, coming as they did too late, would not have prevented serious permanent injury to British interests. In the defensive political campaign of this arduous period it was ordinarily the part of the Government of India to suggest and to execute, of the British Government to control and to direct: the conduct of operations in the diplomatic field devolved upon His Britannic Majesty's Government, while the political contest in the Gulf itself was waged for the most part by officers of the Indian services and with Indian resources.

Lord Curzon, among whose first political acts as Viceroy was a deadly blow to French influence in 'Omān, and whose progress round the Gulf at the end of 1903 marked the real conclusion of the troubled epoch, was entitled at his departure from India in November 1905 to regard with satisfaction both the issue of the struggle and the part that had been played in it by his own Government. The results attained were satisfactory, for disaster had been averted; but they cannot, in prudence, be regarded as perpetual.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—INDIAN ARMY AND ROYAL INDIAN MARINE ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1905.

Indian Army Establishments.

Stations.—Chahbār, Jāshk, Masqat, Bahrain, Būshehr, and Baghdād.

Strength.—Three Subadars, 3 Jamadars, 11 Havaldars, 15 Naiks, 4 Buglers, 210 Sepoys, 2 Hospital Assistants, and 10 followers; total 258 troops.

Distribution of Sepoys—Chahbār, 45; Jāshk, 45; Masqat, 17; Bahrain, 24; Būshehr, 49; Baghdād, 30.

Cost.—Pay, Rs. 38,525; clothing, Rs. 2,266; rations, Rs. 30,735; batta, Rs. 6,258; repairs to arms, Rs. 5,219; medicines and diet, Rs. 600; postage, Rs. 125; water supply, Rs. 961; conservancy, Rs. 48; lighting and heating, Rs. 45; total Rs. 84,782 per annum.

Royal Indian Marine Establishments.

Royal Indian Marine Ship "Lawrence."—A steel paddle steamer, built in 1886, stationed at Būshehr, at the disposal of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. Gross tonnage, 902; I. H. P., 1,277; speed, 12 knots. Armament: four 4-inch B. L. guns, not mounted; four 6-pr. Nordenfelts and four .45 inch five-barrel Nordenfelts, mounted. Complement: 4 Officers, 2 Engineers, 3 Warrant Officers, and 80 Petty Officers and men. Average cost for three years, Rs. 1,45,656 per annum.

Royal Indian Marine Ship "Comet."—A steel paddle steamer, built in 1884, stationed at Baghdād, at the disposal of the Political Resident,

Baghdād. Gross tonnage, 182 ; I. H. P., 190 ; speed, 9 knots. Armament : two 45 inch five-barrel Nordenfelts, mounted. Complement : 1 Officer, 4 Warrant Officers, and 33 Petty Officers and men. Average cost for three years, Rs. 42,423 per annum.

Masqat Coal Depôt.—In two places, both occupied rent free. Establishment : 1 Fireman and Coal Tindal, 2 Peons, and 1 night watchman. Cost, Rs. 6,200 per annum.

Bāsīdu Coal Depôt.—No buildings. Establishment : 1 Coal Agent, 1 Peon, and 1 fire-engine man. Cost, Rs. 750 per annum.

Būshehr Coal Depôt.—Fifteen godowns, rented at Rs. 1,100 per annum. Establishment : 1 Coal Tindal, 2 Weighmen, and 1 fire-engine man. Cost, including rent, Rs. 9,728 per annum.

Baghdād Coal Depôt.—(Since abolished, coal for the “Comet” being stored in a godown in the Residency grounds.)

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF THE 'OMĀN SULTANATE.*

The modern history of 'Omān, as that of the Persian Gulf in general, may be considered to begin at the close of the 16th century of the Christian era.

RULE OF THE NABĀHINAH, 1566-1624.

Internal history of 'Omān, 1600-24.

In the year 1600 'Omān was governed, as it had been generally since 751 A.D., by an elective Imām † or ruler possessing in name supreme religious, military and political authority; but the real power was at this time in the hands of the Nabāhinah or Bani Nabhān, a clan who had

Rule of a
nominal
Imām and
the Nabā-
hinah.

* This account of the history of the 'Omān Sultanate is founded chiefly upon the materials of which an account follows.

The only authority relating to 'Omān and extending back to very early times is the *Kashf-al-Ghammah* of Sirhān-bin-Sa'id of Izki; a part of it has been translated by Colonel E. C. Ross under the title *Annals of 'Omān*, 1874, and brings the history of events down to the year 1728. The most general historical work on 'Omān is the Reverend G. P. Badger's *Imāms and Seyyids of 'Omān*, 1870, which consists of a translation of the Arabic chronicle of Salīl-ibn-Razīq and others, covering the period 661 to 1856 A.D., and of an analysis and a continuation by the translator extending to 1870. The authorities for the period 1600-1800 are those cited for the Gulf generally in the footnote to the title of Chapter I of this Volume; and some information regarding 'Omān at the beginning of the 19th century is given by Vincenzo Maurizi (*alias* Shaikh Mansūr) in his *History of Seyd Said*, 1819, referring to the years 1807 and 1814.

Captain R. Mignan's *Winter Journey*, 1839, gives particulars of the Rās-al-Khaimah expedition of 1819 and of the Bani Bu 'Ali expedition, both British; and Lieutenant C. R. Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, deals fully with all marine and military matters in which Britain was concerned down to 1863.

The most valuable and trustworthy sources of information for the recent period initiated by the establishment, at the end of the 18th century, of political relations

their hereditary seat in the hilly Hajar country at the villages of Maqniyāt and Yanqul, and whose influence first became predominant about the year 1566.

Opposed to the Nabāhinah there was, however, a strong coalition which embraced the Bani Hina tribe, the ruler of the Samāil Valley, and the chief of Rustāq. Bahlah, still an important town of the inner tableland of 'Omān, was in those days the political capital of the whole country, and it was more than once lost and recovered by the Nabāhinah and their adversaries.

between Britain and 'Omān are, however, the records of the Government of Bombay and the Government of India, and a number of summaries and précis which have been compiled from the same. The *Précis of Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia* covers the period from 1646 to 1846 and contains scattered references to 'Omān affairs. *Bombay Selections No. XXIV* comprises a summary of events from the end of the 18th century down to 1853, and is supplemented, where it is deficient, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*. Mr. Saldanha's *Précis on Maskat Affairs, 1856-72*, continues the story, and is partially overlapped by Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler's *Summary of Affairs of the Government of India in the Foreign Department from 1864 to 1869*; by Mr. C. Girdlestone's *Note on Events in 'Omān subsequent to the Expulsion of Syud Salim*, written in 1869; and by Mr. C. E. Buckland's *Précis of Muscat Affairs from October 1869 to March 1872*. Mr. Buckland's *Précis* was carried on by himself to June 1873; by "F. C. D." to July 1874; by an anonymous summarist to July 1875; by Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, Assistant Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, from August 1875 to December 1884, inclusive; by Lieutenant W. Stratton, First Assistant Political Resident, to the end of 1888; and by Captain S. H. Godfrey, First Assistant Political Resident, to the end of 1892. Another *Précis of Maskat Affairs*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, completes the series down to 1905.

The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, beginning with one for 1871-72, supply a concise chronicle of events in 'Omān from year to year and contain three valuable monographs, viz., *Outlines of the History of 'Omān from A. D. 1728 to 1883*, by Captain E. C. Ross, in the Report for 1882-83; and a *Biographical Sketch of the late Seyyid Sa'eed-bin-Sultan* and a *Sketch of the Career of Seyyid Sultan-bin-Ahmad*, by Colonel S. B. Miles, in the Reports for 1883-84 and 1887-88 respectively.

The work known as Aitchison's *Treaties* disposes fully and conclusively, in 'Omān as elsewhere, of the subject with which it is concerned.

Zanzibar affairs, which until 1858 were interwoven with (and even now are not entirely divorced from) those of Masqat may be studied in Captain P. D. Henderson's *Précis of Correspondence relating to Zanzibar Affairs from 1856 to 1872*, in Lieutenant M. L. Ramsay's *Précis of Zanzibar Affairs from 1872-1878*, and in Mr. R. N. Lyne's book, *Zanzibar in Contemporary Times*.

The latest portion of this history, that referring to events since 1899, was carefully revised by Major P. Z. Cox, Political Resident, Būshehr, and Major W. Grey, Political Agent, Masqat.

† The origin and nature of the Imamate of 'Omān are explained in the Appendix on Religions.

At the close of the period now under consideration the Nabāhinah were overthrown, and even expelled from their original location in Hajar, by the Ya'āribah, another indigenous family, who seem to have been connected with the chief of Rustāq.

Overthrow of the Nabāhinah by the Ya'āribah.

Affairs of the Portuguese in 'Omān, 1600-24.

On the coast, at this time somewhat neglected by the native powers, whose internecine struggles were carried on chiefly in the interior, the Portuguese had long held sway; but their authority was on the decline. They still occupied Masqat, where they had first appeared in 1507; and that place was, next to Hormūz, their principal military station in the Gulf. There were probably Portuguese posts at Quryāt and Sūr also, but this is uncertain.

Possessions of the Portuguese in 'Omān, 1600.

In 1616, probably at the invitation, and certainly with the assistance, of a native chief named 'Omair-bin-Himyar, the Portuguese attacked and captured the Bātinah seaport of Sohār, of which the increasing trade had caused a diminution in the receipts of their customs houses at Masqat and Hormūz; the town was burned to the ground, and the fort, taken by bombardment and assault, was permanently occupied by the Portuguese.* Whether this affair had any connection with the contest between the Nabāhinah and the Ya'āribah cannot be determined; but the decline of the Nabāhinah appears to have followed very closely on the capture of Sohār by the Portuguese. In 1623, as mentioned in the next paragraph, the Portuguese, after the loss of Hormūz—their chief settlement,—added Khor Fakkān to their possessions in 'Omān.

Capture of Sohār and Khor Fakkān by the Portuguese, 1616 and 1623.

Relations of Persia with 'Omān, 1566-1623.

Shortly after the fall of Hormūz the Persians seized Sohār and Khor Fakkān; but before the end of 1623 they were again ejected from both places by the Portuguese commander Ruy Freire de Andrade.

* In 1522, nearly a century before, the Portuguese had expelled the Persians from Sohār; they did not, on that occasion, take direct possession of the place but contented themselves with setting up a native ruler under Portuguese protection.

RULE OF THE YA'ĀRIBAH, 1625-1744.

Under the Ya'āribah rulers who followed the Nabāhinah, and whose capital was Rustāq, the Portuguese were finally expelled from the country ; and 'Omān, suddenly developing into a naval power, entered, under the auspices of the new dynasty, upon a career of piracy, aggression, and foreign conquest.

Internal affairs of 'Omān from the rise of the Ya'āribah to the expulsion of the Portuguese, 1625-50.

Effective
control
established
over all
'Omān by
the Ya'āribi
Imām.

The first of the Ya'āribi line was Nāsir-bin-Murshid, a relative of the Rustāq chief who had opposed the Nabāhinah ; he proceeded, immediately after his election to the Imamate in 1625, to reconvert that office from the shadow that it had become into a reality. In the course of a reign of more than 20 years he brought the whole of the interior, including Sharqīyah, under his effective rule.

Affairs of the Portuguese in 'Omān, 1625-50.

Position of
the Portu-
guese at
Masqat,
1625-40.

After the fall of Hormūz in 1622, a number of the Portuguese who had resided on that island removed to Masqat, bringing with them Muhammad Shāh, a nephew and namesake of the native ruler of Hormūz whom the Persians had carried into captivity ; this prince the Portuguese at Masqat continued, at first, to treat as if possessed of royal dignity. By the influx of the new settlers the size and importance of the Portuguese station at Masqat were for a time increased ; and Pietro della Valle, when he visited the place in 1625, found there two churches and a motley population of Portuguese, Arabs, Indians and Jews. The principal fort then was the modern Mīrāni ; and at the top of the pass leading to Kalbūh the Portuguese had a rampart, defended by artillery, to prevent incursions into the town from that side. In Bātinah, where the Portuguese still retained Sohār, they were held in such execration that their merchant vessels at times dared not touch to obtain water.

In 1634 the Portuguese repaired their forts at Masqat ; and about 1640 the place was deemed an "impregnable fortress." The appointment of Commandant was believed to be worth 50,000 ducats a year.

It was at this time, however, that the Arabs of 'Omān, encouraged by the growth of their own power, began a series of assaults upon the Portuguese which ended in the expulsion of the latter from the country. In 1640 the Imām of 'Omān, being informed by Arabs employed in the Portuguese customs house at Masqat that the garrison had been seriously reduced by the despatch of troops with a naval expedition, attacked the place ; but he was repulsed with considerable loss. On the 7th of November 1643, however, Sohār was captured by the Arabs, some of the Portuguese garrison being killed and others taken prisoners ; and Khor Fakkān, if it had been retained after its capture by Ruy Freire in 1623, which is doubtful, must apparently have been lost about the same time. At length, on the 16th of August 1648, a large Arab force, under the command of Sa'id-bin-Khalifah, commenced a regular siege of Masqat ; and on the 11th of September, the ammunition of the Portuguese beginning to fail, negotiations were opened ; but the demands of the Arabs were so extravagant that the besieged prolonged their defence to the uttermost and did not finally capitulate until the 31st of October, by which time the hills above Makallah had fallen into the possession of the enemy, and plague, with a mortality of 50 a day, was raging in the town. Peace was then arranged on the following terms : that the Portuguese should raze to the ground certain forts which they possessed at Matrah, Quryāt and Sūr* ; that the Imām should demolish a fort which he had built at Matrah, that place for the future to be considered neutral ; that 'Omāni vessels should go abroad unchecked, but should take Portuguese passes for the return voyage ; that subjects of the Imām should pay no duties, either personal or commercial, on entering or leaving Masqat ; that trade should be in every respect free ; and that the Arabs should destroy all fortifications erected during the siege, while the Portuguese should not build anything upon the site of their demolished works. These terms clearly involved the financial ruin of the Portuguese settlement ; but there was no alternative to acceptance. The Captain-General of Masqat, Dom Julião de Noronha, and the Vedor of Finances were subsequently placed under arrest by order of the King of Portugal with a view to an enquiry into their conduct ; but the final result of the proceedings against them is not recorded.

Arab attack
upon Masqat
and loss of
Sohār, Qur-
yāt and Sūr
by the Portu-
guese,
1640-48.

* Mr. Danvers (II. 296) gives the name as "Dobar," but from another authority it appears that Sūr must be meant.

Fall of
Masqat,
January
1650.*

The end, after this, was not long delayed. Towards the end of 1649, Masqat being again in a state of siege, but no proper watch kept, a body of Arabs entered the town by night, killed a number of unresisting people, and invested the Portuguese Factory and also one of the forts; the Portuguese commander, being hard pressed, had retired into the fort and was thus separated from the bulk of his arms, ammunition and supplies, which, contrary to regulations, were stored in the Factory. By a vessel which arrived at Diu on the 18th of January 1650, carrying some 700 Masqat refugees, news of these events reached India, and a fleet was at once despatched to Masqat by the Viceroy of Goa; but it arrived too late. The fort had surrendered on the 23rd of January, and the Factory three days later, to a very inconsiderable force of Arabs. Some natives who fought on the Portuguese side were said to have shown great courage; but the conduct of the Portuguese Captain-General was pusillanimous, if not treacherous; and a Portuguese fleet which happened to be present in the harbour, instead of attempting to recover the town, had weighed anchor for Diu. To escape the results of an enquiry into his behaviour on this occasion, the commander of the fleet, Braz Caldeira de Mattos, subsequently fled to Cochin; he was condemned, but could not in any case have been executed, being a Cavalheiro.

Relations of Persia and England with 'Omān, 1625-50.

In 1625, as mentioned in the chapter on the General History of the Persian Gulf, the Persians, under an alleged agreement, claimed the assistance of the English, their recent allies in the capture of Hormūz, for the purpose of reducing Masqat. It was considered by the representatives at Sūrat of the East India Company that it would be inexpedient plainly to deny the obligation, but they found means of evading compliance with the Persian demand.

Internal affairs of 'Omān from the expulsion of the Portuguese to the Persian invasion, 1650-1736.

Prosperity
and naval
power of
Omān.

The Ya'arabi era was, for the most part, one of internal peace and prosperity, during which wealth increased and learning flourished; it was remarkable also for a sudden and extraordinary development of naval

* The version of the capture of Masqat given by Hamilton in his *New Account* (I. 59-62) appears improbable, though he had it from an individual who professed to be an eye-witness.

power, which led to irregular warfare and piracy by 'Omānis, beginning about 1677. In 1695 the fleet of the Masqat Arabs, as they were then called by strangers, comprised five considerable vessels carrying 1,500 men; and in 1715 it consisted of one ship of 74 guns, of two of 60 and of one of 50, besides 18 smaller vessels carrying 32 to 12 guns, and some Trankis or rowing vessels of 8 to 4 guns,—an imposing naval force with which the officers of the Imām terrorised the shores of the Indian and Arabian oceans from Cape Comorin to the Red Sea. The 'Omānis, under Sultān-bin-Saif II, seized and temporarily occupied Bahrain about 1718; and along the Arabian coast, about the same time, the authority of the Imām extended as far to the southward as the Kuria Muria Islands.

The Ya'arabi period was disturbed, towards its close, by a contest for the succession that paralysed the power of the Imām abroad and gave birth to the Hināwi and Ghāfiri factions at home,—a source of 'anarchy which none of the later rulers of 'Omān have been able to suppress, and very few to control. Rustāq, the capital under the Ya'aribah, was seized by the adherents of a youthful pretender to power; but the rightful Imām was able to maintain himself till his death in the central district of 'Omān, not however without the help of a remarkable partisan leader, Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, of the Miyāyihah or Bani Ghāfir tribe. About the time of the true Imām's decease, in 1723, Muhammad-bin-Nāsir took Rustāq and captured the person of the claimant, in whose name he at once proceeded to act against the boy's former supporters; but among these a leader, hardly inferior to Muhammad-bin-Nāsir himself, had now arisen in the person of Khalf-bin-Mubārak, known as "the Dwarf," a Shaikh of the Pani Hina. In 1724 a request on the part of Muhammad-bin-Nāsir to be relieved of the guardianship of the young Ya'arabi ruler was met in a strange fashion by the elders of 'Omān, who elected Muhammad personally to the Imāmship; and he, having accepted the charge and made Jabrīn in central 'Omān his headquarters, ruled for four years with much vigour. He conducted successful campaigns in almost every part of the country; reduced marauding Bedouins to order for the first time; pursued the Āl Wahibah even into the Ruba'al-Khālī desert; and had many encounters in different districts with his ubiquitous adversary Khalf, who, in the later stages of the war, made Masqat town his base and held it carefully. Muhammad's last operations were against Sohār, which had defied his authority; Khalf marched to the relief of the besieged garrison; and the final catastrophe, in 1728, was one of dramatic completeness, for both leaders were killed in a complicated action that took

Rise of the
Hināwi and
Ghāfiri poli-
tical factions,
1723-28.

place under the walls of the fort. The origin, composition, and even the names of the modern Hināwi and Ghāfiri factions are traceable to the tribal combinations formed in this war by the genius of Khalf the Hināwi and Muhammad the Ghāfiri.

Relations of the Portuguese with 'Omān, 1650-1736.

The expulsion of the Portuguese from Masqat seemed to increase rather than to diminish the enmity of the 'Omānis towards that nation; and frequent conflicts, described in the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, occurred between them, both at sea and on shore. In 1652 a strong Portuguese fleet appeared off Masqat and night, it was considered by some authorities, have destroyed the 'Omān navy and retaken the town. Between 1693 and 1699 various naval encounters took place in which the Portuguese generally had the advantage; the 'Omānis retaliated with destructive raids upon the Portuguese settlements of Kung in the Persian Gulf, Mangalore in India, and Mombāsah in East Africa; and eventually they took possession of the last named place. In 1714-19 a fresh series of naval battles occurred in Indian and Persian Gulf waters, in which the Portuguese were completely victorious.

Relations of the English with 'Omān, 1650-1736.

The dealings of the English with 'Omān during this period were generally friendly; but towards its close a partial rupture occurred in consequence of the piratical misdeeds of the Arabs.

Scheme for
an English
settlement
at Masqat,
1659.

In 1659 the establishment of an English station and a garrison of 100 men at Masqat was seriously contemplated by the East India Company's Presidency of Sūrat, as a means of strengthening their position in the Gulf against the Dutch and Persian Governments; but the consent of the Imām to the project could not be obtained, and it came to nothing.

Loss of the
"Merchant's
Delight" on
Masirah
Island, 1684.

About 1684 a London ship, the "Merchant's Delight," was cast away on Masirah Island; but the Bedouins of a neighbouring camp, on a promise of receiving half the cargo and influenced by superstitious motives, treated the crew with unexpected friendliness and even

hospitality, and despatched them in Trankis or "Barks without Decks" to Masqat, along with their full share of the cargo.*

It will be seen, on reference to the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, that after the Masqat Arabs had embarked, about 1695, on a career of piracy, they continued for a time to respect all English vessels; and when eventually, about 1700, they began to depart from this principle, they still confined their attention to the ships of private traders, which were themselves frequently piratical, and did not meddle with those of the East India Company. The Bombay authorities, notwithstanding representations in 1695 by their agents in the Persian Gulf, who feared that the Dutch might gain the good graces of the Persians by assisting them against the pirates of Masqat, decided at first to hold aloof, as no English vessel up to that time had suffered; but later, in 1704-05, when the depredations of the "Muscateers" had become general, it was resolved by the Court of the Company to undertake the suppression of 'Omāni piracy as soon as the war between England and France should be ended. In 1707 Arab pirates were said to be still exercising their vocation along the Indian coast; but after this, though no decided measures were taken by the English or any other European nation, piracy seems to have ceased,—probably in consequence of dynastic disputes and the Hināwi-Ghāfiri conflict in 'Omān.

Piracies by
'Omānis on
English
vessels, about
1700-10.

Relations of Persia with 'Omān, 1650-1736.

During this period the relations between Persia and 'Omān were hostile. During the piratical epoch covering the last decade of the 17th and the first of the 18th century the efforts of the Arab buccaneers were chiefly directed against Persian trade and shipping, which suffered severely. Towards 1720 the 'Omānis appear to have seized some of the Persian islands in the vicinity of Bandar 'Abbās, and for a time to have retained possession of the same. A Persian force which was sent to expel them in 1720 was recalled northwards by the Afghan invasion of Persia in that year; and there is no further information in regard to the proceedings of the Arabs on the islands.

* Hamilton's *New Account*, Vol. I, pages 56-58.

Persian invasion and occupation of 'Omān, 1737-1744.

Difficulties
of the Imām
Saif-bin-
Sultān II.

The line of the Ya'āribah had now become degenerate, and its ruin was shortly brought about by a combination of causes. The Imām Saif-bin-Sultān II, finding himself hard pressed by a competitor for the Imāmate, took a body of Balūch mercenaries* into his service; but they were soon destroyed. He then sought the assistance of the Persian sovereign, Nādir Shāh, and at the same time admitted one of his own subjects, a merchant named Ahmad-bin-Sa'id, Āl Bū Sa'idi, to his confidence, thereby placing himself in the power of two persons whose interests, as the event showed, were inimical to his own.

Persian in-
vasion and
occupation,
1737-38.

Nādir Shāh did not neglect the request for aid made to him by the Imām of 'Omān; but from the first it was clearly perceived, at least by the English in Persia, that the object of the Shāh was not, as he pretended, to assist the Imām to suppress rebellions among his subjects, but to annex 'Omān to Persia. The Persian expedition sailed from Bandar 'Abbās on the 1st of April 1737; it was under the command of Latifeh Khān and consisted of about 5,000 men with 1,500 horses. The Dutch, under pressure from the Persians, contributed a ship to the armament; but the English were careful not to involve themselves in the affair. Disembarkation on the Arabian coast apparently took place at Khor Fakkān, where a small fort was built of which the remains were still visible in 1779; and the chiefs of the adjacent Rās-al-Khaimah district seem before long to have tendered their submission to the Persian general. In the course of 1737-38 the Persians overran the whole of 'Omān; captured Masqat, a place of rising importance, but not as yet the capital of the country; and besieged Sohār, where Ahmad-bin-Sa'id, the recently promoted favourite of the Imām, held out against them with great determination. The Imām, apparently, was not altogether incapacitated for action; for in 1741, when he still possessed 9 top-sail vessels, a supposed combination between him and the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah with the object of seizing an island near the Persian coast and thence plundering Bandar 'Abbās greatly alarmed the Persians; and, in the same year, the Persian Government were much perturbed because an English ship had taken a navigation pass from the Imām, and because the commander of a British vessel had proposed to sell it to that potentate.

Expulsion of
the Persians,
1744.

A new claimant of the Imāmate having been killed in a partially successful attempt to raise the siege of Sohār, and the Imām himself

* This seems to have been the beginning of the system, now well established in 'Omān, of relying on foreign mercenaries, especially Balūchis.

having died of a broken heart at Hazam, Ahmad-bin-Sa'id was left for a time to contend alone against the Persians in Bātinah. Ultimately however the 'Omānis, united among themselves by the excesses which the invaders everywhere committed, expelled the Persian troops from the interior of the country and even obliged them to abandon the siege of Sohār. After this Ahmad-bin-Sa'id obtained the surrender of Masqat town by a bloodless stratagem; but he completed his patriotic task—it is said—in a different manner, by inviting the whole Persian force to Barkah, where he caused them to be treacherously massacred.

IMĀM AHMAD-BIN-SA'ID, 1744-83.

Election of the Imām Ahmad, 1744.

In recognition, doubtless, of his services to the country by the expulsion of the Persians, the successful governor of Sohār was invested with supreme authority in the state, thus becoming the founder of the Āl Bū Sa'idi dynasty which still governs 'Omān. His election to the Imāmate, which probably took place at Rustāq, appears to have been regularly conducted; but it is doubtful whether the suffrages of the electors were unanimous. The opposition, afterwards, of some of the Ghāfiri tribes to his rule favours a conjecture that he was carried into power chiefly by the Hināwi faction, to which his own tribe, the Āl Bū Sa'id, belonged.

Rebellions and other events in 'Omān, 1744-83.

The reign of Ahmad, though undisturbed by the aggression of foreign powers, was chequered, to the very end, by internal and domestic troubles. These arose chiefly from the efforts of the displaced Ya'arabi family to recover their position, from the hostility of a large Ghāfiri element to the new Imām, and from the rebellious conduct of two of Ahmad's sons; and, if the sons did not carry their disloyalty so far as to endanger the common interests of the family, the Ya'arabi chiefs and the Ghāfiris, on the other hand, several times reduced the Imām to serious straits.

Contest with
the Ya'aribah.

Extant accounts of the contest with the Ya'aribah are inconsistent, but it seems to have broken out almost immediately after the promotion of Ahmad to the Imāmate. The leader on the side of the Ya'aribah was one Bal'arab-bin-Himyar, a member of the former ruling family; he had his headquarters at Bizaili in Dhāhirah, and his principal supporters were Ghāfiris of the Ya'aqib, Miyāyihah, Na'im and Bani Qitab tribes. In the beginning of the campaign Bal'arab held possession of the field; but in the end he was defeated and slain by the Imām. Āfi in Wādi Ma'awal and Farq near Nizwa are mentioned by conflicting authorities as the scene of the final overthrow of the Ya'aribah.

Rebellion in
Dhāhirah
and Western
Hajar.

The next serious crisis which the Imām Ahmad had to face was one brought about by the intrigues of Nāsir-bin-Muhammad, a Ghāfiri chieftain of the Dhāhirah District. This crafty individual, who had been restrained by jealous neighbours from building a fort at 'Ainain in Wādi-al-Kabir, succeeded in connecting himself by marriage with the Imām and thereafter placed the valuable stronghold of Ghabbi in the hands of the latter, by whose protection he was enabled to carry out his schemes of private aggrandisement at 'Ainain. As soon as his object was secured he threw off his allegiance, raised the country against the Imām, and himself seized Ghabbi. Hilāl, the eldest son of Ahmad, was sent by his father into Wādi Bani Ghāfir and punished the Miyāyihah, who had taken a leading part in the rebellion, by the destruction of all their towers; but a subsequent advance on Ghabbi by Ahmad in person, which was made from Sohār as a base, ended in disastrous failure and in an accommodation under which, apparently, Ghabbi was retained by the Imām's treacherous brother-in-law. This incident seems to prove that forts in the interior of 'Omān were gained and lost by the Āl Bū Sa'id no less lightly in the early days of their rule than at the present time.

First revolt
of the Imām's
sons Saif and
Sultān, 1781.

In February 1781, towards the end of Ahmad's reign, his sons Saif and Sultān revolted against his authority and took Barkah by surprise: they even put to death the Wāli and garrison who held the place in the name of the Imām. Barkah was quickly recovered by bombardment and the young rebels were pardoned, after which the Imām marched against a Ya'arabi chief whom he had made governor of Nakhl, and whom he now suspected of having countenanced the attempt on Barkah. The Imām's attack on Nakhl, notwithstanding extensive preparations on his part, was unsuccessful and resulted in an ignominious peace; and, while his forces were employed before Nakhl, a body of Na'im and Bani Qitab raiders from Dhāhirah swooped down upon Matrah, *viâ* Wādi Samāil, and plundered the town. This was the first of a long series of

similar episodes, of which the last occurred so lately as 1895. Afterwards Hazam, where some of the Ya'arabi family had their abode, shut its gates against the Imām; and, his artillery having proved incapable of reducing the fort, that place also was lost to him.

A second and more successful rebellion on the part of Saif and Sultān took place at this juncture, in December 1781. The brothers seized the forts of Jalāli and Mirāni at Masqat, and were eventually permitted to retain them, on condition that Saif should accompany his father as a hostage. This arrangement, brought about by the mediation of the Qādhis of Rustāq, lasted for one year only, at the end of which time Ahmad, having repented of the compromise, made Saif a close prisoner and prepared to bombard the forts. A fresh accommodation then took place, in accordance with which Saif was set at liberty, Ahmad was placed in possession of Fort Mirāni, and Fort Jalāli was handed over unconditionally to Saif and Sultān. In the following year, however, Saif and Sultān kidnapped their brother Sa'id at Barkah and retired with him to Fort Jalāli at Masqat; no reason for their action is suggested by the native historian, but jealousy of Sa'id, whose succession may have been desired by the Imām, possibly supplied the motive. The Imām immediately marched from Rustāq and took up a position on Masqat Island, cannonaded Fort Jalāli from Fort Mirāni and also from the open sea to eastward, and finally caused an unsuccessful assault to be made by his troops on a breach that had been opened in the western face of the besieged work. Unappeased by the accidental escape of Sa'id from the fortress, the Imām continued his operations with vigour; but, intelligence having been received of the investment of Rustāq in his absence by Ibn-Rahmah,—a chief, it would appear, of the region now known as Trucial 'Omān,—he once more forgave his sons and raised the siege.

Second revolt
of Saif and
Sultān, 1781-
82.

Ibn-Rahmah did not await the Imām's return to Rustāq, but immediately withdrew to his own country.

Internal political position at the Imām Ahmad's death, 1783.

The Imām Ahmad died in the end of 1783, at Rustāq, and was buried there on the west side of the fort. Before his death, perhaps even early in his reign, he had contracted a matrimonial alliance with the Ya'arabi family, by taking to wife a daughter of the late Imām Saif-bin-Sultān. Ahmad is described as having ruled the whole of 'Omān from Ja'alān to Baraimi; but it seems that at the time of his death neither the districts of Dhāhirah and Jau, nor the important strongholds of

Nakhl and Hazam, though closely adjoining his capital, were in his possession. Masqat, even, was partly held by his rebellious sons ; and it may be doubted whether his control over the rest of the country was at all complete or effectual. In Africa the port of Mombāsah, which had belonged to his predecessors in the Imāmate, was lost during his reign to a family of the Mazārī' tribe.

Relations with North-Western 'Omān, 1744-83.

The political status, in the reign of the Imām Ahmad, of the promontory that divides the Gulf of 'Omān from that of Persia is somewhat obscure. The overlordship of the Imām appears to have been at first admitted, under compulsion, by the inhabitants of that region ; but according to one account, an advance against Sohār by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah was among the earliest of the dangers which Ahmad-bin-Sa'id had to encounter after his accession ; and, though the Qāsimi chief was on this occasion obliged to retire after a drawn battle at Bithnah in Wādī Hām, the Imām also lost credit by the engagement. In 1758, a combination having been formed against the Imām by Mulla 'Ali Shāh of Hormūz and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, a Masqat fleet proceeded to Dibah, but did not, apparently, engage the enemy. In 1760 some vessels were sent by the Imām to Bandar 'Abbās to assist the Khān of Lār and the Bani Ma'in in an attack on the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah ; but no attack was in the end made, the Khān being prevented by difficulties with Karīm Khān, Vakīl, of Shīrāz from embarking on the expedition. As will be seen later on, there was in 1773 an alliance between the Imām of 'Omān and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, directed against the Persians ; but by 1775 it had broken down and hostilities by land had been resumed between the two Arab powers, and in 1780 there was again warfare by sea. The attack by the northern chief Ibn-Rahmah—probably Shaikh Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah, one of whose ancestors was named Rahmah—on Rustāq in 1783 has already been noticed above.

Relations with Persia, 1744-83.

That no fresh invasion of 'Omān by the Persians took place, after the accession of Ahmad to the Imāmate, was probably due less to the

military reputation and resources of the new Imām than to the death of Nādir Shāh in 1747, and to the difficulties with which Nādir's successor, the Vakīl Karīm Khān, had to contend.

Hostilities continued, however, between some of the local authorities in Persia and the Imām; the former watched the proceedings of the latter with much jealousy and lost no opportunity of annoying him and opposing his policy. Thus in 1753, as related in the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, the Khān of Lār took possession, with the assistance of the East India Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās on whom he did not scruple to put pressure, of a ship that had been bought by the Imām of 'Omān from 'Abdul Shaikh, the ruler of Qishm, as an addition to his navy. In 1758, as already mentioned above, the Imām was threatened by a combination between Mulla 'Ali Shāh of Hormūz and the Arab Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and in 1760 he became a party to an alliance, of which the Persian Khān of Lār and the Bani Ma'in Arab tribe of the Persian coast were also members, against the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah; but on neither occasion, it would seem, did any actual hostilities occur. In 1765 the coffee annually exported from Masqat to Basrah was loaded, for the sake of security against the Ka'ab, who were then marauding in the Shatt-al-'Arab, on one of the Imām's men-of-war; but this ship, not venturing to proceed beyond Khārag, halted there towards the end of the year to warehouse her cargo in the Dutch settlement, and was taken along with the island, on the 1st of January 1766, by Mīr Mahanna, the piratical chieftain of Rīg. In 1767 Mīr Mahanna held up a fleet of Sūr vessels carrying coffee to Basrah and, "under the pretext of Customs and a kind of compulsory commerce, squeezed from them 380;" and in autumn of that year over 1,000 bales of coffee had collected at Masqat which, from dread of the Mīr, could not be sent up the Gulf.

1753-67.

In 1769 the Vakīl Karīm Khān, whose position at Shirāz had for some years been well established, demanded the restitution of a Persian ship that had come into the possession of the Imām, also payment by him, with arrears, of the tribute at one time rendered to Nādir Shāh. Both demands were rejected by the 'Omān Government, who replied that the ship had been lawfully purchased from Shaikh 'Abdullah of Hormūz and would not be given up; and they further argued "that," "with respect to the annual tribute paid Nādir Shāh, he was too powerful" "a tyrant to contend with, and it was therefore paid him, not as a" "tribute of right, but as a tribute it would be very impolitic to refuse" "him; Nādir Shāh however and Carem Caun, they said, were powers" "widely different; the one they dreaded, the other they rather despised;"

1769-79.

“the one was the conqueror of all Persia, the other only Vackeel of two”
 “or three of its provinces; if, therefore, Carem Caun thought proper”
 “to persist in his demands, they would answer him by cannon and ball,”
 “if he made use of that kind of argument with them.” The Sūr coffee
 fleet for Basrah was accordingly detained at Masqat by the Imām, though
 not until two Sūr vessels “laden with coffee and other gruff” had been
 captured by Persians on the voyage to Basrah; and petty hostilities
 at sea followed, in which the advantage generally rested with the Imām
 and his allies. In 1770 the Imām’s fleet, carrying a considerable land
 force, made a demonstration against Būshehr; and in 1773 his Wālī
 of Masqat,* in conjunction with the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and
 Hormūz, destroyed two Persian gallivats belonging to Bandar ‘Abbās and
 a Persian magazine at Lingeh. At the end of 1773 Karīm Khān had
 collected a naval force at Kangūn under Mīr Mihr ‘Alī of Rīg; it con-
 sisted of the captured British vessel “Tyger,” of an old ship from
 Būshehr specially fitted out for the occasion, and of all the Rīg and three
 other gallivats; but the crews could not be induced to put to sea against
 the Imām, and the Ka’ab of ‘Arabistān, who were directed to assist,
 evaded compliance with the order. Eventually, in the spring of 1774,
 after an unsuccessful effort by the Vakīl to obtain the co-operation of the
 British and of the Mutasallim of Basrah in an expedition against Masqat,
 Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr was placed in command of the united Persian
 fleets and empowered to negotiate a settlement with the Imām, who now
 professed to desire amicable relations with Persia and even released some
 Persian property on which he had seized; but, as Karīm Khān on the one
 side would not abandon his claim for tribute, and as Ahmad, on the other
 hand, remained obstinate in his refusal to pay, nothing could be arranged;
 and the Imām ultimately announced that his fleet would proceed to Basrah
 as usual, relying on its own power to defend itself against Karīm Khān
 and every other enemy. In August 1775, when Mr. Parsons visited
 Masqat, the Imām’s navy was lying there and at Matrah in readiness to
 convoy a large fleet with provisions for Basrah, which was now besieged
 by the Persians; the fighting force consisted of no less than 34 vessels,
 of which four, built at Bombay, carried 44 guns each, five were frigates
 of 18 to 24 guns, and the rest ketches and galliots mounting from 14
 to 8 guns apiece. The Persians were still permitted to resort to Masqat
 for trade, though for no other purpose; but there was such a congestion
 of goods at the port, due to the war, that half of the merchandise lay

* This was Khalfān-bin-Muhammrad, who afterwards in 1787 received the traveller
 Francklin at Masqat.

piled up in the streets,—unsheltered from the elements, but safe from plunder under the protection of the Imām's excellent police. It was reported that the Imām intended, in case Basrah fell, to despatch a Saiyid, accompanied by the Mughal Envoy at Masqat, to the Vakīl to solicit peace and promise payment of an annual tribute; and Karīm Khan, when Basrah was at length taken in 1776, called for a report as to the possibility of operating from thence by land against 'Omān; but no decisive step was taken upon either side. The Shaikh of Hormūz, under orders from the Vakīl, was by this time waging maritime war against the Imām, and in the summer of 1776 he seized a vessel belonging to his own subjects which was laden with merchandise from Masqat for Būshehr and Bahrain; but in November 1778 he was kidnapped by treachery, or otherwise seized, and carried off to Masqat in an 'Omāni vessel. In the following year, however, he was again at liberty. The death of Karīm Khān in 1779 destroyed, for the time being, the influence of Persia in the Persian Gulf and increased the consequence of 'Omān and the other maritime Arab states, which it left in undisputed possession of that sea.

Relations with Turkey, 1744-83.

On the occasion of the siege of Basrah by the Persians in 1775-76, an expedition was, as we have seen, prepared by the Imām for the assistance of the Turks, who had lately refused to make common cause with his enemies; and it was instrumental in retarding for a time the surrender of the town. The operations of this fleet at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab are described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq. It is stated that encouragement to withhold tribute from Persia, held out to the 'Omānis by the Turks, was one of the considerations which decided Karīm Khān to send his troops against Basrah; but the natural disposition of the 'Omāni ruler, in these circumstances, to side with the Porte appears to have been further stimulated by the promise of a Turkish subsidy. The trade of Masqat, at this time, was to a very large extent with Turkish 'Irāq, the annual visit of the 'Omāni "coffee fleet" in particular being an important event at Basrah; and in 1791 the Turks were drawn into hostilities with the Ka'ab tribe in consequence of an attack by the latter on 'Omāni vessels in the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Relations with India, 1744-83.

Diplomatic relations between 'Omān and India arose, during the reign of the Imām Ahmad, from assistance rendered by an 'Omāni delegate with a ship of war in destroying a piratical community on the Malabar coast who had interrupted the rice trade between Mangalore and Masqat. This courtesy led to the despatch, through the grateful Governor of Mangalore,* of an Envoy nominally on the part of the Mughal Emperor of India; the Envoy visited Rustāq and concluded a treaty by which the Mughal Government bound themselves to support the Imām with men and money against his enemies. This mission, which had its beginning about 1774, or perhaps 1776, terminated in 1800; but, a site in Masqat town having been allotted to the Envoy, who eventually came to be known simply as "Tipu Sultan's Wakil," he built on it a house which, at the middle of the 19th century, was still in existence and was known as the "Nawāb's House." In 1776 it was expected that the Imām, if Basrah fell, would request the good offices of the Envoy in accommodating matters between him and Persia; but it does not appear that these expectations were realised.

Relations with European powers, 1744-83.

Relations
with Britain,
1774-83.

The relations of the East India Company with 'Omān, though they had not as yet any European representative in the country, were of a friendly character; but their policy with reference to the frequent difficulties between the Imām, on the one side, and the Persian Government, petty Persian chiefs and Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, on the other, was generally neutral. In 1753, as we have seen, the Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās sided with the Khān of Lār in a dispute about a Persian ship which had been sold by a Persian subject to the Imām of 'Omān; but in 1758, on the other hand, it was complained that the captain of an English ketch had hired her out to the Imām for use in a naval expedition which he contemplated against Rās-al-Khaimah. In 1763 Mr. Price, on being appointed Provisional Agent in Persia, was ordered to touch at Masqat on his way to the Gulf to obtain intelligence; and he

* At the time Tipu Sahib, afterwards of Mysore. This was the colour given to the transaction, but it is difficult to believe that the Mughal Government of the day had really much to do with it.

was authorised to present "Sundries" worth Rs. 200 "in the Hon'ble Company's name, as a mark of their favour" to a Hindu broker named Narotam, who was their local representative and had done good service in transmitting news to India. In 1769 the Company's servants at Basrah were inclined to assist the Imām by convoying the trading vessels of his subjects to Basrah; but they refrained, partly on account of peremptory orders given them to avoid hostilities with Karīm Khān and partly because they believed that Ahmad was capable of making adequate arrangements without their help. In 1769 a Mr. Boddam* from the Presidency visited Masqat without advising the Agent and Council at Basrah of his proceedings; they considered his action in this respect to be improper and suggested an apology; but the Bombay Government held that the demand was "most absurd and ridiculous, as Mr. Boddam" "was in no shape under their orders or accountable to them for his proceedings." Mr. Boddam's visit was mentioned by the Government of 'Omān many years afterwards as the occasion on which friendly relations between themselves and the British power were instituted. In 1771 the Basrah Agency suggested an alliance with the Imām for the purpose of suppressing the pirates of Rīg and Khārag, whose proceedings they attributed to the instigation of Karīm Khān; but the proposal, which was connected with one for a British naval and military expedition on a large scale, was disapproved; the Court of the Company in London, however, indicated that during the continuance of piracy Masqat might be used as a port of rendezvous, from which "the shipping bound up the Gulph" might be escorted to its destination by British cruisers.† In 1773 the members of the British Agency, on their withdrawal from Basrah to Bombay under Mr. Moore on account of plague at the former place, remained from the 4th to the 6th of May at Masqat; and here one of their number, a Mr. Abraham, was left behind with instructions to proceed to Būshehr and thence report on the progress of affairs at Basrah. On their return to Basrah, later in the year, the Basrah Agent and his Council again put in at Masqat, where they were detained from the middle of November until the 1st of December by the necessity of repairing damage sustained by the ketch "Euphrates" through losing her rudder and driving ashore at the entrance of the harbour. In 1778 the Company were represented at Masqat by a native broker named Narāin Dās, who apparently still held office at the time of Colonel Capper's visit in 1779.

* Probably Mr. R. H. Boddam, who in 1785 was Governor of Bombay.

† The order was perhaps intended to apply to British shipping only; but Parsons, writing in 1775, states that native vessels running to and from Basrah took advantage of the British convoys.

Relations
with France.

The only other European Government maintaining relations with 'Omān at this period was the French monarchy, which, through its agents at Baghdād and in the Mauritius, for a time kept up a correspondence with the Imām and sent him occasional presents of military material. In 1781, however, this amicable intercourse was interrupted in consequence of the wrongful seizure by a French privateer of the "Sālih," a 50-gun ship belonging to the Imām; nor was it resumed until several years afterwards.

General.

When the traveller Niebuhr, early in 1765, passed through Masqat, there was still no resident European, either official or non-official, at that port.

Internal administration and revenue, 1744-83.

Ahmad, though indifferently supported by his subjects on various occasions, enjoyed their respect and esteem in a high degree and left behind him a not unmerited reputation for justice and liberality. The people of Sohār, in particular, showed a steady attachment to their former governor and lent him valuable aid in more than one crisis of his affairs. Full religious liberty was allowed by Ahmad, even to Hindus; and security of the person and property of foreigners at Masqat was ensured by an efficient police.

Ahmad affected greater state than previous Imāms. He surrounded himself with a court in which not only political personages but also literati and men of the law held an honoured place; and he was a patron of poets, or at least of such poets as eulogised his character in their works.

His revenue from the customs of Masqat was estimated in 1765 at Rs. 1,00,000. Import duty in those days was determined by the national or religious status of the merchant; it was 5 per cent. *ad valorem* for Europeans, 6½ per cent. for Muhammadans, and 9 per cent. for Hindus and Jews.

The Imām also collected 6 per cent. in kind on the date harvest, which was then, as it is still, the most valuable economic asset of the country; and he was at the same time a private trader, importing slaves and ivory in his own vessels from Zanzibar and Kilwa.

Military resources of the Imām Ahmad.

The naval force of the Imām consisted, in 1765, of four large and eight small vessels; the former in time of peace were employed by their

master in the East African trade, and the latter were supposed to keep the waters of 'Omān free of pirates,—a duty which they could not effectually perform. By 1775, as we have seen, the Masqat fleet had greatly increased, and held the sea against the Persians. The Imām maintained a body-guard of African slaves for the defence of Rustāq and a mounted contingent of free Arabs for service in the open country, besides whom, on exceptional occasions, he was accustomed to import Jadgāl and other mercenaries from Makrān. The troops of the Masqat garrison were armed, at the time of Niebuhr's visit, with matchlocks, swords and daggers; and the pay of each man was four rupees a month.

Trade of Masqat under the Imām Ahmad.

The trade of Masqat with Basrah furnished cargo, about 1765, for some 50 vessels (called Trankis) per annum; and it is interesting to observe that the mariners of Sūr were already well known on account of the important part which they played in the coffee trade, *viâ* Masqat, between Yaman and Turkish 'Irāq. The removal of the British Agency from Bandar 'Abbās in 1763 was very advantageous to Masqat, which by 1775 had become the principal entrepôt of trade between the Persian Gulf, India and the Red Sea. Exports at Masqat supposed to be brought from the interior of Arabia were gums, drugs, ostrich feathers, hides and skins, honey, bees-wax and live cattle and sheep; and imports from abroad, for local consumption, were Indian piece-goods, pepper, ginger, rice, tobacco, coffee and sugar, and English cloth, cutlery and toys. The transit trade embraced all articles of commerce in the Gulf.

IMĀM SA'ID-BIN-AHMAD, 1783.

Sa'id's election and virtual deposition, 1783.

Hilāl, the eldest son of Ahmad, was disqualified by blindness for the office of Imām, and the choice of the electors fell upon his next brother Sa'id,—the same who had played an undignified and passive part in the dissensions between the late Imām and his sons Saif and Sultān. Sa'id-bin-Ahmad was the last genuine elected Imām of 'Omān, and also the last ruler of that country to reside at Rustāq. He early became

unpopular with his subjects; and, after two unsuccessful attempts had been made to supersede him in favour of his next eldest brother Qais, he virtually abdicated in favour of his more capable son Hamad. Sa'id, in retirement at Rustāq, appears to have sunk into a lethargic state not far removed from imbecility; but up to the time of his death, which did not occur until long afterwards in the reign of Sa'id-bin-Sultān,* he continued to enjoy the title of Imām; and on one occasion he even reappeared, for a brief space, as ruler of the country.

SAIYID HAMAD-BIN-SA'ID, 1784-92.

Events in 'Omān, 1784-92.

Hamad, in achieving his usurpation, had recourse to intrigue and deceit; but he refrained from violence, and his conduct may be excused on the ground of his father's incompetence and of the impossibility of maintaining the ascendancy of the family by any other means.

The attempts made to dethrone Sa'id in favour of his brother Qais had proved the possession of popularity by the latter; but more dangerous to Hamad was the rivalry of his uncles Saif and Sultān, whose ambition had disturbed the closing years of the Imām Ahmad. Saif was soon compelled to leave the country for East Africa, whither Hamad pursued him, and he ultimately died at Lāmu; but Saiyid Sultān, though he fled to Gwādar in 1784 and received a grant† of that place from the Khān of Kalāt, from time to time renewed the contest upon the soil of 'Omān. On one occasion, with the support of the local Ghāfiri tribes, he invaded Wādi Samāil, all but captured Hisn Samāil, and succeeded in destroying a part of Saijah. Another time, in the absence of Hamad at Rustāq, he plundered Matrah and established himself for a while at Dārsait; and, in an attempt to dislodge him from that place, the Wāli of Masqat was defeated and was pursued by Sultān to the Jabru gate of Matrah. Open warfare has never been an obstacle in the Āl Bū Sa'idi family to friendly interviews between relatives engaged upon opposite sides, and meetings from time to time took place between Hamad and Sultān, each of whom had a salutary respect for the courage and duplicity of the other.

Hamad died of small-pox at Masqat in 1792 and was interred in one of the Wādis behind the town.

* Sa'id-bin-Ahmad was still alive in 1811, but by 1821 he was dead.

† See the history of Gwādar, page 601. The title of the present Sultāns of 'Omān to Gwādar depends on this grant.

Reign and policy of Hamad, 1784-92.

So far as can be gathered from the meagre accounts of his regency that are extant, Hamad was a youth of equal moderation and spirit, and was especially diligent in strengthening the military bases of his power. By conciliatory treatment he made the Ya'arabi governor of Nakhl his fast friend for life; with the help of the Bani Kalbān he wrested the strong fortress of Bahlah from a Shaikh of the 'Abriyīn; he fortified Ruwi, and strengthened the defences of Masqat and Barkah; and he caused a large frigate, the "Rahmāni," to be built for him at Zanzibar.* In 1790 Masqat, of which the trade and shipping continued to increase, was the richest and most flourishing port in the whole Persian Gulf region.

But the most important measure of Hamad's reign was probably the transference of the capital from Rustāq in the interior to Masqat upon the sea coast. This was a step fraught with lasting and momentous consequences. It removed the rulers of 'Omān from a situation in which they could only maintain themselves by military and political efficiency; it placed an assured and easily collected customs revenue within their reach, enabling them to maintain a semblance of authority by bribery alone; and it eventually exposed them to the influences of a foreign civilisation which estranged them from the tribes of the interior and diminished their popularity with their subjects. Had the capital remained at Rustāq, it is possible that 'Omān might have enjoyed in the following century the benefits of a more direct and vigorous government, and that the moral decay of the ruling family might have been less rapid.

Removal of
the capital
from Rustāq
to Masqat,
about 1784.

Other political changes of importance were in progress at this time. A tendency towards hereditary sovereignty, which had already shown itself in the time of the Ya'aribah, was confirmed under the first rulers of the Āl Bū Sa'īdi line; but, though the succession was henceforth confined to one family, no exact principle of devolution was established; and the new régime, which may be described as one of imperfect heredity, soon proved to be more fertile of discord than the system of popular election that preceded it. About this time, also, there came into vogue a practice of granting appanages to the near relations of the ruler; and, as these grants generally took the form of a Waliship or local government, which the holders frequently strove to convert into an independent Shaikhdom, they conduced to the dismemberment of the country and to the paralysis of the central government.

Other signifi-
cant innova-
tions.

* This vessel was destroyed by fire in Masqat harbour three days before Hamad's death. It bore the same name as an older ship, belonging to the Imām Ahmad, which had been employed against the Malabar pirates and took part in the relief of Basrah.

Relations with European powers, 1784-92

British relations, 1784-92.

Under the reign of Hamad, the 'Omān Government continued to refuse applications which were repeatedly made to them for permission to establish a British Factory at Masqat; and in 1785 the Company were still unrepresented there, except by a native broker whose name is given as "Coja Chunder-Caun."

French relations, 1784-92.

In 1785 the port was visited by three French vessels from the Mauritius; the first, which arrived on the 22nd of August, was a man-of-war carrying 44 guns and a crew of 350 men; the other two, which came into harbour on the 25th, were of smaller size, and one of them was a merchant ship. The French remained for some days; and it was reported that they had sought leave to open a Factory, but that it had been refused by the Governor, Shaikh Khalfān, under the orders of the Imām.

SAIYID SULTĀN-BIN-AHMAD, 1792-1804.

The evil results of the changes just described above did not become apparent under Sultān, the fifth son of the Imām Ahmad, whom natural force of character now placed at the head of affairs. His rule, on the contrary, was strong; and 'Omān, which his premature ambition had frequently disturbed, became at length the gainer by his energy and resolution. The reign of Sultān may be roughly divided into two periods separated by the year 1800. The first of these was distinguished by conquests of new territory; the second was occupied by a struggle, not entirely successful, to defend the frontiers of 'Omān against the encroachments of the Wahhābis of Central Arabia and their allies the Qawāsim of the 'Omān Promontory.*

Usurpation of Sultān and dismemberment of 'Omān, 1793.

On the death of his son Hamad, the nominal Imām made a short-lived effort to assert himself; but Saiyid Sultān was not inclined to

* The Qawāsim are strictly a small family, which has furnished, during more than a century, the Shaikhs of Shārajah and Rās-al-Khaimah. Even at the present day, however, the name Qawāsim is sometimes used to describe all Arabs subject to the authority of the Qāsimi family; while at the beginning of the 19th century the term seems to have included all tribesmen subject to Qāsimi influence, or, in other words, all the inhabitants (except the Bani Yās) of what is now Trucial 'Omān, and possibly those of Ruḥs-al-Jibāl as well.

submit to Sa'id's authority and soon made himself master of Barkah and of the Masqat forts. Sultān was at first supported by his brother Qais, the holder of Sohār and Matrah, in whose interests he even professed to be acting; but the seizure of the Matrah fort by Sultān at length opened the eyes of Qais to the hollowness of his friendship. Sultān then completed his conquests by expelling from the castle of Bait-al-Falaj the last garrison that held out against him in the Masqat district. Upon the position, thus consolidated, of Sultān the united forces of Sa'id and Qais could make no impression, especially as the Ghāfiris throughout the country were favourable to Sultān, whose mother was a relative of their Tamīmah or principal chief. In virtue of a family compact framed at Barkah, probably at the beginning of 1793, Sultān was invested with the chief authority in 'Omān and his irregular acquisitions were recognised, while the titular Imām was confirmed in possession of Rustāq, and Sohār was preserved to Qais. After this settlement the brothers appear to have lived in amity; and, on Sohār being threatened about 1799 by the Na'im, who were accompanied on this occasion by the Bani Qitab and a contingent of Bani Yās from Dibai, Sultān and Sa'id proceeded to the assistance of Qais and inflicted a sanguinary defeat upon the invaders at "Dabbāgh," possibly Liwa. About the same time Sultān was able effectually to chastise the Darū' Bedouins, who had been disturbing the general peace of the country. The fort of Nakhil, however, seems to have remained, throughout the reign of Sultān, in possession of a virtually independent representative of the Yā'arabi family.

Conquests and acquisitions of Sultān on the Persian coast, 1793-94.

One of the first acts of Saiyid Sultān on his accession to power was to occupy Gwādar, where his exile had been passed under the protection of the Khān of Kalāt. Here a Wālī deputed by Sultān established a fort; and from this place the Wālī subsequently proceeded by Sultān's orders against Chahbār, which he captured by surprise and added to his master's dominions. Saiyid Sultān in person then conducted a naval expedition against the Bani Ma'in ruling Qishm and Hormūz, whom he worsted and overthrew; and a natural but historically important result of this success was the transfer, in 1794, of the revenue*

* 1794 was the year in which Āgha Muhammad Khān, Qājār, finally overthrew Lutf 'Ali Khān, Zand. The lease of Bandar 'Abbas, etc., if it was formally granted, may have been given by either of these.

lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which then included Mināb and the islands of Qishm, Hormūz and Hanjām, from the Shaikh of the Bani Ma'in to the ruler of 'Omān. The yearly rental was probably not more at first than \$4,000, the amount at which it still stood in 1821; but a surety for payment seems to have been required by the Persian Government from the Saiyid, and to have been furnished by him in the person of a Persian merchant and banker named "Haji Khebat."

Friction with Persia and Turkey, and war with the Qawāsīm, 1794-1800.

The sudden appearance in the Gulf of a power so aggressive as 'Omān was under its new ruler seems to have caused widespread anxiety. In 1797 a rupture took place between 'Omān and Persia, and the Shaikh of Būshehr was directed by the Persian authorities to prepare a land force to be embarked against Masqat; but he was not, apparently, able to give effect to his instructions.

In 1798 Saiyid Sultān, who seems to have maintained that he had a pecuniary claim against the Baghdād Government in consequence of the services rendered by his father during the siege of Basrah, made peace with his constant enemy the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah and seemed about to prosecute his demands upon the Pāsha of Baghdād by force. His attitude so disturbed the Turks that they at one time sought the good offices of the British Resident at Basrah; but in the end the matter was amicably adjusted, without British intervention, between the Mutasallim of Basrah and the commodore of the Masqat coffee fleet, then at Būshehr.*

After the settlement of this dispute, Sultān, ever energetic, seems to have reopened hostilities with the Qawāsīm: he had been at war with them previously during the whole of 1797. A naval attack which he made on Dibah was repelled by the Sharqiyyīn and Naqbiyyīn tribes, but not without severe loss to themselves. At the beginning of 1800 Sultān was still at war with the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah.

Attempted subjugation of Bahrain, 1799-1802.

War with
Bahrain and
seizure of
Khārag,
1799.

The reduction of the Bahrain islands was, from this time onwards, the chief object of Saiyid Sultān's endeavours; but the Wahhābi difficulty, which we shall presently describe, now hampered all move-

* At the suggestion of Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, Captain Malcolm was authorised in 1799 to advise the Saiyid to maintain friendly relations with the Turks, who were in close amity with the British Government, but it does not appear what action he took in this respect.

ments on his part, and the cheme was never fully realised. The pretext for war against Bahrain seems to have been the refusal of the 'Atbi Shaikhs of those islands to pay a due which Sultān claimed the right to levy on all ships entering the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean; but his chief object was probably to obtain control of the most valuable pearl market in the Gulf. In 1799, under an arrangement with the Persian governor of Fārs, he proceeded to cruise against the 'Utūb and captured three of their vessels; but the only result of these operations was to throw the 'Utūb into the arms of Persia, for they now tendered their allegiance to the Shāh and even paid one year's revenue as a guarantee of sincerity and good faith to Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, the representative of the Persian Government in the matter, who had proffered his services as mediator. Sultān indemnified himself by seizing the island of Khārag, for the lease of which to himself he began to treat with the Persian Government over the head of Shaikh Nāsir, the actual farmer; but his proposals were not entertained, and in August 1800 the Shaikh re-occupied Khārag with a force of 1,500 men from the mainland.

In 1800 Sultān's forces made a successful descent upon Bahrain, and his young son Salīm was placed in nominal charge of the islands with headquarters in the fort of 'Arād on Muharraḡ Island, an experienced Wālī being attached to him as his adviser. An expedition by Sultān's forces against the town of Kuwait, where some of the 'Utūb of Bahrain had taken refuge, was not successful, unless in outward appearance; and shortly afterwards, Salīm having been besieged in 'Arād and compelled to surrender, the 'Omāni occupation of Bahrain came to an abrupt end, having lasted only a few months.

First occupa-
tion of
Bahrain,
1800-01.

Soon afterwards Saiyid Sultān again landed troops in Bahrain, but the Wāhhābis had now undertaken to assist the 'Utūb, and this time the Saiyid was compelled to invoke the aid of the Persian Governor-General of Fārs, which after some delay he obtained. The arrival of a Persian contingent from Būshehr enabled Sultān to defeat the 'Atbi Shaikhs in the summer of 1802; but, before he had completely driven them out of the islands, the growth of the Wāhhābi danger near home obliged him to suspend his active operations and, in the end, to withdraw altogether from Bahrain.

Second occu-
pation of
Bahrain,
1802.

First Wāhhābi invasion of 'Omān, 1800-03.

The progress of the Wāhhābi power in Eastern Arabia now claims our attention.

Early proceedings of the Wahhābis in 'Omān.

In 1800, after the occupation of the Hasa and Qatif Oases by the Wahhābis, a large Wahhābi detachment, mounted on horses and camels, made their way thence by land to Baraimi on the confines of the 'Omān Sultanate; here their leader Harīq, a Nubian slave, established a fortified settlement; and here the Na'im, Bani Qitab and other tribes of Dhāhirah, who were unfriendly to the central government of 'Omān, quickly identified themselves with the Wahhābi cause. Saiyid Sultān, ever prompt in action, made peace with his enemy the Qāsīmī Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah and marched, *vid* Wādi-al-Jizi, against Baraimi; but the result of the first encounter was so unfavourable that he made a truce with Harīq and retired on Sohār. This temporary respite from hostilities at home enabled Sultān, as we have seen, to prosecute his designs against Bahrain with some measure of success; but, in that direction also, the influence of the Wahhābis, which was thrown into the scale of the 'Utūb, retarded the progress of his arms; and a fresh breach with the Wahhābi Amīr, which occurred in 1803, destroyed his last hope of success in Bahrain.

Hostilities precipitated, 1803.

The immediate cause of the final rupture seems to have been the favourable reception by Sultān of overtures from the Sharīfs of Makkah, who were then endeavouring to defend the Hijāz district of Western Arabia against the assaults of the Wahhābis. Early in 1803 Sultān had himself gone on pilgrimage to the Holy Cities, leaving 'Omān to be governed in his absence by his young son Sālim, assisted by a council of regency; and, though he did not himself take any active part in the hostilities between the Sharīfs and the Amīr, he assisted the former with money and munitions of war, and possibly also with the loan of a small armed contingent. During the absence of Sultān his nephew Badar, the son of Saif, after failing in an attempt to obtain possession of Fort Jalāli at Masqat, fled to 'Ajmān and thence to Zubārah, eventually making his way to Dara'iyah, where he associated himself closely with the Wahhābi Amīr.

Naval campaign of the Wahhābis against 'Omān, 1803.

The resentment of the Wahhābi ruler at Sultān's conduct in Hijāz affairs, intensified by the aversion which he already felt for him as an Ibādhi heretic, at length broke forth in a declaration of war. As suzerain of the Qawāsīm of Rās-al-Khaimah and of the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Kuwait, the Wahhābi Amīr now called upon them, unwilling though they were to abandon the pearl fishery for the season, to cruise against the subjects of the 'Omān Government; and they reluctantly obeyed his summons. Alarmed by a new development that seemed to threaten the future safety of their own coasts, the Persian and Turkish authorities in the Gulf at first showed a disposition to make common cause

with Saiyid Sultān ; but for want of courage, or possibly of the appropriate means, their good intentions remained inoperative ; and the ruler of 'Omān was left to bear the brunt of the Wāhhābi's displeasure alone. Sultān quickly destroyed the war fleet of the 'Utūb ; but his enemies were too numerous for him, even at sea ; and he found himself unable to undertake offensive operations and at the same time protect his own coasts from ravage. A descent by a hostile squadron on the island of Qishm, then a dependency of 'Omān, which they overran and pillaged, was among the incidents of this maritime warfare.

At last, a mission having been sent by Sultān to Dara'iyah, a truce was concluded for three years on condition that 'Omān should pay an annual tribute of \$12,000, and that a Wāhhābi political agent should be allowed to reside at Masqat. The truce, however, had hardly begun, when it was violated by the Wāhhābis.

Peace made,
but violated
by the
Wāhhābis.

The Wāhhābi troops under Harīq entered the Bātinah district, committing unspeakable atrocities as they advanced towards Masqat ; and a force despatched by Saiyid Sultān for the defence of Suwaiq, which was in danger, was ambushed by them in difficult ground and almost altogether annihilated. In this emergency a national council of war was convened by Saiyid Sultān at Barkah, and it was resolved to continue the struggle against the invaders to the uttermost. The first object of the patriotic assembly was to raise the siege of Sohār, where Harīq, after his successful action near Suwaiq, had invested Qais ; and Khābūrah was appointed as a place of rendezvous for the tribes of 'Omān. When, however, a large force had collected at Khābūrah and was about to march on Sohār, Harīq, who in the meanwhile had probably received intelligence of the assassination of his master 'Abdul 'Azīz at Dara'iyah, withdrew from Sohār to Baraimi ; and the 'Omāni leaders, satisfied apparently with the retirement of the enemy, allowed the great tribal muster to disperse.

Land cam-
paign of the
Wāhhābis
against
'Omān.

Relations of Saiyid Sultān with Britain, 1792-1804.

A choice of policy, more momentous even than his decision to resist the Wāhhābis, was imposed on Saiyid Sultān by the strife which prevailed from 1793 to 1802 between the British and the French in eastern seas ; his final decision was not taken, however, until 1798.

British interests in 'Omān were still represented by a native broker, who in 1793 asked to be supplied with a British pass and flag for a vessel that he owned. In 1796 Lieutenant Skinner was sent to Masqat with a ship, with instructions to enquire whether there were any

British
affairs in
'Omān from
1792 to 1798.

Frenchmen residing at Masqat; if there were, he was authorised to offer the governor of the port from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000 for the surrender of each with his papers; but, in the case of M. de Corches or of the Abbé de Beauchamp, who was stated to have been sent as French Resident to Mauritius, or of Mr. Humphries, "an Englishman of notorious character," who was to have accompanied M. de Corches, the amount might be raised to Rs. 8,000. No Frenchmen were found at Masqat, however; and Saiyid Sultān, in a friendly letter to the Governor of Bombay, denied the presence of any. In 1797 a request by the Company's broker (Narotam Ram Chandar Raoji) to be allowed to import salt into Bengal was refused, but he was granted instead a salary of Rs. 100 a month. At the same time he was instructed to present a letter from the Governor of Bombay to Saiyid Sultān and, in conjunction with the Commander of one of the Company's ships, to obtain from him an assurance that the vessels of the French, and of the Dutch who were in alliance with them against Britain, would be prevented from visiting Masqat under Arab colours,—a device to which they had begun to resort and which made impossible their capture by the British at sea.

Mission of
Mehdi 'Ali
Khān and
First Agree-
ment with
Britain,
1798.

In 1798 the occupation of Egypt by a French army and the suspected designs of Bonaparte in the East impelled the British authorities in India to seek a closer understanding with the ruler of 'Omān, as also with the other native powers in the Gulf. In September 1798 Mirza Mehdi 'Ali Khān, a Persian gentleman of good family who had been selected for the appointment of British Resident at Būshehr, was deputed to the Gulf in the "Panther"; he was instructed to ascertain at Masqat the real disposition of Saiyid Sultān towards the French, to endeavour to dissuade him from assisting them, and to report on the trustworthiness of the Company's broker, which had come under suspicion, in political matters; he was further to obtain, if he could, a concession for the establishment of a British Factory at Masqat; and he might promise, in case the Saiyid undertook to exclude the French from 'Omān, that a surgeon would be sent him from India. In the space of ten days, at an expenditure of only Rs. 2,820, Mirza Mehdi successfully discharged the greater part of his commission; for he obtained the execution by Saiyid Sultān, on the 12th October 1798, of a Qaulnāmeḥ, or written agreement, securing the main objects of British policy. By this document the ruler of 'Omān bound himself always to take the part, in international matters, of the British Government; to deny a commercial or other foothold

in his dominions to the French and Dutch nations, so long as a state of war should prevail between their Governments and the British East India Company ; to dismiss from his service and expel from 'Omān an employé of French nationality ; to exclude French vessels, which then made Masqat a base for privateering operations against British commerce, from the inner anchorage used by British ships, or, in case of a fracas occurring in the port, to lend active assistance to the British ; and, finally, to permit the British to establish, should they wish to do so, a large fortified Factory and a sepoy garrison at the port of Bandar 'Abbās, which the Saiyid then held on lease from Persia. Dissuaded, however, by the Company's broker, he refused to permit a British Factory at Masqat, on the ground that such a concession might involve him in a war with the French and the Dutch ; and, though he at first agreed to receive an English gentleman as political agent at Masqat, he subsequently withdrew his consent under the influence of the broker, who represented that constant disputes would result. Saiyid Sultān requested that his vessels in Indian ports might be supplied with wood and water free of charge, a privilege enjoyed by British vessels visiting Masqat, and that each of his ships might be allowed to discharge 5,000 maunds of salt at Calcutta instead of 1,000 maunds only, which was the maximum prescribed for ordinary Arab vessels ; both of these points were referred by the Mirza to the Bombay Government for a decision. Saiyid Sultān also wrote a letter to the Governor of Bombay, acknowledging the presents which he had received, and assuring him that a vessel which he had despatched to Mauritius had been sent there only to obtain restitution, if possible, of a ship seized by the French. The removal from his post of Narotam Ram Chandar Raoji, the broker, whom the envoy represented as favourably disposed to the French and the Dutch, was ordered by the authorities at Bombay ; but in the meanwhile he died. His place was given to Vishn Dās, a nominee of Mehdi 'Ali Khān, who was entertained on a salary of Rs. 100 per mensem ; but this appointment also was not entirely suitable, for it was afterwards found that Vishn Dās was in the service of Saiyid Sultān.

In the year following the conclusion of the Agreement, facts came to notice which brought the attitude of Saiyid Sultān towards the British Government once more under suspicion ; in particular it was alleged that he still employed Frenchmen in his service and exhibited a partiality for their nation ; that his governor of Zanzibar had shown incivility to Commodore Blankett of the Royal Navy, who happened to call there for

Suspected continuance of relations and correspondence between Saiyid Sultān and the French, 1799.

supplies with a squadron of His Majesty's ships; that he had himself facilitated the transmission of presents from Tipu Sultān to the Shāh of Persia; that he had suffered the French to bring a ship belonging to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, which they had taken, into Masqat harbour; that he had allowed a ship to carry to Mauritius a quantity of grain and sulphur taken in the "Pearl," a native vessel under British colours which had been captured by the French, the rest of the cargo being openly sold in the Masqat bazaar; and that he had received, on the 10th of November 1799, a French agent specially deputed to him from Mauritius. The doubt which these reports excited was intensified when a British man-of-war intercepted at sea a letter from Bonaparte to the ruler of 'Omān, containing an enclosure for Tipu Sultān of Mysore. This interesting document was dated Cairo, the 25th of January 1799; it informed Saiyid Sultān of the French occupation of Egypt, credited him with friendly sentiments towards France, promised protection to merchant vessels which he might send to Suez, and requested him to transmit the enclosure to Tipu Sāhib. The enclosure held out to Tipu Sāhib hopes of aid by Bonaparte in throwing off the British yoke. Whether Saiyid Sultān, subsequently to his treaty with the British, had done anything to invite such a communication it is at this distance of time impossible to determine; but the Indian Government of the day must have had substantial grounds for dissatisfaction with his conduct, for they were led to consider the propriety of withdrawing certain indulgences that had been extended to him at Indian ports,—possibly those relating to wood, water and salt for which he had petitioned in 1798.

Captain Malcolm's
Mission, and
Second
Agreement
with Britain,
1800.

At the end of 1799 Captain John Malcolm, who was then despatched by the Government of India on his first political mission to the Persian Court, was instructed "to adjust, while at Maskat, any points relating to our interests at that place" which might be recommended to his attention by the Government of Bombay; but he was not to allow negotiations with Saiyid Sultān to delay him on his way to Persia. With him sailed in the Company's ship "Intrepid" Assistant-Surgeon A. H. Bogle, who had been selected, in case matters should be satisfactorily arranged, as physician to the Saiyid and British Political Agent at Masqat; for the Saiyid had asked that an English physician might be sent to attend him. Dr. Bogle's salary was fixed at Rs. 500 a month exclusive of field allowance, which also he was to draw. Captain Malcolm, learning at Masqat that the Saiyid had gone on a cruise, landed Dr. Bogle and proceeded on his way to the Gulf, where, on the 17th of January 1800, he had the good fortune to find Saiyid

Sultān on board his ship the "Gunjava," in the anchorage between the islands of Qishm and Hanjām. On the next day, "after a short but explicit conversation," Saiyid Sultān, on whose mind the submission of the whole western coast of India to the British power—and possibly the failure of Bonaparte in Syria—had produced a deep impression, set his seal to a new Agreement which Captain Malcolm, though without definite instructions on the subject, thought it advisable to propose; this document confirmed the former treaty in its entirety and provided for the admission of a British Political Agent at Masqat, as a means of averting misunderstandings. Captain Malcolm then continued on his voyage to Būshehr, while Saiyid Sultān sent to Masqat for Dr. Bogle, who joined him at Hanjām on the 12th of February; and when the "Gunjava" returned to Masqat, on the 29th of that month, Dr. Bogle had already established himself in the Saiyid's confidence and regard and had received from Captain Malcolm written instructions to assume the position of British Political Agent at Masqat. Saiyid Sultān requested, both through Captain Malcolm and Dr. Bogle, that eight or ten European artillerymen might be sent from Bombay to replace several French employés whom he was about to discharge from his service; it does not appear, however, whether this concession was granted. Shortly before the arrival of Captain Malcolm in the Gulf the Saiyid had sought the good offices of the Bombay Government for the purpose of obtaining a ship for himself at Bombay.

In 1800 Saif-bin-Muhammad, who was acting as regent of 'Omān during the absence of the Saiyid on an expedition against the Qawāsim, wrote to Mirza Mehdi 'Ali Khān complaining that a permit given to his master by the Government of Bombay for the importation of 10,000 maunds of salt at Calcutta had been disregarded by the authorities in Bengal. The Resident in reply reminded him of the recent suspicious dealings of his Government with the French at Masqat, and advised him "to look upon the friendship and esteem of the English Government as the soul by which Muscat breathes and has its being," and to "fly the continuation of the French fraternity as you would the plague." At the same time, irritated perhaps by Captain Malcolm's supersession of himself in Persia and by the appointment of Dr. Bogle at Masqat, he suggested to the Governor of Bombay that the Saiyid should be attacked on account of his "ambiguous connection," and that a lease of Masqat to the British, which might be had for the asking, should be obtained from the Shāh of Persia; but these suggestions appear to have been ignored. The seizure of Saiyid Sultān's salt at Calcutta was subsequently shown to have been due to his having neglected to obtain a

Further relations of Saiyid Sultān with Britain, 1800.

certificate covering the consignment from the Company's broker at Masqat.

British Political Agents,
1800-03.

Dr. Bogle, the first British Agent or Resident at Masqat, died in less than a year, a victim of the Masqat climate, and was succeeded in 1801 by Captain David Seton of the Bombay Army. Ill-health obliged Captain Seton in 1802 to take a year's leave to India, but in June 1803 he returned to his post.

Repulse of a French mission in accordance with the British treaties,
1803.

The fidelity of Saiyid Sultān to his engagements with the British power was after this subjected to a severe test ; but he emerged with credit from the ordeal. General de Caen, who in the spring of 1803 had been appointed by Napoleon to be Captain-General of the French possessions in the East and had received a special commission to report on the position of the British in India, now established himself in Mauritius, and thence despatched, in September 1803, a M. de Cavaignac whom Napoleon had himself invested with the quality of French Consul and Political Agent at Masqat. On the 3rd of October 1803 M. de Cavaignac reached Masqat in the French frigate "Atalanta," a well-known ship of her day. Fortune at first seemed to smile upon his enterprise, for Captain Seton had left Masqat on a cruise in the Persian Gulf and the town was full of French sympathisers, chiefly merchants and others who had commercial relations with Mauritius. While awaiting the return of Saiyid Sultān, then engaged at a distance in negotiating with the Wahhabi commander, M. de Cavaignac was made aware of the existence of the British agreements of 1798 and 1800, hitherto apparently unknown to the French ; this discovery may perhaps have prepared him for the ultimate failure of his mission. On the 12th of October Saiyid Sultān arrived in his capital and immediately informed the French mission that, while he was willing to discuss commercial matters, he could not, on account of his agreements with the British, accept a French representative at Masqat, or even entertain proposals on such a subject. So decided was his attitude that no interview at all took place between him and M. de Cavaignac, and the "Atalanta," after remaining one day more in port to test the finality of his reply, vanished under cover of night.

Reasons of Saiyid Sultān's adherence to the British interest.

That Saiyid Sultān consented to enter into an exclusive arrangement with the British and that, having done so, he scrupulously regarded its obligations are facts of which the explanation is to be sought in the importance to the inhabitants of 'Omān of the Indian trade, rather than in any personal preference on the part of the ruler for Englishmen over Frenchmen. It seems to have been directly intimated to Sultān more than once, that, were he to throw in his lot with the French,

the British Government would have no alternative but to place his dominions under a commercial blockade from the side of India. The deportation of the French army from Egypt in British ships and the victories of Lord Lake over the Marāthas in India, too, were significant events which cannot but have influenced his political views.

Notwithstanding his loyal observance in difficult circumstances of an important treaty, the conduct of Saiyid Sultān at this time was regarded by the Bombay Government as unsatisfactory, chiefly in regard to the prevalence of piracy. The fact seems to have been that Sultān wished to make it a rule that every ship proceeding up the Gulf should put into Masqat and receive a safe conduct or a convoy, to protect her against pirates, from his officials there ; and when ships under the British flag disregarded this condition, as they frequently did, and afterwards suffered by the misdeeds of pirates under Sultān's real or nominal jurisdiction, he was somewhat slow to inflict punishment or enforce restitution.

Difficulties
between
Saiyid Sul-
tān and the
Government
of Bombay,
1803-04.

In particular, Sultān appears to have been held responsible for the depredations of one Nāsir, a Suwaidi or member of the Sūdān tribe, who, after forsaking his home in the Shaikhdom of Rās-al-Khaimah, had settled on the island of Hormūz, in the jurisdiction of the ruler of 'Omān, and thence had committed several piracies. On one occasion, the Suwaidi seized a botella * belonging to Mīrza Mehdi 'Alī Khān, before mentioned, while carrying British official despatches ; but Saiyid Sultān in this instance obliged him to restore the boat to the owner, and himself transmitted the despatches to their destination.

Again a vessel owned by Muhammad Nabi Khān, afterwards Persian Envoy to India, was captured by the Suwaidi while navigating under British colours ; and a small vessel carrying gunpowder consigned from the Bombay Arsenal to the Turkish Governor of Basrah likewise fell into his hands. On the last occasion some even of the local officials, subject to Masqat, were supposed to have shared in the plunder. Sultān was perhaps reluctant to take action in these later cases, for nothing was done by him until the Bombay Government had sent the "Duncan" with Indian troops on board to the Gulf ; and, though Captain Seton accompanied him on an expedition to Hormūz which ensued, the offenders with all their property were allowed to escape to Hasa, where they joined the Wāhhābis.

It was further alleged that Saiyid Sultān had allowed property looted by the people of Nakhilu from the British ships "Hector" and "Alert," which went ashore in the summer of 1803 upon the Persian coast, to be disposed of at Masqat ; and another grievance against him

* Possibly a Batil is meant.

was the purchase from the captors, by Saiyid Sultān on his own account of the British ship "Armenia" which had been taken by the French. There was also a dispute about the non-expulsion from 'Omān of a party of Frenchmen who had come from Goa to Masqat, protected, as Sultān alleged, by a British pass ; but this last case must have been a weak one, for the men in question, after being seized by a British ship at Masqat and carried off to Bombay, were eventually sent back to 'Omān for disposal.

For the settlement of these difficulties Saiyid Sultān, in the beginning of 1804, sent an agent of his own to Bombay to offer explanations ; and, at the same time, he invoked the mediation of Mehdi 'Ali Khān, lately British Resident at Būshehr, who enjoyed special favour with Mr. Duncan, the Governor. By these means a reconciliation seems to have been in the end effected between the ruler of 'Omān and the Government of Bombay, by whom the death of Saiyid Sultān, when it occurred a few months later, was sincerely deplored.

Relations of Saiyid Sultān with France, 1792-1804.

The nature of the connection between Saiyid Sultān's Government and France has been partially illustrated in the foregoing section, but a few facts remain to be added.

Early relations of Saiyid Sultān with the French.

It is related that Saiyid Sultān, while in rebellion against his father and besieged by him in one of the Masqat forts, succeeded in capturing a French sloop of war which put into the harbour, and was assisted by some of his French prisoners in defending his position by artillery fire. The favourable impression made on his mind by this incident was probably confirmed by the action of the French authorities in 1790, though Saiyid Sultān was not himself upon the throne at that time, in sending a small vessel to Masqat to replace the "Sālih" unjustly seized by a French privateer in the reign of Ahmad,—an act for which reparation had been frequently demanded by the Government of 'Omān.

Employment of Frenchmen by Saiyid Sultān.

The friendly relations between France and 'Omān, restored by this means, were disturbed by the French Revolution ; but Saiyid Sultān, after his accession, freely availed himself of the services of individual French subjects whom chance threw in his way. Among these the best known were Maurelle, a French military surgeon, and Justaigne, a Fleming by birth, who were both cast by shipwreck, but at different times, upon the coast of 'Omān. The article in the Saiyid's Agreement relating to the dismissal of Frenchmen from his service was that which

occasioned most friction with Britain ; and as late as 1801 it became necessary to remonstrate with him on the continued presence of Justaigne at Masqat.

In 1797-98, and even later, there seems to have been constant communication between Masqat and Mauritius. In 1797 the "Lakhshmi," commanded by Captain Crouch, who was possibly an American, visited Masqat from Batavia and then sailed for Mauritius ; and in 1798 it was reported by Captain Spence of the "Pearl" that there was a Frenchman at Masqat who kept two small vessels running between that port and Mauritius.

Communication with Mauritius, 1797-98.

The case of the "Pearl," already referred to above, is somewhat obscure ; but the following seem to be the facts. On the 23rd of September 1799 a French war vessel either passed Masqat at sea, or called there and was hospitably received ; she then proceeded up the Gulf in search of British shipping. On the 29th of the same month a British cruiser with a crew of only 60 or 70 men arrived from Bûshehr at Masqat, took in supplies, and went in pursuit of the Frenchman. Meanwhile the French warship had apparently captured the "Pearl,"—a native vessel under the British flag, with a partly British crew, and bound for India,—on board of which were some horses belonging to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, and some property of Mirza Mehdi 'Ali Khân, the British Resident at Bûshehr. The British and French war ships seem after this to have encountered, with the result that both took fire and blew up ; but the "Pearl" was brought by the French to Masqat, where Mr. Manesty's horses were bought in by the Company's broker and the rest of the cargo was disposed of as already mentioned. Mr. Cramlington, one of the officers of the ill-fated "Pearl," died at Bombay in November 1799 before full information had been obtained from him on the subject.

Case of the "Pearl," 1799.

The dealings of Saiyid Sultân with Tipu Sâhib may be regarded as a branch of his relations with the French, with whom the ruler of Mysore maintained a connection. The Mysore political agency founded at Masqat in the reign of the Imâm Ahmad continued to exist under Saiyid Sultân, but it was now apparently described as a "Factory" ; and in 1797 it was reported that five or six vessels under Mysore colours visited the port every year. Tipu Sâhib's representatives seem to have quitted Masqat somewhat hurriedly soon after the installation of Dr. Bogle there as British Political Agent, and suffered shipwreck, it was said, on the coast of Kach in returning to India ; their master, it should be remembered, was by this time dead.

Dealings of Saiyid Sultân with Tipu Sâhib of Mysore, 1792-1800.

-Last cruise and death of Saiyid Sultān, 1804.

In 1804, on the Wahhābis renewing their efforts for the complete conquest of 'Omān, where they had now succeeded in establishing a post so near to Masqat as Barkah, Saiyid Sultān turned for aid to the British and to the Turks. At the hands of the first he met only with discouragement ; from the second he received many promises but no real assistance. Thrown on his own resources Saiyid Sultān proceeded, in September 1804, to sweep the Gulf with fourteen war-vessels in search of pirates. He eventually reached Basrah, where he had an unsatisfactory interview with the representative of Turkish authority ; the subsidy claimed on account of services at the siege of Basrah and the preparations for meeting the Wahhābis were probably the chief subjects of discussion. On his return homewards, near Lingeh, Saiyid Sultān left his ship, the "Gunjava," for a smaller vessel, the "Badri," in which he proposed to touch at Bāsīdu or possibly to make his way through Clarence Strait to Bandar 'Abbās ; but the little "Badri," when beyond reach of help from the 'Omāni fleet, was attacked at a venture by three Qāsimi war-vessels of Rās-al-Khaimah ; and Sultān, shot through the head with a musket ball in the brief encounter, was buried on shore at Lingeh. This sad event took place about the middle of November 1804.

Character, administration and revenues of Saiyid Sultān.

Saiyid Sultān was a man of bold and enterprising temper ; and in freedom from sensuality, and possibly also in sincerity, he was the superior of his more famous son, Saiyid Sa'id.

Little is known of his domestic policy, but the facts which have been preserved seem to indicate that peace and prosperity prevailed in 'Omān. In 1802 the annual revenue of the Masqat customs was estimated at Rs. 3,00,000,* while the port of Suwaiq yielded Rs. 40,000. Import duty was collected at the rate of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, and a drawback of 2½ per cent. was allowed on goods re-exported. The land revenue of the country had mostly been assigned to relations or to military retainers for their support, and little of it reached the Masqat treasury. There was a valuable export of salt from the territories held on lease from Persia, which, when the salt was admitted to British India, brought in as much as Rs. 1,00,000 a year to the Government of 'Omān.

* In all probability an excessive estimate. The amount about 30 years later was placed at \$100,000, and at the present time, even, it is less than \$300,000.

The private property of the ruler, accumulated for the benefit of his children, consisted largely in date-plantations.

Military and naval resources of Saiyid Sultān.

The standing army of Saiyid Sultān was composed of about 300 armed slaves and 1,700 Sindi, Balūchi, and Arab mercenaries ; in addition to these, however, all Arab subjects were bound to render military service in an emergency, while some enjoyed grants of revenue on condition of responding to every call to arms, and so formed a kind of militia. It was calculated that Saiyid Sultān, with the assistance of his brothers Sa'īd and Qais, could put 20,000 men in the field in 'Omān ; but his means of carrying on war abroad were more restricted ; and in the expedition against Bahrain in 1802 his force only amounted to 7,000 men, of whom 2,500 were Persians.

The strength of his fleet is uncertain,* but it must have been relatively powerful ; for, though he could not entirely protect his long coast line against the great maritime combination which the Wahhābis raised against him, he never apparently hesitated to seek out and bring to action his enemies at sea.

Trade of 'Omān under Saiyid Sultān.

The mercantile marine of 'Omān was at this time in a most flourishing state, and trade had increased enormously in the later days of the Imām Ahmad and since his death.

No less than fifteen ships of 400 to 700 tons, besides three brigs, belonged in the time of Saiyid Sultān to the port of Masqat alone, while Sūr was the headquarters of a fleet of a hundred sea-going vessels of various sizes. The largest craft made voyages to Bengal, returning by Malaya and Batavia, or touching at places on the Malabar coast ; and commercial intercourse was maintained by vessels of inferior capacity with the Persian Gulf, the western coasts of India, East Africa and even Abyssinia.

Mercantile
Marine.

Foreign trade was on a scale corresponding with this large commercial navy ; and it was carefully protected by the local government, who

Foreign
trade.

* His flagship the "Gunjava" was a vessel of 1,000 tons, carrying 32 guns of various calibres. In 1800 he had three others rigged and armed in the European manner, each of more than 20 guns.

showed every consideration for the interests of merchants, whether natives or strangers. The import duties were not heavy, amounting to 6 or 6½ per cent. only, *ad valorem*, on merchandise of all kinds; and the custom of buying and selling for cash, which prevailed at Masqat, commended itself to European traders and was in agreeable contrast with commercial usage at some other ports in the Gulf. In the last decade of the 18th century the proportion of the trade of the Persian Gulf that passed through Masqat was about five-eighths of the whole or one crore of rupees per annum; and almost every line of business there was represented. The principal exports to India, as also to Batavia and Mauritius, were specie, pearls, sulphur, rocksalt, copper, and arsenic; those to the ports of the Red Sea were Basrah dates, pearls, Indian cloth goods and spices; and those to places in the Persian Gulf were Yaman coffee and European and Indian stuffs. The imports by European vessels from India and elsewhere were chiefly piece-goods, Indian cloth goods, sugar, spices, rice, turmeric, indigo, iron, steel, tin, lead, red lead, small cannon, cannon balls, and some coarse firearms, the last three of these articles being mainly supplied by the French. The leading import from the Red Sea was one of coffee, representing, it was supposed, half the entire produce of Yaman, and fully providing the countries of the Middle East as well as, to some extent, Russia, Germany and other European States.

Politico-
commercial
aims of
Saiyid
Sultān.

It is not perhaps wonderful that, in these circumstances, Saiyid Sultān should have claimed an exclusive right to protect navigation in the Persian Gulf, and should have wished for this purpose to make a preliminary visit to Masqat obligatory on all vessels proceeding up the Gulf: the difficulties with the British Government and with the 'Atbi rulers of Bahrain to which these pretensions gave rise have been noticed above in connection with political affairs. It was also the Saiyid's ambition to make Masqat the sole distributing centre of goods from abroad destined for sale on the western side of the Gulf; but the 'Utūb, who were the most enterprising merchants in the Gulf and who had no love for Masqat, preferred after the first to begin and end their trading voyages at Basrah,—a circumstance which secured to that port a good share of the direct wholesale trade with India and other foreign countries. Eventually Saiyid Sultān found it to his advantage to enter into close commercial relations with the Basrah authorities; and thereafter, by mutual arrangement, goods from either port were admitted into the other on payment of a reduced import duty of 3 per cent. *ad valorem*.

SAIYID BADAR-BIN-SAIF, 1804-07.*

Disorders following the death of Saiyid Sultān, 1804-05.

With the death of Saiyid Sultān stable government ceased for a time to exist in 'Omān. The two elder sons of the deceased, Sālim and Sa'id, were minors under the guardianship of Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Jābiri, a relative of Saiyid Sultān on his mother's side; and their succession to the Sultanate was immediately disputed by Qais, the ruler of Sohār, the most active and capable of the surviving sons of the Imām Ahmad. Qais, whose claims were favoured by Sa'id-bin-Ahmad of Rustāq, the nominal Imām, and Muhammad-bin-Ahmad of Suwaiq, his brothers, at once advanced through the Bātinah district, taking possession on the way of Khābūrah and Sīb, and laid siege to the capital.

The position of the young Saiyids was already precarious, when the sudden reappearance on the scene of their cousin† Badar-bin-Saif gave a new aspect to their affairs, for the personal qualities and Wāhhābi connection of the returned exile, who had been summoned to their aid from Zubārah in Qatar by Saiyidah Mōzah, a daughter of the Imām Ahmad and a lady of unusual force of character, immediately caused the balance to incline against Qais. The Wāhhābis having threatened Sohār, and a large contingent of Ghāfiris under Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain having arrived from Dhāhirah in the neighbourhood of Masqat, Qais was obliged to relinquish Matrah, which he had seized, and at first agreed to accept some small scattered additions in Bātinah to his principality of Sohār; but a few weeks later he repented of the arrangement and re-occupied Matrah, once more obliging Badar to requisition Wāhhābi aid. A large Wāhhābi force now proceeded towards Masqat by land; and fifteen of their vessels, manned by 'Utūb and other maritime tribes subject to Wāhhābi influence, anchored in Masqat harbour and caused much alarm in the town by displaying trophies of the sack of Karbala, and by other unusual proceedings. The policy of the Wāhhābis, however, was to keep the contending factions of 'Omān in a state of equipoise; and their interference resulted, on this occasion, in the retention of Matrah by Qais and in the grant to him by Badar of a salary of \$1,000 a month.

Rise of
Badar-bin-
Saif and
Wāhhābi
intervention.

* This short period has generally been treated as a part of the reign of Sa'id-bin-Sultān; but, as will appear, the supreme power was entirely in the hands of Badar till his death in 1807.

† *Vide* page 424 *ante*.

The general outcome of all these evolutions, which seem to have occupied a few weeks only, was the virtual displacement of the young sons of Sultān from power and the substitution of Badar in their place.

Policy of the Government of India, 1805.

The British Government in India, who in the reign of Saiyid Sultān had become accustomed to regard the state of 'Omān as a convenient and ever-ready instrument for the repression of piracy, were much exercised by the uncertainty of the succession at his decease, and by the possibility of the country falling under a government less serviceable than that of Saiyid Sultān to the objects of British policy in the Gulf.

Re-institution of the British Political Residency, 1805.

They accordingly re-established the British Residency at Masqat, which had been withdrawn a few months previously, and despatched Captain Seton to take charge of it; his instructions were to support the interest of the sons of Sultān, if this could be done by influence without involving the British Government in hostilities with the opposite party, but otherwise to establish friendly relations with the *de facto* ruler, and in either case to obtain recognition of the engagements of 1798 and 1800 by the eventual successor of Saiyid Sultān. Captain Seton on his arrival, probably in April, found Saiyid Badar in power and well-disposed to the British Government; and from him he obtained, in May 1805, full and satisfactory confirmation of the treaties made with his predecessor. In the time of Saiyid Sultān, however, the Political Resident had not been allowed to fly the British flag at Masqat, while the house assigned him by the native government was described as a miserable hovel; and it does not appear that any change was as yet made in either of these respects. The Government of India, in re-instituting the Masqat Residency, declared their intention of maintaining it permanently; and it was described at this time by the Government of Bombay, though apparently placed under their orders, as existing "for general purposes, and not solely or principally for the service of Bombay."

Recovery by Badar of the dependencies of 'Omān in Persia, 1805.

Expedition against Bandar 'Abbās and co-operation of the British Resident, May-July 1805.

Captain Seton, whose orders related chiefly to the suppression of piracy, a scourge now rapidly becoming intolerable, took part in a naval expedition that sailed from Masqat in May 1805 for the recovery of Bandar 'Abbās from the Bani Ma'in Shaikhs of Qishm, by whom it had been appropriated during the confusion following the death of

Saiyid Sultān, and for the relief of Mināb, which was besieged by them. Captain Seton considered the recovery by the Saiyid of the Persian dependencies of 'Omān to be an indispensable preliminary to any successful crusade against piracy in the Gulf ; and he thought it likely that, if he were not himself present, Badar might be drawn into proceedings offensive to the Persian and Wāhhābi Governments. The 'Utūb under Wāhhābi influence who had lately visited Masqat joined the expedition at the outset, but deserted it at an early stage of the proceedings. The operations at Bandar 'Abbās in June, and those which followed at Qishm in July, are fully related elsewhere*; here it is enough to mention that the steps taken for the recovery of the leased Persian territories were altogether successful, though they subsequently evoked a strong protest from the Shāh's ministers, but that the blockade of the Qāsimi fleet resulted, in so far as 'Omān was concerned, merely in a truce of 70 days between the Saiyid and the Qawāsīm.

Saiyid Badar, in recognition of the countenance and aid lent him by Captain Seton, and perhaps in the hope of uniting British and 'Omāni interests upon the Persian coast, was willing at this time to authorise the establishment of a British factory at Bandar 'Abbās on such terms as might be desired ; but the offer was declined, as the concurrence of the Persian Government was felt to be necessary.

In the following year the Saiyid succeeded in kidnapping Mulla Husain, the head of the Bani Ma'in, whom he carried off to Masqat and detained until Qishm and Hormūz should be delivered up as a ransom for his release ; but Shaikh Sultān, the Qāsīmī Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, by throwing a force into the town of Qishm, rendered compliance with these terms impossible to the Bani Ma'in. During the absence of the fleet from Masqat in 1805 Shaikh Sultān had made two piratical descents on 'Omān territory, at Sūr and Gwādar.

Internal affairs of 'Omān.

On his return home Badar made ready to assume the offensive against Qais ; but before his preparations were completed Qais appeared at Matrah, invested Masqat by land, and attacked the various entrances to that town in succession, but without result. The Ghāfirīs (especially the tribes subject to that dangerous intriguer, the Shaikh of 'Ainain), some of the Hināwis (including apparently the Hirth under the leadership of 'Isa-bin-Sālih, father of an afterwards celebrated rebel against the rulers of 'Omān), and the titular Imām (Sa'id-bin-Ahmad) allied on this occasion to the side of Badar, who also received assistance

Final defeat
of Qais by
Badar.

* *Vide* page 181 *ante* and page 638 *post*.

from the distant Bani Yās of Dibai, and eventually even from the 'Utūb; while Qais was supported, as was not unnatural, by the Bani Ma'in of Qishm and by some at least of the Qawāsīm. The young Sa'id-bin-Sultān, who was at Barkah, meanwhile succeeded in capturing Sīb and Bidbid, and the garrison of Masqat, encouraged by Sa'id's successes and themselves strengthened by reinforcements, were about to attack Matrah, when Qais, finding the tables turned, entered into negotiations; so unfavourable was his situation that the settlement deprived him not only of Matrah but also of all the other acquisitions, except Khābūrah, which he had made since the death of Saiyid Sultān. A subsequent attempt by Badar to recapture Khābūrah was foiled by the treachery of Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain, who on two occasions had received a present of \$40,000 for his services against Qais; but the forts of Bahlah and Nizwa in the interior were surrendered to Badar by Muhammad-bin-Ahmad, the brother and ally of Qais.

Assassination of Badar by Sa'id-bin-Sultān, 1807.

The power of Qais had no sooner been broken than Sa'id-bin-Sultān, now about seventeen years of age, determined to throw off the yoke of Badar, who, by the assassination some time previously of Muhannah-bin-Muhammad, the Ya'arabi ruler of Nakhl, had deprived Sa'id and his brother of their most loyal and disinterested adherent. In 1807, Sa'id, having decoyed Badar to Barkah, caused him to be murdered near that place in circumstances of exceptional treachery; but his act, instead of meeting with the reprobation which it deserved, was generally applauded and accepted as a proof of his capacity to rule. It led moreover to a reconciliation with Qais, who now placed himself in voluntary subordination to his successful nephew.

SAIYID SA'ID-BIN-SULTĀN, 1807-56.

It seems to have been anticipated by the British authorities that the rule of Sa'id, begun amidst unfavourable omens, would be of short duration: 'Omān, except the sea coast, was in the hands of the Wahhābis; an exodus of the inhabitants from Masqat town had set in, prompted by want of confidence in the new government; and Makrān, with the possible exception of Gwādar, had shaken off Arab control. The event, however, falsified the expectations even of the most competent local

observers; and the reign of Sa'id, though troublous and disturbed throughout, in the end continued for half a century and is thus, probably, the longest in the whole history of 'Omān. Until his death in 1821, Salīm, the elder brother of Sa'id, was associated with him in the government; but his influence on affairs, notwithstanding the excellent relations which to the end prevailed between him and Sa'id, was imperceptible,—a circumstance of which his peculiar and unstable character seems to afford a sufficient explanation.

The reign of Sa'id is naturally divisible into two parts. During the first, which ended in 1829, he was personally occupied with the affairs of 'Omān and of the Persian Gulf, and his policy there was bold and aggressive, somewhat resembling that of his late father. During the second part of his reign, Sa'id's attention was chiefly engaged by his growing interests in East Africa, and Zanzibar became his principal residence, while his position in 'Omān, its maintenance having been abandoned to incapable regents, deteriorated rather than improved.

Hostilities with the Wāhhābis and their allies the Qawāsīm, 1807-20.

The accession of Sa'id was unfavourably regarded by the Wāhhābis, whose schemes received a sudden check through the removal of their convert and instrument, Badar; and the Wāhhābi Amīr, whose arms had not as yet suffered a permanent reverse in any quarter, seems to have resolved on a serious effort for the subjugation of 'Omān. In the meanwhile, however, that potentate affected to believe the assurances of Sa'id, who shamelessly denounced his former guardian, Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, as the murderer of Badar; professed his own readiness to maintain all existing arrangements with the Wāhhābi power, including payment of tribute; and promised to permit the replacement of a Wāhhābi garrison which had fled from Barkah on the assassination of Badar.

A direct collision was accordingly postponed; but in May 1808, with the assistance of his uncle Qais and of Muhammad-bin-Matar, headman of Fuairah, Sa'id proceeded against Khor Fakkān, where Sultān-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, had built a small fort and established a base for the piratical operations that his tribe were now conducting under the patronage of the Wāhhābis. The expeditionary force, which included contingents of the Āl Wahībah, Hirth and Hajriyīn tribes, captured the fort and put the garrison to the sword; but Sultān-

Repulse of
Saiyid Sa'id
from Khor
Fakkān,
1808.

bin-Saqar suddenly appeared upon the scene with a superior force and drove them to their ships with heavy loss, Qais-bin-Ahmad being among the slain. Later in the same year, the Wāhhabis removed Sultān-bin-Saqar from the Shaikhship of Rās-al-Khaimah and substituted Husain-bin-'Alī, Shaikh of Rams, as governor on their part over the Qawāsīm; and, on the same occasion apparently, they placed a garrison of their own troops at Khor Fakkān.

Hostilities
between Sai-
yid Sa'id
and the
Wāhhabis,
1809.

In 1809 Saiyid Sa'id, taking advantage of the absence of the Wāhhabī Amīr at Makkah and relying on assistance promised by the Shaikh of Būshehr, by the 'Utūb, and by a discontented section of the Qawāsīm, proceeded to the Gulf with an armament with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the new Wāhhabī chief of the Qawāsīm; but his allies failed to co-operate with him as they should have done, and he was obliged to return to Masqat without having effected anything. The Wāhhabis, who still maintained a political agent at Masqat and whose religious emissaries had established a sort of inquisition in the town, now summoned Sa'id to join with the Qawāsīm and 'Utūb in a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah: and only by the stationing of the British frigate "Cornwallis" off Rās Musandam, a measure which prevented the exit of piratical expeditions against his coasts from the Persian Gulf, was the Saiyid enabled to evade compliance with their imperious demands. But the general countenance and naval support of the British Government could not save him from paying by land the penalty of his persistent, though somewhat indirect, opposition to the policy of the Wāhhabis. By seizing Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, the same whom he had unjustly accused of the murder of Badar, and by imprisoning him until he delivered up the forts of Samail and Bidbid, Sa'id had estranged a valuable supporter; and Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, after securing the friendship of the Bani Ruwāhah and of Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain, betook himself to the headquarters of the Wāhhabī Amīr. The Amīr, whose intentions in regard to 'Omān have already been mentioned, was then easily induced to despatch an expedition under Mutlaq the Mutairi, accompanied by Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, against 'Omān.

Anglo-
'Omāni
expedition
against
Shinās, 1809.

It was at this juncture, in 1809, that the Government of India despatched their first expedition against the Qawāsīm, the proceedings of which beyond the limits of the Saiyid's dominions are related* elsewhere in their proper place. Colonel Lionel Smith, the British commander, after carrying out his instructions at Rās-al-Khaimah, Lingeh and Lāft, returned to Masqat, where he held a consultation with Sa'id as to the propriety of further measures. The Wāhhabī general Mutlaq, who had arrived too late to assist the Qawāsīm in the defence of Rās-al-Khaimah,

* *See* page 183 *ante* and page 613 *post*.

had now captured the port of Shinās in Bātinah and placed it in charge of one Muhammad-bin-Ahmad. Saiyid Sa'id, on being questioned, recommended an expedition for the recovery of Shinās, as also of Khor Fakkān, where he had been so disastrously defeated in the preceding year; and his suggestions were accepted. The expedition, accompanied by Saiyid Sa'id with about 2,000 men in English and French-built ships, reached Shinās on the 31st of December 1809. On the 1st of January 1810 they landed and entrenched themselves on the beach and were joined by the Saiyid's mounted forces, who had fought their way from Sohār; on the 2nd of January a few shells from a 10-inch mortar were thrown into the fort held by the enemy, but without much result, and recourse was had to battering. On the morning of the 3rd of January, a breach having been effected, the troops advanced to the assault; a party of Saiyid Sa'id's men, through a mistake, obtained a start of the British troops and got to the breach first, but they were strongly opposed and could not enter. The British column then forced their way in and drove the defenders into two towers of the fort, which was square with a tower at each angle; but in these towers the remains of the garrison held out, fighting with extraordinary determination, until 5-30 P.M.; when, their defences having been rendered untenable by artillery fire, they accepted quarter. Eleven persons emerged from the smaller, and upwards of 100 from the larger of the two towers, nearly all of whom were more or less maimed or bruised. The British loss, owing to the enemy having acted entirely on the defensive, was small, there being only one European killed, two officers and seven Europeans wounded and two sepoys wounded; of the enemy over 400 were believed to have been killed in the whole of the operations. The 'Omānis lost 30 or 40 men, chiefly in cavalry encounters around the place. The Saiyid, on the plea that the fort had been rendered indefensible, declined to place troops in it, and the proposed expedition against Khor Fakkān was abandoned. Meanwhile Mutlaq had arrived from Baraimi, and, on the evening of the 5th of January, the day that the British troops and Saiyid Sa'id embarked on their ships, he fell upon the 'Omāni forces remaining in the neighbourhood of Shinās and dispersed them with considerable slaughter; Salim, the brother of Sa'id, and 'Azzān-bin-Qais, the ruler of Sohār, who were with the army on shore, narrowly escaped with their lives.*

* From the conflicting accounts contained in the works of Maurizi, Buckingham, Brydges, Low and the native annalist, it is difficult to understand what really happened at Shinās. The present writer has followed, in the main, some valuable extracts from the Regimental Records of the 65th Foot, kindly placed at his disposal by Captain T. D. Parkinson, Adjutant, 1st York and Lancaster Regiment.

Wahhābi
successes,
1811.

Mutlaq, following up this success, advanced to Sohār, which he invested but was not able to take; he then passed on towards Masqat, which with Matrah and Barkah he for a time blockaded. Besides Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Jābiri, he had with him Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain; and an influential Ya'ārabi of Nakhl, one Mālik-bin-Saif, also attached himself to the Wahhābi cause. At the beginning of 1811, in attempting to relieve Hisn Samāil which had been besieged by Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Sa'id suffered a severe defeat in Wādi Ma'āwal, losing the greater part of his mercenary force of Balūchis and Jadgāls; and Hisn Samāil shortly afterwards capitulated to the enemy. Mutlaq in the meantime had returned to his headquarters at Baraimi.

Saiyid Sa'id
assisted by
Persia, 1812.

Disappointed in the hope of succour from India, to the British rulers of which he had repeatedly made application in vain, Sa'id towards the end of 1811 despatched a mission to Shīrāz under his brother Sālīm. The Persians, who hated the Wahhābis on account of the atrocities committed by them at Karbala in 1802, and who perhaps thought that they saw in the embarrassment of 'Omān an opportunity of re-establishing their suzerainty over that country, agreed to assist him; and at the beginning of 1812 Sālīm returned, bringing with him a force of 1,500 mounted Persians and four light guns worked by Russian deserters, the whole under the command of Sa'adi Khān, Qājār. The combined 'Omāni and Persian force recovered Nakhl and Hisn Samāil; but it was almost annihilated at Saddi in 'Omān. Proper, in an attempt to capture the fort of Izki; and Hisn Samāil fell once more into the hands of the enemy.

Fearful Wah-
hābi invasion,
1812 or 1813.

Turki and Faisal, sons of the Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd-bin-Muhammad, had now arrived at Baraimi and relieved Mutlaq of his command; but, as they were attempting to pass through Bātinah, a successful night attack was made upon their camp by the people of Khadhra; and Mutlaq, with levies from the Dhāhirah tribes, hastened to rejoin them at Hazam. Having been beaten off with loss in an attack on Barkah, the Wahhābis ravaged the outskirts of Masqat, plundered the town of Matrah and the village of Arbaq, and then swept through Eastern Hajar in a tornado of bloodshed and destruction. Hail-al-Ghāf and Tiwi suffered severely from their passage; but the inhabitants of Sūr were able partially to buy off their hostility. From Sūr they marched inland to Falaij-al-Mashāikh in the Ja'alān District, where they encamped. From Ja'alān they made an excursion against the coast village of Hadd, which they burned. During their stay in Ja'alān the Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Rāsib became their fanatical supporters and helped them against the Bani Bū Hasan. Eventually Mutlaq returned to Baraimi by way of Izki, at which place

he was hospitably entertained on his journey by his ally Muhammad-bin-Nāsir.

But the end of the first and most dreadful period of Wahhābi tyranny was at hand. Sultān-bin-Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah, after his deposition by the Wahhābis from the Qāsimi Shaikhdom and imprisonment at Dara'iyah, had escaped and made his way to Jiddah. He was thus brought into communication with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt; and the Pāsha utilised his services as an envoy to the Saiyid of 'Omān, whose co-operation against the Wahhābis he was anxious to secure. Sa'id gladly fell in with the views of Muhammad 'Ali, wrote to Tūsūn Pasha promising his assistance, and apparently undertook to restore Sultān-bin-Saqar to his Shaikhdom by force of arms; indeed his unsuccessful expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1813, which was accompanied by Lieutenant Bruce, the British Resident at Būshehr, and is more fully described in another place,* had the restoration of Sultān-bin-Saqar for one of its objects.

Failure of
Saiyid Sa'id's
first expedi-
tion against
Rās-al-Khai-
mah, 1813.

As a counterblast to the new combination against himself, the Wahhābi Amīr ordered a fresh invasion of 'Omān; and Mutlaq, having assembled an overwhelming force, descended once more into the Bātinah district. Sa'id, perceiving the futility of resistance upon this occasion, waited upon Mutlaq at Suwaiq, made his submission, and propitiated the Wahhābi with a gift of \$40,000. Mutlaq then proceeded to Najd; but, his successor Ibn-'Azdakah having been murdered on the way to Baraimi by the Bani Yās of Dhafrah, the Wahhābi Amīr directed him to return to 'Omān without delay. On regaining Baraimi, Mutlaq, who had perhaps been reproved for treating Sa'id with undue leniency, immediately organised an expedition and marched against the Saiyid's supporters in Sharqīyah. Here in November 1813 the redoubtable Wahhābi met his death at the hands of a party of the Hajriyīn, being separated at the time from the bulk of his army, whom he had sent out in different directions to ravage the country of that tribe. His arms and coat-of-mail were carried as trophies to Saiyid Sa'id at Masqat. One Ibn Mazrū' shortly after arrived at Baraimi to take the place of Mutlaq; but with the death of Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi Amīr, in 1814, all danger from the Wahhābis ceased by land. No formal peace, however, was concluded; for Sa'id persisted in his determination to reinstate Sultān-bin-Saqar as Shaikh of the Qawāsim, a condition to which the Wahhābi would by no means consent; and 'Abdullah, the successor of Sa'ūd, continued from time to time to make use of the Qawāsim to annoy the Saiyid and his subjects by sea.

Death of
the Wahhābi
Mutlaq,
1813.

Partial failure of Saiyid Sa'id's second expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, and continued hostilities with the Qawāsim, 1814-18.

In 1814 Sa'id, after he had preferred an unavailing request for naval and military reinforcements to the Bombay Government, proceeded for the second time against Rās-al-Khaimah; and, though he did not actually succeed in reducing the place, he compelled the inhabitants to agree to terms of peace, among which was one of abstention from piracy and maritime warfare in the seas extending from Bahrain and Kangūn in the Persian Gulf to Rās-al-Hadd and Gwādar in the Gulf of 'Omān. But the views of the Saiyid had, it would seem, undergone some change; and it was now his object to establish his own authority at Rās-al-Khaimah and to place Sultān-bin-Saqar over the Qawāsim of Shārjah only. In 1815 Sa'id again represented his need of assistance to the Bombay Government, complaining at the same time of the insolence of the Wahhābi Wakil at Masqat and of the aggressiveness of the people of Rās-al-Khaimah; but again his overtures were doomed to failure. Before long his worst apprehensions were justified by the appearance of a piratical fleet of the Qawāsim in the Gulf of 'Omān; Matrah was threatened by these marauders; and the Saiyid, being obliged to put to sea against them in person, was wounded and very nearly captured along with his 40-gun frigate, the "Caroline," in an action fought off Quryāt. In 1816 Sa'id blockaded Rās-al-Khaimah for four months without effect, and in the following year he was defeated by a Qāsimi force on land at Khor Fakkān. After the fall of Dara'iyāh in 1818, however, the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah, alarmed at the progress of the Egyptians in Najd, besought him to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with them,—a proposal which he at once rejected.

Reduction of Rās-al-Khaimah by a British expedition, 1819.

Towards the end of 1819 the second British expedition for the suppression of piracy in the Persian Gulf proceeded from Bombay, *via* Masqat, against Rās-al-Khaimah. The incidents and results of that short campaign are fully described elsewhere*: here we are only concerned to observe that Saiyid Sa'id personally accompanied the armament, to which he contributed two frigates and 600 men, besides a large land force that arrived too late to be of use; and that, though he obtained no extension of territory under the settlement,—a contingency which had been contemplated by the Government of Bombay,—the pacification of the Qawāsim was of great advantage to him in every way and released him finally from the fear of a dangerous enemy. It had originally been desired by the British Government that the Egyptians should co-operate with them against the Qawāsim; but this part of the scheme did not commend itself to Sa'id, who distrusted the Egyptians,

* *Vide* page 197 *ante* and page 658 *post*.

and its abandonment through force of circumstances must have been agreeable to him.

Attempts by Sa'id to subjugate Bahrain, 1812-28.

During the earlier part of his reign the policy of Saiyid Sa'id in regard to Bahrain was the same as that of his father Sultān, who had perseveringly endeavoured to annex it to his dominions. In all, three expeditions were despatched by Sa'id against Bahrain; and, though the first of these, in 1811, might be justified as a counter-attack on the Wāhhābis, who were then overrunning 'Omān, the later two, in 1816 and 1828, are not susceptible of any such explanation.

The expedition of 1811 was facilitated if not suggested by the reduction, in consequence of the successes of the Egyptians in the Red Sea districts, of Wāhhābi garrisons which had been established two years previously in Bahrain and at Zubārah on the coast of Qatar; it resulted in the destruction of Zubārah, in the capture of a number of Wāhhābi officials, including the Governor of Bahrain or his brother, and in the restoration of Bahrain to the 'Utūb.

First expedition against Zubārah and Bahrain, 1811.

The second expedition, in the summer of 1816, was of a different character; it was directed against the 'Utūb, was undertaken in opposition to advice tendered by the British Resident at Būshehr, and was countenanced by the Persian authorities at Shīrāz. Arab boats from Būshehr, 'Asalu and Kangūn on the Persian coast took part in the descent, which was made on the island of Muharraḡ; but the invaders failed to make good their footing and were eventually expelled with great loss. Hamad, a younger brother of Saiyid Sa'id, being killed in the affair. Sa'id, in accordance with a financial bargain about Bahrain which he had struck with the Government of Shīrāz, next took his fleet over to Kangūn to ship some Persian reinforcements; but, finding that treachery towards himself was intended by the Persians, he thence returned home. In 1817 Rahmah-bin-Jābir, who had taken part with Sa'id in the expedition of the previous year, a famous pirate and a bitter enemy of the 'Utūb, visited Masqat and tried to induce the Saiyid to renew his attack, but without success.

Second expedition against Bahrain, 1816.

At the beginning of 1820, when his prestige had been greatly exalted by co-operation with the British in the successful attack on Rās-al-Khaimah, Sa'id appeared inclined to renew his attempts on Bahrain either in conjunction with Persia, for whose support he had

been previously negotiating, or independently upon his own account. So apprehensive was the Persian Governor-General of Shīrāz that Sa'id might now dispense with his assistance, that he wrote to the commander of the British expedition suggesting that four or five British ships should be lent to Persia for the purpose of conveying Persian troops to Bahrain.

Third expedi-
tion against
Bahrain,
1828.

The Saiyid, however, abstained from further action against Bahrain until 1828. In that year, after some months devoted to preparations, during which he firmly assured the 'Utūb that he had no designs against them, he sailed for Qishm; called at Abu Dhabi, where he was joined by the Shaikh of that place with a contingent of Bani Yās; and eventually arrived off Bahrain in the month of November. A detached fort had been taken, and he had arranged for a general assault on the town of Manāmah, when the precipitate and possibly treacherous landing of his Bani Yās auxiliaries upset his plans and brought about a premature engagement with the enemy. The 'Omānis were driven into the sea with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, the Saiyid himself receiving a slight wound and being with difficulty rescued from a worse fate by the efforts of his faithful Nubian slaves; two of his vessels also, which ran ashore in the confusion, fell into the possession of the enemy. Discouraged by this reverse, by the fear of treachery, by an outbreak of cholera on board his ships, and by unfavourable news from his possessions in East Africa, Saiyid Sa'id decided to relinquish the enterprise and returned to Masqat.

In the following year an avenging 'Atbi squadron of seven vessels under the personal command of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad set out to cruise against the shipping of the Saiyid's subjects, but met with little success. In December 1829, peace and an informal alliance were at length concluded between the Saiyid and his adversaries the 'Utūb, a principal condition being discontinuance of the tribute which was claimed by the former.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Persia before 1829.

The embassy sent by Sa'id to Shīrāz in 1811, the despatch of Persian troops to help him against the Wahhābis in the following year, and the doubtful assistance lent him by the Shīrāz Government in his attempts to reduce Bahrain have already received notice; but, in order to complete a review of the Saiyid's early relations with Persia, mention

must be made of certain difficulties which arose in connection with his lease of Bandar 'Abbās, and of a disagreement which occurred between him and 'Abdur Rasūl, Shaikh of Būshehr.

In 1823 a covert attempt was made by the Persian Government to dispossess Sa'id of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies ; but the Saiyid, having arrived at Bandar 'Abbās with two ships of war, entered into negotiations with the agent of the Shīrāz Government and succeeded, partly by bribery and partly by promising a slightly increased tribute for two years, in retaining his valuable fief. Before leaving, however, he either seized or made away with the Hākims of Bandar 'Abbās and Mīnāb, who had encouraged the designs of the Persians.

First attempt
by Persia to
annul the
lease of
Bandar
'Abbās, 1823.

In 1826, during the absence on pilgrimage at Makkah of the Shaikh of Būshehr, who had calumniated the Saiyid to the authorities at Shīrāz and had tried to supplant him in a matrimonial alliance with the family of the Farmān-Farmā then governing Fārs, Sa'id declared war against his rival and succeeded in capturing a vessel belonging to him, which he immediately incorporated with his own fleet : he refrained, however, probably out of respect for the British Residency, from molesting the port of Būshehr ; and he caused the merchandise belonging to third parties which had been found on the " Nasrat Shāh " to be delivered to the owners. A little later, while cruising off Qishm for the purpose, he was fortunate enough to capture Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl himself, then on his way home from Makkah, together with two more of his ships ; nor did he release him or his vessels until he had extorted from him a bond for \$80,000.

Hostilities
between
Saiyid Sa'id
and the
Shaikh of
Būshehr,
1826.

In 1827, a Persian lady, daughter of the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, and sister of Timūr Mirza and Riza Quli Mirza, was duly betrothed to Sa'id, who soon afterwards went in person to meet his bride at Bandar 'Abbās. In 1829, in consequence of a request from Timūr Mirza, who had just taken Būshehr, Sa'id's frigate " Muzaffar " followed the " Harriet " belonging to Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl, from Kangūn into Būshehr harbour in order to seize her there, if desired ; but before the arrival of the ships a settlement had taken place on shore.

Matrimonial
and other
connections of
Saiyid Sa'id
with Persia,
1827-29.

Relations of Sa'id with Turkey before 1829.

The only dealings which Sa'id had with the Turks arose out of the ancient subsidy granted, or said to have been granted, by the Turkish Government to the Imām Ahmad for services rendered by him at Basrah in 1775-76. The claim of the Saiyid for arrears amounted, in 1826, to \$104,000. As the Pāsha of Baghdād, notwithstanding representations by

Expedition
of Saiyid
Sa'id against
Basrah, 1826.

the British Resident on the Saiyid's behalf, refused to treat, Sa'id in the autumn of the year blockaded Basrah, and was successful in obtaining satisfaction of his demands. In 1827 the Shaikhs of the Ka'ab solicited his help against the Turks of Basrah ; but the Saiyid, on the advice of the British Resident, declined to interfere.

Internal affairs of 'Omān from 1814 to 1829.

Sohār and
Nakhl ac-
quired by
Saiyid Sa'id.

The more striking events in 'Omān during the first years of Sa'id's reign were all incidents of his struggle with the Wāhhābis, an account of which has already been given above, and after the death of Mutlaq the country settled down into a state of comparative quietude. In 1814, in consequence of the death on pilgrimage of 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Sohār, Sa'id obtained possession, unopposed, of that principality ; but the authority of Sa'id over Nakhl, where the Ya'arabi family still exercised much influence, was not established beyond dispute until after the second expedition against Bahrain in 1816. In 1821, the year in which his elder brother Sālim died of paralysis and left him sole ruler in name as well as in fact, Sa'id confirmed his uncle Talib-bin-Ahmad in the governorship of Rustāq ; but it cannot be ascertained which of the other forts in the country were at this time in his possession or under his direct control. At some time, apparently, between 1821 and 1828, a successful raid was made by Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, Wāhhābi, from Baraimi on the Hajriyin tribe ; but it was not on a serious scale, and the only object of the leader was to take private and personal vengeance for the death of his father Mutlaq. A reconciliation had now taken place between Saiyid Sa'id and Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Jābiri ; but Hamaid-bin-Nāsir of 'Ainain was still among the opponents of the Government of 'Omān.

Pilgrimage
of Saiyid
Sa'id to
Makkah,
1824.

In 1824 the situation generally was so favourable that Sa'id was able to undertake the pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah, which he performed with great éclat, but at heavy expense. Notwithstanding his Ibādhi unorthodoxy he was treated with much distinction by the Sharīf of Makkah ; and he was loaded at his departure with presents from the Pāsha of Egypt.

Annexation
of Dhufār
to Omān,
1829.

In 1829, on the murder of Muhammad-bin-'Aqil, Shaikh of Dhufār, Sa'id sent a force and took possession of the Dhufār district.

Preoccupation of Sa'id with East African affairs, 1829-56.

We have now reached a point at which Sa'id began to find his chief pleasure in the extension and improvement of his East African dominions

and to regard the maintenance of his position in 'Omān, though that country was still the chief source of his naval and military strength, as an arduous and unpleasant duty to be delegated so far as possible to agents. With his proceedings in East Africa we are not concerned, except as they bear on the course of events in 'Omān; but a few of the principal facts may be recounted in order to show how great was the pressure of African affairs upon his personal attention. Zanzibar, it would seem, had from the first acknowledged his authority; but Mombāsah, under a line of hereditary governors belonging to the 'Omāni tribe of the Mazārī' had, since the accession of the Imām Ahmad at least, enjoyed virtual independence. To this independence Sa'id was now resolved to put an end. His earlier attempts against Mombāsah had caused the Mazārī' and their subjects to seek protection from British naval officers; and a declared British protectorate over Mombāsah even existed from 1824 to 1826, but it was withdrawn in the latter year at the instance of the Government of India, who were unwilling to thwart the projects of their ally.

The difficulty arising from the British protectorate having been removed and the aspect of affairs in 'Omān being auspicious, Sa'id in December 1829 proceeded on his first voyage to East Africa. He was repulsed with heavy loss from Mombāsah, and after paying a visit to Zanzibar returned to Masqat, which he reached in May 1830.

First visit of
Saiyid Sa'id
to East Af-
rica, 1829-30.

In the course of his second expedition to East Africa, which lasted from spring to September of 1832, Sa'id obtained possession of the Mombāsah fort by a discreditable stratagem, and began to prepare Zanzibar for his residence by laying the foundations of a palace and starting clove and rice plantations.

Second visit,
1832

His third absence from 'Omān extended from November 1833 to April 1835. It was distinguished by an unsuccessful attack on Mombāsah, which had in the meanwhile reverted to the Mazārī'; by a hollow peace with the Mombāsah chiefs; and by a rising of African natives against his authority at Siwi.

Third visit,
1833-35.

On the fourth occasion Sa'id left Masqat in November 1836 and did not return until September 1839. During this interval he repossessed himself by treachery of the Mombāsah fort and captured a number of his Mazrū'i rivals, whom he afterwards put to death. On this expedition to Mombāsah he was accompanied by the adventurer 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who afterwards played a large part in the affairs of Bahrain and Qatar.

Fourth visit,
1836-39.

His fifth sojourn in East Africa, which he now regarded as his home, was the longest of all, being prolonged from the autumn of 1840 into

Fifth visit,
1840-51.

the spring of 1851; and, but for a terrible disaster at Siwi in 1844, in which some auxiliaries from the Persian Gulf perished along with his own Arab force, it might be described as uneventful.

Sixth visit,
1852-54.

Sa'id again left Masqat in November 1852 on his sixth voyage to Zanzibar, where he would probably have remained to pass his declining years in peace, had not circumstances made another visit to his hereditary capital necessary.

Death of Sai-
yid Sa'id,
19th October
1856

He arrived at Masqat for the last time in May 1854 and was detained there by Persian affairs until 1856. In September of that year he sailed once more for Zanzibar, but died at sea, on the 19th of October, before reaching his destination. In this manner more than two-thirds of his time, after 1829, was spent by Saiyid Sa'id either on board ship or in his African possessions.

Having anticipated the movements and personal history of the ruler, we now proceed to relate the internal events, the aggressions of the Wahhābis and the Egyptians, and the transactions with Persia and other powers in the Gulf which characterised the second part of the reign of Sa'id.

Internal affairs of 'Omān, 1829-56.

First rebel-
lion in 'Omān
and loss by
Saiyid Sa'id
of Sohār, etc.,
1830.

When Saiyid Sa'id first sailed for East Africa in 1829, he withdrew the garrison that only a few months previously he had thrown into Dhufār; but the step may be taken as a symptom not so much of weakness as of indifference, when more important interests were at stake, to the fate of a district so remote. Sa'id endeavoured to secure the peace of his dominions during his absence by imprisoning at his departure his cousin Hilāl-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ahmad, Wālī of Suwaiq, a youth whose ambition he distrusted, and by subsidising the Shaikhs of the Qawāsīm and Bani Yās; and he appointed his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sālim to act as regent on his behalf. Scarcely had he sailed, however, when Saiyidah Jōkhah, the high-spirited sister of Hilāl, seized Suwaiq and excited a rebellion in Bātinah with the object of procuring her brother's release; and Hamūd-bin-'Azzān-bin-Qais, at the invitation of the former subjects of his father, took possession of Sohār, to which he quickly added Khābūrah, Liwa and Shinās. The regent was supported by his uncle Saiyid Tālib, Wālī of Rustāq, by his aunt Saiyidah Mōzah, who had before played an important part in the troubles that followed the death of Sultān-bin-Ahmad, and by Muhammad-bin-Nāsir, Jābiri; but, the rebellion continuing to spread, he found himself compelled to invoke British aid and to despatch a swift vessel to recall Sa'id. The British

Resident in the Persian Gulf, instructed by Government, prepared to support the representative of the absent ruler by every available means ; a British man-of-war was sent to defend the capital, which was in danger, other vessels were held in readiness, and the leaders of the rebellion were warned to desist from their attempts to overthrow the power of Sa'id. Sa'id, on his return in May 1830, made light of the insurrection and dismissed the British cruiser ; but he was foiled in his attempts to reduce Sohār, and was ultimately obliged to release Hilāl and to agree to the retention by Hamūd of Sohār, Khābūrah and Majis in consideration of an annual tribute of \$8,000. Dissatisfied with this settlement, Sa'id, after engaging the help of the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Rās-al-Khaimah, renewed his attack on Sohār ; but the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, annoyed that his aid had not been sought also, kept the Rās-al-Khaimah Shaikh in play in his own territory ; and, on a successful sortie being made by the defenders, the 'Ajmān Shaikh turned his arms against his employer. Sa'id then retired to Masqat utterly disgraced, having lost 400 or 500 men. Early in 1832, after entrusting his affairs in 'Omān to his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sālim, to his own eldest son Hilāl (whom he made Wālī of Masqat) and to a relation named Sa'ūd-bin-'Ali (whom he appointed Wālī of Barkah), he returned to Africa to resume his interrupted operations against Mombāsah.

Soon after Sa'id's departure, Sa'ūd-bin-'Ali made prisoners at Barkah of his nominal coadjutors Muhammad-bin-Sālim and Hilāl who were on their way to Rustāq ; he also laid siege to Masna'ah, but could not take it. Hamūd-bin-'Azzān and Hilāl-bin-Muhammad, after taking part in the ineffectual siege of Masna'ah, proceeded to beleaguer Rustāq on their own account, while the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah took possession of Dibah, Khor Fakkān and Ghāllah, places on the Shamailiyah coast. Saiyidah Mōzah and Muhammad-bin-Nāsir were as before the mainstay of Sa'id's party ; and the former succeeded in ransoming her nephew and grand-nephew from Sa'ūd-bin-'Ali by a payment of \$8,000. The British Government also lent effectual aid, the Assistant Political Resident in the Persian Gulf being at once deputed to Masqat with a respectable naval force, and a man-of-war being stationed there as a guardship till the immediate danger was past. Sa'id, on his arrival at Masqat in September 1832, was obliged to condone the rebellion ; but he succeeded in inducing Sa'ūd-bin-'Ali to exchange his Wilāyat of Barkah for that of Rustāq. The British Government turned a deaf ear to the Saiyid's requests for aid in recovering his Shamailiyah possessions from the Qawāsīm, and advised him to remain at home in future and protect his hereditary dominions.

Second rebellion in 'Omān and loss by Saiyid Sa'id of his possessions in Shamailiyah, 1832.

Third rebellion in 'Omān and loss by Saiyid Sa'id of Rustāq, 1834.

But Sa'id could not bring himself to abandon his designs on Mombāsah, which was now once more in the hands of the Mazārī'; and in November 1833, after making terms with the Wāhhābis, whose presence at Baraimi was again seriously felt, he placed his third son Thuwaini in charge of 'Omān and left for East Africa. Again his departure was the signal for a revolt, in which the leading spirit was this time Hamūd-bin-'Azzān. Hamūd seized Rustāq, of which the Wālī, Sa'ūd-bin-'Alī, had recently been murdered; and, the trusty Muhammad-bin-Nāsir having died, the forts of Hisn Samāil and Bidbid, of which he had been in charge, appeared to be in danger also. The British Resident in the Persian Gulf accordingly visited Masqat and wrote to Hamūd to inform him that further aggressions on his part would cause him to be regarded as an enemy of the British Government; but Hamūd, nothing daunted, partially occupied Suwaiq towards the end of 1834. He was promptly dislodged, however, by a force which Thuwaini sent from Masqat.

Fruitless endeavours of Saiyid Sa'id to recover Sohār and Rustāq, 1835-36.

Sa'id, having returned from Africa in April 1835, organised an expedition against Rustāq, but it failed; and a subsequent attempt upon Sohār was abandoned by him from personal fear of an enormous tribal levy which had been collected for his operations from the Dhāhirah district. In 1836 Sa'id entered into an arrangement with Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wāhhābi, for the expulsion of Hamūd from Sohār and Rustāq; and Sohār was again invested, the troops of the Wāhhābi and the tribal contingents besieging it by land, while the ships of the Saiyid blockaded it by sea. The defenders, however, having suggested that the Wāhhābis in event of success might retain Sohār for themselves, Sa'id became suspicious of his allies and broke off the siege, which perhaps he was well-advised in doing. These two last expeditions against Sohār are said to have cost the Saiyid not less than \$300,000 in subsidies and presents.

Treaty of peace between Saiyid Sa'id and Saiyid Hamūd of Sohār, 1839.

During Sa'id's fourth absence from 'Omān, between November 1836 and September 1839, Hamūd, having attained his principal objects, remained quiescent; and, as the time of the Saiyid's return approached, he even sought the good offices of the British Government as mediator between himself and his relative. As Hamūd stood well with the British authorities and had joined a federation formed under their auspices to oppose the advance of the Egyptians, the Resident was permitted to exercise good offices on his behalf; and on the 23rd of December 1839, not without difficulty, a treaty was concluded between Sa'id and Hamūd at Masqat, by which the territorial *status quo* was

confirmed and the parties bound themselves to live in peace without jealousy or discord, Sa'id even undertaking to afford the Sohār chief military support, should such be required, against his enemies.

Whether Hamūd faithfully observed this treaty or not is uncertain: facts can be adduced in favour of either view. In 1840 Hamūd accompanied Sa'id on a cruise to Qishm and Bandar 'Abbās; but again in 1841, after the departure of Sa'id for Africa, he paid a visit to Bombay of which the object has not been satisfactorily explained and was probably hostile to Sa'id. On his return to Sohār the conduct of Hamūd was peculiar; for he placed some * Mutawwa's or religious zealots—among them the afterwards famous Sa'id-bin-Khalfān Khalīlī,—in charge of his principal forts, to hold them against the Wahhābis, and himself adopted a religious profession and way of life. A proposal was next circulated, perhaps without his approval, that he should be raised to the Imamate of all 'Omān. Then, a disagreement having occurred between Saif, the son of Hamūd, and the Mutawwa' party, the former succeeded in possessing himself of Sohār; but, on his opening friendly relations with Sa'id's representative Thuwaini, his father Hamūd caused him to be assassinated. The order, connection, and explanation of these events are, and must remain, obscure.

Eccentric
behaviour
thereafter of
Saiyid
Hamūd,
1839-49.

In 1849 Saiyid Thuwaini proceeded by sea to Shinās. One of his objects was to provide for the safety of Shinās, Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān—the two latter having been at some time recovered from the Qawāsīm—which were again threatened by the northern tribes; but another object also soon declared itself in the treacherous seizure at Shinās of Hamūd, whom Thuwaini suspected of hostile proceedings inconsistent with the treaty of 1839, and in an attack on Sohār. Qais, the brother of Hamūd, defended Sohār with energy and called in the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, with whose help Shinās, Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān were quickly taken; meanwhile however, in April 1850, Hamūd had died in his prison at Masqat, not without suspicion of foul play. The Government of India, who strongly reprobated the faithless conduct of Saiyid Thuwaini, sent the Political Resident in a steam-frigate to mediate, but not authoritatively, between the parties in the field; but his intervention remained without effect: letters also were written by the British authorities to Saiyid Sa'id at Zanzibar to urge his immediate return.

Treacherous
removal of
Saiyid Ha-
mūd by the
representa-
tive of Saiyid
Sa'id.
1849-50.

Sa'id on reaching Masqat in May 1851 approved the proceedings of Thuwaini, who in all likelihood had only obeyed his father's instructions;

Recovery of
Sohār by
Saiyid Sa'id,
1851.

* The Appendix on Religions may be consulted with reference to the Mutawwa' party and their views.

and in September, with assistance from the Shaikh of Dibai, Sa'id himself commenced a short but successful campaign against Qais. Khābūrah was taken after a two days' bombardment; Sultān-bin-Saqar, the Qāsimi Shaikh, was detached from the cause of the enemy; Shinās fell; and Qais surrendered. The settlement which followed transferred Sohār to Saiyid Sa'id, but it left Rustāq and Hibi in the possession of Qais, to whom also a subsidy of \$200 a month was granted: thus came to an end the separate Sohār principality, or what by the British authorities had been treated as such when, in the year 1849, they concluded with its chief an anti-slavery treaty. Sa'id was now master of the whole sea coast, and his reputation in 'Omān stood higher than ever before,—a result to which his judicious political arrangements had contributed no less than the success of his military operations.

During the last visit of Sa'id to Zanzibar, 'Omān seems, apart from the inevitable turmoil caused by a return of the Wāhhābis upon the stage, to have remained fairly quiet.

Aggressions of the Wāhhābis and Egyptians, 1829-56.

The dangers which threatened 'Omān from the side of Najd during the later part of Sa'id's reign are so little connected with the course of local affairs just related as to be capable of separate consideration; their appearance and disappearance were regulated chiefly by the crises through which the Wāhhābi kingdom itself passed during this period.

Tribute from
'Omān to
the Wāhhābis
fixed at
\$5,000 in
1833.

By 1830 the power of the Wāhhābis, temporarily crushed at its centre in 1818, had revived to a considerable extent in Eastern Arabia; and in 1833 their pressure was felt once more on the frontiers of 'Omān. The British Government in India, who admitted no responsibility for the defence of the Saiyid's dominions by land, having approved his intention of entering into a friendly understanding with the Wāhhābi Amīr, a compact was formed between the Saiyid and the Wāhhābis under which the limits of direct government of the contracting powers were defined and Sa'id undertook to pay \$5,000 a year as Zakāt to the ruler of Najd. A further stipulation by which each party was bound to assist in suppressing rebellion in the dominions of the other was deemed imprudent by the British authorities, especially in view of the hostile relations existing between the Wāhhābis and the Pāsha of Egypt; but Sa'id assured them that the observance of this article would be regulated, on his part, by a strict regard for the wishes of the British Government. The arrange-

ment just described appears to have been negotiated with the Wahhābi general Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq by Saiyid Sa'id immediately before his third expedition to East Africa, but there is nothing to show how long the tribute promised continued to be paid. The abortive combination formed by Sa'id and the Wahhābis in 1836 for the purpose of expelling Hamūd-bin-'Azzān from Sohār and Rustāq has already been noticed under the head of internal affairs.

In 1839 the Egyptians occupied the position in Central Arabia from which they had ousted the Wahhābis; but they continued the domineering policy of their predecessors towards 'Omān, and they even made use of the same local agents, namely Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq and Bin-Battāl. Sa'id, in order to promote his designs on Bahrain, which he had never abandoned, was disposed at first to conform his policy to that of Muhammad 'Ali, Pasha of Egypt; but, on becoming aware of the anti-Egyptian sentiments of the British Government in what concerned Eastern Arabia, he associated himself with their views, underwent the reconciliation already mentioned with his kinsman Hamūd of Sohār, who was a consistent opponent of Egyptian influence, and disregarded a peremptory demand made on him for assistance by Khurshīd Pasha, the Egyptian Commander in Najd. Such correspondence with the Egyptian authorities as he could not avoid he carried on henceforward with the cognisance and approval of the British Government. The danger to 'Omān from the Egyptians ceased only on the withdrawal of the latter from Najd in 1840.

'Omān
threatened
by Egypt,
1839-40.

At the beginning of 1845, during Sa'id's longest absence from 'Omān, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq appeared once more at Baraimi in his original and familiar character of Wahhābi agent, captured Majīs, and demanded tribute of Sa'id's representative (Saiyid Thuwaini) and of Hamūd (the Sohār chief) at the rate of \$20,000 and \$5,000 per annum respectively. Hamūd was ready to appeal to arms, but Thuwaini preferred to temporise; and a truce was patched up on the understanding that \$5,000 down should be paid on account of Sohār, while the rest of the demand was referred to Saiyid Sa'id at Zanzibar. This arrangement was in consonance with the advice of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, who on the first appearance of danger had counselled Thuwaini to comply with the Wahhābi demands, provided they were not excessive or humiliating, and in the opposite case to threaten a reference to the British Government. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq soon violated the truce by permitting a raid on Barkah, and began to collect a huge levy of tribesmen, largely Bani Qitab, for an attack of Masqat: in this emergency the British Resident

Wahhābi
aggression
renewed,
1845.

in the Gulf addressed a stringent protest to the Amīr, enjoined Sa'ad to await his master's orders, and sent British war-vessels to cruise upon the Bātinah coast. These steps caused the Wāhhābi to abate his demands; he agreed to accept, exclusive of an initial present of \$2,000, an annual tribute of \$5,000 a year which Thuwaini under his father's instructions was willing to pay; and the Wāhhābi expedition was then broken up, and Majīs restored to the ruler of 'Omān. The prestige of the Wāhhābis seems to have suffered by this settlement, for we now find a number of local chiefs and tribes—particularly the Yāl Sa'ad—arming against them; and their messengers in Bātinah were after this frequently detained and otherwise treated with contumely.

Tribute from
'Omān to the
Wāhhābis en-
hanced to
\$12,000 in
1853.

At the end of 1852 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, the son of the Wāhhābi Amīr, arrived at Baraimi with a commission to extend and enforce the authority of his father's Government. Taking advantage of the recent expulsion of Qais-bin-'Azzān from Sohār, he required the cession of that district by Saiyid Sa'id, and demanded an increase of tribute so great as to make it apparent that what he really wished was a pretext for declaring war. The British Resident in the Gulf, who had meanwhile reached the coast of Trucial 'Omān upon a different errand, at once applied himself to counteracting the influence and prestige of the Wāhhābis, and at the same time encouraged the regent Thuwaini to resistance by a promise to assist him, if need be, in the defence of his capital: his attitude emboldened Saiyid Thuwaini to proceed to Sohār, which he placed in a state of defence. The Wāhhābis then abandoned their design of attacking Bātinah, and a compromise was arranged under which the frontiers of 'Omān remained intact, but the yearly tribute payable to the Wāhhābis was increased from \$5,000 to \$12,000; simultaneously an offensive and defensive alliance was established between the signatories, the Wāhhābis in particular undertaking to assist the regent Thuwaini in case of internal difficulties. In the next year, the tribes of Bātinah having withheld their contributions and payment of the stipulated tribute being consequently impossible, Thuwaini called upon 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal for the aid guaranteed by the recent treaty; it was afforded, though not without reluctance; and at the end of 1853 the refractory tribes had been coerced and amity still prevailed between the Government of 'Omān and the Wāhhābi power. Ahmad the Sadairi, whom the Wāhhābis now placed in charge of Baraimi, seems about this time to have undertaken a tour in 'Omān Proper, where he probably wrung fresh contributions from the inhabitants, irrespective of the tribute already paid for the whole country by the ruler of 'Omān.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Persia after 1829.

The connections of Sa'id with Persia during the later part of his reign were at first not unsatisfactory; but towards the end his influence and position in that country were suddenly and irretrievably destroyed.

In 1830 and 1831, contentions again prevailing at Būshehr between Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl and Tīmūr Mīrza, Saiyid Sa'id was much inclined to send ships to the assistance of the latter, who was his brother-in-law; but he finally allowed himself to be dissuaded by the Resident at Būshehr and by the Governor of Bombay from embroiling himself in the internal affairs of Persia. In 1839, conceiving himself to be insulted by the murder—at the hands of a rival chief—of Jamāl Khān, a candidate for the Governorship of Būshehr whom he had employed as his agent in arranging a fresh matrimonial alliance between himself and the royal family of Persia, Sa'id was disposed to adopt extreme measures against the port of Būshehr; but eventually, under British advice, he contented himself with making a respectful reference to the Shāh, and received in reply an assurance that the murderer should be suitably punished. In 1840 Saiyid Sa'id visited Hormūz and Qishm on a tour of inspection.

Renewed friction between Saiyid Sa'id and the Persians at Būshehr, 1830-31, 1839, and 1845-48.

In 1845 and 1846 the relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Persia were again strained. The trouble originated in the ill-treatment of a Masqat merchant at Būshehr and in the seizure at that place of some chests of indigo which were the property of Muhammad-bin-Sālim, the nephew of Sa'id; and it was shortly aggravated by the advance, under instructions from the Governor-General of Fārs, of a Persian army against the Saiyid's fief of Bandar 'Abbās, where an attempt was made to extort a large payment from Saif-bin-Nabhān, the 'Omāni Governor. Saiyid Sa'id, being superior to the Persians at sea, was inclined to retaliate by blockading or even attacking Būshehr, and the Persian authorities were considerably alarmed by his attitude, especially Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr who feared the loss of Khārag Island; nevertheless they continued to temporise, and eventually Mīnāb, one of the chief places in the Saiyid's rented possessions, was invested by a Persian force under Fazal 'Ali Khān, Governor of Kirmān. Saif-bin-Nabhān would at this juncture have declared a blockade of the Persian coast in his master's name, but a stringent prohibition by the British Resident at Būshehr deterred him, and he resorted instead to payments, or

Second attempt by Persia to resume the Bandar 'Abbās fief, 1846-48.

promises of payment, which had the effect of causing Fazal 'Ali Khān to withdraw his troops. In 1847 Saiyid Sa'id received a second Persian princess in marriage, a grand-daughter of Fath 'Ali Shāh; but the match had no political significance or value, and he continued to demand in vain reparation for the indignities which he had suffered. British intervention also failed for a time to procure redress; but in 1848, when the British authorities were on the point of withdrawing their objection to his employing naval force, the unfriendly sovereign of Persia died, British influence at Tehrān revived, and a settlement was reached. The offender Fazal 'Ali Khān was removed from his post.

Renewal of
the Bandar
'Abbās lease
to Saiyid
Sa'id on un-
favourable
terms and at
an increased
rental, 1856.

During the last absence of Saiyid Sa'id at Zanzibar between 1852 and 1854, the Persians, probably encouraged by the difficulties to which the Wahhābis at Baraimi had reduced the 'Omān regency, renewed their efforts to terminate the 'Omāni occupation of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies; and they succeeded in expelling Saif-bin-Nabhān, whom Sa'id on his return from East Africa found residing at Masqat and treated with coldness,—apparently from a belief that the catastrophe had been partly due to his mismanagement. The Saiyid shortly after despatched against Bandar 'Abbās a large expedition, composed chiefly of Arabs from Sharqīyah and 'Omān Proper, under the command of his son Thuwaini, and the lost districts were temporarily recovered; but they could not be held against the ever-increasing numbers of the Persians, and Saiyid Thuwaini was eventually driven to his ships, while many of his force fell in the hands of the enemy and were carried as prisoners to Shirāz. The Bani Yās of Trucial 'Omān would apparently have made common cause with the Saiyid on this occasion; but the British authorities, fearing that this might bring the Qawāsim into action on the opposite side, forbade them to cross the Gulf to his assistance. The lease of Bandar 'Abbās to Sa'id was renewed* by a Persian edict in 1855, and by a formal treaty on the 17th November 1856. The districts of Shamīl, Mināb and Biyābān, and the islands of Qishm and Hormūz, were specified as included in the lease; but the sovereign rights of Persia over all these places were now clearly asserted and admitted, and the annual rental—in 1821 only \$4,000—was increased from \$6,000 to \$14,000 Tūmāns, including an honorarium of 2,000 Tūmāns. The new arrangement was made in favour of Sa'id and his† sons only, and was

* See Aitchison's Treaties, 3rd edition, Appendices 45 and 28.

† Or descendants ("Aulād"). The Government of India, in discussing the question in 1868, inclined to the view that the term included "any Ruler directly descended from the loins of the then Imām."

declared terminable at the option of Persia after twenty years, or on the accession of a usurper to the throne of 'Omān; and it contained various stipulations, favourable to Persia, which are mentioned * in the history of the Persian Coast and islands. The general effect of the arrangement was to transfer the position of the Saiyid at Bandar 'Abbās from a basis of right to one of sufferance, and it was necessarily very damaging to his prestige.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with other native powers in the Gulf after 1829.

The demands of East Africa on his attention and resources and the absorption of what remained of these by difficulties with the Wāhhābis and the Persians left Sa'id with no power to prosecute an active policy in any other direction. Of relations with Turkey nothing is heard; nor did Sa'id manifest any interest in places upon the Arabian coast of the Gulf, except only Bahrain, to the affairs of which he showed himself not entirely indifferent.

Renewed
designs of
Saiyid Sa'id
on Bahrain,
1839-43.

In 1830 the Saiyid appeared to be negotiating with the Wāhhābi Amīr for the transfer of the islands of Bahrain to himself as a fief; but his endeavours were frustrated by a settlement which his own attitude enabled the Wāhhābis to extort from the 'Utūb. In 1835 Sa'id performed a friendly service to the ruling 'Atbi family of Bahrain by sending his son Hilāl to compose their domestic differences; but the desired object was not attained. In 1839 Saiyid Sa'id seems to have entered into negotiations with Muhammad 'Alī of Egypt for the conferment of the Bahrain islands on himself, to be held by him under the suzerainty of the Egyptians. The incompatibility of British and Egyptian policy constrained him in the same year to abandon this scheme, but he immediately proposed another by which he should seize and occupy the Bahrain islands in the interests of the British Government and in opposition to the Egyptians; the suggestion, however, did not commend itself to the British authorities. In 1843, civil war then raging in Bahrain, Saiyid Thuwaini in his father's absence was invited by certain interested parties to annex the islands, and in reply sent provisional

* *Vide* page 2045 *post*.

assistance to his well-wishers in the shape of military stores ; and Saiyid Sa'id himself afterwards pressed for the approval by the Government of India of an effort at annexation. It was withheld, however, chiefly in view of the unlikelihood of success and of the probability of offence being caused to the Wahhābis and Persians, and the enterprise remained unattempted.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with Britain after 1809.

Early preference of Saiyid Sa'id for a French alliance.

Saiyid Sa'id, notwithstanding the presence of a British political representative at Masqat, showed a disposition, when he first came to power, to depart from the policy of his father Saiyid Sultān and to range himself on the side of the French in the struggle which was still proceeding. The pessimistic view taken by the British Resident, at the time, of Sa'id's prospects in 'Omān may have afforded some just cause for resentment on the Saiyid's part ; but it is difficult to understand why the Indian Government, unless they were in ignorance of the facts, did not at once protest effectively against certain of his proceedings which were incompatible with the Agreements of 1793 and 1800. In June 1807 a treaty was concluded at Mauritius between the French Captain-General de Caen and an envoy from Sa'id, for which, in the following year, a revised treaty was substituted. A French Consular Agent, M. Dallons, was about the same time sent to reside at Masqat, where he remained at least until 1810, and French influence became for a short time predominant in the Saiyid's councils. These events took place notwithstanding a warning delivered at Masqat at the end of April 1808 by General John Malcolm, then on his second mission to Persia. In 1810, however, the capture by the British of Mauritius and Réunion—retarded, it is said, by the complaisance of Saiyid Sa'id in throwing supplies into those places by means of his own ships—destroyed for a time the power and prestige of the French in East African and Arabian waters ; and during the next five years their flag and influence were excluded from the countries bordering the Indian Ocean,—a state of matters which compelled Sa'id to seek a good understanding with Britain.

Rās-al-Khaimah expeditions of 1809 and 1819.

Even before French influence had been finally dissipated, a rapprochement, due to the depredations of the Qāsīmi pirates upon British and 'Omāni commerce alike, had begun between Sa'id and the Government of

India; and we have already seen how in 1809 the Indian Government associated the Saiyid with themselves in their first decided effort to extirpate the buccaneers of the Persian Gulf and, indirectly, to intimidate the Wahhābis. From the time of the first Rās-al-Khaimah expedition onwards, Britain was the only European Power interested in the Saiyid's Arabian and Persian affairs: the transactions of the ruler of 'Omān with other great nations related almost exclusively to his African possessions. The policy of the British Indian Government towards 'Omān from 1810 to 1818 was, as our relation of events has shown, friendly yet, in what concerned the Wahhābi power, reserved; and in 1826, a discussion of the point having been raised by Saiyid Sa'id, it was expressly held by the Government of India that the treaties of 1798 and 1800, while they implied strict friendship, did not constitute an offensive and defensive alliance against all enemies between the states of Great Britain and 'Omān. The Saiyid was not assisted by Britain to repel the frightful incursions which the Wahhābis made on his territories between 1810 and 1813 in retaliation for the part he had taken in the expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah; nor was he encouraged in his attempts, from 1814 to 1816, to restore an anti-Wahhābi chief to authority over the Qawāsim. In 1819, however, during a temporary eclipse of the Wahhābi power, the Government of India launched their second and very successful expedition against the piratical Qawāsim; and no one reaped greater or most lasting benefit from the operations than the Saiyid, who was thus compensated for much of what he had previously suffered by reason of his connection with the British.

Here we may notice a curious isolated episode * in the history of 'Omān, in which the British and Saiyid Sa'id were jointly concerned. In 1820, the Bani Bū 'Ali tribe of the Ja'alān district having been charged with complicity in certain piratical proceedings, Captain Thompson,† the British Political Officer at Qishm, was authorised by Government to take suitable action against them, after satisfying himself of their guilt. After this a messenger—apparently the Shaikh of Rās-al-Hadd, who had been sent with a letter to the chiefs of the tribe—was murdered on the beach at Lashkharah; and Captain Thompson, on his own responsibility, decided

First Bani
Bū 'Ali expe-
dition, 1820.

* For fuller accounts of the two Bani Bū 'Ali expeditions see *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, pages 189—191; Saldanha's *Précis* (1801-53), pages 127—128; Mignan's *Winter Journey*, II, pages 248—271; Low's *Indian Navy*, I, pages 270—274 and 280—385; and Badger's *Imāms and Seyyids*, pages 338—345. Mignan's account, as that of an eye-witness of the second operations, is the most interesting.

† An account of the very remarkable career of Captain (afterwards General) Perronet Thompson will be found in Low's *Indian Navy*, I, page 381 (footnote). In 1820 he was an officer in His Majesty's 17th Light Dragoons

to take action jointly with Saiyid Sa'id, to whom also the Bani Bū 'Ali were obnoxious as they were in open rebellion against his government. In pursuance of this design six companies of Indian sepoy were embarked by Captain Thompson at Qishm and landed at Sūr, where they were reinforced by a tribal levy under the Saiyid, consisting chiefly of Bani Jābir, Hishm, Hajriyīn and Āl Wahibah. On the 8th of November the allies encamped at Falaj-al-Mashāikh, and surrender of the murderers of the British messenger, as well as of the fortifications and arms of the tribe, was demanded; but the negotiations failed, entirely, it would appear, in consequence of the determination of the British Political Officer to enforce the surrender of the arms. On the following day, the 9th of November, a force of 380 sepoy and 4 guns, with 2,000 Arab auxiliaries, advanced to attack the village of Balad Bani Bū 'Ali; but they were ignominiously routed by a charge of swordsmen, and fell back upon their entrenched camp with a loss of 7 British officers, 270 sepoy and all the guns. Saiyid Sa'id himself behaved with coolness and courage and was wounded in the hand in endeavouring to save a British artilleryman—an act of gallantry which the Government of India subsequently acknowledged by the presentation of a valuable sword. Most of the tribesmen by whom Sa'id was attended either fled, immediately that the day turned against them, or remained neutral; but the Hajriyīn proved an honourable exception and were killed to the last man. On the night after the battle the British camp was attacked, but without success, by the Bani Bū Hasan, in whose land it was situated; and, eventually, the remnants of the British force returned *viâ* the Wādi-al-'Aqq to Masqat, where they arrived on the 17th of November.

Second Bani
Bū 'Ali ex-
pedition,
1821.

The Government of Bombay, considering that Captain Thompson had exceeded his instructions for the suppression of piracy and had allowed himself to be made an instrument of the Saiyid's internal policy, condemned the whole of his proceedings and ordered him to be removed from his post; but it was necessary that the military reputation of Britain should be rehabilitated in 'Omān. A strong expedition, consisting of 117 British officers, of 1,263 British rank and file from His Majesty's 65th Regiment, the Bombay European Regiment and the Bombay European Artillery, and of 1,686 native soldiers, was despatched from Bombay under the command of General Lionel Smith, the same who had directed the operations against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1809, and reached Sūr on the 27th of January 1821. On the night of the 11th of February the lines of the headquarters staff and the Bombay European Regiment, which were situated at some distance from the main camp, were surprised by a large party of Bani Bū 'Ali swordsmen, who succeeded in inflicting over

40 casualties before they were driven off. On the 2nd of March 1821 the British force arrived before Balad Bani Bū 'Ali, where the skeletons of their predecessors still strewed the ground. The warriors of the tribe, about a thousand strong, repeating their formerly successful tactics, rushed out of the village and fell sword in hand upon the right brigade, when stiff fighting and some confusion followed; but, once the rush had been stemmed, the Bani Bū 'Ali were practically defeated; the village was quickly surrendered; and the tribe this time consented to lay down their arms. Saiyid Sa'id was present, but only as a spectator of the engagement. The British casualties were 26 killed and 171 wounded, while the enemy left 235 dead upon the field besides carrying off, it was supposed, as many more. The prisoners, among whom were the principal chief Muhammad-bin-'Ali and his brother Khādim, numbered about 250, and of these nearly 100 were wounded. Some 80 of the prisoners were made over to Saiyid Sa'id, who allowed them to die of starvation at Masqat; but 150 others, including Shaikh Muhammad-bin-'Ali, were conveyed to Bombay and were well treated there. After an interval of two years, when the assent of the Saiyid to their return had with some difficulty been obtained, the Bombay prisoners were repatriated at the expense of the Government of India, and were provided with funds to enable them to make a fresh start in life. As a tribe, however, the Bani Bū 'Ali have never fully recovered the position which they once held in 'Omān.

The relations of the British Government with the Sultān of 'Omān arising from the British military occupation of the island of Qishm under his authority from 1820 to 1822 or 1823 are fully described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast.

Notwithstanding the example made of the Bani Bū 'Ali, outrages continued to be committed by pirates and wreckers under the jurisdiction of Masqat, and even by the Bani Bū 'Ali themselves.

In 1829 a small vessel belonging to a Mr. Shipton was attacked and plundered on a voyage from the Red Sea by dependents of Saiyid Sa'id, but the Sultān took immediate steps in the matter, with the result that in the first instance \$6,000, and later 1,000 crowns, were recovered from the pirates and remitted to the Government of Bombay.

About the same time the British ship "Oscar", having gone ashore on the coast of the Ja'alān district on her way from Bombay to Būshehr, was boarded by Arabs, chiefly belonging to the Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Bū Hasan tribes, who plundered her of her cargo worth eight lakhs of rupees, the greater part of which, but for their violence, might have been saved. Under the orders of the Bombay Government, whom the underwriters in India had approached with strong representations on the subject, the Resident in the Persian Gulf then proceeded in the schooner "Fly," accompanied by Commodore Collinson in the

British
occupation of
Qishm
Island, 1820-
1882.

Maritime
outrage by
subjects of
the 'Oman
Sultanate,
1829.

"Ternate", to Masqat, where three other cruisers belonging to the East India Company were already assembled. On the 19th of October 1829, after a small part of the "Oscar's" cargo, consisting of Kashmir shawls had been recovered at Masqat on payment of salvage, the Resident, with the British squadron, and the Sultān, with two frigates, sailed in company for Sūr; but no traces of the missing property were discovered at that place. Commodore Collinson then visited Khor Jarāmah, where he had a long interview with Muhammad-bin-'Alī, the chief Shaikh of the Bani Bū 'Alī, and persuaded him to give up a few shawls and cash to the amount of \$1,200, this being all that the Shaikh, according to his own solemn oath, had it in his power to restore. As the offending tribes could not be punished by means of a naval expedition, the Resident abandoned the idea of further recoveries, and instead "endeavoured to create such an impression on "the minds of the inhabitants of this dangerous coast as would be likely "to prove highly beneficial to any British ship that might have the "misfortune to suffer a similar accident to that which had befallen the "Oscar"; and so the proceedings terminated.

Assistance
rendered to
Saiyid
Sa'id by the
British Gov-
ernment on
several occa-
sions.

After the difficulties with the Bani Bū 'Alī, encountered together in 1820-21, the British authorities in India never failed to show their solicitude for the interests of Saiyid Sa'id, at times restraining him from imprudent enterprises in Bahrain, Persia or Turkish 'Irāq, and at others directly supporting his authority against rebels, or enabling him to obtain a reduction of Wāhhābī demands. The British naval demonstrations at Masqat in 1830 and 1833, the threats addressed by the Political Resident to Hamūd during his rebellion in 1834, the peace arranged between Saiyid Sa'id and the Sohār chief by British intervention in 1839, the help and encouragement afforded by the British representatives in the Wāhhābī crises of 1845 and 1852, the diplomatic support lent to his case at Tehrān in 1848,—these are leading illustrations of the spirit which, after 1821, animated the policy of the British Government towards Sa'id. On the other hand the Government of India, in 1834, positively declined to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the continental possessions of the Imām of Muscat against the Wāhhābis, remarking that, "if we "were once to commit ourselves by a declaration of our intention to "support that Chief, this line of policy must be followed up at any "expense, and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and "treasure which might ensue in consequence." The Saiyid on his part was not wanting in gratitude; and, at his final departure from Zanzibar

in 1854, he placed his son Khālid, whom he left in charge there, under the virtual guardianship of Colonel Hamerton, the British Resident. A great part of 'Omān was explored in 1835-36 by Lieutenants Wellsted and Whitelock of the Indian Navy, under the auspices of Saiyid Sa'id.

The friendly and reasonable disposition of Sa'id was turned to account by the British Government in the conclusion with him of various treaties, of which the most important were a Treaty of Commerce in 1839 and two Treaties for the suppression of the Slave Trade in 1822 and 1845, also of a Customs Agreement in 1846, by which transshipment dues on cargo were fixed in general at 5 per cent., special provision being made for landing dues in the case of distressed or injured vessels, while stores, the property of the British Government, were exempted from duty altogether. In 1854 Sa'id transferred the Kuria Muria Islands to the British crown by a deed of gift, and refused to accept any *quid pro quo*: the islands were valuable on account of the guano with which they were then covered, and which the French had made several efforts to obtain.

Commercial and other treaties with Britain, and cession of the Kuria Muria Islands.

Ceremonial courtesies were from time to time exchanged between Sa'id and His Britannic Majesty. The Saiyid, about 1836, presented King William with the "Liverpool", a fine ship of war but too large for the service of Masqat, receiving in return a handsome yacht, the "Prince Regent"; and in 1838 he sent a mission to England to congratulate Queen Victoria on her accession, on which occasion also an interchange of valuable gifts took place. A less agreeable court incident was the clandestine departure for England in 1845 of Sa'id's eldest son, Hilāl, for whom he entertained an unaccountable aversion, and whom he had clearly manifested his intention of excluding from the succession. The young man succeeded in making some political interest in England, but his friends were unable to influence the Saiyid in his favour, and he eventually died a refugee at Aden in 1851.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with the British Court.

At the beginning of Sa'id's reign British political interests were represented at Masqat by a European officer; but, after the death of three successive Residents from the effects of the climate, *viz.*, of Lieutenant Watts in 1808 and of Captain Seton and Mr. Bunce in 1809, the place was adjudged too unhealthy for permanent occupation and was placed instead under the supervision of the Resident at Būshehr. In April 1840, however, in connection with the Egyptian danger, a British Resident (Captain Hamerton) was re-appointed to Masqat; but the Residency was soon afterwards removed to Zanzibar, where it remained till after the death of Sa'id.

British political representation at Masqat.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with France after 1809.

**Commercial
Treaty with
France, 1844.**

The short-lived ascendancy of French political influence in 'Omān has been mentioned in an earlier paragraph ; during the period of its depression, which followed between 1810 and 1815, the French representative appears to have been withdrawn, and thereafter none was posted to Masqat during the reign of Sa'id. In 1817 communication with 'Omān was re-opened by the French Governor of Réunion ; and Masqat was visited in 1819 by the French vessel "Zélée," in 1822 by the "Moselle," and a little later by the "Cléopâtre," all sent on friendly or political missions by the French Governor of Bourbon. Ultimately a commercial convention came into existence, favourable to the importation of 'Omāni produce into the French possessions, and a brisk trade sprang up between the two countries. In 1839, however, pending the negotiation of a regular commercial treaty with France, a condition which was not fulfilled until 1844, Sa'id declined to recognise a French Consul at Zanzibar. The Treaty of Commerce with the French, which was signed in 1844, was communicated by Sa'id to the British Government for their approval before its conclusion ; and, unless in East Africa, it entailed no political consequences.

Relations of Saiyid Sa'id with America.

**Commercial
Treaty with
America.**

The first treaty concluded between the ruler of 'Omān and the chief government of a great power, as distinguished from the government of a dependency, was one of amity and commerce negotiated at Masqat in 1833 by Mr. Roberts, Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, who visited the place for that purpose in the sloop-of-war "Peacock." This treaty became the model of the subsequent British and French commercial treaties of 1839 and 1844. The recognition of his importance by the Americans was highly flattering to Saiyid Sa'id, and he immediately sought to improve the occasion by promising them special commercial advantages in East Africa, where their trade lay, on condition of their assisting him by armed force to bring that region under subjection. There is nothing to show that the American government were inclined to take advantage of the offer ; but the fact of its having been made was considered sufficiently serious to warrant the despatch of H.M.S. "Imogene" from Bombay to Zanzibar in 1834, to inquire into the matter.

Character, administration and resources of Saiyid Sa'id.

Saiyid Sa'id was described, when in middle life, as tall, stout and of a distinguished presence, with a face and manner in which penetration and benevolence were agreeably blended; but he was prematurely aged, a circumstance sufficiently accounted for by his manner of life. The history of his reign bears witness to his self-reliance and tenacity, and in more than one emergency he displayed high physical courage; but intelligence and tact were perhaps more salient traits of his character. Character.

The government of Sa'id in time of peace was mild and equitable, and trade flourished in a high degree. Foreign merchants were attracted in large numbers to Masqat, of which the population increased very rapidly; but the commercial development of the Saiyid's East African possessions was even more remarkable. In 1834 his annual receipts from the customs of Masqat were estimated at \$100,000 and those from the customs of Zanzibar at \$150,000, a year; the latter had risen in the course of one or two years from a total of \$40,000 only, and they continued to increase until the end of his reign. The public revenues were supplemented by the profits of private trade, in which Saiyid Sa'id at one time had twenty ships employed.

His forces for war were chiefly naval, and he lavished money and bestowed much personal attention on his fleet, sometimes even commanding his flagship in person; but the efficiency of his overgrown armaments was not on a par with their imposing appearance. The largest vessel he ever owned was the "Liverpool" line-of-battle ship, a two-decker of 74 guns, which he afterwards presented to the British sovereign; and in 1847 he possessed about fifteen vessels of war, of which one, the "Shāh 'Ālam," carried 54 guns. Navy.

SAIYID THUWAINI-BIN-SA'ID.

1856-66.

Separation of Zanzibar from 'Omān, 1856-61.

Sa'id left at his death a large number of sons, none of whom, however, were lawful children by his wives. It had been his intention that his eldest surviving son Thuwaini, whose mother was a Georgian concubine and to whom after 1833 Sa'id had invariably entrusted the affairs of 'Omān in his own absence, should succeed him at Masqat; Division of Saiyid Sa'id's dominions at his death. 1856.

and he had designated his son Khālid, the offspring of a Malabari woman, as heir to his African dominions. Khālid, however, predeceased his father ; and his place in the dispositions made for the family was taken by another son Mājīd, whom Sa'id, at his final departure from Africa in 1854, left in charge of Zanzibar. At the death of Sa'id, accordingly, Thuwaini and Mājīd stood forth as the rulers of Omān and Zanzibar respectively ; while Turki, a brother intermediate in age, held separate possession of Sohār, over which his father in his lifetime had appointed him Wālī.

Agreement
between
Thuwaini and
Mājīd, the
heirs in
possession
respectively
of 'Omān and
Zanzibar,
1857.

In 1856 or 1857 Muhammad-bin-Sālim was deputed by Thuwaini of Masqat to visit Mājīd at Zanzibar, and succeeded in obtaining a promise from the latter that he would pay a sum of \$40,000 annually to Thuwaini ; one-fourth of this sum was to be devoted to satisfying the demands of the Wahhābis, who now exacted from 'Omān a yearly tribute of \$20,000. It is uncertain whether the agreement thus formed was accompanied by conditions, or by any clear understanding as to the relative position of the two brothers ; and it is therefore possible that the parties interpreted it in different senses, the one regarding it as an admission of his rights of suzerainty by an inferior, the other as a compromise entered into with an equal.

Expedition
by Thuwaini
against Zan-
zibar prevent-
ed by British
interposition,
1858

Whatever may have been its nature, it did not long remain in force ; the promised payments were withheld by Mājīd ; and at the end of 1858 it became known that Thuwaini was about to proceed in person against Zanzibar. A steam frigate, despatched by the Governor of Bombay, succeeded in overtaking the 'Omāni expedition, after it had sailed, in the neighbourhood of Rās-al-Hadd ; and Thuwaini, in deference to the wishes of Lord Elphinstone, who deprecated hostilities and suggested recourse to British arbitration, caused his fleet of about 10 vessels with 2,500 fighting men on board to put about and return to Masqat. It was perhaps fortunate for himself that he did so, for his brother Turki was already on the point of making an attack on the 'Omāni capital. The proceedings of Turki were possibly countenanced by Mājīd ; and it seems probable that Thuwaini, on his part, did what he could to promote disaffection to Mājīd in Zanzibar, where in the autumn of 1859 the Hirth of 'Omān and Barghash, a younger brother of Mājīd, rose in rebellion, and where the French Consul was believed to encourage the designs of the disloyal and of Thuwaini's agents.

British Com-
mission of
Enquiry,
1860.

Thuwaini, though he accepted the arbitration of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in principle, was extremely unwilling to bind himself to abide by His Excellency's decision ; however, a written

guarantee of submission to the award having at length been obtained from him, Brigadier-General W. M. Coghlan, Resident at Aden, was appointed in May 1860 to investigate the claims of the disputants with the assistance of the Reverend G. P. Badger, Chaplain of Aden, an accomplished Arabic scholar, and of Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, temporary British Agent at Masqat. The proceedings of the Commissioner, who began by securing from each of the parties a formal bond for his acceptance of the Viceroy's decision, were careful and exhaustive; and his final report, which was not submitted until the close of the year, was accepted by Lord Canning without modification except in one unimportant particular. To the multifarious questions of principle and fact with which the report dealt it is unnecessary to refer in detail here.

The general result of Lord Canning's award, promulgated on the 2nd of April 1861, was to separate the African possessions of the late Saiyid Sa'id from his territories in Arabia; to assign the new and independent principality of Zanzibar, thus created, to Mājid; and to impose on Mājid and his successors an obligation to pay the sum of \$40,000 a year to Thuwaini and his successors, not by way of tribute, but in adjustment of the unequal inheritance of the two branches of the family, and as compensation for the abandonment by rulers of 'Omān of their claims to sovereignty over Zanzibar. The arrears payable by Mājid to Thuwaini were at the same time fixed at \$80,000; and it was resolved to negative a claim advanced by Turki that his position at Sohār should be recognised as independent. Both Thuwaini and Mājid, verbally and in writing, professed themselves satisfied with the Viceroy's decision; and before the end of the year the latter had discharged the first six-monthly instalment of the subsidy and had remitted bills in payment of the total arrears. Experience had shown that the two States of 'Omān and Zanzibar could not be successfully governed by the same ruler; and it cannot be doubted that their separation on such equitable terms was beneficial to both.

On the separation of the principalities the Government of Bombay decided that each of the two rulers should in future be styled Sultān, a term by which, from this point onwards, we shall generally describe them.*

Award of Lord Canning, by which Zanzibar was separated from 'Omān and a subsidy made payable by the former to the latter, 1861.

Title "Sultān" of 'Omān officially adopted by the British Government.

* The significance of the title Imām is fully discussed by Badger in his *Imāms and Seyyids*, pages 378—381. As the term Sultān (though possibly of British origin) is now commonly applied to the rulers of 'Omān even by natives of the country, we have used it in the text (in preference to "Saiyid") to designate the successors of the Imāms. The present ruler, however, is described on his own coins both as Sultān and as Imām.

Re-establishment of the British Residency at Masqat, 1861.

The arbitration proceedings brought home to the Government of India the expediency of re-appointing a European political officer to Masqat, where British interests at the time of the breach between Thuwaini and Mājid had been represented only by an illiterate Jew. This circumstance alone had placed Thuwaini at a considerable disadvantage in relation to his brother, for Mājid was advised in all his difficulties by the British Resident at Zanzibar. Lieutenant W. M. Pengerley of the Indian Navy was selected as the first incumbent of the revived post.*

Internal affairs of 'Omān, 1861-64.

Rebellion of Saiyid Turki and his treacherous seizure by the Sultān, 1861.

Saiyid Turki of Sohār, disregarding the advice of the British authorities that he should consider himself subject to his brother Thuwaini, now openly defied the authority of the Sultān; and Saiyid Thuwaini, in the early summer of 1861, was about to proceed against him with an armed force, when the British Political Agent volunteered his mediation and it was accepted by both sides. On a safe-conduct from the Political Agent, which Thuwaini promised to respect, Turki came to Sib to confer with his brother; but, on the arrival of Thuwaini, he suddenly changed his mind, feigned indisposition, refused a meeting, and made arrangements for returning to Sohār. Thereupon Lieutenant Pengerley, by an unfortunate error of judgment, withdrew his intervention; and Thuwaini, conceiving that the safe-conduct was thereby annulled, seized Saiyid Turki and carried him off to Masqat, where he placed him in close confinement.

Sohār acquired by the Sultān, 1861.

The people of Sohār, on hearing of this, revolted; and Thuwaini sailed against them with a naval force, the Political Agent following him in a British sloop-of-war. The town of Sohār was found deserted, and Thuwaini returned after installing his son Sālim there as Wāli.

Suwaig and Khābūrah lost by the Sultān, 1861.

A little later, in the month of September, the Yāl Sa'ad of Bātinah and the Bani Jābir rose in rebellion at the instigation of Qais-bin-'Azzān

* Lieutenant Pengerley had served with the Turkish contingent in the Crimean war and had done good service in collecting transport animals in Turkish 'Irāq for the Persian war of 1856-57.

of Rustāq and murdered Saiyid Hilāl-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ahmad, Wāli of Suwaiq, who refused to join them : Qais also was killed in the affair, but his son 'Azzān shortly afterwards succeeded in making himself master both of Suwaiq and of Khābūra.*

The action of the British Political Agent at this juncture was again injudicious : he wrote to the rebels "commanding them in the name of the British Government to deliver up those towns to the legitimate ruler of the country" ; he despatched H.M.S. "Elphinstone" to the Bātinah coast ; and he urged the Resident in the Persian Gulf not only to permit the Bani Yās Shaikhs of Dibai and Abu Dhabi to send their vessels of war to the Sultān's assistance, but also himself to arrest some deputies who had gone to interview him on behalf of the rebels. The insurgents, however, treated these menaces with contempt ; and in February 1862 the Government of India, disapproving of Lieutenant Pengelley's proceedings, sent Major Green to replace him.

British
Political
Agent
changed,
1862.

Soon after the arrival of the new Agent the "Elphinstone" was sent away ; Saiyid Turki was released from confinement and received an allowance ; and the Sultān was dissuaded from accepting Persian offers of assistance and induced to make an effort, which proved entirely successful, to dislodge the rebels, by the means at his own disposal, from the territories which they had usurped.

Turki
released and
Suwaiq and
K hābūrah
recovered by
the Sultān :
1862.

Renewed Wāhhābi aggressions and British intervention, 1864-66.

Toward the end of 1864, when hostilities broke out between the Sultān and 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq, the latter received support from Turki-bin-Ahmad the Sadairi, Wāhhābi agent at Baraimi. Saiyid Thuwaini, in alarm, at once sought the mediation of the British Government and asked to be supplied with ammunition ; and Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who was then on the point of undertaking his remarkable journey to Riyādh in Central Arabia, was ordered by Government to report upon the situation. No further developments took place until Colonel Pelly's return from the interior, when, in April 1865, he proceeded to Masqat and there ascertained that 'Azzān-bin-Qais had thrown off his allegiance to Thuwaini and placed himself under the Wāhhābi Amīr, and that the Amīr had begun to demand increased tribute

Rebellion of
'Azzān-bin-
Qais at
Rustāq with
encourage-
ment from
the Wāhhā-
bis, 1864.

According to one account Hilāl and Qais fell by each other's hands, Qais being the first to strike.

from 'Omān and to threaten an invasion of the country in case of non-compliance. Colonel Pelly on becoming aware of these facts sent a letter to the Wāhhābi Amīr, with whom his visit to Riyādh had made him personally acquainted, offering his own services as a mediator, and he also invited 'Azzān-bin-Qais to a conference at Masqat ; but the letter remained unanswered, and the invitation was politely declined.

Wāhhābi demand for increased tribute, 1865.

In August 1865 the usual Wāhhābi mission arrived at Masqat and demanded four times the customary annual tribute ; the Sultān, by the advice of Colonel Disbrowe, the British Political Agent, paid the ordinary amount, and sent a message to the Amīr that, as regards the remainder, he awaited the result of Colonel Pelly's offer of mediation.

Wāhhābi raid on Sūr, 1865.

In the same month the Jannabah of Sūr, who were discontented with the Sultān's rule, sought Wāhhābi assistance from Baraimi ; and the Wāhhābi agent, nothing loth, sent his brother and a Wāhhābi contingent who plundered Sūq Sūr, assisted by some of the disaffected tribes of Ja'alān, especially the Jannabah and Bani Bū 'Ali. A garrison occupying a fort on behalf of the Sultān of 'Omān held out for two days ; but they were unable to prevent the entrance of the enemy into the quarter, and eventually they themselves surrendered. Nearly all the damage inflicted fell upon Hindu traders and shopkeepers of the place, who were British Indian subjects ; the extent of their losses was estimated at \$27,700, and one of their number was killed and another wounded. They were prevented from disposing in the ordinary way of the corpse of their companion ; and, before being allowed to leave for Masqat, they were stripped of almost all their clothing.

Assistance given by the British Government to the Sultān against the Wāhhābis, 1865-66.

The Sultān, after a feeble demonstration by sea in the direction of Sūr, purchased peace of the Wāhhābis by one payment of \$10,000 and another of Rs. 6,000 ; but the British authorities in India, conscious that policy and self-interest required them to abandon their usual attitude of neutrality, now incited him to resistance and prepared to aid him with munitions and ships of war in re-establishing his authority at places where it had been overthrown by the Wāhhābis. On the advice of Colonel Pelly, Thuwaini was shortly afterwards supplied with two guns and a large quantity of powder and other ammunition for an assault upon Baraimi, which was clearly recognised to be the key of the Wāhhābi position in 'Omān, and the Sultān began to collect his tribes for the expedition,—measures to which the Wāhhābis replied by an attack on Saham, where some Banyans, British Indian subjects, were driven into the sea, one of them being drowned. The British Political Resident also addressed notifications to the Shaikhs of 'Trucial 'Omān, reminding those who were partisans of the Wāhhābis that their ports were within.

range of British naval guns, and informing the others, who sided with the Sultān, that they were at liberty to proceed to his assistance by land.

These were the local dispositions made to meet the situation ; and among those of a further-reaching character, more fully noticed in the history of Najd, was an ultimatum sent through his seaport of Qatif to the Wāhhābi Amīr, in which a written apology and compensation for the outrage at Sūr were demanded. No reply to the ultimatum having been received within the limit of time prescribed, naval operations against the Wāhhābis followed at Qatif and Dammān ; and on the 11th of February H.M.S. " Highflyer " appeared off Sūr to insist on atonement by the Jannabah for their part in the affair of August by payment of \$27,700 compensation within 24 hours. On the tribe attempting to procrastinate, a fire was opened which demolished their forts ; the whole of their boats were either confiscated or destroyed ; and a large quantity of their ship-timber was burned. No personal injury was suffered by non-combatants, who were given ample opportunity to remove ; but a small part of the town was accidentally burned, in consequence of a change in the direction of the wind.

Direct action,
by the
British Gov-
ernment
against the
Wāhhābis
and the Jan-
nabah of Sūr,
1865-66.

At length, on the 20th of February, two letters from the Wāhhābi Amīr reached Colonel Pelly, who had taken up his post of observation at the British telegraph station then existing in Khor-ash-Sham : the first, which was dated 28th January, accepted Colonel Pelly's mediation between the Wāhhābis and the State of 'Omān, subject apparently to a condition that the British Government should undertake to enforce the award ; while the second, in reply to the British ultimatum, stated that an agent would be sent to discuss matters and that the Jannabah were guilty of the outrage at Sūr, but that the Amīr recognised his responsibility for recovering damages from them. The Government of India animadverted on the stringency of the demands which had been made by their representative at Qatif and Sūr, and on the shortness of the time allowed for compliance with the British terms at both those places ; but they were on the whole satisfied with the result of the operations. In April 1866 Wāhhābi emissaries from 'Abdullah, who had recently succeeded his father Faisal as ruler of the Wāhhābis, arrived at Būshehr and undertook, besides giving other more general assurances, that the Amīr should not in future attack Arab tribes in alliance with the British, especially those of 'Omān, so long as the customary Zakāt was punctually paid. The British Government on their part declined to guarantee the payment of Zakāt, but the good offices of the Būshehr Residency were promised in any dispute which might arise on the subject.

Settlement
between the
British Gov-
ernment and
the Wāhhā-
bis, 1866.

The subject of this mission in its wider aspects is discussed in the history of British relations with Najd.

Assassination of Thuwaini, 1866.

Almost at the same time that he received the letters of the Wahhābi Amīr, the British Resident was informed of the death of the Sultān of 'Omān by violence at Sohār, whither he had gone to organise the advance on Baraimi and whither his brother Saiyid Turki, with whom he was now perfectly reconciled, had accompanied him. The murder, which had occurred on or about the 11th of February, was apparently committed by Salim, an unnatural son of the deceased. Accompanied by a Wahhābi accomplice Sālim stole into an upper room of the Sohār Fort, where his father was enjoying a midday siesta, and shot him through the forehead with a double-barrelled pistol: thus tragically but unregretted, after a long regency and a short reign, died Thuwaini-bin-Sa'id. The chief characteristics of Thuwaini appear to have been weakness and duplicity; not one of the British officers with whom he was brought into contact ever, apparently, professed either liking or respect for him; and the manner of his death seems to indicate that he was detested even by the members of his own family.

Foreign relations of 'Omān, 1856-66.

Treaties with
Britain.

Communication between Masqat and the outside world was improved during the reign of Thuwaini by the institution of a British service of mail steamers; and in 1864 and 1865 an Agreement and a Convention were concluded with the Sultān to facilitate the execution of British telegraph projects in the Persian Gulf. These matters are dealt with in the historical Appendices relating to postal and telegraphic communications in the Gulf; and the establishment of a British Assistant Political Agency at Gwādar in 1863 is mentioned in the historical note on that dependency.

Anglo-French
Declaration
of 1862.

The most important treaty of the period bearing upon the position of 'Omān was, however, one to which the Sultān himself was not a party. On the 10th March 1862 Great Britain and France subscribed, at Paris, to a Declaration or reciprocal agreement to respect the independence of

the Sultāns of Masqat and Zanzibar. This compact, pregnant with consequences as yet unforeseen, arose apparently out of Zanzibar affairs and was entered into by Her Majesty's Government without reference to the Government of India. The Indian Government did not, in fact, become aware of its existence until 1871.

The claims of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār, raised in 1864, are noticed in the separate history * of those ports. Persian relations.

SAIYID SĀLIM-BIN-THUWAINI.

1866-68.

General insecurity consequent upon the accession of Sālim, 1866.

The British Resident, after receiving the news of Thuwaini's death and instructions to abstain for the present from acknowledging Saiyid Sālim, left Khor-ash-Sham for Masqat in the unarmed Residency steamer "Berenice." On his way down the coast he touched at Sohār : here he learned the details of the recent tragedy and succeeded in obtaining the release of Saiyid Turki, whom Sālim had placed in close custody and whose life was in imminent danger. On or about the 1st of March Colonel Pelly reached Masqat and found the British Indian community in a state of panic. Sālim, who with a party of fanatical priests was now in possession of the town, attempted to open communication with the Resident by sending a near relative with a letter in which it was asserted that Thuwaini had died of fever after a short illness ; but Colonel Pelly ignored these overtures and devoted his attention to embarking the British Agent, all Christians, and the pearls and specie of the Indian merchants on board the "Berenice," while at the same time he advised the British Indian subjects for whom there was not room on the "Berenice" to seek safety in native boats. No war vessels having yet arrived, and information having been received of a plot by Sālim and his adherents to attack the "Berenice" by night and massacre all on board, Colonel Pelly decided on quitting Masqat ; and after dark the vessel left for Khor-ash-Sham.

When H.M.S. "Octavia" and "Highflyer" arrived at Masqat a few days later, the bazaars were closed, trade was at a standstill, not a single native vessel was to be seen in the harbour, and all British subjects had departed. An invitation from Sālim to visit him on shore was declined by the naval officer commanding.

* *Vide* page 601 *post.*

Meanwhile the "Coromandel" was sent from Bombay with Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent, to assist British subjects who might be in danger at various places in 'Omān; and police were despatched from Karāchi for the protection of British interests at Gwādar, where much alarm was felt.

Relations of Sālim with the British Government, 1866-68.

Mission sent by Sālim to Bombay, 1st April 1866.

In April two envoys of respectable position arrived at Bombay with a letter from Saiyid Sālim, in which he prayed that his position as the successor of Thuwaini might be recognised by the British Government and protested against the hostile attitude of the British Resident in the Gulf. The Government of Bombay in their reply, which was signed by a Secretary only and was addressed to the envoys instead of to Sālim, ignored the Saiyid's main request; but they refrained from charging him with parricide, and they mentioned their expectation that British subjects in 'Omān would be protected as in the past.

British subjects permitted to return from India to Masqat, May 1866.

Eventually in May, chiefly on the representations of Indian merchants accustomed to carry on their business in 'Omān, the Government of India authorised the appointment, as a temporary measure, of a Native Agent at Masqat instead of the usual British officer; and it was intimated to British Indian refugees in India that they were at liberty to return to Masqat and to resume their commercial dealings there.

Recognition of Sālim and reinstitution of the British Political Agency at Masqat, September 1866.

In the following September Colonel Pelly, under the orders of Government, visited Masqat and formally recognised Saiyid Sālim as Sultān of 'Omān; the new Native Agent, Muhammad Bāqir Khān, was installed in his post; and the British flag was again hoisted over the Agency quarters. The new Agent died in January 1867 and was succeeded, after a short interval, by a British officer in the person of Captain Atkinson.

Masqat Order in Council, 1867.

The Consular powers of the British representative at Masqat were defined by an Order in Council, passed at Windsor on the 4th of November 1867.

Rebellions of Saiyid Turki and Hamad-bin-Sālim, 1867-68.

Attempt by Turki to recover Sohār.

Such was the position of affairs when the position of Sālim began to be actively disputed by his uncle Saiyid Turki. Turki first sought the help of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, but they were cautioned by the

British authorities against abetting his proceedings, especially by sea. Turki then made Yanqul in Dhāhirah his headquarters, and, having obtained support in that quarter, took Sohār by surprise, but was unable to hold it.

After this he removed to the Ja'alān District and succeeded in attaching to his interests the Hirth, Bani Bū Hasan, Hajriyīn, and Āl Wahībah tribes. Finally he set his face towards Masqat, negotiating with Sālim as he advanced for the cession of Sohār, and arrived at Bidbid in the last days of August. His approach caused much alarm in Masqat, to allay which the British Government gave it to be known that Turki, even if successful, would not be recognised by them, and that the forts of which he might obtain possession would be bombarded by British vessels of war. Turki, however, pressed on to Matrah, which he captured, and attacked Masqat, but was repulsed from that place.

**Capture of
Matrah and
assault on
Masqat by
Turki, 1867.**

At this juncture Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, arrived before Matrah with H. M.'s frigate "Octavia." Turki thereupon abandoned his territorial pretensions, asking instead for a liberal pension; and, by the mediation of the Resident, it was finally arranged that he should receive from Sālim, by deduction from the Zanzibar subsidy, an annual stipend of \$7,200 and should for the future reside in India under the supervision of the British Government. Sālim was accordingly replaced in possession of Matrah; and Turki, on the 11th of September 1867, embarked for Bombay.

**Intervention
of the British
Resident and
deportation
of Turki to
India, 1867.**

These troubles had scarcely subsided when the peace was again disturbed by a particularly futile contest between the Sultān and his near kinsman Hamad-bin-Sālim, of which unjustifiable aggressions on the part of Sālim are said to have been the cause. Hamad, fief-holder of Masna'ah, which had been conferred on him by his uncle the late Sa'id-bin-Sultān, was supported by the local tribes; and Sālim, in February 1868, found himself obliged to summon Turki-bin-Ahmad-as-Sadairi, the Wahhābi agent at Baraimi, to his aid; to call upon the Hināwis of Ja'alān for assistance; and to draw upon a sum of \$40,000 which had been placed at his disposal by the Government of India, on the security of the Zanzibar subsidy withheld at this time by Mājid, to the extent of \$10,000. A hollow reconciliation then took place; but the Hināwis of Ja'alān were not to be baulked of their expected rewards. On the way to Masqat they allowed themselves to be bought over by Hamad for a small sum, but shortly returned to their allegiance to Sālim; and, after draining the resources of Sālim dry, they quartered themselves upon Hamad at Masna'ah and reduced him to the utmost straits for money.

**Rebellion of
Hamad-bin-
Sālim, 1867.**

In the end they were themselves seized by an unaccountable panic, and fled in small bodies towards their native country, losing a number of men by the way at the hands of their Ghāfiri foes. The unscrupulous and cowardly behaviour of these tribesmen was considered to have brought disgrace on the whole Hināwi faction.

Relations of Sālim with Persia.

The arrangement in regard to Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies made between Persia and the Sultān of 'Omān in 1856, remained in force until 1866 and was then legally terminated by the accession of Sālim, who was a grandson, not a son, of Sa'id. The Persians, accordingly, transferred the lease to one Shaikh Sa'id, formerly governor of Bandar 'Abbās under the Āl Bū Sa'id and himself a member of that family; but it was granted to him as a dependent of Persia, not as representing the Sultān of 'Omān; and the rent payable annually was increased from 16,000 to 20,000 Tūmāns. This Arab lessee having withheld the revenue due from him, the Governor-General of Fārs at the beginning of 1868 took steps for his forcible removal, with a view to the substitution of a Persian nobleman in his place. At this point, in April 1868, Sālim threatened to blockade the Persian coast unless the lease were given to him; and the Persian Government, who had then no vessels in the Gulf, applied for British mediation, while Sālim, unable to carry out the threat of blockade without the approval of the Government of India, which was refused, committed his interests to the hands of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. Colonel Pelly accordingly visited Shirāz in July 1868, accompanied by Hāji Ahmad, the minister of the Sultān; and on the 4th of August, after an attempt by the Persians who had regained confidence, to reject the British intervention, an Agreement was signed. By this document the lease of Bandar 'Abbās was renewed for eight years, in favour of Sālim and his descendants only, at an enhanced yearly rental of 30,000 Tūmāns: most of the other conditions were much the same as in 1856. In the course of the discussions the Sultān claimed Hanjām and Lārak as dependencies of 'Omān, irrespectively of the Bandar 'Abbās lease; nor was his claim to these islands either abandoned or disproved.

Temporary suspension of the Zanzibar subsidy, 1866-68.

It may be mentioned here that the Sultān of Zanzibar, on becoming aware of the accession of Sālim and the circumstances thereof, attempted to evade continued payment of the annual subsidy decreed in 1861; he argued that the arrangement was personal to Saiyid Thuwaini, and that in any case he could not be expected to continue payment to a parricide. His first contention was disallowed by the Government of India, on the ground that it was clearly opposed to the terms of Lord Canning's award; and the other difficulty was met by the Government of India undertaking to receive and transmit the amount due by the Sultān of Zanzibar to the Sultān of 'Omān, the necessity for direct dealings between Mājid and Sālim being thus obviated. Eventually the outstanding obligations were discharged by Mājid in the spring of 1868.

It may be noted incidentally that, in 1867, the Government of Bombay found it necessary to warn the Sultān of Zanzibar against presenting munitions of war as gifts to subjects of his relation the Sultān of 'Omān,—an abuse which did not again become clamant till nearly thirty years afterwards.

Expulsion of Sālim by 'Azzān-bin-Qais, 1868.

A final upheaval against his authority now terminated the short and unhappy reign of Sālim. On the 23rd of September 1868 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq made himself master of Barkah, on the 29th he captured Matrah, and on the 1st of October he suddenly occupied the town of Masqat while Sālim, leaving his valuables to become the spoil of the enemy, hurriedly took refuge in one of the harbour forts.

Capture of
Masqat by
'Azzān-bin-
Qais.

Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, who was present in the harbour, suggested an armistice until the wishes of the Government of India could be ascertained; but 'Azzān declined to wait, and commenced operations against the fort in which Sālim still held out. No active part was taken in the contest by H.M.S. "Vigilant" beyond placing a rocket-party in one of the forts to prevent the removal by 'Azzān from its vicinity of an 18-pounder gun which the British Govern-

Neutrality
of the British
Government.

ment had once presented to Thuwaini and of which the companion, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Resident, had been seized and brought into use by the besieging party. On the 7th of October instructions were received by Colonel Pelly to abstain from using force on Sālim's behalf.

Flight of
Sālim.

The 8th of October passed in fruitless negotiations between Sālim and 'Azzān; and on the 9th, after Sālim had sought an asylum on board the "Vigilant", 'Azzān hoisted his flag upon the forts and proclaimed his accession by an artillery salute. On the 12th of October, Sālim, in a ship of his own, left Masqat for Bandar 'Abbās.

Causes of
Sālim's over-
throw.

The downfall of Sālim has been attributed to various causes, but chiefly to his general unpopularity, to his treatment of Hamad-bin-Sālim of Masna'ah, and to his dependence on the Ghāfiri tribes of Ja'alān, of whom the powerful Bani Bū 'Ali and Jannabah were paralysed, at the time of 'Azzān's insurrection, by a feud between themselves.

SAIYID 'AZZĀN-BIN-QAIS.

1868-71.

Early associates and proceedings of 'Azzān, 1868-69.

Ultra-reli-
gious charac-
ter of Azzān's
early adminis-
tration.

The immediate result of this revolution, achieved at the expense of Sālim, was to place in power a group rather than an individual; for 'Azzān was in the beginning largely dependent on his principal advisers and adherents. Among these the most prominent were Sa'id-bin-Khalfān, Khalili, the ecclesiastic who had for a time held charge of Rustāq in the lifetime of Hamūd-bin-'Azzān, and Sālih-bin-'Ali, the leading chief of the Hirth. In the beginning the influence of the former, who was, or soon became, the father-in-law of 'Azzān and who generally acted as Wāli of Masqat town, predominated, and gave a fanatical colour to the administration; a white Mutawwa' banner was substituted for the time-honoured red flag of 'Omān; tobacco and strong drink were prohibited; music of all sorts was placed under the ban; and the easy-going inhabitants of Masqat were compelled to attend the mosques with regularity, and to trim their moustaches in a particular style. The new régime thus resembled Wahhābism in some of its external characteristics; but, as subsequent

events showed, no sympathy existed in political matters between its exponents and the Wahhābi power. Discontent was soon rampant in more than one quarter, for fines and confiscations were numerous, yet the pay of the troops was in arrear. Foreign trade declined, and the revenue afforded by the customs became insufficient for the needs of government.

But the energy of 'Azzān was equal to all emergencies; and, while the Khalili at the beginning of 1869 lorded it at Masqat and kept his master—as was currently reported—on very short commons financially, 'Azzān marched from Barkah with 3,000 men and two guns against the refractory tribes of Wādī Samāil and its tributaries. In February 1869, after reducing Ghailah, Milaiyinah and Nafa'ah, he completely humbled the Siyābiyīn, who were then his principal adversaries. Having effected a junction at Nafa'ah with his supporter Sālih-bin-'Alī, who brought with him from Samad a contingent of 1,500 Hirth, Hajriyīn, Habūs and others, 'Azzān succeeded, notwithstanding the difficult nature of their country, in chastising also the Nidābiyīn and Rahbiyīn, who were sympathisers of the Siyābiyīn. The enterprise had been regarded by onlookers as rash and even suicidal; and the complete success of 'Azzān evidenced an ability and force of character to which 'Omān had long been unaccustomed in her rulers. Sohār, Samāil, Masna'ah and Sūr had already submitted to his authority, without even an attempt at resistance.

Military successes of 'Azzān and rapid extension of his authority.

Early in his reign 'Azzān seems to have been proclaimed "Imām" by his priestly supporters; but it does not appear that the title, though often applied to him, ever received the needful ratification by the tribes of 'Omān as a whole.

'Azzān described as "Imām."

Proceedings of 'Azzān's rivals, 1868-69.

Sālim, the deposed prince, having been cautioned by the British authorities not to disturb the maritime peace by a naval expedition against 'Omān, crossed privately from Bandar 'Abbās to Dibai and entered into negotiations with the Sadairi agent who represented the Wahhābis at Baraimi, with the object of arranging an attack by land upon 'Azzān. In April 1869, however, the violent death of the Wahhābi agent at Shārjah deprived Sālim of the aid upon which he chiefly relied; and, though in May he made a tour by way of Barkah, Izki and Nizwa to the Ja'alān district and returned northwards *viā* Birkat-al-Mōz, he was unable to secure any active support.

Failure of Sālim-bin-Thuwaini in the interior of 'Omān, 1869.

Successes of
'Azzān in
the same,
1869.

In the months of September and October following, after the capture of Baraimi as related below, 'Azzān paid a visit to 'Omān Proper and reduced the fortresses of Bahlah, Nizwa, Izki and Adam; and he even entered the Ja'alān district and awed the inhabitants, including the Bani Bū 'Ali, into submission. At Adam he repaired a fort built by his ancestor the Imām Ahmad.

Seizure of
Gwādar by
Nasir-bin-
Thuwaini,
1869.

The manœuvres of Saiyid Nasir, another son of the deceased Thuwaini, were more successful. This individual, having escaped by a stratagem from surveillance at Masqat, crossed in April 1869 to Gwādar, of which place he succeeded in making himself master; and he might possibly have taken possession of Chahbār also, had he not been forestalled by Dīn Muhammad, the Balūch chief of Dashtyāri, who occupied it himself.

Veto placed
by the British
Government
on naval
operations.

A considerable influence on the course of events was exerted by the British Government, who peremptorily forbade the competitors to make expeditions against one another by sea. This prohibition made it impossible for 'Azzān to recover Gwādar, and at the same time it prevented Nasir from making Gwādar a base, as he was anxious to do, for operations against 'Omān; it also had the effect of obviating a hand to hand struggle between 'Azzān and Sālim, whose respective headquarters were divided by the sea.

Relations of 'Azzān with the Wāhhābis, 1869-70.

Baraimi
taken by
'Azzān from
the Wāh-
hābis, 1869.

After the murder of the Wāhhābi agent in 'Omān, the Na'im tribe of Baraimi, who had suffered much from his tyranny, were inclined to shake off the Wāhhābi yoke altogether and applied to 'Azzān for his assistance. 'Azzān immediately proceeded in their direction and, in passing through the Bātinah district, endeavoured to recruit reinforcements; but the tribesmen generally did not respond to his summons, and the Ghāfiris in particular were firm in their refusal to break with the Wāhhābis. At Barkah 'Azzān had received a letter from the Wāhhābi Amīr, who called upon him, on the ground of his having assumed the title of Imām, to remit the customary tribute of 'Omān to Riyādh; but, the Khalīli having been consulted, it was resolved to ignore this demand. A more threatening communication was now received from 'Abdul 'Azīz, a Wāhhābi commander who had recently made a successful raid on Sohār and who, from his name, may have been identical with the Wāhhābi leader of the attack made upon Sūr in 1865. Having been joined by Sālih-bin-'Ali with a contingent of 500 men

from the Ja'alān district, 'Azzān advanced on Baraimi with a total force of about 1,500 men; took the place, after slight resistance, on or about the 18th of June 1869; and, after installing a garrison under one of his own relations, returned to Masqat. Before leaving Baraimi 'Azzān entered into an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and undertook to pay him a subsidy on condition of his protecting the Baraimi frontier of 'Omān. A counter-alliance was formed by the remaining Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān among themselves; but the Shaikh of Shārjah quickly forsook it and attached himself to the interests of 'Azzān.

The British Resident in the Persian Gulf, on hearing of the capture of Baraimi, hastened to remind the Wāhhābi Amīr of the obligation under which he had placed himself in 1866 to abstain from molesting Arab States in alliance with the British Government; but his letter was apparently ignored, and 'Azzān presently received a laconic warning from 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal to prepare for an invasion of 'Omān by the Amīr in person at the head of 20,000 men. At the beginning of 1870 it seemed probable that the threat would be carried into effect; for the Wāhhābi chief was then at 'Oqair on the coast of Hasa and had ordered a large fleet of boats to be made ready, which he probably intended to use as transports for a part of his force. Meanwhile, at the end of February, 'Azzān, accompanied by his own brother Ibrāhīm and by Sa'ūd, a rebellious brother of the Wāhhābi Amīr, proceeded to Baraimi and conferred there with his ally the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Various obstacles now interposed, which obliged the Wāhhābi to defer his operations against 'Omān: among them were the unseasonable scarcity of water and forage in the country between Hasa and Baraimi, the combination between the Abu Dhabi Shaikh and the ruler of 'Omān, the prospect of being himself called to account by the British power in connection with the recent invasion of Bahrain from Hasa, and the fear of intrigue at Riyādh during his absence. Before long 'Abdullah was involved in civil war at home, and he found no further opportunity of prosecuting his designs on 'Omān.

Inability of
the Wāhhābi
ruler to
retaliate,
1870.

Successful campaign of Turki against 'Azzān and death of 'Azzān 1870-71.

The enmity of the Wāhhābi power had thus no direct consequences; but, by encouraging his rivals to renewed activity, it affected very detrimentally the position of 'Azzān.

Return of
Saiyid Turki
from India,
March 1870.

Early in 1869, when the British authorities in India still regarded 'Azzān's usurpation with an unfavourable eye, restraint on Turki's movements had been withdrawn; and in March 1870, Turki, though without the express permission of Government, left India for the Persian Gulf as a private passenger on board a British steamer.

His failure
in Trucial
Omān.

In May he was at Dibai on the coast of Trucial 'Omān, as was also Sālim, the ex-ruler of 'Omān; but he was as yet without funds, and a request from him for a loan by the British Government was of course refused. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, moreover, who continued steadfast in his alliance with 'Azzān, had dissuaded the other chiefs of that region from helping Turki; and the Wahhābi Amīr, in whom was Turki's chief hope, had now returned to his capital in Central Arabia. In these circumstances, Turki, preceded by Sālim who went to Qishm, retired disappointed to Bandar 'Abbās. 'Azzān was at this time engaged in besieging the fort of Hazam, where the descendants of the ancient Ya'arabi line of rulers still held out against his authority.

His sojourn
at Bandar
'Abbās.

In July Turki made a suspicious movement from Bandar 'Abbās in the "Muzaffar", a vessel under British colours, but, being overtaken by the Resident, he returned to port; his native craft, however, he sent to lie at Khor Fakkān on the Shamailiyah coast. In August funds sent for his use by the Sultān of Zanzibar began to reach him through a Hindu firm at Bombay: the first instalment amounted to \$20,000.

His success-
ful invasion
of 'Omān,
September
1870.

In September Turki landed at Khor Fakkān and proceeded *via* Fujairah and Wādi Hām to Baraimi. He was joined on the way by the Bani Qitab and at Baraimi by the Na'im tribe; the Na'im had possession of all the forts in Baraimi, except the principal one, which was held by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in the interest of 'Azzān. The Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Rās-al-Khaimah also attached themselves to Turki's cause. 'Azzān, who, with his brother Ibrāhīm, had meanwhile brought his nine months' siege of Hazam to a successful conclusion, and in the course of a tour in the Dhāhirah District had captured the strong post of 'Ainain, now marched to meet him. As 'Azzān, approached Dhank, he was deserted by a large proportion of his mercenary forces; but he possessed an advantage in the shape of two pieces of artillery, and his troops still numbered about 4,000 men. On the 5th October 1870 the armies encountered in Wadi Dhank, a short way above Dhank town, and the result was a complete and somewhat unexpected victory for Turki. After the battle, in which their side had suffered 300 or 400 casualties, 'Azzān and Ibrāhīm retreated to Sohār, while Turki passed on through 'Omān Proper, Badiyah and Ja'alān to Sūr where he

encamped and collected a large force. On the 29th of October Major Way, the Political Agent at Masqat, visited Sūr and warned Turki against undertaking operations by sea, at the same time refusing to grant him an interview. Finally, about the end of the year, Saiyid Turki and his principal adherent, Saif-bin-Sulaimān of the Bani Riyām, marched from Sūr, the former proceeding to Ja'alān and the latter taking the coast route towards Masqat. By the middle of January 1871 Turki was at Mudhaibi, threatening Samad with a force of 3,000 men, and Saif-bin-Sulaimān had occupied Quryāt on the coast; while Sālih-bin-'Ali was holding Samad, and 'Azzān, with his brother Ibrāhīm, was busily engaged in preparing for the defence of Masqat and Matrah.

Saif-bin-Sulaimān attacked 'Azzān in Matrah, apparently on the 30th of January, and took the place all except two forts. Both Saif and 'Azzān were killed in this engagement: the latter, it is said, met his death in the Jabru suburb of the town.

Defeat and death of 'Azzān, January 1915.

Relations of 'Azzān with the British Government.

The usurpation of 'Azzān seems to have been, at the first, more distasteful to the British authorities than that even of his paricidal predecessor. The arrogant and fanatical character of his counsellors, the unfavourable influence of his administration on trade, and the fact that he was not of the line of Sa'id, whom British officers had come to regard as the natural rulers of the country, were the principal objections against him; and the way towards a better understanding was for some time closed by personal friction between Colonel Disbrowe, the Political Agent, and the members of the new government.

On the seizure by Saiyid Nasir-bin-Thuwaini of Gwādar in April 1869, the Political Agent, in order to prevent recourse by the Masqat authorities to a naval expedition against that place, interdicted the sailing of any vessel of war from the harbour; and when, in the following month, 'Azzān, disregarding Colonel Disbrowe's protests, despatched munitions of war by sea to Barkah and other of his own ports in 'Omān, that officer to mark his displeasure hauled down his flag and took up his quarters for a few days on board the Indian Marine vessel "Clyde". Colonel Pelly, however, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, disallowed the Political Agent's interpretation, in the second case, of the rules relating to the maritime

Friction between 'Azzān and the British Political Agent over the prohibition of maritime warfare 1869.

peace; and it was explained to 'Azzān that, while debarred from descents by sea on foreign or disputed territory, he was not restricted in regard to naval movements within his own territorial waters: 'Azzān in return professed himself grateful and desirous to please the British Government in every respect.

Other diffi-
culties.

Meanwhile, however, an attack on the private house of Mr. Shore, the British Agency Accountant, had been threatened, "should the sounds of a concertina proceed therefrom"; and in August and September some tobacco in which British subjects were interested was seized by the Masqat authorities and destroyed by them in accordance with their religious principles. A little later an attempt was made by the local administration to detain the "Prince of Wales", a ship under the British flag, which they claimed as belonging of right to the navy of 'Omān and as having been unwarrantably carried off by Salim at his departure from Masqat; but in this matter they yielded to the protests of Colonel Disbrowe.

The "Clyde"
incident,
October 1869.

On the 15th of October a much more serious incident occurred. The Political Agent, having received notice of an intended attack by Nasīr-bin-Thuwaini of Gwādar upon Masqat, requested the officer in command of the "Clyde" to move her to a different berth under Fort Jalālī; but he had omitted to inform the local authorities, and the garrison of the fort, not understanding the reason of the manœuvre, opened a fire of matchlocks on the "Clyde" and maintained it for half-an-hour. The Political Resident in the Gulf was ordered to proceed to Masqat at once, and arrangements were made for collecting a British naval force there in case reparation should be refused. Colonel Pelly, however, was successful in obtaining a written apology from the Khalīlī, who was in charge of Masqat during the absence of 'Azzān, as well as an oral apology made publicly by a deputation of five notables on board the "Dalhousie"; and on the 3rd of November 'Azzān himself expressed, in unqualified terms, his regret at what had happened and his respect for the British Government. Colonel Pelly reported on this occasion that the British Indian subjects at Masqat did not complain of being themselves oppressed, and that their two chief grievances were the enforcement of the Muhammadan law of creditor and debtor and of a prohibition against the purchase of tobacco by Masqat subjects, which affected a branch of their trade.

British Poli-
tical Agent
changed,
1869.

At the end of the year, when matters had quieted down, Colonel Disbrowe was transferred to another post and was succeeded at Masqat by Major Way, the latter being placed in strict subordination to the Resident

and instructed not to correspond directly with the Government of Bombay unless in exceptional circumstances.*

In November 1869 the Government of India instructed Colonel Pelly to make careful local inquiries regarding the stability of 'Azzān's position in order that the question of his recognition as Sultān of 'Omān might be decided. It was felt that the non-admission of his claims reacted unfavourably on the British position in 'Omān; but the case of Sālim had shown what embarrassment might result from the premature recognition of an insecurely established ruler. The undesirability of a Wahhābi conquest of 'Omān, whence Wahhābi influence might radiate to India, was clearly perceived; but it was thought that the mere recognition of 'Azzān, while irritating to the Wahhābi Amīr, would do little to strengthen 'Azzān's position *vis à vis* of that potentate. Eventually the Government of India inclined to disregard the standing danger of a Wahhābi attack and to acknowledge the Sultānate of 'Azzān, provided that his power were shown to be well-established in his own dominions; but in February 1870 the imminence, as was supposed, of an actual Wahhābi invasion caused them to postpone their decision. A few days later, however, apprehension of the Wahhābis being still at its height, they directed Colonel Pelly (then at Calcutta) to proceed to the Persian Gulf with all convenient speed and there formally recognise 'Azzān, if in his opinion such a step should appear to be expedient; in case, however, of his deciding in favour of recognition, he was to reserve for future settlement all questions of detail, such as the maintenance of former treaties and conventions and the validity of 'Azzān's claim to particular territories abroad. The arrival at Masqat of non-British European vessels which did not hesitate to admit the sovereignty of 'Azzān soon illustrated the danger of backwardness on the part of the British authorities; and additional reasons in favour of recognition were supplied by the facts that the British Political Agency at Masqat had been continuously maintained and that an apology in the "Clyde" case had been accepted from 'Azzān as *de facto* ruler. Colonel Pelly, however, did not at once make use of his discretionary power to recognise 'Azzān, and before long the opportunity for doing so as an emergency measure had passed away.

Discussions regarding the official recognition of 'Azzān by the British Government, 1869-70.

* To avoid allusion to the personal aspect of these difficulties was impossible without conveying a false impression. It is clear from the Government records that the attitude of Colonel Disbrowe towards 'Azzān and his strained relations with Colonel Pelly, to whom he was only partially subordinate, were a principal cause of the troubles of 1869. In fairness to Colonel Disbrowe it should be added that, in the opinion of Government, he was not alone to blame for the differences between himself and Colonel Pelly.

The "Bullfinch" incident, March 1870.

Discussions regarding the recognition of 'Azzān continued till interrupted by his death, 1870-71.

In March 1870 a boat belonging to H.M.S. "Bullfinch" was fired on in Masqat harbour; but the occurrence was shown to be due partly to a mistake by the garrison and partly to the neglect of the boat to carry a light after dark, as required by the regulations of Masqat harbour; consequently the harmonious relations which now prevailed were not disturbed.

At length, in May 1870, the Government of India submitted the question of the recognition of 'Azzān to the Secretary of State, with especial reference to the terms and conditions on which it might be granted; in particular they desired to know whether, in case of recognition, all previous treaties with the ruler of 'Omān should be maintained; whether continuance of the Zanzibar subsidy should be guaranteed; whether the good offices of Britain with Persia should be promised in connection with the lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which had lapsed by the displacement from power of Sa'id-bin-Sultān's descendants; and whether the responsibility of mediating for the restoration of Gwādar and Chahbār to 'Omān should be assumed. Before these difficult questions could be resolved, the situation in 'Omān had been entirely altered by the appearance of Turki on the scene; and at the time of his death the Sultanate of 'Azzān was still officially unrecognised by the British Government.

History of the Zanzibar subsidy during the reign of 'Azzān.

During the whole of his reign 'Azzān received nothing on account of the Zanzibar subsidy, nor was anything paid to his successor on account of the period during which 'Azzān had ruled. The non-recognition of 'Azzān's government was not the sole cause of this omission. Mājid, the Sultān of Zanzibar, found in the usurpation of 'Azzān a fresh excuse for not discharging his liabilities under the award of 1861; from May 1868 he discontinued his payments; and about the end of that year he sent a mission to England to remonstrate against the obligations to which he had been subjected. Her Majesty's Government, who were anxious at this time to obtain from Mājid certain facilities for the suppression of the slave trade, encouraged him through his envoy to hope for release from the payment of the subsidy. A long discussion followed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India, in which the latter maintained that there had been no change of circumstances which could be held to invalidate Lord Canning's award; that justice and good faith required the British Government either to enforce against the Sultān of Zanzibar the award which they had imposed on the Sultān of 'Omān, or to set the latter free to prosecute his claims on Zanzibar.

by all means in his power; and, finally, that good policy obliged the British Government to insist on continued execution of the award, inasmuch as failure to do so would bring all their arbitral decisions between native powers in that part of the world into contempt and would greatly weaken the 'Omān Sultanate, which in the interests of Britain ought rather to be strengthened. The Government of India also combated a suggestion that, if it were found necessary to continue the subsidy, the burden of payment should be transferred from the Sultān of Zanzibar to themselves: such a charge, they contended, could not fairly be cast upon the Indian revenues, because it would procure for India no new advantages in 'Omān or elsewhere, and would be in effect a financial measure for the suppression of the African slave trade,—a matter in which India was not concerned. The question was not finally settled in the lifetime of 'Azzān; but in 1870 hopes were held out to Saiyid Mājīd by Her Majesty's Government that the arrangements existing under the arbitration of 1861 would soon be declared at an end.

In connection with the Zanzibar subsidy question we may mention that in December 1869 there were rumours of a descent contemplated by 'Azzān upon Zanzibar; and that, upon another occasion during the reign of 'Azzān, the British authorities found it necessary to warn Mājīd against harbouring designs on Masqat.

Character and administration of 'Azzān.

'Azzān may perhaps be justly regarded as the most meritorious and the most unfortunate among recent sovereigns of 'Omān. Such leadership and manly resolution as his had not been witnessed at Masqat since the days of Sultān-bin-Ahmad; nor had he been approached by either of his immediate predecessors in energy or in determination to rule. He had many disadvantages to contend against, not the least being the character of the associates by whom he was carried into power and the dissensions that prevailed among them; but, as his authority became consolidated, the influence of religious fanaticism in his councils declined, and he always showed much skill in maintaining an outward agreement between his rival advisers, the Khalīlī and Sālih-bin-'Alī, Hārithī. The rule of 'Azzān was strong; but its centralising tendency was distasteful to his subjects, and it could only be maintained by great severity. The forts of Masqat in his time swarmed with political prisoners and the town with hostages; and the Ghāfirī faction as a whole disliked and were distrusted by him. In general his government was abhorred from the first by the townsmen, who were completely in his power; while the tribesmen became alienated from it gradually, as they discovered its absolutist ten-

dencies. But for the refusal of British recognition, the consequent loss of the Zanzibar subsidy, and the release by the Indian Government of his most dangerous rival Turki, it is possible that 'Azzān might nevertheless have surmounted all his difficulties and reduced 'Omān, for a time at least, to the semblance of a well-ordered monarchy.

SAIYID TURKI-BIN-SA'ID.

1871-88.

Events in 'Omān from Turki's accession to his temporary retirement, 1871-75.

Capitulation
of 'Azzān's
supporters,
February
1871.

After the death of 'Azzān-bin-Qais and Saif-bin-Sulaimān at Matrah, operations were continued by the surviving leaders upon either side, and by the 3rd of February the town of Masqat was in the possession of Turki's adherents, a number of whom belonged to the Hishm tribe; but the Khalili still held out in the forts. Meanwhile Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, had arrived on the spot, and a day or two later Turki, whom Sālih-bin-'Alī had successfully held in check at Samad, appeared at Masqat to profit by the success of his supporters. An armistice having been arranged, the Khalili consented to surrender the forts to Turki upon certain terms, of which the principal were that members of the late government should not be molested by the new, and that their official acts should be ratified, and their public liabilities assumed, by their successors. A written agreement was accordingly drawn up and was attested by Colonel Pelly and by Major Way, the Political Agent at Masqat, as witnesses. It was fortunate that the British officers concerned took the precaution of explaining that they assumed no responsibility for the subsequent observance of the agreement by either party; for, less than a month after, the death of the Khalili took place in circumstances indicative of foul play and was followed within 48 hours by the death of his son also.

Position of
Turki at the
commence-
ment of his
reign, 1871.

As matters now stood, Turki was master of Masqat, Matrah and Sūr, and the commanders of a number of the forts in the interior of 'Omān had declared for him; but Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, the brother of the deceased 'Azzān, from his headquarters at Sohār ruled the whole Bātinah coast

between Shinās and Masna'ah, both of which were in his hands; the Rustāq valley was held by 'Azzān's cousin Faisal-bin-Hamūd; and some Wahhābis, profiting by divisions among the Na'im, had reoccupied the Baraimi fort. The most serious competitor for the sovereignty of 'Omān, however, appeared at first to be Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, the ex-Sultān, who was now living in exile at Qishm; and even greater disquiet was before long to be caused to Turki by 'Abdul 'Azīz, his own younger brother, who at first joined him as one of his dependents. The decisive battles of Dhank and Matrah had been won for Turki chiefly by Ghāfirī tribesmen, and it was upon the loyalty of the Ghāfirīs that the new sovereign in the beginning of his reign chiefly relied.

The recovery of the Sohār principality was the first task to which Turki addressed himself. On his first expedition, in May and June 1871, Shinās was taken; but Sohār town, though besieged, made a successful resistance. A second effort in August 1871, in which the Shaikh of Dibai participated, resulted in the capture of Liwa; and the walls of Sohār Town also were breached and the place was about to be stormed, when the followers of Turki, true to the 'Omāni predilection for a balance of power, insisted on a compromise by which Sallān and Khābūrah with all intermediate places on the Bātinah coast (including Sohār) should be retained by Ibrāhīm, while the remainder (including Masna'ah and Suwaiq) were transferred to Turki. In this position matters remained until November 1871, when Turki, who had now been strengthened by British recognition of his Sultanate, succeeded in taking Khābūrah.

Recovery by Turki from Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais of Shinās, Liwa, Masna'ah, Suwaiq and Khābūrah in Bātinah, but not of Sohār, 1871.

Meanwhile in June 1871, 'Abdul 'Azīz, after declining the command of the Sohār expedition which was offered to him, had established himself at Gwādar in virtual independence of his brother; and rivalry and opposition, which only the impecuniosity and personal insignificance of the malcontents prevented from becoming a danger to Turki's rule, now sprang up on every side. At the end of the year Sālih-bin-'Ali was fostering disaffection among the Hināwi tribes of the Sharqiyah District and had opened a treasonable correspondence with Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais; 'Abdul 'Azīz, by means of emissaries sent from Gwādar, was carrying on intrigues throughout 'Omān; and Sālim at Qishm was meditating a coalition with Ibrāhīm, whose sister he had received in marriage. In February 1872, Sālim, after an interview *en route* with Ibrāhīm, landed at Sūr; but on Turki following him to that place, which is a stronghold of the Ghāfirīs, he decamped to the country of the Bani Bū Hasan in the interior.

Movements of 'Abdul 'Azīz, Sālih-bin-'Ali and Sālim, 1871-72.

Renewed
struggle in
Bātinah,
1872.

In the spring of 1872 Ibrāhīm succeeded in repossessing himself of Majis and Shinās, and laid siege to Liwa; but the forces of the Sultān inflicted a severe defeat on him in the Dabbāgh quarter of the latter town and the places which had been lost were recovered.

Departure
of 'Abdul
Azīz and
Sālim to
India, loss
of Khābūrah,
recovery of
Gwādar and
loss of
Chabhār,
1872.

About the same time Sālim, operating from a base in Ja'alān, attempted to seize Sūr; but this attempt also was foiled. At the beginning of May, in the absence at Bombay of Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz, a detachment of Wahhābi mercenaries was sent over to Gwādar and re-occupied the place in the name of Turki; but in the meanwhile Chabhār had passed irretrievably out of the possession of 'Abdul 'Azīz into that of Persia. The course of events in autumn was less favourable to the Sultān; for in September Sālim made a raid upon Quryāt, in which the Wālī of that place was wounded, and then again threatened Sūr, while Khābūrah fell once more into the hands of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais. At the end of the year the situation again improved, for Sālim, having failed to raise a party in 'Omān, left Sūr in a native sailing boat for Bombay.

Recovery by
the Sultān of
the whole of
the Bātinah
coast, 1873.

In July 1873 Turki, fortified by the renewal in his favour of the Zanzibar subsidy and assisted by the Na'im tribe, felt himself strong enough to undertake the reduction of Sohār; and on this occasion Ibrāhīm, who a short time before had received the fort of Hazam also as a gift from his relative Hamūd-bin-Faisal of Rustāq, surrendered after an investment of a few days only. The entire Bātinah coast was ceded to Turki, while Ibrāhīm in return merely received a bonus of \$5,000 and a pension of \$100 a month, the latter conditional upon his living at or near Hibi, the only place of strength that remained to him of his former possessions.

Renewed
activity of
the rebels,
attacks on
Gwādar, and
deportation
of 'Abdul
'Azīz to
India, 1873.

Immediately after this success of the Sultān the rebel party again became very active. 'Abdul 'Azīz and Sālim having left Bombay in separate Baghlahs about the end of May, the former, towards the close of July, invested Gwādar and nearly succeeded in capturing it. In August an attempt was made by Sālih-bin-'Alī to advance on Masqat; but it was frustrated by the Ghāfirī Nidābiyīn and Rahbiyīn, who prevented his passage through Wādī-al-'Aqq; and a contingent of Āl Wahībah, whom Sālih had sent in advance, found themselves in a somewhat precarious position under the walls of Matrah. In September 'Abdul 'Azīz was captured at sea near Sūr by the Political Agent, Major Mockler, in H.M.S. "Rifleman", and was deported to Karāchi, where he was kept in honourable detention; a warrant under Regulation III of 1818 was however prepared, in case he should at any time attempt to escape or to abuse his comparative freedom. A little later the partial advantages gained by Turki were countervailed by the

retirement of Hamūd-bin-Faisal of Rustāq into private life and the succession to his place of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, for from this time onwards the rebellious line of Qais had their chief seat in the inaccessible Rustāq valley, instead of upon the coast. On the 8th of December 1873 Gwādar was taken by Sālim, who appeared there unexpectedly with a handful of followers and escalated the fort, possibly with the connivance of the Wali; but his tenure of the place, as will appear from the history of Gwādar, lasted only three days, after which he became once more a homeless wanderer.

Towards the end of 1873 Turki, who at the time was unmarried, espoused the daughter of his cousin Hamad-bin-Sālim.

At the beginning of 1874, Turki being at the time prostrated by sickness, Sālih-bin-'Alī, on a false report of his death, marched from the Sharqīyah district on Masqat with a force of 300 tribesmen, chiefly Hirth, Habūs, Hajriyīn and Āl Wahībah, among whom were also a few Bani Ruwābah. As a candidate for the succession Sālih brought with him Hamūd, a son of the late ruler 'Azzān-bin-Qais, whose age was about 12 years. The 'Aqq pass having been denied them by its Ghāfiri custodians, Sālih's Hināwi force took the Qahza route and arrived at Ruwi, entirely unexpected, on the 17th of January. A small detachment of Wahhābi mercenaries sent out to attack them was defeated with loss, and the rebels then took possession of Matrah; they respected the fort of the Khōjahs, over which floated the British flag, but they plundered indiscriminately in the bazaars, and part of the damage so caused fell upon British Indian subjects. Arrangements were made by the British authorities to support Turki in resisting the further progress of the rebels; but the necessary means were not immediately at hand, and the Sultān preferred to treat with the enemy rather than to protract matters till ships could arrive. On the 20th of January terms were arranged by the Sultān at Masqat with Hamūd-bin-Sa'id, Jahafi, of the Āl Wahībah tribe, afterwards a celebrated freebooter and rebel. The principal conditions on which the insurgents promised to retire were that they should receive \$6,000 in cash and 100 bags of rice; that sales of confiscated property made by the Government of 'Azzān-bin-Qais to the Hirth and Bani Ruwābah should be confirmed; that the property of the Khalili should be restored to his family; and that the proceedings of the rebels themselves should be condoned: a stipulation also was added against any attack by the Sultān on Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, whom Sālih-bin-'Alī undertook to restrain. H.M.S. "Nimble" arrived at Masqat on the 22nd of January; but it was too late, for the terms had been ratified and the rebels were already evacuating Matrah. The undertaking given by the Sultān to recognise the confis-

First rebel
attack on
Masqat,
January
1874.

cations of 'Azzān gave great offence to the Ghafiri tribes especially to those of Wādī Samāil who had been largely despoiled; and where the Ghāfiris were strong, as at Nakhl, they flatly refused to respect it.

Masna'ah and Suwaiq occupied by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, but recovered for the Sultān by British action, 1874.

This episode was hardly over when Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, whose capital was now in Rustāq, began to move once more in Bātinah: on the 6th of March 1874 he took the town of Masna'ah and laid siege to the fort. Ibrāhīm was supported by Muhammad-bin-Salaiyim, Ghāribi, the most influential Mutawwa' of Bātinah; the Yāl Sa'ad, the largest tribe in that district, flocked to his standard in ever-increasing numbers; and fears began to be entertained for the safety of Barkah and even of Masqat. The fort of Masna'ah surrendered after one week's siege; but Major Miles, the British Political Agent, when the rebels persisted in occupying it in defiance of his request that they should await the pleasure of the British Government, caused them to be driven out by shell fire from H.M.S. "Philomel". On the 26th of March Colonel Ross, Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived with Major Miles at Masna'ah and demanded the evacuation of the fort, which the rebels had in the meantime re-occupied; and, the demand having been complied with, the work was dismantled by the guns of H.M.S. "Rifleman" and "Philomel" to such an extent as to render it untenable. In the beginning of June the Yāl Sa'ad captured Suwaiq, from which place however British Indian subjects had previously been removed as a measure of precaution, and plundered the bazaar; but Major Miles, having proceeded to the spot in H.M.S. "Magpie", obliged the insurgents to withdraw. The rebellion in Bātinah then collapsed, leaving no trace behind except a considerable bill on account of the losses sustained by British Indian subjects at Masna'ah, one of whom had been killed in the disturbances there: the subsequent proceedings in connection with this claim are described in a later paragraph. Ibrāhīm after this succeeded in possessing himself of 'Awābi; but eventually, about the end of 1874 or beginning of 1875, he made nominal submission to the Sultān, and was allowed to retain Rustāq, besides obtaining from the Sultān a pension of \$100 a month.

Abdul 'Aziz permitted to return from India, May 1874

The difficulty of facing such crisis as had occurred without the help of a single influential or disinterested adviser had disposed Turki to a reconciliation with his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz, and about the beginning of May 1874 the exile was permitted to return from Karāchi to Masqat, in time to render good service in the recovery of compensation for their misdeeds from the Yāl Sa'ad.

Hināwi-Ghāfiri disturbances, 1874-75.

Nevertheless disorganisation, due to the ill-health, indecision and occasional faithlessness of Turki, continued to spread during 1874; and in 1875 even the capital was affected. In August of 1874 difficulties

between the Hināwi and Ghāfiri tribes in Wādi Samāil became so acute that the Sultān was obliged to proceed in person to the spot; but the settlement that he arranged was unacceptable to the Ghāfiris, and their submission to it was insincere and of short duration. Fighting between the two great factions was already in progress at Izki, Birkat-al-Mōz and Nizwa in 'Omān Proper, and later it broke out at Yanqul in Dhāhirah. Meanwhile the Sultān, who from day to day was falling more and more under the influence of the Hināwis, had greatly weakened his position at Masqat by the dismissal of a large part of his reliable Wahhābi mercenaries and by the substitution for them of ordinary Hināwi tribesmen,—a measure in itself sufficient to incapacitate him for impartial authoritative intervention between tribe and tribe. In February 1875 open war was declared between the Ghāfiris and Hināwis of Wādi Samāil; irreparable mischief was done by the Ghāfiris in felling large numbers of date trees belonging to the Hināwis; and the feud was not composed until June, when the Ya'āqīb of Ibri intervened and persuaded the parties reciprocally to withdraw their claims.

In May 1875 a dispute occurred at the capital between the Sultān and the Bani Bū Hasan, who were now strongly represented in the garrisons of the Masqat forts; and, while 'Abdul 'Azīz conciliated the offended tribe by granting, under his brother's authority, all their demands, the Sultān hid himself on a merchant ship in the harbour. After this incident Turki, who was physically indisposed and mentally depressed, would have abdicated his authority altogether, had he not been dissuaded by Colonel Miles and 'Abdul 'Azīz. At the beginning of July an estrangement took place between Turki and his brother 'Abdul 'Azīz in consequence of the indulgence shown by the former to Numaish, an unworthy favourite, and to Hamūd-bin-Sa'id the Jahafi; and a number of the Al Wahībah took advantage of the circumstance to occupy Masqat and Matrah, and to demand various concessions, of which the most serious was the permanent retention of themselves in the Sultān's military service.

Matters were brought to a crisis on the 10th of August by a rupture between Turki and 'Abdul 'Azīz. The latter had demanded the dismissal of the Balūch garrisons from the Masqat forts on the ground that they were fraudulently kept below strength by the responsible commandants; when this demand was refused, he resigned office; and Turki for a few days carried on the administration alone. A rising then occurred of Bedouins who were anxious to take the place of the Balūchis, and Turki was obliged to hand over the forts of Jalāli and Mīrāni to the malcontents. Disgusted with the course of affairs and feeling himself unable to maintain the contest, Turki now went on board his corvette the "Rahmāni,"

Insubordina-
tion of Bani
Bū Hasan
guards and
insolence of
Al Wahībah
tribesmen,
1875.

Retirement
of Turki to
Gwādar,
August 1875.

leaving 'Abdul 'Aziz to struggle as best he could with the prevailing anarchy. On the 21st of August 1875, having assured Colonel Miles that he would return if circumstances permitted, and having formally appointed 'Abdul 'Aziz to act for him, Turki left for Gwādar in H.M.S. "Rifleman".

Turki's internal administration, 1871-75.

Political and
military
causes of
Turki's
initial want
of success.

The ill-success of Turki as a ruler was a severe disappointment to many, including the British authorities, by whom his accession had been regarded with complacency. The energy and military qualities by which he had attained the Sultanate soon became foreign to his character; and the support of the Ghāfiri tribes, to which he chiefly owed his position, almost as quickly ceased. The chief causes of his failure were probably ill-health and the success of Salih-bin-'Ali's sudden attack on Masqat in 1874; the latter showed the Sultān's power to be without real foundation, and induced him to exchange the friendship of the Ghāfiris for that of the Hināwis, whom he had come to regard as the more dangerous. His independent military resources, consisting originally of a few hundred Wabbābis and Balūchis, were never considerable; and he consented, as we have seen, to reduce them to a still lower level at the dictation of the Hināwis, thus cancelling his own authority and virtually handing the capital over to Bedouin control.

Turki's early
advisers.

Some of Saiyid Turki's worst mistakes might have been averted had he possessed a trustworthy minister and been willing to defer to his opinion; but the fact is clear, though not fully accounted for, that his position from the beginning was one of isolation. His first Wazir, a man of evil character named Thuwaini-bin-Muhammad, was dismissed by him in 1872 for complicity in the murder of Nāsir-bin-'Ali, Wāli of Masqat, and was assassinated a year later by a slave of his supposed victim. After the removal of Thuwaini, Turki fell into the hands of Maish or Numaish, an unscrupulous adviser of low origin, who after three years in the Sultān's service was believed to have amassed a fortune of \$40,000. The return of 'Abdul 'Aziz, especially as it had been voluntarily sought by the Sultān, might have been expected to put an end to the unsatisfactory state of affairs; but 'Abdul 'Aziz, though animated by a sincere devotion to his brother's interests, was never after the first fully trusted by him, and had to contend on unequal terms, almost up to the time of Turki's departure for Gwādar, against the hostile influence of Maish.

Turki did not display during the first part of his reign any of that skill and patience in dealing with the tribes of 'Omān for which in his later years he obtained a considerable reputation; and large sums from the Zanzibar subsidy, and from other sources, were squandered by him in indiscriminate subsidies and ineffectual bribes.

Personal defects of the Sultān, due to inexperience.

Turki's relations with the British Government, 1871-75.

Turki, perhaps in consequence of his two years' residence in the Bombay Presidency, during which he may have had opportunities of recommending himself and his claims to notice, was from the beginning a *persona grata* with the British Government and their agents. His recognition as ruler of 'Omān was recommended without delay, sanctioned by the Secretary of State in June 1871, and communicated to Turki himself on the 8th of August following.

Recognition of Turki as Sultān, 1871.

The transference, at the beginning of 1873, of the Persian Gulf Residency and Masqat Agency from the charge of the Government of Bombay to the direct supervision of the Government of India had no unfavourable effect upon British relations with the new Sultān; and the unhesitating signature by Turki in April 1873 of a new treaty for the suppression of the slave trade, proposed at Masqat by Sir Bartle Frere as plenipotentiary of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, contrasted favourably with the behaviour of Barghash-bin-Sa'id, Sultān of Zanzibar, who declined to treat on the subject, and gave Turki a higher place than before in the good graces of the British authorities.

British anti-Slave Trade Treaty, 1873.

The renewal of the annual subsidy of \$40,000, formerly paid by the Sultān of Zanzibar under Lord Canning's award of 1861, had been held out, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, as an inducement to Turki to sign the new treaty, and payment of the same was now resumed by the Government of India with effect from the date of Turki's accession, the Sultān being at the same time informed that it would be maintained "so long as he continued faithfully to fulfil his treaty engagements and manifest his friendship towards the British Government". From this time onwards until 1883, the cost of the subsidy, which in commemoration of its origin may still be called the

Regrant and disposal of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, 1871-75.

"Zanzibar" subsidy, * was divided, like the other expenses of the Zanzibar Agency, in equal moieties between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India. Between the 26th of April and the 6th of November 1873 the amounts due under the new arrangement were paid to Turki; but his disposal of the money, though it possibly enabled him to recover Sohār, was generally injudicious, and, so far from procuring him any solid advantages, appeared to inflame rather than to satisfy the cupidity of the tribes and of their untrustworthy leaders.

British naval
and political
support at
Gwādar,
Masna'ah
and Suwaiq,
1873-74.

Besides the indispensable financial support thus afforded to Turki he received, on various occasions, valuable naval and political assistance from the Government of India. On the 1st of September 1873, when 'Abdul 'Azīz and Sālīm were disturbing the country in the neighbourhood of Gwādar, they were warned that, if after rejecting certain terms which had been offered them by Turki they attempted either to cross to 'Omān or to make their way to the Persian Gulf, the British Government would endeavour to arrest them; and, as already related, 'Abdul 'Azīz was actually captured under these orders and interned in India. In 1874, on the occasion of Sālīh-bin-'Alī's attack on Matrah, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was authorised, on condition of abstaining from operations ashore, to lend Turki active assistance by naval fire wherever it could be brought to bear. These instructions, as we have seen, or at least the means of their execution, did not arrive until the crisis that elicited them was over; but they remained in force for some time after as standing orders. The original expulsion of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais's adherents from Masna'ah, in March 1874, was undertaken on his own responsibility by Major Miles, the Political Agent at Masqat, before the orders of Government on the Bātinah rebellion had been received; but eventually the instructions relating to Masqat and Matrah were given a wider application, and the expulsion of the rebels for the second time from the Masna'ah fort was covered by a general permission

* The discussions between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India in 1868-70 (see page 490 *ante*), in which the former impugned, and the latter maintained, the indefeasible right of the Sultān of 'Omān to a subsidy under the Award of 1861, did not result in any definite conclusion. Therefore the subsidy of which payment to Turki began in 1873 may be regarded either as a new subsidy or as a continuation of that decreed by Lord Canning; but the latter view, which is in harmony with the arguments used by the Government of India in 1868-70, appears the juster, and the name "Zanzibar" will accordingly continue to be employed in this Gazetteer, though with inverted commas to mark the doubt. The fresh conditions annexed to the subsidy by the Government of India in 1873,—namely fulfilment of treaty engagements and friendship to the British Government—seem inconsistent with the previous admission by that Government of the unqualified right of the Sultān of 'Omān to the subsidy so long as he should be restrained from attacking Zanzibar.

from Government to give Turki active support so far as guns from the sea could reach. The withdrawal of the Yāl Sa'ad from Suwaiq in June 1874 was likewise the result of a British naval demonstration made under the same extended orders.

At the beginning of 1875, the incompetence of Turki having become fully apparent, the Government of India adopted a more reserved policy in 'Omān and instructed their representatives to avoid interference in the dynastic and internal affairs of the country and to confine themselves to the exercise of good offices merely. More stringent conditions were at the same time attached to the employment of armed force by the local British authorities in support of the Sultān. In accordance with the new policy no persistent endeavour was made to restrain Turki from abdication; and, when he finally did retire, British action at Masqat was restricted to arrangements for the safety of British subjects in case of disturbances.

Subsequent
modified
policy, 1875.

It only remains, in connection with British relations, to describe the manner in which losses sustained by British subjects in the political disturbances of the period were from time to time made good.

Protection of
British sub-
jects in
'Omān, 1871-
75.

Sohar claims
1872.

At the beginning of 1872, some Hindu traders having been maltreated and subjected to extortion by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais at Sohār, which place was not then in the power of Turki, the British authorities themselves undertook to enforce reparation. Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Gulf, himself proceeded to Sohār in April 1872 on H. M. S. "Quantung," assessed the losses after inquiry at \$2,255, and returned after recovering half of the amount in cash and obtaining a bond for the remainder.

Matrah
claims, 1874.

Compensation for the losses suffered by British subjects in the capture of Matrah by Sālih-bin-'Ali in January 1874 was paid by the Sultān himself, as Government held that by making terms with the rebels he had condoned the insurrection and rendered himself responsible for its consequences.

Masna'ah
claims, 1874.

In the Masna'ah case, in which the compensation was fixed at \$15,000, the Sultān was warned against a premature reconciliation with the delinquents; and in July 1874 Colonel Ross, Political Resident, and Major Miles, Political Agent, proceeded again to Masna'ah in the "May Frere" with H.M.S. "Philomel", "Nimble" and "Magpie" and the Sultān's corvette "Rahmāni", the last carrying Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, whom Turki had empowered to negotiate on his behalf. The fort at Masna'ah was found partially repaired and garrisoned for the third time by Ibrāhīm's men; but on the 19th of

July a few shots from the "Philomel" and the support of the men-of-war's boats enabled 'Abdul 'Azīz to land and occupy it without resistance. Negotiations between 'Abdul 'Azīz and the Yāl Sa'ad followed, and it was at length arranged that \$5,000 (or one-third of the amount due) should be paid by the Sultān on condition of the Yāl Sa'ad returning to their allegiance to him, and that the remainder should be collected by the Yāl Sa'ad within 70 days. This settlement received the assent of the Government of India ; but it was not fully or punctually carried out, for in the end \$400 due from the Yāl Sa'ad was remitted, and notwithstanding the remission payment was only completed in January 1875.

Kuria Muria
Islands case,
1875.

After the disposal of the Masna'ah affair another case, arising out of the wrongful confinement and subsequent release on ransom at Hallā-nīyah Island of subjects of the Rāo of Kach, claimed attention: the offenders in this instance were Bani Bū 'Ali of the Ja'āfarah section, belonging to Lashkharah on the South-East Coast of 'Omān. Major Miles went to Lashkharah in H. M. S. "Philomel"; and, as the surrender of the actual offenders could not be obtained, a fine of \$600 was imposed and was readily paid at Sūr by some Shaikhs of the Bani Bū 'Ali who represented themselves as having been authorised by the Ja'āfarah to act on their behalf. A more considerable claim which had its origin at Sūr in June 1875 was not settled, as will be related further on, until 1877.

Regency of 'Abdul 'Azīz, August to December 1875.

Hināwi
satisfaction
and Ghāfiri
discontent.

The position of the regent after his brother's departure was in no way enviable, for the Masqat treasury was empty and the forts were held by a discontented tribal soldiery whose pay was in arrears ; but 'Abdul 'Azīz showed energy and good sense in coping with the difficulties of the situation. The leading men of both factions received friendly invitations to visit Masqat, and a number of them, chiefly Hināwis, responded to the summons, while the turbulent Bedouins were treated with a judicious parsimony which had an excellent effect on the public finances. The general character of the new régime was, after the first, Hināwi and fanatical ; for Sālih-bin-'Ali, arriving from Sharqīyah at the head of 400 men, became the principal adviser of 'Abdul 'Azīz, while the Mutaw-wa's, flocking into Masqat, usurped municipal authority and placed an interdict on dancing and prostitution. The prospect of exclusion from

influence and of subjection to their rivals now alarmed the Ghāfiri tribes, and the Bani Riyām, Bani Jābir, Jannabah and Bani Bū 'Ali prepared to repudiate the authority of the regent. Badar-bin-Saif, Wālī of Sohār, also made ready to resist, with the help of the Na'im tribe, any attempt to coerce him that might be made from headquarters. At the beginning of October, after a month's residence at Masqat, Sālih-bin-'Ali left for Sharqiyah, ostensibly in order to protect the interests of the government there. A visit of more than three weeks' duration was paid to 'Abdul 'Azīz in October by Zāid-bin-Khalifah, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who promised to support his interests.

At this juncture the arrest was effected at sea, by British naval agency, of the ex-Sultān Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, who since his escapade at Gwādar in December 1873 had resided at Qishm on a pension of \$150 a month from Turki. Having left his Persian retreat for 'Omān, Sālim was captured off the Suwādi islands by H.M.S. "Daphne" on the 10th or 11th of October; his excuse for disregarding the previous warnings of the British Government was that he had come to arrange for the continuance of the pension that had been paid him by Turki; but he had with him two Baghlahs and about 40 men, and it was believed that he had meant to land at Hail Al 'Umair in Batinah and thence to make a dash on Masqat. He was accordingly removed to India and kept at Haidarābād in Sind, under conditions similar to those under which 'Abdul 'Azīz had been detained at Karāchi; but he died of small-pox in the following year.

Deportation
of Sālim to
India.

Colonel Miles, the British representative at Masqat, maintained, with the approval of Government, a somewhat distant attitude in his relations with the regency, and more than one request by 'Abdul 'Azīz for pecuniary assistance was refused, the Zanzibar subsidy being continued instead to Turki at Gwādar; confidential orders however were given that, if in a grave emergency at Masqat 'Abdul 'Azīz should prefer a written request for help in the name of his brother Turki, it should be complied with in the accustomed manner, as if emanating from Turki himself. It seems probable, from various indications, that only the fear of non-recognition by the British Government restrained 'Abdul 'Azīz from declaring himself ruler of 'Omān in his own right.

Relations of
the regent
with the
British repre-
sentative.

Towards the end of the year returning health and spirits decided Turki to resume the personal administration of 'Omān; but the manner of his reappearance was peculiar, for, instead of acquainting his deputy with his intentions, he landed clandestinely at Matrah from a native boat on the 13th of December, 'Abdul 'Azīz being then absent

Sudden return
of Turki from
Gwādar and
end of the
regency,
December
1875.

at Hisn Samāil where he had gone for the purpose of replacing a Ghāfirī garrison by one of Balūchis. The fort guards at Matrah, who were partly Balūchis, acknowledged Turki without hesitation and put him in possession of the place ; but the Bani Bū Hasan holders of the Masqat forts declined to admit him to the capital without orders from 'Abdul 'Azīz ; and the latter, probably alarmed by Turki's extraordinary conduct, sent them orders to hold out until he should himself arrive to their assistance. On the 19th of December, Turki, having received Ghāfirī reinforcements from Nakhl and a few Wahhābis from the faithful Wāli of Sohār, occupied the heights above Masqat town ; and on the 21st, after two days of harmless skirmishing with the defenders, he entered the place unopposed. The forts held out for a few days more and then surrendered. Turki had been joined soon after his arrival at Matrah by the notorious Hamūd-bin-Sa'id, Jahafi, with 30 men.

British flag
incident.

An incident of these operations was the improper use by Turki's adherents of the British flag, which they hoisted on a boat sent by Turki from Matrah with a letter to Colonel Miles. The boat was fired on, as it passed, by the Masqat forts ; but, an ample apology having been made by both sides for the impropriety of which they had been guilty, the matter was allowed to drop.

Events in 'Omān from the return of Turki to the attack, by Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Azīz, on Masqat, 1876-83.

The second portion of the reign of Turki was not free from disturbances caused by Sālih-bin-'Ali, Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz, and other lesser malcontents ; but his authority did not again sustain any severe shock.

'Abdul 'Azīz
driven into the
interior, 1876.

'Abdul 'Azīz was soon abandoned by his adherents and found himself obliged to retire from Hisn Samāil to Samad. The Samāil fort continued for a short time to be held in his name by a garrison of the Bani Ruwāhah tribe ; but, after some fighting beneath the walls in which a good many casualties occurred on both sides, it surrendered and was occupied by a garrison of the Sultān's Balūchis. Various negotiations then took place for an understanding between the two brothers ; and in March 1876 Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, who had assumed the rôle of intermediary, had a meeting with 'Abdul 'Azīz at Quryāt. 'Abdul 'Azīz, however, would agree to no settlement which involved his removal

from 'Omān ; and Turki on the other hand refused to grant him terms except on condition of his residing out of the country.

The principal event of 1876, however, was a serious incursion into the Sultān's territories by Hamūd-bin-Sa'id the Jahafi. This pestilent rascal, who had been imprisoned by Turki in April, was very imprudently released at the request of Sālih-bin-'Ali in July ; and in September he descended from Sharqiyah on the Bātinah accompanied by a gang of marauders, without the approval, it would seem, on this occasion of either Sālih-bin-'Ali or Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais. Passing through Rustāq he committed depredations at Jammah, all but captured the Sultān's second son Faisal and favourite Numaish at Tarif, and so reached Sib ; but, on finding that the British Indian traders there had withdrawn leaving little booty behind, he plundered the bazaar of what it contained and proceeded to Saham, securing at the latter place some property of Hindus which the owners had not time to remove or to conceal. Hamūd next joined himself to the Ma'āwal of Wādī Ma'āwal, whose relations with the Sultān had always been bad—chiefly on account of lands confiscated by 'Azzān-bin-Qais and bought in by the Ma'āwal at a low price—and who at this time were in overt rebellion. The people of Nakhl and Samāil, however, having come to blows with the Ma'āwal and inflicted severe loss upon them, the intervention of the Sultān was sought ; and he seized the opportunity to obtain the expulsion of Hamūd from the Ma'āwal country.

Raid on
Bātinah by
Hamūd the
Jahafi, 1876.

In 1877 a fresh attempt was made on Masqat by the discontented subjects of the Sultān. The moving spirit as usual was Sālih-bin-'Ali, assisted by the Mutawwa' party, and an attempt was made to give the movement a creditable appearance by alleging "His Highness's irreligiousness and laxity of morals" as the chief cause of popular dissatisfaction. The approach of the rebels was announced by a letter from Sālih-bin-'Ali which reached Mr. Robertson, the Acting Political Agent at Masqat, on the 9th of June. Mr. Robertson was entirely new to his position, and H.M.S. "Teazer" had left the port the day before ; but Colonel Miles was still at Masqat, and Mr. Robertson acted in consultation with him in the crisis which followed. On the 14th of June the rebels, notwithstanding a written remonstrance from the Political Agent, pushed on to Matrah and occupied that town unopposed ; not, however, before Mr. Robertson and Colonel Miles had removed the Hindu traders of the place with their valuables to boats in the harbour. The Khōjahs at this time desired to remain in their fort, where they considered themselves safe. Sālih had failed to persuade 'Abdul 'Aziz to join him upon this occasion, but he was accompanied by Hamūd the Jahafi ;

Second rebel
attack on Mas-
qat, June
1877.

the bulk of his force consisted of Āl Wahibah, but the Hirth, Habūs, Hajriyīn, Bani Bū Hasan and Bani Ruwāhah were also represented, of whom the Hajriyīn had been among the most consistent supporters of Saiyid Turki's father. The Masākirah gave money aid to the rebels on this occasion, but sent no men to join them. On the 15th of June H. M. S. "Teazer" opportunely returned to Masqat: and on the 17th Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais joined the rebel camp. The insurgents, who numbered at least 1,000 men while the defenders of Masqat did not exceed 200, appeared on the evening of the 17th to be advancing to the assault; and, after a warning had been sent them, H. M. S. "Teazer" at the request of the Sultān threw some shells into the valley behind the town. A few rounds were fired at night also to alarm the rebels and prevent their gathering for an attack. On the next day the "Teazer" ran round to Matrah and dislodged some rebel sharpshooters whose fire from adjacent houses was galling the garrison of the fort; and advantage was taken of the opportunity to oblige all British subjects in the Khōjah fort to leave it and go on board vessels: the "Teazer" then returned to Masqat, where she repeated the artillery demonstration of the previous day with the same satisfactory effect. On the 19th of June the rebels opened communication with the Sultān; but he refused to discuss matters unless they retired to Ruwi, which they accordingly did. On the 20th the "Teazer" carried Turki to Matrah, whence he proceeded to Bait-al-Falaj for an interview with Sālih-bin-'Alī; the latter demanded \$20,000 as the price of his retirement, but the Sultān was firm in his refusal to pay anything. During their occupation of Matrah various atrocities had been committed by the rebels, including the murder of children and of unarmed negroes. On the 21st of June the Mutawwa' force broke up, Sālih returning to Samad and Ibrāhīm to Rustāq; but Hamūd the Jahafi lingered for some days in Wādī Bōshar, threatening to raze every house and to destroy every date tree between Barkah and Masqat unless he received a douceur of \$2,500 from the Sultān; and in the end the government of Masqat, powerless to attack him, considered it the best policy to accede to his request. The Sultān, relieved of present anxiety, showed a prudent regard for the future by immediately repairing the defences of Masqat and Matrah, by increasing the garrisons at both places, and by re-introducing foreign mercenaries. A short time after these events 'Abdul 'Azīz left Samad for the country of the Bani Bū Hasan in the Ja'alān district, where he remained for several months without obtaining any active support.

In the summer of 1878 'Abdul 'Aziz made a movement against Masqat, eliciting a written protest from Colonel Miles; his advance was arrested by Ghāfiri opposition in Wādī Samāil, but not until it had given rise to a panic in the capital, where the recollection of Bedouin brutalities in the previous year was still fresh. Apart from this scare, 'Omān, for the next few years, remained exempt from serious disturbances.

Movements
of 'Abdul
Aziz, 1878.

In 1879 some trouble with the Rinds occurred at Gwādar, and in the same year Dhufār was re-occupied by troops from 'Omān, after an interval of fifty years; but these events, which are related in the Annexures on Gwādar and Dhufār history, did not re-act on the home politics of 'Omān. There were local rebellions in Dhufār in 1880 and 1883.

Trouble at
Gwādar and
re-annexation
of Dhufār,
1879.

Such disturbances as occurred in 'Omān itself were purely local or tribal. One centred upon the fort of 'Ainain in Dhāhirah, which early in 1879 was seized from the Miyāyihah by some Balūchis. The Balūchis retained it until 1881, when, being hard pressed by a large Ghāfiri combination, they made it over to the Bani 'Ali of Yanqul: the Sultān, it may be remarked, by authorising the Balūchis to hold the fort in his name, had given great offence to Shaikh Barghash, the Tamimah of all the Ghāfiris. Soon after taking possession of Bait-al-'Ainain the Bani 'Ali made a successful sortie against the Ghāfiri besiegers, in which over 50 men were said to have been killed. In 1881 the Miyāyihah were at war with no less than eight other tribes.

Tribal contest
for possession
of Bait-al-
'Ainain, 1879-
81.

Another important dispute related to the fort of 'Awābi, which was held by the 'Abriyīn and claimed by the Bani Riyām. It was decided by the transfer of the fort in 1881, in consequence of an agreement, to the ownership of the Sultān, who retained in it the garrison of the 'Abriyīn.

Acquisition
of 'Awābi by
the Sultān.

But the most serious tribal affray was one which resulted, in July 1881, from an old feud between the Bani Bū 'Ali and the Bani Bū Hasan in Ja'alān; it took the form of an attack, after five days' notice given, by the Bani Bū 'Ali assisted by the Jannabah, Bani Rasib and Hishm upon the Bani Bū Hasan, whom they totally defeated in their own quarter of Jawābi-al-Khuwaisah and drove into the fort. This engagement was described as the most sanguinary ever fought between 'Omani tribes, and was said to have cost the lives of 60 of the Bani Bū 'Ali and 75 of the Bani Bū Hasan.

Battle be-
tween Bani
Bū 'Ali and
Bani Bū Ha-
san, 1881.

In 1882 there was a recrudescence in 'Omān of political trouble of a graver kind. On the 11th of March Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais once more seized Masna'ah; but, warned by previous experience, he carefully protected the British Indian traders from pillage, and the commercial life of the port continued undisturbed. The Sultān, however, was resolved

Masna'ah
again taken
by Ibrāhīm-
bin-Qais and
recovered by
the Sultān,
1882.

on recovering it by force of arms; and on the 9th and 10th of April he attacked the fort with an 18-pounder gun, H.M.S. "Arab" being present to watch events, but not to take part in the operations. Ibrāhīm himself was absent at Rustāq, and on the second day of the bombardment the fort was taken by assault, not without a number of casualties on either side. Turki then resumed possession of Masna'ah; and the success thus gained redounded considerably to his credit.

Matrah and
Masqat
threatened by
rebels, 1882.

In the month of June 1882, however, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz and Hamūd the Jahafi succeeded in slipping through the 'Aqq pass; and on the 22nd they arrived at Wataiyah with the declared intention of attacking Matrah and Masqat. A protest by Major Grant, the Political Agent at Masqat, failed to divert them from their purpose; but, on the 24th of June, influenced probably by the arrival of H.M.S. "Arab" which anchored off Matrah, the rebels substituted negotiations for threats and in the end extorted favourable terms from the Sultān, one condition being the payment of a pension of \$200 a month to 'Abdul 'Azīz. Saiyid Faisal, the Sultān's son, was then sent to punish the Nidābiyīn for allowing the passage of the rebels through Wādī-al-'Aqq, but he allowed himself to be deterred by the threats of Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Azīz.

Machinations
of Sālih-bin-
'Ali, 1883.

Throughout the earlier part of 1883 Sālih-bin-'Ali was busy in preparing the way for a supreme effort to depose Saiyid Turki; but he had now lost the support of Ibrāhīm of Rustāq, who in March of that year accepted a pension of \$100 a month from the Sultān; and, though he still put 'Abdul 'Azīz prominently forward, it seems to have been his intention, if successful, to set the religious recluse Hamūd-bin-Faisal of Rustāq upon the throne. Sālih made skilful use of dissensions among the Ghāfiris of Wādī Samāil and its tributary Wādis, especially of a dispute between the Nidābiyīn and Bani Jābir about date plantations at Sarūr, to weaken the chief defence of Masqat against invasions from Sharqīyah. He was so successful that the confidence of Turki in the Nidābiyīn was temporarily shaken, and the tribe repudiated their obligation to hold the 'Aqq pass against the Sultān's enemies.

Third rebel
attack on
Masqat, Octo-
ber 1883.

Of the final attempt on Masqat, which was not made until October, there were several premonitory symptoms. In June Hamūd the Jahafi attempted to make his way down to Masqat, but was stopped at Sarūr by the loyal Bani Jābir and Siyabiyīn tribes. At the middle of August Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Azīz were at Sarūr, where they had come unopposed, to settle the dispute between the Nidābiyīn and Bani Jābir; but, though they had a large force with them, they unaccountably returned

from Sarūr to Sharqīyah. At length, on the 19th of October, Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, received intimation from 'Abdul 'Azīz of an impending attack on Masqat; it was accompanied by a request that arrangements should be made for removing British subjects out of harm's way. The Sultān, who on this occasion appeared to great advantage and showed much energy, concentrated his forces to the number of about 500 men for the defence of Masqat, leaving Matrah somewhat slenderly garrisoned; this disposition, as events turned out, was the best that could have been made. Meanwhile British Indian subjects at Masqat were required by the Political Agent to ship their valuables and to be in readiness to embark themselves, and the Hindu traders at Matrah were brought round for greater safety to Masqat; but the Khōjahs of Matrah were left to their own discretion and elected, for the most part, to remain in their fort. On the 21st of October the advance guard of the rebel army arrived at Ruwi; and at 1-30 A.M. on the 22nd a determined and altogether unexpected assault, led by 'Abdul 'Azīz in person, was made at three separate points upon the wall of Masqat town. This direct attack on Masqat by way of the Wādī-al-Kabīr was considered to be a remarkable departure from the time-honoured custom by which Matrah was occupied first and used as a base against Masqat. The night was dark, the assailants were dressed in black and provided with scaling-ladders, and the garrison, though on the alert, were not expecting an alarm; but the attack was repulsed, the Sultān himself proceeding to the ramparts; and the rebels retreated with a loss of about 30 men killed and 60 wounded. 'Abdul 'Azīz fell back on Sidāb and thence on Ruwi, rejoining Sālih who had not risked his person in these operations, though a small nocturnal attack had been made by his men upon the walls of Matrah. On the 22nd the Sultān, doubtful of his ability to defend Masqat without assistance, obtained from the Political Agent a promise of support by H. M. S. "Philomel" which was then in harbour; and all British subjects in the town, except those attached to the Agency, were ordered to betake themselves to boats. During the day a welcome reinforcement of 70 Jannabah arrived from Sūr in the Sultān's steam-yacht "Dār-as-Salām"; and in the evening Colonel Miles with the "Philomel" paid a visit to Matrah, and, after causing a couple of 7-inch shells to be thrown over the rebels' position to prevent their advancing against the ill-defended walls, returned to Masqat. On the 23rd the Sultān asked that occasional shots might be fired by the "Philomel" to keep the enemy at a distance during the following night,

and his request was granted. On the 24th the enemy appeared in force in the upper part of Wādi-al-Kabīr and on the heights above Kalbūh, and annoyed towers guarding the water supply with musketry fire, but could not capture them. On the 25th some friendly Shaikhs of the Hirth and Masākīrah arrived with a contingent of 300 men, and the fire of the "Philomel" was discontinued. On the day following a small fleet of boats entered the harbour, bringing reinforcements to the number of 700 men from various quarters, and, all danger being now at an end, the town gates were thrown open and the garrisons permitted to leave their posts. On the same day Sālih-bin-'Alī and 'Abdul 'Azīz broke up their camp at Ruwī and returned to Sharqīyah, leaving a small party behind to bring the wounded home. The rebels had lost about 70 killed, including three or four Shaikhs; and the Sultān regarded the operations as the most decisive in 'Omān since the battle of Dhank, in which the power of 'Azzān-bin-Qais was broken. The tribes principally implicated in this rebellion were the Hajriyīn, Hirth and Habūs; but the Sultān subsequently stated that no tribe of Sharqīyah was entirely innocent of participation in the rising. The Bani Battāsh remained neutral, and the Bani Kalbān and Bani Shatāil declared for the Sultān.

Punitive
expedition to
the Samāil
and Ma'āwal
valleys,
November
1883.

The army of the Sultān having increased at the end of the siege to about 3,000 men, he despatched a force of about 1,700 men, under his son Faisal, to follow up the rebels and punish the disaffected Ghāfirī tribes who had given them passage. The movements of Faisal, who did not start until the 3rd of November, were too leisurely to occasion any anxiety to the retreating enemy; but he was successful in the second object of his mission and obtained the submission of the tribes in and about Wādi Samāil, besides compelling the Nidābiyīn and Rahbiyīn, after he had driven them up Wādi-al-'Aqq, to renounce their alliance with the Hināwis. On his return march Faisal visited the Ma'āwal tribe, who had paid no revenue for three years, in their own valley; and he carried off their principal Shaikh a prisoner to Masqat. The Sultān, on Faisal's arrival, disbanded his levies and dismissed them all with presents to their homes. The operations by Faisal were said to have brought in fines to the amount of \$19,800, exclusive of a fine of \$12,000 imposed on the Ma'āwal, of which at least half was ultimately recovered.

Internal Administration of Turki, 1875-1883.

Improved
policy of the
Sultān.

The domestic policy of Turki, after his resumption of power at the end of 1875, differed considerably from what it had been before, for he now no

longer favoured the Hināwi tribes but rather returned to dependence on the Ghāfiris; he paid more attention to the efficiency of his own military resources; and he utilised the services of his own relations and of other respectable men more freely in the administration.

The re-enlistment of foreign mercenaries, Hasāwis and Najdis, while it made the Sultān almost independent in his capital of tribal support, was not an unmixed benefit; for the soldiery were prone to factions among themselves, and the behaviour of those among them who were Wahhābis was apt to be truculent. In 1879 the chief of the Hasāwis at Masqat was murdered by the Najdis, and the fear of an armed struggle between the two corps was so great that H.M.S. "Beacon" was sent to strengthen the authority of the Sultān. In 1881 a Hindu merchant was shot dead at Matrah, and so strongly did the Hindu community believe this murder to be the work of the Sultān's Wahhābi guard that they petitioned the Political Agent to take steps for its disbandment. In 1882 a daring robbery of a Khōjah British subject was committed by a Wahhābi soldier at Matrah, and some difficulty was experienced by the Political Agent in obtaining reparation.

His military resources.

The naval position of the Sultān was extremely weak after his return from Gwādar, during his sojourn at which place he had disposed of his only vessel, the corvette "Rahmāni," by selling her at Bombay. In 1876 Turki solicited the help of the British Government in obtaining a steam-vessel, the cost of the same to be deducted by instalments from the "Zanzibar" subsidy; but the request was not favourably entertained. In the end, however, Turki received the steam yacht "Dār-as-Salām" as a gift from his brother the Sultān of Zanzibar; and she seems to have been of considerable service in strengthening his control over the coast.

His naval resources.

Turki's principal minister throughout this period of his reign was Sa'id-bin-Muhammad, the brother of his original ill-fated Wazīr, Thuwaini-bin-Muhammad. Entire confidence did not, however, exist between the Sultān and Sa'id; moreover the latter was the enemy of Badar-bin-Saif, a consistent supporter of Turki who had governed Sohār as Wāli ever since its capture in 1873. In consequence largely of the intrigues of Sa'id, Badar was removed from Sohār in 1878 and banished to Zanzibar; but Turki in 1879 allowed him to return to 'Omān and appointed him governor of Matrah. Turki discovered a useful servant in a certain Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, whom, from 1879 onwards, he employed chiefly in Dhufār.

His public servants.

With most of his near relatives, except his brother 'Abdul 'Azīz, Turki was on friendly terms; but in 1876, on suspicion of intrigue, he

His relation.

deported his nephews 'Abdul 'Azīz, Muhammad, Hamūd and Hamdān, the sons of Thuwaini, to Qishm, where their brother Hārib already resided; Nāsir-bin-Thuwaini, however, with whose conduct he was satisfied, was allowed to remain at Masqat. In 1877 an allowance was granted by Turki to the exiles; but their brother Hārib did not apparently relish their presence at Qishm, for he himself soon afterwards removed to the British settlement of Bāsīdu.

His family.

Turki's sons were now old enough to afford him some help in the government, and in 1880 he employed Faisal, the second eldest, as Wālī at Hisn Samāil and Nizwa, and Fahad, the third, as Wālī of Barkah. Muhammad, the Sultān's eldest son, was in nominal or real charge of Sohār from 1878 to the end of the period, but he early disgusted his father's subjects there by his arbitrary behaviour and incompetence.

Fiscal innovation, 1881.

An octroi duty of 5 per cent. on all produce entering the towns of Masqat and Matrah from landward was substituted by the Sultān in 1881 for one of 2 per cent. only. It caused much dissatisfaction among the neighbouring tribes and was perhaps one cause of their failure to support the Government in 1883.

Relations of Turki with the British Government, 1875-83.

In the contest with 'Abdul 'Azīz which ensued on Turki's return from Gwādar at the end of 1875 the attitude of the local British officers was at first neutral, and the mediation between the brothers unsuccessfully attempted by the Political Agent was purely personal and unofficial; but, as soon as the position of Turki was seen to be secure, the policy of modified support was resumed in his favour.

History of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, 1875-83.

Payment of the "Zanzibar" subsidy continued without interruption, and was very frequently made in advance of the due date in order to relieve some pressing necessity of the Masqat Government. To meet the convenience of the Sultān, the instalments, which had at first been half-yearly, were made quarterly in 1876; and in 1879 they became monthly. From the 1st of September 1883, the date on which His Majesty's Government assumed the exclusive direction of Zanzibar affairs and from which the financial connection of the Government of India with that protectorate ceased, the subsidy became an entirely Indian charge. It was paid, after 1873, in rupees at the rate of Rs. 86,400 a year—the equivalent, presumably, at the time of conversion of \$40,000; and the amount has not since been

reduced, although the value of the dollar has declined in comparison with that of the rupee.

General and naval assistance continued to be rendered to the Sultān by the Government of India under much the same conditions as formerly, but, perhaps, with somewhat less readiness. In 1876 the Government of India declined to undertake the custody of Hamūd the Jahafi, whom the Sultān had arrested and wished to have confined in an Indian jail; and in 1877 they refused to lend the services of a ship of war for the recovery of Suwaiq, which Turki then considered as good as lost on account of the disloyalty of the governor. In 1880, at the request of the Sultān and to prevent the recipient from making a political use of the money, a sum of over \$8,000, realised at the instance of the Indian Government on account of some rights of inheritance which 'Abdul 'Aziz possessed at Zanzibar, was paid over by instalments instead of in a lump sum. Implements of war and military stores were supplied to Turki from India at various times, some gratis and others on payment; and in 1883 the Resident was authorised to assist him, unofficially, in obtaining drill instructors for his Balūch and African retainers. On at least three occasions written requests to refrain from an intended assault on Masqat or Matrah, were addressed by the Political Agent at Masqat to advancing rebels; and Mr. Robertson and Colonel Miles made a cautious use of British war ships to repel the serious attacks upon the capital in 1877 and 1883, their action in each case being subsequently approved by Government. In 1881 it was intimated to the Political Agent that, on Turki's death, the Government of India would not interfere, in event of the succession being disputed, unless to prevent the reunion of 'Omān and Zanzibar.

British policy
of modified
support of
the Sultān
continued,
1875-83.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān, 1875-83.

One other phase of British relations remains to be dealt with, namely the protection, during the period under consideration, of British subjects in 'Omān and the vindication of their just rights: such matters, in consequence of the extreme weakness about this time of the Sultān's government, were far from easy of settlement.

An unimportant but difficult and protracted case arose from a burglary at Sūr, in June 1875, on the premises of a Hindu merchant; the offenders belonged to the Jannabah tribe, and the value of the goods stolen was \$1,600. Neither 'Abdul 'Aziz during his regency nor the Sultān

Sūr claim,
1875-77.

after his return from Gwādar was able to obtain any satisfaction from the Sūris; but at length in July 1877 Mr. Robertson, the Political Agent, accompanied by the Sultān's Wazīr, proceeded to the spot in H.M.S. "Teazer" and, by threats of instant coercion, recovered the amount of the Banyan's claim together with a fine of \$2,000. The fine, after the cost of sending the ship had been deducted, was handed over to the Sultān.

Saham claim,
1876.

The raid of Hamūd the Jahafi in Bātinah, in the autumn of 1876, was the cause of some loss to Hindu traders at Saham, whose property was plundered partly by Hamūd's men and partly by the Yāl Bū Qarain inhabitants of the town. The direct damage in this case was estimated at \$3,544; but a claim was also brought for the amount of outstanding debts which the traders, in the expectation that they would not be able to return to Saham, feared that it might be impossible to recover. For the item of direct damage the Sultān was held responsible, inasmuch as the traders had been left defenceless through the unauthorised withdrawal of a guard at Saham by the Sultān's Wālī of Sohār, and he ultimately accepted the responsibility; but in regard to the recovery of the debts it was ordered by Government that the procedure customary in such cases should be followed. When the traders subsequently wished to return from Sohār to Saham and Dil, both of which were unwallled towns, objections were at first raised by the Sultān; but, the British representatives having taken their stand upon an article in the Commercial Treaty of 1839 by virtue of which British subjects were at liberty to reside and trade in any part of the Sultān's dominions, the right of the traders to return was not, apparently, any further contested.

Matrah claim,
1877.

The most important case of recovery of compensation for British subjects was that which resulted from the occupation of Matrah by the rebels in the rising of 1877. The damages in this instance were at first assessed at \$15,000; and Mr. Robertson proposed, and Colonel Ross supported, a scheme by which one-fourth of the compensation should be paid by the Sultān and the remaining three-fourths by the actual rebels, pressure being put on the latter by seizure of their exports at Sūr and Matrah. The mail by which these recommendations were forwarded to India unfortunately went astray, and the whole question was entirely lost sight of until 1879, when it seems to have been decided that the British claim should be reduced to \$10,000 and that payment should be demanded of Salih-bin-'Alī personally and of the Hajriyīn, Hirth and Habūs tribes, the Sultān, it would seem, being now excused from payment of any share. A notification was accordingly issued by the Resident, in

February 1880, in which Sālīh-bin-'Alī was called on to pay \$1,500, the Hajriyīn \$3,750, the Hirth \$2,750 and the Habūs \$1,000 to the Sultān,* whom the notification declared to be acting in the matter with the full consent and support of the British Government; and it was intimated that, if payment were not made within a month, the demand might possibly be increased. Various excuses, but no payments, were made by the tribes concerned; and, in September 1880, the Sultān's official Saif-bin-Badar in the "Dār-as-Salām," accompanied by Major Grant, Political Agent, in H.M.S. "Woodlark," proceeded to Sūr to lay an embargo on produce belonging to the Hajriyīn tribe which was said to have reached that port; but the information on which they acted was incorrect, and no attachable property could be found. Eventually, with the concurrence of the Government of India, after a portion of the demand had been recovered by seizures, it was arranged between the Sultān and those of his subjects concerned that a tax of \$1 per Bahār should be levied on all dates exported from Sharqīyah, to whatever tribe belonging, and the proceeds devoted to paying off the indemnity. The right to realise this tax was apparently leased by the Sultān to his Hindu customs farmers; and, \$1,400 out of the collections having subsequently been withheld by them on account of other claims against His Highness, Turki was constrained to make good the amount by short drawals of the "Zanzibar" subsidy. The final settlement of the whole claim does not appear to have been reported to Government; but it was no doubt discharged, in process of time, by means of the temporary tax.

In September 1882 a Hindu Faqīr, a British subject, was murdered by night in the Miyābīn quarter of Masqat town; but no clue could be obtained in the case. The murder of a Hindu merchant and the robbery of a Khōjah at Matrah within the following two months have been mentioned above in connection with the lawlessness of the Sultān's Wahhābi guards. In the former of these cases there was no proof against any individual, but in the second restitution and punishment of the culprit were obtained.

Other cases,
1882.

A matter of an exceptional character, of which the British authorities were obliged to take cognisance, was an attempt by the inhabitants of Rās-al-Hadd to extort dues from vessels using the harbour of Khor-al-Jarāmah, concerning which and the somewhat similar Khor-al-Hajar a dispute as to proprietorship seems to have existed between the people of Rās-al-Hadd and those of Sūr. A British war vessel visited the spot in connection with this affair about 1877; and again, in 1879, H.M.S. "Ready" at the request of the Sultān conveyed one of his officials to Sūr and Rās-al-Hadd, when

Illegal harbour dues at
Khor-al-Hajar and
Khor-al-Jarāmah,
1877-80.

* The total of these sums is \$9,000 only. Possibly there is a clerical error in the records.

the disputed harbours were declared free to all lawful traders and the difference between the Arab disputants was at the same time composed. In 1880 fresh difficulties arose regarding the use of the two Khors, and the places concerned were visited by H.M.S. "Woodlark" and the Sultān's "Dār-as-Salām." All tolls on trading vessels entering the Khors were now finally abolished; but Nākhudas were required to pay for actual assistance received, and were advised to propitiate the local chiefs with occasional small presents.

Events in 'Omān from the attack on Masqat by Sālih-bin-'Ali and 'Abdul 'Aziz to the death of Turki, 1883-88.

The last five years of Turki's reign were free from dangerous combinations against his power,—a state of affairs due chiefly to the repulse of the rebels from Masqat in 1883 and to an important assurance of support, given by the British Government in 1886, which will be noticed further on. The position of the Sultān was now relatively strong: in 1884 he did not hesitate to reject the overtures of Salih-bin-'Ali for a pardon; and at the end of 1884, when a new Shaikh of Rās-al-Hadd, appointed by him, was murdered by the former Shaikh, an expedition sent from Masqat in the "Dār-as-Salām" promptly deposed the rebel. Rumours of a fresh attack to be made on Masqat, which prevailed in August 1885, died away unfulfilled. In July 1886 the Sultān was able to make a short trip into the interior, which he had not visited for many years. Tribal disorder and disregard for the Sultān's authority continued, however, in the more distant, and even in some of the nearer districts; but only two instances are deserving of notice.

Rebellion of
the Bani
Battāsh,
1885-86.

The first was a rebellion of the Bani Battāsh, some of whom, in September 1885, made an attack on the Sultān's Wāli of Quryāt, killing one of his followers. Blood-money for this injury had already been partly paid, when Turki, in May 1886, without reference to his Wazīr, caused Muhammad-bin-Shimās, the turbulent chief Shaikh of the tribe, to be seized and executed in his presence. In September the Bani Battāsh retaliated by attacking the Quryāt fort, but were repulsed; they succeeded, however, in looting some merchandise which was the property of a Hindu trader. In October 'Abdul 'Aziz, acting in concert with the Bani Battāsh, appeared at Hājir in Wādi Jannah or Hatāt with 200 men, mostly Habūs, but retired to Samad on a force being sent against him. A few days later a body of 1,200 men with one gun, under Badar-bin-Saif and

the Sultān's sons, marched inland from Quryāt, routed the Bani Battāsh at Misfāh, which they destroyed, and razed the fort of Mazāra', the tribal capital, to the ground. The Bani Battāsh then submitted and eventually paid a fine of \$4,000.

The second conspicuous example of defiance of the Sultān's authority was the unexpected seizure of Suwaiq, in July 1887, by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, whose allowance had been stopped by Turki and who was encouraged to activity by the prevalence of disorder in 'Omān Proper. Colonel Ross, however, with Colonel Mockler, went immediately to Suwaiq in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" and induced Ibrāhīm to evacuate the place quietly, on condition of his pension being restored; and a Hināwi combination which Salih-bin-'Ali was forming in the Sharqiyah District then immediately dissolved.

The affairs of Gwādar and Dhufār at this time are fully related in the Annexures to the present chapter; in the former the principal event was a settlement, in 1886, with the Rind tribe; in the latter a rebellion occurred in 1887, and there were suspicions of Turkish intrigue.

Saiyid Turki, whose health had long been feeble, died on the 3rd of June 1888, a few days after receiving a visit at Masqat from his friend Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident. The Sultān, though feeble in character and sometimes treacherous in conduct, was of a mild and liberal disposition, and his death was felt to be a misfortune for 'Omān.

Suwaiq taken by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais and recovered by British intervention, 1887.

The Gwādar and Dhufār dependencies.

Death of Turki, June 1888.

Administration of Turki, 1883-88.

The Sultān's authority at a distance from his capital was everywhere, even at the close of his reign, either nominal or precarious. In 1884 Turki was obliged to remove his son Muhammad from the government of Sohār, where his rule was extremely unpopular; and in the same year the fort of Izki was lost to the Bani Ruwāhah and again recovered—though not without expense—by the Sultān, while Nizwa also passed out of his control into that of the Bani Riyām and was not so quickly retaken. From the port of Sūr, notwithstanding its large trade, the Sultān derived only \$2,000 a year as customs; and a scheme devised in 1884, to improve matters in this respect by enclosing the town with a wall, ended in nothing. In May 1885 an attempt by Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, Wālī of Izki, to seize Farq for the Sultān ended in a fiasco. In June 1887 the Sultān was deprived of Birkat-al-Mōz by a Shaikh of the Bani Riyām

Administrative matters at Sohār, Izki, Nizwa, Sūr, Farq and Birkat-al-Mōz.

and condoned his conduct ; and the temporary loss of Suwaiq in the following month, already mentioned, was an indirect consequence of the injury to his prestige resulting from the Birkat-al-Mōz incident.

Increased respect enjoyed by Turki towards the end of his reign.

Turki's mind, in his last days, was somewhat unhinged by his sufferings, and about a month before his death he even dismissed his Wazir Sa'id-bin-Muhammad on suspicion of practising sorcery against his life ; but otherwise, during the concluding years of his reign, Turki enjoyed a reputation for sound judgment in tribal affairs and for skill in the management of his Arab subjects. He conciliated the people and kept before his eyes the Arab ideal of a sovereign,—that of a Shaikh of Shaikhs, *primus inter pares* : in short he was a weak, but not an evil, ruler.

Special Relations of Turki with the British Government, 1883-88.

The financial support of the British Government was continued by means of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, a check being however imposed on the granting of advances of the same by the Political Agent on his own responsibility ; and a marked extension was given to the policy of armed assistance to the Sultan in his difficulties.

Undertaking by the Government of India to uphold Saiyid Turki in repelling unprovoked aggression, and conferment on him of the G.C.S.I., 1886.

In 1885, when rumours of disaffection in the Sharqiyah district once more became rife, it was suggested by Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, that an explicit announcement should be made to all concerned that the British Government would not allow attacks upon the towns of Masqat and Matrah, where British subjects possessed valuable interests, to be permanently successful, but would, if necessary, expel the rebels who occupied them and replace Saiyid Turki in possession. Colonel Ross argued that use and wont had made it impossible to decline future requests from Turki for armed assistance, and that, such being the case, it would be well to declare clearly the policy of Government, inasmuch as the mere declaration would probably suffice to prevent attacks on the capital ; the guarantee, however, should be personal to Turki and should not extend to his successors. The Government of India, reposing confidence in Colonel Ross's knowledge of the situation and in the soundness of his judgment, authorised an announcement to the Sultan, and to his rivals and enemies, that the British Government had for especial reasons resolved to uphold Saiyid Turki in

repelling unprovoked aggression during his lifetime, but that as their normal policy towards 'Omān was one of non-interference in dynastic struggles and internal administration, their active support would not necessarily be continued to his children. This decision was announced at a public Darbār held in the palace at Masqat on the 13th of July 1886; the principal object of the Darbār, as such, was however the presentation to Turki of the insignia of the G.C.S.I., which had been conferred on him. 'Abdul 'Azīz had been invited to attend, but had declined to come in unless the safe-conduct given him by the Sultān were guaranteed by the British Political Agent,—a condition which could not be granted. The Secretary of State, when informed of the assurance respecting British support, regarded it with some misgiving and directed a condition to be attached, namely that the support promised would be continued only so long as His Highness should conduct his administration in a manner not unsatisfactory to the Government of India. The results of the announcement however justified the anticipations of Colonel Ross, for no serious effort was again made by rebels to overthrow Turki's government; and its effect appeared also in the readiness with which Ibrāhim-bin-Qais restored Suwaiq to the Sultān in 1887, as already described, when called upon to do so by the British authorities.

It may be added here that, under British advice, Turki in 1886 declined overtures from residents of Dibah, Khor Fakkān and Kalba for the annexation of the Shamailiyah tract to the 'Omān Sultanate.

The protection of British subjects in 'Omān and reparation for minor injuries sustained by them at the hands of unruly tribesmen continued to be subjects demanding constant attention. In 1883 the British S. S. "Knight of the Bath" was wrecked on the Kuria Muria islands; but the crew, having made their way to an Arab village near Rās Sauqirah, remained there in safety until relieved by a vessel which was despatched from Bombay on the facts being reported at Masqat. In spring 1884 the safety of the Indian traders at Saham was threatened by Bedouin incursions from Dhāhirah; and the Political Agent suggested, and obtained, an increase of the Sultān's garrison at that place. At the beginning of 1886 raids were made in the neighbourhood of Sohār and Shinās by the Bani Qitab, 'Awāmir and other predatory tribes, and H.M.S. "Osprey" was sent to Shinās; but the compensation for incidental damage to Hindu traders, chiefly through exaction of blackmail, was paid by the Sultān. In January 1886 the Khōjah merchants at Khābūrah, who were

Protection
of British
subjects in
'Omān,
1883-88.

British subjects, complained of extortion and personal ill-usage by Hamad-bin-Nāsir, the Wālī of the town; and the British Political Agent was successful in obtaining from the Sultān the removal of that official and the payment of \$100 as an indemnity to the sufferers. The misconduct of the Bani Battāsh resulted, in September 1886, in some loss to a Hindu trader at Quryāt, but it was doubtless made good out of the fine soon after recovered from the tribe. In April 1887 two boats of H.M.S. "Kingfisher," while lying at anchor at Sūr, were fired on by night from the shore and obliged to put to sea for safety; but no damage was done, nor could any clue to the author of the outrage be obtained. At Sūr in July 1887 one Hindu trader was beaten and another kidnapped by the Aulād Kāsib, a small section, originally of the Jannabah, who had attached themselves to the Bani Bū 'Ali; but the necessity for action by the Sultān or by the British Government was obviated by prompt and friendly action on the part of the Shaikhs of the Bani Bū 'Ali.

Relations of Turki with Zanzibar throughout his reign, 1871-88.

The reign of Turki in 'Omān was almost exactly synchronous with that of his brother Barghash over Zanzibar. In 1871 or 1872 Turki wrote to Barghash, claiming payment of the Zanzibar subsidy under threats of a rupture, and professed anxiety to make an attempt on Zanzibar; but, from the time that payment of the subsidy was undertaken by the British Government, the brothers seem to have remained upon excellent terms: indeed in 1880 Saiyid Turki proposed to retire from the sovereignty of 'Omān in favour of Saiyid Barghash. Gifts were frequently exchanged, the more valuable being sent by Barghash, who in 1884 presented Turki with Rs. 32,000 to make good a deficit caused by the rebellion in 'Omān in the previous year and in 1886 gave him the S. S. "Sultani;" the "Dār-as-Salām" steam yacht, also, was a gift from Zanzibar. In March 1888 Barghash paid a visit to 'Omān and spent a week at the hot springs, of Bōshar, hoping in vain for relief from a fatal disease by which he was attacked; Turki treated him with great distinction and received in return a present of \$50,000. Both brothers died within three months of this their last meeting.

Relations of Turki with Persia, 1871-88.

By the expulsion of Sālim from the Sultanate of 'Omān in 1868 the lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, then only two months old, was annulled; and the Persian Government proceeded to grant a new one in favour of Hāji Ahmad Khān, apparently the very minister of Saiyid Sālim who had taken part in the negotiations for the lease of 1868. During the reign of 'Azzān, and for some time subsequently, this individual, notwithstanding some vicissitudes which are described in another place, succeeded in maintaining his position as leaseholder under the Persians; but in 1872 he was superseded by one Ahmad Shāh of Mināb. Meanwhile, however, the question of the Bandar 'Abbās lease was not lost sight of by Turki, who several times applied for British aid in obtaining it. In 1871 the good offices of the British Resident at Tehrān were brought into play on his behalf; but the Shāh evidently distrusted the policy of 'Omāni Sultāns on Persian soil, and the lease was in the end refused. The Persian Government stated on this occasion that an agent of the Sultān, if one should be stationed at Bandar 'Abbās, would be treated with proper respect, but that he would not be officially recognised. In 1875 the Persian Government, who now treated Hāji Ahmad Khān as a Persian subject, pressed certain claims of his to property at Masqat on the attention of Turki through the medium of the British Government; but it was alleged by Turki in reply that Hāji Ahmad Khān had left Masqat in 1868, two years before the Sultān's own accession, and that he had subsequently removed all his personal property to Persia. In 1875 Turki was still desirous that the lease of Bandar 'Abbās should be renewed to him. In 1879 he made a telegraphic offer to the Shāh's government for the lease of Bandar 'Abbās, without result, and was anxious to appoint a representative at the place; but the Political Agent at Masqat, by referring to what had been said on the subject by the Persian authorities in 1871, was able to dissuade him from his purpose.

Non-renewal
of the Bandar
'Abbās lease
notwithstanding
British
intervention,
1871.

Relations of Turki with the Ottoman Porte, 1871-88.

In the earlier years of Turki's reign Ottoman military transports on the way to or from Basrah occasionally anchored in Masqat harbour. The

Turks were at this time, on account of the recent annexation of Hasa, regarded with much suspicion throughout Arabia; and the treatment by the Sultān of the Turks with whom he was brought in contact appears to have been so uncivil as to necessitate a hint by the British authorities that he should be more circumspect. In 1873 some trouble was caused by the purchase of four persons at Masqat, as slaves, by the chief officer of a passing Turkish vessel; and between 1875 and 1886, as explained in the separate history of Dhufār, the Turks seems to have encouraged the pretensions of the Moplah, Saiyid Fadhl, to ownership of that district of the 'Omān Sultanate.

General relations of the British Government with Turki throughout his reign, 1871-88.

The financial and naval policy of the British Government towards Saiyid Turki has been described, stage by stage, in some of the foregoing paragraphs; but a few other features of Anglo-'Omāni relations still remain to be mentioned.

Personal and
ceremonial
matters.

The Sultān, during his reign, received numerous marks of British favour, among which were his investment, already alluded to, with the G.C.S.I., in 1886, and the presentation to him in 1887 of two batteries of 12-pounder guns, with carriages and ammunition complete, for the defence of his Masqat forts. Turki on his part was the donor, at different times, of gifts to Her Majesty Queen Victoria and to the Viceroy of India; and in 1887 he caused the jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen to be celebrated at Masqat with much éclat and rejoicing.

Question of
the Slave
Trade.

The Treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, obtained by Sir Bartle Frere in 1873, was of great value; but the sincere efforts of the Sultān to enforce it, in co-operation with the British Government, tended to make him unpopular with certain classes of his subjects. His loyalty in slave trade matters may thus have been one cause of his extreme dependence on British support; and it certainly was a principal reason of the personal regard in which he was held by the British political officers with whom he had to do.

Questions of
status and
jurisdiction.

An important question of status was satisfactorily settled, in 1873, by Turki's unqualified recognition in writing of the amenability to British jurisdiction of the subjects of Native Indian States resident in 'Omān, and of the applicability in their case of treaty provisions relating to

British subjects proper. Various other matters connected with status and jurisdiction were settled during the reign of Turki.

Commercial discussions in the reign of Turki related largely to the sea customs, which were, and are, the financial mainstay of the 'Omān State.

Commercial questions.

In 1867 a concession had been obtained from the Sultān of the day in favour of the British India Steam Navigation Company, by which only one-eighth of the legal transshipment duty of 5 per cent. should be charged, or, if the goods were landed for transshipment, a rebate of seven-eighths should be allowed on reshipment. In 1871 a movement was made by the Company to obtain the total abolition, in so far as they were concerned, of transshipment duty; and in 1872 the Sultān consented to forego all duty upon transshipments of Gulf cargo, if made without landing the goods, for Aden or Zanzibar. A test case, which occurred in 1874, showed that this exemption was not intended by the Sultān to apply to goods taken ashore pending transshipment.

In a letter, dated the 10th of February 1875, a wider application was given by the Sultān to the concession, *granted by his father in 1846, in respect of the dues on cargo landed from damaged vessels and subsequently reshipped.

Various questions of taxation, also, were agitated from time to time. In 1872, a system of manifests and reports for vessels entering and leaving the harbour of Masqat having been introduced by the Sultān in order to meet the wish of the British authorities for shipping statistics, a fixed fee of \$2 per manifest and a graduated fee of Re. 1 per 50 tons of cargo began to be levied under his orders. The Resident was inclined to think that these proceedings were partly at variance with the terms of the Commercial Treaty of 1839, but he was instructed that no exception need be taken to the new charges unless the rates were increased, and that it would be enough to remind the Sultān of Article 9 of the Treaty.

Questions of taxation.

In 1877 weighment dues, instituted by Sa'id early in his reign, and wharfage dues, instituted by Turki in 1873, were found to exist at Masqat. The amounts of both were moderate; but the Sultān, on the matter being mentioned to him, issued a notice making the payment of either charge optional in the case of British Indian subjects.

In 1880 some Banyans, relying on Article 10 of the Commercial Treaty, protested against a monopoly of dyeing silk for the Arab market which brought \$2,000 or \$3,000 a year into the Sultān's treasury; but the Government of India thought that there was no need to interfere with this long-established arrangement.

* *Vide* page 467 *ante*.

In 1881 the octroi tax in the towns of Masqat and Matrah was enhanced from about 2 per cent. to 5 per cent. and, instead of being included in the annual contract for the sea-customs, was farmed out as a separate tax and fetched \$15,500 for the first year. This innovation, already mentioned above,* was not regarded as unfair to British subjects, but it was irritating to the rural Arabs and was expected to drive trade to Sūr.

In 1879 mention was made for the first time of a tax better known in after years; it was at first described as a tax on country produce imported from the interior into the towns of the coast. By 1886 the rate of this tax, originally lower, had been enhanced to 5 per cent., and the tax had virtually assumed the form of an impost on dates exported from the coast of 'Omān to places abroad and was represented as a substitute for one of the ordinary taxes on agricultural produce which the Sultān was unable to collect from growers in the far interior. The Government of India seem to have considered it doubtful whether the tax was really, as some of their officers contended, an export tax; and, further, whether the silence of the commercial treaty of 1839 on the subject of export duties gave sufficient ground for protest against the imposition of such. No effort was therefore made at this time to get the tax withdrawn; but the Sultān, in consideration of thus receiving a consolidated duty of 5 per cent., abolished some other petty dues which existed in the seaport towns. It was subsequently ruled by the Government of India that no objection could be taken to the levy of a tax, even if exceeding 5 per cent., upon tobacco exported by sea from Bātinah to Masqat, inasmuch as any understanding with the Sultān in regard to export taxes could have reference only to exports for abroad.

Compulsory
weighment of
Matrah dates
at Masqat.

In 1885 a complaint, first heard in 1880, was renewed; it was that British Indian subjects exporting dates from Matrah were being compelled to send their goods to Masqat for weighment and assessment of duty. Representations by the Political Agent resulted in the discontinuance for the time being of this innovation, and no attempt was made to re-introduce it in the time of Turki.

Limit of
jurisdiction of
the British
Agency at
Masqat and
provision of a
guard, 1880.

It may be mentioned here that in 1880 the Government of India fixed the boundary between the political jurisdictions of their Aden and Masqat representatives at Rās Sājar on the southern coast of Arabia: also that the Masqat Agency was for the first time provided with a military guard in the same year, the guard consisting of a haval-dar's detachment of Indian infantry.

Tours by the
British Poli-
tical Agent.

The character of Saiyid Turki's reign and his personality favoured the free movement of the British Political Agent in the interior of 'Omān,

* *Vide* page 512 *ante*.

and full advantage was taken of these circumstances by Colonel Miles, who seems to have possessed many personal friends among the leading men of the country. In 1875 Colonel Miles made an excursion from Sohār to Baraimi by Wādi-al-Jizi and back ; in 1876 he visited Nakhl, crossed Jabal Akhdhar and returned to Masqat by Wādi Samāil ; in 1884 he entered Wādi Tāyin by the Qahza pass and made his way home by Quryāt and a route adjacent to the coast ; and in 1885-1886 he made an extensive tour through 'Omān Proper and Dhāhirah and came back *viâ* Rustāq.

Relations of Turki during his reign with non-Asiatic powers other than Britain, 1871-88.

With European powers except Britain, and with the United States of America, 'Omān had but little contact in the time of Turki.

In 1877, not without the assistance of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, a commercial Declaration was exchanged between the Government of the Netherlands and the Sultān of 'Omān ; it provided that, in matters of export, import, and transit trade, most favoured nation treatment should be extended by each of the signatories to the other.

Commercial
Declaration
exchanged
with the
Netherlands,
1877.

In 1880 a Consul at Masqat was appointed by the United States of America in the person of Mr. Maguire, a British merchant. In 1881 Mr. Maguire was recognised by the French Government as Consular Agent of France in 'Omān.

American and
French Con-
sular Agencies
established at
Masqat, 1880-
81.

SAIYID FAISAL-BIN-TURKI,

from 1888.

Accession of Faisal, 1888.

Saiyid Turki left three sons ; the eldest, Muhammad, was the son of a negress, while the second and third, Faisal and Fahad, were Abyssinians on the maternal side. All three had served as Wālis under their father, and had gained some experience of public affairs ; but Muhammad, who had been unsuccessful as Governor of Sohār, was disqualified by appearance and manner, as well as by want of capacity, for succession

to the Sultanate of 'Omān. Turki towards the end of his life had expressed a wish to separate Gwādar from the rest of his dominions and to leave it to Muhammad; but the idea was not countenanced by the British authorities, and no step was taken by Turki towards carrying it into effect. On the decease of Turki, the sovereignty was assumed by Faisal, who in 1881 had married his cousin 'Alaiyah, daughter of Thuwaini, and whose claims were supported by his brother Fahad; and Muhammad, conscious of his inferiority and unsupported by any party, made no effort to assert his claims. Most of the Shaikhs of 'Omān, including the treacherous Sālih-bin-'Ali, Hārithi, responded in loyal terms to the announcement by Faisal of his own succession; and, contrary to the general expectation, no disturbance of the general peace took place. The age of Saiyid Faisal at his accession was about 23.

Internal events in 'Omān from the accession of Faisal to the rebellion of 1895.

The proceedings of the British Government, chiefly the continuance to Faisal of the "Zanzibar" subsidy without interruption, the discouragement of 'Abdul 'Azīz and Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, and the ultimate recognition of Faisal as Sultān in 1890, are discussed in a later paragraph; here we shall relate only such events of the first part of his reign as belong to the internal history of the country.

Loss of
'Awābi and
failure of an
attempt by
Faisal to
recover it.

The first emergency with which the new ruler had to deal was the loss of 'Awābi: this fort, well placed for watching the valley of Rustāq, had in 1881, as the result of a dispute between the 'Abriyīn and Bani Riyām tribes, passed quietly into the possession of Saiyid Turki. On the 2nd of September 1888 'Awābi was captured by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais after a stout resistance by the garrison; and on the 18th of the same month Faisal, accompanied by his brother Muhammad and by Tahnūn, son of Shaikh Zāid of Abu Dhabi, proceeded in the "Sultāni" to Barkah, where a tribal levy of about 3,000 men was collected. The Sultān's force reached Wushail in Wādī Fara' without opposition, and Faisal approached near enough to the Rustāq fort to shell it with field guns, of which he had brought three with him; but his troops, whom he was unable to pay, were anxious to avoid serious fighting, and the Yāl Sa'ad tribe suddenly rose in his rear and cut his communications with the coast. After less than a month's campaign the defection of

the Bani Ghāfir obliged Faisal to consent to the retention of 'Awābi by Ibrāhīm. He then slipped away by night to Masqat to avoid the necessity of paying the remnants of his army; and, though the Yāl Sa'ad soon afterwards sought and obtained his forgiveness, the general result of the expedition was damaging to his prestige.

The most important internal occurrences of the period were, however, disloyal Hināwi movements in the Sharqiyah District and dissensions between Hināwis and Ghāfiris in Wādi Samāil. The Sharqiyah troubles favoured the endeavours of 'Abdul 'Azīz to make good his claims to the throne; and, but for the attitude of Sālih-bin-'Ali, whom Faisal succeeded in alienating from 'Abdul 'Azīz and in attaching to his own cause for a time, they might have had dangerous consequences.

In April 1889 there were rumours of a Hināwi rising in aid of 'Abdul 'Azīz, who about the same time paid a visit to his friend the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; in May several attempts were made by Sālih-bin-'Ali to bring about a reconciliation between 'Abdul 'Azīz and Faisal, but without success; and about the middle of July a letter was received by the British Political Agent at Masqat from 'Abdul 'Azīz, in which the latter announced his intention of attacking Masqat. At the end of July 'Abdul 'Azīz actually advanced from Samad in the direction of Masqat; but he was repulsed from the Qahza pass by a tribal gathering of 600 men and fell back again on Samad. In January 1890 the free-booter Hamūd-bin-Sa'id the Jahafi, descending from Sharqiyah by way of Rustāq where he was joined by Hamūd and Sa'ūd, the sons of 'Azzān-bin-Qais, arrived with 200 men at Ghubrah, a little to the west of Matrah, and there halted to await the arrival of 'Abdul 'Azīz. All the more direct passes between Samad and Masqat having been blocked by the influence of Sālih-bin-'Ali and of Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, the Sultān's indefatigable Wāli of Samāil, 'Abdul 'Azīz was unable at once to join his associate; but the nearness and well-remembered character of the Jahafi threw the town of Masqat into a panic, and on the night of the 13th January there was much firing from the walls at an imaginary enemy. Not until the beginning of February, when Saiyid Faisal had collected 2,000 adherents at Masqat and his Wāli of Sohār had arrived at Wādial-Qāsim in Bāṭinah with a contingent of 450 Na'im Bedouins, did any advance take place against 'Abdul 'Azīz and Hamūd, who were now on the point of effecting a junction near Sib. On Saiyid Faisal taking ship for Sib, however, the enemy retired to the interior; and Saiyid Fahad, who commanded his brother's land forces, marched unopposed to Jammah, here he remained until it was clear that no further danger was to be appre-

Rebellion of
'Abdul 'Azīz
and Hamūd
the Jahafi,
1889-90.

hended. The Na'im contingent, disappointed of active service, looted the Yāl Sa'ad country as they passed through it on their homeward journey. Hamūd-bin-Sa'id, deserted by his followers and unable to regain Sharqiyah by crossing the intervening hostile country without an escort, made his submission to the Wālī of Barkah and was pardoned by Saiyid Faisal and sent home in safety. The movement against Saiyid Faisal which we have just described had apparently the sympathy, but not the active support, of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, whose allowance had been discontinued by the new ruler.

Final departure of 'Abdul 'Azīz from 'Omān, 1890.

'Abdul 'Azīz remained at Rustāq until the end of March 1890, when he left for Abu Dhabi. In June he arrived at Būshehr and, after an interview with the Resident, sailed for Bombay, whence he did not again return to vex the politics of 'Omān. Until his death in 1907 he continued to reside in the Bombay Presidency, supported by the bounty of his relatives, the Sultāns of 'Omān and Zanzibār.

Dissensions between Hināwis and Ghāfiris, 1890-93.

The passage of Hamūd the Jahafi through the country at the beginning of 1890 was the indirect cause of much trouble between the Hināwis and Ghāfiris in Wādī Samāil; and eventually communication between coast and interior was interrupted, and the trade of Masqat and Matrah brought to a standstill. In January 1890 some 400 sheep were raided by Hamūd's following from the Ghāfirī Rahbiyīn, and the Rahbiyīn almost immediately retaliated by an attack, in Wādī Samāil, on a caravan belonging to the Hināwī Āl Wahībāh and Habūs tribes; 40 camels were carried off and 6 members of the Hināwī caravan were killed in this affair. In the last week of November 1890 a caravan of 80 camels from Masqat, laden chiefly with goods belonging to the Hināwī Hirth, was completely plundered, on its way up Wādī Samāil, by the Ghāfirī Bani Jābir. The Khafir or protector of the caravan, himself a Maskari and therefore of the Ghāfirī faction, then took to the hills with a gang of about 20 men, closed all routes to Sharqiyah, and began committing murders up to the very gates of Masqat and Matrah; he was seconded in his efforts by a Hināwī gang which 'Abdullah, the son of Sālih-bin-'Alī, brought with him on a visit to Masqat in January 1891. This condition of affairs, which continued until April, was exceedingly detrimental to the trade of Masqat and Matrah, for neither could merchandise be sent for sale to the up-country districts nor could debts outstanding there be realised; and it was feared at one time that a number of the British Indian traders in those towns would be obliged to suspend business. At length in the beginning of May 1891, at the invitation of Sālih-bin-'Alī, the Sultān, who had hitherto shown a reprehensible apathy in the matter, intervened

through Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, his Wālī of Samāil; and peace was arranged on condition that \$1,800 should be paid as damages by the Ghāfiris of Samāil to the Hināwis of Sharqīyah, in settlement of all claims. On the Hināwi side the Habūs were not satisfied with the award of the Sultān, and in August 1892 they re-opened the feud by raiding 700 goats from the Rahbiyīn; by way of reprisal a mixed force of Rahbiyīn, Nidābiyīn and Bani Jābir invaded their country, doing much material damage, and cut them off by a strict blockade from direct access to Masqat. In the result, trade by the main highway from the coast to the interior of 'Omān ceased altogether during the latter part of 1892; and in January 1893 the Sultān found himself obliged once more to intervene. In a meeting held at Sib he gave judgment in favour of the Ghāfiris against the Habūs for \$1,200; but, as he virtually undertook the discharge of this liability himself, the Habūs returned jubilant to their homes, and on their way raided some cattle from the tribes with whom they had just been reconciled.

In October 1892, before this settlement, Hamūd the Jahafi made a fresh attempt to raid in Bātinah, but he was taken ill and had to return to Sharqīyah.

In 1894 disturbances were renewed in Wādī Samāil, between the Āl Bōshar, supported by the other Hināwis, and the Ghāfiris of the valley; but the Sultān, by the instrumentality of Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, was again able to patch up a seeming settlement.

Hināwi-Ghāfiri dissensions renewed, 1894.

The Samāil valley and the Masqat district were not however, during these years, the only scene of tribal disorders in which the government of 'Omān were directly or indirectly interested.

A serious faction fight having occurred at Khasab in Ruūs-al-Jibāl between the Kumāzirah and Bani Hadīyah, sections of the Shihūh, Saiyid Faisal in August 1888 despatched his brother Fahad and others to the spot in the "Sultāni;" and the offending Shaikhs of both parties, whom the emissaries brought back with them, were interned for a time in Fort Jalālī at Masqat.

Tribal disturbances in various districts, 1888-93: Ruūs-al-Jibāl.

In Dhāhirah, at the end of 1889, somewhat serious fighting took place between the Bani Kalbān and Na'im on the one side and the Bani 'Ali on the other, in which the Bani 'Ali were worsted; and raids committed by the tribes of Dhāhirah on those of Bātinah led, in the winter of 1892-93, to a blockade of the routes from the coast into Dhāhirah by the Yāl Sa'ad, and to a combination against the Yāl Sa'ad by the Ya'aqib, Bani Kalbān and Bani Shakail. The disputants in the last case rejected the mediation of the Sultān and continued to fight out their

Dhāhirah, and Bātinah.

differences until the end of 1893, when, after a bloody encounter at Mabrah, they submitted their feud to the arbitration of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais. The comparatively civilised district of Bātinah was not itself free from internal trouble; and a serious attack on the Hawāsinah of Ghaizain, which was made by the Bani 'Umr in February 1891, was followed by severe reprisals.

'Omān
Proper.

In 1893, the Bani Hina of 'Omān Proper became embroiled with the Bani 'Umr and Bani Kalbān, apparently in consequence of aggressions committed by the first-name— on the Āl Khamaiyis near Hail Bani Hina, and were also attacked, for a different reason, by the Bani Shakail; in both contests the Bani Hina were worsted in the field, and the disputes were eventually settled by arbitration—the former, relating to the Āl Khamaiyis, by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais, and the latter by Sālih-bin-'Ali. In August 1894 Hilāl-bin-Zāhir, a prominent Shaikh of the Bani Hina who had usurped the fort of Nizwa from an Āl Bū Sa'idi Wālī during the reign of Turki, was murdered by the eldest son of the Saiyid whom he had displaced; but his son, Badar-bin-Hilāl, retained possession of the place.

Coast of
Eastern
Hajar.

In 1893, Qurta', a celebrated Sharqiyah raider, by threatening Quryāt obliged the Sultān to take special measures for the protection of that town; but he afterwards retired and begged for forgiveness. In the same year an ancient feud broke out afresh between the Bani Muqīm and the Salūt of Tiwi, and considerable loss of life occurred; Saiyid Fahad, who was sent by his brother to arrange the dispute, failed to do so; and it was finally composed by Sālih-bin-'Ali. At the end of 1888, and again in May 1889, fighting took place at Sūr between the Jannabah and Bani Bū 'Ali tribes, and the good offices of the Sultān were exercised, not without effect, upon both occasions; but in 1893, when desultory hostilities began in Ja'alān between the Bani Bū 'Ali and their old enemies the Bani Bū Hasan, last reconciled by Turki in 1887, it was Sālih-bin-'Ali and not Saiyid Faisal who eventually brought about a truce. The Bani Bū 'Ali were at this time much weakened by a deadly internal blood-feud, which had originated in 1887 from the murder of the Tamimah of the tribe, Muhammad-bin-Mājid, by a man of the Sinadah section. The original murder was revenged by the assassination of Yūsuf-bin-'Ali, a Shaikh of the Sinadah, and 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim was elected Tamimah in place of Muhammad; but the feud continued, and in 1891 Hamūd-bin-Mājid, the slayer of Yūsuf-bin-'Ali, was himself killed by a relative of his victim.

Remarkable
storm, June
1890.

A terrible cyclonic storm may be mentioned here, which lasted from midnight of the 4th to midnight of the 5th June 1890. Its ravages

extended along the coast from Sūr to Suwaiq and inland as far as Wādī Samāil. At Masqat 11·24 inches of rain fell in 24 hours; and it was calculated that throughout 'Omān more than 700 persons were killed, and more than 100,000 valuable date palms uprooted, by the violence of the elements.

Administration and character of Faisal, 1888-94.

It will have been observed from the foregoing that the Sultān, between 1888 and 1894, played on the whole a less conspicuous and successful part in reconciling tribal differences than his subject Sālih-bin-'Ali or the *quasi*-rebel Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais: in fact his policy, from carelessness rather than from incapacity, was apathetic and estranged from him even the best disposed tribes.

Management
of the tribes.

Other aspects of his rule, hardly more satisfactory, also claim attention. The reign of Faisal commenced with the loss of 'Awābi and an unsuccessful expedition to recover it; and his efforts during the next few years to extend his direct authority, or to recover it where lost, were all equally unfortunate. In September 1891 the Sultān went by sea to Masna'ah, taking his brother Fahad and 150 men with him, and marched thence by land to Nakhl, Khōdh and Samāil; but if, as is believed, his object was to visit 'Omān Proper and promote his interests there, it was frustrated by the Bani Riyām, who refused to give him passage into that district. In November 1891 Faisal left by land for Bātinah with a field gun, but the vigilance of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais prevented the attempt on 'Awābi which it was probably his intention to make. In June 1893, leaving Fahad in charge of Masqat, the Sultān proceeded to Nakhl and detached a force to take possession of Mansūr, in Wādī Fara' or Rustāq, which was held by the Bani Harrās; a peaceful transfer of the place was apparently expected, but the negotiations failed; and Faisal, on hearing that a large body of the Bani Jābir, whom he himself had summoned, were approaching under Sulaimān-bin-Saif, a dismissed Wāli of Masna'ah, retreated in haste from Nakhl to Barkah upon the coast. In June 1894 riots took place at Matrah between Balūchis and the African servants of the Khōjah community, and order was not restored without difficulty. In September 1894 Badar-bin-Hilāl, after the death of his father as already described, offered Nizwa to Sayid Faiza on condition that he came to receive

Other branches of government.

possession of it in person; but the proposal, as there were reasons for suspecting treachery, was declined. In fact His Highness's position, as regards administrative control throughout the country generally, was stationary if not retrograde.

Personal
characteris-
tics of Faisal.

The ill-success of Saiyid Faisal at the beginning of his reign is attributable partly to faults of character and partly to mistakes of policy. He was not without energy; but his energy was fitful, and his conduct as a rule was characterised rather by sloth and procrastination. Economical in his personal expenditure, he was often extravagant in the prosecution of impracticable aims. His arrogant and suspicious temper prompted him to despise and reject all advice, and his position in the government was at first one of extreme isolation and of antagonism to all his surroundings.

Advisers and
supporters.

When the Wazir Sa'id-bin-Muhammad, on the death of Turki, returned from abroad, Saiyid Faisal, instead of accepting his services, drove him into exile again, and, but for representations by the British authorities, would probably have confiscated his property. It was only in May 1889 that the Sultān consented, at the request of the British Political Resident, to nominate a Wazir who should be the medium of confidential communications with the British Agency: the individual then selected was one Muhammad-bin-'Azzān. Saiyid Faisal from the first showed considerable confidence in his brother Sayid Fahad, but the latter was a youth of ill-balanced mind and committed suicide in June 1894, in order to escape domestic troubles arising from his marriage two years previously with one of his cousins, a daughter of Saiyid Barghash, Sultān of Zanzibar. The valuable support of Sālih-bin-'Ali was retained by the Sultān only until 1894, when he alienated it by showing favour to Sa'id-bin-'Ali, a rival Shaikh of the Hirth; and the catastrophe was thereafter not long delayed.

Loss of power
at sea.

Saiyid Faisal's most serious error, in non-personal matters, was his failure to maintain the steam-vessels upon which his control of the coast at a distance from Masqat, and especially of the port of Sūr, depended. The "Dār-as-Salām" he caused to be sold at Bombay; and the "Sultāni" he allowed to fall to pieces through neglect.

Political relations with Great Britain, 1888-94.

Saiyid Faisal's natural impatience of restraints and obligations reacted unfavourably on his relation with the British power; but the process

of estrangement was gradual, and no marked disagreement occurred until after the final departure in March 1891 of Colonel Ross, whose experience as Political Resident in the Gulf extended back over 18 years.

Saiyid Faisal, on first assuming the administration, expressed a hope that the friendship of the British Government might be continued to him, solicited their protection, and promised steadfastly to carry out their wishes. On the advice of Colonel Ross formal recognition of the new Sultān was postponed, but payment to him of the "Zanzibar" subsidy was not suspended. The Government of India, in recommending the continuance of the subsidy, took the opportunity to suggest that, as in former times, a part of it should be made chargeable to Her Majesty's Government; but no alteration of the existing arrangements was obtained. In 1888, during this period of undefined relations and in connection with his operations against 'Awābi, Faisal requested the support of H.M.S. "Turquoise" on the Bātinah coast, but it was not granted; and about the same time both 'Abdul 'Azīz and Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais wrote to inquire whether Saiyid Faisal would be supported by the British Government in the same manner as his father,—a query to which the Resident returned a very guarded reply.

Recognition of Faisal by the British Government postponed, 1888.

In the spring of 1889 the formal recognition of Faisal's Sultanate, recommended by the Resident and the Government of India, was authorised by the Secretary of State; but Colonel Ross, finding on arrival at Masqat that fresh dangers threatened the new ruler from the Sharqiyah region, refrained from making the announcement which had been the object of his visit, and reported the circumstances of his abstention to the Government of India. At length on the 6th of April 1890, in full Darbār and in the presence of His Highness's brothers and the principal inhabitants of Masqat, Colonel Ross informed Saiyid Faisal of his recognition as Sultan by the British Government, and a salute of 21 guns was fired from the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence;" Saiyid Faisal in his reply expressed his "earnest desire to be guided in all important matters of policy by the advice of the British Government, and so to conduct the government as to secure the continued friendship and approbation of His Excellency the Viceroy and the British Government."

Faisal recognised by the British Government, April 1890.

The first item of business transacted with the Sultān after his formal recognition was the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, to take the place of the Treaty of Commerce of 1839. The arrangement of a fresh treaty, on the model of one recently concluded with Zanzibar, had been suggested by Colonel Ross in 1887, but proceedings were postponed by the death of Turki;

British Commercial Treaty, 1891.

on the recognition, however, of Saiyid Faisal, a treaty following the lines approved by the Government of India was signed by him and by Colonel Ross, and was transmitted to the higher authorities. The document was not in perfect accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government, and a fresh treaty was accordingly drafted and signed at Masqat, as before, by the Sultān and the Resident; the date of signature of this revised document was the 19th of March 1891 and ratifications were exchanged in the following year. Colonel Ross, it was found, had inadvertently acted as a plenipotentiary without having been invested with the powers of one; but this technical flaw was not considered by Her Majesty's Government a sufficient reason for withholding the British ratification. There was not in the new treaty any material departure from the spirit of the old, which it was expressly declared to supersede; but it contained a new provision by which the Sultān was debarred from prohibiting the import or export of any particular article, and the levy of export taxes was made conditional upon the consent of the British Government. The treaty was to remain in force for 12 years absolutely, and it was to be terminable at any time thereafter on the expiration of 12 months' notice given by either party.

Suggested
British pro-
tectorate over
'Omān, 1890.

In consequence perhaps of the activity of the French Colonial party, of which we shall have more to say hereafter, a discussion had in the meantime, in 1890, been initiated in London between the Foreign and India Offices as to the best means of precluding the interference of other European powers in 'Omān affairs. The consolidation of British influence by means of a protectorate treaty, similar to those recently concluded with the chiefs of the South Arabian coast, was at first suggested by the India Office; and the arbitration of 1861, the "Zanzibar" subsidy, the practical importance to successive Sultāns of recognition by the British Government, the occasional intervention of that Government in dynastic disputes and the deportation of claimants or pretenders to India, the armed assistance lent to Saiyid Turki in various crises, the negotiation of the Dutch treaty of 1877 through the British Resident, and the predominance of British national and commercial interests in 'Omān were adduced by the Government of India as proofs of the existence already of a virtual British protectorate over 'Omān, or, at least, of the justice of the claim that 'Omān should be regarded as falling within the British sphere of influence.

Agreement
of the Sultān
with Great
Britain

As, however, the institution of a protectorate would have been contrary to the terms of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 and the consent of the French Government to the withdrawal of that Declaration was for

the time being impossible to obtain, it was resolved by Her Majesty's Government to proceed in a different manner. This decision resulted in the signature by the Sultān on the 20th March 1891, the day after the conclusion of the new commercial treaty, of an Agreement by which he bound himself, his heirs and his successors never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Masqat and 'Omān or any of their dependencies.*

regarding
cession of
territory,
1891.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān, etc., 1888-94.

It was an unfortunate feature of the Sultān's early administration that representations regarding injuries to British subjects often excited lively opposition upon his part; but the tendency did not immediately declare itself in full strength. In July 1888, when some Hindu traders at Barkah were assaulted by Bani Jābir tribesmen, His Highness caused justice to be done and imprisoned some of the principal offenders. In 1888 he maintained a claim to dispose for his own benefit of a vacant plot of land in the Khōjah fort or quarter at Matrah; but in 1889, on the Khōjahs representing that their ownership of everything within the walls had remained undisputed for more than a century, the Sultān abandoned his contention "out of respect and regard for the British Government." At the end of 1889 some Hindus were threatened and assaulted at Sūr, but no reparation, at least in the first instance, could be obtained.

Miscellaneous
cases.

The first serious disagreement in a case of compensation resulted from incendiarism in the Khābūrah bazaar, by which British Indian subjects were losers to the amount, as afterwards assessed, of \$12,739. The conflagration, which broke out on the night of the 24th February 1891, was shown to have been due to a dispute between the Hawāmid and Sawālim sections of the Hawāsinah, the former of whom claimed from the latter a share in the shop rents of the bazaar, and it was clear that the fire had been kindled by certain individuals of the Hawāmid; nevertheless the Sultān pretended to believe that it was accidental, and he did not, until considerable pressure had been put on him, accede to the demand for compensation. He next endeavoured to collect one-third of the fine from the Sawālim section, who were innocent; but eventually, on the representations of the British Political Agent, he desisted from this injustice. The matter, in consequence of the Sultān's attitude, took more than two years to settle; and in 1892, while it was still pending, an attempt was

Khābūrah
fire, 1891.

* The text of this Agreement is given in Annexure No 4 to the present chapter.

made by the discontented Hawāsīnah to prevent the Indian traders of Khābūrah from obtaining crews for their boats.

The "Khiva case."

In 1893, however, when the S. S. "Khiva" with pilgrims for Jiddah was destroyed by fire off Murbāt in Dhufār, the Sultān sent the Zanzibar steamer 'Avoca,' then at Masqat, to the assistance of the destitute crew and passengers; and his creditable conduct on this occasion, as well as that of the local Shaikhs, was acknowledged by the Government of India and rewarded by suitable presents.

British Political Agency at Masqat rebuilt, 1890.

In 1889-90 the British Political Agency, an old and inconvenient building, was reconstructed on the same site at a total cost of Rs. 87,000 and re-occupied in July 1890. A sum of Rs. 2,000 was subsequently granted for the purchase of furniture.

The rebellion of 1895.

Causes.

The principal causes of the rebellion and attack on Masqat which we are about to describe were undoubtedly the estrangement of Sālih bin-'Ali from the Sultān's cause, the dissatisfaction of some of the Hināwī tribes under Sālih's influence with the existing régime, the weakness—due to his own apathy—of Saiyid Faisal's military and political position, and the non-renewal in his favour by the British Government of the guarantee of support which they had given to his father Turki.

Complicity of the Sultān of Zanzibar.

But, although these factors were sufficient in themselves to account for the outbreak, there can be little doubt that an additional impulse and a special direction were imparted to the movement from Zanzibar. At the accession of Saiyid Faisal his uncle Khalifah-bin-Sa'id was Sultān of Zanzibar and gave evidence of a favourable disposition towards him by presenting him, at the beginning of 1889, with 200 rifles, some ammunition and 6,000 lbs. of gunpowder. The successor of Khalifah was 'Ali, also a son of Sa'id; and he too, during a reign of three years beginning in 1890, gave no symptom of harbouring designs on 'Omān. On the death of 'Ali in March 1893, however, the Zanzibar Sultanate passed to his nephew Hamad-bin-Thuwaini, whose earlier years had been spent in 'Omān and who retained a strong interest and many friends in the land of his birth. By January 1894 a stream of 'Omāni Arabs had begun to pour into Zanzibar, and frequent suggestions were made in Hamad's ear that he should possess himself of 'Omān. Among the visitors were 'Abdullah, a son of the notorious Sālih-bin-'Ali, and Shaikh Muhsin-bin-'Amr, both of the Hirth tribe; also Hamūd-bin-Sa'id the Jahafi, the well-known raider; these

arrived in Zanzibar in company in February 1894. It was stated by some that these chiefs, who on their way to Zanzibar had visited 'Abdul 'Aziz in his place of detention at Bombay, had come to offer the Sultanate of 'Omān to Hamad; and the British Consul-General at Zanzibar, Mr. Cracknall, was accordingly instructed to caution Saiyid Hamad against lending himself to any such intrigue. In May 'Abdullah-bin-Sālih, Muhsin-bin-'Amr and Hamūd the Jahafi returned to 'Omān, and the two former paid a visit to the Sultān at Masqat. It was ascertained that 'Abdullah and another Shaikh of the Hirth had between them received, at their departure, three field-pieces and 300 barrels of powder from the Sultān of Zanzibar; and that prince, on the probable consequences of such gifts being pointed out by the Government of India, was again warned, and promised that in future he would not give 'Omāni visitors anything beyond the customary sword or dagger and robe of honour, unless he was specially requested to do by Saiyid Faisal. In the following year, when the serious financial difficulties of Hamad came to light, the British authorities at Zanzibar reported that they were partly due to his extravagant liberality to Arabs from 'Omān.

In October 1894, some months after the return of his son from Zanzibar, Sālih-bin-'Ali moved to Samad on pretext of settling disputes among the Habūs, Zikāwinah and Warūd of that place. He was next heard of as chastising, with a large force, the Bani Shahaim of Wādī Dima; and about the same time, in the month of November, one of his sons arrived in Wādī Tāyin with a considerable following. During these proceedings of Sālih, the Ghāfiri tribes in charge of the Sharqīyah passes had closed them against caravans proceeding towards Masqat, and the Sultān had seized and imprisoned two sons of one of their Shaikhs whom he found at Matrah; but he refused to see in the conduct of the tribes any sign of disloyalty towards himself on the part of Sālih, and, on the passes being reopened towards the end of November, he released the two hostages on a request from that chief. In December a sanguinary affray took place at Nizwa between the Bani Hina and the Bani Riyām inhabitants of the town, and Sālih in the following month sent his son 'Abdullah to mediate between Badar-bin-Hilāl and Sulaimān-bin-Saif, the heads respectively of the two factions; in the end a six months' truce was arranged.

Suspicious movements of Sālih-bin-Ali, 1894.

From Nizwa 'Abdullah-bin-Sālih went towards Masqat, ostensibly to confer with the Sultān regarding Nizwa affairs; and Saiyid Faisal, hoping perhaps that the interview might be the means of recovering Nizwa for himself, showed no disinclination to receive him. 'Abdullah arrived at the capital on the 11th of February with Muhsin-bin-'Amr,

Town of Masqat taken by treachery and surprise, 13th February 1895.

who had been his companion on his visit to Zanzibar; and on the next day Hāmūd the Jahafi, likewise a sharer in the excursion to Zanzibar, made his appearance: each of these three chiefs was attended by a small armed following. After according the Shaikhs an audience, the Sultān, on the evening of the 12th of February, sent them \$1,200 in cash and the usual presents of dismissal; but the trio still lingered in the town; and, after dark, numbers of their followers began to straggle in from outside. This circumstance excited the suspicions of the Sultān's Hadhramauti and Wabhābi mercenaries, who hastened to inform their master; but the Sultān declined to believe that his guests could possibly contemplate so great a breach of Arab honour as an attack upon himself. About 4 A.M., however, on the morning of the 13th, the Bedouins within the walls seized the gates of the town by surprise and admitted from outside a large body of confederates who had hitherto remained at Ruwi. The house of Saif-bin-Badar, the Sultān's commander-in-chief, was surrounded; the new palace was invaded; and an attempt was made to force a way into the old palace, where the Sultān was, for the purpose of taking his life. After defending himself bravely in his apartment for a considerable time the Sultān, preceded by his wife and sister-in-law, reached the British Agency over the intervening house-roofs and thence betook himself to Fort Jalāli, while his brother Muhammad made good his escape to Fort Mīrāni.

Steps taken
for the pro-
tection of
British sub-
jects.

Measures were instantly taken by the British Political Agent for protecting, so far as possible, the lives and property of British subjects. Colonel Hayes Sadler addressed a letter to 'Abdullah, the rebel leader, warning him that he would be held personally responsible for any injury that might occur; notices of nationality were affixed to the doors of the Hindu traders in Masqat; and the Khōjahs of Matrah were given a British flag to hoist over their fort. The British Indian military guard were brought into the Agency for its defence.

Other pro-
ceedings on
the 13th of
February.

Meanwhile determined attempts were made by the Sultān's adherents, supported by heavy gun and rifle fire from Fort Jalāli, to recover the palace, the house of the late Saiyid Fahad, and the customs house; but all were repulsed. A message was next received by Colonel Hayes Sadler from the rebels, suggesting that further steps should be taken for the protection of British subjects at Matrah, where Shaikh Sālih was shortly expected; and the Agent in reply informed the leaders that the liability for damage at Matrah, as well as at Masqat, would rest with themselves. By evening the insurgents, whose number did not in the beginning exceed 300 men, were masters of the town and of its gates; but the Sultān still

held the principal forts on the harbour, a tower in the south-eastern part of the town wall, and all the block-houses on the adjacent hills. The revolutionary leaders, who had their men under perfect control and restrained them from plundering, gave it to be generally understood that they had come, not to rob, but to set up a ruler who would be able to make his power respected throughout the country.

On the 14th of February the British India Steam Navigation Company's mail steamer entered the harbour, but passengers for Masqat were not allowed to land; and the vessel herself was immediately despatched to Chahbār with a telegram from the Political Agent, informing the Resident of the situation that had arisen and asking for naval assistance. The Sultān requested that the steamer might be sent to Sūr to fetch a reinforcement of loyal tribesmen from that port, but his application was refused by Colonel Hayes Sadler, who considered it now the more necessary to observe a strict neutrality because the town was in the hands of the rebels and they had the lives and property of many British subjects entirely at their mercy. The insurrectionaries spent the day in wrecking the Sultān's palaces and in auctioning such of his effects as they did not destroy; some of the property thus sold was bought in by British Indian traders with the object of saving it for His Highness. On this day the Political Agent received a letter from 'Abdullah, in which an attempt was made to establish a community of interest between the rebel leaders and the British representative, and great deference was expressed for the opinion of the latter; but Colonel Hayes Sadler merely replied that what he required was the protection of British subjects and of their property.

Proceedings
on the 14th
of February.

Early on the 15th of February the white Mutawwa' flag was seen floating over the Sultān's palace. On the 16th the rebels were about to advance into the British Agency quarter in order to blockade Fort Jalālī more effectively, but on the remonstrances of the Political Agent they desisted from their intentions. The first reinforcement for the Sultān arrived on the morning of the 17th in the shape of a contingent of Bani Jābir from Tiwi; and the rebels, almost simultaneously, received a large addition to their forces. On this day the rebel leader Muhsin-bin-'Amr waited on Colonel Hayes Sadler and sought to impress on him that the insurrection was a general Hināwi movement for the purpose of dethroning the reigning Sultān, but that the tribes of 'Omān desired nothing so much as the friendship and support of the British Government. In the afternoon the Political Agent visited the Sultān, and the Sultān enquired whether the Agent could mediate between him and the rebels

Proceedings
from the 15th
to the 17th
February.

before any damage was done to property ; Saiyid Faisal also asked who would be responsible for the material loss to neutrals, were he to descend from his fort and attempt to recover the town by force. To the first question Colonel Hayes Sadler replied that he would be glad to afford his good offices when the proper time for mediation should have come, but that the rebels had not as yet shown any desire for compromise ; in regard to the damage that might be done by fighting in the town his answer was that the Government of a country were responsible for the general safety, and that, though he had in the beginning informed the rebels that they would be held responsible for the losses caused, the situation had now somewhat changed by their remaining for five days in possession of the town without any destruction of property having occurred. Late the same evening 'Abdullah announced the approach of his father, Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Alī, with a large force ; also the arrival of Sa'ūd-bin-'Azzān of Rustāq, who had, he said, assumed the leadership of the rising. Matrah had up to this time escaped occupation owing to the numerical weakness of the insurgents.

Arrival of
the British
Political Re-
sident, 18th
February.

On the 18th of February, in the morning, the Sultān's men made an unsuccessful attack on the Bāb-as-Saghīr, and severe street fighting took place in the Hindu traders' quarter. On the arrival, immediately thereafter, of H.M.S. "Sphinx" the belligerents were induced by the Political Agent to agree to a truce of a few hours, under cover of which all British subjects in the town were removed to the Makallah cove, except the Europeans, who were received on board the "Sphinx" or into the Agency building. In the afternoon Colonel Wilson, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" and assumed the political direction of affairs.

Proceedings
from the 19th
of February
to the 1st of
March.

On the 19th and 20th of February a desultory fire was kept up by the Sultān's men ; on the 21st they gained ground up to the eastern gate of the customs house ; on the 22nd a sepoy of the British Agency was wounded by a stray bullet. Complaints were now received of depredations on the property of Hindu traders by the Sultān's levies, who mostly belonged to the Bani Bū 'Alī, Hishm and Bani Rāsib tribes, and the Shaikhs were warned by the British authorities that, unless they restrained their followers, the boats in which they had come from Sūr would be seized and destroyed. On the 23rd of February Hamūd-bin-'Azzān, brother of Sa'ūd, arrived at Ruwi, and looting of property by the rebels was reported for the first time. On the 24th a large Āl Wahībah reinforcement was reported to have reached Sālih-bin-'Alī at Ruwi, and there were indications of the rebellion developing into a general contest between the

Hināwis and the Ghāfiris throughout the country. On the 25th the Sultān's forces recaptured the water-gate as well as a tower half way between it and the Bāb-al-Kabīr ; and the Bani Bū 'Alī levies advanced their barricades some 50 yards. On the 26th the Sultān sent an evasive reply to questions by the Resident regarding his intended course of action ; the boat of Surgeon-Major Jayakar, the Agency Surgeon, was fired on, probably by mistake ; and the Hindu temple in the middle of the town was taken by the Sultān's adherents. The remaining days of February were uneventful. On the 1st of March a peon of the British Agency was killed by a random shot. During these inconclusive operations H.M.S. " Bramble " had arrived at Masqat.

On the 2nd of March matters seemed to have reached a deadlock, for the rebels had become powerless for aggression, while the Sultān's men still shrank from making a decisive attack on them ; and plunder of the property of British subjects had recommenced. An interesting interview took place on this day between the British Resident and the Political Agent on the one side and Muhsin-bin-'Amr and a second Shaikh of the Hirth upon the other ; the causes and objects of the revolution as well as the actual situation were discussed. The rebel Shaikhs stated that they represented all the Hināwis of 'Omān ; that a change of ruler was generally desired ; that, though acting on their own behalf and not on his, they wished to offer the Sultanate of 'Omān to Hamad-bin-Thuwaini of Zanzibar, whom they knew to be a friend of the British Government while Faisal was not ; and that, failing Hamad, they desired that a son of 'Azzān-bin-Qais should be placed upon the throne. With regard to complaints of looting they admitted their responsibility and that they had no longer full control over their men ; but they said that Sālih-bin-'Alī, who was wealthy, would pay the necessary compensation. In reply the Shaikhs were informed that it was not even clear that all the Hināwis of 'Omān were on their side ; that they did not in any case represent the Ghāfiris, who were much more numerous throughout 'Omān than the Hināwis ; and that their action in disturbing the country, and in causing injury to British interests, would undoubtedly be regarded by the British Government in a very serious light. At the request of the Shaikhs, however, their views were reported to the Government of India by cable.

Reference by
the rebels to
the Govern-
ment of
India,
2nd March.

On the 3rd of March the Resident informed Government of the unsatisfactory attitude of the Sultān, who, though now possessed of an adequate force, remained inert ; and he pointed out the impossibility of dislodging the rebels from the town by naval fire without great damage to property. In reply the Resident was instructed that no expectation of assistance in coercing the rebels should be held out to the Sultān.

Inaction of
the Sultān,
3rd March.

Truce ending
in a panic,
4th to 6th
March.

In consequence of renewed complaints of looting a fresh truce of three days, from the 4th to the 6th of March inclusive, had now been demanded and obtained by the Resident ; this was done in order that the goods, as well as the persons, of the British Indian traders might be placed in safety at Makallah before greater damage occurred. During the 4th and 5th of March goods continued to be removed, but under increasing friction with the rebels ; and on the 6th a panic took place, and the British Indians all returned to the Makallah cove. The Sultān, though warned of the responsibility he might incur by his refusal, declined to extend the truce, even for the purpose of removing the remaining property of the Indians ; and on the 7th of March hostilities were resumed.

Orders of the
Government
of India com-
municated to
the rebels,
7th March.

On the 7th of March, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Major Hayes Sadler, having obtained a short cessation of hostilities, proceeded in a boat to the customs house and informed Sālih-bin-'Ali personally of the orders passed by the Government of India on the representations of the Harithi Shaikhs : they were merely to the effect that a reunion of 'Omān with Zanzibar was out of the question, and that the property of British subjects must be respected, otherwise active measures for its protection would be taken. Shaikh Sālih admitted his responsibility for the damage done by the rebels and promised to pay full compensation ; at the same time he requested that the property of British subjects which still remained in the town might be removed, but he was informed that this was impossible, especially as the lives of British subjects appeared to be no longer safe among the invading Bedouins. On the same day the Sultan applied to the Resident for active assistance in expelling the rebels from Masqat, but under the previous orders of the Government his request was refused.

On the 8th of March further looting took place.

Retirement
of the rebels
and reoccu-
pation of
the town by
the Sultān,
9th and 10th
March.

On the 9th of March terms of peace were at length arranged,—the Sultān, as subsequently transpired, paying over \$12,000 in cash to the rebels besides promising to condone the rebellion and to continue the allowances of the Rustāq family,—and the insurgents evacuated their positions, pillaging, wantonly destroying, and setting fire to the town in several places, as they withdrew. On the 10th the Sultān's levies overran the town, and a general conflagration was with difficulty prevented by means of the British Agency fire-engines. The Indian traders, from fear of the so-called loyal tribesmen, whom there was neither money to pay off nor a sufficiency of boats to send away, did not return from Makallah for some days.

On the 13th of March the French cruiser "Troude" arrived from Obock, where she had received orders for Masqat while the rebellion

was still in progress. During the trouble at the capital, Quryāt also had been attacked by the raider Qurta, and two British subjects there had sustained losses to the amount of \$1,000.

The principal tribes implicated on the rebel side at Masqat were the Hirth; the Habūs, along with their dependents the Āl Bū Rashaid and some of the Zikāwinah and Warūd; the Bani Battāsh; the Awāmir of 'Omān Proper; the Bani Ruwāhah; the Rahbiyīn; and the Hināwis of middle and lower Wādi Samāil, especially those of Fanjah and Khōdh; to whom may be added the Bani Na'amān, Shurūj and Fawāris, also the inhabitants of the Rustāq valley and a number of the people of Khadhra and of other places in Bātinah. At the end of the insurrection the rebels at Masqat were about 2,000 strong, while the loyalists approached double that number. On the side of the Sultān about 40 were killed and 60 wounded: the losses of the rebels were estimated at 80 killed and 80 wounded.

Tribes implicated and casualties.

Internal history of 'Omān from the rebellion to the rupture with Great Britain, 1895-98.

The credit of the malcontent tribes and of their Shaikhs was as much depressed by the partial failure of the rebellion as that of the Sultān by its partial success; and, except in the distant dependency of Dhufār, where the Sultān's authority was in abeyance from 1895 to 1897, the internal peace of 'Omān was not seriously disturbed during the next four years. For a time, however, the Sultān continued to be harassed by swarms of rapacious Shaikhs who crowded in from all parts, but chiefly from Sūr and Samāil, to claim rewards for real or imaginary services rendered during the crisis.

In June 1895 there took place at Izki one of the periodical conflicts between the Nizār and Yaman inhabitants of that place, the former being aided as usual by the neighbouring Bani Riyām and the latter by the Bani Ruwāhah; but peace was easily restored by Saiyid Muhammad, elder brother of the Sultān, whom His Highness sent to mediate between the factions.

Riot at Izki, 1895.

In November 1895 Badar-bin-Hilāl was assassinated at Nizwa by the Bani Shakail; and Saiyid Faisal, who had governed that place as Wālī before its loss in his father's time, despatched his trusty servant Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, then on leave from Dhufār, to recover it in his name; this Sulaimān effected by the simple expedient of buying out the holders and installing a garrison of his own in their place.

Acquisition of Nizwa by the Sultān, 1895.

Violent
death of
Sālih-bin-
'Ali, 1896.

In May 1896 Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Ali, taking advantage of the discontent caused by the imposition of a part of the rebellion indemnity-tax on the Ghāfiris—a circumstance which will be explained further on—induced part of the Bani Jābir of Wādī Samāil to join with the Bani Ruwāhah in attacking Saijah, which was held by loyal Bani Jābir and by Bani Hadhram, and himself assumed command of the operations. This, however, was the last appearance on the scene of the veteran intriguer, whom a random shot now laid low, in the month of September, at an age of over 75; during thirty years of his life he had played a conspicuous part in the politics of 'Omān, generally in opposition to the Sultān of the day, and he had often been suspected of personal aspirations to the supreme power. It is a remarkable fact that Sālih's son 'Abdullah had predeceased him, surviving by an even shorter period his recent perfidy at Masqat; and the life of Hamūd the Jahafi, also, was now not far from its close.

Abortive ex-
pedition of
the Sultān
against the
Bani Ruwā-
hah, 1896.

The Sultān took advantage of the consternation created by Shaikh Sālih's death to organise an expedition against the Bani Ruwāhah, from whom, by removing the tax on the Ghāfiris, he at the same time detached their allies of the Bani Jābir; but his movements were too slow; his huge host of several thousand mercenaries, when they arrived within striking distance of the enemy, refused to fight; and in the end the Sultān was obliged to return to Masqat, having achieved nothing but the expenditure of some \$60,000, which he could ill afford.

Disturbances
at Nakhl,
1896-1897.

In June 1896 a disturbance at Nakhl had been quelled by the Sultān in person at the head of a few hundred men, but exactly a year later trouble was renewed there; on this second occasion, however, the Wālī of Barkah was able to cope with it unaided.

Rustāq
affairs,
1895-98.

In December 1895 Sa'ūd-bin-'Azzān of Rustāq had advanced against Sohār with an army of Yāl Sa'ad, Hawāsinah, Maqābil and Na'im, but a reinforcement of 120 men, whom the Sultān forwarded by sea, enabled the Wālī to repulse him; and affairs on the Rustāq side remained quiet until the death of Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais in May 1898. On the occurrence of this event Sa'ūd-bin-'Azzān, who was supported by the Shaikhs of Rustāq, seized the principal fort by treachery and obliged Sa'id, the son of the late Ibrāhīm, to take refuge in Hazam, where he shortly afterwards besieged him. Saiyid Faisal no sooner heard of these proceedings than he sent Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim to the assistance of Sa'id, and the siege of Hazam was raised; but, on Sulaimān preparing to advance against Rustāq, the Bani Ruwāhah and various Sharqiyah tribes began to move to its assistance, while the Yāl Sa'ad, hitherto impassive spectators, showed signs of unrest.

The attempt on Rustāq was accordingly abandoned, when a counter-attack on the Sultān's possessions in Bātinah was at once threatened and, but for the opportune death at Rustāq of the notorious Hamūd-bin-Sa'īd the Jahafi, one of the moving spirits, would probably have been carried out.

The trouble at Sūr, of which place the inhabitants were now being encouraged by French agency to make light of the Sultān's authority, was attributable chiefly to the high-handed and tactless conduct of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim. This official, on his recall from Dhufār, spent about a week at Sūr in March 1898 and abruptly informed the Shaikhs that in future he would not respect the Khafir system, of which it is possible that they were making some improper use. When he sailed for Masqat he left his son, a boy of twelve years, in charge of the place, with instructions to build forts commanding the water-supply of the town and the caravan routes from the port to the interior. In May a deputation representing all sections of the Jannabah of Sūr waited on the Sultān at Masqat, but he turned a deaf ear to their grievances; later, however, in deference to the advice of 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, Tamīmah of the Bani Bū 'Ali, work upon the new fort was discontinued; but the Sultān still refused to remove the son of Sulaimān from the Waliship. At length, towards the end of September, a force consisting chiefly of Jannabah, but partly also of Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Rāsib, beleaguered the old fort occupied by the Sultān's representative; and on the 4th of October an attack was made, which resulted in the surrender of the garrison, after a short defence, and in their deportation to Masqat. At the end of the year the Jannabah were persuaded to admit a new governor and a fresh garrison on the part of the Sultān; these, on their arrival, found the old fort dismantled, only the bare walls remaining.

Affairs at
Sūr, 1898.

The Sultān's administration, 1895-98.

On the subsidence of the rebellion the Sultān took measures to strengthen the defences of Masqat and Matrah, which he had long neglected, and caused seven 12-pounder guns to be mounted on Fort Mirāni and five on Fort Jalāli. He also re-enlisted 40 African guards who had served his father, armed his palace retainers with rifles, and ordered gunpowder and rifle cartridges from England.

Military
reforms.

Ministers.

A change of ministers also took place as an indirect consequence of the rebellion. In 1896 some treasonable letters which Muhammad-bin 'Azzān, the Wazīr, had written to Sālih-bin-'Alī came into the hands of the Sultān through Zanzibar; and the minister, who on being confronted with them was unable to deny his guilt, was imprisoned until he had paid a fine of \$20,000, after which he was banished to East Africa. He was succeeded in office by Muhammad-bin-Sa'id, who had formerly served Saiyid Turki in the same capacity.

Other public servants.

The most useful of Faisal's local governors at this time were Rāshid-bin-'Ozaiz, whom he continued to employ at Hisn Samāil, and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, already more than once mentioned, a negroid of enterprising but rash temperament; Dhufār was the principal sphere of Sulaimān's activity, but he rendered services at Nizwa and Hazam also, which have been noticed above.

Limits of the Sultān's authority.

During the period now under consideration the direct authority of the Sultān prevailed only over Masqat and Matrah, over Bātinah to the east of Masna'ah, and over the principal coast towns to the west of Masna'ah; but his power was felt in a modified degree in Nakhl, Wādi Ma'āwal, Wādi Tau and Wādi Samail, and in some places such as Sūr upon the coast to the south-east of Masqat. By the recovery of Nizwa the Sultān's influence in 'Omān Proper, where he already held Izki, was considerably increased.

Indebtedness of the Sultān.

The Sultān, as we shall presently see, was greatly embarrassed at this time by want of money; and his debts were rapidly and steadily accumulating.

Revival of French influence in 'Omān, 1891-98.

Compact between France and Russia.

Some time before these events, France and Russia, as more fully explained in another place, had entered into a combination for the purpose of diminishing British influence in the Persian Gulf and of promoting a joint policy of their own in that region. In 'Omān the task of opposing Britain devolved on France; and a contest of international significance thus arose, shortly afterwards, upon a little known stage.

French protest relating to 'Omān, 1891.

In 1891 the French Ambassador in London, in consequence presumably of a misconception of the circumstances in which Saiyid Faisal had succeeded his father to the exclusion of his uncle 'Abdul 'Aziz and of his elder brother Muhammad, complained that the rule of succession to the

Sultanate of 'Omān had recently been altered under the advice of the Government of India; and the complaint, though it betrayed ignorance of the facts, was a symptom of renewed political interest in 'Omān, on the part of the French, after an interval of more than 80 years.

The new policy of the Republic in the Gulf was at length made clear by a budget debate which took place in the French Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of 1893. On M. Deloncle, a Deputy of the Colonial party, proposing a supplementary credit of 7,000 francs for the establishment of a Vice-Consulate at Masqat, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Develle, gave a promise that the post should be created; and, in doing so, he took no step to disavow the main arguments advanced by M. Deloncle, namely, that it was to the interest of France to support Russian policy in the Gulf, and that facilities ought to be provided for the registration of native shipping under the French flag.

Debate in
the French
Chamber,
1893.

Further indications of Franco-Russian interest in 'Omān were not long wanting. A plan of the harbour at Sūr,* published by the French Government in 1901, shows that their attention had been directed to that place at some earlier date; and in 1893 M. Chapui, a somewhat disreputable French subject who had attracted notice by his proceedings on the coast of Trucial 'Omān two years previously, arrived at Sūr in a steamer flying the French flag, and tried, but without success, to obtain a site for a coal shed there. In September 1893 the Russian volunteer cruiser "Nijni Novgorod" called at Masqat, where some of the officers had a private interview with the Sultān; and about this time rumours of Russian intrigue and of the presence of a Russian secret agent at Masqat became current, not only on the spot, but also at Zanzibar.

Other indi-
cations of
French and
Russian
interest.

At length on the 8th of November 1894, M. Ottavi, the long-expected Vice-Consul for France, arrived at Masqat and entered on his duties. His activity ran principally in two channels: he endeavoured to subvert the influence of the British representative with the Sultān and his entourage; and at the same time, by encouraging 'Omāni navigators to use the French flag without their sovereign's consent and even in defiance of his orders, he laboured to create a French interest independent of the Sultān's good graces. The general results of M. Ottavi's policy with the Sultān were apparent chiefly in the growing intractability of Saiyid Faisal to British influence, a fact of which ample illustration will be found in a later paragraph on British relations. Here we may recall the visit of the "Troude" to Masqat in 1895, a few days too late to assist the Sultān in dealing with the insurgents, and mention that in

Appointment
of a French
Vice-Consul
at Masqat,
1894.

* See British Admiralty Chart No. 2220-106 in which the plan serves as an inset

1897 the services of the French war-vessel "Surprise" were offered for the suppression of a rebellion in Dhufār but were declined by the Sultān.

The scheme for advancing French influence by a wide distribution of the French flag, though now for the first time boldly pursued in 'Omān, was by no means a novelty in French political practice. So early as 1860 the French colonial authorities at Nossibé and Mayotte began to issue French papers to owners of native vessels who were not French subjects; and in 1863 the circumstance was brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Government as an obstacle to the suppression of the slave trade, for vessels to which the French flag was granted became, *ipso facto*, exempt from search by British cruisers. In 1869 it was reported that nearly every native vessel to the south of Zanzibar now sailed under French colours, and evidence of the manner in which the French flag was abused to give cover to the slave trade in African waters continued to accumulate. This aspect of the question specially engaged the attention of Sir Bartle Frere on his mission to Zanzibar in 1873, but it is foreign to our present subject.

The French flag system extended to 'Omān, 1891-97.

It was in 1891, about the time when French interest in 'Omān began to revive and the Franco-Russian understanding relating to the Persian Gulf was formed, that the question of the French flag first attracted serious attention at Masqat; it was found that already 13 Nākhudas of Sūr were in possession of French colours, and that the flag was now granted not only in Madagascar but also at Obock, and even at Aden by the French Consul at Aden. The Sultān, who foresaw that a French claim to protect vessels at sea might easily develop into a claim to protect the persons and property of 'Omāni subjects connected with those vessels on shore, at once took up the question; but, though he succeeded in obtaining the attendance of 200 Jannabah at Masqat to discuss it, he was unable to check the growth of the practice. The Sultān also appealed to the Government of India for advice and proposed to address a remonstrance to the head of the French Republic, but the Government of India requested him to refrain from direct protest until they had referred to the Secretary of State; at the same time, however, they informed him that the use of the French flag by his subjects could have no effect as against himself, and that he might safely take any steps he pleased to uphold his jurisdiction, in his own waters, over such of his subjects as might have taken the French flag. Communication between the British and French Governments in Europe resulted in the disavowal by the latter of the action of their Consul at Aden, and early in the next year the flags issued at Aden were withdrawn from the holders;

certain assurances also were given by the French Government on this occasion, which the British Government interpreted as meaning that the general system of granting French flags to aliens would be abandoned, but in this respect there was a misunderstanding. At this juncture France, by her ratification in 1892 of the General Act of the Brussels Slave Trade Conference of 1890, incurred a plain obligation to restrict the grant of her flag to such native mariners as were either French citizens or subjects of a State under French protection; but the restriction was overlooked or intentionally disregarded, and the issue of French flags and papers to Arabs under the jurisdiction of the Sultān of 'Omān continued. By 1894, the year in which a French Vice-Consul was appointed at Masqat, the number of French flag holders at Sūr had risen to 23, of whom 11 belonged to the Jannabah and 12 to the Bani Bū 'Ali tribe; of the authorisations some had been obtained at Obock, some in Madagascar, and others in East Africa. The French flag and certificate,—the latter renewable annually and known as a "titre de navigation,"—were granted either on the security of immoveable property owned in a French colony, or on the personal security of an approved French flag holder; and, the latter being readily procurable, they were obtained without difficulty by 'Omāni boat owners or Nakhudas on their annual trading voyages to the Red Sea or East Africa; moreover, as the privileges were attached to the vessels, of which the owners and crews were continually changing, it became impossible for the Sultān to know how many and what persons might claim protection under a particular certificate. It soon became evident that M. Ottavi intended to push to its utmost limits the indefinite right of protection which the French registration of Omāni vessels provided him with a pretext for exercising. From 1892 onwards abundant evidence was forthcoming of the abuse of the French flag by the importers of slaves at Sūr and by the runners of slave cargoes to places in the Persian Gulf, especially in Turkish 'Irāq; and in 1896 two Sūri vessels under the French flag, the "Salāmah" and the "Sa'ad," were captured by a British vessel in the act of carrying slaves. This last very flagrant case led to fresh correspondence between the British and French Governments; and it was now ascertained that the French assurances of 1891 merely referred to admittedly irregular grants of the flag, as by the French Consul at Aden, and that there was no intention on the part of the French Government to discontinue the grants in what they considered to be legitimate cases. The "Salāmah" and "Sa'ad," in compliance with the claims of M. Ottavi, were handed over to him for disposal; and in 1897 the position of the French Vice-Consul was further strengthened by successful inter-

ference, in two instances, on the ground of the French registry of vessels. In the second of these cases the Sultān, who had imprisoned one of his subjects for refusing to exhibit a French navigation certificate the benefits of which he claimed, thought it necessary, on M. Ottavi protesting, to set the man at liberty. The full scope of the French pretensions and of the scheme based upon them was thus rapidly becoming manifest; but to the Sultān, when in May 1897 he addressed a protest on the subject to the French Vice-Consul at Masqat, the only reply vouchsafed was that the custom had existed for forty years, and that it had been acquiesced in, until the present, by the rulers of 'Omān. In 1897 it was reported that no less than 38 'Omāni vessels had obtained a French status through the Consulate of France at Zanzibar.

Relations with Great Britain and decline of British influence in 'Omān, 1895-98.

Causes of the alienation of the Sultān.

It is time now to revert to the subject of British relations with 'Omān, and in doing so we may premise that British policy in 'Omān, though never more friendly or helpful to the Sultān than in the years immediately following the rebellion of 1895, was increasingly unsuccessful; that there was a growing estrangement on the part of the Sultān; and that the accumulated strain of the period ended in, and was relieved by, a complete rupture. The causes of the alienation of the Sultān were, principally, the neutral behaviour of the British representatives in the crisis of 1895, the vexatious results in the shape of claims for compensation—chiefly British—that followed, and the growth of French influence at Masqat.

British policy of neutrality modified after the rebellion of 1895.

The neutrality of Colonel Wilson and Colonel Hayes Sadler was in part at least inevitable, for once the rebels had occupied the town of Masqat by surprise many British subjects and much British property were in their power; and in any case it would have been impossible to eject them by naval force without doing much material damage to the place. The attitude of the Resident and Agent was also strictly in accordance with the policy of the British Government, who had abstained from renewing to Saiyid Faisal the pledges of active assistance given to his father Turki. The general outcome of the rebellion being however unsatisfactory, as now appeared, discussions regarding a change of policy were initiated; and the Government of India proposed that either

(1) Masqat and Matrah should be annexed and the Sultān pensioned, or (2) that a British protectorate over 'Omān should be declared, or (3) that it should be intimated to the leading Shaikhs of 'Oman that, whatever differences they might have with their Sultān, the British Government would not, in view of the importance of British interests at those places, permit attacks upon Masqat and Matrah.

The Government of India themselves favoured the proposal for a protectorate; but, realising that it might not be prudent to open negotiations with France for the withdrawal of the Declaration of 1862, they recommended the third course, which was in fact a slight modification of the policy observed during the preceding reign. The Secretary of State for India having signified his support, in case the assent of France to a British protectorate over 'Omān should be unobtainable, of this proposal, it was adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf was authorised to communicate the decision to the Sultān for notification to the Shaikhs of 'Omān; at the same time the Sultān was to be made to understand that he was not absolved from taking proper and necessary measures for his own defence. The Sultān, who had more than once hinted that he considered the British Government to have failed in their duty to him, received the announcement with a coldness which had not been expected, and even affected to treat it as a mere matter of course. He also demurred, on the ground of expense, to holding a Darbār for the purpose of making the orders of Government generally known; and in lieu thereof a written notification, after its terms had been approved by the British Political Resident, was circulated by him to the leading men of the country at the end of 1895.

Safety of Masqat and Matrah guaranteed by the British Government, 1895.

In 1896 two 5½-inch mortars with ammunition were presented to the Sultān by the Government of India as an addition to his means of defence; and in the same year an offer of naval assistance was made to him, as will be seen in the history of Dhufār, for the purpose of recovering that province, which had revolted; but it was at first declined.

Other assistance, 1896.

The hostility of Saiyid Faisal to British interests was now so apparent that, in June 1896, the Viceroy of India, Lord Elgin, suggested by telegram that advantage might be taken of affairs in Madagascar to obtain the assent of the French Government to a British protectorate over 'Omān; the reply, however, was that the Foreign Office, while they appreciated the importance of trying to secure a protectorate, considered that the measure could not be successfully accomplished at the time. In 1897 the Sultān requested British aid for the recovery of Dhufār, but it was evident that he did so with reluctance, and he showed no real gratitude

British protectorate again suggested by the Government of India, 1896.

for the favourable result : the ungracious behaviour of the Sultān in the matter of the Dhufār expedition was believed to be due to the influence of the French Vice-Consul over his mind. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, it was still found possible, at the beginning of 1898, to conclude with the Sultān a useful agreement in restraint of the arms traffic, the nature of which is described in the Appendix on that subject.

British loans
to the Sultān,
1895 and
1897.

The financial support of the British Government was never more necessary to Saiyid Faisal than in the years following the revolt of 1895, and it was not withheld. The "Zanzibar" subsidy continued to be paid as usual. In 1895, the Sultān having made written application for a loan of \$30,000 and virtually intimated that, if it were not granted, he would have to look for assistance elsewhere, the Government of India sanctioned the advance to him of a sum of \$60,000, to bear interest at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and to be recovered by monthly deductions of \$2,000 from the "Zanzibar" subsidy ; on his part the Sultān undertook in writing that the money should be applied to meeting his actual difficulties, and that he would not borrow from any other foreign power so long as the loan remained unrepaid. In 1896 and 1897 Saiyid Faisal made further requests for pecuniary aid, chiefly for the purpose of establishing his authority in the interior ; but, as he would not at first give a satisfactory statement of his financial position and prospects, there was some delay in meeting his wishes. Eventually the Sultān was brought to admit that his expenditure was in excess of his income by about \$700 per mensem, and that his liabilities already amounted to \$130,000, of which \$100,000 (inclusive of \$33,000 bearing interest at the rate of 24 per cent.) was due to Banyans and Arabs on account of loans contracted by him locally at the time of the rebellion ; he stated that he required Rs. 60,000 to pay off the portion of the debt subject to high interest and Rs. 40,000 to extinguish the remainder, which was due to Arabs. On the Sultān giving an assurance that the money would be devoted to paying off the more urgent items of his liability and that he would take steps to make his income and expenditure balance, a sum of Rs. 60,000 was in June 1897 advanced to him on the same terms as the first loan, repayment of this supplementary amount to commence upon discharge of the former one. It was also resolved that, in case the Sultān should give evidence of an intention to place his finances on a sound basis, he should be assisted with a third loan of Rs. 40,000 to enable him to pay off his Arab creditors ; and it was suggested by the Government of India that an officer should be lent him for the purpose of reforming his customs, from which he did not derive as much benefit

as he might, or even that further loans should be made to him on the security of the customs instead of the subsidy. With reference to these last proposals it was ruled by Her Majesty's Government that assumption by the Government of India of direct control over the Masqat customs would be inconsistent with the Declaration of 1862, but that the appointment by the Sultān of a British Superintendent of Customs would be admissible, and that a loan to the Sultān might with propriety be made on the security of the customs. About the same time however, at the beginning of 1898, it leaked out that nearly half of the last loan had been misapplied by the Sultān and that his debts now amounted to more than \$190,500; he had also sent in no projects for reduction of current expenditure; and he had politely, but distinctly, refused to make any change in the management of his customs.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān, 1895-98.

Meanwhile it had been necessary to insist on the satisfaction by the Government of 'Omān of the claims of British subjects for losses sustained in the rebellion of 1895. Those claims had been scrutinised by a committee appointed by the British Political Agent, and the compensation justly due had in the end been assessed at \$77,895. The Government of India, though they approved of the action of their Political Agent in refusing to hand over to the Sultān a party of 25 Hirth arriving at Masqat from Zanzibar in a British steamer immediately after the rebellion, were willing to assist the Sultān in any reasonable manner, and agreed that the indemnity might be exacted from the offending tribes in the shape of a tax levied on their export trade; that the Sultān, while he was to understand that his own responsibility was in no way lessened thereby, might be authorised to notify that the demand was made at the instance of the British Government; and that the tax should be fixed at such a rate as to produce the amount required in three years at most. The claims of British subjects, and with them those of an American (the Rev. Mr. Zwemer) and of an Algerian, were to be satisfied first; and thereafter the special tax might be maintained until 'Omāni sufferers by the rebellion had also been compensated for their losses, after which it should be abolished. The Sultān concurred generally in these arrangements; but he clung obstinately to the view that British subjects should have no precedence over 'Omāni subjects, and for some time he persisted

Indemnity
for British
sufferers by
the rebellion
of 1895.

in speaking of the sums realised as "common to the four governments." At first a special export duty of 10 per cent., in addition to the usual export duty of 5 per cent., was imposed on the produce of the guilty Hināwi tribes only ; but, owing to the collusion of Ghāfirī tribes, to the abuse of an exemption in favour of the Hajriyīn, to the weakness of the Sultān's executive at Sūr, and to the partiality displayed by the Sultān himself in making collections at Masqat, the tax instead of bringing in \$20,000 to \$30,000 a year, as had been estimated, yielded between the 1st of August 1895 and the 14th of March 1896 the sum of \$9,054 merely ; and of this only \$650 was derived from Sūr, the chief port of the offending tribes. In July 1896 the Sultān, to punish the Ghāfirīs for conniving to screen the Hināwis and also on account of the part which his own Ghāfirī levies had taken in the plunder of Masqat, imposed an extra 5 per cent. on exported Ghāfirī produce, so raising the export duty payable by the tribes of that faction to 10 per cent. ; but, as we have seen, the circumstance was taken advantage of by Shaikh Salih-bin-'Ali to detach some of the Ghāfirīs of Wādi Samāil from their allegiance, and the new order, which from the first had been discountenanced by the British Political Agent, was then almost instantly repealed. At the beginning of 1897 Saiyid Faisal asked to be allowed six years in all in which to discharge the indemnity, but promised to pay interest on what remained due after the end of the third year ; and in the same year, 1897, he farmed out the punitive tax to Ratansi Parshotam, an Indian merchant, for \$15,000 per annum. In March 1898 only \$29,711 of the indemnity had been paid off, and in August the tax was re-farmed to the same individual for \$18,000, though another Hindu had offered \$25,000 for it.

**Grievances of
British Indian
traders.**

During the period now under consideration, grievances on the part of British Indian traders in 'Omān continued to accumulate. In 1889, and again in 1894 and in every subsequent date season up to and including that of 1898, the British Indian date exporters of Matrah were compelled to bring their consignments to Masqat to be weighed ; this was an arbitrary arrangement from which Saiyid Turki had desisted on remonstrances being made, but in the case of the present ruler mere remonstrances were of no avail. As Fard dates, which went to America only, were exempt from this order, the system amounted to a differentiation in favour of American trade ; and it was unfair to the Khōjahs of Matrah, by the ingenuity of whose rivals, the Hindus of Masqat, it was probably contrived. The commercial treaty of 1891, also, was indifferently observed by the Sultān's officials, and illegal charges were common. Export duty was frequently in excess of the 5 per cent. rate agreed to by the British Government,

and in the case of 'Omāni tobacco it amounted to 20 per cent. On one occasion, in 1898, an additional punitive export tax of 5 per cent. was suddenly imposed on the date produce of the Rustāq and Ma'āwal valleys, after the whole of it had been bought up by British Indian merchants; a remission however was in this case, but not without difficulty, obtained. It was also reported that at various places in 'Omān export and import duties were recovered in an unequal manner to the detriment of British subjects, the Arab merchant of a neighbouring port, and sometimes even of the same port, paying at a reduced rate or even nothing at all, while the British Indian trader was invariably charged the full 5 per cent. At Gwādar too, in 1897, it was necessary to request the Sultān to abate the exorbitant dues which he had begun to levy on fish-yards owned there by British subjects; and the point, though with reluctance, was conceded.

Rupture with Great Britain, 1899.

Events had for some time been leading towards a disagreement between the Sultān of 'Omān and the British power. The deeper causes and their manifestations have already been discussed; but there were other symptoms also, significant though more superficial, of growing antipathy on the Sultān's part. Already, at the end of 1893, he had omitted to salute, as required by old custom, the British Political Agent, Colonel Hayes Sadler, at his departure for Būshehr to assume charge of the Residency,—an intentional mark of disrespect which had necessitated a reference to the Government of India. For a number of years it had been the practice for the Sultān's batteries to fire a salute on Proclamation Day in honour of the Queen-Empress of India; but on the 1st of January 1898, the Resident (Colonel Meade) and the Political Agent (Major Fagan) being then both at Masqat, the accustomed salute was fired without the hoisting of the British flag, and Saiyid Faisal explained the innovation by saying that the ceremony was now to be regarded as a greeting to all Christian nations and not as a compliment to the Queen-Empress alone. The Resident, however, by laying stress on the unfriendliness of discontinuing a long-established courtesy, succeeded in obtaining from the Sultān a written apology and promise of future observance of the fête; and on the 3rd of January, accordingly, the British flag was flown all day and the Queen-Empress's annual salute was fired in the usual manner. At the end of January 1898 a gunner of H.M.S. "Cossack" was assaulted at

Unfriendly
behaviour of
the Sultān
towards
Britain,
1893-98.

Masqat by a slave of the Sultān and subjected, along with two officers of his ship, to ignominious treatment by certain of His Highness's officials. On the matter being represented to the Sultān the slave was flogged and the officials imprisoned; but the affair was none the less an indication of the state of feeling prevalent in palace circles at Masqat.

Increasing
intimacy of
the Sultān
with France,
1898.

Soon after this matters began to move more rapidly. The French gunboat "Gabès" arrived at Masqat in February 1898 and remained there until March; but the object and results of her visit could not at the time be ascertained by the British Political Agent. In October another French gunboat, the "Scorpion," spent a fortnight at Masqat: she brought a breech-loading field gun as a gift from the French Government to the Sultān. The stay was made the occasion of friendly demonstrations and secret conferences, in which M. Ottavi played a large part; valuable return presents were given by the Sultān; and the officers of the ship, with the French Vice-Consul, made an expedition to Bandar Jissah, a small but defensible harbour on the coast 5 miles south-east of Masqat, of which they took photographs and made rough plans. A direct result of the visit of the "Scorpion" was the dismissal by the Sultān of his Wazīr, Muhammad-bin-Sa'id, whom he had appointed in January 1897, and the reinstatement of Muhammad-bin-'Azzān. The latter, besides being illiterate, was now in his dotage; but he was a more facile instrument in the hands of the French party than Muhammad-bin-Sa'id, who in May 1898 had induced the Sultān to re-open discussion of the flag question with M. Ottavi, and who was believed to have opposed the rapprochement with the French in all its stages. French interests at Masqat were now actively promoted by an individual who held a peculiar dual position as confidential secretary to the Sultān and as dragoman of the French Vice-Consulate; this was 'Abdul 'Aziz, an Arab of the Bani Ruwāhah tribe, who had been known to M. Ottavi at Zanzibar and who with Hilāl-bin-'Amr, a name with which we shall become more familiar hereafter, had been expelled from that island in 1893 for political intrigues. 'Abdul 'Aziz, who first arrived at Masqat in 1893, and who doubtless harboured resentment against the British authorities for his expulsion from Zanzibar, had been a salaried employé of the Sultān at least since November 1895; and in his capacity as such he certainly had access to the Sultān's correspondence with the British Agent, for letters sent by the Sultān to the Agency were sometimes in his handwriting. It cannot be doubted that the knowledge he thus obtained was placed at the disposal of his other employer, the French Vice-Consul.

Grant by the
Sultān to the
French of
a coaling
station, 1898.

The immediate cause of the crisis which now occurred was an announcement in the Parisian "Journal des Débats" of the 20th November 1898 to the effect that a French man-of-war had established a coaling-station at

Bandar Jissah. It received corroboration from a report, apparently reliable that the French Vice-Consul at Masqat had received special promotion to Consul for valuable services, and it was resolved to sift the matter to the bottom; for the conduct of the Sultān, if he had granted any concession such as that suspected, was clearly a violation of his Agreement of 1891 with the British Government regarding the non-alienation of territory. In January 1899 the occupation of Bandar Jissah by the French was considered so probable that an officer and boat's crew of H.M.S. "Sphinx" were stationed there, and remained for some time, to hoist the British flag in case of the appearance of a French man-of-war; and a remonstrance founded on the agreement of 1891 was addressed to the Sultān by Major Fagan, the British Agent at Masqat. In reply to Major Fagan's protest the Sultān admitted the grant of a concession, which, however, he described in vague terms and professed himself unable to cancel. A Russian agent was stated to be present in Masqat at this time and to be in communication both with the Sultān and with the French Vice-Consul.

Various other questions, relating for the most part to the treaty rights of British subjects and to compensation claimable by them, were pending at this time, as we have seen, between Saiyid Faisal and the Government of India; and on the 24th of January 1899, Lord Curzon, who had very recently assumed the Viceroyalty of India, proposed to instruct Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to deal with these unsettled cases, and to inform the Sultān that the subsidy paid him would be withheld until they were disposed of. In view of the Sultān's recent intrigues and evident hostility Lord Curzon also considered that a serious warning was required, and he consulted Her Majesty's Government as to the terms in which it should be administered. On the 25th of January the Secretary of State for India authorised the Viceroy to remind the Sultān of past favours conferred on him by the British Government, as well as of the conditions of friendship and observance of treaty engagements on which the continuance of the "Zanzibar" subsidy depended, and to admonish him that, in event of his conduct continuing to be unfriendly, the support of the British Government would be withdrawn and might even take another direction. Further, to compel a settlement of the outstanding questions, the Secretary of State was prepared to approve of any measures, not inconsistent with the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 and not requiring French concurrence, which Lord Curzon might consider likely to be efficacious.

Demand for redress of the grievances of British subjects resolved on.

Under the sanction thus conveyed, a memorandum embodying the British demands was prepared by the Government of India for communication to the Sultān, and the Resident was ordered to proceed to

Addition of a demand for cancellation of the grant to the French.

Masqat, where he arrived in the first week of February. Lord Curzon had meanwhile directed, upon his own responsibility, that a demand for the cancellation of the concession to the French should be added to the memorandum before presentation,—a step which the Sultān's avowal of a grant to the French, the incompatibility of such a grant with the British Agreement of 1891, and the undesirability of ignoring the principal ground of offence combined to render necessary. On the 7th of February Colonel Meade reported the inclusion of the additional demand in the memorandum, which already required that 'Abdul 'Azīz, Ruwāhi, should be permanently dismissed from the Sultān's employment; that interest at the rate of 5 per cent. should be paid on the balance, still due, of the indemnity of 1895; that nowhere should a tax be levied on British, which was not equally levied on 'Omāni subjects; and, finally, that all import duties, and also the tax on dates brought from the interior or exportation, should be reduced to 5 per cent. in accordance with treaty.

British
ultimatum
presented to
the Sultān,
9th Febru-
ary 1899.

On the afternoon of the 9th February an Arabic translation of the memorandum, after being read to him, was handed to the Sultān by way of ultimatum. The Sultān was willing to give way at once in regard to the dismissal of 'Abdul 'Azīz, the payment of interest on the indemnity, and equality of taxation as between British and 'Omāni subjects; but he wished time for discussion of the other points. Discussion, however, was refused; and 48 hours were allowed for a reply.

Proceedings
from the
10th to the
14th of
February.

On the 10th of February the French Vice-Consul, to whom the Sultān had sent a copy of the British Agreement of 1891, informed Saiyid Faisal in writing that he could not recognise its existence as it was contrary to the Declaration of 1862, and that the grant of a coaling station to the French, which had been voluntarily made, could not be recalled. On the 11th the Sultān wrote to the British Resident, urging that the grant of a coaling station was not a cession of territory and was therefore not contrary to the agreement of 1891; at the same time he expressed a hope of being leniently treated and enclosed M. Ottavi's letter of the previous day. On the 12th Colonel Meade replied to the Sultān, returning the letter of the French Vice-Consul and denying the right of the latter to intervene in a matter connected with the Agreement of 1891, and reminded the Sultān that the period of grace had already expired. The next day, the 13th of February, the Sultān sent written notice to the Resident of the revocation of his gift of a coaling-place to the French, and requested British protection against the French in case it should prove that he had incurred the displeasure of the latter. On the

14th of February H.M.S. "Eclipse" from Bombay carrying Admiral Douglas, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, in India arrived at Masqat, where H.M.S. "Redbreast" had preceded her.

Before the actual presentation of the ultimatum Colonel Meade had suggested that, as the Sultān appeared to rely upon French support, the use of compulsion should be authorised even to the extent of employing naval force if necessary; and this request, subject to the condition that collision with the French should be avoided, had been recommended by the Viceroy to Her Majesty's Government on the ground that, at the stage which matters had reached, defiance by the Sultān of the British power could not be permitted. Her Majesty's Government, while they considered that the demand for cancellation of the French concession somewhat exceeded the limits of their previous instructions, agreed that, if it had already been presented, compulsion as proposed by Lord Curzon might be employed to enforce compliance with it as well as with the demands originally authorised.

Compulsion
of the Sultān
by naval
force author-
ised.

The authority to use force, if required, did not reach Masqat until late on the 15th of February, on which day Colonel Meade, considering the measure to be necessary, had of his own motion required the Sultān to announce the cancellation of the French concession in public Darbār as well as by public notices; to inform the French Vice-Consul in writing of the fact, sending a transcript of the letter to the British Resident; to supply the British Agent with a copy of the grant to the French; and to signify his compliance with the other demands contained in the ultimatum. The proceedings at Masqat were reported, as they took place, to the Secretary of State, who authorised a guarantee of support being given to the Sultān in case he followed the advice of the British Government; but publicity in regard to the cancellation of the French concession was strongly deprecated. Colonel Meade was immediately instructed by the Government of India not to require a public announcement; the orders, however, did not reach him until after the demand had been made and complied with.

Proceedings
on the 15th
of February.

On the 16th of February, no answer to the Resident's last letter having as yet been received from the Sultān, Admiral Douglas assumed charge of the negotiations and summoned Saiyid Faisal to meet him on board his ship at 2 p.m. Meanwhile the "Eclipse" was warped into position for opening fire on the palace and forts; all shipping was cleared out of the line of fire; and arrangements were made for warning the inhabitants of the town and the foreign consular representatives. A letter was now received from the Sultān, showing that he had publicly notified the cancellation of the French grant and had informed the French Vice-Consul of the same; it contained, as requested, a transcript of the letter

Submission
of the Sultān
to the British
demands,
16th Feb-
ruary.

sent to M. Ottavi in which the Sultān justified cancellation on the ground of the Agreement of 1891 with Britain, also a copy of the original grant to the French. It was not, however, entirely satisfactory, and a personal interview was still insisted on. The grant to the French, now seen for the first time, conferred on them a coaling-place, but left the exact site undetermined; it had been granted on the 7th of March 1898, during the visit of the "Gabès" to Masqat. At length, after various delays, the Sultān came off to the Admiral's flagship and, after a long discussion, submitted unconditionally to all the British demands; when he returned on shore it was under his ordinary salute of 21 guns. M. Ottavi immediately protested in writing against the cancellation of the French grant, but without effect.

Public
announc-
ment by the
Sultān of
cancellation
of his grant
to the
French.

On the 17th of February the Admiral paid a visit to the Sultān; and in the afternoon of the same day, at a general Darbār attended by all the leading men of Masqat, the Sultān announced the renewal of amicable relations between himself and the British Government and the cancellation of his agreement for a coaling-place with the French, which, he said, had been entered into in forgetfulness of the rights of Britain.

French policy in 'Omān after 1899.

Continued
French intri-
gues in
'Omān.

The result of these proceedings was to deprive the French of the hope of obtaining a naval base in 'Omān under their own control; but they did not as yet despair of the success of their other designs, and for the next three years French intrigues continued to be rife in 'Omān. The Wazīr of the Sultān was still Muhammad-bin-'Azzān, who owed his appointment to French influence; 'Abdul 'Aziz, the dragoman of the French Consulate, though ostensibly dismissed from His Highness's employment, for a time continued to have free access to his presence; and in May 1901 Hilāl-bin-'Amr from Zanzibar suddenly arrived at Sūr and commenced an anti-British propaganda among the tribesmen of the Sharqiyah district. This Hilāl was a brother of Muhsin-bin-'Amr, the rebel of 1895, and a son-in-law of the notorious Shaikh Salih-bin-'Ali; as chief adviser of Hamad-bin-Thuwaini of Zanzibar he had encouraged that prince to take a mischievous interest in the affairs of 'Omān; and in June 1896 he had been deported from Zanzibar to Aden, but he had subsequently been allowed to return to East Africa. The number of French agents in 'Omān was increased by the arrival at Masqat in 1899 of a Frenchman, M. Goguyer, who settled there as a dealer in arms and ammunition, became in 1901

the local representative of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, and was joined in 1902 by two of his sons and by another Frenchman; M. Goguyer had given trouble to his own Government previously in Tunis and Abyssinia, but he had the powerful influence of the French Colonial party behind him. A journalistic campaign which he now inaugurated against British influence is described separately elsewhere.* In 1901 the chauvinistic M. Ottavi, who carried his anti-British spleen so far as to be generally absent from Masqat, and so to avoid dressing his flagstaff on Proclamation Day, was succeeded in the French Vice-Consulate at Masqat by the more moderate M. Laronce.

The results of British action at Masqat were mortifying to the French Government, the more so on account of the publicity with which they had been invested; but they placed the question of the French coaling station upon a clear basis and necessitated its being discussed thereafter by the British and French Governments as a matter between themselves. The French authorities, who evidently hoped to be able to retain Bandar Jissah by means of suitable guarantees as to the nature of the French occupation, at first demurred to the view maintained by the British Foreign Office, that the Declaration of 1862 precluded the acceptance by either France or Britain of a cession or lease of 'Omān territory; eventually however they accepted the British reading of the treaty. In March 1899 an assurance was given to France that no obstacle would be raised to her obtaining coal sheds in Masqat harbour on the same conditions as the existing British sheds in the Makallah cove were held; this implied that the national flag would not be flown, that defences would not be erected, and that the basis of occupation would be sufferance merely, conveying no territorial or sovereign rights. At the end of March Major Fagan, the British Political Agent, suggested that the British and French coal yards might both be accommodated in the Makallah cove; and the unwillingness of the French Government to adopt this simple and natural solution of the difficulty made it even plainer than before that what they really desired was a separate *pied-à-terre* in 'Omān, not coaling facilities at a port where steam vessels under the French flag hardly ever called. In July 1899 the French Government proposed Riyām, and in January 1900 Kalbūh, bays outside the Masqat harbour, as the site of the coal yard to be allotted them; but the British Government declined to agree to either, and at length in May 1900 the British offer of a division of the Makallah site was accepted. The ground, after being somewhat enlarged, was divided into two portions with equal superficies and frontage, and the French, having been invited to choose, took the southern half.

Settlement of
the French
coaling sta-
tion question,
1899-1900.

* *Vide* page 339 *ante*.

Progress of
the French
flag question,
1899-1902.

In the ultimatum of February 1899 the Sultān had been advised by the British Government to order his subjects to use a distinctive flag and to explain to his people that the grant to them, after such order, of flags or protection by the representative of a foreign power would be invalid and would amount to an infringement of the independence of 'Omān. The Sultān, chiefly on sentimental grounds, was indisposed, and in the end refused, to make any alteration in the nondescript red flag of 'Omān; but he wrote on the 16th of February 1899 to the French flag-holders at Sūr, enjoining them to give up their flags; and on the following day he informed the French Vice-Consul at Masqat that he did not recognise the right of the French to exercise jurisdiction over 'Omāni subjects in 'Omān, that he regarded the action of the French in this respect as contrary to the Declaration of 1862, and that in future he would exercise jurisdiction over his subjects himself. Nothing of importance resulted from these steps; and the proceedings in the case during the next four years, though continuous and not devoid of incident, were inconclusive.

1899.

In October 1899 the French Government, acting upon incorrect information, complained that the British representative at Masqat had, besides calling in question the validity of the French flag, demanded of the Sultān that he should enforce the disuse of the French flag by his subjects and promised him the assistance of a British man-of-war. At the end of the year various expedients for neutralising the effects of the French flag system were under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

1900.

In May 1900 the Sultān signified his willingness to write a letter to the British Government, requesting them to undertake his case in a discussion with the Government of the Republic; but the offer was not accepted. In June 1900 the Sultān, who at this time had no suitable vessel of his own, paid a visit to Sūr in H.M.S. "Sphinx." Captain Cox, the British Political Agent at Masqat, was also on board; but neither he nor the British naval officers took any cognisance of the Sultān's doings on shore. The result of the Sultān's visit, in so far as it concerned the French flag case, was that on the 12th June the French flag-holders of Sūr spontaneously presented the Sultān with a written agreement in which, after solemnly professing allegiance, they renounced from that day the benefits of French protection and undertook to return the French flags and certificates in their possession at the earliest opportunity to the authorities from whom they had received them. This paper related to no less than 45 vessels, and the only 'Omāni vessel flying the French flag not included in it was one which did not belong to Sūr; three of the certificates produced had been issued

locally by M. Ottavi. The greater number of the signatories eventually failed, it is true, to carry out the terms of the agreement ; but the incident was not without importance, for it encouraged the Sultān to take a stronger line than hitherto and it shook, in some degree, the confidence of the French representative. By means of an edict dated the 15th of June, which was communicated to the foreign representatives at Masqat upon the same day but was not publicly promulgated until the 6th of August, the Sultān informed his people that he did not recognise foreign flags or papers in 'Omān, and that he would not condone the acceptance of such by 'Omāni subjects unless with his own express consent in writing. It was not clear whether the last clause of this edict referred to the future only, or was meant to have retrospective effect.

On the 26th of June the French Government, who were by this time apprised of the Sultān's excursion to Sūr and its results, intimated through their Ambassador in London that no more French papers of protection would be issued, and that existing papers would be carefully examined with a view to the cancellation of any which might have been unjustifiably granted. The French store ship "Drome" arrived at Masqat in August, nominally to carry out this duty and to enquire into the prevalence of the slave trade under the French flag ; but the inquiries made there and at Sūr by her commander seem to have been cursory. An attempt was made instead to intimidate the Sultān into giving up the French navigation certificates which some of his subjects had surrendered to him, and to persuade him to re-employ 'Abdul 'Azīz in his dealings with the French Vice-Consulate ; but on both points Saiyid Faisal was firm. At the end of the year the French flagship "Catinat" also visited Masqat and Sūr, and a second attempt to influence the Sultān was made, with equal want of success.

In April 1901 it was suggested by Captain Cox that, for the 1901: purpose of narrowing the limits of the foreign jurisdiction created by use of the French flag, the Sultān might be advised to issue an edict, in continuation of that of the 15th June 1900, to the effect that from aspecified date none of his subjects would be permitted, without his written authority, to fly a foreign flag in the territories or territorial waters of 'Omān. His Majesty's Government, to whom this suggestion was referred, having expressed a doubt whether the distinction which it involved was sustainable, the Government of India hoped that at least an assurance to the Sultān might be authorised, consonant with the advice given him in 1891, to the effect that the assertion by the French Government of a claim to jurisdiction over and protection

of His Highness's subjects in Masqat [territory and territorial waters would be regarded as incompatible with the Sultān's independence, and that the British Government would support him in resisting any such claim. In consequence, however, of a communication received from the French Ambassador in August 1901, a decision on this point was deferred. The memorandum now presented by M. Cambon stated that the promise of the Sūri boat-owners to give up their French flags had been obtained by force, with the help of the British authorities, — a view which MM. Ottavi and Goguyer had sedulously inculcated; that strict investigations had been held by the French for the purpose of revising the list of French flag-holders; and that the accusations of slave-trading against vessels flying the French flag were unfounded. The paper also contained various minor allegations of undue British interference in the affairs of 'Oman.

1902.

While materials for a complete reply to this memorandum were being collected at Masqat, a peremptory claim on behalf of the French Government to entire jurisdiction over French flag-holders was suddenly advanced in writing by M. Laronce, who had succeeded M. Ottavi as Vice-Consul of France at Masqat. This occurred on the 23rd of January 1902 during a visit of the French flagship. Captain Cox, at his own suggestion, was authorised to protest on the strength of the Declaration of 1862 against the assumption by France of jurisdiction over 'Omāni subjects; and his protest, made on the 11th of February, was successful beyond expectation. At the beginning of March M. Laronce informed him that France had no intention of bringing 'Omāni subjects under French jurisdiction, and that she claimed nothing more than rights of surveillance and police over vessels bearing the French flag. The Sultān also was assured on the 4th of March, by the French Vice-Consul and the Commander of the R. F. "Catinat," that the French flag-holders of Sūr, for which port the "Catinat" was bound, would be informed of the Sultān's sovereignty on land.

In March 1902 a fresh communication was received from the French Ambassador in London by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs; it stated that the freedom of the Sūri boats under French colours from complicity in the slave trade had, as the result of a careful watch placed upon them, been established, and that the scrutiny of claims to use the French flag had almost been completed by the French authorities. The pledge given in June 1900, that no more French papers would be used, was repeated upon this occasion; but as subsequent events

showed, it was not regarded by the French as a bar to the renewal of papers in favour of existing holders. In April Lord Lansdowne handed to M. Cambon a memorandum, answering the French complaints of the previous year and recapitulating the chief points of the case, upon which, it was observed, the two Governments appeared to be in accord; and simultaneously a request was made that a list of the native vessels and owners considered to be entitled to the use of the French flag might be furnished by the French to the Sultān and also to the British Consul at Masqat.

Matters were thus leisurely progressing towards a settlement, and the objections of the British Government and of the Sultān had already resulted in a considerable abatement of the pretensions of the French, when suddenly, in the spring of 1903, in consequence of two unforeseen accidents, the question of the French flag suddenly assumed a somewhat dangerous aspect. On the 26th of March the sailing vessel "Khadhra" of Sūr, flying French colours, attempted to leave that port in defiance of the orders of 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, the chief of the Bani Bū 'Ali, and was fired upon* and forcibly detained by the Chief's men. Again, on the 9th of April, quarantine was broken at Masqat by five natives of Sūr arriving in a British mail steamer from Bombay, three of whom, in consequence of their connection with boats using the French flag, were regarded by the French Vice-Consulate as under its protection; the fugitives, who immediately made for Sūr in a sailing boat, were pursued by an official of the Sultān in a steam launch lent for the purpose by H.M.S. "Perseus," and were recaptured. In the first of these two cases—which occurred almost simultaneously with the circulation in France of a rumour that Britain was about to annex Masqat—the French Vice-Consul claimed an indemnity of \$1,500 for the detention of the vessel, and, in the second, the instant release of the alleged French protégés. The Sultān, while declaring his readiness to be bound by a joint decision of the French and British Governments in either case, would not in the meantime accede to the demands of M. Laronce, but proceeded instead to deal with the offenders in the quarantine case as 'Omāni subjects, and sentenced them to three months' imprisonment each. The British Government on receipt of this news decided to support the Sultān, on the ground that he was justified, pending a settlement of the French flag question, in acting upon his own view of his rights; and H.M.S. "Naiad" was accordingly sent to join H.M.S. "Perseus" in Masqat harbour, where both ships were present before the arrival on the 11th of May of French war-ship "Infernet." The French Consul at Masqat, in con-

Sudden crisis
in the French
flag case,
1903.

* See also page 580 post.

junction with the commander of the "Infernet," made strenuous efforts to obtain the release of the prisoners in whom he was interested; but the Sultān, assured of British support, remained inflexible.

Agreement
between Bri-
tain and
France to
refer the
question to
the Hague
Tribunal,
1903.

At this point, in consequence of a vehement demand by the French Ambassador in London for the release of the imprisoned Sūris who were claimed as French subjects, discussion became direct between the French and British Governments and local negotiations at Masqat were suspended. On both sides the national honour was now seriously engaged, and deadlock was at one time feared; but ultimately a proposal that the whole matter should be referred to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal was made by Lord Lansdowne after consulting the Cabinet, and, being accepted by the French, provided a convenient solution of the difficulty. Incidentally it was arranged between the two Powers that the prisoners in dispute should be liberated by the Sultān without being handed over to the French local representative, and that the "Infernet" should be removed. Accordingly the prisoners were released on the 29th of May, and the "Naiad" and "Perseus" left Masqat the next day, H.M.S. "Pomone" remaining until the departure of the "Infernet" on the 3rd of June. The immediate result of the liberation of the prisoners was necessarily prejudicial to the Sultān's prestige, and for some time afterwards he continued to be insulted by boats from Sūr, which, after hoisting the tricolor, ran across the bows of his new steamer the "Nūr-al-Bahr."

Preliminary
proceedings,
1904-05.

In Europe the proceedings continued in a manner somewhat more rapid and decisive than hitherto. In March 1904, in the course of a general arrangement of political difficulties then taking place between Britain and France, a move was made by the French Government for the withdrawal of the 'Omān flag question from the Hague Tribunal and for its immediate settlement on a basis highly favourable to themselves; but the British Government did not consent, and the original arrangement was maintained. On the 13th of October 1904 a Compromise or Agreement for the reference of the dispute to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal was signed in London by Lord Lansdowne, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador: by this document the points in issue were defined and the procedure to be followed was fixed. Subsequently Jonkheer A. F. de Savornin Lohman, member of the Second Chamber of the States General of Holland and formerly Minister of the Interior in the Netherlands, was appointed arbitrator on behalf of France, and Mr. Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, on behalf of Great Britain, while

Dr. H. Lammasch, an Austrian senator and professor of international law in the University of Vienna, was nominated to the post of umpire by His Majesty the King of Italy. The court thus constituted finally assembled at the Hague on the 25th of July 1905, and further sittings were held on the 1st, 2nd and 8th of August, at the last of which the award was announced.

It is impossible in the space at our disposal to follow the course of the proceedings through the stages of Case, counter-Case and Argument: suffice it to say that the reserved attitude of France obliged Great Britain to assume the rôle of plaintiff, which she desired to avoid, and to define the French position, which the French case had been formulated with judicious vagueness in order to disguise. The British contentions were, in substance, (1) that, without the consent of the Sultân, 'Omâni subjects could not legitimately become the recipients of French flags and papers unless under some treaty between the Sultân and the French Government, and that no such treaty existed; (2) that under Article XXXII of the Brussels Act of 1890 France was debarred from granting flags and papers to Arabs unless they were either (a) French citizens or (b) French protégés in consequence of being subjects of States under French protection, and that the 'Omânis in question were neither of these; (3) that the withdrawal of 'Omâni subjects from the Sultân's jurisdiction by the conferment upon them, in opposition to the Sultân's wishes, of French flags and papers was a violation of the Sultân's independence and therefore contrary to the Declaration of 1862; (4) that the grant of the flags and papers, even if permissible, could not confer on the holders or on persons connected with them immunity in the territory or territorial waters of 'Omân from the Sultân's jurisdiction; (5) that in any case the right to possess such papers was personal and was not transmissible by inheritance; and (6) that papers and flags granted in respect of particular vessels could not be transferred by the holders to other vessels. The French on their part argued (1) that the conditions of citizenship in 'Omân were indefinite and unascertained; (2) that the status of the flag-holders in question was that of a migratory, sea-faring and polygamous community, whose connection with some of the French colonies was not weaker than their connection with 'Omân; and (3) that in its relations with European countries, 'Omân, as a Muhammadan power, was liable to be dealt with on the analogy of the Turkish Empire as subject to a "régime de capitulations:" they also protested against the far-reaching character of the British contentions and urged that existing usage should be respected. It is noteworthy that the French did

Proceedings
at the Hague,
1905.

not, in the case of a single one of the 26 boat-proprietors mentioned in the revised list which accompanied their counter-Case, attempt to establish by evidence a close connection with any French Colony. Arguments were adduced on both sides which the Tribunal deemed to be irrelevant from the judicial point of view; such were the British allegation that the slave trade was carried on freely under cover of French flags, granted in the manner complained of, and the French assertion that the Declaration of 1862 had been violated by Great Britain herself on various occasions.

Decision of
the Tribunal,
8th August
1905.

The Tribunal found that the situation was governed in the main by the Brussels Act of 1890, after its ratification in January 1892 by the French Government; and that the faculty of a European State to create protégés in 'Omān must be determined by the analogous case of Muhammadan principalities in the west which had agreements with Christian powers on that subject. By the award of the Tribunal it was accordingly decided, with reference to the legitimacy of the French pretensions :—

That before the 2nd of January 1892 France was entitled to authorise vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the Sultān of Masqat to fly the French flag, only bound by her own legislation and administrative rules ;

That owners of native vessels, who before 1892 had been authorised by France to fly the French flag should retain this authorisation as long as it was renewed by France to the grantee ; and

That after the 2nd of January 1892 France was not entitled to authorise vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the Sultān of Masqat to fly the French flag, except on condition that their owners or fitters-out had established or should establish that they had been considered and treated by France as her protégés before the year 1863 :—

and with regard to the effect, transmissibility and transference of the French flag :—

That vessels of 'Omān authorised as aforesaid to fly the French flag were entitled in the territorial waters of 'Omān to the inviolability provided by the Franco-'Omāni Treaty of November 17th, 1844 ;

That the authorisation to fly the French flag could not be transmitted or transferred to any other person or any other vessel, even if belonging to the same owner ; and

That subjects of the Sultān of 'Omān, who were owners or masters of vessels authorised to fly the French flag, or who were members of

the crews of such vessels or who belonged to the families of such owners or masters, did not enjoy in consequence of that fact any right of extritoriality which could exempt them from the sovereignty, especially from the jurisdiction, of His Highness the Sultān of 'Omān.

The award, it will be seen, was substantially in favour of the British claims on all important points, and it left little for subsequent determination except the number of individual vessels entitled to fly the French flag in accordance with the conditions laid down. It may be added here that, though the Sultān had authorised the British Government to present the case against France on his behalf as well as on their own, the French objected to the association of his name with that of the British Government, and the point was accordingly waived; consequently the Sultān was not a party to the case beyond the preliminary stages.

Major W. Grey, the British Consul at Masqat, and M. Laronce, the French Vice-Consul,—the latter of whom had been in Europe during the proceedings at the Hague,—were next instructed by their respective Governments to co-operate for the purpose of bringing the award of the Tribunal into effect. It was easily settled between them that a proclamation by the Sultān to his subjects would be the best means of making the terms of the award known in 'Omān; but, in regard to a list of persons entitled to possess the French flag, which they had been ordered to draw up in consultation with one another, they were unable to arrive at any agreement. In the view of M. Laronce the continued use of the French flag was permissible under the award in the case of 22 owners and 46 vessels; whereas, according to the information of Major Grey, the correct figures were only 14 and 18, respectively. Ultimately, on the 13th of August 1906, His Majesty's Government decided, as an act of friendship, to accept the list of the French Vice-Consul without further question and to concede the transference of the French flag from any vessel lost, sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of to another vessel of the same owner, provided only that the number of vessels authorised to fly the French flag should not be increased in the case of any owner. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government every 'Omāni subject under the French flag must on landing in 'Omān become liable to the jurisdiction of the Sultān, and crimes committed at sea under the French flag should not therefore be tried by the French Vice-Consul at Masqat; but no objection could be raised to the temporary landing of accused persons in such cases under the orders of the French Vice-Consul for the purpose of despatch before French courts elsewhere. His

Subsequent
proceedings
under the
award,
1905-06.

Majesty's Government were also of opinion that 'Omāni subjects should be made aware that they would be severely punished for infringements of the award, and that they were at liberty to renounce at any time the right of using the French flag. The French Government would be approached with reference to these matters, and would also be asked to keep the Sultān and the British Consul informed of transferances of the flag from one vessel to another, and to supply both these authorities annually with a list of the surviving flag-holders and remaining vessels.

Relations of the Sultān with Great Britain after 1899.

Improved situation.

After February 1899 the demeanour of the Sultān towards the British representative at Masqat greatly improved, and in the following month Saiyid Faisal paid his first friendly visit to Major Fagan at the British Political Agency; but for a time he continued to show suspicion and seemed to hope that the late action of the Government of India would be repudiated by Her Majesty's Government,—an idea in which he was probably encouraged by M. Ottavi. In the summer of 1899 Captain Cox was appointed Political Agent at Masqat, where, during the next four years, his able and sympathetic guidance of the Sultān was to produce the happiest results. In May 1900 the Sultān, though he declined to dismiss Muhammad-bin-'Azzān from the Wazirate, agreed to substitute for him, in dealings with the British Agency, the ex-minister Muhammad-bin-Sa'id, whose political sympathies were British.

Visit of Saiyid Taimūr to India, 1902-03.

The Sultān received a cordial invitation to attend the Coronation Darbār at Delhi on the 1st of January 1903 as a guest of the Government of India, or to send a deputation to represent him, in case he were unable to be present. Not venturing to absent himself from his kingdom for so long a period as would have been necessary, Saiyid Faisal sent his eldest son Taimūr in his stead, attended by Saiyid Yūsuf Zawāwi, one of His Highness's friends and advisers, and by Ahmad-bin-Nāsir, Governor of Matrah. Major Cox accompanied the deputation as Political Officer. Saiyid Taimūr was the bearer of valuable presents of Masqat gold work for His Majesty King Edward, which he delivered to the Viceroy; and at Masqat the Sultān honoured the day of the Darbār by firing a salute of 101 guns in honour of the King-Emperor and by paying, in person, an official visit of congratulation to the British

Agency. After the conclusion of the ceremonies at Delhi, Saiyid Taimūr spent a fortnight at Bombay and visited Poona, where he had a friendly meeting with his exiled grand-uncle, 'Abdul 'Azīz. Before returning to Masqat he was taken on a tour to Agra, Aligarh and Calcutta, and he did not reach home until after the middle of February 1903.

Lord Curzon's visit to Masqat, 1903.

Fresh proofs of international amity were interchanged at the state visit which Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, paid to Masqat in November 1903 in the course of his tour in the Persian Gulf: this visit, together with the ceremonials and festivities by which it was marked and the political declarations of which it was the occasion, is fully described in another place.* The Sultān, who had for some time previously entertained an idea of abdicating in favour of his son Taimūr, now placed himself in the hands of the Government of India and promised to be guided by their advice in the matter; and, after a Darbar held on board H.M.S. "Argonaut," he was formally invested by the Viceroy with the insignia of the G.C.I.E. In the course of the visit it appeared, from an ebullition on the part of Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Turki in the presence of the Viceroy, that His Highness's elder brother aspired to succeed to the Sultanate in case of a vacancy.

In February 1904 His Majesty's Government informed the Government of India that, in a general settlement of political questions which was then being negotiated with France, an effort would be made to secure French recognition of a British protectorate over 'Omān; but at the same time they enquired whether, if this were impossible, there were any smaller concession in 'Omān which they might endeavour to obtain. The reply of Lord Curzon was that, apart from the recognition of a British protectorate, or rather from the abrogation of the Declaration of 1862, no satisfactory solution of the 'Omān problem presented itself.

'Omān and the general political settlement between Great Britain and France, 1904.

After the crisis of 1899 the policy of financial support of the Sultan was continued by the Government of India in the shape of the "Zanzibar" subsidy and of special loans. The subsidy, in consequence of the Sultan's unsatisfactory behaviour, had been suspended with effect from the beginning of December 1898, and the question of its renewal was not raised until about ten months afterwards, when it was at length broached by the Sultān. At the end of September 1899 the liabilities of Saiyid Faisal to the British Government amounted to Rs. 90,000, of which Rs. 84,000 represented the balance of the indemnity of 1895, Rs. 36,000 the balance of the loan of 1897, and Rs. 20,000 overdue instalments of repayment of that loan. Arrears of the subsidy aggregated Rs. 72,000, but the Government of India considered that the Sultān, in strict right, had for-

Discharge by the Sultān of all his pecuniary liabilities to the Government of India, 1900.

* *Vide* Appendix P.

feited his claim to these. The punitive tax for the discharge of the indemnity was still in force ; but its proceeds, under a system of direct collection, were diminishing. The matter of the subsidy remained under discussion until the following year, when the Government of India eventually decided to permit the liquidation of all their claims from the accumulated arrears of the subsidy. In October 1900 this adjustment was made, and a small balance remaining was paid over to the Sultān.

Further
loans to the
Sultān, 1902,
1903 and
1904.

The freedom of Saiyid Sir Faisal from indebtedness to the Government of India was not, however, of long duration. In 1902 he received a loan of Rs. 1,61,956 for the purchase of a steam vessel required for his administration, and it was settled that the amount should be repaid out of the "Zanzibar" subsidy, by short drawals, at the rate of Rs. 3,000 a month. In 1903, in connection with dangers threatening his government from Rustāq, the Sultān obtained a cash advance of Rs. 20,000, repayable by deductions of Rs. 1,000 a month from the subsidy ; and in 1904 a further amount of Rs. 30,000 was lent him, upon similar terms of repayment, for the wedding expenses of his son Saiyid Taimūr : on the last of these occasions he gave an understanding not to borrow except from the British Government until his existing liabilities had been discharged. In August 1905 the debts of the Sultān to the Government of India still amounted to about Rs. 1,00,000, and his debts to private creditors in his own dominions reached a similar figure. In September 1905 the Sultān applied for a fresh loan of Rs. 20,000, in order to enable some members of his family to perform the Hajj ; but, while the request was under consideration, he obtained from private creditors the sum that he required and so committed, as he was afterwards reminded, a technical breach of his obligation not to borrow except from the British Government. The decision of the Hague Tribunal in the French flag case had by this time made it possible to take a firmer line with the Sultān in matters of finance. The Government of India were no longer inclined to grant him petty loans for miscellaneous purposes ; but they were of opinion that a substantial loan might be permissible, in consideration of a suitable *quid pro quo*. Negotiations for a fresh advance to the Sultān were about to be commenced on two conditions—that the Sultān should borrow a trained Customs official from the Government of India for the management of his customs and that any loan granted should be part of a general scheme for the reform of his finances—when, in December 1905, on the advice of His Majesty's Government, action was suspended until the proceedings arising out of the award of the Hague Tribunal should have been

satisfactorily concluded. At the end of September 1906 the debt of the Sultān to the Government of India had been reduced to Rs. 45,791.

The control of the Sultān's customs through a British official for the purpose of rendering the management more efficient had been discussed, as we have seen before, so early as 1897. After 1899 it became definitely an article in the policy of the Indian Government. In 1904 a scheme was proposed under which the object might be attained with the assistance of the Imperial Bank of Persia, who would be asked to open a branch at Masqat ; but before it had been communicated to the Sultān it was laid aside in favour of another, of which the essential features were that the Sultān should appoint a nominee of the Government of India to be head of his customs, that differences between the Sultān and this official should be settled by the arbitration of the Political Agent, and that on these conditions the Government of India should guarantee to the Sultān a minimum monthly customs revenue of \$20,000. The Secretary of State for India, however, to whom these last suggestions were submitted in February 1905, while he approved of the first, questioned the admissibility of the second and third points ; and, as has already been explained, the proceedings following the award in the French flag case soon after necessitated the postponement of the matter. The reluctance of the Sultān to agree to a change in the management of his customs appeared to be due to more than one cause ; he feared that it might incapacitate him to draw in advance, as he was accustomed to do, on the farmer or superintendent of customs ; he expected it to result in the abolition of various personal and tribal exemptions which he was anxious to maintain ; and, after 1900 at least, he was deterred by French reports, echoed in the Arabic press, that the customs and with them the whole government of Masqat were about to come under British domination.

British control of the Sultān's customs sought but not obtained.

In April 1899 bubonic plague appeared at Masqat and Matrah, and the question of the sanitary supervision and control of those ports arose. The attitude of Saiyid Faisal in the matter was at first obstructive ; but, as the influence of the French Vice-Consul over him declined and his confidence in his British advisers increased, he no longer sought to dispense with British assistance. With effect from the 1st of October 1900, the approval of the Government of India having been previously obtained, he placed the Surgeon of the British Agency at Masqat in charge of his whole sanitary administration and staff and at the same time appointed him private physician to himself and to his family. The observance of the Sultān's quarantine regulations was

British Sanitary control of the port of Masqat established, 1900.

made obligatory on British subjects and British protected persons by a notification issued by the British Consul at Masqat on the 6th of July 1903. The Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation deals fully with these and allied matters.

Telegraph service inaugurated at Masqat, 1901.

In the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf will be found an explanation of the circumstances in which, in November 1901, 'Omān was brought into telegraphic communication with the outside world by means of a cable laid from Jāshk to Masqat.

Protection of British subjects in 'Omān from 1899 to the present time.

After 1899, in consequence of the generally quiet state of the country, the protection of British subjects in 'Omān and the punishment of offences against them demanded, but for one case of exceptional gravity, comparatively little attention. Tribal raids of the ordinary type, however, continued.

Case at Quryāt, 1899.

The Sultān, being unable to recover compensation from the tribesmen, made good out of his own pocket the losses, amounting to nearly \$1,200, of four British traders of Quryāt, whose goods were carried off in the plunder of the Quryāt bazaar in June 1899 by a gang from Sharqīyah under Hamad, a son of the late Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Ali.

"Baron Inverdale" case, 1904.

The most serious case of the period arose from the loss of a British ship upon the southern coast of Arabia, where the people are wild and uncivilised, and where the treatment of shipwrecked crews has always been a matter of grave uncertainty. On the 2nd of August 1903 a French merchant ship, the "Amiral Gueydon," having caught fire by an explosion, was beached at Rās Hāsik. The crew and passengers, 56 persons in all, were protected by the Sultān's representative in Dhufār and by the Shaikh of Murbāt until the end of the monsoon, and were then despatched in native boats to Masqat; but upon the way there, in the neighbourhood of Rās Madrakah, they were picked up at sea by the Russian steamer "Trouvor." Exactly a year later, on the 2nd of August 1904, the "Baron Inverdale" of Ardrossan, a steamer with a registered tonnage of 2,140, having 31 souls—mostly British—on board, struck Jibliyah, an island of the Kuria Muria group, with more tragic consequences. Eight Greek sailors preferred to remain on the wreck and were taken off it a fortnight later by the British steamer "Prome," but the rest of the company left the ship on the 6th of August in two life-boats, intending to make for the mainland. The smaller of the boats, which must have contained six persons, was never heard of again; the other, after passing up the Masīrah channel, seems to have been driven about the middle of August upon the north end of Masīrah Island, where the 17 occupant were cruelly massacred by Arabs for the sake of their property. On

rumours of the occurrence reaching Masqat, Saiyid Sir Faisal and Major Grey, the Political Agent at Masqat, went to Masīrah Island, where they remained from the 10th to the 18th of September, but could discover no evidences of the atrocity; and before this the R.I.M.S. "Dalhousie" from Aden had visited the wreck, and H.M.S. "Lapwing" had made the tour of Masīrah Island, without discovering any clue to the fate of the missing men. At the end of September the Sultān again left for Masīrah, this time alone, and in less than a fortnight returned to Masqat having discovered all the particulars of the crime and arrested 10 of the murderers, members of the Jannabah and Āl Bū 'Īsa tribes, one of whom threw himself overboard on the voyage to Masqat. Twelve of the principal persons of Dawwah and Unam Rasās, who had assisted in concealing the affair, were also brought back by him in custody. The proofs of guilt—which included some relics of the ill-fated party—having been found sufficient, the captured murderers were sentenced to death by the Sultān; and, in accordance with the procedure of 'Omāni criminal justice, they were then conveyed back to the scene of the massacre. Here they were shot by the Sultān's 'Askaris and buried, without the rites of their religion, in the presence of Saiyid Taimūr, of Major Grey, and of a party of seamen from H.M.S. "Merlin." The small hamlet of Jidūfah at Rās Half, the nearest village to the scene of the massacre, was destroyed by fire, and a monument in masonry of the punishment of the murderers was erected upon a rock, while over the grave of the victims a slab was placed and the burial service read. Some of the ordinary prisoners, or rather hostages, were kept in confinement at Masqat until January 1906, and were then released as they were suffering in health; in the meantime it had become evident that the capture of the remaining offenders and the recovery of pecuniary compensation for the outrage could not be achieved, either by the continued detention of the hostages or by any other means.

No serious difficulty occurred, during the period now under consideration, in connection with questions of British rights under treaty in 'Omān. In 1900 there was a slight difference of opinion between the Sultān and the Political Agent regarding the precise interpretation of the clause of the Commercial Treaty of 1891 that relates to transshipment. The Sultān was at first disposed to contend that exemption from duty could not be claimed on account of goods landed at Masqat unless they were declared in the manifest or bill-of-lading to be for transshipment or re-exportation; while the Government of India were constrained to admit that, in a strictly legal sense, goods consigned to agents at Masqat with

Interpreta-
tion of the
Commercial
Treaty of
1891.

discretion as to disposal must be held to have reached their "port of destination" on arrival at Masqat. In the end, however, the Sultān was induced, in the interests of trade, to place a liberal construction upon the article; and he explained that he had been driven to take up his original position by the dishonesty of the merchants, who, in the absence of a bonded warehouse, had been allowed to keep goods duty-free upon their own premises pending re-exportation.

**Preparations
for revision
of the same.**

In 1903 the Government of India began to consider the question of a revision of the Commercial Treaty of 1891, which had now by lapse of time become terminable. Proceedings were delayed for two years by the French flag case; but at length, in November 1905, the Secretary of State authorised the Government of India to proceed with the negotiation of the new Treaty, the proposed terms of which he at the same time approved. The modifications desired were of minor importance.

**Internal
taxes in
relation to
British com-
mercial
interests.**

In the date season of 1903 a complaint that the Sultān was proposing to enhance the Zakāt or agricultural tax on dates, which then stood at 1 per cent., led to some peculiar discoveries. It now appeared that, whereas the export duty of 5 per cent. on dates had been agreed to by the Government of India, whose consent was by treaty indispensable, as a substitute for Zakāt where the latter was not recoverable, the Sultān's practice was to levy both export duty and Zakāt in such places as he found it practicable. Thus, while Zakāt was unknown at Sūr, it was collected in the Sohār Wilāyat and at some date-growing ports in Bātinah in addition to export duty. The Government of India insisted that, if the rate of Zakāt were increased, the tax should be collected direct in the interior, and not at the coast by means of what was virtually an enhancement of export duty.

**Restrictions
on the liquor
trade.**

In 1904 the Sultān, with the consent of the British, French and American consular representatives, prohibited the retail sale of intoxicating liquors by his subjects; and a similar restriction was imposed on British subjects by a consular notification dated the 7th of June 1904.

British explorations and enterprises in 'Omān after 1899.

**Journeys of
British
officers.**

In consequence of the quieter state of the country and the more favourable disposition of the Sultān, inland tours of exploration in 'Omān once more became, after 1900, possible to the British Political Agent: none of importance had been undertaken since those made by Colonel Miles during the reign of Turki,

In 1901, with the permission of the Sultān and under the instructions of the Government of India, an expedition was organised for the examination of some coal measures which were reported to exist in the hinterland of Sūr. The first attempt, made by Captain Cox and Dr. von Krafft, a geologist of the Government of India, from Kalhāt as starting point, was baffled by the behaviour of the Mashārifah and other tribes, on whose credulity M. Ottavi, his assistant 'Abdul 'Azīz, the family of Shaikh Salih-bin-'Ali, Hārithi, and Hilāl-bin-'Amr and Mohsin-bin-'Amr of the Hirth had worked with effect ; for, although the party, not without long delay and after being ambuscaded and fired at *en route*, succeeded in reaching the spot, which lay at the head of Wādī Falaij 20 miles inland from Sūr, their examination of it in the circumstances was necessarily so hasty as to be of little value. The Sultān, who had done his utmost to facilitate the work and had even proceeded for the purpose to Sūr and sent his son Saiyid Taimūr to join the party, subsequently made arrangements for a second expedition, which in November 1901 was carried out by Captain Cox, accompanied on this occasion by Dr. Oldham as geologist and by Captain Dowding of the Essex Regiment as an Intelligence Officer. A thorough exploration of the neighbourhood showed that the coal, though of excellent quality, existed in small quantity only, and that there was no prospect of mining operations being undertaken with profit ; as a precaution, however, an engagement* was obtained from the Sultān in 1902, that he would not grant a concession for working the field to any foreign government or company until an opportunity had been given to the British Government of undertaking the work in conjunction with the Sultān himself.

Captains Cox and Dowding, on their return journey, landed at Daghamar and thence returned to Masqat by a circular overland route *viā* Wādī Tāyin and Wādī Samāil ; they met with no obstruction or incivility except at the one small village of 'Aqdah, where the inhabitants at first barred the way, gun in hand with lighted match.

In the summer of 1902, Major Cox was able to carry out, unaccompanied by any European, a journey by land from Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān to Masqat. This was the longest tour ever made by a British officer in 'Omān ; it was entirely successful ; and a large amount of valuable information regarding the districts of Baraimi, Dhāhirah and 'Omān Proper was gleaned by Major Cox on the way.

During recent years various additions have been made by the Government of India to their material assets and staff at Masqat. In 1901,

Acquisition
of land and
erection of
quarters.

* The text of this undertaking will be found in Annexure No. 5 to this chapter.

in addition to other smaller purchases, a large plot of land on the sea-front, extending from the British Political Agency to the Sultān's customs house, was acquired from Ratansi Parshotam, an Indian merchant, at a cost of Rs. 50,000; and a house was erected thereon for the Agency Surgeon, besides quarters for the telegraph establishment and the Agency clerks. While Dr. Jayakar was Agency Surgeon, for 23 years ending in 1900, he had resided in a house of his own at Matrah; and before 1901 there were no telegraph officials, and the political clerks had been accustomed to find accommodation as best they could in the native town.

Dispensary.

From 1900 onwards efforts were made at intervals by various Political Agents and Agency Surgeons to obtain, entirely for the benefit of Arab and other native patients, an improvement of the buildings and equipment of the dispensary attached to the British Agency; but, though the Government of India in 1902 added a compounder to the staff at their own expense, the Sultān and native community gave little assistance, and Government, in view of their apathy, took no further steps.

Harbour improvements.

Besides the above, some expenditure was incurred by the Government of India in efforts to improve the harbour at Masqat, and especially the facilities for landing or communicating with the shore in bad weather. In 1903 a sum of Rs. 3,000 was granted for the commencement of an experimental coal jetty in the Makallah cove, and a further amount of over Rs. 8,000 was subsequently allotted for the purpose of carrying on the work. A scheme for a breakwater on the east side of the harbour near its head and another for a pier opposite to the British Political Agency were also discussed; but in 1904 it was decided in the first place to try whether the case could not be met by deepening the Duwairah channel, so as to provide a new and sheltered entrance to the harbour, and money was allotted for the work.

Internal history of 'Omān after 1899.

The narrative of recent internal affairs in 'Omān has been postponed to the end because of the much greater importance, during the time in question, of the Anglo-French contest, which for a long time absorbed the Sultān's attention and sometimes, even in domestic questions, restricted his freedom of action very considerably.

The period, we may observe, opened with a severe visitation of the country in 1899 by the three epidemic diseases of plague, small-pox and cholera, the melancholy results of which are described in the special Visitations
of epidemic
disease, 1899.
Appendix on sanitary matters.

In politics the two chief centres of interest since 1899 have been Sūr and the Rustāq valley.

Sūr, a town never submissive to the authority of the Sultāns of 'Omān, had been hitherto neglected by Saiyid Faisal, who did not once visit it during the first twelve years of his reign. In 1898, as has been mentioned before, the inhabitants expelled the Sultān's garrison by force but allowed it to be replaced on sufferance. By 1900 the people of Sūr, especially those of the Jannabah tribe, had almost ceased, under French encouragement, to regard the Sultān as their master. Affairs at
Sūr.

In May 1900 Hilāl-bin-'Amr arrived at Sūr from East Africa, joined hands with M. Ottavi, and began to inveigh against the Sultān and the British; and the spirit of the Jannabah was now such that, when summoned by the Sultān to meet him at Masqat, they refused to go and insolently suggested that he should deal with them instead through the French Vice-Consul. It was this state of matters which obliged Saiyid Faisal in June 1900 to make a visit to Sūr, the first since his accession. His reception was more favourable than he had expected; for all the elders of the town immediately paid their respects to him, the chief Shaikh of the Bani Bū 'Ali came down from the interior with a thousand men to do him honour, and, as already related, the Sultān was successful before he left in obtaining from the French flag-holders of the port, including the Jannabah, a formal profession of allegiance to himself and a renunciation of French protection. 1900.

In June 1901 the Sultān sent 80 Wahhābi 'Askaris to garrison his post at Sūr, and the French flag-holders, few of whom had observed their promise given in the previous year, understanding the act as a threat to themselves, asked M. Ottavi whether he would protect them in case of an attack by the Sultān's troops; his reply was unfavourable, and the incident marked another stage in the decline of French influence at Sūr. In the autumn of 1901 Saiyid Faisal paid a second visit to Sūr and was anxious, for fiscal and administrative purposes, to enclose the town by a wall on the landward side. Difficulties as to labour and material caused him to desist from this project; but, before he left Sūr, he had carried into execution an older and less ambitious scheme—that which had helped to provoke the local rebellion of 1898—by erecting blockhouses between Sūr and Bilād-as-Sūr to command the caravan routes to the interior. 1901.

1902.

In 1902, as related in another place* the town of Sūr was plunged into mourning by the capture *in flagrante delicto* of a large number of Sūri slave traders by the Portuguese in East Africa. The Sultān, at Lord Curzon's visit to Masqat in 1903, begged that British influence might be used to obtain a mitigation of the sentences passed on these men by the Portuguese courts,—in most cases imprisonment for 25 years; but he was given to understand that his request could not be granted.

1903.

In the spring of 1903, the ordinary annual hostilities between the Ghāfiris and Hināwis of Sharqīyah being then in progress, 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, the Tamīmah of the Bani Bū 'Ali, found reason to suspect that the people of Sūr, though Ghāfiris, were supplying his enemies with the sinews of war. He accordingly marched down to the coast and declared the harbour blockaded until his demands for satisfaction should have been satisfied; and this, as we may mention in passing, was the occasion of a vessel flying the French flag being fired on by his adherents,—an occurrence which in its turn led to an unsuccessful claim for compensation by the French Vice-Consul upon the Sultān and so indirectly contributed to bring about the settlement of the whole French flag question. After 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim had returned to the interior, relations between his supporters in the 'Aiqā quarter and his opponents in Muqraimatain became so strained that, when Major Cox arrived there in August, he found the two factions on the point of opening fire upon each other across the intervening creek. The Political Agent, having obtained a truce of 48 hours, returned at once to Masqat and informed the Sultān, who immediately proceeded to the spot in his vessel the "Nūr-al-Bahr." The Jannabah would not at once submit to his mediation, and, before the proceedings had commenced in earnest, the Sultān was called away by serious news from Rustāq; nevertheless his visit averted actual fighting for the moment, and the dispute was adjusted, not long after, by neutral Shaikhs of the neighbourhood.

Affairs in
the Rustāq
Valley.

The situation in Rustāq, which was the cause of the Sultān's premature departure from Sūr, arose from a coalition between the Mutawwa' or puritanical party of the Sharqīyah District and the Sultān's rivals belonging to the 'Azzān branch of his own family. We left Sa'ūd-bin-'Azzān in possession of Rustāq in 1898, after the expulsion of Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhīm; but he did not long enjoy his acquisition, for in March 1899 he was murdered by his brother Hamūd-bin-'Azzān, who then succeeded him.

Meanwhile the Sharqīyah rebels had never been entirely quiescent. In May 1899 a Shaikh of the Bani Rāsib of Sharqīyah, at an interview

* *Vide* Appendix L.

with the British Political Agent at Masqat, had endeavoured to sound him as to the probable attitude of the British Government in case of a fresh rising against the Sultān. In April 1900 there were short-lived rumours of an attack on Masqat, to be attempted by the tribes of Sharqīyah as a protest against the indemnity export tax still levied upon Hināwi produce; and the Sultān considered it advisable to strengthen Quryāt and Sīb, while Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhīm of Hazam moved to his assistance with 300 men. A little later 'Īsa-bin-Sālih, Hārithi, with his brother Hamad actually visited Wādī Samāil, but his intrigues there met with no success and the Sultān refused him permission to visit Masqat; 'Īsa, it should be explained, was a dignified, ascetic and bigoted character, on whom in this respect the mantle of his father Shaikh Sālih-bin-'Alī had fallen, while his younger brothers 'Alī and Ahmad (or Hamad) were mere commonplace marauders. In 1901 the family of Shaikh Sālih, as mentioned in an earlier paragraph, had a share in obstructing the first expedition which went, under the auspices of the Sultān, to examine the coal deposits in the hinterland of Sūr; and in the same year the Sultān received from 'Īsa-bin-Sālih a threatening letter relating to the manumission of slaves, in which the hand of Hilāl-bin-'Amr was thought to be traceable.

After this the Sharqīyah malcontents did not again come into 1903. prominence until August 1903, when, during the visit of Saiyid Faisal to Sūr, news was received that 'Īsa-bin-Sālih and his two brothers with a considerable following were on their way to Western Hajar to seize Hazam and Rustāq. Hazam was at this time still in the possession of Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhīm, whose sister the Sultān had married in 1898, and Rustāq was held by the fratricide Hamūd-bin-'Azzān. With both of these Paisal was outwardly on good terms; but they were practically independent of him, and they were at feud with one another. The Sultān, on receiving intelligence of 'Īsa's movements, returned to Masqat and despatched Saiyid Taimūr and Sulaimān-bin-Suwallim by water to Sīb to bar the passage of the rebels towards Rustāq; but the 'Aqq pass had been at once thrown open to them by its treacherous custodians, and, before the Sultān's troops could arrive at Fanjah, the rebels had crossed their front and were beyond reach of pursuit. The Sultān himself then proceeded to Masna'ah and put the loyalty of Sa'id to the test by inviting him to a conference; but the latter declined the invitation and instead made his way to Rustāq, where he joined 'Īsa-bin-Sālih and Hamūd-bin-'Azzān.

The intention of 'Īsa, who aimed at power and knew that he could not compete for the Sultanate in his own person, was apparently to revive

the obsolete dignity of the Imamate, to confer it upon Sa'id, and then to govern in his name; this was the policy which his father Sālih and the Khalili had pursued with some success at the beginning of the reign of 'Azzān-bin-Qais. Hamūd was easily persuaded to give up Rustāq in favour of Sa'id; but the garrison of the fort, who belonged to the Bani Ruwāhah tribe, persisted, until sufficient inducements were offered them, in their refusal to deliver it up.

Meanwhile Saiyid Faisal had sent Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim with 150 men to strengthen 'Awābi, his outpost in the direction of Rustāq, and had placed Saiyid Taimūr in garrison at Masna'ah, under the walls of which place there grew up a large camp of professed friendly Shaikhs and their followers, maintained in idleness by the Sultān's bounty. Saiyid Taimūr at one time proposed to make a dash on Hazam; but the Yāl Sa'ad, who dreaded falling under the exclusive power of the Sultān, frustrated his scheme by sending a warning to the garrison.

H.M.S. "Sphinx," sometimes carrying Major Cox, from time to time visited different places on the coast, and courteous letters promising protection to British subjects were received by the Political Agent from 'Isa and Sa'id; consequently there was no panic among the Indian traders of Bātinah, and, though some of them sent their valuables to Masqat for safe custody, they themselves remained in the towns and villages where they were established in trade. Only one serious raid by the adherents of 'Isa-bin-Sālih occurred; it was committed on the outskirts of Barkah by 'Isa's younger brothers, and the chief sufferers were the family of the Sultān's stable manager there, one of whose sons was killed. Some of the Sultān's horses, carried off on this occasion, were returned by 'Isa when he learned to whom they belonged.

The claims of Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhīm to the Imamate aroused no popular enthusiasm; and in October the Sultān found himself in a position to disband the greater part of his expensive levy, while Sa'id humbly solicited the renewal of an allowance which he had been accustomed to receive from Saiyid Faisal. 'Isa-bin-Sālih and his men, whose own country in Sharqiyah was at this time suffering from drought and who, while at Rustāq, lived upon the inhabitants, lingered there until February 1904; but their presence did not, after October 1903, occasion any disquietude. In 1905 'Isa made overtures for a reconciliation with the Sultān, and they were favourably received; but, as the Shaikh declined to visit Masqat without an escort which the Sultān considered excessive, no personal interview could be arranged.

In various other quarters besides Sūr and Rustāq events took place which were of some general importance to the government of 'Omān.

Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, as Wālī of Sohār, engaged in 1901 in an attempt to wrest the fort of Bait-al-'Ainain in Dhāhirah from the Miyāyihah; but the expedition, though helped by the Bani Kalbān, suffered heavy loss and ultimately returned under orders from the Sultān. In 1904 'Arāqi in Dhāhirah was secured for the Sultān. In 1905, with the aid of his former allies the Bani Kalbān, Sulaimān made successful reprisals on the Maqābil, who had been giving trouble in the neighbourhood and in July had even attacked the Sohār fort, killing the 'Aqīd. Apparently on this occasion, one of their forts in Wādī-al-Hilti was taken by Saiyid Sir Faisal's representative.

Expeditions
by the Sul-
tān's Wālī of
Sohār, 1901-
05.

In 1900 a standing menace to the peace of the country was removed by the submission of Shaikh Khalfān-bin-Thinaiyān, who, after heading a rebellion at Nakhl in 1897, had evaded arrest by the Wālī of Barkah, then sent against him; this individual, having become friendless and homeless, now took sanctuary in the Sultān's palace at Masqat and received a free pardon.

At 'Awābi a dispute about Zakāt arose in 1900 between Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhīm and the 'Abriyīn; the former, to enforce his claims, cut off the irrigation of the date groves of the 'Abriyīn, whereupon the tribesmen besieged and captured the fort. The Sultān then intervened, and, rejecting an offer of the 'Abriyīn to hold the place in his name, established in it instead a detachment of his own Wāhhābis. In April 1902 two of the Wāhhābi garrison were murdered by villagers; but the Sultān, having gone in person to the spot, succeeded in capturing one of the murderers and subsequently caused him to be executed at Masqat.

Recovery by
the Sultān of
'Awābi, 1900.

Wādī Ma'āwal becamē in 1901 the scene of serious disturbances between the Bani Ruwāhah and the Bani Riyām, and, as often as the Sultān composed the feud, it broke out afresh. The last deputation sent by the Sultān took with them, as Khafir, an aged and respected Qādhi of Barkah; but the party were ambushed at the entrance of Wādī Ma'āwal, and the Qādhi himself was killed by the first volley. This melancholy incident, which must have been undesigned, apparently brought about a natural cessation of hostilities.

Disturbances
in Wādī
Ma'āwal,
1901.

At Sib, at the beginning of 1902, much annoyance was caused to the other inhabitants by some of the 'Awāmir, Aulād Hadīd and others, who, being at feud among themselves, kept up a constant long-range rifle-fire

Destruction
of tribal
towers by the
Sultān at
Sib, 1902.

upon each other from the towers in their several quarters; but in April the Sultān, during a visit to the place, ordered the towers to be demolished, which was done, almost without resistance, according to his directions.

Danger to
the Sultān's
rule at
Nizwa, 1902,
and Izki,
1905-06.

In October 1902 a serious fracas occurred between the Sultān's garrison at Nizwa and a party of Jannabah in the town; a guard sent by the Wālī to arrest the Jannabah, whom the Wālī suspected of a design against his life, met with resistance and used their rifles, killing four of the Jannabah; but the Sultān was able to pacify the tribe, and his position at Nizwa, which is not in the Jannabah country, was in no way weakened. Izki in 1905-06 was in some danger from the Bani Riyām, who revolted and laid siege to the place; but it was relieved in good time by the despatch of a force, composed partly of Bani Ruwāhah, under Wālī Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim. This success, however, led indirectly to the death of the Wālī, who in February 1907 was murdered by the Siyābiyin in Wādī-al-'Aqq, in retaliation for the confiscation by him of a caravan that the Siyābiyin had attempted to send to the Bani Riyām.

Tribal fighting
in
Ja'atān, 1904.

Ja'alān continued to be as usual the scene of bitter feuds, and in 1904 a severe conflict, in which 20 or 30 men were killed, took place towards the western end of the district between a party of Bani Bū 'Alī and another of Āl Wahibah. Among the slain was a son of 'Abdullah-bin-Sālim, the Tamīmah of the Bani Bū 'Alī, and in revenge for his death a Shaikh of the Āl Wahibah was murdered near Masqat a few months later.

Saiyid Faisal's administration, 1899-1907.

It now only remains to notice the character, in its domestic and personal aspects, of the Sultān's government after the crisis of 1899. In every respect except finance there was considerable improvement, and the Sultān's general political position became better than it ever had been in the past.

Customs
brought
under direct
management,
1899.

To take the unsatisfactory department of finance first, we may observe that the administration of the Sultān's customs, which are the chief source of his revenue, remained inefficient, though it was to some extent reformed. The Sultān, as already mentioned, repeatedly declined the proffer by the Government of India of a trained official to reform the methods of the department; but their advice was not altogether without effect upon his mind. At the end of 1899 the Sultān abolished

the vicious system of farming the customs, and, by the instrumentality of two Indian Muhammadans with experience of customs work, whom he had obtained on his own account from Bombay, introduced in its place a system of direct management. The customs receipts rose in the first year to \$206,701, of which nearly \$190,000 was net revenue, as against a maximum farm in preceding years of \$170,000, and in 1902-03 they reached the high figure of \$285,597 ; but the increase in the returns was partly counterbalanced by a continued decline in the value of the dollar. In 1901-02 the ports of Suwaiq, Masna'ah, Barkah and Sūr were taken under direct management, and in 1903 the same system was extended to Gwādar ; owing to the French flag difficulty at Sūr, however, there was not at first any improvement in the receipts at that place. Under the new régime the customs premises at Masqat, especially the wharf, office, and warehouses for goods, were very greatly improved. Lord Curzon, on his visit to Masqat in 1903, strongly advised the Sultān to employ a financial expert or a competent committee to audit his customs accounts ; but this salutary counsel was disregarded, at least until the Sultān's system had produced its natural results. In 1905 the Sultān quarrelled with Muhammad Ibrāhīm, his Indian superintendent of customs, whose accounts he distrusted but could not in the absence of independent clerks disprove, and dismissed him, replacing him by another Indian. Damodar Dharamsi, a Hindu merchant of Masqat, was at the same time appointed supervisor of the customs accounts on a salary of Rs. 100 a month,—an arrangement which, it was feared by the British Political Agent, would afford no better guarantee than before against fraud, and might prove to be the precursor of a return to the farming system. It was at least clear that, so long as the Sultān continued to prefer loose and irregular methods, and to borrow through his customs superintendent from merchants who were expecting consignments of dutiable goods, no real improvement could be expected. An analysis of the customs and other revenue of the 'Omān Sultanate will be found in the general article relating to it in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer.

In his financial difficulties the Sultān sometimes had recourse to confiscations, and in 1899 he obtained by this means an estate worth \$25,000, left by a Balūchi who had been murdered at Sīb. The Sultān's liabilities of all sorts, as shown already in connection with British policy, amounted in 1905 to about Rs. 200,000 ; and, though the proportion (about half) then due to the British Government had by the end of 1906 been mostly discharged, it was thought that not much progress had been made in paying off the remainder. Indeed in 1906 the Sultān was

Sultān's financial position.

reported to be borrowing small sums from all and sundry ; and, though in April he had refused a loan of \$20,000, which was offered him free of political conditions by the British Government, he was stated in September to have incurred liabilities in other quarters to the amount of \$120,000.

Currency.

The question of currency is one which, since 1894, has given a certain amount of trouble at Masqat. On the closing of the Indian mints there set in a serious drain of Indian rupees and copper pice towards India. The value of the dollar, which is the principal coin of the country and the only monetary standard in the interior, also began to decline by rapid and irregular stages, and by March 1894 had fallen to 108 pice, whereas until 1893 it stood at 136 to 140. The scarcity of pice, which was a cause of great hardship to the poorer classes, was remedied at first by a supply of copper coin which the Sultān caused to be struck for him in England, and later by the foundation of a mint for copper coin at Masqat itself. The fluctuation of the silver exchange was a more serious evil ; and the deputation of merchants under British protection, who waited on Lord Curzon during his visit to Masqat in November 1903, requested that steps for dealing with it might be considered by the Government of India. In 1904 a scheme for the universal and exclusive adoption of the Indian currency in 'Omān was prepared by the Government of India ; but, on account of the more important question of customs management, which is still pending, it has not yet been mentioned to the Sultān or discussed with him.

Military and naval resources of the Sultān.

The military resources of Saiyid Sir Faisal are described in the geographical volume of this Gazetteer : they are probably sufficient for the defence of his actual possessions against any ordinary attack which might be made upon them. The "Nūr-al-Bahr," a steam-vessel of 300 tons, purchased in 1902 with the assistance of the Government of India and brought into use in June 1903, replaced the Sultān in the position which he lost at the beginning of his reign through dispensing with his father's steam-vessels the "Dār-as-Salam" and "Sultāni" ; and it enabled him, in particular, to re-assert his authority at Sūr and to increase it at all places on the Bātinah coast. When Saiyid Taimūr visited India in 1903, two guns for his father were presented to him by the Viceroy to be mounted upon this vessel.

General administrative position of the Sultān.

The extent and effectiveness of the Sultān's administration in 'Omān in recent times are discussed in the geographical portion of this Gazetteer ; and from the facts there given, and from the events related in the paragraph on internal history above, it will be apparent that the influence of the Sultān in 'Omān has latterly become both stronger and

further-reaching than at any previous period in the reign of Saiyid Faisal himself or, perhaps, it might be added in the reign of his father Saiyid Turki. After 1900 the Sultān showed more energy than before in touring and in the general work of government; and, as in the case of his father and grand-father, his judgment gained in balance and his character in weight and sobriety with the lapse of years. Like Saiyid Turki, however, Saiyid Faisal was subject to fits of despondency; and in 1903 before the Viceroy's visit, and once again later, he was so harrassed by the cares of state as to talk seriously of abdication. The assassination of Sulaimān-bin-Suwallim in 1907 was a severe blow to the Sultān, and the first news of that event was received by him with consternation.

From the dynastic point of view the situation in 'Omān was not unsatisfactory. In 1903 Muhammad, the elder brother of Saiyid Sir Faisal, in whose favour he was passed over in 1888, showed that he entertained hopes of the succession in case the Sultān should predecease him or resign; but he had no following, and his ambitious ideas were discouraged by the British representatives from the first moment of their appearance. Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, the uncle of the present Sultān, died at Bombay in April 1907, and his heirs were so little formidable to Saiyid Sir Faisal and his family that their return to Masqat was permitted without hesitation. Since 1903 it had been clear that the Rustāq branch of the Āl Bū Sa'idi family equally did not possess any strong member likely to become a dangerous competitor for the throne of 'Omān; and interest therefore centred chiefly in Saiyid Taimūr, the eldest surviving son of the Sultān, who had always been treated as heir-apparent. Saiyidah 'Alaiyah, the mother of Taimūr, was a daughter of the former Sultān Thuwaini-bin-Sa'id, and the pedigree of the youth was thus unexceptionable upon the maternal side. Saiyid Taimūr may be considered to have entered on public life in 1901 at the age of 16, when on returning from a tour in the interior he was received by his father with a salute of 13 guns and on the following day paid a visit alone to the British Political Agent. In December 1904 he was married to a daughter of 'Ali-bin-Sālim-bin-Thuwaini,* a second cousin once removed of his own; a complimentary

Dynastic
matters.

* 'Ali-bin-Sālim first arrived in 1898 from Zanzibar, whence he had been expelled for political intrigues, and lived at Masqat for some years upon the bounty of the Sultān; eventually, in the beginning of 1904, the Government of Zanzibar, in consequence of a request made by Saiyid Faisal to Lord Curzon during the visit of the latter to Masqat in 1903, agreed to permit his return to East Africa. 'Ali-bin-Sālim, however, shortly sought leave to go back to Masqat, and it was granted him in September 1904.

visit was paid him on this occasion by Major Grey, who presented him with a silver tea and coffee service and the congratulations of the Government of India.

In 1905 the character of Saiyid Taimūr was as yet impressionable and unformed, and in that year some anxiety was caused by his discovering ultrareligious tendencies, adopting Mutawwa' habits, and engaging in a friendly correspondence with some of the fanatics in the Sharqīyah district, such as 'Īsa-bin-Sālih, who might, it was feared, estrange him from his father. The matter, however, received attention from Saiyid Sir Faisal, from Major Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and from Major Grey, Political Agent at Masqat ; and, after a wish on the part of Saiyid Taimūr to go on pilgrimage to Makkah had been disappointed, he showed no further symptoms of bigotry. The only son of the Sultān besides Taimūr who had up to 1907 been employed in any public capacity was Nādir, who was the child of a different mother.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—HISTORY OF DHUFĀR.*

Dhufār, though a dependency of 'Omān, is so remote and self-contained a district that its affairs can scarcely be said to form part of the general history of the Sultanate. It will, therefore, be convenient to treat of them separately.

Early History.

Of events in Dhufār before the beginning of the 19th century little is known with certainty.† The ruins of Bilād and Rubāt attest the existence in Dhufār, at some past epoch, of a community more civilised than the present inhabitants; and the elaborately carved tombstone of Mālik Ibrāhīm-bin-Mudhaffar at Rubāt bears the date 710 A. H., and is therefore more than 500 years old. It was stated in 1883 by Saiyid Turki, Sultān of 'Omān, in a correspondence with the Sharif of Makkah, that the district was once held by the Portuguese and that after their day it passed into the possession of the Ya'arabi Imāms of 'Omān; but these statements rest, perhaps, on no better foundation than Arab tradition.

Reign of Muhammad-bin-'Aqīl, about 1804 to 1829.

At the beginning of the 19th century Dhufār was ruled by Saiyid Muhammad-bin-'Aqīl, 'Ajaibi,‡ a buccaneer and slave trader, who at one time owned three square-rigged vessels and was the terror of shipping in the Red Sea. In later life he possessed himself of Dhufār and governed the district in an enlightened manner for about 25 years, making Salālah his capital. He was finally assassinated at Murbāt in 1829 by Salim-bin-Thori, the chief of all the Qaras, whose family had a blood-feud against him. His tomb is shewn near Murbāt.

*The principal sources of information in regard to the traditions and early history of Dhufār are Cruttenden's *Journal of an Excursion from Morebat to Dyreez*, Haines's *Memoir of the South East Coast of Arabia*, and Carter's *Descriptive Account of the Ruins of El Balad*: the last mentioned work contains also an account of the chief antiquities of the district. Mrs. Bent's *Southern Arabia* deals with ancient remains and contains some conjectures in regard to ancient history. For events since 1875 the official papers specified in the footnote on the historical bibliography of the 'Omān Sultanate are the principal and almost the only authority.

† Traditions of an ancient local dynasty called Minguwi, of their supersession, and of the arrival of the Al Kathirare preserved in Carter's *Descriptive Sketch*. See also Mrs. Bent's *Southern Arabia*, pages 227-276, which contains several passages referring to the early history of Dhufār.

‡ The fullest account of the 'Aqīl family will be found in Haines's *Memoir*.

First annexation of Dhufār to 'Omān by Sa'id-bin-Sultān and subsequent connection of the district with Masqat, 1829-1875.

Occupation
by 'Omāni
troops and
their with-
drawal, 1829.

Immediately on the death of Muhammad-bin-'Aqil, a force was despatched from Masqat by Sa'id-bin-Sultān, the ruler of 'Omān, to occupy Dhufār in his name; and Sa'id at the same time offered the local Waliship to 'Abdur Rahmān, a brother of the deceased Muhammad-bin-'Aqil, then residing as a merchant at Bombay. The proposal was, however,* declined by 'Abdūr Rahmān; and the troops of occupation, being required for service in East Africa, were removed from Dhufār after a very short stay.

The Ameri-
can, 'Abdul-
lah Lorleyd,
about 1836.

Subsequently to the withdrawal of Sa'id's troops in 1829, a prominent figure in Dhufār was for some years an American, known as 'Abdullah Lorleyd, who had been captured as a boy of ten years old in one of Muhammad-bin-'Aqil's piracies in the Red Sea, in which the other Americans of the ship's crew were murdered, and had grown up among the people of Dhufār. When Midshipman Cruttenden of the "Palinurus" visited Dhufār in 1836, Lorleyd, who had become a Muhammadan, was living at Salālah with his Arab family. The country, in the absence of any settled authority, was given up to warfare, chiefly between the Kathiris of the plain and the Qaras of the hills; and the white man, by his mental superiority, and by the daring and success with which he led expeditions against the Qaras, eventually succeeded in establishing a personal ascendancy which he retained as long as he lived. The villages of the plain, however, were entirely independent one of another after Muhammad-bin-'Aqil's death: in 1836 Dahārīz was the most important of these.

Official depu-
tations from
Dhufār to
'Omān.

During the whole of the period now in question no revenue or tribute seems to have been remitted from Dhufār to Masqat, and there was no interference by the Sultāns of 'Omān in the internal affairs of the country. Saiyid Turki however, in 1876, alleged that never after 1829 did the Shaikhs of Dhufār fail to pay homage on the accession of a new Sultān at Masqat. According to the Sultān's statement a deputation consisting of 'Ali-bin-Sālim, Kathiri and 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah, Shanfari, had paid their respects to Saiyid Thuwaini and to Saiyid Sālim on the assumption by each of power; and a similar deputation had sought an interview with 'Azzān-bin-Qais after his usurpation, but had met with a rebuff; while Turki himself, in the first year of his reign, was waited upon by 'Ali-bin-Sālim. These emissaries, from 1856 onwards, were understood to have visited Masqat on behalf of Hamad-bin-'Umar, Marhūni, who was the most influential among the chieftains of Dhufār at the time.

British ma-
rine surveys
off the coast
of Dhufār.

Dhufār was visited by surveying vessels of the Indian Navy on various occasions between 1833 and 1846; towards the end of this period the country was disturbed, and parties from the ships were more than once fired on by the Qaras.

* According to another account, however, 'Abdur Rahmān wished to obtain the district, but Saiyid Sa'id would not accede to his proposals.

Usurpation of Saiyid Fadhl-bin-Alawi, Moplah, 1875-1879.

In 1875, probably about the month of August, an adventurer of an unusual type and one of a kind peculiarly interesting to the Government of India succeeded in establishing his personal authority over Dhufār, and the connection of the district with 'Omān was temporarily severed. The usurper was Saiyid Fadhl or Fazl, a Moplah priest, who, for participation in the Moplah rising of 1852, had been expelled from India and forbidden to return under pain of arrest; in his outlawry he had resided at Makkah and other places in the Ottoman dominions; and he had acquired a high reputation for sanctity. In 1853, at the instance of the British Government, he was prohibited by the Porte from leaving Turkish territory; and there he seems to have remained until 1875, when he left his adopted home in the Hijāz province and proceeded, probably at the invitation of local Shaikhs who had seen him at Makkah, by sea to Dhufār.

Early history
of Fadhl.

Arrived in the district he began to enter into political arrangements with the tribes and quickly became master of the situation; one of his sons administered justice in his name. At an early stage of these proceedings he appears to have sought the recognition of the Turkish Government and to have asked for military assistance, but both were apparently withheld. The usurper was not ignorant of the connection of the district with 'Omān; but, when the presence of the Sultān's flag was mentioned as an obstacle to his claims, he contemptuously advised the objectors to "make a pillow of it".

Arrival of
Fadhl in
Dhufar,
1875.

Saiyid Turki, who was Sultān of 'Omān at the time, first became aware of the Moplah's usurpation by a letter which that individual addressed to him,—a letter in which the writer described himself as Governor of Dhufār under the Ottoman Porte and recommended Shaikh 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah, as a Turkish subject, to the favourable notice of the Sultān. Saiyid Turki, who regarded Dhufār as part of his own dominions, immediately informed the Government of India; and they, though not convinced of the validity of the 'Omāni Sultān's title to the district, represented to Her Majesty's Government the inconveniences to be apprehended from the settlement of a professed enemy of the British Government in such a locality, and from the extension of Turkish influence to any point upon the South Arabian coast. The British Ambassador at Constantinople was accordingly instructed, neither assuming that Saiyid Fadhl had acted with the knowledge of the Porte nor asserting in any way the claim of the Sultān of 'Omān to suzerainty over Dhufār, to remonstrate with the Turkish Government against the proceedings of Fadhl and to urge them to repudiate his acts. No definite answer having been obtained to this communication, made originally in 1876, it was repeated in 1877, but still apparently without result.

Protests by
the British
Government
to the Porte,
1876-77.

In the end, however, the usurpation of Fadhl was brought to an end by local causes. The Moplah, who had made Salalah his capital, at first enjoyed the support of the settled population and carried on desultory hostilities, not without success, against the predatory Qara tribe;

Expulsion
of Fadhl
by the
Dhufaris,
1879.

and he even extended his influence westwards over a part of the Mahra country. Gradually, however, his rule, which was arbitrary and oppressive, fell into discredit; for, while he exacted forced labour and contributions for himself and his family and levied import and export duty on all goods at 5 per cent., he was not long successful in composing the dissensions among tribes, nor was his administration of justice as between individuals applauded. At length, in January 1879, a general revolution took place among the people, and he was obliged to fly the country.

Second annexation of Dhufār to 'Omān by Turki-bin-Sa'id, 1879.

Factions in
Dhufār.

On the expulsion of Saiyid Fadhl from Dhufār, Shaikh 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah, who had taken a leading part in the affair, paid a visit to Masqat and induced the Sultān, then Saiyid Turki, to extend his authority once more over this derelict corner of Arabia. The inhabitants of Dhufār were now divided into three parties, of which one headed by 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah desired the Sultān of 'Omān for their master, while another led by 'Awadh-bin-'Azzān aimed at the restoration of Saiyid Fadhl, and a third, probably the largest, was in favour of independence.

Successful
expedition
from Masqat,
1879.

An expedition by sea, despatched by Saiyid Turki under Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, reached Hāsik at the eastern end of Dhufār in the end of March or beginning of April 1879 and thence proceeded, partly by water and partly by land, along the coast to Sadah and so to Murbāt, where the whole force, consisting of about 100 men, arrived on the 7th of April. The people of Murbāt at once tendered their submission to the Sultān's representative; and, notwithstanding the hostility of a majority of the Āl Kathīr, Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was able on the 11th of May to report himself firmly established at the capital. One of his first acts, intended no doubt to conciliate the people, was to reduce the rate of customs duty from the 5 per cent. taken by Saiyid Fadhl to 4 per cent.

Intrigues
affecting
Dhufār at
Shihr and
Makalla in
Arabia and
at Haidarā-
bād in the
Dakkhan,
1879.

At this time the question of Dhufār was complicated by a dispute between the Chiefs of Makalla and Shihr, under the jurisdiction of the Aden Residency, in which the Sultān of 'Omān, by showing sympathy with the Makalla Chief and sending an agent to reside for a short time at his court, incurred the hostility of the ruler of Shihr. It followed that, while the Chief of Makalla cordially supported the designs of the Sultān in Dhufār, the Chief of Shihr threw his weight into the opposite scale and expressed so clearly his intention of interfering in Dhufār affairs that in June 1879 a warning, which proved effectual, was addressed him by the British Resident at Aden. At the same time steps were taken to prevent the success of appeals for help which had been made, both by the Chief of Shihr and by a minister of the Sultān of 'Omān, to Arabs in the employment of the Nizām of Haidarābād in India.

Dhufār
transferred
by the
Government

An indirect consequence of the discussions which thus arose was a decision by the Government of India, at the end of 1879, that the district of Dhufār should be regarded in future as falling within the jurisdiction

of the Masqat Political Agency and not of the Aden Residency ; this was a reversal of the earlier practice, in which questions relating to Dhufār had always been referred to the Resident at Aden. The boundary between the two jurisdictions on the south coast of Arabia was now fixed at Rās Sājar.*

of India from the political jurisdiction of Aden to that of Masqat, 1879.

Events in Dhufār from the 'Omāni occupation of 1879 to the evacuation of 1885.

The new régime in Dhufār soon attracted considerable unpopularity, partly perhaps because it had been established at the request of a minority of the natives, and partly, it cannot be doubted, on account of the taciturn and imperious temper of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim the Wālī, whose proceedings here, as afterwards in 'Omān, were generally characterised by energy rather than by discretion.

Before the end of the year a split occurred between Sulaimān and the principal supporter of the Sultān's interest in the district, the Shaikh 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah ; the Wālī suspected the Shaikh of working in the interests of a faction and sent him away on a suitable pretext to Masqat, where the Shaikh, in revenge, complained to the Sultān of misgovernment and extravagance on the part of the Wālī. The result of his visit to Masqat was disappointing to 'Awadh, for the Sultān showed him but little liberality and sent him home by the arduous route across the desert ; and towards the end of 1880 'Awadh showed his displeasure by going into rebellion, surprising the Salālah fort and seizing the substitute of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, then absent at Masqat. At the same time the rebellious Shaikh opened a correspondence with the Chief of Shihr and with some Arabs at Haidarābād in the Indian Dakkhan. The Sultān's whole force in Dhufār was at this time only about 30 men ; but 30 more were already on their way there, when the news of the rebellion reached Masqat, partly to relieve and partly to reinforce the existing garrison. On the 21st of December 1880 the Sultān's steamer "Dār-as-Salām", with two boats in tow, left Masqat for Dhufār ; she carried an expeditionary force of 180 men accompanied by Saiyid Khamīs-bin-Sulaimān, Al Bū Sa'idi, and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim. The instructions of Saiyid Turki to the leaders were that, if they found the inhabitants generally averse to his rule, they should evacuate Dhufār altogether, but, if only 'Awadh-bin-'Abdullah and his party were hostile, strong action should be taken against them ; further, if retention of the district were decided on and Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim appeared not unacceptable to the people he should resume his position as Wālī, but otherwise Khamīs-bin-Sulaimān should remain in his place.

First rebellion against the Sultān, 1880.

Meanwhile a counter-revolution had taken place in Dhufār. In the absence of Shaikh 'Awadh from the fort it was captured, after some

Counter-revolution in favour of the Sultān, 1880.

* As shown in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer, the boundary might now appropriately be placed a few miles further to the westward.

fighting and a few casualties, by a combination of his enemies under the leadership of a former supporter of Saiyid Fadhī; and, upon this success, the substitute Wālī was replaced in authority by general consent of the people. On the arrival of the "Dār-as-Salām" at Murbāt, 'Awadh fled to the hills; negotiations with the leaders of the expedition followed; and eventually the Shaikh received a promise of his life and undertook in return to surrender himself at Masqat within a certain fixed time. The "Dār-as-Salām" then returned to Masqat, where she arrived on the 4th of January 1881; she brought back the guns which had been sent with the expedition; but the troops, except an artillery detachment, remained to garrison the district. Perfect tranquillity for a time reigned in Dhufār, and the usual taxes were collected without difficulty or opposition.

Second re-
bellion
against the
Sultān,
1883.

At length, in January 1883, news reached Masqat of a fresh insurrection in Dhufār; and the Wālī, Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, reported himself besieged in the fort. The despatch of reinforcements was delayed by the accidental absence of the Sultān, Saiyid Turki, at Gwādar; but, on his return, a force of 70 men was got together for service in Dhufār and was shipped from Masqat, along with a 10-pounder gun, about the middle of February. Before the arrival of this armament, however, the siege of Salālah had been raised; and the reinforcements, instead of remaining in Dhufār, returned to 'Omān. Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, having left his son 'Ali in charge of the Wilāyat, came to Masqat in the April following, and was for several months employed by the Sultān in negotiations in the interior of 'Omān.

State of
Dhufār at
Colonel
Miles's visit,
1883.

In November 1883 Colonel Miles, the British Political Agent at Masqat, paid a visit to Dhufār in H.M.S. "Philomel": the object of his tour was to acquire information about the southern coast of Arabia as far as Rās Sājar, a task which he very efficiently performed. Colonel Miles, from his local observations, was inclined to attribute the failure of the Sultān's administration in Dhufār, where the Ma'ashani branch of the Qaras was then actually in revolt, to the character of the Wālī, Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, who, though a staunch adherent of the Sultān and a good soldier, was of negro descent and had not the tact to govern amidst discordant elements, nor the capacity to develop the resources of the district. The tax demanded of the Bedouins in Dhufār was at this time one dollar yearly on every five camels, the same on every ten cattle, and one goat out of each twenty.

Third re-
bellion
against the
Sultān and
withdrawal
of the
'Omānis,
1885.

On the 11th of May 1885 another rebellion suddenly broke out in Dhufār in the absence of the Wālī; and 'Ali, the son and substitute of Sulaimān, found himself besieged in the fort with a detachment of 40 Wāhhābi soldiers. At the middle of July, by the mediation of the Ahl 'Umr Qaras of Murbāt, 'Ali-bin-Sulaimān was enabled to evacuate the fort and to retire unmolested to Murbāt, whence he sailed in September for Masqat taking most, if not all, of his men with him. Thus ended for a time the 'Omāni occupation of the greater part, at least, of Dhufār; but it is possible that Murbāt continued to be held in the Sultān's name; and the rebels wrote to Saiyid Turki to inform him that, while they could not tolerate the administration of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, they were not averse to the Sultān's government *per se*. Dhufār between 1879 and 1885 brought in no surplus revenue, and continued to be, in a military sense as well as financially, a drain upon the resources of 'Oman.

Efforts of Saiyid Fadhl to recover Dhufār, 1879-1887.

On his expulsion from Dhufār in 1879 the Moplah Saiyid Fadhl had retired in the first instance to Makalla; but, his intrigues there meeting with no success, he made his way during the next few months by way of Berbera and Jiddah to Constantinople. There he quickly gained the ear of the Sultān of Turkey; and, before the end of the year, that monarch, notwithstanding the advice of his ministers, was almost persuaded to lend the Saiyid active assistance for the recovery of Dhufār. In 1880 Saiyid Fadhl wrote to the Sultān of 'Omān that he had gone to Constantinople in connection with a scheme of reforms for Dhufār, that he was now about to return, and that he was astonished at the presumption of Turki in violating Turkish territory; and about the same time the Sharif of Makkah advised the Porte to recognise and support Fadhl, because, he said, the 'Omāni annexation of Dhufār would produce a bad effect in Arabia. In August of the same year the honorary title of "Wazīr" was conferred on Saiyid Fadhl by the Sultān of Turkey. In March 1883 Fadhl again wrote to Saiyid Turki from Constantinople, claiming that friendship existed between himself and the British Government and stating that he would never renounce his claims to Dhufār; and this missive was followed in July by one from the Sharif of Makkah, in which the Sultān of 'Omān was advised to renounce his claims to Dhufār in favour of Fadhl. To the suggestion contained in the latter of these Saiyid Turki, advised by Colonel Miles, the Political Agent, returned a courteous refusal, stating that Dhufār had belonged to the Portuguese, to the Ya'arabi dynasty of 'Omān and to his own ancestors, but that Saiyid Fadhl had no hereditary claim. In 1884 the Government of Bombay received, through the Turkish Consul-General there, a letter from Saiyid Fadhl, in which he complained of the action of the Sultān of 'Omān in Dhufār; and the question of Dhufār formed the subject of several articles in the Arabic newspaper "I'tidāl", published at Constantinople.

Intrigues
of Fadhl at
Constanti-
nople, 1879-
1884.

It was in 1886, however, during the temporary or at least partial evacuation of Dhufār by the Government of 'Omān, that Saiyid Fadhl made his chief effort to recover the district; but it was frustrated by British intervention. On the 20th of January in that year the returning pilgrim ship "Metapedia", under British colours, was boarded at Aden, and Muhammad, a son of Fadhl, with 16 personal attendants and 100 disbanded Arab soldiers of the Sharif of Makkah, was found to be on board; on the vessel being searched a large quantity of arms and ammunition, including revolvers and Martini-Henry rifles and carbines, was discovered and confiscated under the Arms Act. Muhammad, whose object was undoubtedly a descent on Dhufār, then landed to await, as he said, the orders of the Porte; but he did not apparently receive any.

Attempted
descent on
Dhufār in
the interest
of Fadhl
frustrated by
the British
authorities at
Aden, 1886.

A little later it was reported that an agent of Muhammad had succeeded in conveying to Salālah in Dhufār the Turkish flag and a document purporting to be a Turkish commission, as also some Turkish coin and a quantity of military stores, all of which he had deposited in the house of one of the Al Kathir. No overt act, however, followed these

Subsequent
proceedings
of Fadhl,
1886-87.

preparations; and the controversy closed for the time with a written remonstrance on the subject of Dhufār, which was addressed by the Turkish Wālī of Basrah to Saiyid Turki in March 1886 and was ignored by the latter. In 1887 Saiyid Fadhl did not fail to complain of the Aden incident, both to the British Resident at that place and to the Viceroy of India; but no notice was taken of either communication.

Events in Dhufār from 1886 to 1895.

Authority of
the Sultān
re-established
in Dhufār,
1887.

During the year 1886 the authority of the Sultān of 'Omān was practically in abeyance in Dhufār; but a detachment of his troops, too weak to take the offensive, was soon sent to Murbāt, or perhaps had never been withdrawn from that place. In December the Sultān appointed Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Sulaimān to be Wālī of Dhufār, with Saiyid 'Abdul Jalīl as assistant, and gave him an armed escort of 50 Arabs and 20 Balūchis. The new governor seems to have succeeded in re-establishing the Sultān's authority; but he remained, apparently, for less than a year.

Fourth re-
bellion
against the
Sultān, 1887.

At the end of 1887 Saiyid Turki had resolved to send Sulaimān-bin-Suwaylim back to Dhufār; and we find the Dhufāris besieging the 'Aqid, who at the moment represented the Sultān's authority, and professing a determination to resist the return of Sulaimān by force. The crisis appears to have been regarded as requiring a serious effort; and, on the 13th of January 1888, Saiyid Turki despatched his sons Faisal and Fahad with various notables of 'Omān, 200 fighting men and one gun, on his steamship the "Sultāni" to Dhufār. The expedition was successful: Sulaimān-bin-Suwaylim was installed as Wālī, and five disaffected Shaikhs of Dhufār, who had corresponded with Saiyid Fadhl and with the Chief of Shihr, were arrested and placed in irons on board ship. Upon the return voyage the "Sultāni" ran out of coal, and, much anxiety having been caused at Masqat by her non-arrival, H.M.S. "Turquoise" at the end of February went in search of her, found her with provisions exhausted near Rās Madrakah, and brought her safely to port.

Peace in Dhufār
under
Faisal, 1888-95.

Soon after these events Saiyid Turki died and was succeeded by his son Faisal, the first seven years of whose reign passed quietly in Dhufār. In 1891, a reinforcement of 100 Wabbābi mercenaries was sent from Masqat to reinforce the garrison.

Explorations
of Mr. and
Mrs. Bent in
Dhufār, 1894-95.

In December 1894 and January 1895 Dhufār was visited, and the Samhān hills were explored, by Mr. and Mrs. T. Bent; and a survey of the country was made by Khān Bahādur Imām Sharif, who accompanied the party.

Proceedings of Saiyid Fadhl from 1887 to 1895.

Meanwhile Saiyid Fadhl had not renounced his hopes of recovering Dhufār. His residence was at Constantinople; his four sons known as

Sahl Pasha, Hasan Pasha, Muhammad Bey and Ahmad Bey, were holders of stipends from the Turkish Government; and Saiyid Fadhl himself still received subscriptions from India, but his income from that source was diminishing.

In 1894 Saiyid Fadhl applied to the British Ambassador at Constantinople for permission to return to Dhufār with his sons, and offered, in return for British protection, to maintain free trade between Dhufār and all British possessions and to assist in suppressing the traffic in slaves; but his proposals were not entertained. In the spring of 1895 Sahl Pasha, the son of Fadhl, was living at the Qubbah palace near Cairo as a guest of the Khedive of Egypt, and while there he opened negotiations with the British Consulate-General in Egypt for the countenance of Great Britain in recovering possession of Dhufār; but his advances were discouraged, and in the following summer he returned to Constantinople. As, however, there was fear of unauthorised action by Fadhl or his family, arrangements were made by the British authorities for a careful watch to be kept at Cairo, Jiddah and Aden; and the Sultān of 'Omān was advised to strengthen his position in Dhufār in regard both to *personnel* and to *matériel*.

Overtures by Fadhl and his family to the British Government in regard to Dhufār, 1894-95.

Dhufār lost to 'Omān but recovered with British assistance 1895-97.

The most serious and prolonged rebellion in Dhufār against the sovereignty of 'Omān began with the sudden capture, on the 3rd of November 1895, of the Sultān's fort; in this affair 'Ali, the son, and Musaid, the nephew, of the absent Wālī Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim were killed along with 11 of the ordinary garrison; and the remainder of the Sultān's forces retreated, as usual in time of difficulty, to Murbāt. The immediate occasion of the revolt was the imprisonment of one of the Āl Kathīr who had defrauded the Sultān's customs; but the general causes lay deeper, and were, as more than once before, the harshness and misgovernment of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, under whom, it was said, forced labour, irregular exactions and interference with the women of the country had become serious grievances. The initiative in the rising was taken by the Āl Kathīr of the hills; but they were soon joined by the entire population, except the Shanāfir Kathīris of Hāfah under 'Awadh-bin-'Azzān and the Qaras of Tāqah and Murbāt, who were both as a rule supporters of the Sultān, but upon this occasion assumed a neutral attitude.

Fifth and most serious rebellion against the Sultān, 1895.

The news reached Masqat towards the end of November, and Saiyid Faisal immediately despatched a force of 100 Wahhābis and 150 of the Bani Kalbān tribe; but the expedition, though a good base of operations was provided by Murbāt, was unable to retake the district; and an attempt to land near Salālah, the capital, was actually repulsed.

Ineffectual attempt at suppression by the Sultān.

As reports of the presence of agents of Saiyid Fadhl in Dhufār were rife and the rebels had made use of flags which were described as

British intervention, 1896.

Turkish, Colonel Hayes Sadler, the British Political Agent at Masqat, under instructions from the Government of India, proceeded to the spot at the beginning of March 1896 in H.M.S. "Brisk" to investigate. The Sultān of 'Omān had also authorised Colonel Hayes Sadler to negotiate with the tribesmen on his behalf. The Political Agent found the Sultān's flag flying over Hāfah village, in which the garrison were virtually prisoners, while a Turkish flag floated over Salālah; but no proof was obtained of the presence of emissaries from Shaikh Fadhī, though the rebels had undoubtedly applied for help both to him and to the Chief of Shihr, and the Turkish flag appeared to be one of those of which the introduction into the district had been reported ten years earlier. Colonel Hayes Sadler had an interview with the leaders of the rebellion, of whom the principal were Sālim-bin-Hamad, Marhūni, and 'Alī-bin-Kathairi; but their attitude was defiant, and they refused the reasonable terms offered them by the Sultān, *viz.*, forgiveness for the past, the removal of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, the appointment of a more conciliatory governor, the restriction of taxation within the limits sanctioned by custom, and prompt redress of grievances.

British offer
of assistance
rejected by
the Sultān,
April 1896.

On Colonel Hayes Sadler's return to Masqat the question of assisting the Sultān to recover Dhufār was discussed, and a proposal was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government that the action of the Sultān's forces on land should be supported, if necessary, by British naval fire. The offer was communicated to the Sultān at the beginning of April, accompanied by a condition that he should abide by British advice regarding future arrangements in Dhufār, and it was at first not unfavourably received; but within a very few days His Highness's attitude changed under the French influences to which he was at this time subject; and, professing himself unable to agree to a condition so vague as that of submission to future British advice, he intimated that he could now neither conciliate the Āl Kathīr nor replace Sulaimān by another Wālī. He added that he expected, in the absence of foreign complications, to be able to reduce Dhufār unassisted.

French protest
against
British inter-
vention in
Dhufār, May
1896.

In May 1896 a protest was lodged by the French Ambassador in London against the recent action of the British Government in sending the "Brisk" to Dhufār to support the Sultān's interests,—a proceeding to which objection was taken as being unilateral and therefore inconsistent with the Declaration of 1862. In reply an assurance was given by Her Majesty's Government that the incident complained of implied no intention on the part of Britain to establish a protectorate over 'Omān, or to depart from her engagement with France to respect the Sultān's independence.

British aid
solicited by
the Sultān,
January
1897.

In January 1897 the Sultān, being at length convinced of his own inability to recover Dhufār, solicited the assistance of a British man-of-war and accepted the conditions upon which the British Government were now willing to grant it: these were pardon, after full submission, for the rebels; the appointment of a Wālī acceptable to the local Shaikhs; and the discontinuance of extra taxation. At the beginning of March 1897 the French war-vessel "Surprise" arrived at Masqat, and her services against the rebels in Dhufār were offered to the Sultān, but were declined.

On the 12th of March, Colonel Wilson, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, left for Dhufār in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence"; the "Lawrence" had been preceded by native vessels carrying the Sultān's main force of about 300 men and she was accompanied by H.M.S. "Cossack", on board of which were Captain Beville, the Political Agent at Masqat, Hamad-bin-Nāsir, the Wālī of Matrah, and Saiyid Muhammad, the Sultān's elder brother, with about 70 followers. Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was absent from Masqat when the expedition sailed and was thus unintentionally, but not inopportunately, left behind. The "Lawrence" and "Cossack" anchored off Salālah on the 16th of March, and the Turkish flag was found hoisted in two places. On the 17th, the Political Agent met the rebel Shaikhs on shore; he offered forgiveness for the past and a guarantee against enhanced taxation; but the Shaikhs demanded that either there should be no 'Omāni Wālī of Dhufār at all, or that he should be of their own choosing and should not be supported by troops. On their proposals being rejected the Shaikhs at first declared themselves under Turkish protection, but finally they requested that they might be taken under British protection, or receive a British guarantee for the redress of future grievances. On the evening of the 17th, the Sultān's land forces being now in possession of the village of Hāfah, Colonel Wilson in writing required the submission of the rebels within two days upon the two conditions already explained to them by Captain Beville; on the 18th and 19th the Shaikhs still appeared obstinate; but at dawn on the 20th the Turkish flags had been struck and were soon sent on board the "Lawrence", and resistance was at an end. On the 21st the Resident landed in order to confirm the conditions of peace, granted nominally by Saiyid Muhammad, the Sultān's brother, and the same day the "Lawrence" left for the Persian Gulf; but the "Cossack" with the Political Agent remained for two days longer. The Shaikhs of Dhufār had meanwhile withdrawn their objections to the return of Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim, who appeared moreover to be the only one of the Sultān's officers capable of dealing with the local situation; consequently when it became known that he had, during the absence of the expedition, sailed from 'Omān for Dhufār, no effort was made to intercept or recall him.

The Sultān's authority restored by an Anglo-'Omāni expedition to Dhufār, March, 1897.

Saiyid Fadhl was not, apparently, the instigator of these disturbances; but he immediately tried to turn them to his own advantage. He wrote in May 1896 to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and, after referring to the recent revolt in Dhufār against the tyrannical 'Omāni governor and to the hoisting of a "red flag with a crescent", proposed that he should send an envoy of his own to the spot with instructions to fly "the national flag of Dhufār, green with a pentagonal centre"; that he should cause a regent agreeable to the people to be elected; and that he should proclaim a complete accord between himself and the British Government and the intention of the latter to protect the rights and independence of the Dhufār principality. In reply he was informed that he must not proceed to Dhufār, and that no envoy of his could be recognized or assisted by the British authorities. Saiyid Fadhl continued for a time to press his scheme of sending a representative to Dhufār; but the objections of the British Government were not withdrawn.

Renewed overtures of Fadhl to the British Government, 1896-97.

Events in or connected with Dhufār from 1897 to 1907.

Fresh risings
in Dhufār
and recall by
the Sultān of
the unpopu-
lar Wālī,
1897.

Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim having reached Dhufār and taken over charge of the district on the 15th of April 1897, the familiar tale of discontent and insurrection was shortly resumed. In April and May about 45 men of the 'Omāni garrison in Dhufār deserted in two parties and returned to Masqat; and about the same time the inhabitants of Hāfah, instigated as was supposed by the Wālī, attacked the people of Salālah and killed one of them. The Sultān, when news of the last affair reached him, wrote *viā* Bombay and Aden to recall Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim from Dhufār, and sent Saiyid Saif-bin-Ya'arab to succeed him as Wālī; Sulaimān, however, did not see fit to comply at once with the Sultān's mandate; and, when at length he quitted Dhufār in February 1898, he brought Saif-bin-Ya'arab away with him and left one of his own slaves, a worthless and illiterate Nubian, in charge of the district. His departure was probably delayed at the end by an affair which occurred in November 1897, in which another of his nephews, together with an Arab who accompanied him, was killed by Qaras. It was on his way back to Masqat at the beginning of 1898 that Sulaimān called at Sūr and, by his inconsiderate dealings with the inhabitants, prepared the way for the revolt which took place there later in the year.

Alleged
breach by
the Sultān of
the amnesty
guaranteed
to the rebels,
1898.

Soon after this an incident arose at Masqat in connection with the British guarantee of the terms granted by the Sultān's brother to the Dhufār rebels in 1897. In May 1898 Shaikh Sālim-bin-Hamad, Marhūni, the leader of the rebellion, was brought to Masqat under arrest and placed in close confinement; and a month later his cousin, 'Umr-bin-'Abdullah, was similarly treated. Major Fagan, then Political Agent at Masqat, being informed that the imprisonment of Sālim-bin-Hamad had been procured by Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim on account of the murder of his son in 1895, an offence clearly covered by the amnesty of 1897, demanded the immediate release of the Shaikh; but the Sultān refused, alleging that after the rebellion Sālim had again incited the tribes to resist the authority of the Wālī. Major Fagan then pressed for a public inquiry, which also the Sultān declined to allow. As the Government of India were not satisfied of the accuracy of the Political Agent's information the matter was not officially pressed; but in December 1898, in response to a friendly suggestion by Major Fagan, the Sultān released both prisoners, in honour of his own approaching marriage with the sister of Sa'id-bin-Ibrāhīm of Rustāq.

Unsuccessful
Bedouin
rebellion
against the
Sultān, 1899.

At the beginning of 1899, Sulaimān being still employed elsewhere, a fresh crisis arose in Dhufār. On two occasions supplies destined for a fort in the interior were intercepted on the way by Bedouins. The acting Wālī, in making a third attempt to victual the place, prepared an ambuscade for the robbers; his stratagem was successful and nine of the Bedouins were killed. The nomads of the country then rose *en masse*, and reinforcements from Masqat were urgently requested by the Deputy Governor; but in the end the settled inhabitants of the district took part with the officials against the Bedouins, and the insurrection subsided of itself.

Saiyid Fadhl appears to have died about 1900 at Constantinople, where for some years he had subsisted chiefly on the liberality of the Porte; and with his death foreign intrigue in Dhufār apparently came to an end.

Death of
Fadhl and
cessation of
foreign in-
trigue, 1900.
Passing visit
of Russian
war-vessels
to Dhufār,
1905.

The beaching of the French ship "Amiral Gueydon" at Rās Hāsik in 1903 and the protection of the crew and passengers by the Sultān's representative in Dhufār and by the Shaikh of Murbāt have already been mentioned in the general history of the 'Omān Sultanate. According to a report received at Masqat, the coast of Dhufār was visited in April 1905 by about a dozen vessels of war, supposed to be Russian, which remained there at anchor for two days; some of the crew went ashore, but they committed no mischief. These ships may have been the second portion of the Russian "Third Pacific Squadron," which, under Admiral Niebkoatoff, is known to have left Jibuti on the 7th of April 1905 en route for the seat of the war with Japan in the Far East.

From 1900 onwards Sulaimān-bin-Suwailim was Wālī of Sohār in 'Omān, where he principally resided, and Dhufār was governed by a subordinate on his behalf. During these years the district appears to have enjoyed peace and prosperity; and when, in December 1906, Major Grey, Political Agent at Masqat, visited Dhufār in H.M.S. "Redbreast" and had a meeting there with the Sultān Saiyid Faisal and his son Saiyid Taimūr, he found the country in a flourishing condition.

Peace in
Dhufār,
1900-06.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—HISTORY OF GWĀDAR AND CHAHBĀR.*

Origin of the connection between Gwādar and 'Omān, 1784-92.

During the 17th century the Bulaidais were the dominant tribe in Makrān, of which Gwādar and its territories then formed an integral part. In the 18th century the Bulaidais were supplanted by the Gichkis, and a Brāhūi family also rose into prominence, whose head at the time was one Mohbat Khān. In 1736, Mohbat Khān submitted to Nādir Shāh of Persia and was appointed by the conqueror to be his principal officer in all Balūchistān, including Makrān. In 1739, Taqi Khān, the general of Nādir Shāh, withdrew from Balūchistān and the Gichkis profited by the opportunity to secure themselves a position at Gwādar, of which place they remained until some years later in sole possession.

* The principal authorities for the history of Gwādar are the records and précis mentioned in the bibliography of the 'Omān Sultanate (see footnote, page 397). To these may be added an anonymous précis entitled *Correspondence on the Progress of Persia in Mekran and Western Baluchistan*, 1869, also the *Official History of the Mekran Telegraph Line*, 1895.

Nasir Khān
I of Kalāt,
1750-93.

After a time, however, the Gichkis quarrelled among themselves over questions of religion ; and the assistance of Nasir Khān I of Kalāt, the younger brother and successor of the Brāhui chief Mohbat Khān, was invoked by one of the contending factions. Nasir Khān—who reigned from 1750 to 1793 and was a vassal of Afghanistan, not, as Mohbat Khān had been, of Persia—then commenced a series of incursions into the Gichki territories ; and eventually, about 1778, he obtained for himself a moiety of the revenues of those districts, the administration, however, remaining in the hands of the Gichkis.

Grant of
Gwādar by
Nasir Khān
I to Saiyid
Sultān.

In 1784, as has been related in the history of the 'Omāu Sultanate, Saiyid Sultān-bin-Ahmad, then an unsuccessful pretender to the sovereignty of 'Omān, sought refuge in Makrān. According to local traditions Saiyid Sultān came first to Zīk, a fortified village of the Mirwāris in Kōlwa, and thence, having been joined by Dād Karīm, Mirwāri, proceeded to Khārān, where his cause was espoused by Mir Jahāngir, a Naushairwāni chief. The confederates then resorted to Nasir Khān at Kalāt, who at first apparently undertook to assist Saiyid Sultān in making himself master of 'Omān, but eventually, it would seem, receded from his promise and instead conferred the port of Gwādar—at the time an insignificant fishing village—upon the 'Omāni exile.

Character
and validity
of the grant.

The exact nature of the grant by Nasir Khān is shrouded in an obscurity which it is now probably too late to dispel, and it has in recent times become a subject of controversy. In support of the claims of Kalāt to the ownership of Gwādar at the present day it is alleged that the grant was not permanent, and that it was only for the maintenance of Saiyid Sultān so long as he should continue to be a refugee in Makrān ; while on behalf of the 'Omāni Sultān it is contended that the object of the arrangement was to secure naval protection for the coasts of Makrān, by enlisting the co-operation of a prince whose ultimate succession to the sovereignty of 'Omān was regarded by Nasir Khān as certain. An argument on which the advocates of the Brāhui claim rely is that in 1784 half the revenue of Gwādar still, apparently, belonged to the Gichkis, and could not therefore be lawfully alienated by Nasir Khān : to prove the survival of the Gichki rights in 1784 reference is made to deeds executed by the Gichkis in 1778 and 1793, which convey a share in the revenues of Gwādar and Chahbār to a certain deserving individual, and a statement made by the writer Hāji 'Abdun Nabi in 1839 is quoted, to the effect that only the Brāhui half share of the revenue of Gwādar was conferred by Nasir Khān upon Saiyid Sultān. It is added—to include here evidences of a still later date—that the Gichkis continued to receive their share of the revenue of Gwādar, amounting to \$3,000,* up to the time of Bibi Maryam, a Bulaidai lady who was married to a Gichki ; this person was described in 1868 by the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar as living on the charity of the Sultāns of Masqat, but it is asserted by the Gichkis that what she received was really hers by right, and that it represented the Gichki share of the revenue, which the Sultāns of 'Omān had gradually curtailed. From this short summary of the arguments it will be seen that the Masqat case rests practically upon the prescription of a century and upon nothing else,

* The total amount is said to have been \$7,000 a year, of which the 'Omāni Sultān received \$1,000 on account of the expenses of collection, besides his own share amounting to \$3,000.

while the evidences in favour of the Kalāt view are reducible to *ex parte* documents and assertions, the value of which, on account of the time that has elapsed, cannot now be tested.* The title of the Sultāns of 'Omān to Gwādar, inasmuch as it has been impugned and cannot be supported otherwise than by evidence of long possession, may be described as of doubtful validity; but it is obvious that the flaw is technical rather than material.

Until the year 1792, when he at length attained to the supreme power in 'Omān, Sayid Sultān would appear to have made Gwādar a base for expeditions against the Arabian coast opposite; and he had no sooner established his power at Masqat than he took measures to secure Gwādar as a dependency of 'Omān by despatching a certain Saif-bin-'Ali with troops to govern the place and build a fort there.

Annexation
of Gwādar to
'Omān, 1792.

Events at Chahbār, 1792-1809.

After he had carried out his instructions at Gwādar, Saif-bin-'Ali proceeded to Chahbār with a fleet of boats which he brought into the harbour under pretext of fishing, took the town by surprise one night, and added it to his master's possessions. The possessor at the time was one Shafī' Muhammad, Bulaidi, who paid a quarter of his revenue to Mir Subhān, the chief of Dashtyāri Bāhu, and had for some time paid another quarter to the Saiyid of 'Omān. The place was said to have been betrayed by one Allah Rakhiya, a Khojah.

Annexation
of Chahbār
to 'Omān,
1792.

Chahbār seems to have been lost to 'Omān on the death of Saiyid Sultān in 1804, but to have been recovered again after a short interval. Its revenue in 1809 was Rs. 5,000 a year, which went entirely to the Saiyid of 'Omān.

Events at Gwādar from 1792 to 1861.

Of the history of Gwādar during the next 70 years extremely little is known; but it seems that, after the 'Omāni occupation, Gwādar rapidly distanced in prosperity the ports of Pasni and Jīwnri, to which it had formerly been reckoned inferior. Endeavours were made by the Brāhūis from time to time to recover Gwādar, but the weak rulers who followed Nasir Khan were incapable of carrying the matter to a successful issue and were as a rule fully engaged in protecting other outlying

Early attacks
on Gwādar.

* For a statement of the arguments on the Kalāt side the Imperial Gazetteer of Balūchistān and the Provincial Gazetteer of Makrān may be consulted. The case for 'Omāni ownership has never been fully set forth, and the present Sultān, secure in the strength of his *de facto* title, professes ignorance of the grounds on which it is based; some remarks by the Reverend G. P. Badger from the 'Omāni point of view will be found, however, in his official report No. 9, dated 3rd June 1861.

parts of their state, especially upon its western border. Between 1804 and 1807, it is said, Mīr Dōstain, the Bulaidai chief of Sarbāz, took possession of Gwādar during the confusion that followed the death of Saiyid Sultān; but, if the statement is correct, he was ejected after a short tenure of the place by troops despatched from Masqat. In 1805 a piratical raid was made on Gwādar by the Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and about 1839, according to Makrāni tradition, Shaikh Qāsim, Gichki, threatened Gwādar and succeeded in obtaining payment of the Gichki moiety of the revenue on account of two years.

Sardār
Khan's in-
vasion of
South-
Eastern
Persia *viā*
Gwādar and
Chahbār,
1843-44.

A curious incident, a little later, was an expedition made into South-Eastern Persia *viā* Gwādar and Chahbār by Sardār Khān, the brother of His Highness the Agha Khān. At the end of 1843 Sardār Khān left Karāchi with a body of 200 horsemen whom he had collected, and, marching by land, reached Gwādar at the end of a few weeks. After a short halt at Gwādar he moved on to Chahbār, which, on account of the Khōjah settlement there, he found a convenient base of operations; and, by means of negotiations conducted from Chahbār, he eventually made himself master of Bampūr. Here however he was besieged by a Persian army, and, having been obliged to surrender, was removed as a prisoner to Tehrān.

Attempt of
the Naib of
Kaij on
Gwādar,
1847.

In 1847 Faqir Muhammad, the Naib of Kaij, invested Gwādar with a force of 1,000 men; his object was to extort from Saiyid Thuwaini, at that time regent of 'Omān, a customary annual present which had been withheld for two years in succession. After the attacks of Faqir Muhammad had been several times repulsed, the inhabitants of the town, finding themselves straitened for ammunition and supplies, obtained a truce; they then kept the Naib amused with idle promises, and possibly with small payments, until the arrival of 100 men in the brig "Nāsiri" from Masqat obliged him to relinquish the siege.

Efforts of
the Bāhuīs
to recover
Gwādar,
1857, etc.

In 1857 an expedition was organised by Nasir Khān II, partly with the object of recovering of Gwādar, and was despatched to Kaij under the command of Shāhghāsi Wāli Muhammad; but the contemplated attack upon Gwādar was apparently bought off by the Arab governor, who presented a number of slaves and a sword to the ruler of Kalāt and possibly paid a sum of money as well. Another expedition against Gwādar was subsequently planned by Khuda Dād Khān; but, in consequence of trouble with the Naushairwāni tribe of Khārān, it had to be abandoned.

The claim of Kalāt to Gwādar, 1861-63.

The affairs of Gwādar and Chahbār during the following eight years, from 1861 to 1869, were closely connected with the construction of the Persian Gulf telegraph, an undertaking which gave rise to some difficult questions of jurisdiction and boundaries.

The preparations for erecting a land line of telegraph from Karāchi to Gwādar seem to have inspired the Khān of Kalāt with the idea of reviving, assisted by the British Government, his dormant claim to the

latter place ; and in 1861 he proposed that Gwādar should be purchased by the British authorities from the Sultān of 'Omān and handed over to himself,—an arrangement which, he argued, would benefit both the state of Kalāt and the Government of India. The suggestion, after full consideration, was rejected by the Government of India on the ground of ancient possession by the Sultān ; and in April 1863 the Commissioner in Sind was informed by the Government of Bombay that the Khān's claim to Gwādar was as little sustainable as his claim to Karāchi and as little deserving of countenance.

The claims of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār, 1863-69.

The fluctuations of Persian authority in Makrān during the 19th century are described in the separate history of that province : in the present place we have only to consider those pretensions on the part of Persia to Gwādar and Chahbār which were excited by the British negotiations for telegraph rights.

At the end of 1862, as the land line from Karāchi was approaching Gwādar, it became apparent that the local Persian authorities would not much longer remain quiescent. At the commencement of 1863 Ibrāhīm Khān, the Persian Sartip of Bampūr, began to interest himself in the operations and wrote to Thuwaini, the Sultān of 'Omān, and to the Arab Wāli of Gwādar desiring them to prevent the further progress of the line until the sanction of the Persian Government should have been obtained. To give weight to his admonitions Ibrāhīm Khān next, apparently, assembled a large body of Rinds and advanced in the direction of Gwādar, causing much excitement and the interruption of communications with the interior. On the 12th of March 1863 a serious raid was committed near Gwādar, and a number of men from the "Hugh Rose" gunboat were landed for the protection of the telegraph officials. In May 1863 fresh letters from Ibrāhīm Khān were received by Mr. Walton, in charge of the telegraph construction party, and by the Wāli of Gwādar ; the threats which they contained appeared, however, to be conditional upon the work being carried beyond Gwādar. Permission was given by the Sultān of 'Omān for the landing of British troops in order to protect the telegraph, but it was not immediately utilised.

Obstruction
of British
telegraph
work near
Gwādar by
local Persian
officials,
1862-63.

Meanwhile the Persian Government, having been addressed through the British Legation at Tehrān, repudiated the proceedings of Ibrāhīm Khān ; but the language of the Shāh's ministers indicated the existence of vague and extensive Persian claims in the direction of Makrān ; and shortly afterwards it became known that Persia considered Gwādar and Chahbār specifically her own. In 1864 Colonel Goldsmid was sent to the spot to collect evidence bearing on the territorial disputes which had arisen, and his report was adverse to the alleged rights of Persia at Gwādar and Chahbār ; but meanwhile the pretensions of the Persian Government had continued to increase. At the end of 1864 they were found to include "sovereign rights over all

Claim of
Persia to all
Makrān and
Baluchistān
including
Gwādar, and
Chahbār,
1864.

Makrān and Balūchistān"—the basis of claim being apparently the conquests of Nādir Shāh ; and in 1867 they constituted a serious obstacle in the negotiations for the extension of the land line of telegraph to the westward of Gwādar. In a Persian official memorandum it was now stated that "the Persian Government considered Kaij and Makrān integral parts of the province of Kirmān and therefore undoubtedly Persian territory," and that the ports of Gwādar and Chahbār "were also placed by them in exactly the same category as other ports belonging exclusively to Persia."

Persian
claim to
Gwādar
waived and
abandoned,
1868-71.

Eventually however, in concluding the Telegraph Convention of 2nd April 1868, these claims were waived, without prejudice, by the Persian Government ; and they also, though not without reluctance, abandoned a contention which they had raised that the coast from Gwādar westwards should be described in the Convention as "the Persian Coast". The boundary laid down by General Goldsmid in 1871 between Persian and Kalāt territory afterwards placed Gwādar beyond the reach of Persia ; but it did not affect Chahbār, which, though claimed by Persia, was still actually in possession of the Sultān of 'Omān.

British political representation at Gwādar, 1863-1873.

Establish-
ment of an
Assistant
Political
Agency,
April 1863.

The situation of Gwādar, near the point of contact between several spheres of political influence, is peculiar, and the place may be regarded in various different aspects : it is at once a dependency of the Sultanate of 'Omān, a locality of which the interests are closely bound up with the affairs of Southern Balūchistān and particularly of the Kaij district, a convenient point from which to survey the affairs of Persian Makrān, and a station upon the Makrān section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department's land telegraph, of which the headquarters are at Karāchi. The multiplicity of the interests which thus exist at Gwādar has not been without its effect on the nature of British representation there, and has from time to time necessitated administrative changes which will presently be described ; but the institution of a British Agency was due, in the first instance, to the difficulties with Persia which arose out of the construction of the land telegraph to Gwādar in 1862-63.

The British representative was, in the beginning, a European Assistant Political Agent, the cost of whose appointment was debited to the Indo-European Telegraph Department ; and the first incumbent of the post was Lieutenant E. C. Ross, Adjutant of the 1st Balūch Regiment,—afterwards Sir E. C. Ross, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,—who had been nominated by Mr. Mansfield, Commissioner in Sind, to be Assistant Political Agent at Kalāt, but who was ordered, in consequence of the threatened trouble with Persia over the telegraph, to proceed to Gwādar instead. He arrived there in April 1863. About the same time, under the authority from the Sultān of 'Omān for landing British troops at Gwādar to protect the telegraph, 100 Karachi

armed police under a Native Officer were sent to Gwādar ; and, on their withdrawal in September 1863, a small military detachment from India was substituted as a guard.

In 1869 it was suggested that the political officer at Gwādar, whom it had hitherto been the custom to gazette as Assistant to the Political Agent at Masqat and to the Political Agent at Kalāt, should be made Political Agent on the Makrān Coast, thus becoming independent of the Agents at Masqat and Kalāt, and that he should be given a place in the cadre of the Political Department instead of being attached as it were to the Indo-European Telegraph Department's establishment. In practice his relations, other than those with Masqat, were with the Commissioner in Sind, for communication between Gwādar and Kalāt could hardly be said to exist. The proposed change was vetoed, however, the chief reasons assigned being that no inconvenience had resulted from the subordination of the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar to more than one authority ; that the larger political questions in Makrān,—those connected with Persia,—were of an imperial character and could not be entrusted to the handling of a local officer ; and finally that the investment with a higher position of the Assistant Political Agent, whose primary duties related to the telegraph and to the collection of information, might be to give his appointment a more political character and to promote interference in the internal affairs of the country.

Proposed
political
reorganisation,
1869.

In 1872 the removal of the Assistant Political Agent, with the telegraph station, to some spot healthier than Gwādar on the Makrān coast was mooted ; but eventually it was decided rather to try and improve the sanitation, and with it the health, of the place.

Proposed
transfer of
the Agency,
1872.

Events at Gwādar from 1861 to 1872.

While the Khān of Kalāt and the Persian Government were pressing their claims to the possession of Gwādar, that is from 1861 until 1868, the history of the place itself continued for the most part to be uneventful. In 1863 a terrible fire occurred, and deaths from starvation among the houseless population were only prevented by the prompt action of the British officials in obtaining supplies. In 1864 and 1865 two Telegraph Conventions, the latter referring specifically to the Sultān's possessions in Makrān, were concluded between the ruler of 'Omān and the British Government. In 1866, on the murder of the Sultān Thuwaini and the succession of his son Saiyid Sālim, there was a panic at Gwādar ; but British Indian police were temporarily drafted in from Karāchi to afford protection to British subjects and interests.

Tranquillity
at Gwādar,
1861-68.

In the course of the four years following 1868, however, the course of affairs at Gwādar did not run quite so smoothly.

'Azzān-bin-Qais, on his accession to the Sultanate of Masqat in 1868, sent a certain Saiyid Saif to govern Gwādar as his representative ; but the new Wālī quickly disgusted the inhabitants by his Mutawwa'.

Usurpation
of Gwādar
by Saiyid

Nasir,
1869-71.

tendencies ; and, when in April 1869 Nasir, a son of the Sultan Thuwaini, escaped from detention at Masqat and arrived at Gwadar, the people received him with open arms and expelled Saiyid Saif in his favour. 'Azzan wished to send a force to re-instate the displaced Wali, but the preservation of the maritime peace in the Gulf of 'Omān, as well as in the Gulf of Persia, was at this time a part of the policy of the British Government ; and an interdict was placed by Colonel Disbrowe, the Political Agent at Masqat, upon the sailing of the intended expedition. A little later the idea of attacking Masqat was mooted by Nasir-bin-Thuwaini, which obliged Major Ross, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwadar, to address to him a similar prohibition. 'Azzan-bin-Qais, however, continued to press for permission to attack Gwadar, which he regarded as part of his hereditary dominions, in a regular manner ; and eventually, as his relations with the British authorities improved, the latter became disposed to concede the point. The desired authorisation, however, was withheld until 'Azzan should have been officially recognised by the British Government,—a condition which in consequence of his premature death was never fulfilled. Nevertheless, in February 1869, an annual payment of Rs. 1,500 to the ruler of Masqat was sanctioned by the Government of India on account of telegraph facilities afforded at Gwadar and Chahbār, two-thirds of the sum being, it was understood, on account of the former port.

At the end of January 1870, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, son of the late Sultan Sa'id and younger brother of Saiyid Turki who was 'Azzan's principal rival, appeared off Gwadar in a native coasting vessel and was decoyed ashore and seized by Nasir-bin-Thuwaini ; but the latter, preferring to deport rather than to imprison him, at the suggestion of Major Ross sent his captive to Būshehr in a British mail steamer. In October 1870, in consequence of a report that 'Abdul 'Aziz was about to attack the place, alarm prevailed at Gwadar ; and the Indian traders there were allowed to take refuge in the British telegraph station. This arrangement was objected to by Dāhu-bin-Muhammad, the African Wazir of the Arab Wali of Gwadar, who one day appeared in the office and presented a pistol at the head of Mr. Possmann, then in charge ; but Mr. Possmann struck the weapon out of his hand with a ruler, and his followers were cleared off the premises by the telegraph staff. Two days later Major Ross, who had been absent, returned from Karāchi with the "Dagmar" and the I.M.S. "Kwangtung" ; and on the following day, under threat of a bombardment of the fort, Dāhu gave himself up and was removed to India, where he was detained as a political prisoner for two years.

Usurpation
of Gwadar by
Saiyid 'Abdul
'Aziz,
1871-72.

When Saiyid Turki-bin-Sa'id succeeded 'Azzan-bin-Qais at Masqat, his brother Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, already mentioned, after declining the command of an expedition against Sohār and the prospective governorship of that place, crossed over in June 1871 to Gwadar, and established himself there in place of Nasir-bin-Thuwaini, who had meanwhile taken ship for Zanzibar. At his arrival the functions of government were apparently being carried on in the name of Sayid Turki, but most inefficiently, by a Balūchi who had once been a peon on the staff of the British Political Agency. The action of 'Abdul 'Aziz was not apparently authorised by Saiyid Turki, but neither did he at once

disavow it ; and we may therefore surmise that the departure of 'Abdul 'Aziz from 'Omān, where his presence was a cause of danger, was at first not altogether unwelcome to his elder brother. In August 1871, however, Saiyid Turki applied for the aid of the Indian Government in ejecting 'Abdul 'Aziz from Gwādar and Chahbār ; the request was not granted, but Saiyid Turki was informed that he was at liberty to take naval and military action for the recovery of both places,—a permission of which he did not at once avail himself. 'Abdul 'Aziz, immediately that he found his authority sufficiently established at Gwādar, commenced a series of efforts, which will be described later on, for the capture of Chahbār. These were crowned, in January 1872, with temporary success ; but in March 'Abdul 'Aziz was expelled from his new possession by a Persian army and retired to Bombay, leaving Gwādar as well as Chahbār to its fate. In the beginning of May 1872, 'Abdul 'Aziz being then at Bombay, Saiyid Turki threw a garrison of 200 Wahhābi mercenaries into Gwādar and secured the place for himself ; the inhabitants both of Gwādar and of Chahbār had favoured his claims to the Sultanate from the time of his first appearance in the field as a candidate.

Events at Chahbār to the capture of that place by Persia, 1861-72.

Chahbār did not emerge from its usual obscurity until after the accession of 'Azzān-bin-Qais, but from that event until its final loss to 'Omān in 1872 it continued to be much in evidence. In 1864 the revenue of Chahbār was Rs. 6,000 a year, of which Rs. 1,000 was retained by the Arab Wāli, Rāshid-bin-Hamad, for administrative expenses ; but the protection of the place devolved upon two local chiefs, Dīn Muhammad, Jadgāl, of Dashtyāri and Mīr 'Abdullah of Gaib, who received respectively Rs. 900 and Rs. 200 a year for the discharge of this duty. The Wāli had only 10 Arab attendants of his own.

In 1868 or 1869, after the expulsion of Saiyid Sālim from Masqat, Chahbār was quietly occupied by Dīn Muhammad, the more powerful upon the spot of its salaried protectors ; and like Gwādar it was not recovered for 'Omān in the time of 'Azzān-bin-Qais. Notwithstanding this, an annual subsidy of Rs. 500 a year on account of telegraphic conveniences enjoyed by the British Government at Chahbār was paid after February 1869, as already mentioned, to the government for the time being of 'Omān.

In August 1871, after the conquest by Saiyid Turki of 'Omān and the seizure by 'Abdul 'Aziz of Gwādar, a curious triangular struggle for the possession of Chahbār began. 'Abdul 'Aziz first wrote from Gwādar to Khōjah Ismā'il, a Sindi by race but an 'Omāni subject, and at the time nominally governor of Chahbār on behalf of Saiyid Turki, desiring him to retain the whole of the customs ; to discontinue an allowance formerly enjoyed by Dīn Muhammad, whose usurpation of the chief power in 1868 or 1869 must have been temporary only ; and

Temporary occupation of Chahbār by the Chief of Dashtyāri, 1869.

Struggle between Saiyids Turki and 'Abdul 'Aziz and the local chiefs for possession of Chahbār, 1871.

to exclude that chief from the Chahbār fort. Dīn Muhammad on becoming aware of these orders established himself in the fort, and, professing to hold it in Saiyid Turki's interest, requested Turki's permission to resist the demands of 'Abdul 'Aziz by force if necessary; and a little later Muhammad 'Alī, chief of Bāhu, whose help had been solicited by 'Abdul 'Aziz, also wrote offering his services to Saiyid Turki. These proposals, which by the advice of the British political officers were declined, induced Saiyid Turki to seek the aid of the British Government in expelling 'Abdul 'Aziz from Gwādar and Chahbār: the meagre results of his application have already been mentioned above.

Abortive attempts of 'Abdul 'Aziz upon Chahbār, 1871.

In the meantime 'Abdul 'Aziz did not desist from his efforts to capture Chahbār. In September 1871 he started by land for that place with a following of 150 of the Rind tribe and others; but the chief of Bāhu, whose attitude has already been described, induced him on this occasion to return to Gwādar. In October, having received promises of assistance from Husain Khān, chief of Gaih, 'Abdul 'Aziz again took the route for Chahbār, this time with a few companions only; but once more he was obliged to fall back on Gwādar without having accomplished anything. About the same time Saiyid Turki sent the former Wālī of the place, Rāshid-bin-Hamad, to Chahbār on a special mission; but the envoy failed in his object, of which the precise nature is not known, and returned to Masqat in the following month.

Seizure of Chahbār by 'Abdul 'Aziz, January 1872.

At length, on the 15th of January 1872, Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz left his headquarters on pretext of a shooting excursion in the interior; after placing a few miles between himself and Gwādar he embarked in a Dangi; and shortly after he arrived at Chahbār, where the fort, held only by two or three men under Aghi, a son of Dīn Muhammad, fell into his hands without resistance. The fact that the boat on which 'Abdul 'Aziz sailed for Chahbār belonged to Sohār and brought letters from the chief of that place lent colour to a supposition that the coup had been instigated, or at least suggested, by Ibrāhīm-bin-Qais.

Expulsion of 'Abdul 'Aziz from Chahbār by the Persians, February 1872.

'Abdul 'Aziz was not destined, however, long to enjoy the fruits of this venture. With Dīn Muhammad he concluded an arrangement by which he was to remain in undisturbed possession of Chahbār while the matter was referred to Saiyid Turki; but Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān, the Persian Governor of Bampūr, was less accommodating. Early in February 'Abdul 'Aziz received a letter from the Sartīp stating that Chahbār belonged to Persia, and desiring him personally, in case he desired Persian recognition, to wait on the Sartīp at Qasrkand for the purpose of entering into the necessary arrangements. It is worthy of remark that the Vakīl-ul-Mulk, Persian Governor-General of Kirmān, was also at Qasrkand at this time. 'Abdul 'Aziz consulted Captain Miles, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar, who had meanwhile been authorised by the Government of Bombay to inform Ibrāhīm Khān that Chahbār had always been regarded by the Government of India as belonging to Masqat, and that its status was not affected by the determination of the Perso-Kalāt boundary; and, at the suggestion of Captain Miles, 'Abdul 'Aziz solicited the orders of Saiyid Turki. Before a reply could be received from Masqat, however, the Persians had arrived in the neighbourhood, and a request for advice was telegraphed by 'Abdul 'Aziz to Colonel

Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf; but the time for negotiation was already past. About midnight on the 21st of February Ibrāhīm Khān's leading troops under the command of Husain Khān of Gaih, who was acting with the Persians, reached Chahbār; and on the next day, after a defence of three hours and the loss of several men, 'Abdul 'Aziz evacuated the fort, which he had held with four guns and a garrison of 30 Arabs and Balūchis, and took refuge on board of a vessel in the harbour.

Directly the fighting was over the Persians commenced to plunder the town, from which the British Indian residents had fortunately sent away their families and much of their property in anticipation of the attack. To the remonstrances which Major Miles, in accordance with the instructions of the Government of Bombay, addressed to him from Gwādar, Ibrāhīm Khān replied denying the claim of 'Omān to possession of Chahbār and asserting the title of Persia, which had, he said, been confirmed by the recent* award of the Perso-Kalāt Boundary Commission; he also complained of the conduct of 'Abdul 'Aziz in confining some Persian subjects on board of his vessel. After a few days' halt the Sartip made over charge of the town to Husain Khān of Gaih and departed for Qasrkand in the interior. The proceedings of Husain Khān were much complained of by the British traders of Chahbār, who were reduced to great straits for food and at the same time were prevented from removing their goods lest they should quit the place. Most British subjects had now taken refuge in the neighbourhood of the British telegraph station, and, to ensure their safety, it was resolved to send a vessel of war to the spot; but none was at the moment available. 'Abdul 'Aziz remained for some days on his vessel in the harbour; he intercepted specie arriving from abroad, sent boats to fetch armed assistance from Sūr and Khābūrah in 'Omān, and, on one occasion at least, opened fire on the fort; but his action only irritated the enemy without advantage. Meanwhile representations were made by the British Minister at Tehrān to the Persian Government, who were still in total ignorance of the occurrences at Chahbār; and Captain Miles, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar, was directed to proceed to Chahbār in the despatch vessel "Hugh Rose" and to remain there until the arrival of a gunboat. The Persian Prime Minister twice telegraphed to Husain Khān, whose attitude towards the British Government was openly disrespectful, almost derisive, to afford full protection to British subjects; but the Khān at first paid little attention to these commands. Eventually the Persian Government sent orders by courier to the Governor-General of Kirmān to despatch a special Commissioner to Chahbār to settle the grievances of British subjects; and, after this, matters seem to have returned gradually to their normal course. In March Ibrāhīm Khān, who was reported to be on his way to Tiz to inspect a new fort built there by his orders, was said to have offered immunity from taxation for one year as an inducement to Hindu traders who had left Chahbār to return. Compensation for the losses sustained by British subjects, which in consequence of the precautions

Ill-treatment
of British
subjects by
the Persians
on the occu-
pation of
Chahbār.

* This was of course nonsense. The settlement of the frontier between Persia and Kalat could not affect the title of Masqat to any place, whether on the Persian or the Kalāt side of that frontier.

taken were not large, was subsequently obtained through the Persian Government.

Acquiescence
of the British
Government
in the Persian
occupation of
Chahbār.

The mediation of the Viceroy of India in the dispute regarding Chahbār between 'Omān and Persia was offered, but was not accepted; and in the end no action was taken by the British Government to obtain the rendition of Chahbār to the Sultān,—a matter in which, according to the view of the authorities of that day, Great Britain was not interested. It only remains to add that in 1874 the Sultān of 'Omān, who apparently thought that Chahbār had been assigned to Persia in the adjustment of the Perso-Kalāt boundary, appealed to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy for rectification of the supposed error. In reply he was informed that the proceedings of the Boundary Commission had no reference to Chahbār, but that the British Government were nevertheless unable to interfere; and at the same time he was dissuaded from provoking a collision with Persia.

Events at Gwādar from 1873 to 1888.

After the loss of Chahbār the interests of the 'Omān Government in Makrān were limited to the town of Gwādar and a few square miles of territory adjoining.

Attack on
Gwādar by
'Abdul 'Azīz,
July-August
1873.

The year 1873 was marked by two attempts on the part of relations of Saiyid Turki to deprive him of possession of Gwādar; the rebels were Saiyid 'Abdul 'Azīz and Saiyid Sālim, the ex-Sultān of 'Omān, both of whom left Bombay for Makrān in native sailing vessels about the end of May. The movements of Sālim were delayed by his arrest on a warrant at Karāchi, upon a charge of cheating; but 'Abdul 'Azīz towards the end of June landed at Pasni, and on the 18th of July he appeared at Gwādar, where he established himself near the British Telegraph Station with the object of cutting the town off from its water supply. His following consisted of about 600 men, half of them Rinds and other subjects of Kalāt; and Khuda Nabi Bakhsh, a local chief of some influence, was among those who had attached themselves to his cause. The Sultān of 'Omān, when this trouble first arose, was engaged in an attempt to reduce Sohār; but he sent a small detachment of 20 men to Gwādar to reinforce the original garrison of 40 men. A much larger draft, sent later, unaccountably returned to Masqat; but the defence of Gwādar was greatly strengthened by the adhesion to the Sultān's cause of some local Kalmatis, the fear of a blood-feud with whom had a restraining effect upon the followers of 'Abdul 'Azīz. Matters remained in suspense until the 22nd of July, when a determined attempt was made by 'Abdul 'Azīz to carry the fort, and for a time it seemed as if the Sultān's Wali must capitulate to superior numbers; but the event did not justify these apprehensions. Matters however appeared so serious that the entire community of British subjects and persons under British protection now left the town, first affixing to their premises notices of nationality provided by Captain Mockler, the British Assistant Political Agent, and

assembled for safety in a sheltered situation near the Telegraph Office; and on the other side Khuda Nabi Bakhsh, alarmed at the prospect of injury to British interests, severed his connection with 'Abdul 'Aziz. At length, on the 7th of August, the besiegers withdrew baffled. The total cost of the operations to the Sultān of 'Omān was about Rs. 8,000; and the losses sustained by his Arab and Balūchi subjects were considerable.

The attack on Gwādar was not commenced by 'Abdul 'Aziz until, in reply to a request by him that British subjects might be removed beyond reach of danger, he had been informed that he would be held personally responsible for all injuries that might befall British persons or property through his acts of aggression. As at Chahbār in 1872, the protection of a British gunboat was not immediately available, and H.M.S. "Rifleman" did not reach the scene until two or three days after 'Abdul 'Aziz had commenced his operations; nevertheless, out of 139 British shops protected by official notices, only 5 were tampered with by 'Abdul 'Aziz's partisans; and, though the traders entitled to British protection estimated their losses at Rs. 48,658, Captain Mockler placed them at a very much lower figure. It was ruled by the Government of India that to recover compensation from Saiyid Turki would be unfair, and from Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz impossible; consequently no official estimate of the damage done was ever drawn up.

Losses of
British sub-
jects.

But the Government of India, while they recognised the impracticability of obtaining reparation from 'Abdul 'Aziz, were now resolved to put an end to his disorderly proceedings, as well as to those of Saiyid Salim, who, a few days after the incidents above described, announced his intention of making a fresh attack on Gwādar. 'Abdul 'Aziz was now in Bāhu and Salim in Kaij, and their presence was disturbing to the country at large and even threatened to cause trouble with Persia. Accordingly, at the end of August, the Commissioner in Sind was informed that, in case of the Saiyids approaching Gwādar to molest it, they might be called on to withdraw and to disperse their men, and that, if they refused, they might be arrested. A few days later the Commissioner was further authorised to inform the Saiyids that an allowance of \$300 a month would be paid to each of them by Saiyid Turki, on condition of their residing in British territory and abstaining for the future from interference in the affairs of 'Omān,—an offer for the consideration of which ten days were allowed them,—and to warn them that, if they forcibly threatened Gwādar or attempted to make their way to 'Omān or to the Persian Gulf, they would be liable to arrest.

Terms offered
by Saiyid
Turki to
'Abdul 'Aziz
and Salim,
and ultima-
tum of the
British Gov-
ernment.

The terms offered were not accepted by either of the Saiyids; but in September 1873, as we have seen in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, 'Abdul 'Aziz was captured at sea and removed to India. Salim however remained at large in Makrān, chiefly in the district of Dashtyāri, and definitely declined a renewed offer of the same terms as before.

Capture and
deportation
of 'Abdul
'Aziz, Sep-
tember 1873.

The course adopted seems to have driven Salim to desperation. In the early morning of the 8th of December 1873, having made a forced march from the interior of 100 miles in two days, he arrived in Gwādar with only 15 followers and captured the fort by escalade: the Wālī, one Sa'id-bin-Khamis, was absent at the time; and the acting Wālī was a weak man, incapable of action, but not, it was believed, disloyal to the Sultān. On the 11th of December H.M.S. "Columbine" and the

Seizure of
Gwādar by
Salim and
failure of an
attempt to
arrest him,
December
1873.

Manora " tug, carrying 60 armed police under a European officer, arrived from Karāchi, whence they had been despatched under the orders of Government ; and Captain Mockler arranged for a cordon to be drawn across the isthmus and called upon Saiyid Sālim to surrender. The summons, however, was ignored ; and, shortly after nightfall, Sālim, with the loss of a horse which was shot under him, succeeded in breaking through the line and in gaining the open country. As it was impossible to pursue him into Persian territory negotiations were re-opened, but Sālim still declined the terms proposed ; and in the end he escaped from Makrān and made his way back to his original retreat on Qishm Island.

Fresh machi-
nations
against Saiyid
Turki in
Makrān, 1874.

In April 1874 Saiyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, a brother of Sālim-bin-Thuwaini, left Masqat surreptitiously with one Dāhu, the same African who had given trouble at Gwādar in 1870, and landed, probably with disloyal intentions, at Puzim in Makrān ; but, in the month of September following, the pair were brought back in custody to Masqat by Dīn Muhammad, chief of the Dashtyāri district, whom the Sultān had suborned. The erring Saiyid was confined in the palace and not otherwise punished ; but Dāhu disappeared and was believed to have been executed.

Capture and
deportation
of Sālim,
October
1875.

From August to December 1875, Saiyid Turki himself resided at Gwādar, having virtually resigned the sovereignty of 'Omān for the time being into the hands of his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz, to whom he had been partially reconciled. In October, during his sojourn at Gwādar, Saiyid Sālim, his principal rival, was arrested at sea by a British man-of-war under the orders of 1873 and deported to India.

Fondness of
Saiyid Turki
for Gwādar
and his later
residences
and proceed-
ings there.

Gwādar was again visited by the Sultān in August and September 1881 for change of air, and in January 1883 ; shortly after his visit in 1883 he caused the garrison to be reinforced by a draft of 80 Wahhābis ; and between 1884 and 1886 a post was constructed under his orders at Pishukān, on the western boundary of the Gwādar enclave. In 1888, shortly before his death, Saiyid Turki, for whom Gwādar had always had a special attraction, wished to separate it from the rest of his dominions and confer it on his eldest son Muhammad ; but this intention remained unfulfilled.

Difficulties with the Rind tribe, 1875-86.

About 1875 strained relations arose between the Sultān's officials at Gwādar and the Balūchi tribe of Rinds, whose headquarters are in Mand, close to the Persian frontier, at a distance of about 80 miles from the coast. The Rind country is open and not destitute of cultivation, the fighting strength of the tribe is only about 1,500 men, and the majority of its members ordinarily follow peaceful pursuits ; but the headmen, on the other hand, possess little influence over individuals, and the tribe for this reason are prone to misbehave and difficult to control.

The trouble at Gwādar between the Rinds and the representatives of Saiyid Turki was intensified—if it was not created—by the treaty for the abolition of the slave trade signed by the Sultān in 1873, in which he bound himself to make free all persons entering his territories from without; and the liberation of slaves who took refuge at Gwādar, strict observance of the treaty being insisted on by the British Assistant Political Agent there, soon became a serious grievance in the eyes of the Rinds and other slave-owning tribes of the vicinity.

Causes of the
Rind trouble.

In 1875 some Rinds made a small raid upon a caravan travelling from Gwādar to Bāhu, and the whole tribe were as a punishment excluded from the town for six months by order of the Arab Wāli; but the effects of this blockade seem to have fallen chiefly upon the trade of Gwādar itself, and the Sultān found it necessary to appease the merchants and the customs farmer by paying them compensation out of his own pocket. In 1876 a party of Rinds, incensed by the manumission of some of their slaves at Gwādar, vowed vengeance against the British Political Agent; twice cut the telegraph wire in the neighbourhood; abducted a telegraph employé, who was however released after two or three days' detention; and committed other offences chiefly against the British telegraph establishment.

Early misbe-
haviour of
the tribe,
1875-76.

After this outbreak, minor outrages continued to occur from time to time, and in June 1879 feeling was much embittered by an unfortunate fracas in Gwādar town which resulted in the death of three Rinds, members of a party whom the Wāli had ordered to appear before him and who had attempted to resist his mandate by force. Seven prisoners taken by the Wāli on the same occasion were released on an agreement that no reprisals should be made, and that the tribe should abstain from depredations in future; but the incident was not forgotten by the Rinds, who more than once afterwards threatened to institute a retaliatory blood-feud, not only against the Arab Government but also against the British telegraph establishment. The situation was fully reported on at the time by Captain Durand, First Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who arrived at Gwādar while the matter of the seven Rind prisoners was still pending before the Wāli; he gave it as his opinion that the temerity of the Rinds was increasing, and that punitive measures of some sort were required for the restoration of order. To allay apprehension during what was locally regarded as a crisis, H.M.S. "Ready" was sent for a time to Gwādar to protect British subjects and their property.

Serious Rind
episode at
Gwādar,
1879.

The trade of Gwādar with India and Balūchistān was none the less increasing at this time; it was mainly in the hands of British subjects, who now numbered 50 or 60 households.

In 1880 there was a lull in the offences committed by Rinds and no more serious cases occurred until 1883. In January of that year, however, while Saiyid Turki was personally present at Gwādar on a visit to the place, an attack was made by a gang of 16 Rinds on a telegraph party at Sarchib, 57 miles west of Gwādar; it resulted in the kidnapping of a telegraph Jamadar and the carrying off of a considerable amount of property, some of which belonged to the British Government. The Rind country had suffered from scarcity during three years, and the primary

Recrudescence of the
Rind trouble,
1883.

object of the attack was undoubtedly plunder; but the excuse alleged by the Rinds themselves was the Gwādar affair of 1879, and it is not improbable that a desire to embarrass the Sultān may have been among the motives of the crime. The Jamadar was released after a few days, but stores of considerable value remained unrecovered, and the Rinds were said to have renewed their threats of a feud against the British and 'Omāni Governments. Major Mockler, who had an intimate knowledge of Gwādar, acquired during his service there as Assistant Political Agent, was deputed from Basrah to examine into the situation; and after local inquiry he arrived at the conclusion that, while there was no danger of a feud, the time had come for the coercion of the Rinds by the troops of the Khān of Kalāt, assisted, if necessary, by the British Government. As a measure of precaution, however, an escort consisting of a Jamadar and six camel-riders was provided for the protection of the Inspector of the telegraph-line between Gwādar and Chahbār; and the sale of gunpowder and similar articles to Rinds was prohibited at Gwādar by order of the Wāli.

Attempted
settlement of
the Rind
difficulty,
1884.

A tour by the Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān in some of the outlying portions of his charge had been for some time in contemplation; and in July 1883 Sir Robert Sandeman was authorised to visit with a military escort, during the ensuing cold weather, the tracts of Panjgur, Kaij, and Southern Balūchistān. A part of his mission, as defined by his instructions from the Government of India, was to enquire into, and so far as possible settle, the questions pending with the Rinds at Gwādar; and it was arranged that Major Mockler, on account of his local experience, should be associated with him in the task. The Rinds were at this time being solicited to profess allegiance to Persia, but there was little danger of trouble from this cause, and a more substantial obstacle in the way of a settlement was the nominal character of the control as yet exercised by the Khān of Kalāt over this part of his dominions. Sir R. Sandeman reached Kaij on the 5th of February 1884, and was met there by Major Mockler; but the Rinds, in spite of a summons which had been addressed to them, did not at first appear. After five days' delay at Kaij a move was made to Tump, a Rind village 40 miles west of Turbat, and this had the effect of bringing in some of the Rind headmen and their followers. At Tump Sir R. Sandeman appointed a Jirgah for the disposal of 26 cases pending between Gwādar and Kalāt subjects and the Rinds; but the proceedings of the Jirgah, held on the 12th, 13th and 14th February, were partial and unsatisfactory, and some differences of opinion arose between Sir R. Sandeman and Major Mockler. On the 14th of February, however, an agreement was executed by the Rind chiefs in attendance, by which they undertook to be responsible for the conduct of their tribesmen and to surrender evil-doers.

On the 20th of February Sir R. Sandeman reached Gwādar; but nothing could be effected there as the Wāli had no power to settle cases on behalf of the Sultān, and the necessary authority was not obtainable without delay. On the 23rd of February Sir Robert left for Karāchi, where, in consultation with Mr. Finch, Director of Telegraphs, he summarily decided the telegraph claims which lay against the Rinds. Subsequently the Wāli of Gwādar, who seems to have had insufficient

notice of what was required on his part, produced a list of 90 supplementary claims by 'Omāni subjects against the Rinds; and Sir R. Sandeman and Colonel Ross, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, agreed that these should be disposed of at a meeting between Colonel Miles, the Political Agent at Masqat, and Mr. Ffinch. The arrangement, however, broke down on a preliminary point.

The whole matter then came before the Government of India, with a strong recommendation on the part of Sir R. Sandeman that the Rinds should be treated with leniency and in accordance with tribal custom, and his report was very carefully reviewed. The proposed settlement, however, was not approved by the Government of India; and instead a special tribunal was constituted, with powers to consider all claims against and by the Rinds, including claims already disposed of by Sir R. Sandeman when a retrial of such might appear to the court itself to be advisable. It was ordered that claims of more than twelve years' standing should be treated as time-barred; but, with a view to a complete settlement, the Sultān of 'Omān was persuaded to agree to the submission of the celebrated Rind claim on account of the three tribesmen killed at Gwādar in 1879 to the judgment of the tribunal. For the trial of the bulk of the cases the court consisted of Colonel Reynolds of the Balūchistān Agency and Colonel Miles, Political Agent at Masqat, but in the disposal of telegraph claims the place of Colonel Miles was taken by Mr. Ffinch, Director of Telegraphs; the tribunal was assisted in its deliberations by native assessors, representing the interests, respectively, of Masqat, Kalāt and the Rinds. The cases and counter-cases settled amounted to 123 in all. Thirteen of these were telegraph cases; and it was proved that the wire had been cut four times, and that telegraph employes had several times been robbed. In the case of the Jamadar kidnapped and property looted in 1883, a fine of Rs. 620 was imposed on account of the damage not made good. The remaining 110 general cases included 5 of considerable raids, several of highway robbery, and a number relating to petty cattle-thefts, besides the Rind claim of 1879. Except in regard to the last-mentioned case, which was referred for decision to the Government of India, the judges found themselves in complete accord. No decrees were passed in favour of the Rinds; but judgment was given against the tribe, on behalf of Arab and British subjects, for sums amounting to Rs. 5,216 and Rs. 1,744, respectively. The proceedings began on the 6th of March and were concluded on the 16th of April 1885.

Settlement
with the
Rinds, 1885-
86.

The findings of the special court in which both judges agreed were, but for one trifling modification, accepted by the Government of India as they stood; and, concurring with Colonel Miles and disagreeing with Colonel Reynolds, they rejected the Rind claim of 1879, which was for an amount exceeding Rs. 6,000. The question of the execution of the award was one of some difficulty, for the Rinds had been led to expect that no serious demands would be made against them on account of past offences, and there were also doubts as to the feasibility of coercing the tribe without resort to expensive operations; so ultimately, in view of these facts, of the improvement in the behaviour of the tribe since 1883, and of their submission to Sir R. Sandeman in 1884, the Government of India decided themselves to undertake the obligations of the Rinds on

condition of the tribe's executing a bond for good behaviour and an undertaking to repay within five years the amounts liquidated on their behalf; repayment however was to be demanded only in event of fresh misbehaviour by the tribe. The required agreement having been obtained by Colonel Reynolds on the 20th of February 1886, the liabilities of the tribe to their creditors were discharged by the Government of India out of public funds, and no demand was made upon the Rinds for repayment.

British political representation at Gwādar from 1873 to the present time.

Changes of
organisation,
1863-77.

From 1863 until 1877 the European Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar remained under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind, being regarded at the same time as an assistant to the Political Agents at Masqat and Kalāt; but after 1873, in consequence of the transfer of the Persian Gulf in that year from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, matters reported by him were referred to the Supreme Government by the Commissioner in Sind, instead of to the Western Presidency. In 1873 the Sultan's Wālī of Gwādar endeavoured to persuade the Assistant Political Agent to intervene in a difficulty with some of the Rinds of Mand; but, this request having been brought to the notice of the Government of India, they enjoined their representative to interfere as little as possible in local quarrels.

In 1877 the British officer at Gwādar was withdrawn from the authority of the Commissioner in Sind, and was made Assistant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf for the country between Gwādar and Jāshk, remaining Assistant to the Political Agent at Masqat in respect of Gwādar proper, and becoming Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān in regard to Kalāt affairs. This change was due to difficulties in regard to political jurisdiction on the coast between Gwādar and Jāshk, which had been assigned to the Persian Gulf Residency, but which was actually supervised from Gwādar. The pay of the appointment was now fixed at Rs. 1,000 a month and its cost was divided equally between the Political and Telegraph Departments.

In 1879, the advisability of maintaining a British officer at Gwādar having been called in question, and the post being vacant at the time, Sir R. Sandeman, then in charge of Balūchistān, advocated the reduction of the post to a native agency controlled by the Political Agent at Kalāt; and in that year partly on account of the phenomenal unhealthiness of the Gwādar station, where a kind of wasting fever generally prevailed, the European Assistant Political Agency was abolished and a Native Agency substituted. The reconstituted Agency, however, instead of being placed under the Political Agent at Kalāt, was made subordinate to the Deputy Director (now the Director) of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, on whom political charge of the whole Makrān coast was at the same time conferred, his position with respect to the British political authorities in the

Persian Gulf, 'Omān and Balūchistān being assimilated to that held by the Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar between 1877 and 1879. This arrangement, inasmuch as the Director is the head of British telegraph interests in Makrān and possesses special facilities for visiting the coast in a telegraph vessel, was found convenient; and, with an interval of a few months in 1884 during which charge of Gwādar was assumed by the Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān, it remained undisturbed from 1880 onwards.

In 1877, possibly in connection with the turbulence of the Rinds near Gwādar, it was arranged to increase the strength of the Assistant Political Agent's military guard to about 24 sepoys; but the change did not apparently take effect until the end of 1878. In January 1880 the guard was again reduced to 12, and in December 1880 to 8 men, in consequence of the extreme unhealthiness of the station; and soon afterwards it was abolished altogether.

Indian Military guard,
1877-80.

In September 1893 the telegraph station at Gwādar was closed, and a telephone communicating with Chahbār and Ormārah was provided instead for the use of the Native Political Agent; but the arrangement was not found satisfactory, and in the following year the telegraph station was re-opened as a combined post and telegraph office.

Telegraph station at Gwādar closed, 1893, and re-opened, 1894.

Proposals since 1895 for the transfer of Gwādar from the Sultān of 'Omān to the Government of India or the Khān of Kalāt.

The failure of the Khān of Kalāt in 1861 to recover Gwādar by the good offices of the Government of India has been already mentioned in its proper place; but it remains to notice some later proposals which were made from time to time with the object of abolishing the apparent anomaly of 'Omāni sovereignty in Makrān.

In 1885 the question was mooted by Sir R. Sandeman, then Agent to the Governor-General in Balūchistān, who suggested that the port should be acquired from the Sultān on a quit-rent and handed over for management either to the Khān of Kalāt or to the British authorities in Balūchistān; but the Government of India negatived the scheme, as they considered that the British occupation of Gwādar would entail serious responsibilities, and that, even if the Khān of Kalāt were disposed to purchase the place, which he was not, it would be impolitic to press the transfer upon the Sultān of 'Omān.

The subject was revived in 1891, when the Government of India, on the ground that the Sultān had lately signed an agreement restricting his own power to dispose of territory and that Gwādar was no longer regarded as of high value to Balūchistān, again declined to take steps to obtain a cession of the place.

Between 1900 and 1902 indications were not wanting of an interest in Gwādar on the part of Russia and France, and the Government of India proposed to His Majesty's Government that an attempt to secure a cession of the port on reasonable terms should be made through the

Khān of Kalāt, the necessary funds being supplied by the Government of India and the Khān alone appearing in the transaction; the expenditure, it was urged, would be justifiable as an insurance against an attempt by a foreign power to obtain a footing on the Makrān coast. The Home Government, who, in view of the attitude of France in 'Omān affairs, did not consider that the question could judiciously be taken up in the manner indicated, suggested that an effort should be made instead to obtain a lease of the Gwādar customs for the Khān of Kalāt for a fixed term of years; but this alternative did not commend itself to the Government of India, and the matter accordingly dropped.

In September 1903 the Khān of Kalāt requested the assistance of the British Government in obtaining the rendition of Gwādar; and in January 1904 the Jām of Las Bailah also advanced a claim, not seriously sustainable, to possession of the port, which he alleged that a bride from Kalāt had brought into his family as a part of her dowry. The Government of India, however, decided in 1904 not to take action on either of these applications; and at this point the question rested.

Renewed trouble with the Rind tribe, 1891-1894.

Friction with
the Rinds
in 1891 and
1892.

Since the beginning of the reign of Saiyid Faisal over 'Omān, peace and security have ordinarily prevailed at Gwādar; but until 1891, notwithstanding the settlement of 1886, friction with the Rinds still occasionally arose from questions connected with the liberation of slaves. In 1891 the demeanour of the tribe was discontented and menacing; and the Native Agent who represented the British Government, and who appeared for that reason to be in some danger, was ordered to live in the fort; but nothing happened to justify the apprehensions which had been excited. Again in May 1892 the Rinds demanded the surrender of 70 slaves whom they alleged to have absconded to Gwādar, threatening in case of refusal to create a disturbance, and the situation was sufficiently serious to necessitate a re-inforcement of the garrison and the despatch of an official of high rank from 'Omān; but it subsided for the time on a warning being conveyed to the Rinds through the Political Agent in Southern Balūchistān. During the cold weather of 1892-93 fugitive slaves continued to collect at Gwādar, where their number in May 1893 amounted to several hundreds; and so strained was the situation thus created that it was found advisable to induce the refugees to remove to British India, and some of them were even provided with the means of reaching that destination.

Final settle-
ment with
the Rinds,
1894.

The trouble continued at Gwādar, in the form of threats and even of petty outrages by the indignant Rind slave owners, until the beginning of 1894, when, on the 15th of January, a satisfactory settlement with the tribe was at length negotiated by Captain Ramsay. By the new agreement, which was in writing, the Rinds bound themselves to make no further disturbances at Gwādar on account of fugitive slaves, while the Government of India undertook that released slaves should not be allowed to remain at Gwādar for more than 15 days after

their liberation ; furthermore, upon the Rinds promising to make restitution for the raids that they had recently committed, the forfeiture of Rs. 7,010 to which the tribe had now become liable under the settlement of 1886 was waived. After 1894 the Rind question was not prominent at Gwādar.

Affairs at Gwādar after 1888.

Other noteworthy events at Gwādar during the period under consideration were few. In 1892 there was a serious outbreak of small-pox in the months of March, April and May ; its ravages were intensified by the refusal of the people to permit the isolation of cases, even Khōjah and Hindu merchants declining to allow their patients to be removed to hospital. In the same year a few cattle, the property of British Government employés, were stolen with the connivance of the headman of Nigwar ; and a long and troublesome case followed, which was ultimately settled by the Sultān agreeing to advance the compensation himself and recover it afterwards from the delinquents. In April 1893 a terrible fire broke out in the town of Gwādar, which rendered 1,000 people homeless and caused damage to the extent of about Rs. 80,000. In 1905 Mir Ahmad Khan, one of the joint rulers of Bāhu, looted 300 camels from Pālairi within the border of the Sultān of 'Omān ; his intention was to punish a tribe who had left his dominions and settled at Pālairi with the Sultān's permission, but among the camels carried off were a number belonging to employés of the British telegraph. Partial restitution was eventually obtained in this case.

Natural calamities, tribal raids, etc.

In the Sultān's administration of Gwādar the department of finance is the most important, but it was for a time the one of which the working was the least satisfactory. In 1897 the taxes imposed on the fish-yards owned by British subjects were found to be excessive and out of all proportion to the profits of the industry ; nevertheless Saiyid Faisal was at first disinclined to reduce them, and an abatement was not obtained without considerable difficulty.

Taxation.

In the summer of 1903 direct management of the Gwādar customs was introduced by the Sultān, and the application of a uniform *ad valorem* import duty of 5 per cent. was announced ; but the results were less favourable than they had been at Masqat, and much discontent was caused by the abolition of some complicated customs and privileges of long standing, to which the merchants of the port were attached. In 1903-04 the gross customs receipts under the new system were only \$22,000, as against \$40,000 obtained by farming the right of collection in the previous year. In February 1904 Saiyid Faisal paid a personal visit to Gwādar, in the course of which various misunderstandings between the merchants and his officials were removed ; and in the same year he changed his Superintendent of Customs. Accordingly in 1904-05 the gross receipts rose to \$27,000, and by 1907 the complaints of the merchants had ceased, and the uniform import duty of 5 per cent. was being regularly collected.

Customs.

General ad-
ministration.

The administrative difficulties of the Sultān at Gwādar were largely due to the difficulty of obtaining trustworthy and capable officials in his dominions. In 1902 the Saiyid Faisal removed Saif-bin-Sa'id from the Wādlīship of Gwādar as his conduct there was not satisfactory, but that of his successor was worse and compelled the Sultān temporarily to reappoint the former governor. In 1903, however, the Sultān was fortunate enough to find, in one Saif-bin-Ya'arab, a more successful and deserving representative.

ANNEXURE NO. 3.—HISTORY OF RUŪS-AL-JIBĀL.

The internal history of the remarkable mountainous headland of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, tenanted entirely by the semi-barbarous tribes of Shihūh and Dhahūriyīn, is almost unknown. Its external history may be divided into three periods: an early period, during which the external relations of the district were chiefly with the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah; a middle period, from 1864 to 1868, during which a British telegraph station existed in Khor-ash-Sham or Elphinstone Inlet and direct dealings between the British authorities and the tribesmen of the neighbourhood appear to have been the rule; and, finally, a recent period, during which the right of the Sultān of 'Omān to authority over the district has gradually become clear.

Early period, 1836-1864.

War of the
Shaikh of
Shārjah
against the
Shihūh,
1839.

In 1836 an admission is said to have been made to the British authorities in the Gulf by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, that the Shihūh of Ruūs-al-Jibāl were dependents of the Qāsimi Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar; but the tribe themselves did not apparently admit their subordination to that chief and continued to maintain a friendly intercourse with Masqat. A quarrel subsequently arose between the Shihūh and the Shaikh of Shārjah through the dismantlement of a Shihhi fort in the neighbourhood of Dibah by a Qāsimi official to whom it had been treacherously surrendered; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, finding himself unable to retaliate effectively by land upon the Shihūh, who were now raiding his territories, resolved in 1839 on a naval blockade of their whole coast, especially of Khasab and Kumzār; but the progress of the Egyptians in Najd, by which the Shaikh's position was more vitally affected, caused him to abandon his intention and to conclude, instead, a hasty peace with the Shihūh.

Second war
of the
Shaikh of
Shārjah
against the
Shihūh,
1855-57.

In 1855, in consequence of the murder of Mashāri-bin-Ibrāhīm, Qāsimi governor of Dibah and grandson of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, by Shihūh over whom he had attempted to tyrannise, the Shaikh of Shārjah called his subjects of Shārjah, Khān, Abu Hail, Fasht and Hairah to arms, and ordered the majority of them to rendezvous at Rās-al-Khaimah and march thence by land against Dibah; while he himself

accompanied by 100 boats and the whole fighting strength of the Za'ab tribe, proceeded to the same destination by sea. The Qāsimi land forces under the Shaikh's sons were unable to force the mountain defiles, and in the end they also were conveyed by boat to Dibah. The war, at first local, shortly became general; for the Shihūh of Kumzār and other places now put to sea to pursue the boats of the Qawāsim, or to carry assistance to their kinsmen at Dibah; and the Qawāsim, on their part, began to attack the Shihūh, wherever found. In one instance a Kumzāri Batil, which happened to put into Khor Fakkān, was seized by the people of that place, who killed eight of the crew and made the rest prisoners. At length in January 1857, when this state of matters had lasted apparently about a year, the British Political Resident, Captain Felix Jones, called upon Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to desist from sending troops and warlike stores by sea; and the Shaikh, with a bad grace and not without an attempt in 1858 to obtain cancellation of the orders by a direct reference to the Government of Bombay, ultimately submitted. It was part of the Shaikh of Shārjah's case that the Shihūh were his rebellious subjects, whom he must be allowed full liberty to coerce; but the Resident at this time believed that the allegiance of the Shihūh was due, and had, unless in exceptional circumstances, hitherto been rendered, to the ruler of Masqat,* and that the object of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was simply to subdue the tribe wrongfully and by force of arms to his own authority.

In 1859 the British Political Resident visited Bakhah, Khasab, Kumzār and other principal points on the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl in a steam frigate, of which the appearance created a great sensation among the unsophisticated barbarians of the country, and obtained the release of some Qāsimi prisoners who had been captured from boats at sea by the Shihūh. As to the political status of the country, the impression which he derived from intercourse with the people was that they had a predilection for the Government of the Saiyid of Masqat and were animated by an implacable hatred of the Qawāsim. It was evidently in the course of this tour that Captain Jones, as described in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, obtained at Khasab the surrender of a pirate whom, as a subject of Masqat, he at once handed over for execution to Saiyid Sa'id.

Tour of the British Resident along the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1859.

Two offences against security at sea, committed in 1859 or 1860 by inhabitants of Bakhah, were, as related in the history of Trucial 'Omān, settled direct by the British authorities with the local Shaikh; but in 1863 Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on receiving a complaint from the Shaikh of Khasab that his village of Ghassah had been burnt to the ground by a boat expedition from Kumzār, referred the parties to the Political Agent at Masqat, at the same time reporting to the Government of Bombay that both Khasab and Kumzār belonged to the Sultanate proper of 'Omān.

Minor events in Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1859-1863.

* It is not clear whether this opinion refers to the whole of the Shihūh or only to those, probably of Bai'ah, between whom and the Qawāsim the disagreement originally arose.

Middle period, 1864-1868.

At this juncture affairs in a part of Ruūs-al-Jibāl were brought, for a time, under the immediate notice of the British political authorities, through the establishment by the Indo-European Telegraph Department of a short land line across the isthmus of Maqlab, between the Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets, and of a telegraph station on an island in the latter.

History of
the British
telegraph
occupation,
February
1864 to
December
1868.

The telegraph cable, brought from Gwādar, was landed on the 9th of February 1864 on the Maqlab isthmus, where Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent at Masqat, had spent a fortnight of the preceding month in establishing relations with the people of the country. Much trouble was experienced in dealing with the uncivilised Dhahūriyīn, especially of the two neighbouring villages of Habalain and Maqāqah; quarrels arose among the indigenes themselves, and between them and the workmen of the construction party; honest labour at a fair price was not to be obtained; telegraph stores were pilfered; and finally an intimidating, or more truly a begging letter was received from "all the Bedouins," of which the key-note was "Give us something, or your abode is not safe." No material assistance was lent by the Sultān of 'Omān, though he asserted the country to be under his jurisdiction; but the practical difficulties of the situation were eventually overcome by the personal influence of the British officers. Although no actual danger was apprehended, Colonel Disbrowe considered that the presence of a vessel of war for two or three months would have a good effect; and the gunboat "Hugh Rose" was accordingly sent from Bombay to protect, for a time, the newly established telegraph station and its occupants. The cable-laying ships and main part of the telegraph party proceeded on their way to Būshehr about the middle of March.

For nearly four years, notwithstanding the drawbacks of the place, the telegraph station in Elphinstone Inlet was maintained; but at length, in December 1868, the office was transferred to Jāshk on the Persian coast. The heat in Elphinstone Inlet was excessive; and the insolence of the natives, notwithstanding the periodical gifts which their chiefs received, had been frequently such as to make the presence of a gunboat necessary.

Discussions
as to the own-
ership of the
Ruūs-al-Jibāl
district,
1864.

In 1864, in connection with the operations, and with regard particularly to control of the natives and protection of the telegraph station, the question of the ownership of Ruūs-al-Jibāl was raised, and was found to present considerable difficulties. In January 1864 Colonel Disbrowe, who had hitherto assumed that the district belonged to the 'Omān Sultānate, was informed by Sulaimān, Shaikh of the village, that the people of Habalain owned allegiance to the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah; and the Political Agent, though the statement was not satisfactorily corroborated and was on the contrary denied by a Wālī whom the Sultān then maintained at Khasab, considered the point to

be of such importance that he returned to Masqat with Colonel Stewart, R.E., the Director of the telegraph operations, and asked Saiyid Thuwaini to state in writing, for purposes of official record, whether Maqlab itself and the villages of Habalain and Maqāqah, between which the telegraph line crossed the isthmus, were part of His Highness's territory, and whether he agreed to certain local dispositions proposed by the telegraph officials. In reply, in a communication dated 21st February 1864, the Sultān with reference to "Maqlab, Khasab and their neighbourhood" stated categorically "These are all my country and my dependents, no one has any concern with them;" and he assented to the suggestions regarding details of construction. From local enquiries, made later, it seemed certain that Kumzār and Khasab on the western coast, together with the villages between them, actually acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultān of 'Omān; but some doubt remained as to the status of the inhabitants of Film, Shābūs, and Shīсах on the eastern side of the promontory, who were said to be virtually independent while at home and to become subjects of the Shaikh of the Shārjah in the date season, when they were accustomed to migrate to Dibah. On the other hand no claim to any part of Ruūs-al-Jibāl was openly advanced by the Shaikh of Shārjah, and it was stated that, in reply to a reference from the Shaikh of Maqāqah, Sultān-bin-Saqar had merely ordered that the telegraph operations should not be opposed in any way.

The undisputed doubts in regard to jurisdiction at Maqlab continued for some time to exercise the Government of Bombay; but they clearly inclined to the view that the tract belonged to Masqat. The question whether the telegraph station should be regarded as lying in the official district of the Consul at Masqat or in that of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, between whom at this time there was some friction, was decided by the Bombay Government on the 21st of April in favour of the former officer, on the ground that "it is generally admitted that Mussendom is in the territory of the Imaum of Muscat;" and later, on the 5th of July 1864, the same Government ruled that "the Telegraph Islands in the Elphinstone Inlet are part of the Muscat territory," and that consequently the Political Agent at Masqat should deal with offences committed in Ruūs-al-Jibāl by British subjects under his consular instructions, obtaining from the Sultān of 'Omān the requisite authority to dispose of such as might be committed by others. On the 26th of October 1864 however, on a representation by Colonel Pelly, Resident in the Persian Gulf, that it was inexpedient to raise a question of local boundaries and that the contingency of claims to ownership by the Trucial Shaikhs might be provided for by the execution of an agreement on their part to protect the British telegraph at all places in or near their territory, the Government of Bombay readily assented, adding that no investigation of claims had been either intended or authorised; and, as the Government of India held similar views, an agreement was obtained in the form suggested, as is related in the history of Trucial 'Omān. The ownership of Ruūs-al-Jibāl thus remained indeterminate.

In 1865 a journey was made by land from Dibah to Rās-al-Khaimah by Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent at Masqat, and Captain Powell

of the late Indian Navy ; but the only record of it that exists is a sketch map, and the purpose for which it was made is not known.

Recent period, 1869-1907.

Agreement
by the Sul-
tān of 'Omān
with the Qā-
simi Shaikh,
1871.

As mentioned in the history* of the Shamailiyah tract, a written agreement was executed by Saiyid Turki, Sultān of 'Omān, in 1871, by which he acknowledged the title of the Qāsimi Shaikh to the whole of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district with the exception of Khasab, but the beneficiary never founded any claim to possession upon this document, and in 1879 it was repudiated as invalid by Turki himself for reasons which, if they were in accordance with the facts, cannot but be deemed sufficient.

Question of
the maritime
peace on the
coast of
Ruūs-al-Ji-
bāl, 1881.

In 1881, in connection with hostilities which arose in 1879 between the people of Fujairah and their suzerain the Shaikh of Shārajah, it was decided by the Government of India that peace at sea should be maintained along the coast of Shamailiyah, and—so far as convenient—along the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, in the same manner as upon the shores of Trucial 'Omān.

Minor events,
1885-90.

In 1885 or 1886 the Shaikh of Bakhah brought himself to notice by an armed demonstration at sea in the direction of Sha'am; and in 1893 one of the Shaikhs of the Shihūh of Khasab was called to account, through the Sultān of 'Omān, for a similar irregularity in regard to the same place. Further details of both of these cases will be found in the general history of Trucial 'Omān. In 1887, one of the men of the Masqat Wālī of Khasab having been killed in a fight between the Bani Hadiyah and Bani Shatair divisions of the Shihūh at that place, Saiyids Faisal and Fahad, sons of the Sultān of 'Omān, went by sea to Khasab, and, after recovering a fine of \$500 from each, reconciled the factions with one another. In 1888 the Sultān of 'Omān was obliged to send a ship to stop fighting which had again broken out at Khasab between the Bani Hadiyah and the Bani Shatair; and on this occasion three men of the former and four Shaikhs of the latter division were brought back as prisoners to Masqat and interned in Fort Jalāli. Between 1886 and 1890 some unrest prevailed among the Shihūh of Ruūs-al-Jibāl adjoining Rās-al-Khaimah, and various raids, murders and other injuries were committed by them in the environs of the town; but they did not themselves come off scatheless in all their attempts. These disturbances are noticed in the history of Trucial 'Omān.

The great
Kumzār
pearl case,
1899-1902.

A case which arose in 1899 concerning the royalty on a very valuable pearl, found by a wader of Kumzār in Ruūs-al-Jibāl, is described at length in the Appendix on the Pearl Fisheries; the result indicated that the title of the Sultān of 'Omān to sovereignty over Ruūs-al-Jibāl was not now questioned by the Trucial Shaikhs, at least not by the Shaikh of Shārajah.

* *Vide* page 780 *post*.

In 1900, as explained in the chapter on the General History of the Persian Gulf, the evident intention of other European powers to establish for themselves a naval position in the Gulfs of Persia and 'Omān made it unnecessary to consider, from the British point of view, the naval situation in those waters; and the promontory of Ruūs-al-Jibāl figured largely in the ensuing deliberations of the British and Indian Governments. The practical results of the discussion find their appropriate place elsewhere; but in this place the facts finally elicited in regard to the ownership of the district may be placed on record.

Recent investigations of the political status of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1900-05.

In 1902 a voyage along the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl was made by Major P. Z. Cox, then Political Agent at Masqat, chiefly for the purpose of ascertaining local opinion on the subject of jurisdiction. Major Cox reported that the Shaikh of Līmah admitted, in the abstract, his subordination to Saiyid Faisal-bin-Turki of Masqat and regarded the Sultān's wishes as a law to him. The Dhahūriyīn of Malcolm Inlet seemed to recognise that the ruler of Masqat possessed at least a patriarchal authority over them; and they added that, if any dispute should arise amongst themselves, they would appeal to the Sultān to settle it. The people of Kumzār unhesitatingly and unequivocally acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultān, not only over themselves but over the whole Shihhi tribe, with the exception of a few who were said to be subject to Rās-al-Khaimah.* The Shihūh of the villages between Elphinstone Inlet and the Rās-al-Khaimah border expressed friendly and loyal sentiments towards Saiyid Faisal, and their Shaikh was in the habit of paying complimentary visits to the Sultān at Masqat. On the other hand, facts were observed by Major Cox which seemed to point to the enjoyment by the inhabitants generally of practical independence; and Major Cox was of opinion that, on the evidence obtained by him, it was open to the British Government to regard Ruūs-al-Jibāl either as a district of the 'Omān Sultanate or as an autonomous tract.

The 20th of November 1903 was spent by Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, while on tour in the Persian Gulf, with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Atkinson-Willes, in an examination of the inlets and coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl; but no opportunity occurred in the course of this short visit for a satisfactory investigation of the political position of any of the villages.

In March 1905 the present writer, partly with a view to supplementing Major Cox's enquiries by ascertaining what opinion as to the ownership of Ruūs-al-Jibāl prevailed in a neighbouring district, paid a visit to Shārajah, where a meeting, attended by the Shaikh of Shārajah himself, by an intelligent Shihhi, and by various other well-informed men, was held at the house of the Residency Agent for the purpose of investigating this and other points of geographical and political interest. By the assembly it was stated, with absolute unanimity, that all places upon the sea between Sha'am and Dibah, in other words the whole coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, belonged to Masqat; and no difference of status in the interior was suggested.

*Probably the Shihūh of Sha'am, Ghallāh and Khor Khuwair, who live outside the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district, and whose position as dependents of Rās-al-Khaimah has never been doubtful.

From the facts related in the foregoing summary of events it will be apparent that sovereignty has been claimed and exercised in the past by the Sultāns of 'Omān over parts of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, especially Khasab; that the inhabitants, though in most places they exist in a state of virtual independence, are generally disposed to admit a connection with Masqat; and that the Shaikh of Shārajah, whose grandfather was supposed in 1864 to entertain a rival claim to the district, does not now dispute the title of the Sultān of 'Omān.

ANNEXURE NO. 4.—AGREEMENT REGARDING CESSION
OF TERRITORY BY THE SULTAN OF 'OMĀN, 20TH
MARCH 1891.

Praise be to God alone !

The object of writing this lawful and honourable Bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between His Highness Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultān of Muskat and Oman, on the one part, and Colonel Edward Charles Ross, Companion of the Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of the British Government, on the other part, that the said Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultān of Muskat and Oman, does pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Muskat and Oman or any of their dependencies.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable Bond Seyyid Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan of Muskat and Oman, and Colonel Edward Charles Ross, Companion of the Star of India, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the former for himself, his heirs and successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each, in the presence of witnesses affix their signatures on this ninth day of Shaaban one thousand three hundred and eight (A.H.) corresponding to the twentieth day of March (A.D.) 1891.

E. C. ROSS,
*Colonel, Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.*

Signature of His Highness Seyyid
Feysal bin Turki bin Saeed, Sultan
of Muskat and Oman.

LANSDOWNE,
*Viceroy and Governor-General of
India.*

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twenty-third day of May 1891.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

ANNEXURE NO. 5.—TRANSLATION OF AN UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY THE SULTAN OF 'OMAN ON THE 31ST OF MAY 1902, TO THE BRITISH POLITICAL AGENT AT MASQAT, REGARDING THE SUR COALFIELDS.

After the usual compliments.—Regarding the communication you made to me on the subject of the Geologist's report and the views of Government on the subject of the coal deposits, Your Honour is at liberty to inform Government on my behalf that for the present I have no intention of entering upon the work myself; and that in the future, if any Government or company ask my permission to embark upon the mining enterprise in question, I will not accord such permission without first communicating with Government, in order that they may themselves take up the work with me if they feel so inclined. This is what had to be written, may you be preserved.

•

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF TRUCIAL 'OMĀN.*

The history of the region at the present day known as Trucial 'Omān before the middle of the 18th century is almost entirely lost.

PERIOD PRECEDING THE RISE OF PIRACY,
1600-1778.

Relations of
the Portu-
guese with
the coast of
'Omān
between Khor
Quwai and
Rās-al-
Khaimah,
1600-1750.

In February 1625, after his defeat off Bandar 'Abbās by the English and the Dutch, the Portuguese commander Ruy Freire de Andrade retired with some of his vessels to an anchorage—probably Khor Quwai—on the opposite Arabian coast, and there established a temporary base;

* The chief general authorities for the history of Trucial 'Omān are *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf*, 1801-53, printed in 1906, supplementing the last in various important respects; Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Trucial Chiefs*, 1854-1905, also published in 1906; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Buckingham in his *Travels in Assyria, Media and Persia*, 1829, gives a valuable and independent account of the piracies of the Qawāsīm; and Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, contains full information relative to all British naval or combined land and sea operations affecting Trucial 'Omān. Some additional facts relating to the Qāsimi pirates will be found in Moir's *Journey through Persia*, 1812, and in Mignan's *Winter Journey*, 1839.

For early times (1600-1800) the authorities are, generally, those cited in the footnote to the title of Chapter First of this volume.

For revision of the recent history of the tract, and for much supplementary information regarding the same, the writer is indebted to Major P. Z. Cox, Resident in the Persian Gulf, who was assisted in his enquiries by Khān Bahādur 'Abdul Latif, Residency Agent at Shārah. Interesting extracts from the Regimental Records of the 65th Foot were kindly supplied by Captain T. D. Parkinson, Adjutant, 1st York and Lancaster Regiment; and the writer is also indebted to Major H. G. Pardon and to Captain J. B. Wall (P) Adjutant, of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.

and about the same time the Portuguese authorities seem to have had in view the establishment of a station at Khasab. Eventually Kung became the chief if not the only Portuguese settlement in the Persian Gulf proper, though, from a mandate of the King of Portugal dated 1649, for the strengthening of the "fortress of Cassapo," it might perhaps be inferred that a post was also maintained at Khasab. About 1631, in pursuance of measures for recovering Hormūz from the Persians by force, the Portuguese built a fort "in Julfar," *i.e.*, near Rās-al-Khaimah; and this may have been the post, just mentioned, which is conjectured to have existed at Khasab.

It does not appear that the Arabs of the 'Omān coast were much in evidence in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās, or anywhere upon the Persian side of the Gulf, before the Afghān invasion of Persia which began in 1720. In the confusion following the overthrow of the Safavi dynasty Shaikh Rāshid, probably the ruler of Rās-al-Khaimah, seized Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm and there established a settlement of which the trade seriously affected the customs receipts at Bandar 'Abbās, then shared by the Persians and the English. This led to an English naval expedition in April 1727 against Shaikh Rāshid, conducted by Mr. W. H. Draper, the East India Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās; the ships employed were the "Britannia" frigate, the "Bengal" galley, and two Trankis; and the outcome was the recovery from the Shaikh of "the share of customs due to the East India Company." In 1737, when a Persian force landed at Khor Fakkān and began to overrun the territories of the Imām of 'Omān, the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah appear to have made submission to the Persian commander; but in 1741, the Persian occupation of the Imamate still continuing, the Arabs came under suspicion of intending plunder of Bandar 'Abbās, in concert with the Imām, after seizing an island in the vicinity.

Proceedings
of the Rās-
al-Khaimah
Arabs on the
Persian
coast, 1600-
1750.

Very little is known of the internal condition even towards the end of the 18th century of the region now styled Trucial 'Omān; but it seems clear that neither the Portuguese nor the Persians then retained any hold upon the country, and that the influence of the Qāsimi Shaikh, whose capital at this time was Rās-al-Khaimah town, greatly predominated over that of his neighbours. The subjects of the Qāsimi, to whatever tribes they might belong, were generally spoken of as Qawāsīm; and it seems possible that, abroad, the name was applied to almost all Arabs hailing from the western coast of the 'Omān promontory. It was the decline of Persian influence in the Gulf after the death of Nadir Shāh that in the end brought the Qawāsīm upon the general scene.

The Qawāsīm
at home and
abroad, 1750-
1800.

From their first appearance abroad their energy was directed to exploiting the nearer parts of the Persian coast and to promoting or opposing the policy of their neighbour, the Imām of 'Omān, as their interests at the moment might happen to dictate.

Establish-
ment of the
Qawāsim on
the Persian
coast and is-
lands, 1750-
—1765.

On the decease of Nādir Shāh in 1747, Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who under the late sovereign had been Governor of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies and Darya Baigi or Admiral of the Persian Gulf, finding himself pressed with demands for tribute from more than one quarter and threatened by Nāsir Khān, the hereditary ruler of Lār, secured the aid of the Qawāsim, with whose Shaikh—apparently Rāshid-bin-Matar—he seems to have allied himself by giving him a daughter in marriage. In 1758 Mulla 'Ali Shāh with vessels from Hormūz, came to the assistance of the Qāsimi Shaikh against the Imām of Masqat; but no actual collision occurred between the opposing forces. In 1759, as related in the chapter on the General History of the Gulf, the crews of some Arab vessels, subjects of the Qāsimi Shaikh, who were supposed to be cruising against Mir Mahanna, the piratical chieftain of Rīg at the northern end of the Gulf, created a disturbance at Bandar 'Abbās and inflicted serious injuries on the servants of the British Agency there, for which no reparation was afforded by the Persian Deputy-Governor of the place. In June 1760 the Qawāsim, who appear in the meantime to have obtained a footing at Qishm and Lāft on the island of Qishm and also at Lingeh and Shanās on the coast of the mainland to the westwards, assisted Mulla 'Ali Shāh to seize the town of Bandar 'Abbās; but, being unable to dislodge a garrison which held the fort for the Khān of Lār, they again withdrew; on this occasion their strength was estimated at 1,000 men, and they were commanded by Shaikh Rāshid in person. The Khān of Lār replied with demonstrations against Lingeh and Rās-al-Khaimah, but he found both places too strong and too well prepared to be seriously attacked; he succeeded, however, in devastating the island of Qishm. In 1761 Mulla 'Ali Shāh brought over the Arabs of Rās-al-Khaimah to help him in an attack on Hormūz, where his family were kept prisoners in the fort by the inhabitants of the place and by the Bani Ma'in Arabs; two assaults were made, but both failed. In the course of these disturbances vessel from Masqat, carrying 2,400 bags of rice and a "Leaguer of Arrack" for the British Factory at Bandar 'Abbās, was seized by the Qawāsim, and the rice was appropriated by Mulla 'Ali Shāh, who seems, however, to have made restitution. Early in 1763 a tripartite peace was arranged between the Bani Ma'in on the one side and the Qawāsim and Mulla 'Ali Shāh on the other; among the conditions were the definite assignment to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah of

a ship named the "Rahmāni," of which he had taken possession, and an equal division of the revenues of Qishm Island among the parties.

Karīm Khān, Zand, in establishing his power over the south of Persia, appointed Shaikh 'Abdullah of the local tribe or family of the Bani Ma'in to be ruler over Bandar 'Abbās, Hormūz and Qishm; and this Shaikh succeeded, about 1765, in expelling the Qawāsīm and other intruders from his dominions, and was able during his lifetime to keep them at a distance.

Expulsion of the Qawāsīm from Persia about 1765.

Before their expulsion from Persia the Qawāsīm had generally been at war with the Imām Ahmad of 'Omān, who apparently claimed, yet was unable to enforce, a species of suzerainty over them. Afterwards when the policy of Karīm Khān appeared to threaten the independence of the Arabian littoral generally, they formed a temporary alliance with the Imām; and in 1773 two Persian gallivats belonging to Bandar 'Abbās were destroyed by the 'Omāni fleet, assisted by that of the Hormūz Shaikh, the Masqat vessels retiring thereafter to Rās-al Khaimah. In 1775, however, the Qāsīmī Shaikh and the Imām were again at war between themselves; and the Shaikh, relying on his personal resources alone, did not scruple to seize Būshehr vessels on the plea that the cargoes belonged to subjects of the Imām. In 1780 their relations were still hostile.

Relations with the Imām of 'Omān, 1750-80.

In or about 1777 Shaikh Rāshid resigned the headship of the Qawāsīm in favour of his son Saqar, and the latter sought escape from the extreme isolation of his position by marrying a daughter of Shaikh 'Abdullah of Qishm, and so adjusting his differences with the Ma'ini family.

Accession of Shaikh Saqar bin-Rāshid at Rās-al-Khaimah, about 1777.

PERIOD OF THE RISE AND SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY, 1778-1820.

General history, 1778-1803.

In the years 1779 and 1780 the whole Gulf was in a state of turmoil owing to the non-existence of any controlling power; and the contest between the Qāsīmī Shaikh and the Imām, resumed after a short interval during which the Qawāsīm had addicted themselves to mercantile pursuits, contributed largely to the prevailing confusion. The Qāsīmī fleet, manned by ruffians who depended on piracy for their livelihood,

Commencement of piracy by the Qawāsīm, 1778-80.

scoured the seas plundering all indiscriminately ; and their successful example soon found imitators in every Arab port. Towards the end of 1778 the Qawāsīm captured a vessel belonging to the East India Company on its way from Bombay to Basrah, and sold the crew and passengers as slaves ; and in 1779 they seem to have been in possession of a ship named the " Expedition," belonging to the Shaikh of Būshehr, which they declined to restore.

Qāsimi inter-
vention in
Bahrain,
1782.

In 1782 the Shaikh of the Qawāsīm, after mediating unsuccessfully between the 'Utūb and the Persian claimants of Bahrain, took part with a contingent of his subjects in the unsuccessful assault by the Persians on the 'Atbi stronghold of Zubārah ; his attitude on this occasion appears to have been determined by a recent outrage on the part of the 'Utūb, who had captured a boat belonging to his Shaikhdom and put 18 of the crew to death.

Raid, pos-
sibly Qāsimi,
on Rustāq in
'Omān, 1783.

About 1783 Ibn-Rahmah, a Shaikh of the Pirate Coast—as the modern Trucial 'Omān may most appropriately be styled at this time—made a serious attack on Rustāq, then the capital of the Imām of 'Omān ; but the identity of the chief cannot now be fixed* nor the significance of his raid ascertained.

Some years of peace followed, during which nothing was heard of the Qawāsīm ; but in 1797 a state of war again prevailed between Masqat and Rās-al-Khaimah and hostilities had been declared between the Imām of 'Omān and the Government of Persia,—circumstances which may have conduced to the commission in this year of two remarkable and unprovoked outrages by the Qawāsīm.†

Capture
of the
" Bassein,"
May 1797.

On the 18th of May 1797, off Rams, a fleet of Qāsimi boats attacked and captured the snow " Bassein," though under British colours and carrying public despatches, and took her to Rās-al-Khaimah, where she was detained for two days and then released by order of the Shaikh. No reparation seems to have been exacted for this insult to the British flag.

Attack on
the " Vipér,"
October
1797:

Impunity bore its natural fruit. In the month of October following a fleet of Qawāsīm, commanded by Sālih, a nephew of the Qāsimi Shaikh, were lying in the harbour of Būshehr, their purpose being to intercept

* It may have been Shaikh Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah, whose great-great-grandfather's name was Rahmah.

† Mr. F. Warden, Member of Council at Bombay, gives another explanation of these incidents (see *Bombay Records*, XXIV, pp. 57 and 302) ; but his two suggestions, (1) that the British had previously failed to observe neutrality in the Gulf and (2) that the conduct of the Qawāsīm arose from a contest between the Imām Sa'id of 'Omān and his brother Sultān, appear to be equally unfounded.

some Sūri vessels returning from Basrah, and were granted, on the request of the representative of the Indian Government, at Būshehr, a supply of powder and cannon shot from the H.E.I. Company's brig "Viper" of 14 guns; having received it, they treacherously and without warning attacked the "Viper" at anchor, while her crew were at breakfast on deck. The "Viper," with great promptitude, slipped her cable and made sail to escape being boarded; and, in the engagement which followed, she not only beat off her assailants but succeeded in chasing them out to sea; her gallant commander, Lieutenant Carruthers, was killed, and among a crew of 65, all told, there were no less than 32 casualties. Once more the authors of the outrage were suffered to escape without punishment. The British authorities were apparently satisfied by an assurance received from the Qāsīmi Shaikh, that he had the highest regard for the British nation but exercised no control over Shaikh Sālīh, who "had proceeded to the Persian shore and there established himself among the Bani Khālīd Arabs, marrying a woman of that tribe, which was one of a villainous nature and character;" and no exception appears to have been taken even to a statement by the Shaikh that the "Viper" had been the first to fire.

In 1798 Saiyid Sultān of 'Omān made peace with the Qawāsim in order to facilitate the enforcement of certain claims which he had against the Turkish authorities at Basrah; but with the settlement of the Turko-'Omāni dispute there was a return to the normal state of warfare between the two Arab powers, and Saiyid Sultān made a naval attack, which was beaten off, on the Qāsīmi seaport of Dībah.

In 1799 an attempt on Sohār was made by the Na'im and Bani Qitab tribes, assisted by Bani Yās from Dībāi; but the invaders were defeated at Liwa, with great loss, by the Saiyids Sultān and Qais of 'Omān.

In 1800, as related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, an advanced force of the Wāhhābis, who had lately annexed the oases of Hasa and Qatif, arrived in Baraimi. The leader of the expedition immediately took measures for a permanent occupation of the place, which he must have seen to be admirably adapted for controlling all western 'Omān, and succeeded in attracting some of the neighbouring Bedouin tribes to his standard; and the ruler of Masqat and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah—though they sunk for the moment their hereditary differences, consulted together, and even tried conclusions with the newcomers in the field—were unable to rid themselves of their presence. The wilder tribes of 'Omān continued to flock to the standard of the Wāhhābi invaders, and, by the middle of 1802, the whole eastern coast of Arabia from the

Relations
with Masqat,
1798-99.

Establish-
ment of the
Wāhhābis in
'Omān,
1800-03.

neighbourhood of Basrah to Dibah in the Gulf of 'Omān was reported to acknowledge their authority. In 1803 the Qawāsim, under pressure from their Wāhhābi masters, took the sea against their late ally, Saiyid Sultān ; and they probably had their share in a raid on the island of Qishm, then a dependency of Masqat, which was ravaged in the same year at the instigation of the Wāhhābis.

Increase of Piracy, 1804-05.

Alleged responsibility of the Wāhhābis.

The establishment of the Wāhhābis at Baraimi was followed by an increase of piracy and lawlessness at sea, which in India was ascribed chiefly to their influence ; but a dispassionate study of the facts, after the lapse of more than a hundred years, by no means confirms the extreme contemporary view that the Qawāsim, in the incidents which now took place, were mere unwilling instruments in the hands of the Wāhhābis. The natural character of the Qawāsim, as proclaimed by their conduct in 1778-79 and 1797, and the policy of the Bombay Government, which will shortly appear from the sequel, were such that it appears almost superfluous to search for any further explanation of events in the working of Wāhhābi influences ; and it must be remembered that *force majeure* on the part of the Wāhhābis afforded a convenient and unverifiable excuse for acts which nothing could justify.

The "Fly" case, 1804.

In 1804 a number of English gentlemen and Indian British subjects, who had been captured by a French privateer * and released at Būshehr, were making the passage from that place to Bombay in a native vessel, when, between Tunb Island and Rās Musandam, they were captured by Qāsimi pirates after a resistance in which several of their number were wounded. Some of the party had belonged to the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Fly", which, on being pursued by the French vessel, had been run ashore on Qais Island, the treasure and despatches that she carried being at the same time thrown overboard in shallow water ; and on their way down the Gulf the travellers had made shift to recover the "Fly's" despatches, but had been obliged to leave the treasure behind. Finding that they were held prisoners at Rās-al-Khaimah without hope of release, they volunteered, on condition of receiving their liberty, to enable the Qawāsim to recover the sunken treasure of the "Fly", which they did ;

* This ship was "La Fortune" of 38 guns, Captain Surcouff, afterwards taken by H.M.S. "Concorde".

but the Arabs then proceeded to a general massacre of the inhabitants of Qais and afterwards departed, leaving the released prisoners to their fate upon the deserted island. In the end, out of a once numerous company, only two—Mr. Jowl or Yowl, an officer of the mercantile marine, and a seaman named Pennel—survived to reach Bombay and deliver the carefully preserved despatches of the “Fly”; the rest mostly perished between Qais and Būshehr, some by shipwreck and others from the hardships of the way.

The death of Saiyid Sultān of Masqat at the hands of the Qawāsim in 1804 is related in another place.

In 1805 two English trading brigs, the “Shannon”, Captain Babcock, and the “Trimmer”, Captain Cummings, both belonging to Mr. Manesty, the H.E.I. Company’s Resident at Basrah, were attacked by pirates in the neighbourhood of Farūr Island and taken after a slight resistance. The Indian members of the crews were put to death; and Captain Babcock, having been seen to fire a musket in the fray, was condemned to lose his arm, which was accordingly struck off with a single blow of a sword. The European prisoners were then conveyed to the Arabian coast, from which in course of time they succeeded in making their escape. Subsequent enquiry showed that the “Shannon” had fallen to the Qawāsim of Lingeh, while the “Trimmer” had passed into the possession of those of Rās-al-Khaimah; and both were at once converted by the captors into vessels of war and were regularly employed in piracy. Mr. Manesty, conceiving that the Wahhābi Amīr had power to order the release of his property, sent an agent to wait upon him at his capital of Dara’iyah; but nothing resulted from this mission.

Capture of the “Shannon” and “Trimmer,” 1805.

In the same year a fleet of 40 Qāsimi vessels surrounded the H.E.I. Company’s cruiser “Mornington”, of 22 guns, and tried to capture her; but the attack failed, and the assailants had reason to regret the encounter.

Attack on the “Mornington,” 1805.

First British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1805.

Up to the point that we have now reached, the Government of Bombay had manifested towards the pirates a degree of forbearance which, in the light both of earlier and of later events, it is difficult to understand. It appears to have been a standing order of that Government that none of their vessels in the Gulf should fire until they had

Policy of the Bombay Government.

been fired upon,—a rule which placed their small and isolated cruisers at a dangerous disadvantage in dealing with an enemy whose favourite method of attack was by boarding; and offenders against this regulation were liable to heavy punishment. On one occasion Lieutenant Gowan of the "Fury," 6 guns, having beaten off a number of boats which closed in upon him with hostile intent during a calm, received on arrival at Bombay a severe reprimand from the Governor in person for "daring to molest the innocent and unoffending Arabs of these seas."*

Coercive measures adopted, March 1805.

In March 1805, however, at the suggestion apparently of Captain David Seton, who had been sent to Masqat as Resident for the second time in consequence of the death of Saiyid Sultān, Government determined to assist the ruler of Masqat in chastising the Qawāsim;† but the decision was hedged about by so many conditions and qualifications as to render it almost impossible of execution. Captain Seton was to refrain from action altogether unless satisfied that the Wahhabi Amir would not take offence at the coercive measures to be employed; in his proceedings towards the pirates, even, he was "to act with the greatest moderation" and "to aim at pacification by means of negotiation"; and he was to avoid all possible complications with the Governments of Turkey and Persiā. A further difficulty was created by his being required to conduct his proceedings in consonance with the ideas of Mr. Manesty, Resident at Basrah, and also with those of Lieutenant Bruce, Resident at Būshehr. In the event Captain Seton, who sailed from Masqat in the "Mornington" on the 28th of May 1805, unfortunately allowed himself, before taking steps against the Qawāsim, to be drawn into thinly-veiled co-operation with Saiyid Badar against the Ma'ini possessors of Bandar 'Abbās,—a proceeding against which the Persian authorities afterwards protested as an act of hostility against themselves; but before their protest had time to take effect Captain Seton found an opportunity for a partial reckoning with the Qawāsim.

Blockade of the Qāsimi fleet at Qishm, July 1805.

On the 15th of June the Anglo-'Omāni squadron, on a report that a Qāsimi fleet had arrived there, moved over to Qishm town; but the rumour proved to be incorrect, and, as the Qawāsim were in too great

* These are the allegations of the journalist Buckingham, but they have been adopted by Low, the historian of the Indian Navy. Some allowance must be made for the strongly anti-official tendencies of Buckingham, who was subsequently deported from India because of his attacks upon the Government of the day.

† There was chronic hostility, as we have seen, between the Qawāsim and Masqat; and at this time it was specially incumbent on the ruler of Masqat to take steps for avenging the death of his immediate predecessor, Saiyid Sultān, who had been slain by the Qawāsim.

force on shore to be attacked by landing parties, the ships returned to their former station. At daybreak on the 5th of July, however, a flotilla of 30 Qāsimi boats carrying about 1,000 men entered the Qishm roadstead; and here Captain Seton and Saiyid Badar immediately blockaded them.

In the negotiations that followed the part of intermediary was assumed by Mulla Husain, Shaikh of Qishm. Captain Seton in the first place required that the losses suffered by British shipping should be made good by the Qawāsim; but, as they assured him that they could not pay more than Rs. 10,000, and such a sum only by instalments, the question of an indemnity was dropped. Eventually it was arranged that, if the "Trimmer" were returned to Captain Seton at Masqat in 25 days, along with a letter for the Governor of Bombay expressing the penitence of the Qawāsim, their inability to pay an indemnity, and their resolve to abstain from piracy in future, a truce should be observed until the Governor's pleasure was known; and that, if the Governor considered the settlement satisfactory, the "Trimmer" should be retained by Government and peace declared. Mulla Husain was anxious that Captain Seton should have a personal interview on shore with Sultān-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of the Qawāsim, who was present; but Captain Seton avoided compliance with this wish as he learned that further conditions, to enable the Qawāsim to visit India, would be pressed upon his acceptance.

Preliminary negotiations.

Saiyid Badar was anxious to return to Masqat, and it is possible that his impatience may have prejudiced the negotiations; on his part he was satisfied with a truce of 70 days, after which he intended, according to his own statement, to requite the Qawāsim for the death of Saiyid Sultān and to expel them entirely from Qishm and the other parts of his Persian fief. While the Masqat fleet was before Bandar 'Abbās the Qawāsim appear to have attempted a diversion by means of maritime raids on Sūr and Gwādar.

Eventually, in October 1805, an agent from Mulla Husain of Qishm arrived at Masqat to negotiate on behalf of the Qawāsim, and Captain Seton applied for the instructions of the Bombay Government; these, when received, were to the effect that any peace to which the Government became a party should be of a universal character, extending to the whole Gulf, and that full indemnification for past losses must in any case be required.

Further negotiations, October 1805.

First British treaty with the Qawāsim, 1806.

The enforcement of these extensive demands, so disproportionate to the impression which had as yet been made on the minds of the Gulf

Arabs, having proved impossible without recourse to hostilities on a large scale, a modest treaty was signed by Captain Seton at Bandar 'Abbās on the 6th of February 1806 and was confirmed by the Governor-General of India on the 29th of April following. By this document peace was established, the Qawāsīm binding themselves under a penalty of \$30,000 to observe the same; the "Trimmer", which had been brought to Masqat, was restored, all claims to the cargo, guns, etc., of that vessel and of the "Shannon" being however waived by the British Government; the Qawāsīm undertook to assist British vessels visiting, or driven upon, their shores, and promised to give three months' notice before infringing the peace, should they find themselves compelled to do so at the behest of the Wāhhābī Amīr; finally, in case of the treaty being ratified, as it was shortly after, the tribe were to be at liberty, as before, to frequent the ports of India. The Wāhhābī Amīr was not consulted in the negotiations. Before the execution of the treaty the "Shannon" had already been returned in a dismantled state.

Temporary cessation of piracy, 1806-1808.

Large British fleet in the Gulf, 1807.

For fully two years from the signature of this peace the Qawāsīm remained quiescent, abstaining at least from offences against British trade and vessels. It is not improbable that their good intentions, recorded in the treaty of 1806, were confirmed by the presence in the Gulf during 1807 of a fleet of no less than eight of the H.E.I. Company's cruisers. These ships were originally sent in company with H.M.S. "Fox" to threaten Basrah, in consequence of hostilities in Europe between Britain and Turkey; but, instead of being withdrawn on the conclusion of this service, they were left on duty in the Gulf for about a year.

Tribal wars of the Qawāsīm, etc., 1806-1808.

In other directions, however, the turbulence of the Qawāsīm was not altogether suspended. In 1806 some of the Qawāsīm espoused the side of Saiyid Qais of Sohār in his contest with Saiyid Badar of Masqat for the mastery of 'Omān, but they did not do so with sufficient force to prevent his being worsted by Badar. A spirited movement by which the Qāsimi Shaikh, Sultān-bin-Saqar, recovered Khor Fakkān from the 'Omāni Saiyids Sa'id and Qais in May 1808 is described in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate.

His exploit at Khor Fakkān must have been one of the last public acts of Sultān-bin-Saqar at this time, for within the next few months he was deprived, under orders from the Wahhābi Amīr, of his general headship over the Qawāsīm. He retained at first independent authority in his own port of Rās-al-Khaimah ; but in the following year (1809) even this was taken from him ; Husain-bin-'Alī, Shaikh of Rams, was nominated governor and tax-collector on behalf of the Wahhābis over most of what is now Trucial 'Omān, including Rās-al-Khaimah ; and other Wahhābi officers were appointed to the smaller sub-divisions of the country. The Wahhābis also possessed themselves of the forts of Fujairah, Bithnah, and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah.

Deposition
the Qāsimi
Shaikh
by the
Wahhābi
Amīr, 1808.

Revival of piracy, 1808-1809.

Apparently before the removal of Shaikh Sultān from the Qāsimi Shaikhship the predatory instincts of his tribe had broken forth once more upon the high seas and the treaty of 1806 had been violated. This breach of their engagements was the more notorious that it was committed off the coast of India.

In April 1808, off the coast of Gujarat, the schooner "Lively," Lieutenant Macdonald, was hemmed in by 4 Arab vessels, each larger and carrying more men than herself, and an attempt was made by the enemy to board her ; but it was repulsed by the determined fire of the "Lively," which did great execution. Three of the pirate craft which took part in this affair were subsequently discovered at Sūrat and were taken to Bombay ; but, though wounded men were found concealed on board and the identification in other respects appeared to be complete, the Government, "in consideration of their long detention, set them free again to exercise their calling on some hapless coaster." This they, or others resembling them, seem to have done with effect ; for, in the course of 1808, no less than 20 country vessels fell a prey to Arab buccaneers off the Indian coast.

Attack on the
"Lively,"
1808.

About September 1808 the "Minerva," Captain Hopwood, another trading ship belonging to Mr. Manesty of Basrah, was captured by boarders from a number of Qāsimi boats, which had maintained a running fight with her during several successive days. The majority of the occupants were, it was said, put to a cruel death by methods indicative of religious fanaticism ; but the lives of the second mate and

Capture of the
"Minerva,"
1808.

carpenter and of an Armenian lady, wife of Lieutenant Taylor, Assistant Resident at Būshehr, were spared, and they were carried prisoners to Rās-al-Khaimah. Mrs. Taylor was successfully ransomed a few months later by Lieutenant Bruce, the Resident at Būshehr, but her two less fortunate companions never, apparently, regained their liberty.

Capture and
re-capture of
the cruiser
"Sylph,"
1808.

On the 21st of October 1808, a few weeks after the mishap to the "Minerva," the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Sylph" of only 78 tons, mounting 8 guns, was approached by a fleet of large Arab vessels; she had been accidentally separated from the squadron which carried Sir Harford Jones and the members of his Mission to Persia; and Muhammad Husain Khān, one of the Persian secretaries attached to the Mission, was actually on board of her at the time. Precluded by regulation from using her guns until it was too late, the tiny vessel fell an easy prey to the crowd of boarders which the Arab ships hurled on her deck from their towering bows; and a wholesale massacre of her crew, who perished fighting desperately, was the sequel. Among the few survivors of the action were the commander, Lieutenant Graham, who fell, covered with wounds, down the fore hatchway, and the Persian secretary, who hid himself in a cabin-locker. The lives of the remnant were saved by the sudden appearance on the scene of H.M.S. "Néréide," Commodore Corbett, a frigate of 36 guns, at the sight of which the Qawāsīm took to flight in their own vessels abandoning the "Sylph," and were pursued for some distance by the "Néréide," but without success.*

Attack on
the cruiser
"Nautilus,"
1808.

Only three days after the "Sylph" incident the H.E.I. Company's brig "Nautilus" of 14 guns, Lieutenant Bennett, was threatened, while passing the island of Hānjām, by a squadron of two large and two small pirate vessels. In consequence of the order which prohibited British ships from taking the initiative in these affairs, Lieutenant Bennett considered himself obliged to hold his fire until the hostile squadron had advanced so near that the war dances and brandished spears of the Arab crews could be distinctly seen and their songs and shouts heard; he then hoisted the British colours and fired two shots across their bows. As they still continued to approach, the "Nautilus" immediately discharged a broadside at the two larger vessels; and a gunnery combat ensued which was maintained for nearly

* The statement of Sir H. J. Brydges in his *Brief History of the Wahabys* (page 36), that the "Néréide" sank three of the pirate vessels is not accepted by Low, the historian of the Indian Navy. See also a quotation from the log-book of the "Néréide" at page 46 of Morier's *Journey through Persia*.

an hour. At length the Arab squadron took to flight, pursued by the "Nautilus," who plied them with her shot as long as they were within range.

Second British expedition against the Qawāsīm, 1809-10.

The insolence of the Qawāsīm and their power for mischief had now reached such a point that they could no longer be ignored ; and the spirit of the tribe was clearly shown in a demand, made by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah about this time, that the Government of Bombay should pay tribute for the privilege, which he would accord to their ships, of navigating the Persian Gulf in safety. The Qāsīmi sailing craft were estimated to amount to 63 large and 813 smaller vessels, and the crews to aggregate nearly 19,000 men.

Temerity and strength of the Qawāsīm.

The outbreak of piracy in 1808 was attributed, like the same phenomenon in 1805, to Wahhābi influence ; but the indications of this, though more substantial than on the former occasion, could still hardly be called conclusive. Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams had, it is true, visited the capital of the Wahhābis before becoming their representative in the Qāsīmi country ; and there were rumours of an engagement on his part that one-fifth of the proceeds of piracies should be paid to the Wahhābi Amīr in accordance with Wahhābi practice in such matters. The piracies on the Indian coast were considered by Captain Seton to be due to Wahhābi instigation ; and, whether his belief were well-founded or no, it was undeniable that the recent outrages coincided very closely in time with the supersession of the hereditary Shaikh of the Qawāsīm by a Wahhābi officer. In 1809 the deposed Qāsīmi Shaikh, Sultān-bin-Saqar, was decoyed by the Wahhābis to their capital, Dara'iyah, and there detained ; but he eventually escaped, by way of Yaman and the port of Mokha, to Masqat, where he was kindly received by Saiyid Sa'id, the ruler. Meanwhile a demand had been addressed to the Qawāsīm by the Wahhābi Amīr, that they should join the 'Utūb in a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah ; and with this requisition they seem to have complied, or at least to have professed their willingness to comply.

The Wahhāb Government and the Qawāsīm.

On the coast of Persia, in 1809, the Qawāsīm sustained a check, being driven out of Lingeh and Chārak by a Persian force from Lār and compelled to retire to Bāsīdu on Qishm Island ; it is probable, however, that this reverse was of very short duration, for a British armament a

Events, immediately preceding the British expedition of 1809.

few months later destroyed Lingeh on the ground of its being a Qāsimi town. The Qawāsim about the same time sent 22 boats to the relief of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, a pirate of Khor Hassān in Qatar, when he was attacked by a Persian expedition from Būshehr; and so effectual was their co-operation that the Būshehr flotilla was repulsed and six of the vessels belonging to it were captured. Perhaps the last victim of Qāsimi rapacity during this period was the "Deria Dowlut," Captain Flemming, which seems to have been taken in June 1809; while in October of the same year a boat from H.M.S. "Caroline," commanded by Lieutenant Wood, boarded and captured one of a fleet of 27 piratical vessels. A naval demonstration was made by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat against the Qāsimi ports, but it was wholly ineffectual.

Motives of
the British
expedition.

In these circumstances a naval and military expedition was sanctioned by the Governor-General of India, of which the principal object was to destroy completely the sea power of the piratical tribes at that day denominated "Qawāsim," and to release British subjects and others who might be held by them in bondage; but there was also an intention of replacing Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in possession of certain places in the Gulf of 'Omān, of which he had been deprived by the Qāsimis. The 'Omān Sultanate was at this time threatened with invasion by the Wahhābi general Mutlaq, whose headquarters were at Baraimi; and a desire to relieve the ruler of Masqat from this danger has also been mentioned as among the motives of the expedition.* A conciliatory convention was, if possible, to be arranged with the piratical powers after the destruction of their vessels. Incidentally topographical information regarding the country, and especially the ports, of the Qawāsim was to be procured; and an "eligible island" was to be sought for in the vicinity of the Qāsimi coast, which it might be possible to occupy as a maritime station or a Residency.

Instructions
to the
commanders.

The instructions issued to the naval and military commanders in charge of the expedition placed all these objects before them for attainment, except that relating to the relief of Masqat from Wahhābi pressure; this last, if it entered into the scheme at all, was apparently viewed as an indirect consequence, with which executive officers were not concerned. Special stress was laid upon the complete destruction of all piratical craft. From the political point of view extreme caution was enjoined. Land operations of every sort were to be avoided, so far as possible, and especially any conflict with forces in the service of the Wahhābi Amīr; no hostility towards the Wahhābis was to be expressed; and the supposed connection of the Wahhābis with the Qawāsim was to

* See *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, pages 131 and 305.

be ignored, the latter being treated for all purposes as an independent power.* The susceptibilities of the Persian and Turkish Governments were to be respected to the utmost, and the local representatives of the former were to be assured, if necessary, that the operations against the pirates covered no territorial designs. At Laft, though that place was no longer under the control of the Saiyid of Masqat, the Qasimi shipping was not to be destroyed without his express assent.

The naval force detailed for the expedition was placed under the command of Commodore J. Wainwright of H.M.S. "Chiffonne," 36 guns, and consisted, besides the flagship, of H.M.S. "Caroline," 36 guns; and of the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Mornington," 22 guns; "Ternate," 16 guns; "Aurora," 14 guns; "Mercury," 14 guns; "Nautilus," 14 guns; "Prince of Wales," 14 guns; "Vestal," 10 guns; "Ariel," 10 guns; "Fury," 8 guns; and "Stromboli," bomb-ketch.

Strength and
organisation
of the
expedition.

The land force, conveyed in 4 large transports and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lionel Smith of His Majesty's 65th Regiment, amounted to about 1,411 fighting men, of whom 883 were Europeans and 528 natives of India; the European portion was composed of His Majesty's 65th Regiment, the flank companies of His Majesty's 47th Regiment, and a detachment of the Bombay Artillery.†

The armament, as a whole, was under the joint command of Captain Wainwright and Colonel Smith.

By the death of Captain Seton, Resident at Masqat, a month before it sailed, the expedition was deprived of its political adviser.‡ Mr. Bunce, who was sent to take Captain Seton's place but probably possessed no local knowledge, was ordered by the Bombay Government to remain at Masqat; he also expired before the end of the year.

The expedition started from Bombay on the 14th of September 1809. The voyage. Before the ships had been 24 hours out of port the bottom fell out of the "Stromboli" bomb-ketch, and she foundered, carrying with her

* In some earlier instructions sent to Captain Seton a sort of explanation to the Wahhābi Amir of the action about to be taken against the Qawāsīm appears to have been contemplated: see *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, page 43. The writer has not been able to ascertain whether these earlier instructions were cancelled or executed.

† According to Regimental Records there were 638 sepoy and the whole force only numbered about 1,200 men.

‡ Captain David Seton, of the Bombay Military Service, was Resident at Masqat, with two short intervals, from 1800 to 1809. He died of fever at Barkah on the 2nd of August 1809 and was buried at that place. He was not a careful reader of his instructions, and the repudiation by Government of the treaty which he arranged with the Amirs of Sind in 1808 (*vide Kaye's Afghan War*) will be remembered; but he seems to have been an earnest and energetic officer, and his death was much regretted.

an artillery officer, most of her crew, and the main supply of heavy ammunition for the force. Masqat was reached on the 24th of October, and here the expedition was joined by Captain Pasley and other members of Sir John Malcolm's third Mission, then on their way to Persia; these gentlemen "most handsomely volunteered their services," which were accepted. Saiyid Sa'id, who was in a despondent mood, seemed to regard the smallness of the armament with some dismay in view of the task assigned it; and he did not, apparently, at this stage offer to co-operate. Pilots and small boats for landing were, however, obtained; and on the 2nd November the expedition left Masqat. An offer made by the Shaikh of Kuwait to join the British expedition with his whole naval force and supply pilots for all the piratical strongholds was declined by Captain Wainwright, who afterwards regretted his action in this respect, for the pilots obtained at Masqat were altogether useless.

Arrival at
Rās-al-Khaimah,
11th November
1809.

The expedition arrived off Rās-al-Khaimah on the afternoon of the 11th November; but the shallowness of the soundings made it necessary for the ships to anchor at distances of 2 to 4 miles off the town, according to their size. The captured "Minerva," a full-rigged ship on which the Qawāsīm had mounted 20 guns, was starting from Rās-al-Khaimah on a cruise when the British squadron arrived; but, on sighting the armament, she put about and ran aground under a circular tower about a mile to the south of the town. In this position she was attacked by the smaller British vessels and taken; but a heavy fire from the shore prevented her removal, and she was burned instead where she lay. In the attempt to cut out the "Minerva," the cruiser "Prince of Wales" went aground and suffered some damage by a fusillade from the land.

Bombardment,
12th November.

On the 12th the town was bombarded during three hours by such of the vessels as from their size could approach near enough; but the defenders maintained an unshaken fire from small batteries and entrenchments thrown up along the beach, and little or no impression was made.*

Landing and
capture of
the town,
13th November.

In the early morning of the 13th a demonstration was made against the mouth of the harbour at the north end of the town, under cover of which the whole of the British infantry and some detachments of marines and native troops were landed at the opposite end, in water reaching to their waists. The landing was disputed by a crowd of swordsmen, but their rush was broken by a fire of case from gunboats, and they were then driven back by a charge. By sunrise the wall across the peninsula on the landward side of the town had been secured, along with its towers and

* According to Regimental Records (65th Foot) the bombardment was not a heavy one and was only made to cover a reconnaissance for the purpose of locating the enemy's shipping.

some adjacent buildings. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon the centre of the town had been gained, the British flag had been hoisted on the Shaikh's house, and only the northern quarters at the point of the peninsula remained in possession of the enemy. By 4 P.M. 50 vessels belonging to the place, including 30 large war boats, had been set on fire by the seamen of the fleet, and the town had become the scene of a general conflagration. Some booty was obtained by individuals,* but no general plunder was authorised.

At daylight on the 14th, in consequence of a report that a large body of Arabs was approaching from the interior, Colonel Smith, actuated doubtless by the instructions to avoid a conflict with the Wahhābis, hurriedly re-embarked his force. No admission of defeat had been obtained from the enemy, who immediately re-occupied the shore with every gesture of defiance. There is reason to believe that the Wahhābi general Mutlaq did actually move to the assistance of Ras-al-Khaimah as soon as he heard that it was attacked; and, especially in view of what occurred a few weeks later at Shinās, it is impossible to condemn the cautious behaviour of the British commander.

Evacuation,
14th November.

It does not appear that the fighting at Rās-al-Khaimah can have been of a severe character; but some particular buildings were held with obstinacy. The fatal casualties on the British side were two men killed on board the "Prince of Wales" and Captain Dansey of the 65th Regiment, slain by a spear, which struck him in the neck while he was clearing a house in the town; the wounded numbered 21. But for the screen formed by the smoke of burning houses, the British losses would, it is said, have been much heavier. In regard to the enemy it was reported that "from 70 to 80 of these vagabonds were killed." The landing and embarkation of the troops, in view of the difficulties by which these operations were attended, were considered to have been very successfully performed.

Casualties.

The armament then crossed the Gulf to Lingeh, which was deserted by the inhabitants at its arrival; on the 17th the town was occupied without resistance by a small detachment of native troops and given to the flames; and 20 sailing craft, of which 9 were large war vessels, were destroyed.

Destruction
of Lingeh,
17th November.

At midday on the 26th of November the cruisers "Morington," "Ternate," "Nautilus" and "Fury" with the transport "Mary," having obtained pilots at Qishm town, entered Clarence Strait and anchored off the port of Lāft. They carried a force of about 500 land troops,

Operations at
Lāft, 26th to
28th November.

* A private of one of the British regiments soon after placed £300 in an officer's hands to be remitted to his friends.

most of whom were Europeans. The Qawāsim, or their Qishmi allies occupying the place, were summoned to surrender; but without result. About 2 P.M. on the 27th, the garrison being still defiant, 300 men* were landed to storm the fort; but the work proved to be of unexpected strength, and the result was a decided reverse for the assailants. A 5½-inch howitzer, which had been brought up to force the only entrance, was abandoned in the open under a heavy fire; and the attacking force were obliged to take cover behind hillocks and sand ridges, in positions from which they could not even retire until darkness fell. Meanwhile, however, a heavy fire was maintained by the "Fury" and some gunboats; and by sunset the fort had been seriously shattered. The casualties of the day amounted to 11 killed and 55 wounded, among the killed being an Irish subaltern of the 47th Regiment, Lieutenant S. Weld, who made a gallant attempt to form a party for the recovery of the howitzer. At nightfall an ultimatum was sent to Mulla Husain, who commanded the defence, requiring the evacuation of the fort by 2 A.M.; and daybreak revealed a Union Jack waving on the battlements in the hands of Lieutenant Hall of the Bombay Marine, a survivor of the "Stromboli," who had entered the place single-handed by night, a few of the garrison who still lingered there taking flight at his approach. Eleven vessels, captured apparently during the unsuccessful attack on the fort, were burned; and the town, with miscellaneous property to the value of Rs. 2,00,000, was delivered over intact to an agent of the ruler of Masqat.

Pause in the
operations,
December
1809.

On the 7th of December the whole force rendezvoused at the base, which was the roadstead of Barkah near Masqat; and the flank companies of the 47th Regiment and 200 sepoy were sent back to Bombay. In the general destruction of Qāsimi shipping small boats not convertible to piratical uses had been spared to avoid exciting unnecessary bitterness.

Shinās affair,
January 1810.

Saiyid Sa'id, whose confidence had revived with the recovery of Laft, was now anxious that the programme of the Bombay Government should be executed in its entirety by the expulsion of the Qawāsim from the ports of Shinās and Khor Fakkan on his western seaboard, and it was decided to comply with his wishes. The successful operations which resulted from this decision are described, together with their for the Saiyid disastrous sequel, in the history of the Sultanate of 'Omān.

Final
operations on
both coasts,
January 1810.

Leaving Shinās, the expedition returned to the Persian Gulf and on the 15th of January 1810 reached Rams, where 10 large vessels were given up to be burned. At Jazirat-at-Hamra, the next place visited, the people

* *Viz.*, a light company of the 47th, half a company of the 65th, a detachment of the 2nd Native Infantry, and some seamen and marines.

at first made a show of resistance; but, learning that the town of Rams had been spared, they eventually surrendered 8 large vessels for destruction. At Shārajah no large vessels in good condition were found. The war fleet of 'Ajmān evidently was spared or escaped, for in 1811 we find it cruising in the Gulf in company of the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir. On the 21st of January the armament, having crossed the Gulf, anchored at Mughu on the Persian coast, and four Shārajah boats found in the anchorage were destroyed. Nakhilu, Chārak, Kung and Band Mu'allim were visited, but no large craft were found; a strict warning was addressed, however, to the Shaikhs of the two first-named ports.

Before the return of the whole expedition to India, a discussion took place as to the expediency of operations against Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the piratical chief of Qatar, who, with the assistance of the Qawāsīm, had defeated an attack made on him by the Persian authorities of Būshehr. His punishment was strongly advocated by Mr. Hankey Smith, the British Resident at Būshehr; but the project was in the end negatived, partly on the ground of Rahmah's neutral and even friendly attitude towards the British power, and partly on that of a close connection which he had recently formed with the Wahhābis. The bulk of the expeditionary force returned to Bombay in February 1810; but a portion was detained in the Gulf until the question of Rahmah's punishment had been settled, and did not reach India till April.

Question
Qatar pirates.

As Sultān-bin-Saqar, the legitimate Shaikh of the Qawāsīm, was still at this time an exile without authority over his tribe, while the Qawāsīm themselves as yet remained in strict if not voluntary subjection to the Wahhābi agents set over them, no attempt was made to arrange the conciliatory convention which it had been one of the objects of the Bombay Government to bring about. Regard being had to the somewhat inconclusive end of the military operations at Rās-al-Khaimah, it is probable that no satisfactory arrangements could have been attained at this time without further coercion. An impression nevertheless prevailed among British officials that the danger from the Qawāsīm was practically at an end; and discussion was limited to proposals for preventing its recrudescence. Mr. Manesty, the Resident at Basrah, advised that an embargo should be laid by Government on the exportation of timber from India to Masqat and the ports of the Persian Gulf; and his suggestion, which was supported by General Malcolm, British Envoy to Persia, was adopted, but proved futile.* To

General
outcome
of the
expedition.

* The sale of timber to Arabs on the coast of Malabar was prohibited for a time, until experience showed that they had no difficulty in obtaining it thence by indirect means, especially from Travancore.

the Wabhābi Amīr a letter would seem to have been addressed, requesting that potentate to prohibit piracy by his dependents ; and he in his reply, which was dignified but somewhat sarcastic in tone, appears to have stated that he had no cause of quarrel with Christians and that he had interdicted his followers from molesting British vessels.* The "distinguished zeal, prudence, promptitude and ability" with which the operations generally had been conducted by Captain Wainright and Colonel Smith† were highly commended by the Governor-General of India in Council.

Renewed trouble with the Qawāsīm, 1811-1819.

Recrudescence of piracy, 1812.

During the remainder of 1810 and throughout the year 1811, the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Benares" and "Prince of Wales" being for part of that time employed in the Gulf, there was a complete cessation of piracy ; but in 1812 the Qawāsīm showed signs of returning to their nefarious practices. In 1813 several large craft belonging to Kangūn and Basrah fell into their hands, while some Indian trading vessels under the British flag were plundered by them, and others lay in enforced idleness at Porbandar not venturing to put to sea. The possibility of a renewed outbreak such as occurred is partially explained by the unsurveyed state of the Persian Gulf, in consequence of which a much larger proportion than was supposed of piratical craft had escaped destruction in 1809-10.

Anglo-'Omāni proceedings at Ras-al-Khaimah, 1813.

In 1813, as mentioned ‡ in the history of the 'Oman Sultanate, an expedition was undertaken by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat against Rās-al-Khaimah, the ostensible object of the same being the restoration of Sultān-bin-Saqar, the legitimate Shaikh of the Qawāsīm, who promised to exert his influence for the repression of piracy, to his position of authority over the tribe. At the suggestion of the Saiyid and under orders from the Government of Bombay, Lieutenant Bruce, the British Resident at Būshehr, accompanied the 'Omāni expedition for the purpose of witnessing the agreement which Sa'id proposed to form

* See Morier's *Journey through Persia*, pages 374-375.

† Colonel Lionel Smith, G.C.B., G.C.H., served with the 65th Regiment from 1806 till about 1825 ; he was promoted Major-General in 1819 ; he became Colonel of the 1st Foot in 1834 and Colonel of the 40th Foot in 1837 ; and in the latter year he reached the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1838 he was created a Baronet. He was appointed Governor-General of Jamaica, and afterwards of Mauritius, where he died in 1843.

‡ *Vide* page 445 *ante*.

with Sultān-bin-Saqar ; of arranging with the Qāsimi Shaikh, after his restoration, a renewal of the treaty of 1806 ; and of concluding new treaties upon similar lines with other Arab powers in the Gulf. The failure from the military point of view of the Saiyid's expedition, notwithstanding help rendered by the Bani Yās tribe of Abu Dhabi, caused the British scheme founded on it to fall to the ground.

In 1814 a fresh expedition by Saiyid Sa'id against Rās-al-Khaimah in which the Bani Yās once more assisted, was crowned with partial success, the Qawāsim binding themselves by the terms of peace to abstain from aggression upon the inhabitants of either coast of the Gulf of 'Omān and of the Persian Gulf below Bahrain and Kangūn, all of whom were to be regarded as subjects of Masqat, and to return any booty which might have been taken by their fleets then actually at sea ; but the engagement was not observed. During the presence of the Saiyid before Rās-al-Khaimah, or very shortly after his departure, a Persian vessel carrying goods from Masqat to Bandar 'Abbās, a port under his jurisdiction, was attacked by 7 Qāsimi boats and taken after a stout resistance in which many were killed on both sides ; and it is not clear that restitution was made even in this case, although it was covered by the terms of the treaty, on which the ink was not yet dry.

Repetition
of the same,
1814.

Saiyid Sa'id, before sailing against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1814, had attempted to enlist the active co-operation of the Bombay Government by claiming the benefits of an offensive and defensive alliance ; but this interpretation of existing Anglo-'Omāni treaties was at once repudiated by the British authorities. Lieutenant Bruce, however, who had been instructed to proceed to Rās-al-Khaimah in any case and to demand satisfaction for recent injuries by the Qawāsim, besides obtaining, if possible, a fresh treaty with the tribe, was authorised to accompany the expedition ; but it would seem that either the course of events or the line of policy followed by his associate was such as did not permit of his intervening in the negotiations.

In the accommodation which was arranged the Saiyid appears to have concentrated his attention on obtaining advantages for himself, and even to have obliged Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to relinquish in his favour all claims to Rās-al-Khaimah ; but it was agreed that the Shaikh should be placed in possession of Shārjah, at which place and at Lingeh he for some time afterwards continued to reside.

In August 1814 Sultān-bin-Saqar, who was then at Lingeh and was supposed to be well disposed towards the British Government, sent an agent of his own to the Court of Shirāz, on a mission of which the nature did not transpire ; the only visible result was that, three months

Relations of
Shaikh Sul-
tān-bin-Saqar
with Persia,
1814.

later, the Shaikh received a dress of honour from the Shāh of Persia and was requested to co-operate with the Persians in the reduction of Bahrain.

Preliminary
agreement
between the
Resident at
Būshehr and
a Qāsimi
plenipoten-
tiary,
October
1814.

The Resident at Būshehr had for some time been in correspondence with Hasan-bin-Rahmah, *de facto* Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, in regard to depredations committed by the Qawāsim on the coast of India; and in the meanwhile the ship "Ahmad Shah," apparently containing remounts for the East India Company, had been taken by the Shaikh of Chārak near the island of Qais, whence a part of the booty had been carried off to Rās-al-Khaimah in a Qāsimi boat. Hasan-bin-Rahmah did not immediately reply to the Resident's first letter, but proceeded to Dara'iyah to confer, perhaps on the subject thereof, with 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd, the Wāhhābi Amīr. On his way back to Rās-al-Khaimah Hasan-bin-Rahmah despatched from Hasa a certain Hasan-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ghaith with letters from the Shaikh himself and from the Wāhhābi Amīr for Lieutenant Bruce: this emissary arrived at Būshehr on the 2nd of October 1814. In their epistles the Amīr and the Shaikh both denied the commission of offences by the Qawāsim against the British flag, but promised the restitution of any property the taking of which could be proved; both requested that the distinction between British subjects and others might be made more plain; and a request was added by the Shaikh that Hasan-bin-Muhammad might be treated as a plenipotentiary empowered on his part to renew the treaty of 1806, and that the past might be regarded with a lenient eye. To increase the attractiveness of these proposals a hope was held out that an Agent would shortly be deputed by Hasan-bin-Rahmah to Bombay for the purpose of negotiating a regular treaty; and, by way of mollifying the resentment of the British Government, it was verbally explained by the envoy that the incessant naval warfare in which the Qawāsim engaged was necessary for the maintenance of their position in the Gulf, and that without it they could not live in safety from their enemies. Lieutenant Bruce and the emissary accordingly signed a preliminary agreement by which it was provided that, in consideration of the Qawāsim's respecting British vessels in future, flying a special flag to distinguish them from other maritime Arabs, restoring the Company's property taken from the "Ahmad Shah," and fulfilling certain other conditions, the misdeeds of the past should be overlooked and the tribe should be at liberty to visit the ports of British India. On the Resident's part this agreement was entered into subject to the approbation of the Government of Bombay, to whom it was immediately referred.

The hollowness of the arrangement was, however, very shortly demonstrated by the seizure, in Rās-al-Khaimah harbour, of a boat in which Lieutenant Bruce, under the orders of Government, had sent friendly letters to the chief and to his envoy, Hasan-bin-Muhammad, regarding the capture off Porbandar in the preceding month of August of some boats under British colours. According to one authority * the wretched envoy himself had, on his return from Būshehr to Rās-al-Khaimah, been subjected to the most degrading treatment because of his concessions to the infidel.

Immediate
break-down
of the
arrangement.

The Qawāsīm, feeling perhaps how deeply they had committed themselves, now indulged in a carnival of maritime lawlessness, to which even their own previous record presented no parallel. In the Mughu anchorage, with the connivance of the people of Mughu, they captured a Baghlah belonging to Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat which was laden with remounts for His Majesty's 17th Light Dragoons and with sulphur for the British Government. Six native vessels were taken by them off the coast of Sind; and not long afterwards an action was fought off Quryāt between one of their fleets, consisting of a ship with 25 Baghlahs and Batils, and a squadron commanded by Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in person. In this encounter the Saiyid was wounded, while his flagship the "Caroline" was boarded, and, but for an opportune discharge of grape from the poop among the enemy's boarders crowding the forecastle, would probably have been taken. In 1815 a British Indian vessel was captured by the Qawāsīm near Masqat, the majority of the crew being put to death and the remainder held to ransom.

Numerous
fresh
outrages by
the Qawāsīm,
1815.

On the 6th of January 1816 the H.E.I. Company's armed pattamar "Deriah Dowlut," officered and manned entirely by natives of India, was attacked by Qawāsīm off Dwarka, and eventually taken by boarding. Out of 38 souls on board, 17 were killed or murdered, 8 were carried prisoners to Rās-al-Khaimah, and the remainder, being wounded, were landed on the Indian coast. The entire armament of the "Deriah Dowlut" consisted of two 12-pounder and three 2-pounder iron guns; whereas each of the pirate vessels, three in number, carried six 9-pounders and was manned by 100 to 200 Arabs, fully armed.

Capture of
the "Deriah
Dowlut,"
January
1816.

In the same month a Qāsīmī squadron composed of 15 vessels, the smallest pulling 20 oars, waylaid the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Aurora" of 14 guns, Captain Jeakes, while convoying down the Persian Gulf a large

Attack on
the "Aurora,"
January
1816.

* *Vide* Buckingham, pages 424-425.

Baghlah that carried treasure for the ruler of Masqat. Though much incommoded by the Baghlah, which she had in tow, the "Aurora" stood on through the middle of the hostile fleet; and in the action which ensued she plied them so hotly with grape and canister that several were sunk, and the remainder at nightfall drew off baffled, and disappeared in the direction of the Arabian coast.

Other
piracies,
1816.

Not long after this, the Qawāsim pursued and fired at the American ship "Persia"; attacked the "Macaulay" and the "Cintra"; and even plundered a French schooner on the voyage from Mauritius to Basrah, though convoyed by a ship of the same nationality. A few weeks later several other seizures were achieved by the Qawāsim, among them that of a ship under the British flag, of which the name was never ascertained; this vessel was taken by five pirate boats and her crew and passengers were put to the sword. The H.E.I. Company's armed boat "Turrarow" also fell into the hands of the Qawāsim; and on every side their captures and atrocities continued. Matters had now reached such a pitch that Lieutenant Bruce, the Political Resident, could not even obtain a boat to carry a letter of remonstrance to Rās-al-Khaimah; most of the ports on the Persian side to the south of Nāband had begun to emulate the Pirate Coast to the best of their ability; the Shaikh of Chārak had attached himself to the piratical Qāsimi organisation; and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Bahrain, was reported to have announced his intention of adopting piracy as the shortest road to fortune.

Capture of
Sūrat
merchantmen
in the Red
Sea, 1816.

Matters were at length brought to a head by the capture in the Red Sea, in 1816, of three Indian merchant vessels from Sūrat, which were making the passage to Mokha under the British flag; of the crews only a few survivors remained to tell the tale, and the pecuniary loss was estimated at Rs. 12,00,000. The pirates were commanded on this occasion by Amīr Ibrāhīm, a kinsman of Hasan-bin-Rahmah, the *de facto* Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. In this new and remote quarter the offences by the Qawāsim had their beginning in 1815; and it was probably about this time that, as tradition relates, they made cruel raids at various points along the southern coast of Arabia including the Kuria Muria Islands and Hāsik on the mainland, both of which they left virtually depopulated.

Reparation
refused.

The circumstances of the outrage upon the Sūrat vessels took some time to investigate; but in September 1816, as soon as the facts had been made clear, His Majesty's sloop "Challenger," 18 guns, and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Mercury" and "Vestal," 14 and 10 guns respectively, sailed from Bombay for the Gulf. The "Ariel,"

already present there, was meanwhile sent to Rās-al-Khaimah to demand an explanation, and returned to Būshehr with a flat denial, on the part of the Qawāsim, of their complicity in the Red Sea affair ; to this denial were subjoined the further curious justifications, that the Qawāsim had promised to respect the lives and property of Christians only, not those of idolatrous Hindus, and that in any case they could not recognise as native subjects of Britain any inhabitants of the western coast of India except those of Bombay and Mangalore. The Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, and his Assistant, Lieutenant Taylor, arrived off Rās-al-Khaimah on the 23th of November with the "Challenger," "Mercury," "Vestal" and "Ariel," and early the next morning a letter addressed to the Shaikh was conveyed ashore by Lieutenant Taylor, but he was not allowed an interview with the chief. A little later, however, Hasan-bin-Rahmah consented to see Captain Bridges of the "Challenger," whom Mr. J. S. Buckingham, afterwards well-known as a traveller and journalist, accompanied in the capacity of interpreter ; and by these gentlemen it was ascertained from the chief personally that he had both received the letter of the Resident and fully understood its contents. In that communication discussion of the principal point, whether the Qawāsim were the authors of the crime in the Red Sea or not, was refused ; the immediate restoration of the plundered vessels and property or, alternatively, the payment of their value in cash was demanded ; the surrender of Amīr Ibrāhīm for punishment was claimed ; and it was added that two sons of Shaikhs must be delivered up to the Government of Bombay as hostages for the future behaviour of the tribe. In event of failure to comply with all or any of these terms the squadron, under the instructions received by the Resident, was simply to withdraw after denouncing the displeasure of Government against Qawāsim. The answer of the Shaikh, delivered at noon on the 27th, was insolent and evasive ; but he was given a further period of 24 hours for consideration, and meanwhile a wind from the north-west arose, which compelled the squadron to weigh anchor and run over for shelter to the coast of Qishm. On the 30th the ships again appeared before Rās-al-Khaimah and a fresh period of grace was allowed the Shaikh, terminating at noon on the following day. Hasan-bin-Rahmah continued obstinate and adhered firmly to his own counter-proposal, which was that he should be allowed to send envoys to Bombay to settle the matter there.

On the receipt of this reply the squadron stood in as close to the town as they could without going aground and opened fire upon four Arab vessels which were anchored close in-shore ; but the range, which was fully a mile, was too great for all but a few of their guns ; and,

Futile attack
on Ras-al-
Khaimah, 1st
December
1816.

though some 350 rounds were fired, no visible execution was done.* The squadron then dispersed, the "Mercury" and "Ariel" being detailed to visit Shārjah, Lingeh and Chārak on a mission similar to that performed at Rās-al-Khaimah, while the "Challenger" convoyed the "Vestal" out of the Gulf, turning back at Masqat to afford protection to upward-bound vessels.

Naval resources of the Qawāsim.

The piratical force of the Qawāsim at this period was estimated at 60 large boats belonging to Rās-al-Khaimah, carrying from 80 to 300 men each, besides 40 others of a smaller size distributed over the ports of Shārjah, Rams, Lāft, Lingeh and Chārak. At the time of the British squadron's visit to Rās-al-Khaimah it was understood that the Qawāsim had about 20 vessels actually at sea, of which 15 were then prowling in the Gulf of 'Oman and 5 in the upper part of the Persian Gulf.

Raids by the Qawāsim on the Persian Coast, 1817-18.

The Government of Bombay, though decisive action against the Qawāsim was now contemplated, were not in a position to take immediate steps; and, while they delayed, the temerity of the pirates continued to increase. In October 1817 a Qāsimi fleet made a raid on Shaikh Shu'aib, burned and plundered the villages at the western end of the island, drove off all the cattle, and slaughtered a number of the inhabitants. A little later they entered the roadstead of 'Asalu, captured there 5 large native Baghlahs worth with their cargoes Rs. 3,00,000, and put the crews to death. After a stay of 12 days at 'Asalu the pirate fleet made a demonstration against Kangūn and even attacked Daiyir, but they were repulsed by the inhabitants of the latter place. These outrages, of which the proximity to Būshehr steadily increased, caused a panic in that town; and the people were with difficulty restrained by the Governor from taking flight to the interior.

Depredations on the coast of India.

Simultaneously two native ships, with cargoes of cotton, were taken by the Qawāsim off Diu; and thereafter the "Mustapha," an Arab vessel but officered by Englishmen and flying English colours, was captured only 70 miles north of Bombay.

Escape of a Qāsimi fleet at Gwatar, December 1818.

In December 1818 the H.E.I. Company's brigs "Thetis" and "Psyche," assisted by H.M.S. "Eden," succeeded in cornering 14 piratical Qāsimi vessels in Gwatar Bay; but, time having been allowed them until the morning, in opposition to the advice of the Company's officers, they made their escape during the night.

* In these proceedings the local officers appear to have exceeded their instruction. *Vide* Buckingham, pages 497-498.

On the 21st of December 1818, near the island of Qishm, the Company's cruiser "Antelope" came upon the "Rahmany," a full-rigged ship belonging to the Sultān of 'Omān, beset, along with a native Baghlah, by a Qāsīmi fleet consisting of 4 great Baghlahs, 2 Batils of the largest size and another vessel, with which they had maintained a running fight for two days, almost exhausting their ammunition. The "Antelope," Lieutenant Tanner, immediately attacked the pirate fleet and drove them towards the coast of Qishm; they then turned at bay and made desperate attempts to board their determined assailant, but were repulsed by the accurate fire of the British guns, after having on one occasion succeeded in approaching within 100 yards. On the pirates taking to flight the "Antelope" gave chase and pursued them for 5½ hours, but could not overtake them on account of the lightness of the wind. This was a remarkable action, inasmuch as the combined force of the Qawāsīm amounted to 29 guns and about 1,070 men, whereas the "Antelope" carried only twelve 18-pounder carronades and two 12-pounder brass guns with a crew, all told, of 71 Europeans and 37 natives. The Qawāsīm subsequently confessed to the loss of 117 men in the affair with the "Antelope."

Defeat of a
Qāsīmi
squadron
by the
"Antelope,"
December
1818.

On Christmas morning, 1818, H.M.S. "Eden" and the Company's brig-of-war "Psyche" rescued a captured boat from two pirate Trankis, which managed to escape; during the whole of the same day the Company's cruiser "Thetis" followed without success a Qāsīmi fleet of 7, and on the next day another of 4 sail; and on the 10th and 11th of January 1819 H.M.S. "Eden" sunk 2 piratical Baghlahs off Qishm and Hanjām, but failed to capture 6 Trankis by which the Baghlahs were accompanied. About the same time H.M.S. "Conway" found 17 Qāsīmi war vessels at Bahrain, returning with a large number of men from Qatif, where they had arrived too late to help the Wahhābi Amīr in opposing the Egyptian forces which were then overrunning Arabia; but the commander, Captain Barnard, out of respect for the neutrality of the port of Manāmah abstained from attacking the Qawāsīm at anchor; and, once at sea, the Qawāsīm were able to evade his pursuit. Between October 1818 and January 1819 the Company's cruisers "Thetis" and "Psyche" encountered the Qawāsīm sailing in flotillas of 2 to 10 vessels no less than 17 times, and continued to drive them from place to place; but, on account of the superior sailing qualities of the Arab boats, the British vessels seldom or never succeeded in bringing them to action. In February 1819, on the occasion of a British naval demonstration at

Various
engagements,
pursuits, etc.,
by British
cruisers,
October 1818
to February
1819.

Bahrain, the Shaikh of those islands was induced to arrange with Hasan-bin-Rahmah for the exchange of some Qāsimi prisoners in the hands of the British Government against Indian women then held in captivity at Rās-al-Khaimah : of the latter 17 were released.

Preparations
by the
Qawāsim
to occupy
Bāsīdu.

The Qawāsim now entertained the design of forming a settlement at Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm, to which they might retire if successfully assailed by the ever advancing Egyptians, and whence, at the same time, they might continue to prey with convenience upon the upward and downward commerce of the Gulf. The gallant action fought by the "Antelope" is believed to have been largely instrumental in frustrating the execution of this scheme.

Overtures of
the Qawāsim
rejected by
the
Government
of Bombay.

Conscious of impending retribution, the *de facto* Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah at this point made overtures for a reconciliation with the Government of Bombay and adverted to the negotiations of 1814 between himself, the Wāhhābi Amir and the British power ; but it was too late. His advances were sternly rejected.

The third British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1819-20.

Deliberations
preceding the
expedition.

The third campaign of the Indian Government against the pirates of the Persian Gulf was undertaken, after full consideration, with a firm resolve that it should be final and conclusive ; and it probably would not have been so long delayed as it was, had it not been for difficulties in India, particularly those occasioned by the Gurkha war of 1814-15 and by the Pindāri troubles and Marātha war of 1817-18. Operations appear to have been contemplated as early as 1816 ; but it was not until September 1818 that the Government of Bombay submitted, under orders from the Government of India, detailed suggestions for the pacification of the Gulf. It was believed that a stubborn resistance would be offered by the Qawāsim, to overcome which a strong land force, estimated by the Government of Bombay at 3,000, and by the Government of India at 4,000 or 5,000 men, would be required ; and, as on account of the position of affairs in the Dakkhan not a single battalion could be spared in time for service abroad during the approaching winter, the Government of India directed that the expedition should be postponed until the following year. The Wāhhābi power in Central Arabia had recently been overthrown by Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt ; and it was hoped that the eastward progress of the Egyptians, whose active co-operation against Ras-al-Khaimah it was at the same time resolved to invite, would in the meantime make the task of the

British easier by striking terror into the Qawāsim. Pending a settlement the Government of Bombay maintained the system, which had already been for some time in force, of protecting trade by giving convoy up and down the Gulf to trading vessels,—a duty in which they were materially assisted by His Majesty's ships. Some of the East India Company's vessels were placed for this purpose at the disposal of the officers of the Royal Navy commanding in the Gulf, while others were stationed off the Persian Coast to prevent piratical attacks upon that side.

In the following year, 1819, discussion of the measures to be taken in the Gulf was resumed, and various schemes were proposed for ensuring the maintenance of peace after the conclusion of the expedition. The Government of Bombay, who did not regard the possible introduction of the Egyptians into Gulf affairs with much satisfaction, inclined apparently to a scheme under which the Saiyid of 'Omān should be placed in charge for the future of the Pirate Coast and Bahrain Islands, and should in return authorise the formation of a British settlement upon the island of Qishm, and even defray the cost of maintaining it. The Government of Bombay considered that the Saiyid had a hereditary claim to suzerainty over the Pirate Coast, and that the Shaikh of Bahrain had forfeited all claim to consideration by harbouring and protecting pirates ; and they understood that the Shāh of Persia had expressed his readiness to agree to the occupation of Bahrain by the Saiyid on condition of an annual payment of 30,000 Tūmāns to himself out of a total estimated revenue of 200,000 * Tūmāns ; but they entertained some doubt of the expediency of destroying the independence of the Shaikhs of Bahrain, and they evidently anticipated serious opposition on the part of the Persian Government to the location of a British post on Qishm. The course which was in the end adopted, after argument,† will appear from the

* The estimate must have been excessive for the Tūmān was then worth about a pound sterling, while the present revenue of Bahrain is only about £20,000 per annum.

† An independent line was adopted by Mr. F. Warden, who had made a special study of Persian Gulf subjects, who in his capacity of Chief Secretary had not been consulted by the Governor of Bombay in regard to the expedition, and who therefore, as a provincial member of the Bombay Board, delivered himself on the 12th August 1819 of a monumental minute on policy. Mr. Warden's main contention was that the Wāhhābis, not the Qawāsim, were principally to blame for the piracies committed by the latter ; and he observed : "The result of my researches has established this important fact, that piracy is not indigenous to the soil or the shores of the Persian Gulf, but of recent growth ; on the contrary every tribe is rather disposed to engage in commercial pursuits." He argued that the molestation of British vessels was to be

sequel: it involved the acceptance of naval and military aid from the Saiyid of 'Omān and the ultimate occupation of Qishm under his authority, but without his financial assistance.

attributed to undue interference by the British Government in native affairs in the Gulf; he endeavoured to explain away the "Bassein" and "Viper" cases of 1797; and he represented the Qawāsim and the 'Utūb as obliged by the Wahhābis to engage in piracy against their will. Of the Qawāsim he wrote: "The Joassmees then, not "being free agents but compelled by the Chiefs placed over them by the Wahabees to "engage in maritime depredations, do not appear to be so atrociously guilty, so deeply "stained with the crimes of piracy, as I thought when I was less acquainted with their "history. * * * * The prevalence of piracy, then, in the Gulph of Persia "may be attributed wholly and exclusively to the instigation of the Wahabee tribe. "Under that impression I feel disposed in some degree to advocate the cause even of the "Joassmee tribe, and to palliate their enormities." Mr. Warden regarded the Saiyid of 'Omān, on whose weakness and restlessness he dwelt at length, as a most unsuitable chief to be invested with any sort of general supremacy in the Gulf; and it cannot be doubted that he stood on firm ground when he insisted that the Saiyid had no valid claim to the overlordship of the Pirate Coast, that the Persian Government would object to his being placed in possession of Bahrain, and that his claim to sovereign rights over Qishm, as against Persia, was probably ill-founded. Mr. Warden was in favour of reducing the strength of the proposed expedition and of limiting its scope to the restoration of the authority of Shaikh Sultān, the lawful non-Wahhābi head of the Qawāsim, for which purpose he would have invoked the co-operation not only of the Saiyid of 'Omān, but also of the Shihūh, the Bani Yās, the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Kuwait, the Persians, and the Turks. He agreed, however, with the general opinion that a British station should be established on the island of Qishm, but to this end he would have negotiated with the Government of Persia rather than with that of 'Omān, and he was even in favour of a transfer of the Persian Gulf Residency from Būshehr to Qishm. He urged the desirability of a convention with the tribes for the suppression of piracy, the importance of a right to visit all ports and destroy armed vessels, and the necessity of a prohibition of the export of ship-building timber from India.

Some of Mr. Warden's suggestions had results which are traceable in the subsequent proceedings; but his general line of argument did not meet with the approval of Government. In a minute, dated 6th September 1819, Sir E. Nepean, the Governor of Bombay, observed: "The Board is already in possession of my opinion on the rest "of the points contained in Mr. Warden's minute; and all that may be necessary for me "at present to add is that the impressions formed by all the most intelligent officers, "naval and military, who have for some years past visited the Gulph are directly in "opposition to those entertained by Mr. Warden; and so far from thinking they (the "tribes) are disposed to quit their present predatory habits and to have recourse to "commercial pursuits, they consider their present habits so deeply rooted that nothing "but the strong hand of power will keep them down. What said the Chief of Rasell- "Khyma on Mr. Bruce's remonstrances in consequence of his breach of engagement on "the capture of some vessels belonging to our native subjects? 'If we (meaning the "Joassmees) were to accede to the proposition of respecting vessels navigated by natives "of India, we must starve."

For the purpose of concluding preliminary arrangements,* Captain G. Forster Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment had already been despatched from Bombay, on the 14th of April 1819, with letters for Saiyid Sa'id and Ibrāhīm Pāsha. The instructions of this officer were that he should call at Masqat, and, after making known to the Saiyid the nature

Mission of
Captain
Sadleir, April
1819 to
January
1820.

* As it has been stated information about Captain Sadleir is not now procurable, the present writer takes the opportunity of placing on record some facts which he has been able to collect regarding the forgotten career and personality of a remarkable officer.

George Forster Sadleir was born at Cork on the 19th January 1789. His father, James Sadleir, who belonged to a Tipperary family, purchased an estate named Shannon Vale and was at one time High Sheriff of the city of Cork. His mother was a Miss Forster, and his second name was derived from her family. He had two brothers, of whom the younger, Richard, served in the Royal Navy.

Sadleir joined the Army as Ensign on the 4th April 1805; he was promoted Lieutenant in the same year, Captain in 1813, and Major in 1830; and he retired from the service, by sale of his commission, on the 17th February 1837. He saw military service at Monte Video and Buenos Ayres in 1807; from April 1812 to June 1815 he was engaged, with twelve sergeants from his Regiment, in training the Shah's troops in Persia, in acknowledgment of which he was subsequently awarded a Farman and sword of honour from Fateh 'Ali Shāh; he took part in the Malwa campaign, Central India, and was employed in a political capacity under Sir J. Malcolm, 1817-18; in 1819-20, he carried out the mission in Arabia, described in our text, for the charge of which he was recommended by the Government of India to the Government of Bombay; in 1820-21 he was sent as Envoy to Sind and concluded the "Treaty of Hyderabad on the Indus," and in 1824-26 he discharged the duties of Major of Brigade with the Bengal Division of the British army in Burma.

He returned to Europe in 1833 or 1834, probably not for the first time since his departure for the East, for on the 20th March 1826 he had been enrolled as a Freeman of Cork. After his retirement he married, probably in 1847 or 1848, a Miss Ridings of Cork, her brother also marrying his sister; and about 1855 he emigrated to New Zealand. He died in Auckland before 1868.

A personal touch is supplied by an officer of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment who writes: "Sadlier was a great linguist, but a man of violent temper, and he was the cause of Colonel Elrington being tried by Court Martial, as he reported the Regiment to be in a mutinous state on the line of march in Scotland, when he was in command. It was in the year 1834, and the Batta allowance was given in kind (bread) in Scotland instead of money, and the men could not understand this and stuck the loaves on their bayonets."

Whether his name was spelt "Sadleir" or "Sadlier" must be considered doubtful; possibly it was written in both ways. An extract copied from the Freeman's Roll of Cork gives "Sadlier"; but "Sadleir" is the form found in the records of the War Office and that favoured by most of his surviving relatives and friends. It is believed that no male representative of the family bearing the name of Sadleir or Sadlier is now alive.

of his mission to Ibrāhīm Pāsha and ascertaining the nature and extent of the assistance which the ruler of 'Omān himself would be able and willing to afford, should proceed with the utmost despatch to the camp of the Egyptian commander, whom he was authorised to assure that, as soon after the termination of the monsoon as it might be convenient to undertake operations from India, an adequate British force, naval and military, would be sent to the Persian Gulf for the purpose of co-operating with the Egyptians in the reduction of Rās-al-Khaimah, and that the town would thereafter be delivered over to be garrisoned by Egyptian troops, provided the Pasha should have allotted a competent force to the service of covering the siege. In the formal letters addressed to Ibrāhīm Pasha that general was congratulated on his recent brilliant successes, and the scheme of joint Anglo-Egyptian operations was unfolded for his consideration. Captain Sadleir was further directed to study the situation of the Egyptians in Central Arabia and to fathom, if he could do so without showing too great an interest in the subject, their ulterior designs in the direction of the Persian Gulf; but, whatever those designs might be, he was to refrain from giving the Egyptians, on behalf of the British Government, any guarantee beyond that authorised in regard to Rās-al-Khaimah. As much information as possible regarding the geography and resources of Central Arabia itself was to be collected by Captain Sadleir in his journeyings; and, having accomplished his mission, he was to return to the Presidency headquarters.

Before Captain Sadleir's arrival on the spot, the political situation had so changed as to render the main part of his task impossible of fulfilment, but in his efforts to perform it he showed himself possessed of extraordinary energy and perseverance. Incidentally he achieved the unique distinction of being the first European to traverse the Arabian continent from sea to sea, and that at the hottest season of the year.

Captain
Sadleir's
negotiations
with the
Sultan of
'Omān, May
1819.

Captain Sadleir remained at Masqat from the 7th to the 18th of May 1819 and was successful in obtaining from Saiyid Sa'id a careful estimate of the political position and military force of the Qawāsīm, a promise by the Saiyid to co-operate in person with the British expedition at the head of a large force, a precise statement of the part which he was prepared to take in the operations, and a detailed undertaking to assist in the matter of supply and marine transport. In one respect only Saiyid Sa'id was not amenable to persuasion: he would not consent to any sort of association between his own troops and those of the Egyptians; and he manifestly regarded the proposed co-operation

of the latter at Rās-al-Khaimah as in the highest degree dangerous to his interests. Saiyid Sa'id also expressed an opinion that Ibrāhīm Pāsha would be unable to reply to the British proposals without a reference to his father, the Viceroy of Egypt, and that Captain Sadleir's mission could not be accomplished before the time fixed for the expedition, unless the latter were postponed; in both of these respects his anticipations were remarkably confirmed by the event.

On his journey from Masqat to Būshehr, Captain Sadleir was much delayed by contrary winds; nor did he reach Qatif, where his attempts to open communication with Ibrāhīm Pāsha began, until the 21st of June. He found the credit of the Egyptians already gone and their short-lived occupation of Eastern Arabia practically at an end; but he still considered it his duty to convey his despatches to their destination. From Hofūf, which he reached on the 11th of July, he accompanied the disorganised and retreating Egyptian forces by Dara'iyah and Shaqrah to Rass in Qasīm, where he arrived on the 26th of August, only to learn that the Pāsha had left 48 hours previously for Madinah. From Rass it was impossible for Captain Sadleir, in the actual state of the country, to return to the Persian Gulf; and he therefore pushed on with the Egyptians to Madinah, in the environs of which he arrived on the 6th of September, his horse falling down exhausted just as he reached the last halting place.

On the 8th of September Captain Sadleir obtained an interview with Ibrāhīm Pāsha, and on the following day he delivered the letters of the Governor-General of India and the Governor of Bombay, together with a sword, a gift from the former to the Pāsha; but the Egyptian commander insisted on referring the proposals of the Indian Government, though no longer capable of being put into effect, to Muhammad 'Alī at Cairo. The Pāsha then proceeded on pilgrimage to Makkah, Captain Sadleir meanwhile awaiting the result of the reference at Yanbō', where he suffered severely from fever. When a sufficient time had elapsed for the receipt of a reply from Egypt, Captain Sadleir followed Ibrāhīm Pāsha to Jiddah; but the tone of the Pāsha, formerly friendly, had now become uncivil. Eventually, in consequence of a studied insult to the Governor-General of India contrived by the Pāsha in connection with his return present, Captain Sadleir broke off communication on the 14th of November. On the 23rd of January 1820, the H.E.I. Company's cruiser "Prince of Wales" happening to visit Jiddah, Captain Sadleir was taken on board and so, apparently, returned to Bombay after an absence of nearly a year, during which he had supported with indomitable spirit the most unusual hardships. Of the despatches sent by

Captain
Sadleir's
quest of
Ibrāhīm
Pāsha and
journey across
Arabia, June
to September
1819.

Unsatisfac-
tory issue of
Captain
Sadleir's
negotiations
with Ibrāhīm
Pasha,
September to
November

Captain Sadleir to the Government of India after his departure from Hofūf not one reached its destination ; and in the expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, which meanwhile took place, the expectation of Egyptian assistance was after the first discarded.

Assurances
to Persia.

To prevent a misunderstanding by the Persian Government of the objects of the British expedition, such as might easily arise through the chastisement of the Shaikhs of Lingeh, Mughu, Chārak and Chiru, who were believed to be implicated in recent piracies and whom it was intended to punish, Dr. Jukes was despatched in advance with reassuring letters from the Governor of Bombay for the Persian Governor-General of Fārs and the Persian Governor of Būshehr ; and, on the 15th of December 1819, a letter explaining the intentions of the Indian Government was addressed to Mr. H. Willock, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān, for the satisfaction of the Persian Court.

Objects
of the
expedition.

In the instructions ultimately issued to Major-General Sir William Grant Keir, K.M.G., in whom were vested both the supreme political authority and the direction of the military operations, much was left to the discretion of the commander ; but it was clearly indicated that the main purpose of the expedition was the exemplary punishment of the Qawāsīm of Rās-al-Khaimah and the annihilation of their power, by the capture of the town and the destruction of all their piratical craft as well as of every object of naval or military use which might be found there ; and similar measures were to be applied to Rams and other guilty ports subordinate to Rās-al-Khaimah, and to places on the Persian coast of which the piratical character might be established. The principal restrictions imposed by the orders of Government were that the British troops should not, unless in very exceptional circumstances, be employed at any distance from the places at which there were piratical vessels to be destroyed ; and that, on the Persian side, the utmost practicable consideration should be shown for the undisputed rights of His Persian Majesty. As regards the temporary administration of Rās-al-Khaimah, which the Government as yet intended to transfer to the Egyptians, it was at first ordered that Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who had recently deserted the Saiyid of Masqat in an attempt to capture the place, should not on any account be placed in charge of the same ; but this prohibition was early rescinded, Sir W. Grant Keir being invested instead with discretionary power to make the town over after capture to Sultān-bin-Saqar, or to any other chief whom the people might elect, provided only that he was unconnected with the Wahhābis and unlikely to become a patron of piracy.

Composition
of the naval
and military
forces.

The ships of war placed at the disposal of Sir W. Grant Keir were the following, some of which were assembled at Bombay while others were already in the Gulf : H.M.S. "Liverpool," 50 guns, Captain

Collier ; H.M.S. "Eden," 26 guns ; H.M.S. "Curlew," 18 guns ; and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Teignmouth," "Benares," "Aurora," "Nautilus," "Ariel" and "Vestal," of 16, 16, 14, 14, 10, and 10 guns respectively. The transports for the conveyance of land troops and naval stores numbered 18 ; and the military portion of the force consisted of one company of European artillery,* His Majesty's 47th and 65th Regiments, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry, the flank companies of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry and of the Marine Battalion, and half a company of Pioneers : in all 3,069 fighting men, of whom 1,645 were Europeans and 1,424 were sepoys.† The divisional staff consisted of Major E. G. Stannus, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Captain D. Wilson, Assistant Quartermaster-General ; and Captain G. F. Sadleir of the 47th Regiment, Interpreter : the place of the last, as he was still absent on his mission, was taken by ‡ Captain T. Perronet Thompson of H. M.'s 17th Light Dragoons.

Sir W. Grant Keir having embarked in the "Liverpool," the division of transports carrying the European troops sailed from Bombay on the 3rd of November 1819 and was followed by the remainder at an interval of a few days ; the whole were under the convoy of men-of-war. The Qawāsim remained active to the last. At the end of October their vessels were reported to be cruising in large numbers off the coasts of Makrān, Sind and Kathiawar ; and the "Curlew," while actually on her way to Bombay to join the fleet, had been attacked by 15 large Qāsimi boats which she defeated in a five hours' battle, sinking three and capturing seven. While the fleet made straight for the appointed rendezvous off Qishm, the commander of the expedition proceeded in the "Liverpool" to confer with Saiyid Sa'id at Masqat, arriving there on the 13th of November ; on the 21st he rejoined the main body of the expedition at sea ; and on the 24th, a gale then blowing, all but the rearmost ships were collected at an anchorage under the lee of Larak Island.

The voyage,
3rd to 24th
November.

On the 25th of November the "Liverpool," accompanied by the "Benares," arrived off Rās-al-Khaimah and blockaded the harbour, while the transports on the 26th moved round to Qishm town to take

Reconnais-
sance and
blockade of
Rās-al-Khai-
mah, 25th

* The guns were "a battering train of six 18-pounders, with some 10-inch mortars and 5½-inch howitzers, and field pieces in proportion." (Regimental Records.)

† "The 65th Regiment embarked 750 rank and file on this expedition, and the light company was armed and equipped, by the authority and sanction of Government, as riflemen." (Regimental Records of the 65th Foot.)

‡ See footnote page 463 *ante*.

November
to 2nd
December.

in water. The 26th and 27th were devoted by Sir W. Grant Keir and his chief engineer to an examination of the defences of the town: and, as the result showed that the place might be taken with the force already available at Qishm, the "Benares" was sent to summon the fleet thence. The ships arrived on the 2nd of December, followed in the afternoon by the four last transports, whose arrival—lest a change of weather should take place—it had been decided not to await; and on the same day Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat made his appearance with two frigates and 600 men.

Disembarkation, and
siege
and capture
of the town,
3rd to 9th
December.

Upon this occasion the landing was effected about 2 miles south of the town, and a cordon was immediately formed across the peninsula; the 3rd of December passed in these preliminary operations and in disembarking tents, stores and provisions. It was found that the old wall across the isthmus had been taken down since 1809, leaving a bank in its place, and that a fort * had been constructed in the middle of the isthmus with the materials; a new wall had also been built, nearer to the town than the old. Rifle pits had been dug by the enemy in advance of his position. On the 4th a ridge about 900 yards from the nearest part of the fortifications was seized by the † "skirmishers and pickets" of the force, the enemy being driven back upon the fort and town; in this engagement Major Molesworth of the 47th, "a gallant and zealous officer," was struck on the head and killed by a shot from one of the enemies' guns, the fire of which he had mounted the ridge to observe. During the following night a battery for four guns was completed at a distance of 300 yards from the southernmost tower of Rās-al-Khaimah, with a mortar battery on the right of it about 100 yards from the edge of the inner harbour or backwater. On the 6th the town was bombarded, and its defences shaken, by the guns of the fleet and of the land batteries; the response of the defenders was feeble, apparently for want of ammunition, for they frequently fired large stones from their guns and darted out, between the discharges of the British artillery, to collect round-shot which had lodged outside the walls. On the night of the 6th, under cover of unusual darkness, the Arabs made a stealthy sortie; and the British mortar battery on the right was actually in their possession for a short time, during which they succeeded in removing a howitzer to a distance of about 100 yards;

* The fort, which was 350 paces from the new town wall, was a quadrangular stone building of much more solid construction than any ever before seen in the Persian Gulf. (Regimental Records of the 65th Foot.)

† *Viz.*, all the light companies of the force (51 in number) under Captain Backhouse of the 47th, followed by pickets under Major Molesworth of the same regiment.

but they were quickly driven out again at the point of the bayonet, leaving six dead. During the 7th more guns and mortars were brought into position, including two 24-pounders from the "Liverpool," and during the 8th the enemy's works were subjected to almost continuous battering. A bombardment of the town was maintained throughout the night; and before daylight on the 9th the guns re-opened against the fort, the breaches in which were reported practicable at 8 A.M. The storming party, composed of 100 bluejackets and marines, the whole of the 47th Regiment, and the grenadier and flank companies of the other regiments, then advanced to the attack under the command of Colonel Elrington of the 47th; but their advance was unopposed, and the town, which had been evacuated in the night, was occupied as fast as the troops could run through it. Boats were then brought into the creek, and a party were sent over to Mahārah on the mainland and took possession of a round tower there. The operations had involved much fatigue and privation, which were borne with cheerfulness by the troops. The weather, during part of the time, was inclement and unfavourable.

On the British side the total loss in the operations was 1 officer and 4 men killed and 3 officers and 49 men wounded. The casualties of the enemy were admitted by the Shaikh himself to amount to 400 killed and wounded, and some reports placed them at so high a figure as 1,000. Very little ordinary property except cattle remained in the town, the length of the siege having afforded the inhabitants' ample opportunity to remove their effects across the harbour to the mainland; but 60 or 70 guns, most of them small and unserviceable, and about 80 vessels of 40 to 250 tons were captured. The only persons found in the place were a score of men and a few old women; of the former some were captives of the Qawāsīm.

Military
results.

Useful assistance, especially in the matter of disembarkation and embarkation and in the conveyance of guns, matériel, etc., was lent by the crews of the Masqati frigates. The 'Omāni land army did not arrive until two days after the capture of the town; and, at the instance of the British General, they were immediately sent home, lest their presence should lead to complications, and because of the scarcity of supplies. The Saiyid himself remained on the spot until the 7th of January, when he took his leave.

Co-operation
of Saiyid
Sa'id.

On the fall of Rās-al-Khaimah the "Curlew," "Aurora" and "Nautilus" were sent to blockade Rams, a coast village a few miles to the northward, at which there were some piratical vessels and of which the Shaikh, Husain-bin-'Ali, was devoted to the Wahhābi interest

Operations
against and
capture of
Dhāyah,
18th to 22nd
December.

and had at one time acted as agent on behalf of the Wahhābis in the whole Qāsimi country. Rams was found abandoned, the inhabitants having retired to Dhāyah, a place about 2 miles inland, where there was a village with a strong fort belonging to Husain-bin-'Ali upon a pyramidal hill ; and, as the fort was considered by the Arabs to be impregnable, preparations for its capture, in view of the moral effect which its fall might be expected to produce, were immediately undertaken. On the 18th of December a force, consisting of His Majesty's 65th Regiment, of the flank companies of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Native Infantry Regiment, and of 30 artillerymen with two brass 12-pounders, two 8-inch mortars and four field guns, proceeded against Dhāyah under the immediate command of Major Warren of the 65th, General Grant Keir, however, accompanying the troops in person. On the 19th the enemy were driven back upon Dhāyah, disputing every foot of ground as they retired through the date plantations ; an evasive answer was returned by the Shaikh, who had been summoned to surrender ; and a couple of mortars commenced playing on the fort. The defences of Dhāyah were found to be unexpectedly strong. On the 20th more ground was gained, and the attacking force was increased by the flank companies of H.M.'s 47th Regiment, under Captain Backhouse, and of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry. On the morning of the 21st Dhāyah was completely surrounded, Ensign J. Matheson* of the 65th, "a most gallant, intelligent and zealous officer," being killed ; and in the evening two 24-pounders from the "Liverpool," which had been brought up in face of great physical difficulties † by a naval contingent from the ships, were got into position against the fort on the north-east side, and a couple of 12-pounders against the Shaikh's house on the westward. On the 22nd an opportunity was allowed the garrison of sending their women and children to a place of safety ; but it was neglected. At 8-30 A.M. the guns opened, and at 10-30 a breach had been made practicable and a column were about to advance to the assault, but were halted on the appearance of a white flag. The besieged now surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared, they giving up their arms and other property ; at 1-30 P. M. the British flag was hoisted on the fort and Shaikh's house ; and the prisoners, amounting to 398 fighting

* Also spelt (in the same Regimental Records) Mathison and Matthison.

† The guns had to be brought three miles up a narrow, intricate and shallow creek, and dragged first through a muddy swamp and then over rocky and intersected ground. The efforts of the sailors under Captain Walpole, R.N., and Lieutenant Campbell, R.N., were described by General Keir as "astonishing" and, in his experience, unsurpassed.

men, were marched to Rams to be embarked on the transports. For the safety, and even for the comfort, of the women and children, who exceeded 400 in number, every consideration was shown; and before the departure of the squadron so many of the male adult prisoners as were certified by Lieutenant Bruce, the Political Resident, to be usually peaceful cultivators were set at liberty and permitted to rejoin their families, with whom they found an asylum at the adjacent village of Shimil in Sir. The prisoners not released, amounting—exclusive of the Shaikh himself—to 177, most of whom were either professional men-at-arms or natives of places that remained to be visited by the expedition, were then removed by sea to Rās-al-Khaimah. Eleven guns were captured, and the fort and Shaikh's house were blown up. The total British loss in the operations at Dhāyah was 1 officer and 3 men killed and 16 men wounded, one of whom died; among the Indian troops there were apparently no casualties.

At their return to Rās-al-Khaimah, on the 26th of December 1819, the force from Dhāyah found that the demolition of the defences there ordered to be destroyed had been completed by the troops left behind, while the construction of a work for the accommodation of a British garrison had also made considerable progress. On the 17th of January 1820, a garrison of 800 sepoy with some artillery being left at Rās-al-Khaimah, the expedition proceeded against the remaining piratical harbours upon the coast. Jazīrat-al-Hamra was found deserted; but at Umm-al-Qaiwain, reached on the 18th of January, and at 'Ajman, Fasht, Shārajah, Abu Hail and Dibai, the fortifications and larger vessels were destroyed. The fate of the shipping of Rās-al-Khaimah itself is not clear; Sir W. Grant Keir was evidently averse to its total destruction, and, for a time at least, spared a portion under plea of employing it in the service of the fleet.* On the receipt of a report that ten piratical vessels had taken refuge in Bahrain, which was now clearly shown to be a constant resort of the pirates and the principal market in which they disposed of their plunder, a naval force was detached to obtain their surrender; and, having been handed over, they were duly destroyed. In February some of the war-vessels and transports, carrying the bulk of the force, crossed over to the island of Qais, where they watered; and thence,

Further
operations,
January and
February
1820.

* That the Bombay Government, some time later, had reason to doubt whether the orders for the total destruction of piratical craft had been carried out as ordered appears from paragraph 6 of their letter No. 37 of the 16th February 1820. In the Regimental Records of the 65th Foot it is stated that 218 vessels in all were taken or destroyed by the expedition.

the expedition being declared at an end, they returned to Bombay. Some boats were taken and destroyed at the Persian ports of Lingeh, Mughu, 'Asalu and Kangūn. Prize money with interest, aggregating Rs. 2,66,625, was distributed seven years later under the orders of the East India Company: it was chiefly on account of vessels taken or destroyed.

General Treaty of Peace, 1820.

Negotiations
with the
Qawāsīm.

Having followed the course of military events to the end, we may now revert to the political negotiations which commenced upon the fall of Rās-al-Khaimah. During the siege terms had been offered to such of the garrison as might surrender, but none of them had taken advantage of the offer; on the town passing into the possession of the British, however, Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Jazīrat-al-Hamra, came in upon an assurance of safety and was allowed to remain at large. Encouraged by his example Hasan-bin-Rahmah also gave himself up on a promise of "Amān"; this was a condition by no means implying freedom from personal restraint, but, as his confinement along with his suite appeared to excite general distrust, he was again set at liberty, and confidence was re-established. Numbers of Arabs then flocked in for the purpose of buying back the dates and rice which they had abandoned in the town; Sultān-bin-Saqar, Shaikh of Shārjah, soon after appeared to tender his unconditional submission; and he was followed by Muhammad-bin-Hazzā', the nine-year old chief of Dibai, sent in by his father's widow, who was in charge of the government of that principality. On the 15th of January 1820 Shaikh Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams and his followers were released, partly in order to facilitate the negotiations, and partly because there was sickness among the prisoners and it seemed not unlikely that a number of them might die in custody.

Preliminary
agreements.

As the first step towards a general settlement, each principal Shaikh of the Pirate Coast was required to sign a preliminary agreement; and not until he had done so, and had fully discharged its obligations, was he allowed to become a party to the General Treaty of Peace, which was the principal result achieved by the expedition. The objects of the preliminary agreements were, generally, the surrender of the vessels, towers

and guns of piratical places, under a promise that pearling and fishing craft should be restored, and the release of Indian prisoners; but no two of the agreements were precisely similar, and that signed at a late stage in the proceedings by an envoy of the Shaikhs of Bahrain bore reference chiefly to commercial dealings between Bahrain subjects and the pirates of 'Omān. By Hasan-bin-Rahmah, now described as Shaikh of Khatt and Falaiyah only, it was agreed that Rās-al-Khaimah, with Mahārah on the further side of the harbour, should remain in possession of the British Government. In the case of the Shaikh of Shārjah who had shown from the first a lively anxiety to submit, and of the Shaikh of Dibai, who was but little to blame and for whom the ruler of Masqat had interceded, an undertaking was given that the British troops should not enter or lay waste their towns. 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain as well as Shārjah were disposed of in the preliminary agreement made with Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar. The dates of execution of these documents, giving a rough clue to the progress of the negotiations, were as follow : by the Shaikh of Shārjah, 6th January 1820 ; by the Shaikh of Khatt and Falaiyah (Hasan-bin-Rahmah), 8th January ; by the Shaikh of Dibai, 9th January ; by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, 11th January ; and by the Shaikhs of Bahrain (through an envoy), 5th February.

The General Treaty of Peace, subscribed in turn by each of the above chiefs after the obligations imposed on him by his preliminary agreement had been fulfilled, and also by some additional Shaikhs, was signed as below : by Hasan-bin-Rahmah of Khatt and Falaiyah, formerly of Rās-al-Khaimah, and by Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazīrat-al-Hamra, at Rās-al-Khaimah on the 8th of January 1820 ; by Shaikh Shakhbūt of Abu Dhabi, at Rās-al-Khaimah on the 11th of January ; by Husain-bin-'Ali of Dhāyah, at Rās-al-Khaimah on the 15th of January, the day of his release ; by Zāid-bin-Saif, on behalf of his nephew the Shaikh of Dibai, at Shārjah on the 28th of January ; by Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, at that place on the 4th of February ; by Saiyid 'Abdul Jalīl, envoy on behalf of the Shaikhs of Bahrain, at Shārjah on the 5th of February, and by the Shaikhs themselves, Sulaimān-bin-Ahmad and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, in Bahrain on the 23rd of February ; and, finally, by Rāshid-bin-Hamaid of 'Ajmān and 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid of Umm-al-Qaiwain, at Falaiyah on the 15th of March. From their separate signature of this treaty it would appear that the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain were now considered to be independent rulers,—a status not conceded to them in the preliminary agreements. This position they have retained to the present day ; but it may be observed, in the same

General
Treaty
concluded,
8th January
1820.

connection, that the Shaikhs of Dhāyah (or Rams) and Jazīrat-al-Hamra, who no longer enjoy any such distinction, were apparently treated in 1820 as on an equality with those who still do.

Terms of the Treaty.

By the first article of the General Treaty of Peace the signatories bound themselves to abstain for ever from all plunder and piracy by sea and land. In the second article plunder and piracy were distinguished from lawful warfare; and plunder and piracy, to whatever nation the persons attacked might belong, were interdicted under pain of death and forfeiture of property. The third article prescribed a flag for use by all Arabs included in the treaty, namely, that known in the British Navy as "White-pierced-Red"; of this pattern the red centre was understood to perpetuate the blood-red flag of the Qawāsim, the emblem even at the present day of most maritime Arabs, while the white border was symbolical of peace. The object of the fourth article was apparently to make it clear that the British Government entertained no political or territorial ambitions in the Persian Gulf and would not interfere in ordinary local disputes. The fifth article, some difficulty in enforcing which was foreseen by Sir W. Grant Keir himself, contemplated the introduction of two sets of papers, *viz.*, a "Register" for the identification of every vessel by means of measurements, etc., given under the signature of the chief, and a "Port Clearance," also signed by the chief, to certify the particulars of the actual voyage on which the vessel might be engaged, both of which were to be produced on the demand of a British or "other" vessel: the object of these provisions was to introduce law and order at sea and to prevent irresponsible equipages from ranging the Gulf with impunity. Principally to facilitate execution of the provisions relating to ships' papers the sixth article empowered the "pacificated" Arabs to maintain an agent at the British Residency in the Gulf and the British Government to accredit an envoy to the Arabs, the representative in either case to be paid or maintained by the party whose interests he represented. The seventh article, introduced chiefly in order to make it clear that failure of one or more signatories to conform to the treaty should not be held to absolve the others from observance of the same, imposed upon the pacificated Arabs the duty of co-operating with the British Government to punish plunder and piracy. The eighth article condemned the barbarous Qāsimi custom of putting prisoners to death in cold blood and proclaimed a war of extermination against those who should in future practise it. The ninth article, which was inserted at the instance of

General Grant Keir's Interpreter, Captain Thompson, afterwards a distinguished Abolitionist,* prohibited the slave trade among the pacificated Arabs; this article, which, strange to say, was accepted without demur, was described as politically advantageous, inasmuch as the resistance to the British forces had been carried on largely by means of slaves. The tenth article made the pacificated Arabs free of British ports and conferred on them, in somewhat vague terms, a guarantee of British protection against aggression by all and sundry. The eleventh and last article provided for the adherence from time to time of fresh signatories to the treaty.

The Government of Bombay, though they highly commended his conduct of the military operations and appreciated the humane motives that inspired his policy, were disappointed at the leniency of General Grant Keir's settlement, and desired, if it were not too late, to introduce some conditions of greater stringency. In their opinion the more guilty of the Shaikhs should have been removed from their positions of authority, other local chiefs being substituted for them or their possessions transferred to the Saiyid of Masqat, while those who had actually fallen into the hands of the force should have been detained in custody: the release of Husain-bin-'Ali was particularly regretted. The† treaty ought to have interdicted the fitting out of armed vessels at ports hitherto piratical; to have limited the size of the vessels employed in commerce; to have stipulated for powers of search and confiscation by the British authorities in order to enforce these conditions; to have provided for a restriction of the export of ship-timber from India; and to have forbidden the construction of fortifications in certain circumstances, at the same time empowering the British Government to enter on and destroy any that might be built in disregard of the prohibition. In the view of the Bombay Government the treaty, as it stood, afforded no guarantee against the renewal of piracy, except one of an illusory character depending on the institution of ships' papers, and was so drafted that breach of its conditions would not render the culprits liable to any punishment that might not equally have been inflicted in the absence of a treaty.

Dissatisfaction of the Government of Bombay with the terms arranged.

To these strictures Sir W. Grant Keir made a spirited but temperate reply. He explained that if, instead of accepting the voluntary submission of the hostile chiefs, he had attempted to enforce extreme measures against them, it would have been necessary for him, in contravention of his instructions, to have pursued them into the interior;

* See footnote in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, page 463.

† In the objections referred to in this sentence we seem to discover the influence of Mr. Warden. (See footnote, page 659.)

and that, if others had been substituted in their place, the British Government, committed to the support of their own nominees, would have become entangled in local affairs. The minor stipulations which it was desired to insert in the treaty might, he conceived, be enforced at any time when a necessity for them should arise, for they would be in harmony with the general spirit and objects of the treaty, which were perfectly well understood by the Arabs. In his opinion, any condition which obliged the boats of particular ports to put to sea unarmed would make it incumbent on the British Government to protect them from the attacks of their enemies; and the export of ship-timber from India appeared to him to be a question of the internal regulations of that country, to which it was unnecessary to refer in a treaty with the Qawāsim. But the principal argument of Sir W. Grant Keir was that, though a treaty might be entered into with the Qawāsim to restore confidence, "any measure calculated to secure their reform must have its foundation in power," and that reliance must be placed, not on the binding power of any agreement, but rather on the moral effect of the defeat which the tribe had sustained, and on prompt and effective action by the naval and military force which it was the intention of the Honourable Company to maintain for the future in the Gulf. By the treaty death and forfeiture were declared to be the penalty of piratical crimes, and, such being the case, it could not be said that the treaty failed to render punishable the violation of its own terms.

In the end, though in certain respects the views of the Bombay Government remained unaltered, the settlement as arranged upon the spot was allowed to stand; and subsequent events proved the policy of Sir William Grant Keir to have been no less judicious than it was liberal.

PERIOD FROM THE GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE TO THE FIRST MARITIME TRUCE, 1820-35.

Arrangements for the repression of piracy after the expedition, 1820-23.

Views of the
Bombay
Government.

In despatching a force against Rās-al-Khaimah the Government of Bombay had not, as already shown, lost sight of the fact that, whatever immediate success might attend the expedition, further measures of a more

permanent character would be required to confirm the results obtained. The project to which they inclined was the establishment of a British naval and military station in a central situation in the Gulf, which would enable them to exercise a more immediate and commanding influence over its waters than could be wielded from either Būshehr or Basrah. They anticipated that the island of Qishm, which with Hanjām they believed to appertain to the ruler of Masqat, would be found to afford every advantage for the execution of this scheme; that a port might be created thereon which, by means of customs dues, could be rendered self-supporting, at least in part; and even that the Political Residency at Būshehr, where a commercial factory had ceased to be required, might without detriment to British interests in Persia be transferred to the new settlement. The project was referred to Sir W. Grant Keir for an expression of his opinion; and in the meanwhile an effort was made, through the British Envoy at Tehrān, to obtain the concurrence of the Persian Government, which it was felt would probably be withheld. One battalion of native infantry was the military force which the Government intended to locate permanently in the Gulf; but they were prepared if necessary to exceed this limit, and at one time they even proposed the retention of one company or more of European troops. An argument advanced in favour of the occupation of an island was that a detachment in such a position would be less exposed to attack than on the mainland, and that the proportion of the garrison immobilised for the defence of the station would in consequence be smaller.

At the beginning of April 1820, after a personal visit to Qishm Island, Sir W. Grant Keir submitted his views. He deprecated the immediate removal of the Residency from Būshehr, as possibly involving the commercial ruin of that place; and he suggested that, after the establishment of the new station, some time should be allowed for trade to settle in its natural channels before any great modification of the existing political arrangements was undertaken. The General regarded the position of the garrison at Rās-al-Khaimah as perfectly secure; but a very serious difficulty existed in regard to the water supply and scurvy and fever were prevalent, and he consequently advised that the troops should be transferred to Qishm, which he concurred with the Government of Bombay in thinking the most suitable place in the neighbourhood for a cantonment.

These views having found acceptance, Captain Thompson, who, "having exerted himself most successfully in acquiring the confidence of the inhabitants," had been placed in political and military charge of

Recommendations of Sir W. Grant Keir.

Evacuation of Rās-al-Khaimah, 18th July 1820.

Rās-al-Khaimah with the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Native Infantry and 20 artillerymen under his orders, was instructed, after procuring the consent of the Saiyid of Masqat, to remove his force to the island of Qishm, destroying the defences of Rās-al-Khaimah before evacuating it, and handing the town over at his departure to Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, or to any other suitable chief. Saiyid Sa'id having readily signified, in writing, his consent to the occupation of Qishm, Captain Thompson proceeded to negotiate with Sultān-bin-Saqar, promising him possession of Rās-al-Khaimah on condition that he should agree to the detailed stipulations of which the omission from the General Treaty of Peace had been regretted by the Bombay Government ; but to this condition the Shaikh would by no means agree, and he further insisted that the defences of the place should not be destroyed before its rendition. Captain Thompson, as the Shaikh remained obstinate and he himself was not vested with discretion in the matter, first destroyed nearly every building in Rās-al-Khaimah, these being all in a greater or less degree fortifications, and then evacuated the place on the 18th of July. Two days later the troops disembarked at Qishm town.

Temporay
occupation
of Qishm,
followed by
a system
of purely
maritime
control.

The occupation of Qishm having given rise to difficulties with Persia, and the climate of the island having proved extremely unhealthy, a scheme of maritime control was, about the end of 1821, adopted by the Government of Bombay on the advice of Mr. Meriton, Superintendent of Marine ; this, it was hoped, would render superfluous the retention of a military force in the Gulf. It was decided to maintain in all a squadron of six cruisers, of which three, based on the island of Qais, should cruise continually off the Arab ports from Rams to Dibai. On the island of Qais, which was selected because the prevailing winds favoured rapid communication between it and the Pirate Coast, a small dépôt of stores, with gunboats, should be established under the care of a Master Attendant and the protection of a small sepoy guard. Of the remaining three cruisers, two were to be employed in carrying despatches, in affording convoy, and in other miscellaneous duties between Masqat and Basrah ; and the third was to be used in maintaining communication with Bombay. A year later, on the evacuation of Qishm being carried into effect, these arrangements were slightly modified, four instead of three vessels being appropriated to active cruising duties, while one only was reserved for general employment between Masqat and Basrah. Masqat was made, at the end of 1822, the point of rendezvous of the H.E.I. Company's vessels in these seas ; but in 1823 Mughu on the Persian Coast was substituted, and arrangements were made for establishing a store dépôt at that place, as also a Native Agent on the part of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. Ultimately in September 1823 the

Resident was instructed, in case, as appeared to be probable, the Persian authorities should object to a British establishment at Mughu, to make the necessary dispositions at Basidū instead.

Relations of the British Government with the Pirate Coast, 1820-35.

The immediate supervision of the Pirate Coast having devolved, at the withdrawal of the Qishm detachment, on the Residency at Būshehr, Lieutenant J. McLeod,* an able and judicious officer, now appointed to that post *vice* Captain Bruce removed, was directed to visit the signatories of the General Treaty of Peace for the purpose of conciliating them, and of confirming them in the disposition which they had hitherto shown to adhere to their obligations; he was also to take advantage of the opportunity to explain that the evacuation of Qishm betokened no change of policy on the part of the British Government, and that a marine force would still be maintained in the Gulf and would continue to visit the Pirate Ports; and he was to arrange for the introduction of ships' papers and the use of a particular flag,—two provisions of the treaty which had hitherto been generally neglected. In case of a recurrence of piracy he was empowered to proceed to the destruction of boats; but he was not to resort to operations by land. On the Persian side the Resident was to maintain a close watch upon piratical ports; but, in case of action becoming necessary, he was merely to refer to the Persian Government, who had now undertaken full responsibility for the control of their own coast. Lieutenant McLeod, besides establishing a system of news reports, was to study in detail the whole political system of the Persian Gulf. The true understanding of local affairs upon the Arabian side may be said to date from the time when these orders were carried into execution.

Instructions
to the
Resident,
November
1822.

In January 1823 the Resident, in the "Ternate" accompanied by the "Aurora" and "Antelope," all under the command of Captain Faithfull, made a voyage along the Pirate Coast and visited Qatar and Bahrain. Besides interviewing all the principal Shaikhs and fulfilling the other instructions which he had received from Government, especially that relating to the institution of ships' papers, the Resident discussed with the chiefs a number of points that had arisen

Lieutenant
McLeod's
tour on the
Pirate Coast,
January
1823.

Lieutenant McLeod died of fever at Būshehr in the following September.

in regard to the interpretation of the General Treaty of Peace, of which document even the simplest requirements did not appear to be universally understood ; and the free and friendly intercourse thus established inaugurated a new epoch in the history of British dealings with the Pirate Coast. Incidentally, Lieutenant McLeod sought to dissuade Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah from hostilities against the ruler of Masqat, for in his opinion a state of war between these two, of whom the former possessed the greater military strength and had less to lose, while the latter was the more wealthy, was fraught with grave danger to the safety of seas ; and he concerted measures with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to compel Suwaidān-bin-Za'al, a dangerous maritime wanderer with a large following, to adopt a more settled mode of life. As a marine survey of this part of the Gulf, recommended by General Sir W. Grant Keir before his departure, was now in progress, the Resident took the opportunity afforded by his cruise to visit the scene of operations. Between Shārjah and Dōhah in Qatar the squadron took a still unsurveyed passage.

Questions
relating to
the inter-
pretation of
the Treaty,
1823.

One measure now recommended by the Political Resident was the establishment of a Native Agency at Shārjah, if necessary by the transfer of a Native Agent who was then maintained at Qatif ; and the proposal appears to have been carried into effect soon afterwards.

Connected with the Treaty of 1820 were a number of doubtful points, certain of which, raised for the most part by the perverse ingenuity of Sultān-bin-Saqar, the Resident now referred to Government for an authoritative decision. Before the removal of the troops from Qishm, Colonel Kennett being then the political officer at that place, two other questions had been agitated,—whether the British authorities had the right to enquire into the building of new vessels at the piratical ports and to destroy them on the stocks in event of the explanation given being unsatisfactory, and whether it was permissible to detain the vessels of signatory states if not possessed of the papers or flying the flag required by the treaty of 1820 : in both cases the decision appears to have been in the negative. The principal points now discussed were the competence of the British authorities to forbid the building or rebuilding of fortifications by chiefs, the scope of the article (No. 9) relating to the slave trade, and the extent to which under another article (No. 10) the British Government was pledged to protect the pacificated Arabs against the attacks of non-signatory powers. It was ruled with reference to these, in March 1823, that the terms of the treaty did not warrant any prohibition of the building

of forts; that the article in which slaves were mentioned referred not to the buying and selling of persons already enslaved but to raids on the coast of Africa for the purpose of making slaves, which alone could be correctly described as "plunder and piracy"; and that the promise of protection against non-signatories only covered the Indian ports to which, by the same article, access was guaranteed to signatories.

Here it may be mentioned that Sultān-bin-Saqar, having apparently received permission from Lieutenant-General Smith so long before as 1821, proceeded in 1823 to erect a tower 30 feet high on the sea-face of Rās-al-Khaimah, whereupon Captain Faithfull of the Bombay Marine, supposing this to be a breach of treaty, at once proceeded to the spot with five cruisers and obtained the demolition of the work. Captain Faithfull's action was rendered possible by his omission to consult the Resident, who was probably by this time aware of the ruling of Government in regard to new fortifications,—an omission which he was enjoined to avoid for the future in all political questions, unless of extreme urgency.

Destruction
of a tower
at Shārjah,
1823.

The establishment of order at sea was necessarily a gradual process; but piracy had ceased to be a profession, and such cases as occurred, even when they could not be attributed to quarrels among the Arab chieftains or their subjects, did not often affect the vessels of foreigners.

Minor
piracies,
1823-88.

At the end of 1823 one Hassūn of Shārjah fitted out a boat for piratical purposes and was said to have cruised for some time, but without success, off the coast near Jāshk; on his return to port his proceedings became the subject of inquiry, but evidence sufficient to ensure his conviction was not obtained.

1823.

At the beginning of 1824 two other Shārjah boats put to sea with nefarious intentions, as was reported to the Senior Marine Officer by the Shaikh, though not until after their departure; and a little later it was stated that they had captured a Mahra Baghlah near Soqotrah, putting all on board of her to death, and had proceeded on their way to Zanzibar. This case also was apparently not free from doubt, for the British Government, on the return of the boats to their home waters, rested content with the breaking up of one, which was found abandoned at Chārak, while the other, discovered at Matrah, was left unmolested.

1824.

In 1825 a somewhat grave case occurred through an unprovoked attack by some vessels of Shārjah upon a Bahrain boat near the island of Hanjām, in which the Bahrainis had three or four men killed and were robbed of a considerable amount of specie; and in the month of August the Senior Marine Officer was directed to proceed to Shārjah

1825.

with a squadron and demand full compensation: should it not be granted he was to remove the Residency Native Agent and to capture all the vessels belonging to the port. As a result of his proceedings ample redress was vouchsafed to the injured parties, the Shaikh of Bahrain expressed himself satisfied, and a proper appreciation of the treaty of 1820 was inculcated upon the people of the whole Gulf.

1826-27.

In 1826 a series of piracies were committed by 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn and Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tikhān), adherents of the freebooter Suwaidān-bin-Za'al who had fled from Abu Dhabi territory and settled at Dōhah in Qatar, in the nominal jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Their offences included the taking of an Abu Dhabi Baghlah, several persons in which were killed and wounded; the capture of an Umm-al-Qaiwain boat, not long retained, with a loss to the defenders of one man killed and one wounded; and the plunder of a vessel belonging to Bahrain. On the ground that the base of these piratical operations was Dōhah in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Bahrain, while the sufferers in one case belonged to Umm-al-Qaiwain, a dependency of Shārjah, Sultān-bin-Saqar now attempted to evade payment of the compensation arranged in the Hanjām case of 1825; but his plea was not admitted by the British authorities. It does not appear that in the cases of 1826, though the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi appealed to the British authorities and nearly declared war against the Shaikh of Bahrain, any action was taken by the Resident; but in 1827 the Shaikh of Shārjah was induced to imprison one 'Adwi of 'Ajmān who had committed piratical acts against boats belonging to Dibai.

1828.

In 1828 some Bani Yās pirates, who in July of that year had captured two Bahrain Baqārahs and a Kuwait Batil not far from Dōhah, succeeded in escaping to the interior; but the boats taken were recovered and restored to the owners. In September 1828 a vessel manned chiefly by subjects of Abu Dhabi, after a cruise upon the Persian Coast and the seizure of their captain at one place where they touched, returned to the Arabian side, plundering on their homeward way four boats belonging to 'Asalu which they found in the neighbourhood of Yās Island; but the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, on both parties appearing before him, caused the sufferers to be fully compensated.

Serious
piracy on a
Sohār boat,
1828.

In 1828 the atrocities of earlier days were recalled to mind by an attack made upon a boat from Sohār by a Batil under the command of one Mushun-bin-Rāshid of Rās-al-Khaimah; in this affair the whole cargo of the Sohār boat was plundered, the crew numbering 14 persons were tied to a grapnel and thrown overboard, and the vessel itself was

scuttled and sunk. Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, alarmed at the view of the case taken by the British authorities, despatched a Baghlah in pursuit of the pirate Batil, which was eventually forced on shore near Lingeh; the majority of the buccaneers were captured and taken to Rās-al-Khaimah, where they were imprisoned for several months; and the Batil and the stolen property recovered were delivered up to the Saiyid of 'Omān. Muslim-bin-Rāshid seems to have been subsequently strangled by order of Sultān-bin-Saqar, whom, if rumour may be trusted, he accused of being himself the instigator of the crime.

In 1829 the British merchant ship "Sunbury" was somewhat unceremoniously handled at Shārjah in consequence of a belief, not unfounded, that she carried supplies for the hostile port of Abu Dhabi. The cargo for Abu Dhabi having been resold by the agent of the owner to the Shaikh of Shārjah without the knowledge of the captain of the ship, several boatfuls of men boarded the "Sunbury" in a very insolent manner to take delivery; an attempt was made to haul down the British flag; and the mate, in resisting it, was struck with some violence by one of the Arabs. The incident was quickly terminated on the arrival of the "Amherst" sloop-of-war. Shaikh Sultān, after protesting his ignorance of the affair, caused the first boat that had boarded the "Sunbury" to be burnt, while the chief aggressor in the matter of the colours was tied up and flogged by his orders.

Case of the
"Sunbury,"
1829.

In 1831, a number of places on the Persian Coast having been deserted by their inhabitants in consequence of the plague then raging, some Qawāsīm on their way home from Basrah seized the opportunity to plunder Dilam and Rīg, which were among the number; and further down the coast they took possession of a boat returning from Kangūn to Būshehr.

Further
petty
piracies,
1831-34.

These excesses appear to have been ignored; but when the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, being openly at war with the people of Sohār as a natural consequence of his coalition with Saiyid Sa'id against them in 1831, extended his depredations to the shipping and commerce of the 'Omān Sultanate to which Sohār had now ceased to belong, steps were immediately taken to call him to account: this, however, was not done until his captures at sea amounted to more than a dozen vessels with their cargoes. Sultān-bin-Saqar having found it convenient to deny that he any longer possessed authority over 'Ajmān or Umm-al-Qaiwain, an ultimatum was conveyed direct to Shaikh Rāshid of 'Ajmān by two British vessels of war; and his efforts at evasion being cut short by a refusal to allow him more than 24 hours' grace, the Shaikh, after

1832.

the value of one 'Ajmān Batil seized in reprisal by the people of Masqat had been deducted, made good the balance of the claim by handing over boats, money, jewels and other property to the required amount. These events took place in 1832.

1832-33. In May 1832 a boat belonging to a British subject was taken by pirates off the Persian Coast; and subsequently three of the principal offenders, who belonged to the village of Khān in the Shārjah principality, absconded from that place and took refuge with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. The settlement of this case was delayed by other more pressing demands on the services of the British cruisers in the Persian Gulf; but in 1833 the chief of Abu Dhabi, on whom the first demand was served, paid up a fine of \$1,500 rather than surrender the criminals. Shaikh Sultān, from whom \$2,000 fell to be recovered, was at first recalcitrant; but a few shots fired into a Shārjah Batil lying near 'Ajmān quickly brought him to his senses.

1833. In 1833 the crew of a Qāsīmi boat touching at the island of Khārgu carried away a portion of a tent belonging to the British Residency, which had been transferred to Khārgu during the prevalence of plague at Būshehr; and, as the marauders were well aware of the British ownership of the article stolen, the case was treated as one of intentional insult, and a war vessel was sent in pursuit. The thieves were found at Muhammareh and brought back with the stolen property to Būshehr, but were afterwards released at the intercession of the Shaikh of Būshehr.

1834. In 1834 some members of the Sūdān tribe who had recently removed from 'Ajmān to Abu Dhabi attacked a Batil of the Matārish from Matrah and plundered her of property worth \$1,000; no loss of life, however, occurred. In this case redress was withheld by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, until British vessels, prepared to enforce it, appeared off his port. In this year the squadron in the Gulf consisted of two cruisers only, the "Amherst" and the "Elphinstone."

Final
outbreak of
piracy
among the
Bani Yās,
1835.

The year 1835 was made remarkable by an expiring flicker of the old piratical spirit, which this time flamed up, not among the subjects of the Qāsīmi Shaikh, but in the formerly well-behaved and law-abiding tribe of the Bani Yās. The outbreak may be attributed partly to a change of rulers at Abu Dhabi and to dissensions among the Bani Yās; partly to the passions kindled by recent savage wars between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah; and partly to the weakness of the British naval establishment in the Gulf. The Bani Yās pirates placed themselves in the fair-way of the Gulf and began to

prey upon passing commerce without respecting any flag, even the British; their robberies were accompanied by atrocities, such as the massacre of entire crews, that vied with the worst offences in former days of the Qawāsīm; and so infatuated were they by their easy success against native trading vessels that one of their squadrons put to sea with the avowed object of encountering the Company's cruisers. On receiving news of this last challenge Commodore Elwon, commanding the Persian Gulf squadron of the Indian Navy, immediately directed Captain Sawyer to proceed with his vessel, the "Elphinstone" sloop-of-war, in search of the pirates and to bring them to action. The "Elphinstone" carrying eighteen 32-pounders, was much more powerful in relation to Arab war-vessels than her predecessors of 15 years before,—a fact which the pirates perhaps did not appreciate; but her crew was comparatively small, numbering only about 150 men, of whom however 80 were Europeans. On the 16th of April the "Elphinstone" came up with the pirate fleet, which appeared to consist of 3 Baghlahs, 1 Batil and 3 Baqārabs, the largest Baghlah having one of the others in tow: this last vessel proved eventually to be the "Nāsir" of Kangūn, captured by the pirates off Kung four or five days previously. After gaining a position to windward and double and treble shotting his guns with round and grape, Captain Sawyer, unfettered by the necessity of waiting till he was attacked, steered between the large Baghlah and her prize; and, as the "Elphinstone" passed through with her guns almost touching the enemy's sides, both broadsides were discharged with terrific effect, making the splinters fly in every direction. The Arabs confined themselves to an attempt to board, which had it been successful would have sealed the doom of the "Elphinstone," for the large Baghlah alone contained at least 200 men; but it was frustrated by a destructive fire of small arms. Seeing that the fortune of the day was against them, the pirates at once made off, abandoning the "Nāsir," from which a prize crew of about 90 men leaped into the water and were picked up by the large Baghlah. That vessel, accompanied by the Batil, was pursued by the "Elphinstone" until nightfall, when she rounded Farūr Island and disappeared; and meanwhile the remainder of the pirate fleet, after stripping the "Nāsir" as far as they could, sailed away in another direction. Returning on the next day to the scene of the encounter, the British cruiser took possession of the "Nāsir" and rescued nine of her original crew drifting on a raft, to which, fearing the return of the pirates, they had committed themselves. Enquiry showed that 33 dead bodies of pirates had been thrown overboard from the "Nāsir" alone while

some 25 wounded had been carried off by their friends; and the losses on the large pirate Baghlah must have been even more considerable.

The settlement with the Bani Yās which followed this well-merited chastisement was satisfactory in the extreme. One brig, 7 Baghlahs, 2 Batils and 5 Baqārahs, which had been captured by the Bani Yās, were surrendered; the greater part of the cargo taken from the "Durya Dowlut," a Baghlah under British colours, was recovered; compensation for other property to the amount of over \$10,000 in cash and kind was obtained, a bond and security in the shape of 3 large Bani Yās vessels being taken for due payment of the balance of \$1,600; all prisoners in the hands of the pirates were released; and two of the principal buccaneers, Muhammad-bin-Saqar and Muhammad-bin-Mājid, were handed over to be tried for their crimes. In addition a Bani Yās Batil, which happened to arrive from India at Masqat, was detained by the authorities of that port. At Bombay Muhammad-bin-Saqar was convicted of piracy on the high seas in the case of the "Durya Dowlut" and sentenced to transportation for life; but Muhammad-bin-Mājid, on the failure of the case against him, was brought back to the Gulf to be handed over to Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, and unfortunately escaped by swimming ashore from an anchorage four miles off Shārjah.

Piracies by
Dibai boats,
1834-35.

General depredations on the trade of the Gulf were commenced by the Āl Bū Falāsah of Dibai soon after their secession, elsewhere described, from Abu Dhabi; they attacked and plundered 1 Masqat, 1 Bahrain and 2 Nāband vessels, murdering in the first case 5 men; and they looted a village on the coast of Bātinah near Masqat. A British demonstration against the town of Dibai, however, procured full satisfaction in the cases in which it had not been voluntarily afforded or otherwise obtained.

Piracies by
Shārjah
boats, 1835.

In 1835 the Shārjah chief, on pretence of assisting the Saiyid of 'Omān against the rebellious town of Sohār, proceeded with a fleet to Khor Fakkān and Dibah, but his depredations soon extended beyond the shipping of Sohār to that of his nominal ally, and even to neutral vessels; for such as were reported, however, he was compelled to afford satisfaction.

Relations of the Pirate Coast Shaikhs with the Saiyid of Masqat, 1820-35.

Before proceeding to review the internal history of the Pirate Coast from the General Treaty of Peace in 1820 to the first Maritime Truce in

1835, we may take account of some external influences which were not without their effect upon domestic politics. The foreign factor or greatest importance on the Pirate Coast, after the British power, was at this time undoubtedly the Saiyid of Masqat. The principal supporters of His Highness on the Pirate Coast were ordinarily the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai; but in 1823 an exceptional combination occurred, Abu Dhabi and Dibai allying themselves with Shārjah, while 'Ajmān sought to preserve his independence of Shārjah by attaching himself to Masqat.

In 1824 a dispute arose between Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat and Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah over the oasis of Baraimi, which, in a former treaty between them, had been declared neutral territory; the details of the quarrel are now obscure, but it seems that the Shaikh of Shārjah had wrongfully built or taken possession of some towers in Baraimi. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi had in the meantime encouraged a colony of Sūdān refugees from Shārjah to build a fort at Dairah between Dibai and Shārjah; this settlement was a source of much annoyance to the Shārjah Shaikh, and, in conjunction with the Baraimi difficulty, produced a general state of tension which the British Resident considered it his duty to relieve.

The Baraimi-Dairah case
1824-27.

At a visit to Shārjah in December 1824 the Resident effected a reconciliation of the parties on an understanding that the Baraimi towers and the Dairah fort should both be demolished, and that the Sūdān immigrants should be removed to some other part of the Abu Dhabi principality. In February 1825, no steps having been taken by Sultān-bin-Saqar to carry out his part of the arrangement, a strong remonstrance was addressed him by the Resident; the Shaikh in reply pleaded intrigues on the part of his adversaries and suggested that a commission of three persons, one appointed by himself, one by the Saiyid of Masqat and one by the Resident, should be sent to Baraimi to superintend the execution of the agreement. In May 1825 the Resident took advantage of a visit which he paid to Masqat to despatch Gulab Anandas, the Native Agent representing Britain at that port, along with some troops of the Saiyid to witness the destruction of the Baraimi towers under an authorisation specially obtained from the Shārjah Shaikh. Scarcely however had the delegate started when Sultān-bin-Saqar made a sudden attack on Dairah, afterwards repulsing a force sent by Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt to its relief; and this treacherous action on his part necessarily put an end to the efforts of the Resident to adjust the quarrel. The Masqat Agent, it may be noted, on his return from

Baraimi, reported about the delay in the proceedings in a sense wholly unfavourable to the good faith of Sultān-bin-Saqar.

The result of the rupture between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi was to prevent the subjects of either Shaikh from taking part in the pearl fishery for the year,—an exclusion which was severely felt by both sides and led to a reconciliation in October 1825 under the auspices of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, then present on the coast with a squadron of his vessels. In this settlement the Baraimi difficulty was entirely ignored; but the demolition of the Dairah fort and the withdrawal of the Sūdān colony by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi were decreed. A curious clause, probably representing the Saiyid's brokerage on the bargain, was added, but apparently remained unfulfilled; it provided for the neutralisation of the town of Dibai by the handing over of its defences to the ruler of Masqat. The arrangement remained a dead-letter until 1827, when the dismantlement of Dairah was enforced by Saiyid Sa'id with a naval force; but His Highness before his departure compensated Shaikh Tahnān with a gift of military stores and encouraged him to seize Dubai. The ruler of Masqat undoubtedly considered a rapprochement between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi to be hostile to his own interests.

Designs of
the Shārjah
Shaikh,
1829-30.

In 1829, before starting on his first expedition to East Africa, Saiyid Sa'id endeavoured to arrange for the security of his possessions at home by granting subsidies to some of the Pirate Coast chiefs, and among them Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was promised an allowance of Rs. 2,000 a year. Notwithstanding this payment the faithless ruler of Shārjah was hardly restrained, at first by the remonstrances of the chief men of his tribe and later by the menaces of the British Government, from throwing in his lot with the rebels who in 1830 attempted to upset the Saiyid's government.

Intrigues
relating
to the
operations
Sohār, 1831.

After Sa'id's return from Africa he endeavoured to obtain the aid of Sultān-bin-Saqar in his operations for the recovery of Sohār in 1831, but the Shaikh hung back, demanding as the price of his support the transfer to himself of either Dibah or Khor Fakkān, and eventually a raid by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on Qāsimi territory prevented his taking part on either side in the fighting at Sohār. The movement of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh was intended to embarrass Saiyid Sa'id, who had declined his assistance at Sohār, probably because of the bad behaviour of the Bani Yās contingent in an expedition against Bahrain in 1828. The only one of the Pirate Coast chiefs who rallied to the side of Saiyid Sa'id before Sohār was consequently Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, Shaikh of 'Ajmān, a dependent of Shārjah: on the defeat of the Masqat

troops this unreliable ally changed sides and helped to complete the Saiyid's discomfiture.

In 1832, on the occurrence of another rising against Saiyid Sa'id's authority during his second absence in East Africa, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar availed himself of the opportunity to seize, by surprise or treachery, Dibah and the Shamailiyah ports of Khor Fakkān and Ghāllah, which were thus lost to the 'Omān Sultanate. But for the timely arrival of two Masqat frigates, with reinforcements and stores, it is probable that the town of Shinās also would have fallen into his hands.

Annexation
by the
Shārjah
Shaikh of the
Shamailiyah
district.

Connection of the Wahhābi power with Pirate Coast affairs, 1820-35.

The prestige of the Wahhābi Amīr was for a time destroyed by the successful operations of the Egyptian and British forces against him and his dependents; but, with the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Najd and of the British from Qishm, his influence in 'Omān began to revive. Though in 1821 Sultān-bin-Saqar had already abjured Wahhābi tenets, and though his authority was even then preponderant over that of Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams, the official representative of the Wahhābi interest on the Pirate Coast, it was nevertheless the case that in 1823 a large proportion of the people were still Wahhābi in sympathy; but of the secular power of the Wahhābi Amīr there was no longer a trace to be found in the country.

Temporary
discredit
of the
Wahhābis,
1821-23.

In 1824 the Wahhābi state began to raise its head once more in Central Arabia; and Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar and his chief dependent, Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Hamaid of 'Ajmān, lost no time in creating interest for themselves with its ruler. The negotiations were conducted quite openly on the part of the Shaikh of Shārjah, who pretended that they were necessary for his safety.

Revival of
Wahhābi
influence,
1824.

In November 1825, in an interview with the British Resident, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar professed great fear of the growing power of the Wahhābis and enquired whether he might rely on British aid in endeavouring to defend his independence against them; he also asked what course he should follow if the Wahhābis were to make war on the Saiyid of Masqat and demand the assistance of Shārjah. No reply was apparently given to the question about British support, the Bombay Government thinking it more prudent not to publish their intention of avoiding a collision with Wahhābis over merely territorial matters; but the Shaikh

Corre-
spondence
between the
Shaikh of
Shārjah and
the British
authorities
relative to
the Wahhābi
danger, 1825.

was informed that no plea of compulsion by the Wāhhabīs would be admitted by the British Government in extenuation of piratical proceedings, and he was strongly advised to abstain from joining any combination against His Highness of Masqat.

Refusal of
the British
Government
to support
the Shaikh
of Shārhah
against the
Wāhhabīs,
1830.

In 1830 the successes of the Wāhhabīs in Hasa and the prospect of their immediate appearance in 'Omān caused a considerable stir upon the Pirate Coast. The Shaikh of Shārhah, who had everything to lose by their return, endeavoured, while openly professing delight at their approach, to obtain in secret a promise of support against them from the British Government; but it was explained to him that Britain had no end in view except the maintenance of maritime security and could not interfere in the internal affairs of Arabian states. A large number of the common people, however, as well as the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, who hoped that by some change they might be freed from their dependence on Shārhah, sincerely rejoiced at the appearance of the Wāhhabīs; and Rāshid-bin-Hamaid of 'Ajmān even applied for the post of Wāhhabī vicegerent in the country, but received the chilling reply that the Amīr regarded, and would continue to regard, the Saiyid of Masqat and the Shaikh of Shārhah as the two heads of the tribes of 'Omān. Rāshid was however made the medium, in 1831, of a communication from the Wāhhabī Amīr to the Governor of Bombay, in which the former signified a wish to be on terms of amity with the British Government.

Ineffectual
Wāhhabī
intervention,
1834.

In 1833, in consequence of an internal revolution, the principality of Abu Dhabi fell temporarily under Wāhhabī influence; and in 1834 the Wāhhabī representative at Baraimi interposed, on the side of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in the chronic feud—then at its height—between that ruler and the Shaikh of Shārhah. His action, however, though it prevented Sultān-bin-Saqar from obtaining Bedouins to beleaguer Abu Dhabi town on the landward side, did not seriously impress him or cause him to desist from hostilities.

Relations of the Qawāsīm with the Persian Coast, 1820-35.

The Qawāsīm had still a close connection with the coast of Persia, where Lingeh was governed by a family of their tribe; and they seem to have favoured, not unnaturally, the side of the local Arab Shaikhs in the periodical difficulties between the latter and the central Persian Government.

In 1832 Shaikh Nāsir, a hereditary Governor of Būshehr who had been expelled by the Persian authorities, blockaded his former charge and summoned the Qawāsīm to his aid, promising them the plunder of the town if it should be taken. In response to this invitation Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, at the end of November, arrived in person at Būshehr with a fleet carrying from 1,000 to 1,500 men; and serious mischief might have resulted had not Mr. Blane, the British Resident, seeing that Shaikh Nāsir's blockade had already failed and that there was no hope of his permanent restoration by violence, ordered the Qawāsīm to withdraw. This they did reluctantly and only in consequence of threats by the Resident to employ force.

Demonstration at Būshehr, 1832.

Internal affairs of the Pirate Coast, 1820-35.

Even before the evacuation of Rās-al-Khaimah by the British forces Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar had stepped into the place of principal authority among the Qawāsīm. Hasan-bin-Rahmah of Rās-al-Khaimah had then already become subservient to him; and the aged Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams, who clung to his Wahhābi ideas and was apparently supported by Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazīrat-al-Hamra, could make no head against his influence.

Position in 1821.

At the time when, in January 1823, Lieutenant McLeod's visit to the Pirate Coast first laid bare to view the internal politics of the country, the influence and power of the Shaikh of Shārjah greatly exceeded those of any other chief, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, his chief competitor, not excepted. Sultān-bin-Saqar had now deported the old Shaikh of Rams to Shārjah, replacing him by Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, the son of a former Shaikh; his own brother Muhammad he had placed over Rās-al-Khaimah town, which now occupied a site on the mainland opposite to the peninsula; the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, owned him for his liege-lord; and on the coast northwards of Shārjah the only chief who considered himself independent was Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān. This last obstacle in the way of his complete supremacy Sultān-bin-Saqar was extremely anxious to remove, and, as evidence of his rights over 'Ajmān, he referred the Resident to the preliminary agreement made between himself and General Sir W. Grant Keir in 1820, which expressly covered 'Ajmān; but the force of the argument as proving the perma-

Position in 1823.

ment subordination of 'Ajmān was not admitted, and the Shaikh was further informed that the British Government took no interest in his claims to suzerainty over other chiefs.

Lieutenant McLeod, dissenting from the current view that the ruling Shaikh of Shārjah was little better than a monster in human shape, described him at this time as a turbulent and ambitious man, but superior in ability, as well as in most other respects, to his neighbours. The establishment of Shaikh Sultān's power over the whole Pirate Coast might, he reported, possibly be advantageous to Government; but it should be understood that, as no Shaikh was absolute even in his own tribe, so the hegemony of Shārjah over the other principalities would be nominal at the best; and the Resident foresaw trouble from the rancorous hatred of its ruler for Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat.

The principality of Dibai, still governed by Zaid-bin-Saif, the uncle of the Shaikh, was at this time dependent on that of Abu Dhabi, of which the ruler was Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt; and both of these states, which were military and pastoral rather than maritime in their condition, generally inclined to alliance with Masqat.

The Qawāsim, whose extreme poverty and fewness of resources were now for the first time set in a clear light, still built their boats entirely of Indian teak; their warlike stores were obtained from Bahrain, from the Persian ports of the lower Gulf, and from Masqat; and their arms, mostly taken from prizes, were commonly of Persian manufacture. None of the chiefs possessed more than three or four boats except Sultān-bin-Saqar who had at least 30 fine vessels, each capable of containing 50 to 100 men; and it was strongly suspected that most of these were over three years old and had been hidden away by the Shaikh, instead of being surrendered, at the time of the British expedition.

Continued
ascendancy
of the Shaikh
of Shārjah,
1823-32.

Qadhīb-bin-Ahmad of Jazīrat-al-Hamra was now dead; in 1824 his successor was removed by Sultān-bin-Saqar to make way for a more pliant representative in the person of one Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah; and about the same time the Shaikh of 'Ajmān also bowed to the inevitable and acknowledged the overlordship of Shārjah. In 1825 Shaikh Sultān, having acquired influence at Dibai by his own marriage with the sister of the young Shaikh, was scheming to obtain actual possession of that place, the nearness of which to his capital would be a serious danger in case of its falling under inimical influences. In 1832 however, Sultān-bin-Saqar, made aware by experience of the disadvantages of being held responsible for the behaviour of minor chiefs, formally resigned his pretensions to suzerainty over 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and in

1833 he sustained a serious reverse at Abu Dhabi which cannot but have lowered his prestige.

Meanwhile, in 1828, the town of Rās-al-Khaimah had begun to rise once more on its original site, the ruins of the old town serving as quarries of material for the new ; the wall across the isthmus on the landward side of the town had already been restored ; and a square tower had been built on a mound which marked the place of a former principal fortification.

It is unnecessary here to do more than refer to the acts of war between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi which took place in 1825 in connection with the Baraimi-Dairah quarrel, and which have already been mentioned above.

In February 1829 Sultān-bin-Saqar, irritated by a constant coalition against himself between the Saiyid of Masqat and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, took advantage of the failure of the joint expedition of those two powers against Bahrain to declare war against Abu Dhabi ; and very soon, by means of a blockade, he succeeded in reducing to severe straits the principal and only town belonging to his rival. The prospect of exclusion from the approaching pearl fishery was however equally disagreeable to both sides ; and in June 1829, by the mediation of Muhammad-bin-Qadhib, Shaikh of Lingeh, peace was arranged on condition that neither party should interfere any more with the subjects or dependents of the other.

In 1831 trouble was renewed in consequence of the curious imbroglio, already described, which resulted in 1831 from the operations of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat against Sohār. The Shaikh of 'Ajman, on his return from Sohār, found that his town had been plundered and the flocks of his subjects raided by Bani Yās and Manāsir despatched by Shaikh Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt ; and war against Abu Dhabi was immediately declared on his part and on that of the Shaikh of Shārjah. A peace was shortly patched up by the Shaikh of Lingeh, no doubt with the object of postponing matters until the end of the pearl season ; but in September it was broken by subjects of Shārjah, who attacked two pearl boats of the Bani Yās near Bahrain, an act to which the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi immediately replied by seizing 14 vessels of the Qawāsīm that happened to call at his port for provisions. A partial adjustment of claims now took place, but in December 1831 the situation was again strained ; no further serious operations however took place.

In 1833, encouraged by a split among the Bani Yās and the secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah section and others from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar resolved on a supreme attempt to

Hostilities
between
Shārjah and
Abu Dhabi,
1825-31.

Determined
but ineffec-
tual efforts
of Shārjah

to crush
Abu Dhabi,
1833-34.

overthrow, once for all, the power of his hated rival the Bani Yās Shaikh.

All Shārajah subjects having been hurriedly recalled from the pearl banks in the height of the diving season, much to their discontent, a naval expedition against Abu Dhabi was prepared without delay; it consisted of 22 boats carrying 520 Qawāsīm, under the command of Shaikhs Sultān-bin-Saqar and Hasan-bin-Rahmah, and of 80 boats manned by 700 of the Āl Bū Falāsah and other refugees at Dibai. On the afternoon of the 10th September 1833 the Qawāsīm and their allies landed at a point about four miles from Abu Dhabi, which town they expected to find almost deserted and to capture without difficulty on the morrow; but the Shaikhs of the Bani Yās had received sufficient notice of the intended attack to collect a large number of their own tribe and of Manāsīr Bedouins; and, when the sun rose, the invaders discovered that they were surrounded by a vastly superior force. Seized by panic they fled to their vessels; but most of these, left high and dry by the tide, were not available for escape. Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar himself was nearly drowned by the sinking of a small boat, in which he had put to sea along with four of his slaves. The losses of the Qawāsīm on this occasion amounted to 30 men killed, including a brother of the Shaikh of Lingeh; and six of their vessels, one a Batīl, were taken. Of the Bani Yās allies 15 were killed, and 235 were taken prisoners and compelled to return to their homes at Abu Dhabi, while of the 80 boats contributed by the Bani Yās dissidents no less than 60 were captured.

The Shaikh of Shārajah did not, however, abandon his enterprise, but by means of alliances with the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Lingeh got together a fresh fleet, which sailed from Dibai on the 9th of November 1833. Having arrived before Abu Dhabi, Sultān-bin-Saqar during three days endeavoured to take the place by direct naval attack; but his attempts were defeated by a large mixed garrison of townsmen and Bedouins, whose fire from six or seven large vessels moored by iron chains to the shore was very effective and even damaged the Baghlah of Shaikh Sultān himself. A blockade was accordingly substituted on the part of the Qawāsīm, by which the defenders of the town soon found themselves reduced to serious straits; and the departure of Saiyid Sa'id from Masqat to his African possessions destroyed, about the same time, their last hope of assistance from without. To add to the troubles of the besieged, thirty of their boats were captured by the Qawāsīm at some distance from Abu Dhabi; ten of their men were

killed in an engagement with the people of Dibai ; and a caravan of 50 camels bringing dates from Baraimi to Abu Dhabi was intercepted by the enemy.

The garrison, however, did not lose heart, but under cover of night sent three large vessels carrying 500 men to sea; these were pursued by a detachment of 20 sail from the blockading fleet, but were not overtaken. The first exploit of the escaped vessels was the capture of an 'Ajmān Baqārah near Bustāneh; out of the crew of eight men, seven were put to death. They then attacked a Masqat Baghlah, killed five of her crew, and plundered her of a quantity of dates, Rs. 3,000 in cash and all her guns,—a piratical proceeding for which they afterwards voluntarily accounted to the Masqat authorities without the intervention of the British Resident. After this, a pursuing Qāsimi squadron coming in sight, they made sail for home and regained Abu Dhabi in safety.

Meanwhile Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt of Abu Dhabi had succeeded in inflicting deterrent punishment on the Ghafalah and other Bedouin tribes who had assisted the people of Dibai in cutting off his supplies by land, and the discomforts endured by the crews of the blockading fleet were hardly less than those which the inhabitants of the beleaguered town suffered; for the provisions and water of the fleet had to be obtained from Lingeh and Rās-al-Khaimah, and each individual on board was required to make the arrangements for his own supply. Finally, in 1834, a peace was arranged through the Shaikh of Lingeh, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi restoring all the vessels which he had captured since the beginning of the war and the Shaikh of Shārjah withdrawing his blockade.

The peace was not of long duration. A foray in Qāsimi territory by Manāsīr Bedouins, dependent on Abu Dhabi, led to retaliation by the seizure upon the pearl banks of ten Bani Yās boats, together with their crews of 80 men and pearls to the value of Rs. 4,000. This rupture having obliged the Shaikhs to withdraw their subjects from the banks, a penalty severely felt by both, Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi was persuaded to send his father Shaikh Shakhbūt as an envoy to Shārjah with proposals of peace, and a stable treaty was at length arranged. In regard to the Bani Yās domiciled at Dibai it was settled that they should henceforward be regarded as subjects of Shārjah.

The exhausting war which we have just described, perhaps the most persistently waged of any that ever occurred between Shaikhs of the Pirate Coast, had undoubtedly an excellent effect in preparing the way for the conclusion of the first Maritime Truce in 1835.

PERIOD FROM THE FIRST MARITIME TRUCE TO THE PERPETUAL TREATY OF PEACE, 1835-53.

The Maritime Truce and Restrictive Line, 1835-36.

Failure of
the Treaty
of 1820 to
establish
absolute
security.

The insufficiency of the General Treaty of Peace for the purpose of maintaining security at sea was now fully apparent; for it did not prohibit regular maritime warfare, and experience had shown that in the Persian Gulf such warfare must usually be expected to degenerate into indiscriminate piracy.

The need of further restrictions seems to have been felt even by the chiefs themselves. The Shaikh of Shārhjah, in 1827, and the Shaikh of Bahraïn, in 1828, argued earnestly that under Article No. 4 of the Treaty the British Government were bound to prevent hostilities at sea, whatever their nature, among the pacificated Arabs; but the reception by the British authorities of this suggestion was necessarily, from the wording of the Treaty, unfavourable. The attempt to enforce the provision relating to ships' papers, it may here be remarked, had long been abandoned as impracticable; and in other respects, as we have seen, the Treaty had been found ambiguous, if not unworkable.

The British Government were as yet unwilling to assume responsibility for the prevention of all warfare at sea, especially as they foresaw that interference might disturb the balance of power between maritime principalities and others of which the power was chiefly military; and in 1834 the Court of Directors expressly ruled that it was inexpedient, even at the invitation of the petty Arab States, to assume any sort of protectorship or arbitral authority over them. Nevertheless the British authorities, while they continued to regard themselves as in strictness merely the head of a naval confederacy for the suppression of piracy, exerted all their influence on the side of peace, and for a time even made it a rule to treat as piracy all aggressions committed on the pearl banks during the annual fishery; they insisted also that the requirements of the Treaty of Peace should be observed even by such Arab principalities as were not parties to it, such as those of Qatif and Kuwait.

The first
Maritime
Truce, 1835.

These being the circumstances and the views of the principal parties, Captain S. Hennell, the Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf, seized the opportunity of the settlement with the Bani Yās to assemble some of the principal Shaikhs or their agents at Basidu, where, after an unavailing attempt had been made to adjust their claims and counter-claims, it was

proposed by Captain Hennell that they should agree to a Maritime Truce to cover the season of the approaching pearl fishery.

This suggestion having met with general acceptance, a more formal meeting was held at the Būshehr Residency on the 21st August 1835, and here a document was sealed by or on behalf of the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai, 'Ajman and Abu Dhabi, whereby they bound themselves to observe an inviolable truce from the 21st of May to the 21st of November of the same year, during which period all claims should remain in abeyance ; to afford redress for any infraction of the truce by their respective subjects ; and, in case of any aggression being committed upon their subjects, not to retaliate, but to report the matter to the British political or naval authorities. The Resident on his part was careful to explain to the parties, before execution of the agreement, that any breach of the truce, when once established, would be treated as a case of piracy, and that no regard would be paid to the existence of a state of war on land.

The Shaikh of Bahrain, who was amenable to British influence and between whom and the Saiyid of 'Omān there was at the time a prospect of war, was not invited to subscribe to the Truce ; but everywhere its conclusion was hailed with delight by those interested in the pearl trade, — in some cases almost the entire population. The importance of Captain Hennell's achievement may be judged by the fact that, before this, some of the pearl merchants of Shārjah had actually offered to pay \$ 20 a year to the British Government for each pearl boat of which the safety at sea should be guaranteed.

From 1835 onwards " Trucial 'Omān " becomes the most appropriate name for the country hitherto known as the Pirate Coast, and its chiefs may henceforth be correctly described as " the Trucial Shaikhs."

Another suggestion made by Captain Hennell in 1835 and well received by the Shaikhs was that, for the protection of neutral commerce, a portion of the Gulf on the Persian side should be placed out of bounds for tribal warfare, even at the times when no truce existed. On the recommendation of Captain Hennell the Bombay Government agreed that the cruising of Arabian war-boats nearer to the Persian coast than the islands of Bū Musa and Sirri should at all times be interdicted ; but Major Morison, who succeeded Captain Hennell, was able to arrange with the Shaikhs for the substitution of Sir Bū Na'air in place of the islands previously mentioned, by which means the area liable to disturbance was still further reduced.

In consequence of some irregular proceedings on the part of the Shaikh of Bahrain the restrictive line was afterwards authoritatively

The
Restrictive
Line,
1836.

prolonged by way of Hālūl Island, of a point 10 miles off Ras Rakan, and of the island of Qraiyn, to Rās-az-Zor upon the coast near Kuwait. No formal agreement in regard to the line was ever executed ; nor was any required.

British relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1835-53.

Series of
short mari-
time truces,
1835-42.

During the eighteen years which followed the conclusion of the first Maritime Truce, the relations of the Trucial Shaikhs towards the British Government and towards one another at sea continued to be regulated by the General Treaty of 1820, supplemented by a series of maritime truces similar in their terms to that of 1835. The second and third truces, concluded on the 13th of April 1836 and the 15th of April 1837 respectively, were apparently for not more than eight months each ; but the period of the fourth, signed in 1838, was fixed, at the instance of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, at one year. Annual truces were arranged thereafter in 1839, 1840, 1841 and 1842 ; but on the expiration of the Truce of 1840 a slight interval occurred, by which the Shaikh of Shārjah profited to make a naval attack on the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

The Ten
Years'
Maritime
Truce.
1843-53.

The establishment of permanent peace at sea having been proposed by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar in 1837, the attention of the Bombay Government was directed to the question ; and, in 1841, they expressed a wish that a truce for more than a year might, if possible, be arranged. Although the Shaikhs as a whole were not adverse to a lengthened truce, considerable doubt was felt by Captain Hennell, the Resident, as to the expediency of any change ; he feared that a prolonged or permanent maritime truce would impose an intolerable strain on the propensities of the Arabs to wrong-doing and retaliation, and might so lead to a breakdown of the whole trucial system ; and he foresaw that it would operate to the disadvantage of the Qawāsīm, who were predominant at sea but suffered severely from the depredations of the Bani Yās on land. It was also apprehended that the difficulty and responsibility of settling by peaceful means quarrels that would ordinarily be decided by the sword, a duty which would necessarily devolve on the British Government as guarantor of the truce, might prove excessive. In the end the matter was left by Government to the experience and discretion of Captain Hennell, who justified the confidence reposed in him by negotiating a truce, upon the usual conditions, for an extended period of

10 years from the 1st of June 1843. In the eyes of even the Qāsimi Shaikh the prospect of an undisturbed pearl fishery year by year outdid in attractiveness the possibility of taking naval revenge at intervals upon his military rival the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

The idea underlying the Maritime Truces was, on the part of the British authorities, the prevention of piracy, as distinct from its punishment under the Treaty of 1820; and the truces were regarded as a natural corollary to the suppression of crime at sea, inasmuch as they provided a guarantee for the free exercise of other maritime callings by tribes formerly piratical. The result of the truces, within the limits which bounded them, was beneficial in the highest degree. The danger, at times apprehended, of hostilities at sea between a signatory and a non-signatory power never took actual shape; and from engaging as allies in the naval wars of non-signatory powers, as one or more of them might have done upon opposite sides,—this being a case not provided for in their engagements,—the 'Trucial Shaikhs were firmly, and successfully dissuaded by the local British authorities.

Working
of the
periodical
maritime
truces.

A point more than once debated in the early years of the trucial system was the proper treatment thereunder of attacks by land parties upon the crews of fishing boats drawn up in creeks or backwaters, often at a distance from their own port. It was held by the Resident, in whose view the Shaikhs eventually acquiesced, that such attacks were a form of land warfare and as such were not prohibited by the terms of the Maritime Truce.

Trivial cases of aggression, chiefly at the pearl banks, by boat upon boat were still not infrequent; they were almost invariably due to the absconding of indebted divers or other pearl operatives from the jurisdiction of one Shaikh to that of another, and they generally took the form of an attempt to capture the debtor, or to recover the amount of his debt, from the boat or the tribe to which he had attached himself. The settlement of such cases was felt to be a delicate matter, for enforcement of extradition by the British authorities might involve a high degree of interference on their part in local affairs and might destroy an important safeguard against oppression of their subjects by the Shaikhs. Endeavours were accordingly made to induce the Shaikhs to come to an understanding on the subject, independently of any guarantee by the British Government for its observance; but they failed, partly because of the reluctance of the Arab to surrender in any circumstances the fugitive who has taken refuge with him, and partly in consequence of an idea entertained by each chief that his own government was the most attractive to strangers and would be the chief loser by a check upon migration. For the

solution of this difficulty, finally attained in 1879, the time was not yet ripe.

Cases of
piracy and
breaches of
the Maritime
Truce,
1835-53.

The principal infractions of the Treaty of Peace of 1820 and of the Maritime Truce at the time in force may now be placed on record ; but in doing so it is unnecessary to distinguish between the two classes, for all aggressions at sea were now equally included in the piratical category. The much less serious character, on the whole, of the offences committed during this period is a clear testimony to the progress made, under the Treaty of Peace alone, in the years preceding.

1837.

In 1837 an ordinary piracy was committed on a boat belonging to Bandar 'Abbās by inhabitants of Hairah village ; but the Shaikh of Shārjah, whose subjects the pirates were, of his own accord compelled them to make restitution.

1838.

In 1838 two Qāsīmī subjects, Sultān-bin-Sohār and Muhammad-bin-Sohār, brothers, attacked and plundered a Khārag boat at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, killing several persons ; and they also looted, in the vicinity of Rās-al-Hadd, a vessel belonging to the Bātinah coast. Sultān, having been captured at Lingeh, was delivered over by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Shaikh of the Ka'ab, whose interest in the case will be explained further on ; but Muhammad and a Nākhuda who had been associated with him in his misdeeds, on their surrender by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Sagar after severe treatment at Shārjah, were released by the British authorities with a light additional punishment. Also in 1838, a Baqārah belonging to Khābūrah in the 'Omān Sultanate was stealthily pursued by a Baqārah of Dibai to an anchorage at Barkah and there, at night but not unawares, attacked. Of nine men on board the Khābūrah vessel, six were wounded and two subsequently died ; but blood-money and other compensation were exacted in full from the aggressors by the British authorities through the Shaikh of Dibai.

1840

In 1840 some petty controversies took place on the pearl banks, and elsewhere at sea, between subjects of Abu Dhabi and Dibai and between subjects of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi ; but they were unaccompanied by bloodshed or extreme violence and were adjusted by the Resident under the terms of the Maritime Truce. More serious was the plunder by Bin-'Askar, a member of the rebellious Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās, in his flight with a number of companions from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, of two Baqārahs owned by Bani Yās and containing pearls of high value ; nor did the Shaikh of Dibai at once comply with the demand of the British authorities, that Bin-'Askar should be handed over to his own Shaikh.

The ruler of Dibai also became liable about this time for compensation on account of an Abu Dhabi boat, which some of his subjects, mov-

ing by water and not by land, had discovered in a creek and there broken up in reprisal for a land raid by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

In 1841, as the Dibai Shaikh persisted in his refusal to satisfy the claims outstanding against him, some of which arose from the petty disputes on the pearl banks already mentioned, a British squadron including the steam frigate "Sesostris," Commodore Brucks, was sent against his town. After two shells from the 8-inch guns of the "Sesostris" had been fired over the place, he consented to pay \$400 as compensation, and to surrender the Baqārahs brought by Bin-'Askar from Abu Dhabi, with their fittings. In the same year a boat belonging to a respectable member of the 'Amāir of Hasa was plundered by pirates while stranded between Zakhnūniyah Island and Bahrain, one of the crew being killed and others wounded; and, as the criminals were shown to be Manāsīr and Bani Yās of the Hawāmil section, a demand was made on the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for redress. He at once took personal action by sea and other vigorous action by land against the offending communities, with the result that, notwithstanding the remoteness of their habitat, one of their boats was destroyed and five of their bad characters were captured together with their families and 50 camels. 1841.

In 1844, a Qāsimi subject having seized a person of the Ka'ab tribe from a Dibai boat on the pearl banks, as related further on, some men of Dibai ventured to retaliate by plundering a Baqārah of Shārjah; but the Shaikh of Dibai, Maktūm-bin-Butai, who had profited by experience and was now a thorough-going supporter of British policy, repudiated the act, restored the property taken, and, after punishing the perpetrators, obliged them to lodge security for their future good behaviour with the British Residency Agent at Shārjah. The Ka'ab case abovementioned and some others which had occurred at the pearl fishery made it necessary for the Resident, Colonel Hennell, to enforce respect for the Ten Years' Maritime Truce, then recently concluded, by demanding reparation and security for the future from the aggressors, who were subjects of Shārjah; and, with the ready concurrence of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, these were immediately afforded. Meanwhile a fresh claim against Shārjah had arisen through the conduct of an infuriated pearl diver of that port, who, after firing with his matchlock on an 'Ajman boat, boarded it and did some execution among the crew with a spear and an iron mace; but the further requisition on the Shaikh of Shārjah which this incident necessitated was satisfied with the same alacrity as the former. In both cases the demands of the Resident were conveyed to Shārjah by a ship of war. 1844.

At the beginning of 1845 an affair occurred which illustrated in a remarkable manner the growth of a more orderly spirit, in matters mari- 1845.

time, among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Two vessels with rice, bound from Lingeh to Shārjah, attempted to make the 'Ajmān creek in a storm; one was wrecked at the entrance, but the other succeeded, with the loss of a part of her cargo, in reaching the inner harbour. Here she would certainly have been plundered but for the exertions of the Shaikh, 'Abdul 'Azīz, and his brother, who, hastening to the beach and drawing their swords, swore to cut down the first man who should tamper with the vessel or her cargo. For his spirited conduct on this occasion the Shaikh received through the Resident the special thanks and commendations of Government.

1849-50. In 1849 and 1850 a number of claims relating to the seizure and counter-seizure of slaves from boats at sea arose between the people of Abu Dhabi and Dibai; but, with the assistance of the Resident, they were all satisfactorily adjusted. In the autumn of 1850, however, a case of a gravity now unusual occurred in the capture of a Hamriyah boat and the murder of two of her crew by subjects of Abu Dhabi. The "Tigris," Lieutenant Manners, and the "Euphrates," Lieutenant Tronson, were at once despatched to Abu Dhabi town and intimidated the Shaikh by approaching within effective range of the shore,—an operation hitherto unattempted at Abu Dhabi; and, perhaps in consequence of this manœuvre, they had no difficulty in obtaining satisfaction of the claim that they brought, which was for \$600 as blood-money and the restoration of the boat and property taken.

1852. In the spring of 1852 a piracy was committed in Zanzibar waters, upon a Zanzibar craft, by a Baghlah of which the owner resided at Rās-al-Khaimah; but the slowness of communication in those days between Būshehr and East Africa greatly protracted the case, and at the time of the conclusion of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace in 1853 it was still unsettled. The Qāsimi Shaikh at first sought to evade responsibility on the plea that the entire crew of the pirate boat were natives of Qashiyāt in Bāṭinah, and therefore subjects of Masqat; but in the end he seems to have agreed to pay whatever compensation might be assessed. Likewise in the spring of 1852, a boat, belonging to Bani Yās seceders established at Dōhah in Qatar but carrying passengers for Dibai, was seized off Abu Dhabi town, and then and there appropriated with all that she contained. This affair being regarded not as a legitimate act of sovereignty over rebellious subjects but as an infraction of the Maritime Truce, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was immediately called to account; and, though he had in the beginning professed to act under an authorisation by the Wāhhābi Amir to coerce the dissident

Bani Yās by confiscating their boats, he found no difficulty in accommodating himself to the Resident's demands, made known to him through Commodore Robinson.

The Native Agent established at Shārjah in 1823 was now, apparently, the medium of all ordinary communications between the Resident and the Trucial Shaikhs.

The Shārjah
Agency.

The incumbent during a considerable part of the formative period now under consideration, when the personal character of the functionary must have been a matter of great importance, was one Mulla Husain. The relations of Mulla Husain with Shaikh Sālīh, a brother of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who acted as Deputy-Governor of the town of Shārjah until 1838 when he was superseded, were extremely cordial; and the removal of Sālīh was accordingly regarded by the British authorities with some dissatisfaction.

In 1852 the relations between the Shārjah Shaikh and the Residency Agent, then Hāji Ya'qūb, to whom insults followed by reparation were twice offered, became exceedingly strained: this state of matters was partly due to revelations made by the Agent in connection with the slave trade, and it was aggravated by an order of the Court of Directors, that compensation payable to persons under Shārjah jurisdiction should not in future be handed to the Shaikh for disbursement. The order in question, which was issued in contrariety to the advice of the Resident, seems to furnish a clue to a charge of misappropriating money which, among others, the Shaikh levelled at the Agent.

The article in the General Treaty of Peace referring to the slave trade, on which Government in 1823 had placed a somewhat restricted interpretation, was expanded during the period now in question by three separate treaties concluded with the Trucial Shaikhs.

Treaties
for the
suppression
of the
slave-trade,
1838, 1839
and 1847.

The first of these, signed in 1838, conferred on British Government cruisers the right to detain and search, anywhere at sea, vessels belonging to the ports of the signatories which might be suspected of carrying off or embarking slaves; also the further right of seizing and confiscating such vessels in event of the suspicion being found correct. It does not appear that the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain subscribed this agreement.

The second treaty, that of 1839, conceded similar rights of detention and search over a part of the Indian Ocean in regard to vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, and authorised the confiscation of the same with their cargoes should they be found carrying slaves. This treaty contained an express declaration that Somālīs were "Hurr" or free and therefore not liable to enslavement, and it made the

sale of Somālis punishable. It is not clear that this treaty was formally accepted by the Shaikh of Ajmān.

The third and last treaty, dated 1847 and signed by all the Trucial Shaikhs, prohibited the exportation of slaves "from the coasts of Africa and elsewhere" on board vessels belonging to the signatories or their subjects or dependents; and it conferred on British warships the power to detain and search suspected vessels anywhere at sea, and to seize and confiscate the same on proof of the prohibition having been violated by their means.

From the wording of these engagements it would appear that they bore no special reference to the slave trade in the Persian Gulf, but were rather adjuncts to larger schemes for the suppression of the traffic on the coast of Africa.

Connection of the Egyptians and the Wahhābis with Trucial 'Omān, 1835-53.

The external relations of the Trucial Shaikhs during the period that we have now reached, other than those which they had with the British Government, were almost exclusively with the Wahhābis or, at first, with the Egyptians, by whose power that of the Wahhābis was for a time superseded in Central Arabia.

Successful
Egyptian
intrigues
in Trucial
'Omān, 1839.

In 1839—in disregard of a pledge not to extend his conquests in the direction of the Persian Gulf, given in 1838 by Muhammad 'Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, to Colonel Campbell, the representative of the British Government at Cairo—the Egyptians occupied Hasa, appeared to contemplate the reduction of Bahrain, and despatched an agent to prepare their way among the tribesmen of Trucial 'Omān. These steps provoked countermeasures on the part of the British Government, who felt their influence in the Gulf to be imperilled by the progress of the Egyptians; and in February 1839 the Political Resident at Būshehr was expressly instructed to exert his influence for the purpose of checking their further encroachments. With the same object a visit was paid to the coast of Trucial 'Omān by Sir F. Maitland, the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the East, in H.M.S. "Wellesley"; and the Trucial Shaikhs, in the presence of Captain T. Edmunds, Assistant Political Resident, who accompanied the cruise, solemnly undertook to hold no friendly relations with the emissary of the Egyptians, but on the contrary to oppose him. Notwithstanding this promise the Egyptian agent,

who was no other than the former Wahhābi representative Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, was allowed by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to remain at Shārjah, where, on his arrival in March 1839, a fortified house and tower had been placed at his disposal by the Shaikh; and from this point of vantage Sa'ad at once began to intrigue, calling on the Na'im tribe through Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to surrender Baraimi for occupation by a garrison of Wahhābis, whom he had brought with him, and opening a direct correspondence with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, whose co-operation with themselves, in view of his previous steady opposition to Central Arabian influences, had been confidently anticipated by the British authorities. On the Na'im, who had but recently obtained or recovered possession of Baraimi, the threats of the Egyptian agent produced no effect, and the Na'im were encouraged in their defiant attitude by Saiyid Hamūd-bin-'Azzān of Sohār, who immediately sent his own brother Qais with 200 men to their assistance; but by Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt of Abu Dhabi the advances of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq were cordially received.

The situation *vis à vis* of the Egyptians was now so unsatisfactory that Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, resolved on a personal visit to Bahrain and Trucial 'Omān; he arrived off the coast of the latter on the 1st of July 1839 in the H.E.I. Company's Steamer "Hugh Lindsay," of which the novel and surprising evolutions were not without their influence on the disaffected Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.* Captain Hennell's enquiries showed that the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain were unfavourably disposed towards the Egyptians, but that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was using every endeavour to supplant the Shaikh of Shārjah in Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq's favour, which Sultān-bin-Saqar on his part was doing his utmost to retain. From each of these four chiefs the Resident obtained a general written agreement to support the policy of the British Government and to resist that of the Egyptians; and in the case of Sultān-bin-Saqar a further clause was added, by which the Shaikh bound himself not to enter into any correspondence or treaty with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt, his dependents, or any other foreign power without the consent of the British Government, and to regard the friends and enemies of the British as his own. The Shaikh of Shārjah was also furnished, at his own request, with letters from the Resident to himself and to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq representing the

Counterac-
tive measures
by the
British
authorities,
July 1839.

* The "Hugh Lindsay," Lieutenant Campbell, drew only eleven feet of water, and the power of the vessel to advance up a narrow channel against the wind greatly impressed the Arabs.

advisability of the return of the latter to Najd; and, to satisfy the Shaikh's demands for British support, the Resident promised that, in case compliance with the policy enjoined should involve him in hostilities, he should be supplied with such munitions of war as might be necessary and proper: this undertaking Captain Hennell offered to confirm in writing on the expulsion of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq. Meanwhile an appeal for help against Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq had reached Captain Hennell from the Shaikhs of Baraimi, to which that officer replied by encouraging them to maintain their independence, by holding out hopes that an Agent would be sent to reside with them, and by promising to supply them with ammunition, if attacked because of having conformed to his advice. The Resident's letter addressed to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq contained a reference to these negotiations, and indicated that the Na'im of Baraimi had been taken under British protection pending a settlement between the British and Egyptian Governments.

Policy of the
Indian
Government.

The whole of Captain Hennell's proceedings were confirmed, and his zeal and energy were highly applauded, by the Governor-General of India; but the project of extending British protection to Baraimi, indicated in the Resident's letter to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, was negatived, along with certain other of his proposals for more active measures against the Egyptians and their supporters in Eastern Arabia. The Government of India considered that the larger question of Egyptian encroachments was one for the British Cabinet; and it is probable, moreover, that the anxieties of the first war in Afghanistan had by this time begun to cramp their policy in other directions; but the Resident was authorised to pursue, and, even to extend, the policy of distributing ammunition, etc., for use against the Egyptians.

Further
action of the
British
authorities,
1839-40.

The local results of Captain Hennell's visit were not entirely satisfactory; for, though the Egyptian agent now took his departure for 'Oqair, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in violation of the spirit of his freshly-formed obligations and in the interest—as was supposed—of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, proceeded in person against the Na'im of Baraimi; but the Na'im, though disappointed in this emergency of the help of the Shaikh of Sharjah, stood firm and even repulsed the attacks of Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt with such vigour as to make him desirous of peace for the sake of his Bedouin supporters. At this juncture the Resident intervened and required the Shaikh to make such reparation as should be satisfactory to the Na'im within three months, on pain of being considered an enemy to the British Government and of rendering himself liable for the payment of a lump sum of \$1,000 as compensation to the Na'im; and eventually Shaikh Khalifah was able to produce a letter

from the Na'im Shaikhs certifying that their claims had been satisfied and amity restored.

In January 1840 Captain Hennell revisited the coast of Trucial 'Omān and held a meeting at 'Ajmān with the Shaikhs of Baraimi, whose position he was anxious to strengthen; the principal figure among the Shaikhs was Hamūd-bin-Sarūr of the Shawāmis division of the Na'im, the holders of the Baraimi forts. The Resident was able to effect a defensive alliance against all enemies between the Na'im and the Dhawāhir inhabiting the Oasis, whose mutual hostility had hitherto been a source of weakness; but his efforts to reconcile the Na'im with their neighbours the Bani Qitab were not equally successful. A judicious distribution of rice, money and ammunition, which next took place, was designed to illustrate the advantages of the British connection and was so regulated as to make it clear that the favours of Government would be reserved for its sincere supporters.

British support extended to the Shaikhs of Baraimi January 1840.

On the conclusion of these proceedings Captain A. Hamerton, an officer of the Khārag Field Force who was soon after selected to be Political Agent at Masqat, travelled from Shārjah to Baraimi under the protection of Hamūd-bin-Sarūr, regaining the coast at Sohār in Batinah. He found the defences of Baraimi to consist of a main fort on the south side of the place, built of sun-dried bricks and about 60 paces square, and of a smaller one, about 300 paces to the northwards: both of these were constructions of Mutlaq the Wahhābi. The Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai did their utmost, by means of intrigues, to prevent Captain Hamerton's journey.

Captain Hamerton's journey to Baraimi, January and February 1840.

On his return to Hasa, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq seems to have incurred the distrust of his employers and to have been sent by them under surveillance to Riyādh; but not long afterwards the Egyptian occupation came to an end, and in May 1840 the Egyptian troops were in full retreat from Najd.

Withdrawal of the Egyptians from Najd, May 1840.

The Egyptians at their withdrawal had installed Khālid as ruler of Najd, and reports soon became current that the new Amīr cherished designs upon 'Omān. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq probably still maintained a correspondence with the Trucial Shaikhs; and in 1841 a letter addressed to him by the Shaikh of Shārjah fell into the hands of the Na'im of Baraimi, who found that it related to a project for their own destruction. In November 1841, the Amīr Khālid being then at Hofūf in Hasa and his movements indicating an intention to proceed against 'Omān, the remonstrances of the British Government were conveyed to him through Lieutenant Jopp, who landed at 'Oqair and, after visiting the Amīr at his headquarters, returned to the coast at Qatīf. The Amīr in

Suspected designs of the Khālid and 'Abdullah on 'Omān,

his reply denied that he entertained any designs on 'Omān; but his continuance in power after this event was so brief as to leave it uncertain whether his assurances had been sincere.

'Abdullah, the successor of Khālīd, during his brief tenure of power, opened a correspondence with the Trucial Shaikhs, in which he announced his intention of sending Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq as his agent to Baraimi; but his letters, except that which he had addressed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, were obtained by Colonel Robertson, the British Political Resident, who remonstrated against his proceedings on the ground that they might lead to a revival of piracy. 'Abdullah, in reply professed his abhorrence of piracy; but he did not fail to claim the people of Trucial 'Omān as his subjects.

Discontinu-
ance of
British sup-
port to the
Shaikhs of
Baraimi,
1843.

In July 1843, immediately on his return to power, Faisal, the restored Amīr of Najd, informed the Shaikhs of 'Omān by letter that it was his intention at the end of the hot weather to send a force under Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq to take possession of the province. Alarmed by these threats the Na'im of Baraimi, who had ere now by lawless acts estranged their former ally Saiyid Hamūd of Sohār, applied for aid to the British Government; but in reply they were informed that the object of the assistance given them in 1840 was to prevent the establishment of the Egyptians in the country, and that, this danger having been removed, it was now the intention of the British Government to withdraw from interference in the internal affairs of Arabia. At the same time friendly communications of a general nature were passing between the Būshehr Residency and Riyādh.

Re-occup-
ation of
Baraimi
by the Wah-
hābis, 1845.

Early in 1845 Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, accompanied by a small force, arrived once more in the neighbourhood of Baraimi. His hesitating approach betrayed some uncertainty as to the event; but on this occasion the Na'im and Dhawāhir submitted without resistance, the Baraimi forts were at once placed in his hands, and the Trucial Shaikhs hastened to do him honour. Once firmly established in his old headquarters he devoted his attention, with results which are described in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, chiefly to squeezing the richer principalities of Sohār and Masqat, but did not therefore neglect less valuable prey which lay within easy reach. On the contrary he at once engaged in intrigues to obtain possession of the town of Dhank in Dhāhīrah, and in October he made preparations to seize the small oasis of Dhaid in the interior of Trucial 'Omān, besides which he proposed to build a fort on the coast in Zora, an insulated tract between 'Ajmān and Hamriyah. These proceedings and his general arrogance and rapacity

soon brought into coalition against him on the east the Na'im tribe, the chief of Sohār, and the Mutawwa' class of 'Omān, and on the west all the Trucial Shaikhs except the chief of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who, probably with a view to some personal advantage, favoured the design of the Wahhābis on Dhaid. His enemies did not as yet venture on active opposition in arms to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq; they chose at first the safer course of accusing him to his master of malversation in respect of the revenues that he collected,—a charge which, from his behaviour in a settlement with the Saiyids of Sohār and Masqat, seems to have been well-founded. At this time the Wahhābi agent's direct communications with Central Arabia appear to have been broken by the tribes, now hostile, that lay upon the route. Sa'ad's departure from Baraimi for the court of the Amir, at which he had resolved to appear in person for the purpose of justifying his conduct, was countermanded at the last moment, on the unexpected arrival from Najd of an order confirming him in his appointment but requiring of him an immediate remittance in money. With the assistance of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who provided a vessel, he at once despatched a quantity of treasure by sea to Hasa.

The position of the Wahhābis at Baraimi remained unaltered until the 4th of May 1848, when Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi, taking advantage of the momentary absence of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq and assisted by the Dhawāhir tribe, suddenly captured a Wahhābi post in the Dhawāhir country. Shaikh Sa'id was at once joined by the Na'im and by a contingent from Sohār under the command of Saif-bin-Hamūd of that place; the result was the capitulation, after a short struggle, of both the Wahhābi strongholds in Baraimi; and these were immediately occupied by the Abu Dhabi Shaikh, while Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq sought refuge at Shārjah. The son of the Sohār chief, in consequence of a misunderstanding, soon withdrew his support; and the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai and 'Ajmān,* irritated at the pre-eminence so easily acquired by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, combined with the Wahhābis; but Shaikh Sa'id continued to maintain his position at Baraimi with boldness and success. At length, in February 1849, peace was arranged between the contending parties by an emissary of the Sharif of Makkah; the conditions were apparently unfavourable to Shaikh Sa'id, for they involved the restoration of the Baraimi forts to the Wahhābi agent and a general return to the *status quo ante bellum*.

Temporary
expulsion
of the
Wahhābis
from Baraimi
by the Shaikh
of Abu
Dhabi,
1848-49.

In November 1849 the Shaikhs of Dibai and Shārjah strongly urged the Wahhābi Amīr to settle the emigrant Qubaisāt section

* According to one account the Shaikh of 'Ajmān (like the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain) refused to take part against Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn.

of the Bani Yās under his own protection at Khor-al-'Odaid ; but this intrigue failed in consequence of prompt and successful measures by which the Abu Dhabi Shaikh obliged the seceders to return to their homes and their allegiance.

Various unsuccessful attempts by the Trucial Shaikhs to expel the Wahhābis, 1850-51.

In March 1850 Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, who had since the peace of 1849 been carrying on negotiations with Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, for a fresh attack on the Wahhābis, sent a contingent of 400 Bani Yās and Manāsir to assist his ally in the defence of Shinās against the Qawāsim, and himself began an attack on the Wahhābi position at Baraimi by destroying the irrigation channels of that settlement. An interruption of his operations was threatened by the collection at Dhaid of a large force from Shārjah, Dibai, 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain ; but this army having proceeded, after much discussion among the leaders, to Bātinah to take part in the struggle there between the Saiyids Thuwaini and Qais, Shaikh Sa'id was left free to prosecute his desultory, and in the end ineffectual, operations against Baraimi. In the following November a combined but apparently fruitless attack was made by the Qawāsim, Bani Yās and Na'im upon the Najdi garrison of Baraimi. This attack was the precursor of a regular combination in 1851 between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi against the Wahhābis ; but the alliance was due, on the part of Shaikh Sultān, merely to jealousy of the favour now shown by the Wahhābis to the Shaikh of Dibai, and it was barren of results.

Sojourn of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, Wahhābi, at Baraimi, 1853.

In the spring of 1853 the Trucial Shaikhs, with the exception of Sa'id-bin-Buti of Dibai who deputed a relation to represent him, waited in person upon 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, then recently arrived in Baraimi as the representative of his father the Wahhābi Amīr ; and so assiduous were they in their attentions to him, and in their rivalry for his good graces, that the presence of all upon the coast was not secured without some difficulty by Captain Kemball, when he arrived there in May 1853 for the purpose of concluding a Perpetual Treaty of Peace. The principal object of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal during his stay at Baraimi was, as explained in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, to wring the utmost possible concessions from the unfortunate ruler of Masqat,—a policy in which, needless to say, he was warmly encouraged by Shaikh Sultān of Shārjah. Shaikh Sa'id of Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, exerted himself to prevent an invasion of Bātinah by the Wahhābi and Qāsimi forces, such as was proposed and at one time all but undertaken ; and the terms of peace, the most favourable that 'Abdullah could be persuaded to grant, were arranged at Sohār by the instrumentality of this chief and of a certain

Ahmad-as-Sadairi, who had now apparently succeeded to the position of Wahhābi agent at Baraimi formerly held by Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq.

Other external relations of the Trucial Shaikhs, 1835-53.

The Shaikh of Shārjah continued to display, as in earlier times, a relentless animosity against the rulers of 'Omān; and in 1842 he even broke off negotiations for a peace, otherwise advantageous to himself, with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, merely because it would have entailed amicable relations with the Saiyids of Masqat and Sohār. In 1849 he was contemplating an attempt to recover Khor Fakkān from Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, into whose hands it had fallen, as also had Ghāllah; but he was for the moment dissuaded by the Wahhābi agent at Baraimi and the Shaikh of Dibai. In 1850, supported—as has already been mentioned—by his neighbours of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shaikh Sultān marched to the aid of Qais-bin-'Azzān of Sohār against Saiyid Thuwaini; and Shinās, Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān were quickly taken and distributed between the allies, in whose possession they remained for about a year. In 1851, on the appearance before Sohār of Saiyid Sa'id in person, Shaikh Sultān was bought over to abandon Qais to his fate. The army of the Saiyid, assisted by a contingent from Dibai, then recovered Sohār and Shinās with little difficulty; but Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān appear to have remained in the hands of the Shārjah Shaikh, who thus profited by the war to the extent of regaining his lost possessions in Shamailiyah.

Relations
with the
Saiyid of
Masqat.

Some of the Trucial Shaikhs continued to follow with interest the fortunes and disputes of their Arab kinsmen settled on the Persian littoral; but they were generally restrained by the influence of the British Political Resident from active interference upon that side. In 1835 the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was withheld from sending help to the Āl 'Ali of Chārak, his ancestral dependents; and in 1837 the Shaikh of Shārjah was similarly prevented from supporting the people of Tāvuneh against those of Chārak.

Relations with
the Arabs of
the Persian
Coast.

There was occasional friction between the Ka'ab Shaikh of Persian 'Arabistān and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. The seizure of a Ka'ab subject by Qāsimi pirates in 1833, together with the steps taken in connection with it by the British authorities, has been mentioned in a previous paragraph; but this affair, though the victim was among the wealthiest and most valued of Shaikh Thāmir's supporters, gave rise to

Relations with
the Shaikh of
the Ka'ab in
Persian
'Arabistān.

no serious difficulties, for the Ka'ab chief, mollified by the surrender of the chief criminal, accepted the assurances of the British Resident that the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Lingeh and their subjects as a whole were innocent. The Qawāsim, apparently expecting severe reprisals, had in the meanwhile formed their 'asrah-bound vessels, 22 in all, into a fleet sailing together for mutual protection.

In December 1844 a case much more difficult of settlement arose through the seizure at Muhammareh of a Batil belonging to Abu Dhabi; this act was committed under the orders of Shaikh Fāris, the Ka'ab chief of the day, who justified it by reference to an untenable claim of his own, more than 30 years old, against the Bani Yās tribe. After a protracted controversy, of which the particulars are described in the history of 'Arabistān, the Batil was returned to the owners through the British authorities in May 1845.

Relations
with Bahrain.

The intervention of the Trucial Shaikhs in Bahrain affairs was now discountenanced by the British Government in the same manner as their interference in Persia. In 1843 permission to assist the ex-chief of Bahrain, 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, was positively refused to the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai by whom it had been sought, and the more prudent Shaikh of Abu Dhabi himself voluntarily declined to listen to overtures from the other contending faction in Bahrain. In July 1851, however, the questions pending between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wāhhābi Amīr were amicably adjusted by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in whose conduct upon this occasion there was nothing reprehensible.

Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1835-53.

Leading
motives.

The internal history of Trucial 'Omān at this time, relating chiefly to petty wars among the principalities, is confusing and monotonous; but it is not altogether without meaning or explanation. The central fact is a contest for the general paramountcy between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi: a contest in which, after the first, the power of Shārjah appeared relatively to decline, and one by which the Shaikh of Dibai, who held the balance of power, profited so largely and so unscrupulously that the principals from time to time forgot their feud in an endeavour to exterminate him by united action.

Besides hostilities traceable to the antagonism between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi there was, however, much desultory fighting due to

predatory raids and the reprisals which they provoked; and some incidents of considerable importance arose out of aggressions by the Shaikh of Shārjah on his smaller neighbours. About 1840 it was clearly the ambition of the Shaikh of Shārjah to reduce Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Ajmān, and even Dibai to dependence upon himself.

In May 1838 Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi, in whose mind the secession of the Āl Bū Falāsah to Dibai still rankled deeply, made a sudden raid upon that place in the absence of the inhabitants at the pearl banks, captured a tower upon the sea face, and, after placing a garrison of his own in it, withdrew. On receiving news of the incident the Āl Bū Falāsah at once returned from the pearl fishery and, assisted by Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, dislodged the intruding Bani Yās after three days' operations; they also destroyed the tower. Bickerings followed, but in the end a settlement was effected, and the boats of Dibai and Abu Dhabi were enabled to return to the pearl banks before the close of the season.

Relations between Shārjah, Abu Dhabi and Dibai, 1838.

In 1839 a blood-feud arose between the people of Dibai and those of Umm-al-Qaiwain; it led to hostilities between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain and is therefore treated of in a later paragraph.

A year later the hand of Maktūm-bin-Buti, Shaikh of Dibai, was shown in the domestic affairs of the Qāsimi principality by Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān's proclaiming his independence, in the town of Shārjah, of his father, the Qāsimi Shaikh; and on the failure of this *coup d'état*, during the continuance of which the influence of Shaikh Maktūm had dominated Shārjah, the rebellious son was provided at Dibai with a refuge from his father's vengeance. Seemingly stung to fury by these proceedings, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar underwent a reconciliation with his arch-enemy, Shaikh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi, and it was agreed between them that, on the capture of Dibai, the town should be completely destroyed and the inhabitants obliged to remove to Abu Dhabi or Shārjah; the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain also, having been placated by Shaikh Sultān, was persuaded to join in the arrangement. When matters had reached this point the Shaikh of Shārjah, with a falseness almost incredible even in one so celebrated for that quality, suddenly accepted the submission of the Shaikh of Dibai, which was accompanied by a gift of \$ 1,000, and withdrew, leaving his indignant allies to conclude the affair as they best could.

1839.

1840.

In 1841 Dibai was much weakened by the exodus of 500 discontented Āl Bū Mahair, who settled at Shārjah; and at the same time the prevalence of a virulent fever in the town of Dibai caused a number of the inhabitants to desert it and settle temporarily, with the written

1841.

permission of Shaikh Sultān, at the place called Dairah which in 1824-1827 had been the cause of a serious dispute between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. Finding Dibai almost undefended in consequence of these events and of the departure of the men of the Āl Bū Falāsah to the pearl fishery, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, after securing the neutrality of the Bani Qitab and other Bedouin tribes, made a dash with 150 men upon the town, which he took and plundered, ravaging the date groves, destroying all provisions found, and burning a Batil, the property of Shaikh Maktūm, on board of which two men also were killed. The Shaikh of Dibai at once applied to the Shaikh of Shārjah, who came to his aid with 200 men; but, while the allied force did not venture to attack the invaders, now in occupation of Jumairah, the enterprising Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt sent out a raiding party which looted the village of Khān in their rear, carrying off fifteen slaves, and returned to headquarters in safety. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi then retired to his own territory, whence he afterwards attempted a surprise on the towns of Dibai, Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah; but this time, finding the enemy everywhere prepared to receive him, he was obliged to retreat with the loss of a few men and of his own riding camel.

1842. In April of the following year it was suggested to Shaikh Khalifah that he, with the other Trucial Shaikhs, should enter into an engagement to abstain from mutual aggressions by land as well as by sea during the approaching pearl season; but the Shaikh, who was still smarting under the ill success of his latest raid, declined to consider the suggestion, and even proceeded to detach Shaikh Maktūm from Shaikh Sultān as a preliminary to a fresh attack on the latter. He remained quiescent, however, during the summer months; and in October 1842, unusual cordiality then prevailing between himself and Shaikh Maktūm, the latter undertook to arrange a peace with Shārjah; but the Shārjah Shaikh refused to abandon his enmity with the Saiyid of Masqat, which was an indispensable condition, and the negotiations accordingly failed.

1843. In March 1843 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi paid a visit to the Shaikh of Dibai, and, much to the chagrin of the Shaikh of Shārjah, their friendship appeared to be confirmed.

A raid by 150 camel-riders of the Bani Yās was next conducted by Sultān, a brother of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh, against the allies of the Qawāsīm; and, all in the space of seven days, the Bani Qitab had three men killed and 70 camels taken, a caravan bound from Baraimi to Shārjah

was plundered, and three of the Na'im were slain, the raiders themselves returning home with the loss of only two men killed and two wounded.

In July a hollow peace put an end, temporarily, to the war ; but in August, at the instigation it was believed of the Shaikh of Dibai, Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt with a considerable force of horse and camelry ravaged the territories of the Bani Qitab, Ghafalah and Na'im and carried off a number of their camels, which had been collected for safety at Dhaid while the owners themselves were absent on a foray in the Bātinah district. Promises to restore the booty taken were given by the Bani Yās, but they were not fulfilled.

In November 1843, in consequence of an attack by Ghafalah on a Dibai caravan, Shaikh Maktūm carried fire and sword into the country of that tribe and of the Na'im, who were allies of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, and the result was an approach to a rupture between the two Shaikhs ; but the Qāsimi Shaikh from prudential motives so hung back that even the Ghafalah, incensed at his desertion, turned their arms against him and threatened to transfer their allegiance to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. An inhabitant of Shārjah having been killed by the hand of a brother of Shaikh Maktūm, a crisis again occurred, and again passed over harmlessly. Finally, a direct collision took place in the interior between the Ghafalah and the Shaikh of Dibai and several men were killed on either side ; the Shaikh was victorious, but lost the sight of one eye.

In July 1844 the Shaikh of Shārjah set about trying to recover his lost influence with the tribes of the interior ; but in Bedouin state-craft he showed himself no match for Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt, who, in the course of a summer tour, succeeded in attaching to his cause even the tribes that he had most recently plundered. At Baraimi the Abu Dhabi Shaikh held a gathering of his friends and allies, which was attended by Saiyid Hamūd-bin-'Azzān, the ruler of Sohār, and Saiyid Qahtān-bin-Saif, Deputy-Governor of Shinās ; but Shaikh Maktūm of Dibai, who was invited to present himself for a settlement of his differences with the Ghafalah, thought it more prudent to excuse himself and sent his brother Sa'id in his room.

1844.

In 1846 the whole of the Trucial Coast was involved in war by the ambition of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, whose object still appeared to be the annexation of Umm-al-Qaiwain and 'Ajmān and the crippling of Dibai. The threatened chiefs combined in self-defence against the Shaikh of Shārjah, who in his turn persuaded Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, a new Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, unversed as yet in Qāsimi duplicity, to enter with him into a counter-alliance. We are not here concerned with the conduct of the Umm-al-Qaiwain or of the 'Ajmān Shaikh, though the steadfastness

1846.

of the former had a strong influence on events, but shall confine our attention to the dispute between Shārjah and Dibai and its results.

The immediate cause of quarrel was a resolve by Sultān-bin-Saqar to set limits to the growth of Dibai by building a number of towers at Abu Hail, a place situated on the coast of his own territory but distant only five miles from Dibai, which proceeding Shaikh Maktūm felt it necessary at all costs to prevent. Hostilities had scarcely begun, when they were interrupted by the arrival off Shārjah of a British and Indian naval squadron under the command of Commodore Sir H. Blackwood, R.N., who urged the combatants to suspend matters until a reference should have been made to the Resident. To this suggestion they agreed, but on the departure of the ships Shaikh Sultān immediately broke his promise and recommenced building at Abu Hail; and Captain Kemball, who arrived in March 1846 to promote a reconciliation on behalf of the Resident, found war fairly begun and his own best efforts of no avail.

A day or two after the Assistant Resident's departure the situation was greatly altered by the death of Saqar, son of the Shārjah Shaikh, who was killed in an attack on Umm-al-Qaiwain; and, at the request of Shaikh Sultān himself, a truce for more than 6 months, to the 12th of November following, was mediated by Commodore Hawkins. On the part of the principal mover in the matter the observance of this truce was merely nominal, for Shaikh Sultān at once resumed his building operations and excluded Dibai subjects from Shārjah, besides instigating the Abu Dhabi chief to insult the Shaikh of Dibai and to harass the Bedouin allies of Umm-al-Qaiwain; and on one occasion over 20 men of the latter, belonging to the Ghafalah tribe, were reported to have been butchered in consequence of his incitements.

On the expiration of the land truce the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah again met, and it was decided first to reduce Dibai; but Shaikh Sultān, seized by a sudden fear lest Shaikh Sa'id should retain the place, if captured, in his own hands, changed his mind and insisted that Umm-al-Qaiwain should be the first objective of the combined force.

1847. Hereupon the allies opened separate negotiations with Shaikh Maktūm, their intended victim, who threw himself into the arms of the Shārjah Shaikh and in February or March 1847 concluded a peace with him, while with Abu Dhabi he remained at war. The reason of Shaikh Maktūm's choice appears to have been that Shaikh Sultān now promised to destroy the towers at Abu Hail,—an undertaking which he did not fulfil or even intend to fulfil,—while Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, pressed upon him a disagreeable condition implying forgiveness of the obnoxious Bani Qitab.

Matters remained stationary until the 12th of January 1848, when, 1848.
intercourse between 'Ajmān and Shārjah having been but lately resumed, a treacherous attempt was made by the governor of Shārjah, Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Sultān, a worthy son of his father, to possess himself of the 'Ajmān fort. The scheme miscarried and was at once disavowed by the elder Qāsīmī Shaikh; but the disgust which it excited was such as to throw the four other Trucial Shaikhs into combination against Sultān-bin-Saqar and his sons. No active retaliation however was attempted.

The relations of the Shaikhs with one another during the next two 1844-50.
years in Baraimi and Bātinah, have been partially described above, and at home no movements of importance took place among them. It may be added here that, during the occupation of Baraimi by Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, his relations with the Shārjah and Dibai Shaikhs were much strained. In July 1848 he required the former, as his ally, to break with the latter—a requisition with which Shaikh Sultān merely pretended to comply; and in December the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai, and possibly 'Ajmān combined to recover Baraimi for the Wahhābis, but the force which they assembled never, apparently, reached its destination.

In 1851, notwithstanding the efforts of Shaikh Maktūm to prevent 1851-52.
it, peace was concluded between Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn and Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar; but in 1852 Shaikh Sultān, who had interfered in the domestic affairs of the Dibai principality, found himself confronted by a defensive alliance between the Shaikhs of Dibai, Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain.

The aggressions of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar on the small neighbouring Shaikhdom of Umm-al-Qaiwain, the independence of which, notwithstanding his repudiation of suzerainty in 1832, he would willingly have destroyed, demand a short separate notice. In 1839, two inhabitants of Dibai having been slain in the desert by men of Umm-al-Qaiwain and others who mistook them for members of the Manāsīr tribe, the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, hastened to tender compensation through the Shaikh of Shārjah, for the share of his subjects in the deed; but his offer was not accepted, nor was the friendly intervention of the British Resident productive of any result. A raid was then made by the Shaikh of Dibai, with the consent of the Shaikh of Shārjah, upon the territory of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but it ended in the capture of six of the Dibai party by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who placed them in confinement and refused to let them go. Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān, son of the Qāsīmī chief, now openly sided with Shaikh Maktūm of Dibai; and Umm-al-Qaiwain was approached by a joint force, which, after drawing the defenders into

Relations between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, 1839.

the open by a simulated flight, inflicted on them a loss of 20 killed and many wounded. The affair ended with the release of the six prisoners and the payment of blood-money in the original case by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

1840. On the expiration of the current Maritime Truce in the following year, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who was by no means satisfied with the blow which his son and ally had dealt to the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, made a well-organised effort to reduce that port. While he himself with 700 Bedouins invested the place by land, a fleet of 3 Baghlahs and 60 Baqārahs, commanded by Saqar-bin-Sultān and the Shaikh of Dibai and carrying 1,500 men, proceeded to blockade it by sea; but a tower, situated at the entrance, prevented the boats from entering the backwater or creek, without possession of which the blockade could not be made effective. An entrenchment covering this tower was taken by a landing party of the Qawāsīm, but they were beaten back from the tower itself with a loss of 8 men killed and 40 wounded; and meanwhile the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, with a view to relieving Umm-al-Qaiwain, had made an attempt to surprise the town of Dibai. In these circumstances the mediation of the British Resident was gladly accepted by the parties, and a formal treaty of alliance and friendship was concluded on the following conditions: that Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar should withdraw his demand for the destruction of a particular tower protecting the water supply of Umm-al-Qaiwain; that 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid should compensate the Qāsimi Shaikh for his loss in skirmishes previous to the siege; and that no fresh fortifications should be erected by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

1841. In 1841, encouraged by dissensions between the Qāsimi Shaikh and his son Saqar, Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid sounded the British Resident as to the permissibility of resuming work on certain fortifications, left incomplete at the time of the siege, upon the sea face of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but the project was severely discouraged by the Resident as involving a breach of the treaty mediated by himself. The Shaikh, however, disregarding the Resident's wishes, shortly proceeded to complete the unfinished towers and even to build an additional one for the defence of the backwater.

1842. Upon this Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar immediately applied to the Resident for enforcement of the treaty; and in November 1842 the Assistant Resident was deputed to the coast of Trucial Omān to enquire into the case. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was unable to justify, except as a precaution against treachery which he apprehended from

Shaikh Sultān, his own open and undeniable violation of the treaty ; not only did he refuse to dismantle the new works, but he even expressed an intention of building others ; and, in effect, he said that he would only desist under compulsion. The Shaikh of Shārjah, with his usual acuteness, refused to discuss any compromise and appealed to the honour of the British officials. Eventually the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was obliged to suspend his building operations, and the case was referred for the orders of Government.

In May 1843 the Assistant Resident, armed with authority from 1843. Government, again proceeded to the spot, and Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, until he found that coercion would be used if necessary, was just as obstinate as before ; but the conclusion of the Ten Years' Maritime Truce, which took place at this time, deprived the question of its practical importance, and it was decided that, after the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had fulfilled his obligations by destroying the works constructed in violation of the treaty, the treaty itself should be annulled and the Shaikhs and the British Government absolved from their mutual responsibilities. The British Agent was directed to remain at Umm-al-Qaiwain to witness the demolition of the towers, and their destruction was commenced ; but, after one tower had been levelled with the ground, the Shaikh of Shārjah, at the intercession of the Shaikh of Dibai and not uninfluenced by a threat on the part of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain to ruin the pearling season by beginning a war on land, agreed that the remainder should be spared—a concession which the British authorities very readily confirmed.

In 1844 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was driven by adverse winds to 1844. take refuge in the harbour of Umm-al-Qaiwain, and Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, overlooking the past, invited him ashore and treated him as a distinguished guest during a night and day. This, however, seems to have been a mere incident of Arab hospitality, for it led to no improvement of the bad relations between the two chiefs.

In the general war which broke out along the Trucial Coast in 1846, 1846-47. chiefly in consequence of the ambition of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain played an important part. In marked contrast with Shaikh 'Abdul Azīz of 'Ajmān, the other member of the triple combination, who finding it to his advantage to do so soon changed sides, Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid supported with unswerving loyalty his ally of Dibai ; and by these two the war was carried to a not unsuccessful conclusion. Early in the operations an encounter took place in the

neighbourhood of Umm-al-Qaiwain between a force under the personal command of the Shaikh and a raiding party of Bañi Qitab and others accompanied by Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān of Shārjah; in this affair, the son of the Qāsimi Shaikh having been slain after a fierce struggle, the partisans of Shārjah were put to flight. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was included in the peace of 1847; but, though he subsequently co-operated with the Qawāsīm in an expedition to Bātinah he ever remained on his guard against the vengeance of the Shaikh Shārjah for the death of his son.

Aggression by the Shaikh of Shārjah on the Shihūh of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, 1839.

It will be interesting, before leaving the subject of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar and his attempted aggrandisements, to notice some operations which he undertook in 1839 against the neighbouring Shihhi tribe. The Saiyid of Masqat is said to have admitted in 1836 the dependence of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district on the Qāsimi Shaikh; but the Shihūh, inhabiting the same, apparently held other views. One of their forts having fallen by treachery into the hands of Shaikh Sultān's representative at Dibah and having been demolished by him, the Shihūh embarked on a series of raids and forays, to which the Qāsimi Chief replied by unsuccessful land expeditions against their chief towns of Khasab and Kumzār. Shaikh Sultān had, in consequence of these reverses, resolved on a naval blockade of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl coast, when the success of the Egyptians in Najd drew his attention to a different quarter, and even caused him to take the initiative in seeking peace with the Shihūh.

Conflict between 'Ajmān and Hamriyah, 1848.

It remains to mention an isolated conflict; between the people of 'Ajmān and those of Hamriyah; it did not, apparently, disturb the relations of 'Ajmān with the Shaikhdom of Shārjah, to which Hamriyah belonged. In September 1848, on the death of Saif-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh of Hamriyah, the inhabitants of that village elected one 'Abdullah as Shaikh in his place. This proceeding seems to have been resented by 'Abdul 'Azīz, Shaikh of 'Ajmān, for he immediately set out to attack Hamriyah at the head of 400 men; but the 'Ajmāni host, were routed at the first encounter by an inferior number of the people of Hamriyah, who pursued them back to the very gates of their own town. In this engagement Shaikh 'Abdul 'Azīz was killed and his brother Hamaid-bin-Rāshid wounded, while the newly elected chief of Hamriyah also lost his life; and, besides the leaders, there were 26 men killed and 20 wounded on the side of 'Ajmān and 5 killed and 22 wounded on the side of Hamriyah. 'Abdur Rahmān, a son of Saif-bin-'Abdullah, then became Shaikh of Hamriyah; and Hamaid-bin-Rāshid succeeded his deceased brother as Shaikh of 'Ajmān.

Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 4th May 1853.

When the period of the Ten Years' Maritime Truce began to near its end, Captain A. B. Kemball, then Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, consulted the Shaikhs who were parties to the same regarding the conclusion in its place of a permanent peace at sea. The replies received were not unfavourable, and the project was strongly supported by the Government of Bombay; accordingly, at the beginning of May 1853, Captain Kemball, under the sanction of the Government of India, proceeded in the "Clive" to the Trucial Coast, where the negotiations were quickly and successfully completed. Experience had now convinced the Shaikhs of the benefit to all from unbroken peace at sea, and not even that *pro formâ* opposition was encountered which had been anticipated on the part of the more powerful Shaikhs of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi, the Shaikh of Shārjah being satisfied by an assurance that the signature of the new treaty would not debar him, in an extreme case, from defending his maritime possessions in the Gulf of 'Omān by naval means against the ruler of Masqat. The terms of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, as it was styled, were similar to those of the Ten Years' Truce, but included, as an additional stipulation, that the "perfect maritime truce" now established "for evermore" should be watched over and enforced by the British Government. The treaty, which took effect from the 4th of May, was signed by the Shaikhs on various dates between the 4th and the 9th of that month.

The continuance of a system of presents, which the Resident was accustomed to bestow at his periodical visits in recognition of good conduct on the part of the individual Shaikhs, was expressly sanctioned by the Government of India.

PERIOD FROM THE PERPETUAL TREATY OF PEACE TO THE EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT, 1853-92.

British Relations with Trucial 'Omān 1853-92.

The term "maritime irregularity", which after 1853 generally figures in official correspondence in place of the word "piracy", is significant of the great and peaceful revolution which, by the firmness and moderation of the British political officers, had been gradually brought about in the Persian Gulf. Maritime irregularities.

1854.

On his first visit to the Trucial Coast after the conclusion of the Perpetual Peace, the Resident, Captain Kemball, found the Shaikhs confirmed in their "attachment and devotion to the British Government" and in their resolution faithfully to observe their engagements. On this occasion only two slight cases of breach of the peace at sea came under his consideration, and they were easily settled.

1855-1856.

In January 1855 a Shū'ai belonging to one 'Abdul Karim of Bahrain, having been driven by a storm to take shelter near Khor-al-'Odaid, was attacked and plundered there by two Baghlahs of Abu Dhabi; in the fray 'Abdul Karim himself was wounded and one of his men was killed. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, Zāid-bin-Khalifah, who had just succeeded to the Shaikhdом, at first demurred to settling the case on the ground that it had occurred under his predecessor; but, this plea having been disallowed, he complied with the demands made on him through Commodore Ethersey by paying full compensation for the robbery and \$600 as Diyah or blood-money on account of the murdered man, and by causing the two offending Baghlahs to be burnt.

A disturbance which took place at Hamriyah in 1855 gave rise to several slight aggressions at sea, two of them upon stranger vessels belonging to the Batinah coast; but redress in these cases was easily obtained.

In November 1855, while the "Kallian", a Bombay native vessel belonging to a Hindu British subject, was unloading her cargo at Shārjah, a storm arose and drove her on shore. On the wind abating a rabble from the town came down to the beach and plundered and partially destroyed her, besides tearing down a British flag which the Nakhuda had hoisted for her protection; and a second British flag having been hoisted, the Arabs began to abuse the British Government and violently assaulted one of the crew. A man-of-war was accordingly despatched to Shārjah with a demand for compensation, for the repair of the vessel, and for the punishment of the guilty parties; and, after a vain attempt by the Shaikh to present the case as one of wreck and to throw the blame upon Bedouins not amenable to his authority, these terms were substantially fulfilled.

An ordinary case of the seizure of runaway divers upon the pearl banks was so energetically handled in this year by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who imprisoned the chief offender and returned the kidnapped divers to the Residency Agent at Shārjah, that Government authorised a special increase in the value of his next annual present.

1856.

A peculiar case arose in July 1856 from the participation of a force, sent by sea from Shārjah, in an attempt to reinstate at Abu Dhabi

Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, the ex-ruler of that place. The attack of the legitimists having failed, it was decided to treat the case as one of maritime aggression and to hold the Qāsimi Shaikh partially responsible for the damage done in Abu Dhabi town, though this was to some extent the work of Bedouin allies whom the *de facto* Shaikh had found himself compelled to summon to his assistance. The fine on the Shaikh of Shārajah was fixed at \$25,000, payable by instalments, of which it was intended to remit a portion should the attitude of the Shaikh be satisfactory; but his shifty conduct placed clemency out of the question, and this large sum was in the end exacted to the last dollar, the final payment not being received till May 1860.

In 1857, as is more fully related in another place,* the Shaikh of 1857 Shārajah was prevented, on grounds of expediency and not under the Treaty of Perpetual Peace, which did not apply to the case, from taking action by sea against the Shihūh, with whom he was at war.

In 1859 an atrocity occurred, which revived for a moment, the 1859. memories of former days. Three natives of Hasa, subjects of the Wahhābi Amīr and passengers on a vessel of Dibai bound for Lingeh, were thrown overboard by the Nākhuda and crew, who desired to take possession of their valuables. Two were drowned; but the third member of the party, 'Abdullah-bin-Husain, managed to keep himself afloat until he was picked up by a vessel from Sūr. Eventually he laid information before the Resident, Captain Felix Jones, I. N., who despatched Commodore Balfour with a squadron to require (1) the surrender for destruction of the boat in which the crime had been committed, (2) the payment of \$1,800 as compensation for property taken, (3) the payment of \$1,800 as blood-money on account of two murders and an attempted murder, and (4) the public execution of 'Obaid, the Nākhuda of the guilty vessel, or, in lieu thereof, the payment of a fine of \$1,000. Prompt compliance with these terms was enforced by Commodore Balfour, an officer of very decided character on the Shaikh of Dibai, the fine being accepted instead of the surrender of the chief murderer; but later in the year Captain Felix Jones, discovering that Muhammad-bin-Bazzān, another of the murderers, had returned to his home at Khasab, went there with Commodore Balfour and demanded his surrender under a penalty of \$1,000. Muhammad-bin-Bazzān was accordingly delivered up unconditionally by the elders of the town—the first instance, it was * stated, of such a surrender being made to the British authorities—and, having been handed over to

* The statement was not absolutely correct. It will be remembered that in 1835 two pirates were surrendered by the Bani Yās.

Vide page 623 ante.

his sovereign, the Sultān of 'Omān, was blown from a gun at Masqat on the 21st of May 1860. In 1859 the surrender of seven Shārjah boats which had been guilty of piratical acts, apparently upon the Persian coast, was obtained by Commodore Jenkins, I.N., at 48 hours' notice; but the particulars of this case are not ascertainable.

1860 In 1860 the Shaikh of Hamriyah, after having in the previous year been obliged to pay up a small sum on account of a robbery committed at sea on board a vessel belonging to his port, was so ill-advised as to move by water to the assistance of his suzerain, the Shaikh of Shārjah, who was engaged in coercing some rebellious subjects at Khān and Abu Hail: this thoughtless act cost him \$250.

Two cases which occurred at Bakhah in 1859 or 1860 may, though they belong properly to the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district, be mentioned here as constituting breaches of maritime order on the coast immediately adjoining Trucial 'Omān; in the first a fugitive from Sha'am, at the instigation of the Shaikh of Bakhah, stole a Baqārah and some fishing nets from Sha'am and brought them to Bakhah, and in the second a shipwrecked crew, cast ashore at Bakhah, were robbed by the Shaikh of their few remaining effects. In each case the Shaikh, though he was not a signatory of any truce or peace and would at the present day be regarded as a dependent of the Sultān of Masqat, was called upon to pay a fine of \$100. Payment of the first fine was refused by him to Lieutenant Dyer of the brigantine "Tigris;" but the arrival of Commodore Balfour on the 15th of February 1860 with the steam frigate "Semiramis" and the "Elphinstone" produced a satisfactory settlement, to which was annexed a warning to the Shaikh to be "careful how he ever again refused any demand made on him by the Captain of one of Her Majesty's Indian Navy vessels."

1860. In January 1860 the "Fath-al-Khair" of Lingeh, in endeavouring to enter the harbour of Rās-al-Khaimah during a storm, ran aground and was at once surrounded, with felonious intent, by 15 or 20 armed boats commanded by Shaikh Ibrāhīm, a son of the Qāsimi Shaikh and Deputy-Governor of the town. The unfortunate vessel, after being pillaged and wilfully damaged, was allowed to go, and made the best of her way to the Persian coast, where the owner found an effective advocate in Commander Balfour; for that officer, after due enquiry through a subordinate and a short correspondence with Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, who merely ordered his son to afford redress, himself proceeded to Rās-al-Khaimah. Shaikh Ibrāhīm had recourse to subterfuges, but they were cut short by the entry of eleven armed boats into the harbour, which took six vessels

belonging to the port in tow. In the result the compensation, amounting to \$810, was disgorged within 48 hours, and subsequently an additional punitive fine of \$500 was levied under the orders of the Bombay Government.

In 1866 the Political Resident, Colonel Lewis Pelly, submitted for the information of Government a number of specimen cases illustrative of the petty irregularities which still frequently occurred in the Gulf. It appears that Colonel Pelly felt himself precluded under recent orders from resorting to coercive measures, or even to the imposition of fines, without the previous sanction of Government; and that the abolition of the Indian Navy, whose ships, always at the disposal of the Resident, had been replaced by those of the Royal Navy with more extensive duties to perform, had increased the difficulties of the Resident's position. The reply to this important reference, in which the Resident clearly implied that more freedom of action should be allowed him and a greater material force placed at his disposal, is unfortunately not traceable. 1866-68.

From this time onwards the maintenance of the peace in Gulf waters seems to have become almost a matter of routine, and recourse to exceptional measures was seldom required. In September 1868, however, in connection with a great raid by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and 'Abu Dhabi upon the coast of Qatar, described in the history of Bahrain, Colonel Pelly found it necessary under the orders of Government to proceed to Abu Dhabi with the "Vigilant", "Sind" and "Hugh Rose", and a satisfactory settlement was obtained, but not without actual preparations for a bombardment. The terms enforced included the surrender of a Māshuwah and two Arab mares and the payment, partly by instalments, of compensation to the amount of \$25,000; but of this large sum, it would appear, only Rs. 3,740 was ever actually realised. The Shaikh was obliged by Colonel Pelly to give up his only three guns, which were however returned to him, as their removal might have exposed the town of Abu Dhabi to Bedouin attacks.

Considerable alarm was caused in Trucial 'Omān by the Turkish expedition which annexed Hasa in 1871, for the avowed object of the Turks was the subjugation of "Najd," and it appeared that by "Najd" they understood all countries which had at any time paid tribute to the Wahhābi Amīrs; the statement even appeared in an official journal at Baghdad that Shārjah, Dibai and Abu Dhabi were places in "Najd." The British Government, however, were ultimately successful, as related in the histories of Hasa and Bahrain, in inducing the Turks to confine their proceedings to Hasa and Qatar; and meanwhile, in June 1871, they instructed the Resident in the Persian Gulf to prevent the Trucial 1871.

Shaikhs from taking part, on either side, in the struggle between the Turks and the Wahhābis.

176-81. In 1876, in connection with an attempt by the people of Shamailiyah to cast off the yoke of the Qawāsīm, the question of the despatch by sea by the Shaikh of Shārjah of reinforcements, military stores, etc., for his garrison at Dibah was formally raised. The Shaikh contended, not unreasonably, that such a proceeding on his part was not prohibited by any of his engagements; but the Resident, Colonel E. C. Ross, recommended that all such acts should be forbidden by Government on grounds of general policy, experience having shown that armed Arabs, when once afloat, invariably gave way to the temptation to indulge in indiscriminate plunder. In 1880 the Resident withheld permission from the Shaikh of Shārjah to attempt the recovery of Fujairah by sea, advising him instead to proceed by "negotiations and wise arrangements"; and in the following year the Government of India ordered that the whole of the Qāsimi coast on the Gulf of 'Omān from Dibah to Khor Kalba, as also the coast of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, so far as might be convenient, from Dibah to Musandam, "should be deemed subject to the operation of the maritime truce," which was not applicable to the coasts of the 'Omān Sultanate.*

1878. In 1878 Shaikh Hashar of Dibai, a man of quick and impetuous temper even for an Arab, refused to satisfy three claims established against his subjects, the plaintiffs in two cases being Persians and in the third an Indian; and Colonel Miles found it necessary to visit Dibai in H.M.S. "Teazer". Compensation and a fine were exacted and an offending boat was burned, after which the Shaikh apologised for his conduct and friendly relations were resumed.

1882. In June 1882 it was discovered that boats belonging to 'Ajmān had been implicated in an attack, some time previously, on the "Fath-al-Karīm", a vessel under Turkish colours in the Red Sea, and that part of the booty had been landed at 'Ajmān. H. M. S. "Arab" was accordingly

* Such was the form of the order, but it appears somewhat inappropriate. The General Treaty of Peace of 1820 and the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853 do not apply to particular waters or coasts, but to the subjects of the signatories wherever they may be. It would have been sufficient, and more strictly correct, to have recognised Shamailiyah as belonging to Shārjah, as was actually done later in 1903. Nor can the inhabitants of Ruūs-al-Jibāl, who are Masqat subjects, be properly regarded as subject to the treaties quoted above, to which their Sultān is not a party.

sent to 'Ajmān, where a quantity of the goods was recovered and nine of the boats implicated were publicly burnt as an example.

In June 1884, a dispute about diving stations having taken place on the pearl banks between a boat of 'Ajmān and another of Shārjah, Saif-al-Adham, a mischievous 'Omāni who had been living on Sirri Island for several years since his expulsion from 'Omān, sided with the Shārjah boat and fired upon the other. In consequence of this offence H.M.S. "Philomel" was sent with the Residency Agent to Sirri, where Saif's own boat was publicly destroyed. 1884.

In 1885 or 1886 the Shaikh of Bakhah moved by sea with an armed force, apparently to assist the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah in some operations against Sha'am; he escaped with an admonition from the Resident. 1885-1886.

At the beginning of the period the slave trade continued almost unabated, especially at Shārjah, Umm-al-Qaiwain and 'Ajmān. The Shaikhs professed themselves extremely willing, but quite unable, to suppress the traffic; it was ascertained however that the Shaikh of Shārjah, who was the most obsequious of all in his protestations, habitually levied a tax of \$4 upon each newly imported slave. In 1856 a further Engagement was obtained from the Trucial Shaikhs, in which they undertook, among other things, to seize and deliver up to the British authorities any slaves whose importation into their territories should be proved. Slave trade, and further Engagement (1856) relating to the same.

The Ruūs-al-Jibāl tract having been crossed at the isthmus of Maqlab by the Indo-European Telegraph Department's line and a station having been established on an island in Khor-ash-Sham, it was considered advisable, as the jurisdiction over the district was asserted by some of the inhabitants to belong to Shārjah, to obtain a written guarantee for the protection of the line "in and near" their territories from all the Trucial Shaikhs. An Agreement in this sense, in the form of an additional article of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853, was accordingly concluded in 1864. Telegraph Agreement, 1864.

We have already adverted, in connection with the Ten Years' Maritime Truce, to a principal cause of such minor disturbances as still occurred at sea—the migration, namely, of debtors engaged in the pearl fishery or pearl trade from one jurisdiction to another with a view to evading their liabilities. The evil was a far-reaching one, and in 1868 Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident, took steps for enforcing the duty of extradition upon harbouring chiefs; but they were not, apparently, efficacious. At length, on the 24th of June 1879, an agreement for the mutual surrender of fraudulently absconding debtors was accepted. Absconding Debtors Agreement, 24th June 1879.

and sealed by the Trucial Shaikhs in the presence of Hāji 'Abdur Rahmān, the Residency Agent at Shārjah, and of Hāji 'Abdul Qāsim, Residency Munshi, who had been specially deputed from Būshehr to explain to the Shaikhs the views and wishes of the Resident: it provided that in future every runaway of the class in question should be at once surrendered; that, if on the contrary he were harboured, the harbouring chief should be liable to a fine of \$ 50, or in case of the absconder being allowed to proceed to the pearl banks to a fine of \$100, besides incurring liability for the just debts of the runaway; that the facts, if disputed, should be settled by a Majlis or council of arbitration; and, finally, that no fine should be enforced without the approval of the British Resident. The Government of India were at first apprehensive lest the new system, by unduly increasing the power of the Shaikhs over their subjects, should lead to oppression; but Colonel Ross was able to assure them that, under the patriarchal form of government which prevailed, cases of genuine oppression were rare, and that the system was not likely to be abused. Experience has now fully demonstrated both the justness of this view and the beneficial tendency of the Agreement. *

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Wahhābis, etc., 1853-92.

Wahhābi
intrigues.

The power of the Wahhābi agent in Trucial 'Omān, though his presence was not at once removed, had fallen to a low point; and, having no longer any material force at his command, he was reduced to maintaining his position by petty intrigues and by playing off one Shaikh against another.

1854. In 1854 Ahmad the Sadairi, who at this time was still the representative of the Wahhābi Government in Baraimi, was reported to be making a laudable use of his influence to restrain the Trucial Shaikhs from wanton aggressions on one another; and he had even, on the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi declining to hold himself responsible for the conduct of the Manāsir, organised a successful expedition against that predatory tribe.

1855. In 1855 on the contrary, in a difficulty which occurred between a colony of Shihūh at Hamriyah and the Shaikh of Shārjah, the suzerain of that place, reason was found for suspecting that the Wahhābi agent had encouraged the rebellion with a view to the eventual creation of a *pied à terre* for himself upon the Trucial seaboard. In this project

* The text of the Agreement will be found in Annexure No. 7 to this Chapter.

he was opposed by the Na'im of Baraimi, one of whose chiefs, Fādhil-bin-Muhammad, had an interview with Captain Kemball at the coast in 1855, and suggested that British influence should be brought to bear for the expulsion of the Wāhhābis; but the Resident explained that the policy of Government was now one of non-intervention in internal affairs, and himself merely continued to avoid, as his predecessors had done since 1840, direct communication with or recognition of the Wāhhābi representative.

From 1864 to 1866 the attention of Turki-bin-Ahmad the Sadairi, Wāhhābi agent at Baraimi, was chiefly engaged by the affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate, on which he was trying to enforce payment of an increased tribute; but from this struggle, which is described in another place, the Trucial Shaikhs, including Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar who was now in his dotage and died in 1866, seem to have held themselves aloof. About this time Shaikh Khālid-bin-Sultān of Shārjah, who had thrown in his lot with the Wāhhābis, ventured with their assistance to erect a fort on the coveted Zora site between 'Ajmān and Hamriyah; but, as this innovation threatened to disturb the peace of the entire coast, the fort was bombarded and destroyed by H.M.S. "Highflyer" in January 1866, on the occurrence of a breach between the British Government and the Wāhhābis. The question of Zora remained in abeyance thereafter until 1895.

1864-1866.

In 1867, on the re-incorporation of Rās-al-Khaimah with the Shārjah Shaikhdom, the intervention of the Wāhhābis was sought, but without success, by Ibrāhīm, the displaced Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah.

1867.

In April 1869 the Wāhhābi representative at Baraimi, having proceeded to Shārjah, entangled himself in the domestic quarrels of the ruling family with the result that, in a general affray which took place, he was shot dead. A number of his followers were killed on the same occasion, and the others withdrew. Two months later the opportunity thus presented was taken advantage of by Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Masqat, as related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, to drive the Wāhhābis once and for all out of Baraimi.

Final expulsion of the Wāhhābis from Baraimi, 1869.

Baraimi affairs, from the departure of Wāhhābis, are treated of in the Annexure on the history of the Abu Dhabi principality, with which the Oasis, though independent, is very closely connected.

In 1888 there were rumours, emanating from Qatar, of a contemplated invasion of Trucial 'Omān by Ibn-Rashid of Najd; but, as no invasion was attempted, it seems probable that they may have been invented and disseminated by Jāsim, the Āl T'hāni Shaikh of Dōhah, for his own purposes.

Threatened invasion, 1888.

The Shaikh of Dibai was at first inclined to favour the cause of the expected invaders and to ally himself with the Āl Thāni Shaikh, who was the professed exponent of their views; but later in the year, after a visit to Masqat, he veered round and formed with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi a Hināwi combination to resist any advance from Central Arabia. The Shaikh of Shārajah, whom Shaikh Jāsim attempted to draw into the affair and whom he pretended to consult with regard to the landing at Shārajah of stores for the Central Arabian forces, was advised by the British authorities to excuse himself from co-operation as best he could, and apparently did so; but a little later he figured as member of a Ghāfri combination of all the other Trucial Shaikhs against the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai. The Na'im of Baraimi from the first professed an intention of acting on the side of the Shammar Amīr.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Sultanate of 'Omān, etc., 1853—1892.

In the peaceful era which had now dawned there was no more actual warfare between the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and the ruler of Masqat; and, so far as any connection was maintained between them, it depended chiefly on the internal affairs of the Sultanate, which are related elsewhere in the proper place.

1854. In 1854, hostilities having broken out at Bandar 'Abbās, in connection with the lease of that place, between the ruler of Masqat and the Persian Government, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, actually put to sea with a fleet to render assistance to Saiyid Sa'id; but he was obliged to return to port by the British authorities on the ground that his action might widen the area of disturbance and produce a state of general insecurity at sea.

1857. The encroachments of Saiyid Turki of Sohār in 1857 on the possessions of his brother Saiyid Thuwaini in Bātinah were attributed partly to the instigation of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārajah, to whom a stern warning against intrigue in that direction was accordingly conveyed by the Resident under the orders of Government.

1861. In 1861 a converse case occurred, through attempts by emissaries of Saiyid Thuwaini to arrange a combination with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain against the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārajah; but the chiefs addressed refused to entertain the suggestion, baited

though it was with liberal promises, and no occasion for interference by the British authorities arose.

Saiyid Turki of 'Omān, in the course of his endeavours in 1867 to recover his appanage of Sohār, had recourse once more to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān; but those whose aid he sought, having been warned by the officers of the British Government against any disturbance of the peace, especially at sea, made no response to his overtures. 1867.

After his capture of Baraimi from the Wahhābis in 1869, 'Azzān-bin-Qais formed an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, to whom he also promised a subsidy for the defence of the frontier of the Sultanate upon that side. The alliance was directed against the other Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, all of whom Saiyid 'Azzān then regarded as favouring the Wahhābi cause; but not long afterwards the Shaikh of Shārjah also associated himself with the allies, and the danger from the Wahhābis came to an end. 1869.

In May 1870 Saiyid Turki of 'Omān paid a visit to Dibai with a view to enlisting the support of the Trucial Shaikhs in his struggle with the usurper 'Azzān-bin-Qais; but the influence of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who adhered loyally to his understanding with 'Azzān, was sufficient to prevent for the time any overt movement in favour of the princely wanderer. In the following October, however, in the battle of Dhank which virtually gave to him the Sultanate of 'Omān, Saiyid Turki received invaluable aid, in the shape of contingents, from the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Rās-al-Khaimah and from the Na'im and Bani Qitab tribes. 1870.

In the following year the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi visited Saiyid Turki, notwithstanding the previous opposition between their views, and was received with every honour; but in January 1886 he was suspected of a design to raid the Bātinah District in concert with the rebels of Sharqiyah, and in May 1887 Saiyid Turki was guilty of an unfriendly act in lending support to the Dhawāhir of Baraimi, who were at war with the Bani Yās. In 1891 Shaikh Zāid made another journey to Masqat, apparently in connection with Baraimi affairs. 1871-1891.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with Qatar, 1853-92.

For about 9 years, from 1881 to 1890, almost continual warfare prevailed by land between Zāid-bin-Khalīfah, Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and War between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

and the Āl
Thāni Shaikh
of Qatar,
1881-1890.

Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar. For this state of matters a claim which the Āl Thāni Shaikh maintained to possession of Khor-al-'Odaid in Abu Dhabi territory was partly responsible; but the scene of action was at all times so remote from the more populous part of Trucial 'Omān, that we have preferred to treat of the operations in connection with Qatar affairs rather than in the history of Trucial 'Omān. The scare of an invasion from Central Arabia in 1888, already mentioned, was perhaps only a stratagem by which Shaikh Jāsim sought to bring about an alliance of the other Trucial Shaikhs against his enemy Zāid.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Turkish Government, 1853-92.

'Odaid affairs, described at length in the separate history of the Abu Dhabi principality, gave opportunities for interference in Trucial 'Omān of which the Turks did not neglect to avail themselves. In 1874 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi complained that the local Turkish officials in Qatar had written to him on the subject of 'Odaid, denying his authority there; in 1875 the Turkish flag was apparently sometimes flown at 'Odaid; and there is no doubt that a small tribute to Turkey was paid by the 'Odaid colonists between 1873 and 1876. In 1878 the Porte claimed 'Odaid as a Turkish possession and protested against operations for the repression of piracy which had been undertaken there by the British authorities a few months before. Finally, in 1889, the Wāli of Basrah addressed the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, urging him to submit his differences with the Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar to Turkish arbitration; but the suggestion was declined under British advice.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with Persia, 1853-92.

In 1855, Khalifah-bin-Sa'id, the Qāsimi Shaikh of Lingeh, being then a minor and his affairs having fallen into some disorder, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, who was his kinsman, assumed virtual charge of Lingeh and continued for some months to reside there.

Internal history of Trucial 'Omān, 1853-1892.

Political combinations without permanence, and an endless succession of petty wars by land, compose almost the whole internal history of Trucial 'Omān during this period. Of these meaningless occurrences down to the year 1870 only two need be signalised. Earlier events.

At the end of 1857 an attack was made by the Shaikh of Abu Hail, a dependent of the Shaikh of Shārjah, on an encampment of the Mazāri' tribe at Khawānij and resulted in the death of four Mazāri', one of whom was a Shaikh; the Abu Hail force, 150 strong, regained their homes the same night with a quantity of booty including 2 horses and 30 camels. As the Shaikh of Shārjah declined to make restitution to the Mazāri', the Shaikh of Dibai, under whose protection the Mazāri' were, obtained the help of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi against him; and in March it was announced that Shārjah had been defeated. A reconciliation of the parties was then effected by the Residency Agent at Shārjah. 1857.

A campaign by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi against the Shaikh of Shārjah in April 1868 was rendered memorable by an unusual incident, for Zāid-bin-Khalifah, advancing in front of his troops, challenged his enemy, Khālid-bin-Sultān, to meet him in single combat. The proposal having been accepted, the challenger inflicted on his antagonist a wound which quickly proved mortal. 1868.

In 1869 the town of Rās-al-Khaimah and its dependencies became a separate Shaikhdom under Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah, a nephew of the ruling Shaikh of Shārjah, and so continued until his death in 1900. Separation of Rās-al-Khaimah from Shārjah, 1869.

From 1871 onwards, in consequence of the institution of Administration Reports, information regarding the dissensions of the Trucial Shaikhs is abundant; and, notwithstanding the extreme unimportance of most of the events, it seems advisable, on account of their recentness and of results which in some cases still continue, to present them to the reader in a condensed form. Later events.

In 1871 or 1872 the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, between whom and the Shaikh of Shārjah there was a dispute in regard to Bū Mūsa, put to sea with the intention of raiding the horses of his enemy from that island; but he was anticipated by boats from Shārjah which arrived there first. The Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai were at this time at daggers drawn, in consequence of the protection afforded by each chief to runaway debtors from the jurisdiction of the other. 1871-72.

- During 1872 or 1873 war was begun, or continued, between the
- 1872-73. Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān eventually coming to the assistance of the former and the headman of Hamriyah, a disloyal subject of Shārjah, to that of the latter.
- 1873-74 In 1873 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi joined the combination against the Shaikh of Shārjah, who was generally unpopular on account of his faithlessness, and made a raid by night upon Shārjah town. Eventually the Shaikh of Shārjah was defeated with a loss of 50 men.
1874. In 1874 the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah joined the Shaikh of Shārjah, while the Shaikh of Dibai enrolled himself in the opposite faction and the headman of Hamriyah apparently withdrew from the affair. The friendly offices of the British Residency Agent were exercised without avail to promote a reconciliation.
1875. An expedition by land from Dibai, 200 strong, now attacked the environs of Rās-al-Khaimah, killing 7 men, and returned home. Soon afterwards, in February 1895, the headman of Hamriyah effected a reconciliation between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain ; but the war between Shārjah and Dibai continued ; and in May an attack on Dibai town was made by the people of 'Ajmān and Shārjah, reinforced by Bedouins of the Na'im tribe. About July a raid was made on Hamriyah by 200 camel-riders from Abu Dhabi, who next, with the assistance of a Dibai force, ravaged the gardens of Fasht and Shārjah. At length in September peace was made between Shārjah and Dibai.
1876. In 1876 the country appears to have been quiescent after the exceptional disturbances of the previous year.
- 1877-78. In July 1877 the 'Awāmir Bedouins fell upon the town of Dibai, killing two men and wounding 10 ; but they were repulsed with a loss to themselves of 40 killed and eight captured : in October, assisted by the Darū', they again plundered a Dibai settlement. Between August 1877 and February 1878 numerous raids were made by Bani Qitab Bedouins, chiefly in Abu Dhabi territory ; but subjects of Shārjah and Dibai were not exempt from molestation, and the Ghafalah apparently countenanced the doings of the Bani Qitab. In February 1878 both townsmen and nomads became weary of the strife and a general peace was arranged. The town of Dibai had now become the principal port on the coast and was larger than Abu Dhabi, which appeared to be declining.
1879. At the close of 1879 the Na'im of the Baraimi neighbourhood were divided amongst themselves, and the Shaikhs of Shārjah and 'Ajmān each espoused the cause of a different faction ; the result was tension upon

the coast also, where the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain associated themselves with 'Ajmān and a counter alliance was formed between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. No actual hostilities, however, took place among these chiefs; and in December the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who had gone to Baraimi, returned to his home after witnessing the success of his protégés amongst the Na'im.

During the years 1880 and 1881 general tranquillity prevailed. 1880-81.

In 1882 a quarrel, arising out of family relationships, came to a head 1882. between the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain and Rās-al-Khaimah and ended in open warfare; the principal cause was a marriage contracted by Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah of Umm-al-Qaiwain with a sister of Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah of Rās-al-Khaimah, subject to a stipulation that the lady should continue to reside at Rās-al-Khaimah and that her husband should spend a part of each year with her there. A divorce was declared by the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who went to Rās-al-Khaimah for the purpose as agent of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but it did not end the dispute; and wrangling continued on the subject of property. Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah, who was of a more turbulent disposition than his adversary, then allowed seven boats from his port to proceed to Rams for the purpose of provoking a quarrel, which they did most effectually by assaulting the crew of a Rās-al-Khaimah fishing boat; these proceedings, however, verged upon a breach of the maritime peace, and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was accordingly reprimanded by the British Political Resident and compelled to pay a fine. Fighting on land ensued, in which the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain was assisted by the Shaikh of 'Ajmān and the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah by his own brother, the Shaikh of Shārjah, and by a part of the Na'im tribe. At length, in January 1883, a reconciliation between the parties was arranged by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, on the condition that all injuries should be mutually condoned. The Shaikh of Dibai was at this time on good terms with the Shaikhs of both Shārjah and Abu Dhabi.

The years 1883 and 1884 were uneventful. The chief of Abu Dhabi 1883-84. was now regarded as the most powerful among the Trucial Shaikhs, the hegemony having been lost by Shārjah chiefly through the incompetence of its ruler, Saqar-bin-Khalid, who succeeded to the Shaikhship in 1883. Presents were exchanged between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultān of 'Omān, and between the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain and the Sultān of Zanzibar; but they had apparently no political significance, at least of a local character.

1885. As usual in Trucial 'Oman, after a short interval of peace there was a sudden renewal of disturbances. In May 1885 the son of Ahmad bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, quarrelled with his father and took refuge with Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who refused to give him up; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, Saqar-bin-Khālid, joined the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain for the purpose of attacking 'Ajmān. Shortly after this the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain sent to sea two Baqārahs carrying 50 men, as also some munitions of war which were landed partly at Hairah and partly at Shārjah,—an act for which it was necessary to call him to account. In November, Mr. Robertson on behalf of the Resident, visited Umm-al-Qaiwain in H.M.S. "Reindeer", but Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah evaded a meeting; subsequently, however, his conduct seems to have been condoned on his undertaking not to repeat the offence. Meanwhile raids were committed by the inhabitants of Umm-al-Qaiwain and Hamriyah upon one another; they were suspended, but only for a brief space, after a reconciliation effected in August by the Residency Agent at Shārjah. At the end of November the Shaikh of Dibai united with the Shaikh of 'Ajmān and began to foray the Shaikh of Shārjah's territories.

1886. On the 20th of January 1886 the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Hamriyah attacked the town of Shārjah with a force of about 1,000 men and a field-piece, and a battle followed in which the people of Shārjah lost 40 men killed and 25 wounded, while the attacking force had only five fatal casualties. At the request of Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid of Shārjah the British Residency Agent, who had in the meanwhile informed the Shaikh of Dibai that he would be held responsible for any loss suffered by British subjects in Shārjah, intervened between the parties and succeeded in arranging a peace upon condition that the Shaikh of Shārjah should renounce his alliance with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain. After the retirement of Shārjah from the conflict the campaign was continued by Dibai, 'Ajmān and Hamriyah against Umm-al-Qaiwain and Rās-al-Khaimah; but the operations were now confined to petty raids, some of which were committed on dependencies of Rās-al-Khaimah, at the instigation of Dibai, by the people of Bakhah and Kumzār and by the Shibūh tribe generally. In April an attempt at mediation on the part of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was foiled by the obstinacy of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain. In May a raid was made on Umm-al-Qaiwain by the people of Hamriyah, and shortly afterwards, in the absence of the men of Hamriyah at the pearl banks, a force from Umm-al-Qaiwain entered and destroyed that place, killing

several persons and carrying off with them 25 slaves besides other booty : the headman of Hamryah, however, defended himself in his fort and escaped capture. To avenge this injury to his ally, the Shaikh of Dibai mustered a force of 35 horsemen and 400 camel-riders and marched against Umm-al-Qaiwain, but the excesses of the headman of Hamryah so displeased him that he soon returned home. In September a dispute about divers arose between Shārjah and 'Ajmān, which, had the Residency Agent not mediated, would probably have led to a renewal of hostilities between those two.

In 1887 several robberies were committed by Bedouin Manāsir on boats anchored in creeks to the north of Abu Dhabi town, subjects of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah being among the sufferers. As the robbers had swum off from the land these cases could not be treated as infractions of the maritime peace; and, as it did not appear that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi could fairly be held responsible for the misdeeds of a lawless and wandering tribe, the British authorities did not do more than appeal to his honour and sense of justice. In September a band of Manāsir marauders made a successful raid so far to the north as Shārjah, from which place they carried off eight women and children and several camels and horses. 1887.

In 1888 a feud prevailed between the people of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Shihūh tribe; several townsmen were murdered in outlying date plantations; and 200 palms were destroyed by Bedouins at the village of Khatt in Jiri. 1888-89.

A coalition, as already mentioned above in connection with Waghābi affairs, took place in 1888 between the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai, whom the supposed Waghābi danger had found bitterly at variance, and about the same time the Shaikh of Dibai effected a reconciliation between the Shaikh of Shārjah on the one hand and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān and the headman of Hamryah on the other; his object appears to have been to set the people of 'Ajmān and Hamryah at liberty to assist Dibai in case that principality should be called upon to withstand a Waghābi attack. The coalition, however, between the Hināwī Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai soon provoked a counter-alliance between the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah; and the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain and 'Ajmān, after endeavouring for a time to hold aloof, threw in their lot with the northern combination, which thus became a federation of all the Ghāfiris.

In February 1890 active trouble broke out between the principalities of Shārjah and Dibai, in consequence of redress being refused for the 1890.

mutilation of some Dibai camels within Shārjah limits; friction had really begun in the summer of 1889, when some raids were committed on Shārjah by Manāsir Bedouins nominally subject to the influence of Dibai and Abu Dhabi. A temporary understanding was patched up by the British Residency Agent; but in March 1890 a fresh rupture took place, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi moved a force in the direction of Dibai to support his ally. A considerable amount of petty mischief was done on both sides, after which negotiations for a general peace took place, apparently at the instance of the Shaikhs of Rās-la-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwāin; but they were inconclusive. A raid was made on Rās-al-Khaimah by hostile Shihūh and was repelled with a loss to the raiders of 11 men killed. The punishment of a raiding gang of 'Awāmir and Na'im by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi led to threats against Abu Dhabi by the Na'im, but they were not fulfilled.

1891. The year 1891 passed quietly, in consequence partly of the balance of power established by the Hināwi and Ghāfiri combinations of 1889, which still endured, and partly of the good offices of the British Residency Agent in averting collisions between Shārjah and Dibai. Certain differences occurred between the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain and Rās-al-Khaimah, but they were adjusted by the Shaikh of Shārjah. The most important event of the year was probably the migration *en bloc* of about 400 men of the Marar tribe from Dibai, where they considered themselves ill-treated by the Shaikh, to Shārjah; the move was effected at the end of the pearl season by simply returning from the banks to Shārjah instead of Dibai. This affair gave rise to a number of pecuniary claims and counterclaims of which the settlement, notwithstanding the constant mediation of the British Residency Agent, was attended by fighting on land and dragged on for nearly three years.

Exclusive Agreement of the Trucial Shaikhs with Great Britain, March 1892.

In order to understand the genesis of an important Agreement by which the position of the Trucial Shaikhs with reference to the British Government was in 1892 further defined, it is necessary to go back a few years and refer to certain events by which the undisputed predominance of British influence in Trucial 'Omān seemed to be threatened. These

events indicated the entrance into Persian Gulf affairs of new forces which were shortly to bring about a general challenge of the British position in the whole region of the Gulf.

An absurd but apparently serious attempt was made by Persian officials in 1887-88 to establish a footing in Trucial 'Omān, the principal agent employed being Sartīp Hāji Ahmad Khān, a former Deputy-Governor of Būshehr. In August 1887 this individual left for the coast of Trucial Omān on the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company's steamer "Calder",—a proceeding so extraordinary on his part, with reference to the season of the year and to other circumstances, that the British Resident at Būshehr, Colonel E. C. Ross, caused him to be followed by the Residency steamer "Lawrence" to Abu Dhabi, where he landed in full uniform. After spending some days with the Shaikh at Abu Dhabi the Sartīp paid a visit to Dibai; and then, returning to Abu Dhabi, he took his departure for Lingeh in a native sailing vessel. The Trucial Shaikhs, who had pledged themselves to reticence towards the British authorities, at first preserved an impenetrable silence regarding the designs of Ahmad Khān; but at length, the Shaikh of Dibai having been persuaded to unbosom himself to the Sultān of 'Omān, it transpired that the Sartīp had proposed the establishment of close relations between the Shaikhs and the Persian Government with a view to the exclusion of British influence from Trucial 'Omān. In January 1888 Ahmad Khān, apparently believing the way to be now sufficiently prepared, returned from Būshehr to the Trucial Coast in a native vessel. He brought with him a number of Persian flags, presumably for distribution, and, being a man of method, would have commenced operations in the neighbourhood of Rās Musandam; but the inhabitants of that tract refused to let him land. Later, accompanied by the Shaikh of Qishm and a number of armed men, he had an interview with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain; but soon after this, the impracticability of his scheme having quickly become apparent, he again withdrew to Persia. The Persian Government, on a complaint being made at Tehrān by the British Legation, repudiated the Sartīp's action and even volunteered to reprimand him; and, though, they subsequently presented him with a sword of honour, their official disavowal, being communicated through the Commander of H.M.S. "Osprey" to the Trucial Shaikhs, assuaged the not inconsiderable excitement to which the proceedings of Ahmad Khān had given rise along the coast.

Persian intrigues with the Trucial Shaikhs, 1887-88.

In December 1887, between the first and the second visit of the Sartīp to the Trucial Coast, a precaution had been taken by Colonel Ross which no doubt contributed materially to the final discomfiture of

Preliminary exclusive assurances, 1887.

the Persian emissary ; it consisted in obtaining from the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, Rās-al-Khaimah, 'Ajmān, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shārjah and Dibai a written assurance on the part of each that he would on no account correspond or enter into an agreement with any Government whatever except the British, and that he would not, without the assent of the British Government, allow an agent of any other Government to reside in his dominions. These undertakings were forwarded by the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India.

Turkish
intrigues.

During a number of years, as elsewhere related, the Turkish Government showed considerable interest in the dispute between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Qubaisāt rebels against his authority who had settled at Khor-al-'Odaid in the vicinity of Qatar; and, subsequently, the protracted war between the Abu Dhabi Shaikh and the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar provided the Turks with an excuse for a correspondence with the former, in which they pretended to exercise authority over him.

Proceedings
of suspected
French
agents, 1891.

But the principal reason for attaching the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to the British Government by new and more stringent obligations was the appearance of two Frenchmen upon the Trucial Coast, whose object was suspected to be political intrigue; for a forward movement on the part of the French Government had, by the simple expedient of distributing French flags, lately been begun in 'Omān. Of the two suspicious individuals one was named Tramier or Thomy, while the other was a M. Chapuy, "half adventurer, half merchant and wholly intriguer", who two years later came to notice again through his proceedings at Sūr in the 'Omān Sultanate. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who was three times visited by the associates and received presents from them, fell to some extent under their influence; he was easily convinced of the advantages of the French flag, which now enabled more than a dozen vessels belonging to Sūr to engage in the slave trade without fear of molestation by British cruisers; and he even offered to write a letter to the French Government, promising a good reception in his country to citizens of the French Republic.

The Exclu-
sive Agree-
ment, March
1892.

In view of the mischievous activity of MM. Chapuy and Tramier, who were at length reported to have obtained the grant of a site at Umm-al-Qaiwain, Major A. Talbot, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, suggested the conclusion of a formal Agreement on the lines of the written assurances of December 1887; and, his proposals having been approved by the Government of India, an Exclusive Agreement was signed on various dates in March 1892 by the Trucial Shaikhs—at this time six in number through the existence of a separate Shaikhdom of Rās-al-Khaimah—and by the Shaikh of Bahrain. Under this Agreement

the Shaikhs bound themselves, their heirs, and their successors (1) on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government; (2) without the assent of the British Government not to consent to the residence within their territories of the agent of any other Government; and (3) on no account to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of their territory save to the British Government. These engagements were ratified by the Viceroy of India on the 12th of May following, and were subsequently approved by Her Majesty's Government.*

The difficulties which had arisen did not disappear immediately on the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement; for the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai at first pretended to think that the return to them of ratified copies meant that the Agreement had not been confirmed, and the Shaikh of Dibai, annoyed at British interference with the slave trade, was reported to have proposed "taking the French flag and so escaping from the malice of the English". By degrees, however, the results of the supposed French agents' visits were effaced.

PERIOD SINCE THE EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT.

British relations with Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907.

The closeness of the relations existing between Great Britain and Trucial 'Omān increased greatly after the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement in 1892. British influence began to permeate the country; and, as will be apparent from facts related further on, the preferential rights of Great Britain in Trucial 'Omān became a factor of importance in questions arising between the Shaikhs and external powers.

The Agreements of the Shaikhs for the maintenance of peace at sea were observed with great exactitude. Even trivial breaches of these became almost unknown, and no difficulties of any sort arose, except from a minor question of the use of the Trucial flag.

In March 1892 some Dibai subjects crossed over to the island of Sir Bū Na'air, a possession of the Shaikh of Shārjah, and disarmed and ejected from one of the fishing grounds some natives of Sirri Island, who were then, on account of the connection of Sirri with Lingeh, regarded as Qāsimi dependents; in accordance with the orders of the British

General
features of
the period.

Observance
of the Trea-
ties of 1820
and 1853.

1892.

*Annexure No. 8 to this chapter gives the text of the Exclusive Agreement.

Resident, however, the aggressors were required to withdraw and to return the arms seized ; and the Shaikh of Dibai undertook that in future his subjects should not resort to Sir Bū Na'air without express permission from the Shaikh of Shārjah. In September of the same year the Shaikh of Dibai despatched an armed boat to the assistance of the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, who was then threatened with a land attack by the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain ; but on account of this lawless proceeding he was condemned to pay a fine, and it was realised in the following November at a visit of the Resident to the coast.

No maritime irregularity deserving of mention was committed after this by the inhabitants of Trucial 'Omān ; but in 1893 a Shihhi Shaikh of Khasab in Ruūs-al-Jibāl, having put to sea with an armed party, attempted to enforce a claim upon the property of his deceased father-in-law at Sha'am. In consequence of this misdemeanour the Sultān of 'Omān, acting on British advice, summoned the Shaikh to Masqat, where after much delay he appeared and was mulcted in the sum of Rs. 50.

Injuries to
persons un-
der British
protection.

Cases in which it was necessary to demand redress on behalf of persons enjoying British protection were, similarly, few and insignificant. In 1904, a Hindu having died at Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Saqar, who was in charge of the town in the absence of his father Shaikh Zaid, extorted \$100 in return for permission to dispose of the body according to Hindu rites ; but the money was afterwards refunded on a requisition by the Resident. In November of the same year a Hindu was robbed on Dalmah island, in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, of a considerable sum in money and pearls ; and again the unsatisfactory attitude of the Shaikh necessitated a remonstrance by the British political authority.

Question of
the necessity
of renewal
of agree-
ments, 1900.

In 1900 Shaikh 'Abdul 'Azīz, on his accession not without violence to the Shaikhship of 'Ajmān, wrote to the British Resident at Būshehr that he had signed the agreements of his predecessors with the British Government and that he would abide by them ; and the Resident in reply expressed approval of the Shaikh's resolution. The incident was of a novel character and suggested that agreements by predecessors were not regarded as binding by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, unless confirmed by themselves ; but an enquiry held by Colonel Kemball showed that such was not the case, and the Government of India then laid it down that the various engagements executed by individual Trucial Shaikhs are necessarily binding on their successors. At the same time the Government of India emphasized the desirability of taking means to secure that each chief should be clearly acquainted with the provisions of the agreements by which he is bound.

An Agreement for the suppression of the arms trade in their territories was signed by all the Trucial Shaikhs in 1902. As among the expedients by which the British Government were at this time endeavouring to combat the growth of the traffic in the Gulf, this Agreement is mentioned in the special Appendix on the Arms Trade, where also the text of the same is given as an Annexure.

Arms Agreement, 1912.

The wreck at Dibai in the autumn of 1903 of the "Fath-al-Khair", a native vessel owned at Suwaiq in the Sultanate of 'Omān, but flying the French flag and therefore regarded by the French Vice-Consul at Masqat as under his protection, led to an exchange of views between the British and the French Governments in regard to the political status of Trucial 'Omān. In consequence of allegations that the boat in question had been plundered, the French Vice-Consul addressed a demand for compensation direct to the Shaikh of Dibai; and the despatch of the French cruiser "Infernet" to Dibai to enforce compliance with the same was momentarily expected. At this juncture the Government of India authorised the British Resident in the Persian Gulf to inform the French Vice-Consul of the existence of the Exclusive Agreement and to offer to relieve him of the case; and at their suggestion a similar communication was made in Europe to the French Government. In April 1904 the French Government, after explaining that they had hitherto been unaware of the existence of the special relations between the British Government and the Trucial Shaikhs, agreed that the settlement of the case should be entrusted to British authorities, which was accordingly done. Eventually some compensation was awarded by a Shara' court at Dibai to the owner of the "Fath-al-Khair", which was proved to have foundered in consequence of a collision.

Relations of the British Government with Trucial Oman explained to the French Government, 1903.

In 1906, with the object of ensuring that the Trucial Shaikhs should be properly acquainted with their treaty obligations, each was supplied with a collection, clearly printed in Arabic and in English and handsomely bound, of the principal agreements in force between himself and the British Government. To this collection was prefixed, as an introduction, an address delivered by His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to the Trucial Shaikhs at a Darbār held off Sharjah on the 21st of November 1903.* Arrangements were also made to provide the chiefs from time to time with flags of the pattern prescribed in the Treaty of 1820, in adherence to which they had shown themselves remiss, some through indolence and apathy, others from prejudice. Avoidance of the use of the Trucial flag was most marked at Abu Dhabi and Dibai; and in 1906 the Hināwi Shaikhs of those

Supply to the Trucial Shaikhs of copies of their Agreements and of Trucial flags of correct pattern, 1907.

**See* the Appendix on Lord Curzon's Cruise page 2638.

General
relations.

places after mutual consultation informed the Resident, in reply to a communication on the subject, that they could not compel their subjects to place themselves under an emblem so closely identified with Qāsimi traditions and Ghāfiri principles. For various reasons it was considered expedient not to press the matter at the time.

Apart altogether from the question of specific engagements and their results, the period now under consideration was on the whole an auspicious one in the history of British relations with Trucial 'Omān.

For three years, ending in 1899, no Resident visited Trucial 'Omān in person; but, in the years following, numerous tours along the coast were made by Colonel M. J. Meade, Colonel C. A. Kemball and Major P. Z. Cox, the successive Residents, and the foundations of a more regular and direct intercourse were laid. In these circumstances it became possible for British officers to pay occasional visits to the interior; and Major Cox, who, under the auspices of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, had travelled by way of Baraimi from Abu Dhabi to Masqat in 1902, was able in 1905 to explore the unknown country between Ras-al-Khaimah and Baraimi and to return to the coast at Sohār.

In 1902, the idea of a formal British protectorate over Trucial 'Omān having been mooted, a close examination was made of the existing system, which was in the end declared to be perfectly satisfactory. It was reported by Colonel Kemball, in this connection, that new chiefs on their succession now generally sought to be recognised by the British Government, and that his advice, though not authoritatively given, was generally obeyed and even welcomed in internal affairs.

In the same year the general attitude of the Shaikhs towards the British power was shown by their observance of the 26th of June as a public holiday in honour of the Coronation of King Edward; and the visit of Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to the Trucial Coast, where, as elsewhere described, he held a Darbar at sea off Shārijah on the 21st of November 1903, was a further proof of the confidence and harmony that had come to prevail. At the same time it should be understood that the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān were still unprogressive, ignorant, and prone to childish suspicions. The failure of the Hināwi Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai to enforce on their subjects the use of the Trucial flag has already been mentioned; and other symptoms of a like nature appeared, in 1906, in the unwillingness of the Shaikhs to supply the Resident with genealogical tables of their families, in the reluctance of the Shaikh of Dibai to agree to the establishment of a British Indian post office at his capital, and in objec-

tions made by the Shaikh of Shārajah against the hoisting of a British flag over the British Agency at Sharjah.

A remarkable development of commerce, within the narrow limits imposed by poverty of natural resources and sparseness of population, characterised the period between 1892 and 1907 in Trucial 'Omān; it was accelerated after 1902 by the decline of the Persian port of Lingeh. Before 1902 not more than four or five steamers had called at Dibai annually; but in the year mentioned no less than 21 steam vessels, mostly belonging to the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, entered the port; and early in 1904 the British India Steam Navigation Company included Dibai in their regular time-table.

Commercial relations.

In 1902 the question of urging the Trucial Shaikhs to limit the rate of customs duty leviable by themselves to 5 per cent. *ad valorem* was discussed; but, as the rates actually in force were found to be everywhere lower than 5 per cent., it was decided to postpone action. A little later, however, a lessee of the export duty on mother-of-pearl shells at Dibai was found to be collecting the tax at a rate higher than 5 per cent., and a reference was made to the Shaikh, who at once promised to reduce it.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with Persia, 1892-1907.

In 1899 a question arose between the Government of Persia and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān through the expulsion by the Persians of the hereditary Arab Shaikh of Lingeh, and later the meddlesome activity of the recently instituted Imperial Persian Customs occasioned trouble; in both cases the task of controlling the Arabs and of representing Arab interests devolved on the British power.

Difficulties arising from the Perso-Arab crisis at Lingeh, 1899-1900.

In October 1899 the Persian Government, alarmed by a report that the expelled Shaikh of Lingeh and his supporters had found an asylum in Trucial 'Omān, appealed to the British Government to prevent their collecting a force for the recovery of Lingeh; and suitable warnings were accordingly addressed to the Trucial Shaikhs by the British authorities. Again in January 1900 the Persian Government complained that Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, the ex-Shaikh of Lingeh, was harboured by the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; they asked that the British Government should prevent a descent by him upon Lingeh, which was apprehended; and they added a mighty threat that they would

take action themselves against the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah,—a proceeding which, as was reported by the Resident, might easily result in the loss of their only vessel, the “Persepolis”. A second warning was consequently sent to the Rās-al-Khaimah chief by H.M.S. “Melpomene”; but it was ascertained at her visit to the port that, though Shaikh Muhammad was living there, no design of attacking Lingeh really existed. (The claims of Qawāsīm and others on account of property destroyed or appropriated by the Persians in the Lingeh affair are dealt with in the history of the Persian Coast and Islands.)

Intrigue of the Governor of the Persian Gulf Ports with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, 1900-01.

Early in 1900 it was discovered that a friendly correspondence was in progress between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Darya-Baigi, the Persian Governor of the Gulf Ports; the matter was brought to the notice of the Residency Agent in Trucial 'Omān by the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai, in whose minds the intrigue evidently excited apprehension. The object of the Darya Baigi was probably to detach Shaikh Zāid from the rest of the Trucial Shaikhs for the purpose of preventing an Arab attack upon Lingeh, a contingency of which the Persian officials still lived in dread; and the Abu Dhabi Shaikh, on his part, had probably no deeper motive than to obtain favourable consideration of claims by some of his subjects to property in Persia and good treatment for his vessels upon the Persian Coast. Local rumour, however, connected the affair with the efforts of Russia to obtain a foothold in the Gulf, and in any case it was impossible to ignore so flagrant a violation by a Trucial Shaikh of his Exclusive Agreement with the British Government. When the negotiations were detected the Shaikh had already sent two horses as a present to Lingeh, had differentiated himself from his neighbours by the adoption of a green flag in place of that prescribed by the Treaty of 1820, and had received a sword of honour from the Shāh of Persia along with a commendatory epistle, bearing the royal seal, which was publicly read in an assembly at Abu Dhabi. A remonstrance however sufficed; the direct dealings of the Shaikh with Persian officials instantly ceased; and the use of the new flag was also, but not so immediately, discontinued.

Principle affirmed of the representation of the Trucial Shaikhs abroad by the British Government, 1901-03.

In February 1901 a Dibai boat, which, in returning from Sohār, had been obliged by stress of weather to take shelter at Hanjām, was seized for technical reasons by the Persian Imperial Customs. The boat and its general cargo were soon released in virtue of representations made by the British Political Resident; but restoration of seven rifles and 900 cartridges found on board, the personal property of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, was only obtained in 1903 through the British Minister

at Tehrān. By this case, which the Government of India regarded as a test of the right of Great Britain to act on behalf of the Trucial Shaikhs in external affairs, the British Legation in Persia were made aware for the first time of the existence of the Exclusive Agreement of 1892; and the right in question, subsequently admitted, as we have seen, by France, may be considered to have been definitively assumed upon this occasion.

The next question to arise between Trucial 'Omān and Persia was one of importance, for it involved, to some extent, the naval position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. The establishment of control over Lingeh by the Persian Imperial Customs had, in 1902, driven much of the trade of that place away to the opposite side of the Gulf, especially to Dibai; and thereafter, with a view to the creation on Bū Mūsa of a trade emporium untrammelled by Persian official interference, some merchants of Lingeh began to suggest that the island should be made a port of call by the British steamship companies. Bū Mūsa had formerly been ruled by the hereditary Arab governors of Lingeh in their capacity of Qāsimi Shaikhs, not of Persian officials, and, after the abolition of the Arab governorship of Lingeh, the title of the Shaikh of Shārjah to possession of the island was indubitable. Nevertheless it was feared that actual and prospective loss of trade, if not further-reaching political considerations, might tempt the Persian Government to some act of annexation; and the attention of the Government of India was drawn in this connection not only to the island of Bū Mūsa, but also to that of Tunb, of which the status was precisely similar. In the result the Shaikh of Shārjah was advised to hoist his flag on both islands, and in the summer of 1903 he did so. The sequel proved the precaution to have been necessary. At the end of March or the beginning of April 1904 the Persian Customs steamer "Muzaffari," carrying M. Dambrain, the European Director of Persian Customs at Būshehr, visited Tunb and Bū Mūsa; the Shārjah flags were lowered; the Shārjah flagstaffs were dismantled; and two Persians were placed on each of the islands as Customs guards. It subsequently appeared that these high-handed proceedings, though carried out by a Customs officer, had been initiated by the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, most probably under Russian advice; in the case of Bū Mūsa, the Minister, who evidently perceived the international bearings of the enterprise, had shown marked hesitation in giving the order to occupy. Serious representations were at once made in the proper quarter by the British Minister at Tehrān, and in the end

Attempted annexation of the islands of Bū Mūsa and Tunb by Persia, 1904.

the Customs guards were withdrawn and the Persian flags, which had been hoisted, were removed by order of the Persian Government; this was done on the 14th of June 1904, and a few days later the Trucial flag was replaced on both islands to the general satisfaction of the inhabitants of the Trucial Coast. The Persian Government, in consenting to remove the evidences of their usurpation, had stipulated that the ownership of the islands should be discussed at leisure between themselves and the British Government; but as mentioned in the history of the Persian Coast they failed to convince the British Government of the existence of Persian rights; indeed they did not seriously attempt to do so. Here it only remains to add that the Persians subsequently complained of the erection by the Shaikh of Shārajah of new buildings on Tunb, but that the complaint—in itself inadmissible as maintenance of the *status quo* formed no part of the mutual understanding—was proved by local investigation, and by the visits of British officers to Tunb in 1904 and 1905, to be groundless.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Wāhhābi power, 1892-1907.

Correspondence between Trucial 'Omān and Central Arabia had not at any time entirely ceased; and in 1902 it was reported that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi had sent a present of camels to Ibn-Sa'ūd, the Wāhhābi ruler, and had received four horses in return.

Designs of
Ibn-Sa'ūd
on Trucial
'Omān, 1905.

In September 1905, Wāhhābi supremacy having meanwhile been re-established in Najd, where for some years it had been in abeyance, 'Abdul 'Azīz, the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd, addressed letters to all the Trucial Shaikhs informing them of his arrival in Qatar and of a reconciliation which he had effected among the Bedouin tribes of the Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir and 'Ajmān; he added that he hoped to visit Trucial 'Omān in the spring of 1906.

Behaviour of
the Trucial
Shaikhs.

These communications were received with dismay by the Hināwi Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai, who foresaw a great diminution to their own prestige as a result of the intrusion of the Wāhhābis, and with corresponding relation by the other or Ghāfiri Shaikhs, who were longing for deliverance from the twenty years' hegemony of Abu Dhabi. A correspondence was at once opened between the Abu Dhabi Shaikh and his fellow Hināwi and ally, the Sultān of 'Omān, against whose authority the advent of the Wāhhābis would dispose his Ghāfiri subjects to rise;

indeed the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi considered the matter of sufficient importance to warrant a visit by himself to Masqat in November 1905.

A caution against engaging in intrigues with the Wahhābis was at once addressed to all the Trucial Shaikhs by Major P. Z. Cox, the British Political Resident, who happened to be passing through the country on a journey to Baraimi; and later it was repeated under the authority of the Government of India. The matter was then brought unofficially to the notice of Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait through Captain Knox, the British Political Agent at that place, a hint being at the same time thrown out that the British Government would view with disapprobation any interference by the Wahhābis in Trucial 'Omān. Shaikh Mubārak, who at first explained the proceedings of Ibn-Sa'ūd as a mere device to extort blackmail, and who professed to have remonstrated with him on the subject, afterwards stated that Ibn-Sa'ūd had written disclaiming all unfriendly intentions towards the British Government and regretting any harm that might have been caused by careless remarks on his own part. Since then nothing more has been heard of Wahhābi designs in Trucial 'Omān.

Attitude of
the British
Government.

Relations of Trucial 'Omān with the Sultanate of 'Omān, 1892-1907.

A constant friendly intercourse was maintained between the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultān of 'Omān, culminating, as we have seen, in 1905 in mutual consultations regarding the Wahhābi danger.

In September 1892 the Shaikh of Dibai made a journey to Masqat; and towards the end of 1895 his successor and a son of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi visited that place, but the object of their excursion could not be ascertained. 1892-95.

In July 1904 Khalifah and Sultān, two sons of Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi, were received with much honour at Masqat; were dismissed, after a prolonged visit, with costly presents; and were conveyed as far as Sohār on their return journey by the Sultān's yacht "Nūr-al-Bahr". 1904.

It was ascertained in 1906 that, during the last ten years, the Sultān of 'Omān had been paying a cash subsidy of \$3,000 per annum to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on condition of his restraining the Bedouin tribes of Baraimi and Dhāhirah from incursions into the Bātinah district; and reason was found for believing that, as far eastwards as 'Ibri in Dhāhirah and perhaps also in parts of Ruūs-al-Jibal, though all 1906.

of these belonged to the Sultanate, the influence wielded by Shaikh Zaid-bin-Khalifah far outweighed that of Saiyid Faisal-bin-Turki.

Other foreign relations of Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907.

The Turkish Government informed of the relations between Britain and Trucial 'Omān, 1893.

Turkish case, 1895.

The Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853 had been communicated to the Porte in 1891; and in 1893 the Turkish Government were informed by Her Majesty's Government of the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 between the Trucial Shaikhs and Great Britain.

In 1895 a Turkish subject, while proceeding down the creek at 'Ajmān to embark on a vessel outside, was shot dead from the bank by a watchman who had challenged him and his companions without obtaining a reply. The matter was adjusted by the Resident with the Turkish authorities through the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah and the Turkish Vice-Consul at Būshehr, the relations of the deceased in the end waiving their claims, which an 'Ajmān Shara' court had held to lie against the watchman personally and not against the Shaikh of the principality.

Ibrāhīm Effendi, Turkish subject, 1900-1907.

In later years, in consequence of the pacification of the country and the development of trade, the attention of foreigners, sometimes of undesirable character, was attracted more frequently than before to Trucial 'Omān. One of these, calling himself Dr. Ibrāhīm Effendi, settled as a vaccinator at Shārjah during a smallpox epidemic in 1900, fled to Baraimi in 1904 on the appearance of plague in the Gulf, and on his return to the coast made his head-quarters at Abu Dhabi. This individual, who was originally a Jew and afterwards became in succession a Christian, a Shi'ah Muhammadan and a Wahhābi, was for some time assisted in his business by 'Abdur Rahmān, a proselyte from Hinduism to Islām. In 1904 Ibrāhīm Effendi visited Bombay and there volunteered, on terms which were not accepted, to expose the intrigues of a foreign power in Trucial 'Omān. About the same time he also memorialised the Sultān of Turkey to grant him an allowance for what he described as his charitable work in Trucial 'Omān.

Turkish claim to 'Odaid, 1902-03.

In 1902-03, as explained in the history of Qatar, a move was made by the Porte to establish a Turkish Mulirate at 'Odaid in the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom; but it was checkmated by the action of the British Government.

In 1904, Herr Toeppen, a German adventurer and pervert to Muhammadanism, informed the British Government that one of the Trucial Shaikhs was trying to obtain German protection; he also offered his services in the matter, as those of a person well acquainted with the country, but they were declined. The lease of the export duty on mother-of-pearl shells at Dibai, already mentioned as having given rise in 1902 or 1903 to a commercial question, was found to have been granted to an employé of the German firm of Wöneckhaus; and the Shaikh was accordingly advised not to grant such concessions in future without first consulting the Resident.

German
subjects.

Internal affairs of Trucial 'Omān, 1892-1907.

We come at length to the internal history of the country during fifteen years,—a period during which, be the cause what it may, actual fighting by land has been much less common than formerly, while political combinations have shown more than ordinary stability.

Friction
between
Shārjah and
Dibai, 1892.

To the troubles which befell in 1891 between the Shaikhs of Dibai and Shārjah there succeeded a truce which, having been shaken in September 1892 by the despatch of an armed boat from Dibai to the assistance of 'Ajmān against Shārjah, was again solemnly renewed at Dibai in the same month in the presence of Sultān-bin-Muhammad, a leading Shaikh of the Na'im.

The migration of the Marar from Dibai to Shārjah, where they permanently settled, continued however to be a source of quarrel between the two principalities so long as the claims arising from the affair remained unadjusted. In November 1893 war was again declared between Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah on the one part and Dibai on the other, and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān was subsequently drawn into the fray on the side of his Qāsimi allies. In March 1894 a partial reconciliation between the disputants was effected by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, but the Marar question remained unsettled; in the end it necessitated a special visit by the Resident to the Trucial Coast, in the course of which, at a meeting held under the superintendence of Mr. J. C. Gaskin, Assistant Resident, the dispute was finally laid to rest. The Shaikh of Shārjah on this occasion tried to avoid meeting the Resident, and the usual complimentary gifts were in his case consequently withheld.

Settlement
of the Marar
case, 1893-
94.

Bedouin
raids, 1895-
97.

In January 1895 Manāsīr and Āl Morrah nomads from a distance commenced raiding the whole of the inland districts between Abu Dhabi and Rās-al-Khaimah and were reported to have captured some 400 camels and 100 horses. The Bani Qītab, who were perhaps the principal sufferers, then appealed to the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai; and, on these chiefs calling out their Bedouins, the scourge was temporarily abated. In the following season marauding Manāsīr from Qatar again made their appearance in Trucial 'Omān; but, finding the inhabitants prepared to resist them, they changed their tactics and paid visits of courtesy to the Shaikhs of Dibai, Shārjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, whom they thus obliged to entertain them. From Hamriyah, however, the people there not being sufficiently upon their guard, they carried off a number of animals and a few slaves. Before the end of the winter of 1896-97 a check was inflicted on the Manāsīr by the Bani Qītab, for that tribe, warned by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, with whom they had then recently been reconciled, and assisted by the people of Shārjah, defeated the marauders with loss in a sharp engagement.

Great fires,
1896-97.

The towns of Trucial 'Omān, consisting to a large extent of huts of dry date fronds and other inflammable materials, are at all time very liable to damage by fire; but the year 1896 was rendered memorable by an extraordinary series of conflagrations. In the town of Shārjah 400 houses were reported to have been destroyed, and the loss in property was estimated at Rs. 30,000; at Dibai half of the town proper was said to have been wasted by the flames, together with the whole of the Dairah quarter; while at Abu Dhabi 170 houses were burned, and such property as the owners succeeded in rescuing from the blaze was pillaged by Bani Yās Bedouins. In 1897 there were several fires at Dibai, and a slave-woman caught in the act of incendiarism was put to death.

The Zora
case, 1895-
1905.

The next political incident of importance arose from designs conceived by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in regard to Zora, a sandy tract upon the sea extending from 'Ajmān to Hamriyah, but cut off from those places and from the mainland between them by a creek never fordable at more than two places; the advantages of the insular position of Zora had been fully realised by Shaikh Zāid-bin-Khalifah, who aspired to the headship of all the Bedouin tribes of Trucial 'Omān and saw in Zora a safe asylum for the flocks and herds of his allies and an excellent base for operations by himself, in case of hostilities with tribes lying at a distance from Abu Dhabi. In 1895 the Shaikh obtained from the British Residency, to which the full significance of his action was not as yet apparent, permission to send stores by sea for the use of Bedouins

whom he had collected at Zora in support of the Bani Qitab, then at war with their neighbours; but, the other Trucial Shaikhs having thrown difficulties in the way, he found himself unable to turn the authority thus granted to account. In 1897 a section of the Sūdān tribe under Sultān-bin-Nāsir requested the leave of the Resident to colonise Zora; and in 1900, on the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi offering to protect the settlement and promising to assist the inhabitants with non-military stores sent by sea, the desired permission was given: Shaikh Zāid, it may be observed, was himself a Suwaidi on his mother's side, and a daughter of the Suwaidi Shaikh Sultān-bin-Nāsir was among his wives. The Zora scheme was however alarming to the Ghāfiri Shaikhs; the Shaikh of 'Ajmān at once took steps to protect himself by building a fort near one of the fords connecting Zora with the mainland; and the Shaikh of Shārjah, in September 1900, appealed to the Resident to prevent the establishment of a non-Qāsimi stronghold in the midst of Qāsimi country. The permission given to colonise was accordingly revoked, to the intense annoyance of Shaikh Zāid, who saw himself thus deprived of one of the chief means on which he had counted for the extension of his influence over all Trucial 'Omān, Ruūs-al-Jibāl, Shamailiyah and Baraimi. It may be added that in March 1905 Major Cox, the Political Resident, made a personal inspection of Zora and came to the conclusion that the proposed settlement should not be authorised, unless with the unanimous assent of all the Trucial Shaikhs, which it was unlikely would ever be given.

In 1900, on the death of Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah of Rās-al-Khaimah, that place and its dependencies were re-incorporated with the principality of Shārjah from which they had been separated since 1869. The number of the Trucial Shaikhs was thus reduced from six to five, the latter being their original number.

Disappearance of Rās-al-Khaimah as a separate Shaikhdom, 1900.

The troubles which arose in 1902 between the Shaikh of Shārjah and his vassal the headman of Fujairah in Shamiliyah are fully narrated in an Appendix to this chapter, and at present we are concerned only with their effects upon the relations of the Trucial Shaikhs with one another. The cause of the rebellious headman, who had appealed to the Sultān of Masqat and to the Shaikh of Dibai, was espoused in Trucial 'Omān by the Shaikhs of Dibai and 'Ajmān, with whom the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, on account of neglected claims by his subjects against Shārjah, afterwards associated himself; but the influence of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who, with a view to propitiating the Shaikh of Shārjah in the Zora case, had recently formed a close alliance with him, was

The Shamailiyah case, 1902-05.

thrown at first into the opposite scale. No actual hostilities, however, took place among the Trucial Shaikhs in connection with the Shamailiyah dispute. In 1903, on the return of the Shārjah Shaikh from an expedition to Shamailiyah, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, without prejudice to an offensive and defensive alliance that existed between himself and Dibai, entered into a similar arrangement with Shārjah; and thereafter there was close friendship between them, while the alliance between Shārjah and Abu Dhabi was also maintained. In 1905 Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khalid appeared to have relinquished all idea of coercing the refractory Fujairah headman.

Dispute in
Wadi Hatta,
1905.

A curious difficulty, destined to produce unforeseen and somewhat far-reaching consequences, now occurred in connection with two villages in the upper part of Wādi Hatta in Western Hajar, a valley through which runs a route from Dibai in Trucial 'Omān to the town of Shinās in Bātinah. These villages, Hajarain and Masfūt, both inhabited by Biduwāt, seem to have belonged originally—as the lower part of Wādi Hatta does still—to the Sultanate of 'Omān; but about 1870, in the reign of Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais, on an irreconcilable quarrel taking place between the two, the people of Masfūt placed themselves under the protection of the Bani Ka'ab and the Na'im of Baraimi; and at a later period, in the reign of Saiyid Turki, the Sultān of 'Omān in view of his own inability to defend Hajarain against the Na'im of Baraimi, acquiesced in its virtual transfer to the Shaikh of Dibai. Such was the position, when, in 1905, the Bani Qitab, actuated by enmity towards the Na'im of Baraimi, occupied the hills at the head of Wādi Hatta, built a fort (called Hauz) to command the road at a spot known as Jabail, and proceeded to annoy passing caravans. In these acts they were countenanced by the people of Masfūt, who in so doing apparently took the opposite side from their Na'im protectors, and by Rāshid-bin-Ahmad, a new and vigorous Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who was said to have supplied funds for the building of the fort; but the Na'im of Baraimi and the Shaikh of Dibai entertained strong objections to the fort and called in the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, whose opinion coincided with their own. In September 1905 the five Trucial Shaikhs held a meeting at Dibai, the venerable Zāid-bin-Khalifah in effect presiding; and it was apparently decided that the Jabail fort should be destroyed, and that the Bani Qitab should restore Masfūt, which village had fallen completely under their influence, to the Shaikhs of Baraimi. Shaikh Zāid on this occasion urged Shaikh Rāshid to abstain from encouraging the Bani Qitab, and he even obtained from him a promise to comply with this

advice; but the young chief of Umm-al-Qaiwain had in reality not the slightest intention of deferring to the venerable doyen of the Trucial Coast, and only a few weeks later he conducted the two leading Shaikhs of the Bedouin Bani Qitab to 'Ajmān and Shārjah, where, obviously with the aim of stultifying the policy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, he reconciled them to the ruling chiefs.

Meanwhile, in July or August 1905, a quarrel had arisen in the Dhāhirah district of the 'Omān Sultanate between a Balūch colony at Aflāj Bani Qitab and their overlords, the sedentary Bani Qitab of the same place; and attempts were shortly made by the latter to capture the Balūch fort in the hamlet of Māzim. The Balūch thereupon appealed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for help, and he accordingly tried to prevent the nomad Bani Qitab from joining their kinsmen in the assault upon Māzim, but without success; the garrison of Māzim, however, continued to hold out. The quarrel was at its height in December 1905 while Major Cox, the British Resident, was journeying from Rās-al-Khaimah to Baraimi, and there was at that time some talk of a combination between the Shaikhs of Umm-al-Qaiwain, Shārjah and 'Ajmān for the purpose of supporting the Bani Qitab against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but in reality the Ghāfiri Shaikhs were not prepared to go far, and a remonstrance which Major Cox addressed to Shaikh Zāid, referring to the threatened danger of a Wahhābi incursion, was not without sedative effect. But the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was still anxious to convince the Bani Qitab of the impossibility of opposing his wishes and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain of the folly of attempting to compete with his influence in Bedouin affairs; so in February 1906, after notifying a demand for blood-money on account of Balūch slain, he collected his forces and prepared to move against the Bani Qitab. In this extremity the tribe appealed first to the Shaikh of Dibai, who intimated that he regarded the claim for blood-money as just; then to the Shaikh of Shārjah, who declined to have anything to do with the matter; and finally to the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, who, doubtless under great pressure from the Bani Qitab, in the end undertook their case, so violating his recent promise not to afford them encouragement. Finally counsels of moderation prevailed, and a general meeting of chiefs was held at Khawānīj near Dibai, which resulted in a settlement. A written agreement, dated about the end of April 1906, was also drawn up, in which the respective spheres of tribal influence of the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain were defined; in this document the Bani Qitab, the Ghafalah and the Bani Ka'ab were assigned to

Further
difficulties
arising from
Bani Qitab
affairs,
1905-06.

Shaikh Rāshid, while Shaikh Zāid—in some cases to the prejudice of third parties who were not apparently consulted—obtained the following as dependents: Sultān-bin-Muhammad, Shaikh of the Na'im of Baraimi; Muhammad-bin-Sulaimān, Shaikh of Darīz in Dhāhirah; Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, headman of Fujairah in Shamailiyah; and the Shihūh tribe of Ruūs-al-Jibāl. Jurisdiction over subjects of the Sultān of 'Omān may have been claimed by Shaikh Zāid merely on behalf of that ruler, whose representative and plenipotentiary, in consequence of the strict alliance existing between them, he may have conceived himself to be; but his invasion of the rights of the Shaikh of Shārjah by asserting influence over Fujairah is more difficult to justify; and, were it not for the well-known apathy of Saqar-bin-Khālid, the continuance after this of amicable relations between Abu Dhabi and Shārjah would be inexplicable.

Treacherous seizure of the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and his rescue by the British Resident, 1907.

The settlement was a triumph for the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain as confirming his right to a voice in Bedouin politics; but it was impossible that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi should for long acquiesce in a partition of privileges hitherto exclusively his own with his youthful competitor. Accordingly, about the end of November 1906, having arranged with the Shaikhs of Dibai and Shārjah for their support, he began to collect and arm his adherents among the Manāsir and the Bani Hājir tribes and to prepare for a fresh rupture with the Bani Qitab and for an attack on Falai or Falaj Āl 'Alī,—a small but valuable oasis belonging to the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, from whose capital it is distant about 16 miles inland. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, on his part, proceeded to set the defences of Falai in order and applied to the British Resident for assistance in procuring two breech-loading guns to be mounted on the fort,—a request which was of course declined. Major Cox then addressed a forcible remonstrance to both Shaikhs, and a seeming reconciliation took place; but, at the beginning of January 1907, Shaikh Rāshid, who had ventured to pay a friendly visit to Shaikh Zāid at his camp in the interior, was, after being hospitably entertained for several days, suddenly seized, thrown into chains, and called on to surrender Falai upon pain of forfeiting his life. On receiving news of this affair the Resident immediately despatched a letter from Būshehr by H.M.S. "Proserpine" demanding of Shaikh Zāid that his prisoner should be released; and on the next day, the 17th of February, Major Cox himself followed in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence". On arrival at Shārjah it was ascertained that the Shaikhs of Shārjah, Dibai and 'Ajmān had joined the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi at a place 20 miles inland from Shārjah, where they held Shaikh Rāshid in confinement and were preparing for an

attack on Falai; also that the attendants captured with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had been sent by boat to Abu Dhabi,—an act which might reasonably be construed as a breach of the maritime peace. With much difficulty and after a week's negotiations, the Shaikh of Shārjah being employed as an intermediary, Major Cox succeeded in arranging for the unconditional release of Shaikh Rāshid, whose appearance when he reached the "Lawrence" bore witness to a good deal of physical and mental suffering. After this, in accordance with a friendly understanding that the Resident should, on Umm-al-Qaiwain being set at liberty, mediate between him and the other chiefs, two days were devoted by Major Cox to tedious discussions on shore; in these the Shaikh of Shārjah appeared for himself and for 'Ajmān, and the Shaikh of Dibai for himself and for Abu Dhabi. The result was a written settlement of all differences by which, it was hoped, general peace might be secured for some time to come. On the conclusion of the negotiations Shaikh Rāshid was landed at Umm-al-Qaiwain, where he was received by his subjects with many rejoicings. He seemed grateful for his rescue, and he afterwards presented a thank-offering to the Resident in the shape of a well-bred camel and a young horse, both of which were accepted on behalf of Government.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE SHARJAH PRINCIPALITY.

In the following short summary we propose to deal with the affairs of the ruling family of Shārjah and with events of merely domestic significance. The external history of the Shaikhdом is included in that of Trucial 'Omān, which is contained in the foregoing chapter.

Shaikh Saqar-bin- Rāshid, 1777-1803.

In 1777 Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Matar of Rās-al-Khaimah, the chief of the Qawāsīm, resigned the headship of the tribe, after holding it for about 30 years, in favour of his son Saqar. Shaikh Saqar married, as one of his wives, a daughter of Shaikh 'Abdullah, Ma'ini, of Qishm.

Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, 1803-66.

Place of
residence and
character of
Shaikh
Sultān-bin-
Saqar.

In or about 1803 Shaikh Saqar was succeeded by his son Sultān, who was destined to rule the Qawāsim for a period extending over two generations and to witness, it might almost be said, the whole process of change from barbarism to civilisation in the Persian Gulf. The internal events of his Shaikhship are less known as well as less important than the external already related; and it is even uncertain whether, after the restoration to him of Rās-al-Khaimah in 1820, he resided chiefly at that place or at Shārjah. Till the end of his life he was indifferently described as "Shaikh of Shārjah" and "Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah;" and the direct administration of both towns appears to have been ordinarily carried on by a near relation acting under his orders, and not by himself personally. According to a general consensus of opinion the leading characteristic of Shaikh Sultān was his duplicity, which even by other Arabs was regarded as phenomenal. In his later life his peculiarity in this respect had become so notorious that he was thoroughly distrusted by all, and his "machinations seldom produced, comparatively speaking, any evil consequences."

Governors
Rās-al-
Khaimah and
Sharjah,
1803-04.

During the earlier years of his rule Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar generally employed his brothers, and of a later period his sons, as his representatives in direct charge of the towns of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah. Ras-al-Khaimah was governed in 1823 by Muhammad-bin-Saqar, a brother of Shaikh Sultān; and he may have remained in office there until his death, which occurred at some time prior to 1845. Before 1838 the affairs of Shārjah town were guided by Sālih-bin-Saqar, another of Shaikh Sultān's brothers, who, though his mother had been a slave, was one of the most intelligent and enlightened Arabs of his day upon the Trucial coast; his deposition in 1838 in favour of Saqar, the son of Shaikh Sultān by a Qāsimi wife, was consequently much regretted by the British political authorities.

Rebellion of
Saqar-bin-
Sultān
against his
father, 1840.

In 1840, at the instigation of Shaikh Maktūm of Dibai, a restless and intriguing chief, Saqar-bin-Sultān made an effort, which was for a short time successful, to cast off the authority of his father and to rule the town of Shārjah as an independent principality; he obtained support chiefly by promising to reduce the tax on pearl divers, which was then levied by Shaikh Sultān at the rate of \$7 per head annually. An appeal to arms was at first threatened; but eventually Shaikh Sultān agreed, with much reluctance, to accept an annual tribute from his son and to abstain from direct interference in the affairs of the port. In December 1840 however, Shaikh Sālih, the ex-governor of Shārjah, and some other principal residents of the town, disgusted at the influence which the Shaikh of Dibai had acquired over their new Shaikh, banded themselves together to put an end to the usurpation; this they effectually did by surprising Shaikh Saqar asleep and handing him over a prisoner to his justly offended father. Shaikh Sultān then arranged to remove Saqar to

Rās-al-Khaimah; but the latter, on the way to his appointed place of exile, broke his arrest and took refuge with the Shaikh of Dibai. Military movements followed which are described in the history of Trucial 'Omān, and Shaikh Sultān, after basely betraying his allies, concluded an arrangement with the Shaikh of Dibai, and even replaced Saqar in the government of Shārjah without so much as requiring of him a guarantee not to molest Shaikh Salih and the other loyalists in the town of Shārjah.

Shaikh Saqar continued in charge of Shārjah until his death in battle with the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain in 1846. He appears to have been succeeded by 'Abdullah, another son of Shaikh Sultān, whose mother belonged to an Āl 'Ali family of Tāvuneh on the Persian Coast. 'Abdullah's government was signalised chiefly by his treacherous attempt, noticed elsewhere, to seize the fort of 'Ajmān in 1848; but he continued in office until 1855, when he was killed in fighting at Hamriyah.

Administra-
tion of
Shārjah
town, 1840-
55.

In 1854 occurred the first of a series of rebellions by the inhabitants of Hamriyah, a township on the coast, against the authority of the Shaikh of Shārjah, their lawful ruler. The cause of the trouble on this occasion was a blood-feud that arose between the Hūwalah of Shārjah town and a body of the Shwaihiyīn, recent immigrants into that place, who numbered about 500 fighting men. On the interested advice of Ahmad-as-Sadairi, the Wāhhābi representative in Trucial 'Omān, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar somewhat hastily transferred the Shwaihiyīn to Hamriyah; and here they immediately began to concert measures with 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Saif, the headman of the village, for asserting the independence of the place against Shārjah. When Captain Kemball, the British Political Resident, visited the Trucial Coast on his annual tour in September 1854, he was approached by Shaikh Sultān with a request for permission to coerce the people of Hamriyah by maritime operations; but Captain Kemball, though unwilling to encourage the rebels, persuaded the Shaikh—chiefly on the ground that, as Hamriyah was situated between 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the Shaikhs of those places might be drawn into the fray—to promise that he would postpone proceedings by sea and not undertake them, even in the last resort, without a further reference to the Residency.

Rebellion of
the headman
of Hamriyah,
1854-55.

Affairs at Lingeh, where his young relation Khalifah-bin-Sa'id—a minor—was chief, obliged Shaikh Sultān after this interview to spend several months on the Persian coast. During his absence he rashly entrusted the handling of the Hamriyah affair to Ahmad-as-Sadairi, the Wāhhābi representative. This faithless individual, after doing his utmost under pretence of mediation to aggravate the quarrel, attempted to introduce a Wāhhābi garrison of his own into the fort of Hamriyah; and, on the failure of this scheme, he induced Shaikh Sultān, who had meanwhile returned home, to undertake operations by sea and land against the refractory township. Captain Kemball, arriving off Hamriyah in the "Clive" on the 31st of May 1855, found that the place had already been invested for 25 days, during which period no letter on the subject from Shaikh Sultān had reached him, though it was stated that one had been despatched. The besieging force consisted of the Qāsimi Shaikh's own levies, of the Wāhhābi agent's retinue of 150 men, and of a contingent from 'Ajmān upwards of 3,000 strong; and their artillery amounted to five guns, of which two had been brought from Lingeh,

two from Shārjah by sea, and one from 'Ajman. The strength of the besieged was about 800 fighting men only; but they enjoyed the countenance, if not the actual support, of the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain, to whom the embarrassments of their powerful neighbour of Shārjah were generally a source of relief. The fighting had been of an unusually obstinate character and the result highly favourable to the besieged; for, while the assailants had lost over 60 men killed, including 'Abdullah, the son of the Qāsimi Shaikh, and double that number wounded, the casualties of the garrison were believed not to exceed 10 men killed. In these circumstances Shaikh Sultān eagerly sought the good offices of the Resident, by means of which he hoped that he might be enabled to retire without utter disgrace from an impossible enterprise; and Captain Kemball, while absolutely declining to guarantee any settlement that might be arranged, undertook the office of mediator. The headman of Hamriyah and the Shwaihiyīn refugees, emboldened by their successful defence and instigated by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, would not at first listen to any proposals; but eventually, on the Resident threatening a strict enforcement of the maritime peace, whereby apparently their supplies would have been altogether cut off, it was settled that \$500 should be paid by the rebels to the Shaikh of Shārjah in token of submission, and that, on the conclusion of the pearl season, the Shwaihiyīn should quit Hamriyah and settle wherever else they pleased. The Residency Agent, Hāji Ya'qūb, was sent on shore to witness the formal submission of the rebels to the Shaikh; and the H. E. I. Company's schooner "Constance" remained at the place for a few days longer until the besiegers had broken up their camp and retired. From the predominance in Shārjah town at the present day of the Shwaihiyīn tribe it would seem that Shaikh Sultān must eventually have succeeded in persuading the malcontents to return there.

Governors
of Rās-al-
Khaimah and
Shārjah,
1855 to 1866.

In 1860, and probably for some time before, Rās-al-Khaimah was ruled by Ibrāhīm-bin-Sultān, the son of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar by a wife of the Marāzīq or Marzūqi tribe; and in 1855 Mashāri, a son of Ibrāhīm, had been appointed sub-governor of Dibah, and had been murdered there by tribesmen of the Shihūh. When Shaikh Sultān died, in 1866, Ibrāhīm still held charge of Rās-al-Khaimah.

On the death of 'Abdullah-bin-Sultān in the operations at Hamriyah in 1855, the administration of Shārjah town seems to have been assumed by Muhammad-bin-Saqar, a grandson of Shaikh Sultān; but intrigues for the removal of this young man were shortly commenced by Khālid-bin-Sultān, one of his uncles. The aged Qāsimi Shaikh, who had at last fallen into his dotage and lost both memory and hearing, seems now to have counted for little in the disputes among his unruly progeny. About 1859, Shaikh Khālid having formed a strong party in Shārjah, the town was for a time divided between him and Shaikh Muhammad, each presiding over his own adherents; but such a state of matters could not long endure, and, at the end of 1860 or beginning of 1861, Shaikh Khālid, having decoyed Shaikh Muhammad to a distance from Shārjah in the course of a morning ride, suddenly shot him with his own hand and threw his body into a well. Shortly afterwards, on Captain Felix Jones paying a visit to the coast, Shaikh Khālid sought an interview with him; but it was refused on the ground that the

Resident could not hold converse with "one so recently and so fearfully polluted."

Early in 1860 the Shaikh of Shārjah, by which term must be understood at this time either Shaikh Muhammad or Shaikh Khālid, called upon the headman of Hamriyah to assist him in a land attack in which he was engaged upon the villages, then disaffected, of Khān and Abu Hail. 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Saif was rash enough to respond by proceeding to the scene of hostilities by sea with armed men and munitions of war and was fined \$250 by order of the Political Resident. This sum he duly disbursed on a demand for payment being preferred by Commander Cruttenden.

Co-operation of the headman of Hamriyah with the Shaikh of Shārjah, 1860.

Shaikh Khālid-bin-Sultān, 1866-1868.

On the death of his father Shaikh Sultān in 1866 at the ripe age of over 80 years, Shaikh Khālid, the murderer of his own nephew Muhammad, succeeded to the Shaikhdом of Shārjah, while Ibrāhīm-bin-Sultān proclaimed his independence at Rās al-Khaimah. In May 1867, however, Shaikh Khālid made a successful attack on Rās-al-Khaimah, expelling Ibrāhīm and re-incorporating the town and its dependencies with the principality governed from Shārjah. In 1868, as explained in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Shaikh Khālid died of a wound received in single combat with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi: he expired on the 14th of April.

Rās-al-Khaimah separated from, and again reunited with Shārjah, 1866 to 1867.

Shaikh Sālim-bin-Sultān, 1868-1869.

The place of the deceased Shaikh Khālid, whose mother was a Qāsimi, was taken by Shaikh Sālim, the son by a slave woman of Shaikh Sultān; and the administration of Rās-al-Khaimah was at the same time conferred on, or assumed by, Shaikh Sālim's nephew Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah, who in 1869 proclaimed himself independent of Shārjah and so remained until the end of his days.

Separation once more of Rās-al-Khaimah from Shārjah, 1869.

In April 1869 the agent of the Wāhhābis at Baraimi came to Shārjah, and, under cover of arbitrating in some disputes upon the coast, proceeded to plot the imprisonment of Shaikh Sālim, the establishment of his brother Shaikh Ibrāhīm at Rās-al-Khaimah, and the transfer of Shaikh Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah from Rās-al-Khaimah to Shārjah. An affray however arose in the town; and the death of the Wāhhābi agent who was struck by a bullet, put an end to these designs. Shaikh Sālim, apparently with a view to disarming the resentment of the Wāhhābi Amir, then went through the form of resigning the chiefship in favour of his brother Ibrāhīm; but the two remained in close relations, and there

Pretended resignation of Shaikh Sālim, 1869.

was probably no real transfer of authority. A few months later, the Wahhābis remaining inactive, Shaikh Sālim openly resumed his position as principal Shaikh.

Attack by
Shaikhs Sālim
and Ibrāhīm
on Rās-al-
Khaimah
and interven-
tion of the
British Poli-
tical Resi-
dent, May
1869.

Meanwhile, early in May 1869, Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, while on his way to Masqat in the "Dalhousie," received intelligence at Lingeh that a serious breach of the maritime peace was threatened by the Qawāsīm in the neighbourhood of Rās-al-Khaimah. Taking the gunboat "Hugh Rose" in tow, he crossed the Gulf to Rās-al-Khaimah, and, arriving there on the 12th of May, found that Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhīm of Shārjah had in fact proceeded by sea to expel Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah from Rās-al-Khaimah, near which town they had landed 1,500 men from boats and now occupied a position protected on the landward side by a creek in which their fleet, amounting to 32 vessels, was hauled up. The Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had sent some 500 men by sea to the assistance of Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah; and fighting had already occurred both at Jazīrat-al-Hamra and in front of Rās-al-Khaimah town. On the evening of his arrival Colonel Pelly received on board his vessel the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, who assured him that the sole object of the attack was to place Shaikh Ibrāhīm in possession of the town; and on the 13th of May, after an interview with the leaders on the opposite side, Colonel Pelly ordered Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhīm to withdraw their fleet and forces by sunset. The Resident remained on the spot until dark, by which time all the vessels of the attacking force had defiled out of the creek; he then continued on his way to Masqat, where his presence was urgently required. Colonel Pelly's "prompt and judicious measures" on this occasion were subsequently approved by the Government of India.

Combination
of the Shaikh
of Rās-al-
Khaimah
and Shaikh
Sālim against
Shaikh Ibrā-
hīm, 1871-73.

In 1871 dissensions apparently prevailed between Shaikhs Sālim and Ibrāhīm at Shārjah and the latter had possibly obtained a partial ascendancy in the town, for, taking advantage of his temporary absence at Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Sālim called in his nephew Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, and with their assistance made himself undisputed master of Shārjah. Soon after this affair Hamaid consolidated his position at Rās-al-Khaimah by re-annexing Shalam, Rams and the Shimil village in Sir, which had at some time separated themselves from his principality. In 1873 it was reported that Shaikh Sālim found difficulty in meeting certain financial liabilities which he had assumed on behalf of his "predecessor", a term which in this case was probably intended to apply to Shaikh Ibrāhīm.

Secession of
Hamriyah
from Shārjah,
1875.

In 1873, as mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, the head-man of Hamriyah, at this time Saif-bin-'Abdur Rāhmān, joined a general combination of chiefs against his overlord the Shaikh of Shārjah, from which he again in 1874 withdrew; and in 1875 he was engaged, apparently as a neutral, in mediating a peace among the remaining belligerents. Soon afterwards, in 1875 or 1876, he seems to have seceded from Shārjah and proclaimed his independence, with the result that a number of difficult claims and counter-claims, some of old standing, arose between the two places.

Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālīd, 1883 to the present time.

At the end of March 1883, Shaikh Sālīm having gone for a change of air to Bū Mūsa Island, where his horses were at grass, and his brother Ahmad having proceeded on a journey to Rās-al-Khaimah, their nephew Saqar-bin-Khālīd, a youth of 20 years or less who had been left in charge of Shārjah, seized the opportunity to proclaim himself ruler. He was shortly recognised as such by the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah, Umm-al-Qaiwain, 'Ajmān and Dibai; and he also obtained the support of Mubammad-bin-'Alī, a chief of the Bedouin Na'im, and of Mutawwa' Khasuwāni, the leader of a band of Bani Qitab freebooters. This revolution was facilitated by the unpopularity of Shaikh Sālīm, attributable to his partiality for men of religion and to his indifference to the interests of his subjects; but in general character Sālīm was not, perhaps, inferior to his successor, who soon proved to be weak and unobservant of his promises. Shaikh Sālīm retained possession of Bū Mūsa; but in May he paid a visit to Yūsuf, one of the Qāsimi Shaikhs in Lingeh, and in July he moved to Dibai, where a settlement, guaranteed by the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Dibai, was arranged between himself and his usurping nephew. Under the terms of this agreement Sālīm was to acknowledge the Shaikhship of Saqar and was in return to receive an annual pension of \$600 and to retain his personal property at Shārjah and Dhaid, while his debts at Shārjah were to be discharged by Saqar.

Usurpation of the Shaikhdom by Saqar bin-Khālīd, March 1883.

In 1884 there were complaints on both sides that this agreement was not being observed, and the guarantors apparently held that the blame rested with Sālīm, who was reported to be again living on Bū Mūsa. In the meantime Shaikh Saqar allied himself by marriage to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah. Up to this point the Resident had avoided all connection with the dispute, refusing to give advice or instructions to Saqar on his accession and declining to take special security against breach of the maritime peace from Shaikh Sālīm; but in June 1884, on Shaikh Sālīm appearing at 'Ajmān, the Residency Agent at Shārjah was able to arrange a friendly meeting between him and Shaikh Saqar at 'Ajmān. On this occasion a written document was executed by Shaikh Saqar in favour of Sālīm, in which it was promised that the latter should receive a pension of \$400 a year, half in kind and half in cash, also the revenue of the island of Sir Bū Na'air, which sometimes amounted to \$200 annually, and, finally, a sum of \$250 on account of the past year.

Intervention of the British political representative, 1884.

In April 1884 a fatuous attempt was made by the new Shaikh of Shārjah to recover Hamriyah, which, apparently ever since its secession in 1875, had continued to enjoy virtual independence. The expedient adopted was to invite Saif-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, headman of Hamriyah, to Shārjah, and on his arrival there to despatch his brother Muhammad-bin-'Abdur Rahmān to take charge of the place in the interest of the Shaikh of Shārjah. The coup was effected as arranged; but Saif, on his return to Hamriyah, at once expelled his brother Muhammad without the slightest difficulty.

Futile effort by Shaikh Saqar to recover Hamriyah, 1884.

Expedition by the Shaikhs of Rās-al-Khaimah and Shārjah, 1885.

Proceedings of the ex-Shaikh Salīm, 1886-89.

In December 1885, Sha'am having revolted against the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, that chief, assisted by his cousin the Shaikh of Shārjah, proceeded against the place and quickly reduced it to submission, inflicting a fine of \$1,600, of which a portion was paid at once.

The expelled Shaikh, Salīm, continued to watch for an opportunity of obtaining better terms than he had yet received from his successful rival. In June 1886, on a combination being formed by the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān and Hamriyah against the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, Salīm once more landed at 'Ajmān; but no opportunity having occurred of prosecuting his designs against Shārjah, he shortly returned to Bū Mūsa. In 1888 Salīm paid a visit to Dibai, between the Shaikh of which place and the Shaikh of Shārjah enmity at the time prevailed; a reconciliation, however, having taken place between the two, he was persuaded by the Shaikh of Dibai to promise, in return for the restoration of his pension, which had been suspended, to abstain from intrigues against his nephew. In April 1889, nevertheless, he organised an attack upon Shārjah; but he was unable to carry it out. Again, a little later, he became reconciled to Shaikh Saqar, who this time received him into favour and appointed him his Wazir.

Re-incorporation of Rās-al-Khaimah with the Shārjah Shaikhdom, 1900.

On the 2nd of August 1900 Hamaid-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah, was removed by a paralytic stroke, and Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid in the following month re-annexed the town and district to his principality of Shārjah without encountering any opposition. Shaikh Saqar at first placed his cousin Hamad-bin-Mājid in charge of Rās-al-Khaimah; but a few months later, having found his conduct unsatisfactory, he substituted his own son Khālid as governor.

Hamriyah affairs, 1903-04.

The township of Hamriyah, of which the headman on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to the coast, in November 1903, vainly sought to obtain recognition as an independent Trucial Shaikh, continued in theory attached to the Shārjah principality and in practice virtually independent; the reason of the prolonged estrangement was chiefly, so far as could be ascertained, the neglect or incapacity of the Shaikh of Shārjah to protect the interests of his vassal when assailed by others. On the 3rd of September 1904 a change of headmen occurred at Hamriyah by the death of Saif-bin-'Abdur Rahmān and the succession of his son 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Saif. The latter soon resigned his position in favour of an elder relation named Saif-bin-Saif, of whose ambition he stood in dread; but, on the latter proceeding to despoil him of his personal property, 'Abdur Rahmān attacked the house of Saif by night, taking him prisoner and killing his son, and himself resumed the headship of Hamriyah. Shaikh Rāshid of Umm-al-Qaiwain then intervened and settled the matter by removing Saif-bin-Saif to his own capital.

Political position and personal character of the Shaikh of Shārjah, 1907.

Under Saqar-bin-Khālid the importance of Shārjah among the Shaikhdoms of Trucial 'Omān declined, and the prestige of the Qāsimi name sunk to an unprecedentedly low level. In private life the Shaikh was weak, miserly, and uxorious: in public business he was apathetic and seemed incapable of exertion. He alienated his subjects and former Bedouin adherents by indifference to their grievances and requests; and he forfeited the respect of the other Trucial Shaikhs by his general insignificance, both as a man and as a ruler. In

his personal relations with British officers Shaikh Saqar always showed himself friendly and well-disposed ; but, from indolence, he was sometimes remiss in enforcing the just claims of British subjects ; and, on the occurrence of internal difficulties in his state, he manifested too great a disposition to rely on the help of the British Residency, instead of grappling with them himself. In 1904 the general dissatisfaction of his subjects with his rule found expression in a plot to depose Shaikh Saqar in favour of his uncle, the ex-Shaikh Sālim ; but timely information enabled Shaikh Saqar to frustrate the intrigue and Muhammad-bin-Khādim, one of the chief conspirators, was obliged, on escaping from custody, to seek refuge at Umm-al-Qaiwain. The direct administration of the town of Shārajah was held, until his death about 1906 by Shaikh Saqar's son Rāshid,—a young man who in character resembled his father ; and Rās-al-Khaimah was in 1907 still governed by Khālid, the only son then surviving of the Shaikh.

ANNEXURE No. 2.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE ABU DHABI PRINCIPALITY.

As in the case of Shārajah it appears advisable to devote a short separate notice to the internal affairs of the Abu Dhabi principality, of which the external history has been given in the preceding chapter.

Early history, 1761-1818.

The foundation of the town of Abu Dhabi is ascribed to the year 1761. The surrounding country was then already occupied by the Bani Yās,—a land-faring Bedouin tribe who, until the accidental discovery of water at the site of Abu Dhabi town, where a small village of 20 houses now sprang up, had not apparently a single permanent settlement upon the coast.

For information regarding the chiefs of the tribe at the time of the establishment of the Abu Dhabi principality the reader is referred to the genealogical table of the Bani Yās Shaikhs. Probably the last Shaikh to reside chiefly in the interior was Dhiyāb-bin-'Isa, who in 1793 was murdered by his second cousin, Hazzā'-bin-Zāid. The death of Dhiyāb was amply avenged by his son Shakhbūt, for the young Shaikh succeeded in putting to death no fewer than ten persons who had been present at his father's assassination : and in 1795 Hazzā', the actual murderer, found himself obliged, from fear of a similar fate, to fly

Foundation
of Abu Dhabi
town, 1761.

Rulers down
to and includ-
ing Shaikh
Muhammad,
deposed in
1818.

the country along with all his supporters. Shaikh Shakhbūt remained at the head of the tribe until 1816 : he was then deposed by his son Muhammad, who ruled for two years.

Shaikh Tahnūn-bin-Shakhbūt, 1818-33.

Accession of
Shaikh Tahnūn,
1818.

In 1818 Muhammad was expelled from Abu Dhabi by his brother Tahnūn,—an enterprise favoured by Shakhbūt, the father of both, by a majority of the Bani Yās tribe, and by the ruler of Masqat who afforded material assistance.* Muhammad sought refuge at Dōhah in Qatar under the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrain, while Tahnūn became Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, but for a time associated his father with himself in the administration and employed him on important missions, particularly on that of negotiating a peace with the commander of the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah in 1819-20. The accession of Tahnūn to power under the auspices of Masqat was the beginning of a permanent breach between the Qawāsīm and the Bani Yās, who, if tradition may be believed, had hitherto lived as close friends and allies.

Movements
of Suwaidān-
bin-Za'al,
1822-23.

In 1821 or 1822, some time after the accession of Shaikh Tahnūn, an individual named Suwaidān bin-Za'al, who appears to have been head of the Mahāribah section of the Bani Yās, absconded from Abu Dhabi in order to avoid payment of his debts, and adopted a roving and predatory life. Action was at once taken against him by Shaikh Tahnūn, who succeeded in capturing some of his boats ; but these proceedings were viewed by the British authorities of the day with disapproval, as endangering the tranquillity of the seas ; and the Shaikh was even required, on pain of a British war vessel being sent against his port, to desist from them and to give up the vessels which he had seized. At the end of the year Suwaidān paid a visit to Masqat, where he received a present from Saiyid Sa'id, and in January 1823 he was reported to have settled down quietly on the island of Yās. A different view of Suwaidān's character now apparently presented itself to the local British officers, for we find the Resident advising him to make his submission to Shaikh Tahnūn and even encouraging the latter, on certain conditions, to reduce him by force. Eventually Suwaidān was reconciled to his chief and returned to Abu Dhabi in 1828.

Attack on
Abu Dhabi
town by the

Late in the year 1823 the ex-Shaikh Muhammad, whose headquarters were now at Dōhah in Qatar, appeared before Abu Dhabi at the head

* Such is the account given by Lieutenant Hennell about 1831, see *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, page 464 ; but Lieutenant McLeod, writing in 1823, states that Tahnūn was set up by the ruler of Masqat about 1821 in place of his father, his brother Muhammad at the same time taking flight. Signature of the General Treaty of peace on behalf of Abu Dhabi was in any case performed (on the 11th of January 1820) by Shaikh Shakhbūt, who in 1833 was still alive ; but it is certain that in January 1823 Tahnūn already held the sole power.

of a number of Manāsīr Bedouins and attacked and plundered the town; but he was driven out with a loss of 35 men by his brother Tahnūn, who hastened to the spot with a large force from the interior. Retreating northwards he took refuge in Shārjah, whither Tahnūn followed by land and demanded his surrender; but, before matters came to a crisis between the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah, Muhammad relieved the latter of his presence by returning to Qatar.

ex-Shaikh
Muhammad,
1823.

Shaikh Tahnūn had long distrusted his brothers Khalifah and Sultān and had kept them at a distance from Abu Dhabi; but he was at length persuaded by his father, Shakhbūt, to allow them to return. Soon afterwards they were found to have entered with some of the principal residents of Abu Dhabi into a plot for the removal of Tahnūn, — an act of treason with which the Shaikh prepared to deal by throwing some of their confederates into prison. This precaution, however, was not sufficient. On the contrary it precipitated the action of the conspirators; and in April 1833 Shaikh Tahnūn fell a victim to the pistol of his brother Khalifah and the dagger of his brother Sultān.

Assassination
of Shaikh
Tahnūn,
April 1833.

Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Shakhbūt, 1833-45.

Khalifah and Sultān at first ruled in partnership; but gradually the predominance of Khalifah declared itself, and Sultān descended to a subordinate place. A tender of allegiance and Zakat on the part of the usurpers was readily accepted by the Wahhābi Amīr, who at once took them under his protection and forbade the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah to meddle in their affairs.

Accession of
Shaikh Kha-
lifah, 1833.

In the course of the following summer a conspiracy was formed by some malcontents at Abu Dhabi to murder Shaikh Khalifah and replace him by one of his first cousins; but the cousin whom it was intended to benefit himself divulged the plot to the Shaikh, who, retiring into his fort, seized three of the ringleaders and put them to death. He was also about to execute two influential merchants; but popular indignation and the opposition of his brother Sultān diverted him from his purpose and obliged him to be satisfied instead with the expulsion of one of the merchants named Bin-'Iyān, whom, after beating and despoiling of his property, he sent in a Baqarah to Lingeh.

Plot against
Shaikh Kha-
lifah, 1833.

This violence on the part of Shaikh Khalifah was highly prejudicial to his own interests, for it led to the secession from Abu Dhabi to Dibai, during the pearl fishery, of a large number of Bani Yās of the Al Bū Falāsah section. Dibai, of which the date of foundation cannot be fixed but may have been later than that of Abu Dhabi, seems to have been readily surrendered by the individual who then governed it on behalf of Shaikh Khalifah to the seceders; and they, in the following autumn, were joined there by the bulk of their relatives, returning from the pearl banks. The secession was permanent, almost the entire body of the Al Bū Falāsah being to the present day domiciled at Dibai; and

Secession of
the Al Bū
Falāsah to
Dibai, 1833.

that place, which had hitherto been a dependency of Abu Dhabi, became after 1833 a dangerous rival, and at times enemy, of the parent state.

The attack on and subsequent blockade of Abu Dhabi town by the Shaikh of Shārjah in the autumn of 1833 were due to these dissensions, which appeared to Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar to provide an excellent opportunity of crushing the Bani Yās chief on pretext of obtaining justice for the merchant Bin-'Iyān; but the result was far from answering to the expectations of the wily intriguer.

First secession of the Qubaisāt to 'Odaid, 1835-37.

In 1835, when heavy damages on account of piratical outrages by the Bani Yās were being recovered by the British Government from the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the subjects of Shaikh Khalifah began to disperse in all directions with a view to avoiding payment of their individual contributions; and it even became necessary for the British authorities to request other Shaikhs to abstain from affording asylum to fugitives from Abu Dhabi.

It was impossible, however, to prevent by these means the emigration of the Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās, who now, under the leadership of Khādim-bin-Na'amān and leaving their debts at Abu Dhabi unsettled, removed in a body to Khor-al-'Odaid,—an inlet of the uninhabited coast near the base of the Qatar promontory, distant nearly 200 miles from Abu Dhabi. The British Resident made an effort to reconcile the Qubaisāt with their chief and to induce them to return to their allegiance, but it was unsuccessful; and soon afterwards it was reported that the settlers at 'Odaid were affording encouragement to pirates, especially to the notorious Jāsim-bin-Jābir, Raqraqi, whose depredations occasioned a British naval demonstration along the Qatar coast in 1836, as related in the history of that promontory. The usual headquarters of the pirates were at Mirfah, an anchorage on the coast of Taff in Dhafrāh, where they were accustomed to bring their spoil ashore and load it on camels for despatch to different destinations; but Jāsim had in the first instance issued from 'Odaid, and the headman of that place continued to countenance him so long as he dared.

At length in May 1837, permission to take such measures as were necessary having been accorded by the Resident, Shaikh Khalifah contrived to fall without warning upon the 'Odaid settlement, which he completely destroyed: 50 of the inhabitants were killed; the fortifications and houses were dismantled; and the wells were filled up with the ruins of the buildings and the bodies of the slain. A number of the Qubaisāt then took refuge at Dibai, and probably at other places also; but, when they saw that some of their number who had gone back to Abu Dhabi were treated with indulgence and had their boats restored to them, they accepted a general amnesty offered by Shaikh Khalifah and returned to their homes and their allegiance, among them being Khādim-bin-Na'amān, the chief of the seceders.

Assassination of Shaikh Khalifah, 1845.

In July 1845, in circumstances which are not fully explained, Shaikh Tahnūn with his brother Sultān was treacherously murdered by one 'Isa-bin-Khalid, who had long been lying in wait for his life. The deed was committed at a season when the town was almost deserted by its inhabitants, these having gone either to the pearl banks or to the date

groves of Līwah ; and it formed the conclusion of a feast of which the victims had just partaken, at the invitation of the murderers, under the shade of a Batil drawn up upon the beach.

Notwithstanding the fratricidal crime by which he first attained to power, but which we may consider to have been expiated by the manner of his own death, the rule of Shaikh Khalifah had been in every respect creditable to his character. By his gallantry, firmness and prudence he raised the Abu Dhabi principality to a position much higher than it had ever before occupied ; and at the same time he maintained, at least after 1835, a good understanding with the British authorities, and restrained his subjects to the best of his ability from breaches of the maritime peace.

Administra-
tion of
Shaikh
Khalifah.

Interregnum, 1845.

On the death of Shaikh Khalifah the headship of the Bani Yās was assumed by the principal assassin, 'Isa-bin-Khalid, apparently with the consent of such of the tribe as were then at hand ; but two months later the usurper was cut off by Dhiyāb-bin-'Isa, who from his name may be supposed to have been a first cousin of Shaikh Khalifah. Dhiyāb was slain in his turn by Khālid-bin-'Isa, a son of his victim ; but this individual, instead of attempting to secure the Shaikhdом for himself, prudently returned, after avenging his father's death, to Shārjah whence he had set out. A brother of Khālid contrived to obtain possession of the fort of Abu Dhabi ; but he was speedily ejected by Muhammad-bin-Hamaid and Rāshid-bin-Fādhil, two influential leaders of the Bani Yās, who now declared for Sa'id, a son of the former Shaikh Tahnūn and consequently nephew of the late Shaikh Khalifah.

Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, 1845-55.

The chief authority was retained in their own hands by Muhammad and Rāshid until the arrival of Shaikh Sa'id, who, being generally regarded as the most eligible chief, and being supported moreover by the moral influence of the British Political Resident, established himself in power without any difficulty.

Accession of
Shaikh Sa'id,
1845.

In 1849, dissatisfied at the favour shown by Shaikh Sa'id to the Mahāribah section of the Bani Yās with whom they were at feud, encouraged also by the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai to hope that the Wahhābi Amir would shortly assist them to establish themselves at 'Odaid, the Qubaisāt of Abu Dhabi once more abandoned their homes and settled temporarily at Dōhah in Qatar. Effectual measures to compel their return were at once taken, in November or December 1849, by

Second
(attempted)
secession of
the Qubaisāt
to 'Odaid,
1849.

the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. After imprisoning some of the Qubaisāt who still remained at Abu Dhabi, he sent for the leaders of the Dōhah colony and on their arrival gave them a flattering reception. During the following night, however, the boats in which they had come were stripped of masts, sails and all other gear; and the entrapped envoys, thus deprived of the means of escape, found themselves obliged to agree to the terms imposed by the Shaikh, which included, besides return from Dōhah, the satisfaction of all debts due by the Qubaisāt to private creditors and the payment of a fine to himself.

Expulsion of
Shaikh Sa'id
and accession
of Shaikh
Zaid, 1855.

In 1855 Shaikh Sa'id became embroiled with the entire body of his subjects. The occasion was the murder by a tribal elder of his own brother, apparently not without justification, for the Bani Yās as a whole sided with the elder and resisted the intention of Shaikh Sa'id to put him to death. On a promise given by the Shaikh to remit both that and every other penalty the murderer was brought into his presence, whereupon Sa'id, reverting to his original determination, drew his dagger and with his own hand struck the man dead. The populace at once rose in arms; and Shaikh Sa'id, after defending himself for some time in his citadel, escaped to the Persian island of Qais, taking with him most of his property both in goods and cattle. To the British Residency the Shaikh represented his expulsion as due to efforts which he had made to punish a piracy, committed by Bani Yās of the Hawāmil and Mahāribah sections, upon a Shu'ai belonging to one 'Abdul Karim.

Shaikh Zaid-bin-Khalifah, from 1855.

On the flight of Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, his first cousin, Shaikh Zaid-bin-Khalifah, was elected to succeed him. According to an arrangement apparently customary among the Bani Yās, a brother named Dhiyāb was associated with Zaid in the government; but as usual nothing was heard, after the first, of the assistant chief.

Attack on
Abu Dhabi
town by the
ex-Shaikh
Sa'id, 1856.

In July 1856 a piratical and altogether unexpected descent upon the town of Abu Dhabi was made by the exiled Shaikh, Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn, who in this affair took Shārjah for his base of operations; his fleet consisted of three vessels, all small, of which one was his own, one belonged to the island of Qais, and the other was obtained at Abu Hail in the Shārjah principality. On the 19th of July, the principal Shaikh (Zaid) being then absent in Dhafrah, Sa'id-bin-Tahnūn landed at Abu Dhabi and obtained possession of the town, which was plundered by his adherents; Shaikh Dhiyāb and the few inhabitants then present at Abu Dhabi shut themselves up in the fort, and there held out until the arrival of Shaikh Zaid from the interior with a party of Bedouins. On the appearance of the relieving force the invaders were immediately discomfited: Sa'id bin-Tahnūn himself was among the slain. As mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, the damage done at Abu Dhabi on this occasion was partially made good out of a large fine of \$25,000, imposed on the Shaikh of Shārjah because of the complicity of some of his subjects in the raid.

In nothing does the essentially Bedouin character of the subjects of the Abu Dhabi Shaikh appear more distinctly than in the readiness with which, on slight provocation, they abandon their homes and settle elsewhere. We have already noticed the permanent hiving-off of the Āl Bū Falāsah in 1833 and the temporary secession of the Qubaisāt in 1835-37 and 1849, and mention must now be made of a sustained effort on the part of the Qubaisāt to free themselves, by removal to a distance, from the control of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

In 1869, for reasons not ascertained and therefore probably of slight importance, a body of the Qubaisāt under the leadership of Buti-bin-Khādim once more forsook Abu Dhabi and established themselves in the remote creek of 'Odaid. 1869.

In 1871, in consequence of complaints by Shaikh Zaid that the prosperity of Abu Dhabi was diminished by the competition of the 'Odaid settlement and that the latter had become a city of refuge for fraudulently absconding debtors, Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, made careful enquiries both personally and through his Assistant, Major Smith, regarding the ownership of 'Odaid; the result was to show that 'Odaid itself, to which at this time no Shaikh of Qatar so much as laid claim, was undoubtedly situated within the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. The 'Odaid colonists, however, claimed to form a state entirely independent of Abu Dhabi; they asserted that their territory extended half way from 'Odaid to Wakrah on the side of Qatar, and in the other direction as far as the island of Yās, and that it included Dalmah and other adjacent islands formerly considered to belong to Abu Dhabi; moreover, while they expressed a wish to continue under the Trucial flag, they hinted not obscurely that, if their pretensions were not admitted, they would place themselves under the protection of the 'Turks, who had now arrived in Qatar. Colonel Pelly asked that he might be given instructions for dealing with the matter, inasmuch as the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, relying on the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853, had claimed his intervention as an arbitrator. 1871.

The orders of the Government of India, communicated in May 1872, were to the effect that no action by the Resident was called for under the Maritime Truce, no attack having been made by sea upon the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and that Colonel Pelly should not interfere unless he apprehended a breach of the peace at sea between the parties; but that he should report at once any overt action indicating an intention on the part of the 'Turks to establish their supremacy at 'Odaid. 1872.

The position remained unchanged until 1873, when Colonel Ross, who had meanwhile succeeded Colonel Pelly in charge of the Gulf Residency, reported an application by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for leave to take naval action against the 'Odaid rebels: it was explained that an expedition by land was impracticable on account of physical obstacles. Colonel Ross was inclined to think that refusal of sanction might throw the Shaikh himself into the arms of the Porte; but the Government of India in reply directed him to avoid, if possible, giving any answer to Za'id's request, and, in the opposite case, to inform him that the Government of India could not countenance, and would even prevent, the proposed naval expedition. 1873.

1874-75. In 1874 the Shaikh, having repeated his request in regard to an expedition by sea, was informed of the prohibition of the Government of India; and in 1875 he stated that he had received letters from the Turks, ordering him to abstain from interference with 'Odaid. At this time it was reported that the 'Odaid settlement possessed both a Trucial and a Turkish flag, and that either was flown as the circumstances of the moment happened to dictate.

1876-77. In 1876-77, various piracies having been committed by Bedouins belonging to the neighbourhood of 'Odaid, a strict enquiry was made into the behaviour and circumstances of the colonists. It was stated that some Turks had previously visited 'Odaid, and that a small annual tribute of \$40 or 50 was now paid by the inhabitants to the Turkish Government. In regard to the piracies, it was shown that the offenders were Āl Morrah, who had made use of creeks and anchorages and even of vessels belonging to 'Odaid,—proceedings which the headman of 'Odaid was not in a position to prevent. In consequence of this last discovery the case took a new departure; and, in May 1877, the Government of India directed the Resident to use his best endeavours to promote a reunion between the settlers at 'Odaid and the main body of the Bani Yās tribe, at the same time authorising him, in case of non-success, to assist the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in coercing the seceders. These instructions were duly approved by the Secretary of State for India, and steps towards their execution were at once taken by Captain Prideaux, the Acting Political Resident in the Gulf; but he was not able to bring about any agreement. Matters were further complicated by a piracy by 'Odaid boats upon a Wakrah boat, which occurred in April and obliged Captain Prideaux to insist on the liberation of some prisoners who were confined at 'Odaid. In December 1877 Colonel Ross, who had meanwhile returned to his post, reported that his efforts at reconciliation had failed in consequence of the reliance which the headman of 'Odaid now placed on the help of the Turks and did not hesitate to express, even in writing. He further applied for the services of a war vessel for the purpose of executing his instructions, and the "Teazer" was placed at his disposal. On the arrival of this ship at 'Odaid it was found that the settlers had fled, first dismantling their houses and filling up the wells. These transactions led to a discussion with the Turkish Government which is described in another place.

1880. The 'Odaid fugitives found an asylum at Dōhah in Qatar, where apparently they resided during 1879; but in January 1880 they accepted an offer of Shaikh Zāid to let them return to Abu Dhabi; and, a short time after, the Shaikh's son Khalifah went in person to bring them home. They were obliged to escape secretly from Dōhah, where Jāsīm, the Āl Thāni Shaikh, would now have compelled them to remain; but they reached Abu Dhabi in safety, resumed their allegiance to their chief, and received back their date palms and other property.

Later questions affecting 'Odaid are connected with the history of Qatar rather than with that of Abu Dhabi.

Affairs in
the Baraimi

We may now consider shortly the recent history of the Baraimi Oasis, which, after the expulsion of the Wahnābis in 1869, ceased to

play an important part in the general history of Trucial 'Omān and became almost an annexe of the principality of Abu Dhabi. Oasis, 1875-1907.

At the beginning of 1875 a state of war existed between the Bani Yās and the Na'im; and many distant, and in some cases murderous, raids were executed, especially by the former, who were assisted by their allies the Manāsir and Bani Hājir Bedouins. In January 200 mounted Manāsir and Bani Hājir made an attack on the Na'aimi town of Dhank in Dhāhirah; and about the same time a similar force of Manāsir and Mazārī' made an unsuccessful expedition against Baraimi. The Bani Qītab, finding themselves in danger from the Bedouin allies of Abu Dhabi, applied for protection to the Shaikh of Dibai, who went out with a force of camelry and stood guard over them until satisfactory assurances had been received from Shaikh Zāid. 1875.

In May 1887 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi went to war with some of the Dhawāhir of Baraimi who opposed the extension of his influence to that place. The Sultān of 'Omān, Saiyid Turki, sent assistance in money and ammunition to the recalcitrant Dhawāhir; but the consignment arrived too late. Within a month of his departure Shaikh Zāid returned home victorious, bringing two Shaikhs of the Dhawāhir back with him as prisoners. In April 1889 the Shaikh of 'Ajmān went to Baraimi and composed some disputes which had arisen there among the Na'im. 1887-89.

In April 1891 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi marched to Baraimi, where he was joined by the Shaikh of Dibai with 30 horsemen and 300 camelmén and apparently engaged in hostilities with the Dhawāhir, for his principal operation was the storm and capture of the village of 'Ain. Peace was now established between Shaikh Zāid and the Al Bū Kharībān Na'im of Baraimi; and the Shaikh even took to wife a daughter of the Na'aimi holder of the Baraimi forts. The Bani Qītab and the Bani Ka'ab, formerly reckoned dependents of the Qawāsīm, now attached themselves to the interest of Abu Dhabi; and in June 1891 the Shaikh, being then on a visit to Masqat, persuaded the Sultān to restore some allowances which he had been accustomed to pay through his Wālī of Sohār to the Na'im and Bani Qītab tribes but had suspended. 1891.

When by these and by other similar means he had established a considerable degree of influence over Baraimi, Shaikh Zāid proceeded to adopt more open and unmistakable measures for the virtual annexation of the Oasis. About 1897, or possibly earlier, he appropriated or reclaimed the estate of Jāhālī on the south-western border of the cultivated area; and since then divers pieces of land and sundry water channels in Baraimi or its environs have been purchased by Shaikh Zāid and his sons, especially by his eldest son, Khalifah, who has recently founded a new settlement, Mas'ūdi, on the north-western edge of the Oasis. 1897-1907.

In 1904, a year in which Shaikh Zāid spent several months at his estate of Jāhālī, hostilities nearly arose from the purchase by Shaikh Khalifah of a share in an old disused Falaj, belonging to Ghāfirīs, at Baraimi; for, on some of the co-owners objecting to the intrusion of the Hināwi Bani Yās, Shaikh Zāid at first prepared to enforce his

son's right by arms. At a meeting held at Samaih near Khor-al-Ghanādhah, however, he was induced, by the advice of the Shaikhs of Dibai and 'Ajmān and of his friend Muhammad, the chief Na'aimi Shaikh of Baraimi, to abandon forcible measures. About the same time he proved the strength of his influence in the Baraimi neighbourhood generally by obliging the Bani Qitab to pay blood money for two citizens of 'Ibri town in Dhāhirah, whom they had slain.

General matters, 1857-1907.

After the attack on Abu Dhabi town in 1856 the internal history of the principality was, apart from the affairs of 'Odaid and Baraimi described above, wholly uneventful. The wars of the Bani Yās with the Al Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah will be more appropriately related, though the interior of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom did not entirely escape their effects, in the history of the Qatar promontory. Shaikh Zaid performed the Hajj in 1880-81, and in 1904 he received a fine mare with trappings from the Sharif of Makkah.

ANNEXURE No. 3.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE DIBAI PRINCIPALITY.

Of the early history of Dibai town little is known. It existed already in 1799; and in 1825, as appears from the general history of Trucial 'Omān,* its possession was an object of ambition to the ruler of Masqat. Notwithstanding the separate signature on behalf of its chief Hazzā'-bin-Za'al, then a minor, of the General Treaty of Peace in 1820, Dibai appears to have existed until 1833 as a dependency of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom; but in that year, as related elsewhere,† on the arrival of a body of 800 seceders from Abu Dhabi belonging to the Āl Bū Falāsah section of the Bani Yās tribe, it attained indisputably to the status of a separate principality.

Shaikh Maktūm-bin-Buti, 1833-52.

Accession of Shaikh Maktūm to sole power, 1836.

The leaders of the exodus of the Āl Bū Falāsah from Abu Dhabi were 'Obaid-bin-Sa'id and Maktūm-bin-Buti, who seem, according to a practice common among the Bani Yās, to have been recognised as joint chiefs; but on the death on the 9th of June 1836 of 'Obaid, who was regarded as the senior of the two, the undivided power devolved upon Maktūm, at that time a haughty and inexperienced youth.

Administration and character.

The new principality was exposed for a time to considerable danger, both from the jealousy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the former suzerain of Dibai, and from the ambition of the Qāsimi Shaikh of Sharjah, between whom a combination was more than once formed for its suppression; but the personal courage and the ability of Shaikh

* *Vide* page 686 *ante*.

† *Vide* page 765 *ante*

Maktūm were equal to every emergency, enabling him to play off with success the one enemy against the other; and it is probable that the peril from outside was not without advantage in strengthening his authority at home. The internal history of Dibai under Shaikh Maktūm was in any case singularly uneventful, but in 1843 he lost an eye in battle with the Ghafalah Bedouins. As has often happened in the case of an Arab ruler refractory at the beginning of his reign in his relations with the British Government, Shaikh Maktūm showed in later life a sincere appreciation of the objects and advantages of British policy in the Gulf; and he ultimately acquired, in a high degree, the confidence and respect of the local British authorities.

Shaikh Maktūm fell a victim to small-pox in the spring of 1852. He died at sea on a voyage to Qishm from Masqat, where he had gone to visit his ally Saiyid Sa'id, probably in connection with recent events in Bātinah.

Death of
Shaikh
Maktūm,
1852.

Shaikh Sa'id-bin-Buti, 1852-59.

Shaikh Maktūm was succeeded by his brother, Shaikh Sa'id, but the position of the latter, though his accession was peaceful, was challenged by Hashar and Suhail, sons of Maktūm; and, on his imprudently leaving Dibai to visit Saiyid Sa'id at Masqat in October 1852, the fort of Dibai passed by treachery into their hands. The governor appointed by Shaikh Sa'id at his departure,—one Sa'id-bin-Rashid, his own maternal uncle,—was at first imprisoned, but soon again released by the usurping chiefs; and, before the return of the Shaikh, this individual succeeded in justifying the confidence reposed in him by measures which resulted in the flight of Hashar and Suhail from Dibai. The cause of the exiles was espoused by the Shaikh of Shārjah, with whom they sought an asylum, and by whom a certain Sa'id-bin-Ma'anah was induced to leave Dibai with others of the Al Bū Mahair tribe and to settle at Shārjah; but the evil went no further. Shaikh Sa'id was able on the 17th of December 1852 to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain by which the intrigues of the Qāsimi chief were effectually nullified.

Rebellion
against
Shaikh
Sa'id, 1852.

No further internal incident distinguished the Shaikhship of Shaikh Sa'id, and, like his predecessor in his later years, he was careful to cultivate a good understanding with the British Government: thus he was the only one of the leading Shaikhs of the coast who was not in attendance at Baraimi on the son of the Wahhābi Amīr when the Resident arrived in 1853 to arrange the Perpetual Treaty of Peace. Shaikh Sa'id died in December 1859 of small-pox, a disease to which his family seem to have been unusually susceptible, for another brother and a nephew now also succumbed to the same malady, which, as will be recollected, had carried off his brother Maktūm.

Administra-
tion, charac-
ter, and death
of Shaikh
Sa'id.

Shaikh Hashar-bin-Maktūm, 1859-86.

Shaikh Sa'id was followed in the Shaikhship by his nephew and former rival, Hashar-bin-Maktūm, who on his accession wrote to the British Political Resident professing friendship and a desire to fulfil his obligations towards the British Government; nor did the attitude of the new chief, in a case of serious outrage at sea committed by the Āl Bū Falāsah immediately before his elevation to the chiefship, belie his fair words. Shaikh Hashar died on the 22nd of November 1886, and the succession was claimed by his brother Rāshid and by his son Maktūm, whose supporters were approximately equal in number and influence.

Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Maktūm, 1886-94.

The dispute as to the succession having been peacefully settled by the elders of the tribe in favour of Rāshid, the latter was recognised as Shaikh by the British Political Resident. In 1892, as mentioned in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, the conduct of this chief was not entirely satisfactory; his treatment of British subjects gave rise to complaints; and it became necessary to visit him with a penalty for having violated the Perpetual Treaty of Peace. In September of that year he paid a visit to Masqat, returning by Baraimi and forming on the way a matrimonial alliance with the Āl Bū Shāmis division of the Na'im tribe. In December 1892 he became seriously ill; his indisposition, at first attributed to poison, was subsequently described as a paralytic seizure. He eventually died on the 7th of April 1894.

Shaikh Maktūm-bin-Hashar, 1894-1906.

The place of Shaikh Rāshid was taken, on his death, by his nephew, and original competitor, Maktūm-bin-Hashar. The sons of the deceased Rāshid at once formed a conspiracy against their cousin; but Shaikh Maktūm seized them and imprisoned them for five months, after which they were released and took up their residence at Shārjah on small compassionate allowances granted by the Qāsimi Shaikh.

The subsequent policy of Shaikh Maktūm was liberal and enlightened and resulted in the rapid growth of the port of Dibai, which after 1902, assisted by the decadence of Lingeh, became a regular place of call for steamers and the chief commercial emporium of the Trucial Coast.

The relations of the Shaikh with the British political authorities were always excellent, chiefly on account of the reasonableness of his disposition ; and his sudden death on the 16th of February 1906, apparently from heart disease, was much regretted.

Shaikh Buti-bin-Suhail, from 1906.

On the death of Shaikh Maktûm, leaving no son who had reached man's estate, the government of Dibai was assumed without opposition by his cousin Buti-bin-Suhail, an elderly man. The new Shaikh was reported to be somewhat uncouth and less civilised than his predecessor.

ANNEXURE No. 4.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE UMM-AL-QAIWAIN PRINCIPALITY.

The principality of Umm-al-Qaiwain, though it has played a not inconsiderable part among the petty states of Trucial 'Omān, is almost devoid of anything that can be described as internal history. This circumstance may be due in part to the longevity of the ruling family, belonging to the Al 'Ali tribe, of whom three—a father and two sons—between them governed Umm-al-Qaiwain for nearly a century.

The first of these, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid, must have succeeded before 1820, in which year he personally subscribed the General Treaty of Peace ; and in 1853 he still lived to accept, on behalf of his Shaikhdom, the Perpetual Treaty of Peace which was then executed. The year of his death is not known.

'Abdullah-
bin-Rāshid,
from before
1820 till after
1853.

In 1873 Umm-al-Qaiwain was governed by his son, Ahmad-bin-'Abdullah, who had in the meantime succeeded an elder brother named 'Ali. Ahmad married a sister of Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz, ruler of 'Ajmān, of whom his eldest son, Rāshid, was born about 1876. Another wife was a sister of Shaikh Hamaid, Qāsimi, of Rās-al-Khaimah ; but her he divorced in 1882. Shaikh Ahmad died on the 13th of June 1904 at an advanced age, apparently of paralysis ; his health had been failing for some time previously, and infirmity prevented him from attending in person the Viceregal Darbār held off Shārajah in November 1903.

Ahmad-bin-
'Abdullah,
from before
1873 till
1904.

Shaikh Rāshid, who succeeded his father without opposition, and who in September 1904 wrote to the British Political Resident announcing his peaceful accession and accepting without reserve the existing treaties, appeared to possess ability and force of character ; and, though somewhat headstrong, he was reported to be a satisfactory man with whom

Rāshid-bin-
Ahmad, from
1904 to the
present time.

to deal. Soon after his accession he married a daughter of his maternal uncle, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān.

ANNEXURE No. 5.—INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE 'AJMĀN PRINCIPALITY.

The internal history of 'Ajmān presents few points of interest or importance.

Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, from before 1820 to 1838.

The Shaikh of the principality in 1820 was Rāshid-bin-Hamaid; he died in 1838 and was at first succeeded by his son Hamaid-bin-Rāshid.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, first period, 1838-41.

In May 1841 Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, who had married a daughter of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Shārjah, was displaced by his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Rāshid. This chief, having gained an entrance into the fort by stealth along with some of his slaves and being supported by the good will of the people, was able to maintain his position for a time, and the matter was apparently treated as a family quarrel by the Shaikh of Shārjah, who did not attempt to interfere; but, on learning that Hamaid proposed to erect another fort for himself in the vicinity, Abdul 'Aziz again retired in his favour.

Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Rāshid, 1841-48.

The self-effacement of 'Abdul 'Aziz was not of long duration, and he soon appeared once more in the character of principal Shaikh. His good conduct in 1845 in a matter affecting the maritime peace has been noticed elsewhere; but in tribal politics he was an inconstant and unreliable factor; and in 1846 he deserted the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain, his allies, in their struggle for independence against Shārjah and Abu Dhabi. In September 1848, as noted in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, 'Abdul 'Aziz was killed in battle with the people of Hamriyah.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, second period, 1848 till before 1873.

'Abdul 'Aziz was succeeded by his brother Hamaid, whom he had originally displaced, and who also was wounded in the Hamriyah fight. The death of Hamaid occurred at some time before 1873.

Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, from before 1873 to 1891.

Rāshid-bin-Hamaid, the son of the last Shaikh, ruled 'Ajmān in 1873 and continued to do so till April 1891, when he died and made way for his son Hamaid-bin-Rāshid.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid, 1891-1900.

Hamaid-bin-Rāshid ruled from 1891 till the 8th of July 1900. On that day he was murdered by his uncle, 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Hamaid, who then assumed the Shaikhship. No sympathy was felt for the victim, who had alienated the members of his own family by his failure to make them regular allowances out of the state revenue: indeed his removal was received with general approbation.

'Abdul 'Aziz immediately assured the British subjects resident at 'Ajman of his protection ; nor was his *coup d'état* either accompanied or followed by any general disturbances. The new Shaikh subsequently wrote to the Resident to seek recognition by the British Government ; but tacit recognition had already been afforded, and it was not considered advisable to grant any of a more formal character. 'Abdul 'Aziz was a close personal friend of the ruling Shaikh of Shārajah.

Abdul 'Aziz-
bin-
Hamaid,
from 1900.

ANNEXURE No. 6.—HISTORY OF THE SHAMAILIYAH TRACT.

The Shamailiyah tract on the shores of the Gulf of 'Omān, which for historical purposes may be taken as extending from Dibah to Khor Kalba and as including both of those places,* has undergone within the last century so many external and internal political vicissitudes that its history cannot be conveniently related in connection with the affairs of any principality. A short separate notice of events in Shamailiyah is accordingly given below.

Indeterminate political position of Shamailiyah, 1798-1850.

About the end of the 18th century the northern part of Shamailiyah was evidently held, or at least claimed, by the Qawāsīm; for Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, on a rupture occurring between himself and the Qāsimi Shaikh in or about 1798, made a naval attack on Dibah. The place appears to have been defended chiefly by the Sharqiyīn and Naqbiyīn tribes, who successfully frustrated the Saiyid's attempt but themselves suffered considerably in the operations.

The Qawāsīm
at Dibah,
1798.

Several years later, as is more fully related in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar of Rās-al-Khaimah obtained possession of Khor Fakkān, the most central and one of the most important places on the Shamailiyah coast; and a base for piratical expeditions was at once established there by the Qawāsīm. In 1808 Saiyid Sa'id, the young ruler of Masqat, assisted by his uncle, Qais-bin-Ahmad of Sohār, and by a local chief, Muhammad-bin-Matar of Fujairah, captured the new Qāsimi stronghold at Khor Fakkān; but, before he had time to make good his success, he was suddenly defeated and expelled by a force under Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar.

The Qawāsīm
at Khor
Fakkān,
1808.

* The generalisation is faulty only in the inclusion of Dibah, which is situated just outside the district properly known as Shamailiyah.

Occupation by the Wahhābis of Fujairah, Bithnah and Khor Fakkān, 1809-10.

In the following year, about the time that they brought the Pirate Coast and its hinterland under their direct control, the Wahhābis appear to have occupied the forts of Fujairah, Bithnah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah with troops or adherents of their own; and simultaneously they seized the adjacent town of Shinās in Bātinah, which belonged to Masqat. At the beginning of 1810 Shinās was recaptured from the Wahhābis by a joint British and 'Omāni expedition; but the operation was so little profitable to Saiyid Sa'id, for whose benefit it was undertaken, that the reduction of Khor Fakkān, though previously resolved on, was not attempted. The Wahhābis, therefore, presumably remained in full possession of Shamailiyah.

Recovery by the Saiyid of Masqat of Dibah and Khor Fakkān (date uncertain).

At some time after these events, possibly as an indirect result of the British expedition to Rās-al-Khaimah and the humiliation of the Qawāsim in 1819-20, the ruler of Masqat must have regained possession of the whole of Shamailiyah*; for in 1831 we find the Qāsimi Shaikh, Sultān-bin-Saqar, bargaining with Sa'id of Masqat for the cession to himself, as the price of his co-operation with the Saiyid in an attempt upon Sohār, of either Dibah or Khor Fakkān.

Seizure of all Shamailiyah by the Qāsimi Shaikh, 1832.

In the following year, 1832, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar profited by the absence of Saiyid Sa'id in East Africa and a consequent rising against his authority in 'Omān to seize Dibah, Khor Fakkān and Ghāllah and so to bring the whole of Shamailiyah into subjection to himself: his success upon this occasion has sometimes been wrongly described as the final annexation of Shamailiyah to the Shārjah principality. In 1835 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar proceeded with a Qāsimi fleet to Dibah and Khor Fakkān, and complaints of piratical outrages upon Masqati and other vessels which soon began to reach the British authorities necessitated action by the latter, as is related in another place.

Recovery of central and southern Shamailiyah by the ruler of Masqat (date uncertain).

Again, after an interval, Khor Fakkān and Ghāllah, with—it may safely be assumed—the coast between these two places, returned into the possession of the Saiyid of Masqat; but nothing is ascertainable in regard to the time or manner of this revolution. The Shaikh of Shārjah had not, however, abandoned his claim to the whole district; and in 1849 he was only restrained by the advice of friends from an expedition for its recovery.

Final annexation of Shamailiyah to the Shārjah Shaikhdom, 1850.

The end of these alternations between 'Omāni and Qāsimi ownership came in 1850, when, on an invitation from Qais-bin-'Azzān of Sohār, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar hastened to his assistance, with the result that Shinās in Bātinah as well as Ghāllah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah fell into the hands of the allies and were divided between them, the Qāsimi Shaikh doubtless retaining the two Shamailiyah ports. In 1851, on the arrival of Saiyid Sa'id in person, Shaikh Sultān withdrew his support from Saiyid Qais, whom Saiyid Sa'id then easily expelled not only from Shinās but also from Sohār. The whole of Shamailiyah, however, remained in possession of the Shaikh of Shārjah, whose neutrality, it seems not unnatural to suppose, may have been secured by an undertaking on the part of Saiyid Sa'id to maintain the *status quo* in this respect.

* It should be noted, however, that the troops of the Saiyid had intermediately been in possession of Khor Fakkān and had been again ejected in 1817.

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, 1850-1866.

The only event of importance which occurred in Shamailiyah between the final annexation of that district to Shārajah and the death of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar was a rising, in 1855, of the Shihūh in the neighbourhood of Dibah. Mashāri, son of Shaikh Ibrāhīm of Rās-al-Khaimah and grandson of Shaikh Sultān himself, having been appointed ruler over Dibah, immediately put forth his hand to oppress the neighbouring Shihūh, probably those of Bai'ah, and was waylaid and murdered in consequence by members of that tribe on a journey from Dibah to Rās-al-Khaimah. This extreme step, which was not taken by the Shihūh until their appeals to Shaikhs Sultān and Ibrāhīm against Mashāri had been rejected, led to a general war between the Qawāsīm and the Shihhi tribe which is described in the history of Ruūs-al-Jibāl.

Rising of the
Shihūh near
Dibah, 1855.

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Khālīd-bin-Sultān, 1866-1868.

On the death of Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar and the accession of his son Khālīd in 1866, the headman of the village of Fujairah in Shamailiyah, one 'Abdullah-bin-Khamīs, ceased to pay tribute to Shārajah. There is reason to think that the whole of Shamailiyah at this time rose in insurrection and that it was not recovered until after the death of Khālīd; but this is a matter of conjecture rather than of certainty.

Revolt in
Shamailiyah,
1866.

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Sālim-bin-Sultān, 1868-1883.

Some time after this, Sālim, the brother and successor of Khālīd, sent a force to Dibah for the purpose of re-conquering all Shamailiyah, or so much of the district as was not at the time submissive to his authority; but the Sharqiyyīn, who had acquired a taste for independence, combined under the leadership of the headman of Fujairah to oppose the attempt and formed an alliance with the Shihūh under Sālih-bin-Muhammad, Shaikh of Bai'ah, who were regarded as subjects of Masqat. In the result the Qāsīmī force was besieged in Dibah by the Sharqiyyīn and Shihūh; and Shaikh Sālim, being unable to send reinforcements by land from Shārajah, as the passes through the hills were held by the Shihūh, deputed one of his brothers to make a friendly settlement. The mission was a success: the Sharqiyyīn submitted and promised to pay tribute.

Rebellion in
Shamailiyah

Rebellion
renewed in
Shamailiyah,
1876.

Not long afterwards, in consequence of the Shaikh of Shārhjah's representative at Dibah having imprisoned twelve Sharqiyyīn of Gharaifah, another combination was formed between the Sharqiyyīn and the Shihūh, who closed the nearer passes; and the Qawāsim were again besieged in Dibah. Shaikh Sālim on this occasion sent 50 men with provisions and munitions of war by sea to Dibah; and some prisoners who had been taken were despatched by boat to Shārhjah. On the arrival of H.M.S. "Arab" at Dibah the fighting there ceased; but in the meanwhile a force of 800 Qawāsim had arrived from the direction of Shinās and taken a fort at Gharaifah, killing 36 and capturing 30 of the rebels. It was suspected that these troubles in Shamailiyah had been fomented in the interests of Masqat.

Abortive
insurrection
at Fujairah,
1879.

In the spring of 1879 the people of Fujairah rose against and expelled one Sarūr, who had been set in authority over them by the Shaikh of Shārhjah, and replaced him by a certain Marzūq. At the same time they sent a deputation to Shārhjah to inform the Shaikh of their proceedings; but Shaikh Sālim, instead of being appeased by this step, confined the members of the deputation, sent a land force against the fort of Fujairah, which was recaptured and garrisoned with Balūch, and even transported some prisoners to the island of Bū Mūsa. An allegation by the Fujairah malcontents that the Shaikh had attacked them by sea with the help of their outside enemies was clearly shown to be false.

Claim of the
Sultān of
'Omān to
Fujairah,
1879.

Upon this Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, the headman of Fujairah and apparently the most active of the insurgents, made his escape to Masqat, where he arrived in April, and invited the Sultan of 'Omān to take Fujairah for the future under his own protection. Discussions between the Sultān and the British authorities followed, in which Saiyid Turki at first claimed sovereignty over Fujairah; but eventually he admitted the liability of the place to pay tribute to Shārhjah and only argued against oppressive interference there by the Qāsimi Shaikh in local matters. In this correspondence the curious fact was elicited that Saiyid Turki had in 1871 given a sealed document to the Shaikh of Shārhjah containing an admission that the whole of the coast from Khor Kalba to Shārhjah, with the single exception of Khasab, belonged to the Qawāsim; but this agreement he now repudiated on the ground that it was executed before his accession to the Sultanate and that it was conditional upon the rendering of certain services by the Qāsimi Shaikh which the latter had never performed.

Successful
insurrection
at Fujairah,
1879-80.

The Qawāsim did not long remain in undisturbed possession of Fujairah. At the end of 1879 or beginning of 1880 Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, having returned from Masqat by sea but in a peaceable manner, headed a fresh rising at Fujairah in which the Qāsimi garrison were driven out of the fort with a loss of eight men killed.

British
intervention,
1880-81.

The question of disturbance of the maritime peace which arose in connection with Shamailiyah affairs in 1876 and again in 1880 is noticed,* being a matter of general importance, in the history of Trucial 'Omān. Here we are only concerned to observe that in 1881 the Shaikh of Shārhjah, having been discouraged in his original wish to undertake the recovery of Fujairah by sea, fell back upon a second set of demands, *viz.*, that he

* *Vide page 724 ante.*

should be allowed by the British Government to operate by land, that he should be supported before Fujairah by a British man-of-war, and that the Sultān of 'Omān should be restrained from countenancing Hamad-bin-'Abdullah ; but the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, whom the Shaikh visited at Būshehr, in the end apparently persuaded him to agree to the arbitration of the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah ; and this the people of Fujairah also were ready to accept. The dispute seems to have been ultimately settled in this manner, on a basis of submission by the chief of Fujairah to the chief of Shārajah as his suzerain, together with continued payment of customary tribute ; and a written agreement was executed by Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, apparently in 1881, in which he admitted his dependence on the Shaikh of Shārajah. It was the opinion of Colonel Ross that the complete independence of Fujairah, which in the past had always been subject either to Shārajah or to Masqat, was an object that, in the general interest, ought not to be promoted.

Shamailiyah under Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālīd, after 1883.

At his accession to the Shārajah Shaikhdom in 1883 Saqar-bin-Khālīd found the Shamailiyah district divided into two fiefs, one of which, adjoining Dibah, had been conferred by Shaikh Sālim on his brother Ahmad, and the other, embracing Khor Fakkān, on his brother Mājīd : this arrangement Shaikh Saqar made no direct effort to change.

But Shaikh Saqar, while he did not himself attempt to displace his kinsmen from their possessions, seems to have instigated that turbulent character, Hamad-bin-'Abdullah of Fujairah, to seize not only Gharaifah on the coast, but also the important hill fort of Bithnah in Wādī Hām, which commands the only direct route between Shamailiyah and the coast of Trucial 'Omān. The Fujairah headman waited for no second invitation, but attacked and took both places, besides plundering Zubārah, the inhabitants of which village had gone to the assistance of those of Bithnah. Instead, however, of holding these acquisitions at Shaikh Saqar's disposal, Hamad-bin-'Abdullah made overtures for protection to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah ; and the Shaikh of Shārajah, unwilling to offend that personage, who was his own near relation, remained quiescent.

Practical
independence
of Fujairah,
1884.

In June 1886 the Wālī of Sohār reported to his master, Saiyid Turki of Masqat, that the people of Khor Fakkān, Dibah and the neighbourhood were anxious to be taken under the protection of the 'Omān Sultanate ; and the Sultān requested the advice of Colonel Miles, formerly Political Agent at Masqat, who was now Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf. Colonel Miles replied that interference in Shamailiyah was inadvisable as it might lead to a conflict with the Qāsimi Shaikh ; with whom the Sultān was then at peace, and that it would probably in the end prove injurious to the interests of the Sultān himself. This answer, which was approved by the Government of India, was sufficient to convince Saiyid Turki of the desirability of abstention, and instructions in accordance with it were given by him to the Wālī of Sohār.

Shamailiyah
still coveted
by the Sultān
of 'Omān,
1886.

Petty
disturbances
in Shamailiyah,
1893-96.

In 1893, at the instigation as was supposed of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, an attack was made by some of the Shihūh on the village of Hair in Shamailiyah, where they killed a number of the inhabitants and destroyed the fort. In the following year the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah would have rebuilt Hair; but the Shihūh interposed, and their obstruction was for the time successful. In 1896-97 a Qāsimi was murdered at Fujairah, and the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Rās-al-Khaimah undertook an expedition against the place, which resulted in the payment of blood-money.

Fresh revolt
at Fujairah,
1900-01.

At length in 1900 the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah died, and that place and its dependencies were re-absorbed in the Shaikhdom of Shārjah, governed by Saqar-bin-Khālid. Shamailiyah was still held in two fiefs, a northern and a southern, by Rāshid-bin-Ahmad and Hamad-bin-Mājid, the sons of the original grantees, of whom the latter derived a revenue worth about \$2,000 per annum from Fujairah, including 150 skins of dates, 12 cwt. of wheat and \$10 in cash.

About the beginning of 1901 the Shaikh of Shārjah sent Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, the headman of Fujairah, to treat, as his representative, with the Shihūh in regard to a murder which had occurred at Dibai; but Hamad apparently profited by the occasion to form a private understanding with the Shihūh, and shortly afterwards he showed signs of disaffection. Negotiations followed, in which the Shaikh of Dibai took part; but they were inconclusive; and Ahmad-bin-Mājid at Ghallah, distrusted by the headman of Fujairah and cut off from the assistance of his relation the Shaikh of Shārjah by the hill fort of Bithnah, was placed in a dangerous predicament.

The combinations among the chiefs of Trucial 'Oman to which this crisis gave rise are described in the general history of that region.

The reason, or at least the pretext, of the headman of Fujairah for his revolt was, as subsequently explained by himself, that Shaikh Saqar-bin-Sultān had in the first instance failed to obtain redress for the robbery of certain natives of Lingeh, residing at Fujairah, by 'Awāmir and Bani Qitab Bedouins; and that, when Hamad in these circumstances had sought the good offices of the Shaikh of Dibai, the Shaikh of Shārjah, taking offence at his action, had employed the Mazāri' and Jalājilah Bedouins to harass Fujairah and had obliged the Jalājilah to divert their trade from Fujairah to the port of Ghallah.

Intervention
of the
British
political
authorities,
1902.

In April 1902, Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid having assembled a body of 250 Bedouins for an attack on Fujairah, and a disposition having appeared on the part of the Shaikhs of Dibai and 'Ajmān to assist Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, the attention of the British Resident, Colonel Kemball, was directed to the dispute with a view to its settlement. A visit was paid to Fujairah by Major Cox, then Political Agent at Masqat, before whom Hamad contended that the agreement executed by him in 1881 did not apply to his own village of Fujairah and seemed loth to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shaikh of Shārjah in any shape or form; the Shaikh of Dibai was warned to desist from interference; and the Sultān of 'Omān, Saiyid Faisal-bin-Turki, was restrained from affording support which the headman of Fujairah had gone in person to Masqat in order to procure.

Such was the position of affairs when Colonel Kemball directed the Residency Agent at Shārhjah to take steps to assemble a board of conciliation. The Shaikh of Shārhjah, though he declared his inability to restrain Bedouins from attacking Fujairah, was at this time willing to accept a general decision by the Resident between himself and Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, and he granted a safe-conduct to enable his adversary to appear at Shārhjah. The headman of Fujairah, on the other hand, would agree to no such compromise; he declined to attend the meeting at Shārhjah and was obviously resolved not to submit to any settlement; and it was suspected that he was encouraged in his purpose of resistance by the Shihūh of Bai'ah and even by the Wālī of Sohār in the 'Omān Sultanate. In October 1902 Saiyid Turki of Masqat, at the instance of the British political authorities, sent orders to the Shihūh of Bai'ah to refrain from countenancing Hamad-bin-'Abdullah; but in the meantime Shaikh Saqar-bin-Khālid had repented of his own conciliatory attitude, and in November he caused two inhabitants of Fujairah to be murdered by the way as they were returning from 'Ajman to their homes.

In December Mr. Gaskin, Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, was sent to the spot in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to effect an accommodation, if possible; Shaikh Saqar joined him on board at Shārhjah on the 27th of December, and on the 28th the vessel reached the coast opposite Fujairah. Two days were spent in negotiations: but the demeanour on shore of Hamad-bin-'Abdullah's armed followers was almost threatening, and the attempt at mediation had to be abandoned.

In these circumstances the Government of India decided that there was no need to interfere between the disputants, provided that it was clearly understood by both that the peace at sea must not be disturbed; and they were consequently left to pursue their own measures one against the other.

In April 1903 the Shaikh of Shārhjah sent an expedition against Fujairah which reached Bithnah; and it was reported that Hamad-bin-'Abdullah, though again assisted by the Shaikh of Bai'ah, had been obliged to sue for peace, to admit his vassalage, and to enter into a provisional agreement; but the settlement was nominal only and made no real change in the situation. In his address to the Trucial Shaikhs at the Darbār held at sea off Shārhjah in November 1903, Lord Curzon referred to the Fujairah case and counselled an amicable agreement; but his exhortation fell on unheeding ears.

Early in 1903, in connection with measures for securing the naval position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, it was decided by His Majesty's Government, in accordance with recommendations by the Government of India, that the Shamailiyah district from Dibah to Khor Kalba should be regarded as belonging to the Shāikhdom of Shārhjah, not as an independent principality nor as connected with the Sultanate of 'Omān.

Further
events, 1903.

Recognition
of
Shamailiyah
by the
British
Government
as belonging
to the
Shārhjah
Shāikhdom,
1903.

In the course of some topographical and political inquiries which were held by the present writer on tour at Sohār in March 1905, a

Shamailiyah
officially

regarded at
Sohār as
belonging to
Shārjah,
1905.

Position in
Shamailiyah,
1905-07.

striking corroboration of the correctness of this view was obtained. By a crowded assembly which included the Sultan of 'Omān's Acting Wālī of Sohār it was stated, without one dissentient voice, that the coast from Khor Kalba to Dibah, inclusive, belonged to the Shaikh of Shārjah.

By 1905 the Shaikh of Shārjah had apparently abandoned all hope of reducing the headman of Fujairah to obedience; and in that year it was ascertained that Hamad-bin-'Abdullah held adverse possession of the following places in addition to his own village of Fujairah:—Bithnah, Gharaifah, Marbah, Qaraiyah, Qidfah, Saqamqam and Sufad. In April 1906, as mentioned* in the general history of Trucial 'Omān, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in a written agreement between himself and the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain, claimed the headman of Fujairah as among his own political dependents, and no protest was apparently entered by the Shaikh of Shārjah.

ANNEXURE No. 7.—MUTUAL AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE SHAIKHS OF TRUCIAL 'OMĀN ON THE 24TH OF JUNE 1879.

Preliminary.

Since it is to the interest of all the Trucial Chiefs to combine mutually for the prevention of their subjects absconding for fraud from one territory and taking asylum in another, especially as regards divers and sailors, on this account we, whose seals and signatures are attached to this document, hereby agree and bind ourselves in the presence of Haji Abul Cassim, Residency Moonshee, specially deputed for giving effect to this object, and Haji Abdur Rahman, Government Agent, to give aid in every way possible in preventing such runaways from obtaining aid or asylum in our countries.

Therefore, in accordance with this agreement, we consent—

1st. In the event of a runaway seeking refuge in our territories, whether by sea or land, to consider it our duty to at once restore him to the Chief from whose jurisdiction he may have absconded.

2nd. In the event of its being proved that a runaway is protected by any Chief, and not delivered up, or his liability accepted when demanded by the Government Agent, such Chief shall be liable to a fine of 50 dollars in addition to all just claims proven against such runaway.

3rd. Further, if the Chief harbouring such runaway refuse to deliver him up or accept his liability when demanded by the Government Agent, and permit him to proceed to the pearl banks in pursuance of his vocation, such Chief shall be liable to a fine of 100 dollars in addition to all just proven claims against the runaway.

* *Vide* page 754 *ante*.

4th. When facts are disputed a council of arbitration (mejlis) will be convened, at which the Government Agent will preside, the disputing parties and all the Trucial Chiefs sending delegates, or if they wish attending themselves. The decision of the council to be binding only when confirmed by Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

5th. These fines are only to be enforced when Her Britannic Majesty's Resident in the Persian Gulf has satisfied himself that the Chief complained against is really in fault and fairly liable.

We therefore have written and put our signatures and seals to this document consenting and binding ourselves to carry out this agreement without opposition.

Correct.

(Sd.) SALIM BEN SULTAN BEN SUGGUR AL JOASMI,
with his own hand.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) RASHID BEN HOMEYD BEN RASHID AL NAEEMEE.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) HUSHUR BEN MUKTOOM,

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) AHMED BEN ABDULLAH BEN RASHID.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) The mendicant of God, ZAYED BEN KHULIFA.

Seal.

Correct.

(Sd.) HOMEYD BEN ABDULLAH BEN SULTAN AL JOASMI,
with his own hand,



Seal.

ANNEXURE No. 8.—EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE
SHAIKHS OF TRUCIAL 'OMĀN WITH THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT, MARCH 1892.

I, Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, *viz.*:—

1st. That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government.

2nd. That without the assent of the British Government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3rd. That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Abu Dhabi, 6th March 1892, corresponding to 5th Shaaban 1309 Hijri.

Signature of Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi.

A. C. TALBOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

(The documents signed by the other Trucial Shaikhs, *viz.*, the Shaikhs of Dibai, 'Ajmān, Shārajah, Rās-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain, the first three dated the 7th and the last two the 8th of March 1892, are identical in form.)

CHAPTER IV.

HISTORY OF QATAR.*

Qatar the head-quarters of the Āl Khalifah section of the 'Utūb, 1766-1782.

The modern history of Qatar opens with the settlement at Zubārah, upon the western shore of the promontory, of immigrants from Kuwait—the whole Āl Khalifah division, namely, of the 'Utūb. It is stated that, at the arrival of the 'Utūb in Qatar in 1766, Huwailah, inhabited by Āl Musallam of the Bani Khālid stock, was the largest place on the coast; but Fuwairat and Dōhah also existed, the former being occupied by Ma'ādhid and other Āl Bin-'Ali, and the latter by Sūdān refugees from the Pirate Coast. The Āl Khalifah were followed to Zubārah at a short interval by their kinsmen the Jalāhimah, another division of the tribe, whom they at first hospitably received; but dissensions shortly broke out, resulting in the secession of the Jalāhimah to the neighbouring village of Ruwais, where they addicted themselves to piracy and were afterwards all but exterminated by the Āl Khalifah and by others whom the Āl Khalifah called in to their assistance. After this event the remnant of the Jalāhimah appear to have transferred themselves from Ruwais to the adjacent port of Khor Hassān.

Settlement
of the 'Utūb
at Zubārah,
1766.

The growth of Zubārah was greatly stimulated by the Persian occupation of Basrah between 1776 and 1779, during which a number of Basrah merchants together with fugitives from Kuwait resided temporarily at Zubārah and the pearl trade and the general trade of Eastern Arabia with

Injury to
Persian inter-
ests from
the growth
of Zubārah.

* Apart from the records of the Government of India there are few sources of information regarding the history of Qatar, and such works as do exist are compilations from those records. The principal authorities for earlier times are *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; and a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906: those for a more recent period are a *Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1804-1904*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1904; a *Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs, 1873-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, throws some light on the condition of Qatar in 1863; and Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, gives some details of British naval operations not to be found elsewhere. The single Agreement relating to Qatar will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*.

India to a considerable extent centred there; and in 1779 the Imām of 'Oman sent a ship to Zubārah upon some friendly errand. In these circumstances the reduction of Zubārah became an object of importance to the Persian Government; and under their instructions several attempts, commencing in 1777, were made upon the place by the Shaikh of Būshehr, but without success. In 1780, possibly in the same connection, but more probably in consequence of piracies committed by the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān, that tribe were at war with the 'Utūb, both of Zubārah and of Kuwait. At length in 1782, emboldened perhaps by the increasing difficulties of the Zand rulers of Shirāz, the 'Utūb of Zubārah ventured to retaliate by an incursion into the island of Bahrain, where much damage was done by them to the town of Manāmah, and whence they carried off a Būshehr vessel that had come to fetch the annual tribute paid by the islands to Persia. The military danger from the existence of Zubārah to the Persian position in Bahrain was thus made fully apparent.

Unsuccessful
Persian
attack on
Zubārah,
1783.

'Ali Murād Khān, the ruler of Shirāz, immediately ordered Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr to organise, with the help of the petty rulers of Rīg, Ganāveh, Dashtistān and other places on the coast, a strong expedition against Zubārah; and a force of 2,000 men was accordingly embarked for this service under the command of Muhammad, a nephew of Shaikh Nāsir. The Persian fleet at first blockaded Zubārah, and negotiations ensued in which the rôle of mediator was assumed by Rāshid-bin-Matar, the retired Qāsimi Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; but the utmost that the 'Utūb would concede was the return of the plunder which they had taken in Bahrain. This offer having been declined, the Persian troops were disembarked and proceeded to attack the Zubārah fort; but, being met on shore by a force much larger than they had expected, they were routed and driven to their ships with heavy loss. Shaikh Muhammad, who commanded, as well as a nephew of Shaikh Rāshid-bin-Matar and some notables of Hormūz, who had accompanied the expedition, were among the slain in this disaster. Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr and Shaikh Rāshid met after this at 'Asalu on the Persian coast, where they endeavoured, but without success, to equip a second expedition.

Conquest of
Bahrain by
the 'Utūb
and transfer
of their head-
quarters
from Qatar
to Bahrain,
1783.

A month or two later, the Persian garrison of Bahrain having succumbed to the 'Utūb of Zubārah, to whose assistance their brethren of Kuwait had in the meantime arrived, the islands passed under the sway of the 'Utūb and became, instead of Zubārah, the principal seat of their Shaikhs. Ahmad-bin-Khalifah was the first of the 'Atbi chiefs that ruled over Bahrain.

Affairs during the ascendancy of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Qatar, 1783-1816.

The Jalāhimah, under the sons of a Shaikh named Jābir, had taken their part with the other 'Utūb in the conquest of Bahrain ; but after the victory, conceiving themselves to have been slighted or insufficiently rewarded, they appear to have sojourned for a time on Khārag Island and at Būshehr. Subsequently they returned to Qatar, where they settled at Khor Hassān ; and at that place a contest for the chief power in the section took place between 'Abdullah, an elder son, and Rahmah, a younger son, of Shaikh Jābir. The dispute was eventually decided in favour of Rahmah ; and 'Abdullah at some time before 1810 fled to Masqat, where he died, to seek the assistance of Saiyid Sa'id against his brother. The power of Rahmah in Qatar was, however, at no time universal, and it did not at first extend even to Zubārah, which was in the immediate vicinity of his own headquarters. In 1805 an 'Atbi Shaikh of Zubārah, evidently not Rahmah, joined with the 'Atbi Shaikh of Kuwait in seeking British aid against the Wahhābis.

Settlement
of Rahmah
at Khor
Hassān, 1783
or later.

Zubārah was at this time a larger and more important place than Qatīf ; and in 1790 foreign merchants enjoyed complete protection there, and there were no customs duties. The share of the Arabs of Qatar in the pearl fisheries was at this time small.

The name of Rahmah-bin-Jābir soon became notorious as that of a daring and successful freebooter, by whose depredations the Persians and the 'Utūb other than the Jalāhimah were the chief sufferers. In 1809, shortly before the despatch of the first British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, reprisals against Khor Hassān were attempted by a Persian fleet from Būshehr ; but Rahmah, reinforced by his sympathisers the Qawāsīm, defeated the expedition and even captured some of the enemy's vessels. Towards the end of 1809 he was reported to have taken 20 Batils owned by the 'Utūb while at sea on their way from Kuwait to Masqat ; and in this affair a son of 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, was killed in charge of the convoy. In revenge for the death of the latter a naval attack on Khor Hassān was threatened by the 'Utūb of Kuwait, but was not, apparently, made. The exploits of Rahmah, though in some cases piratical, were performed as a rule under pretext of lawful warfare ; and towards the subjects and officials of the British Government, even at a period when

Naval depredations by
Rahmah,
1783-1809.

no respect was shown for them by the Qawāsim, his conduct was scrupulously correct. On one occasion he was stated to have shown "remarkable . . . forbearance towards the *Augusta* Cruizer, when in the power of his fleet."

Political position and treatment of Rahmah by the British authorities, 1809.

By 1809 Rahmah had entered into close relations with the Wahhābi power and controlled, in conjunction with their emissaries, even the town of Zubārah ; the latter circumstance would seem to mark a recent growth of his power, for in 1800-02 some of the 'Atbi chiefs expelled from Bahrain by Saiyid Sultān of Masqat had been able, in spite of their enmity with Rahmah, to take refuge at Zubārah and engage there in negotiations for assistance by the Wahhābis in recovering Bahrain. In consequence partly of the intimacy of Rahmah with the Wahhābis, a collision with whom the British Government were anxious to avoid, and partly of his irreproachable attitude towards British interests, it was decided, in connection with the Rās-al-Khaimah expedition of 1809, to abstain if possible from direct action against him. At one time indeed it was intended to require, from whichever of the two Jalāhimah brothers might be found in possession of Khor Hassān, a written undertaking to desist at least from giving "employment or active support" to the Qawāsim, who were said to have resorted there from Rās-al-Khaimah, and in event of refusal "Khor Hassān and its maritime and piratical equipments" were to be destroyed ; but in the end even these conditions were apparently waived in deference to the opinion of the naval and military commanders of the British expedition and of General Malcolm, then British Envoy to Persia. Mr. N. H. Smith, Political Resident at Būshehr, who had not perhaps been informed of the decision, would have sent a force to Khor Hassān for the purpose of destroying Rahmah's vessels ; but the movement was disallowed and action prevented by the Government of Bombay with the concurrence of the Government of India.

Predominance of the Wahhābism in Qatar, 1809-11.

In 1809, as already indicated, the Wahhābis with the support of Rahmah brought Qatar strictly under their own rule ; Bahrain soon succumbed to the powerful Wahhābi influences which were then directed on it from Zubārah and Qatif ; and in 1810 a Wahhābi governorship of Qatif, Qatar and Bahrain, with headquarters in Bahrain, was instituted and conferred upon one 'Abdullah-bin-'Ufaisān. Under the ægis of the Wahhābi power, Rahmah assisted by boats from the Pirate Coast proceeded, soon after the conclusion of the British operations at Rās-al-Khaimah, to atrocities of increasing gravity ; he captured 18 loaded vessels belonging to the 'Utūb of Zubārah and Bahrain ; he took a ship and several smaller vessels belonging to Masqat, Kangūn, Būshehr and other ports of

which, with a very few exceptions, he put the crews to death : in short, he created a reign of terror in the Gulf. In May 1811 Rahmah made a piratical cruise of some importance, on which he was accompanied by a fleet from the town of 'Ajmān ; but the star of his Wāhhābi patrons was now temporarily declining, and events soon occurred which obliged him to become more circumspect.

In 1811, the power of the Wāhhābis in Eastern Arabia having been greatly weakened by events upon the western frontier of their empire, Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat attacked them in Qatar by means of a naval expedition, expelled their garrisons from Zubārah and Khor Hassān, and destroyed the former of those two places by fire. The result appears to have been the evacuation by the Wāhhābis not of Qatar only but also of Bahrain, where their governor of Hasa, Qatar and Qatif was taken prisoner, and the restoration of the sovereignty of the Āl Khalifah. Rahmah, who represented the Wāhhābi power at sea in this part of the Gulf, fought a desperate action with the fleet of the 'Utūb and sustained a decided reverse ; and about this time, or soon after, he seems to have transferred his headquarters from Qatar to Dammām on the coast of Hasa.

Expulsion of
the Wāhhābis
from Qatar,
1811.

In 1813 Rahmah, whose respect for the British name was as inalterable as his hatred for the 'Utūb of Bahrain, unwittingly committed a piracy on a Baghlah from Basrah freighted with horses belonging to the East India Company ; but, on discovering the mistake, he made arrangements for forwarding the animals to Bombay, where they all eventually arrived in safety.

Removal of Rahmah-bin-Jābir from Qatar and his proceedings until the second British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1816-20.

In 1816, or possibly earlier, Rahmah somewhat suddenly disassociated himself from the Wāhhābi cause and joined the ruler of Masqat. This change of sides appears to have been due not to inconstancy on his part, but rather to the implacability of his resentment against the 'Utūb of Bahrain, between whom and Saiyid Sa'id, formerly allies, enmity had now arisen ; and Saiyid Sa'id appears to have intended, had he been successful in his attack on Bahrain in 1816, to set Rahmah-bin-Jābir in the place of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs. The Wāhhābis and the Qawāsīm, as friends of the Āl Khalifah, now became the enemies and the victims of Rahmah ; while the Wāhhābi Amīr, annoyed at Rahmah's desertion

Migration
of Rahmah
from Dam-
mām to
Būshehr,
1816.

of his case, persecuted him by every available means. In July 1816 a fort which Rahmah had constructed at Dammām on the coast of Hasa was blown up by the Wahhābis ; not without difficulty he rescued his family and effects at Khor Hassān, the removal of which to Dara'iyah had been directed by the Amir ; and at length, in October 1816, he arrived at Būshehr as a fugitive and an exile, accompanied by about 500 families and bringing with him, besides smaller boats, two very large Baghlahs, a great Batil and several Baqarāhs. To the present day the western and northern coasts of Qatar are dotted with the remains of forts attributed to Rahmah.

Rahmah's
relations
with Masqat
and war
with the
Qawāsīm,
1817.

The proceedings of this restless individual during the next two years form properly no part of the history of Qatar ; but still less do they enter into that of any other district. At Būshehr Rahmah was well received by Shaikh Muhammad, the Governor, who assigned a quarter for his residence and that of his dependents ; nor did he delay to visit the British Resident, to whom he professed friendship for the British Government and readiness to be employed in fighting the Qawāsīm, whose day of reckoning was now at hand.

Saiyid Sa'īd was anxious that Rahmah should become a subject of Masqat and settle in some part of 'Omān ; but the pirate, who regarded his patron as disgraced by the failure of the expedition against Bahrain in 1816, declined the proposal. In 1817, however, Rahmah visited Masqat with the object of inducing Sa'īd to renew his attempts on Bahrain ; but he found the Saiyid occupied with various internal difficulties.

In 1817 Rahmah made a highly successful cruise against the Qawāsīm and captured twelve of their boats while engaged in carrying supplies from Bahrain to Rās-al-Khaimah ; four of these he brought back with him to Būshehr, and eight he sank or destroyed, for want of crews to man them, after removing part of the cargoes.

Migration of
Rahmah from
Būshehr to
Dammām,
1819.

In 1818 Rahmah removed again from Būshehr to Dammām ; and thenceforward he may be regarded as connected with the province of Hasa rather than with Qatar.

British
dealings
with Rahmah
in connection
with the
Rās-al-
Khaimah
expedition of
1819-20.

It was expected in 1819 that Rahmah, either on his own account or under the auspices of Masqat, would join the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, and it was resolved to accept his services should they be offered ; but Rahmah, who never lost sight of his main object—the humiliation of the 'Utūb of Bahrain—and with whom the punishment of the Qawāsīm was a merely secondary matter, did not come forward. Instead, in February 1820, when the Prince Governor of Fārs was endeavouring to organise an expedition against Bahrain in

order to anticipate the designs of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat in that quarter, Rahmah crossed the Gulf to Būshehr and placed himself with three vessels at the disposal of the Persians. On the 10th of February he sailed from Būshehr for Tahiri to join the Prince Governor; but on the way his largest Baghlah was wrecked upon a shoal near Bardistān, Rahmah and his companions barely escaping with their lives,—an accident which seems to have put an end to the enterprise in so far as he was concerned. During these proceedings an order for the destruction of Rahmah's vessels had been issued by General Sir W. Grant Keir, the commander of the British expedition; but, as Rahmah was found to be at the time in the employment of the Shīrāz Government, it was decided to postpone action. On the 13th of April 1820 Rahmah was again at Būshehr, where he was invited by the Resident to become a party to the General Treaty of Peace. He declined, pleading that he was now a servant of the Governor-General of Shīrāz; and this excuse, on its being corroborated by the Shaikh of Būshehr, who also undertook to be answerable for Rahmah's future conduct, was accepted as sufficient by the British authorities.

British Relations, 1821-23.

In 1821 in consequence of piracies committed by the inhabitants, the town of Bida' (now Dōhah) was destroyed by the East India Company's cruiser "Vestal," and three or four hundred of the people migrated temporarily to the islands between Qatar and the Pirate Coast.

Punishment
of piracy,
1821.

In January 1823, in the course of his voyage of discovery along the Arabian coast which is more fully described* in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Lieutenant McLeod, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, paid a visit to Dōhah (then Bida') on the eastern side of Qatar; he found the place, which was admittedly a dependency of Bahrain and therefore subject to the provisions of the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, under the administration of a Shaikh of the Āl Bū Āinain. Dōhah was at this time the only port in Qatar which possessed any trading vessels; but the requirements of the Treaty in regard to flags and the registry of vessels were not observed by the inhabitants, who appeared to be ignorant of its terms. Lieutenant McLeod, however, obtained a list of the shipping; and, on his arrival in Bahrain a few days later, he made representations to the Shaikh which, it was thought, would secure a proper observance of the

Visit of the
Resident to
Qatar, 1823.

* *Vide* page 677 *ante*.

Treaty in Qatar.* A British marine survey of the Qatar coast and of the waters to the east of it was at this time in progress, and the operations were assisted by the Shaikhs of the littoral to the best of their ability.

General history of Qatar from the Resident's visit in 1823 to the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840.

Between the Resident's visit in 1823 and the close of the Egyptian occupation of Hasa in 1840 the affairs of Qatar attracted little attention. Such matters as came to notice related either to the sovereignty of the Bahrain Shaikh over the promontory or to attacks committed by the inhabitants, or by piratical refugees, upon boats belonging to other parts of the Gulf.

Relations of
Qatar with
Bahrain.

Although the authority of the Shaikh of Bahrain in Qatar was not at this period questioned, and although the Shaikh was generally able to expel those who resisted it, his writ cannot be said to have run freely.

1828. An inhabitant of Bahrain having been stabbed by Muhammad-bin-Khamīs, the headman of the Āl Bū 'Ainain of Dōhah, the Shaikh of Bahrain caused the offender to be placed in confinement; his tribe revolted; and in May 1828 Shaikh 'Abdullah, after destroying the fort of the Āl Bū 'Ainain at Dōhah, removed them to the villages of Ruwais and Fuwairat, where they came more directly under his control.

1833. In 1833, and perhaps for some time previously, Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir, resided on the coast of Qatar for the purpose of watching the proceedings of the Wāhhābis, a rupture with whom he was meditating.

1835. In 1835, as related in the history of Bahrain, the people of Huwailah rebelled against the authority of the ruler of Bahrain, opened a correspondence with the Wāhhābis, and were abetted in their revolt by Ahmad and by another undutiful son of Shaikh Abdullah. By the mediation of Saiyid Hilāl, a son of Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, a settlement was arranged between the Shaikh and his rebellious subjects: the conditions were that

* The registration of ships, as observed in the history of Trucial 'Omān, ultimately proved to be impracticable and was abandoned; but, in view of the indefinite status, replete with political difficulties into which the Qatar promontory has now lapsed, it is much to be regretted that our officers did not continue to insist, as they did in Trucial 'Omān, on the use of the Trucial flag. In this there could have been no real difficulty so long as Qatar remained under the Shaikhs of Bahrain; and the maintenance of the flag might have stereotyped the dependence of Qatar on Bahrain, and with it the principle of British control over Qatar.

each party should retain the advantages acquired during the war, but that Huwailah should be evacuated and demolished, and that the inhabitants should remove to Bahrain and settle there under a guarantee by the Saiyid of Masqat for their personal safety. The agreement was almost immediately violated by Shaikh 'Abdullah's nephews and other partisans, who incited some members of the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe to make a raid on Huwailah; and this affair, in which a boat was sunk and a dependent of 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, a leading man among the people of Huwailah, was killed, and for which Shaikh 'Abdullah refused to make reparation, led to the secession of 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, accompanied by a number of the Āl Bin 'Alī and Āl Bū 'Ainain, to Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Oman. The British Resident in the Gulf, however, forbade the seceders to use Abu Dhabi as a base for operations against Bahrain, except on the condition that the Shaikh of that place consented to make common cause with them and to declare war against the Shaikh of Bahrain,—a condition which was not fulfilled; and the subsequent proceedings of the emigrants, described in the history of the Bahrain Shaikhdom, did not affect the promontory of Qatar.

In 1836 and 1837, as mentioned in the history of Bahrain, Shaikh 1836-37. 'Abdullah seems to have entertained an idea of retiring from the midst of the family conflicts by which he was surrounded in Bahrain to a safer and more peaceful abode at Khor Hassān in Qatar, and he even made preparations for the move; but he does not appear to have carried his purpose into effect until some time afterwards.

In 1839, in consequence of relations lately formed by the Shaikh of 1839-40. Bahrain with the Egyptian Military Commander in Hasa, the inhabitants of Qatar became exposed to fresh exactions; and their discontent reached such a pitch that the Āl Bū Kuwārah, whose principal settlement was Fuwairat, applied for leave to remove from the country and to settle elsewhere under the protection of the British Government. At the end of 1839 or beginning of 1840, on some of the Na'im of Qatar refusing to pay Zakāt which had been demanded of them by the Egyptians through the Shaikh of Bahrain, Muhammad Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Hasa, despatched a party of regular troops, assisted by Bedouins of the Makhadhdhabah division of the Bani Hājir, to lay waste their country; but the assassination of the Governor in the neighbourhood of Hofūf obliged the expedition to return prematurely without effecting anything.

During the first part of the period now in question, some insecurity was created at sea by Bani Yās refugees from Abu Dhabi who had settled temporarily in Qatar. The first of these to arrive was Muhammad-bin-Shakhbūt, who had himself been deposed in 1818 from the Abu Dhabi

Maritime
irregularities
committed
by residents
of Qatar.

Shaikhship; and he was followed by Suwaidān-bin-Za'al, a discontented member of the Mahāribah section of the Bani Yās, who quitted Abu Dhabi in 1822 but did not apparently settle in Qatar until some time later. In January 1823 Suwaidān, who was then supposed to be living at Yās Island, was said to have at command about 1,000 armed supporters and to possess a fine Batil and 50 smaller boats. Among his followers were Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tikhān) and 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn, whose names were before long to be associated with piratical outrages.

1823-24.

Towards the end of 1823 Muḥamad-bin-Shakhbūt, then domiciled at Dōhah in Qatar, made an unsuccessful attempt to recover his position at Abu Dhabi, in the history of which Shaikhdom his expedition is described; and, on his return to Qatar, he appears to have shifted his headquarters from Dōhah to Huwailah. Early in 1824, a piracy by Muḥammad-bin-Shakhbūt on a vessel of Dibai—a place then in alliance with Abu Dhabi—having been reported, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf somewhat hastily required Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain, as ruler of Qatar, to take action against Muḥammad, and even offered him the assistance of a British squadron; but the supposed piracy was in the end shown not to have occurred.

1826-28.

In 1826 a number of piratical offences, noticed in the history of Trucial Onān, were committed from Dōhah in Qatar by 'Obaid-bin-Sa'adūn and Saif-bin-Dhaikhān (or Tikhān), the followers of Suwaidān-bin-Za'al; they carried their plunder at first to Dōhah, but soon afterwards they decamped from that place. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was, with some difficulty, restrained by British influence from declaring war on account of these incidents against the Shaikh of Bahrain, and it does not appear that any corrective action was taken by the British political authorities; but in 1828, on the return of Suwaidān and his followers to Abu Dhabi, the depredations of the gang came to an end.

Meanwhile, however, in May 1827, a heinous piracy had been committed by one 'Obaid (or 'Abdullah)-bin-Mahanna, a tribesman of the Manāsir, who had recently settled at Dōhah in Qatar. With some companions, among whom was a certain Husain-bin-Jāsim of Bahrain, he attacked a Būshehr Batil off Ganāveh, on her way to Dilam; a number of the occupants were put to death, and the remainder, after being completely stripped, were landed on the coast near Burdakhān. A small portion of the property plundered was recovered in Bahrain; but to the demand of the British Resident for the surrender of 'Obaid and Husain the Shaikh replied that they had fled beyond his jurisdiction, which appeared to be the case. Enquiries, however, continued; and in April

1828 the Resident had an interview with Shaikh 'Abdullah, at which he impressed on him the necessity of doing his utmost to arrest the offenders. At length in September 1828 'Obaid-bin-Mahanna, issuing from some unknown haunt with a number of Manāsir associates, resumed his piratical practices in the neighbourhood of Būshehr; but, having landed at Ziyārat on the Persian coast and aroused suspicion there by his enquiries as to the destination of a small Baghlah which was there at anchor, he was taken prisoner by the inhabitants after a desperate resistance. From Ziyārat 'Obaid was brought to the British Resident at Būshehr, who, after his identity had been satisfactorily established, handed him over to Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl to answer for his depredations on Būshehr boats and murders of Būshehr subjects; but 'Obaid cheated the gallows by escaping from custody during the storm of Būshehr by Timūr Mīrza in November 1828. On their return from Ziyārat to the Arabian coast, the crew of 'Obaid's boat, as mentioned in the history of Trucial 'Omān, plundered four vessels belonging to 'Asalu.

In 1831, apparently so near to Būshehr as Halileh, a piracy of an ordinary character was committed on a Kangūn fishing boat by an individual named Hasūm, whose home was at Fuwairat in Qatar; the criminal was not traced, however, until the following year. It was afterwards ascertained that, on leaving Halileh, Hasūm had crossed the Gulf to 'Oqair, where he attempted to surprise a boat belonging to Bahrain; but the crew were on their guard and took him prisoner along with eight of his companions. After having been detained for some days at 'Oqair the prisoners had managed to escape to Huwailah in Qatar, and here the boat taken by them at Halileh was subsequently recovered.

After the punishment of the Bani Yās for piracy in 1835, a number of the tribe emigrated* westwards to Khor-al-'Odaid, partly to escape paying their share of the fines imposed by the British Government, and partly in order that they might be able to continue their piratical mode of life. They were countenanced by the inhabitants of the eastern coast of Qatar, who not only made no effort to restrain their depredations, but even supplied them with water and other necessities; and it was consequently resolved to send a naval force to demonstrate the accessibility of those waters to British vessels and to remind the people of Qatar of their responsibilities. The cruise, which was made by two sloops of war and a schooner, was a complete success: it resulted in an undertaking, imposed on the headmen of Dōhah, Wakrah and 'Odaid, to seize the boats of the pirates or otherwise to pay a fine; in the capture of some of the dependants of Jāsīm-bin-Jābir, Raqraqi, the chief

* See also page 766 *ante*.

among the pirates ; and in the burning upon the beach, in presence of the Resident, of one of the piratical Baghlahs. In September 1836 the headman of Dōhah, who was suspected of maintaining close relations with the Raqraqi, was personally warned by the Resident not again to harbour him.

Relations
with Britain.

Qatar, as a dependency of Bahrain at the time, came under the operation of the Maritime Truce of 1835 ; and in 1836 the Restrictive Line was prolonged from Sir Bū Na'air Island, by way of Hālūl, so as to pass ten miles north of the extremity of the Qatar promontory.

General history of Qatar from the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840 to the attack by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi on Qatar in 1867.

Piracies off
the coast of
Qatar and
British bom-
bardment of
Dōhah, 1841.

The misdeeds of Jāsim-bin-Jābir, however, continued ; and in February 1841, in consequence of a Rās-al-Khaimah vessel having been seized and plundered by him, a squadron consisting of the steam frigate "Sesostris," the "Coote," 18-gun sloop of war, and the "Tigris," 10-gun brig, was sent under Commodore Brucks, I.N., to require from the headman of Dōhah the surrender of the pirate's vessel and the payment of a fine of \$300, besides compensation for property plundered. After a short bombardment of the place by the 8-inch guns of the "Sesostris" the vessel of Jāsim, who was actually present in Dōhah at the arrival of the squadron but lost no time in making his escape to the interior, was handed over and publicly burnt ; and some other property which he had left behind was confiscated. The ships then proceeded on a similar errand to Dibai.

In the early summer of 1841 a Lingeh boat, carrying dates and matting from Qatif to Bahrain, grounded on the western coast of Qatar, and, while in this helpless state, was relieved of cargo to the value of 240 Muhammad Shāhi rupees by five Baqārahs which put off from the coast. A complaint made by the sufferers to Nāsir, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was disregarded ; and eventually, at the request of the Shaikh of Lingeh, the case was taken up by the British Resident at Būshehr, and it was decided that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be held responsible. The Qataris, however, pleaded that the property claimed had been voluntarily paid them as salvage by the master of

the distressed vessel ; and, as in the end they substantiated this story by an oath of divorce taken in the presence of a Qādhi, the compensation money, which had been recovered from them, was returned.

Soon after this the promontory of Qatar began to figure, as a scene of operations, in the struggle between Abdullah-bin-Ahmad and Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, the rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, of which the general course is described in the history of that principality. On the first occurrence of a breach between the chiefs in 1840, Shaikh Muhammad, the junior of the two, retired to Qatar and established an influence which was for a time superior to his grand-uncle's in that part of the Bahrain Shaikhdom. In 1842, however, when Khālid, the ex-Amīr of the Wahhābis, visited Shaikh 'Abdullah from Dammām, he was received at Khor Hassān in Qatar where the old chief was then residing, Shaikh Muhammad having in the meanwhile returned to Bahrain ; and a little later on actual hostilities breaking out between the relatives, the first act of Shaikh 'Abdullah was to recross the straits and land in Bahrain, whence in the month of June he succeeded in expelling Shaikh Muhammad. The people of Khor Hassān in Qatar must apparently have sided with Shaikh Muhammad, for the victor immediately gave up that village to partial plunder ; and it was perhaps for the purpose of combating the influence of Shaikh Muhammad, which seems to have been generally strong upon the mainland, that Shaikh 'Abdullah soon after made arrangements to re-occupy the deserted site of Zubārah. Shaikh Muhammad, however, who had landed in Qatar on his expulsion from Bahrain in 1842, anticipated his grand-uncle by seizing the fort of Murair near Zubārah ; and not long afterwards he obtained possession of Fuwairat, and assumed the offensive by launching from that place an expedition, ultimately successful, against the Bahrain islands. In April 1843, immediately after the capture of Muharraḡ, a Qatari contingent by whom Shaikh Muhammad was assisted were suddenly recalled to Qatar by an attack of the Manāsir upon their homes ; but their departure caused no inconvenience to Shaikh Muhammad, whose position in Bahrain was by that time firmly established.

Affairs in
Qatar during
the civil war
in Bahrain,
1840-43.

In the autumn of 1843 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-Āli ally of Shaikh Muhammad, transferred his abode from Qais Island to Dōhah in Qatar ; the change was welcome to the British authorities both because it brought that warlike character to the side of the Restrictive Line on which, in certain circumstances, he could be permitted to indulge his tastes, and because at the same time it took Dōhah out of the hands of a headman of the Sūdān tribe who was more addicted to piracy than to regular war.

Affairs in
Qatar during
the continu-
ance of the
struggle be-
tween the
Shaikh and
the ex-
Shaikh of
Bahrain,
1843-49.

In 1844 the ex-Shaikh Abdullah, sailing from Nāband on the coast of Persia, sought to surprise 'Īsa-bin-Tarīf at Dōhah; but the attempt failed, and he sought another field of operations. In 1847 the contest for the Bahrain Shaikhship was practically ended by a decisive battle on land, fought near Fuwairat in Qatar; in this engagement 'Īsa-bin-Tarīf, who had meanwhile changed sides and become the mainstay of 'Abdullah's party, lost his life, and the hopes of the ex-Shaikh perished with him.

Visit of the
Wahhābis
Amīr to
Qatar, 1851.

Early in 1851 Faisal-bin-Turki, the Amīr of the Wahhābis, in the course of a tour through his dominions, arrived within two stages of Dōhah in Qatar; and the people of that place, as well as of Wakrah and Fuwairat, immediately evinced an inclination to throw off their allegiance to the Shaikh of Bahrain and to become subjects of the Wahhābi empire. A timely peace, however, arranged in July 1851, removed the risk to which the Āl Khalifah were exposed of losing their possessions in Qatar as they had already lost Dammām in Hasa.

Political
position of
Qatar, 1866-
67.

In 1866 it was reported by Colonel Pelly, the British Resident in the Gulf, and in 1867 the view was accepted by the Government of India, that the Shaikh of Bahrain probably owed fealty to the Wahhābi Government on account of his possessions in Qatar, but that, in regard to the Bahrain islands, he was altogether independent of the Wahhābis; and the tribute of \$4,000 a year which the Bahrain Shaikh now rendered to the Wahhābi Amīr was regarded as a payment made to secure his subjects in Qatar from aggression by other tribes of the mainland. At one time between 1852 and 1866 the Amīr appears to have had a representative of his own at Dōhah; but it is probable that this agent was only the local Shaikh.

Attack on Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and its consequences, 1867-68.

Cause and
circumstances
of the attack,
1867.

A remarkably treacherous and destructive attack was made in October 1867 on Dōhah and Wakrah, the principal places upon the eastern coast of Qatar, by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi acting together; the motive, on the part of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was a desire to punish the inhabitants for some restiveness against his authority which they had lately exhibited. The proceedings of the allies are fully described in the history of Bahrain, to which they properly belong, and

need not therefore be mentioned in this place ; suffice it to say that the towns of Dōhah and Wakrah were, at the end of 1867, temporarily blotted out of existence, the houses being dismantled and the inhabitants deported, and that the damage inflicted was estimated to amount to over \$2,00,000. In June 1868, after an unsuccessful appeal for redress to the Wāhhābi Amīr, the Qatar tribes which had suffered embarked on a retaliatory expedition against Bahrain ; but they did not obtain any decided success.

The intervention of the British political authorities in the Gulf, though considerably delayed by circumstances over which they had no control, in the end produced a strong effect, as is related in the history of Bahrain. The results were most conspicuous in Bahrain, where one Shaikh was deposed and another installed ; but they extended also to Qatar, which Colonel Pelly, leaving Bahrain early in September 1868, immediately visited with H.M.S. "Vigilant," the gunboat "Hugh Rose" and the steamer "Sind." At Wakrah the principal Shaikhs of Qatar had an interview with the Resident on board ship and were informed that they had incurred the severe displeasure of Government by their expedition against Bahrain ; their plea that the expedition was merely retaliatory was accepted, however, in partial extenuation of the irregularity committed ; and, as related elsewhere,* a considerable amount of redress was ultimately obtained for them from the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.

British intervention and proceedings at Wakrah, 1868.

An Agreement, dated the 12th of September 1868, was then obtained from Muhammad-bin-Thāni of the Āl Thāni, the most influential man in the whole promontory, whereby he undertook to return to Dōhah, which he had forsaken, and to reside peaceably there ; never to put to sea with hostile intent, but instead to refer all his disputes with his neighbours for settlement by the British Resident ; not to assist the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, but on the contrary to hand him over to the Resident, should he fall into his power ; and, lastly, to maintain with the new Shaikh of Bahrain the same relations as had existed between himself and the former Shaikhs of those islands, submitting for decision by the Resident any differences of opinion that might arise in regard to matters such as tribute. The tribute mentioned may have been the sum which was payable by the Shaikh of Bahrain on account of Qatar to the Wāhhābi Amīr.

Agreement by the Al Thāni Shaikh of Qatar, 12th September 1868.

* *Vide* page 391 *post*.

Nothing is known of the manner in which the Āl Thāni had attained by 1868, to predominant influence in Qatar; they were Ma'adhīd and therefore of the Āl Bin-'Alī, the tribe of 'Īsa-bin-Tarīf.*

Agreement
in respect of
tribute to
Bahrain.

A further agreement was furnished by Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Thāni and the chief Shaikhs of the Qatar Bedouins according to which the tribute, if any, payable by them to Bahrain should be determined before the British Resident, and paid in future through the Residency; and Colonel Pelly then addressed a letter to "all the Chiefs of Qatar," informing them of the settlement reached, and warning them of the consequences of any future breach of the maritime peace.

Redress ob-
tained for
robbery of
British sub-
jects.

Before leaving Wakrah the Resident adverted to a robbery, which had taken place there, of property belonging to certain British Indian subjects resident in Bahrain; and he demanded of the assembled Shaikhs the payment of 18,000 Qrāns as compensation. The amount was immediately produced, one-third in cash and two-thirds in the shape of a bill on a wealthy pearl merchant of Lingeh, the bill being secured by a sealed bag of pearls which was handed over to Colonel Pelly to be delivered to the merchant on receipt of payment. The sum actually realised in this case amounted to 18,699 Qrāns; and out of this 16,200 Qrāns were paid away to two complainants who were able to give proof of their losses.

History of Qatar from the attack by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi to the occupation of Dōhah by the Turks, 1867-71

During the four years following the great raid made on Qatar by the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi no event of importance occurred in the promontory, and the political situation there remained unchanged.

General history of Qatar from the Turkish occupation of Dōhah to a rebellion against Turkish authority, 1871-93.

Occupation
of Dōhah by
the Turks,
1871-72.

In July 1871, a little more than a month after the occupation of Qatīf by the Turks, a deputation, headed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, was sent by the commander of the Turkish troops to Dōhah in Qatar and succeeded in persuading Jāsīm, the son of Muhammad-bin-Thāni, Shaikh of Dōhah and the most influential man in Qatar, to accept the Turkish flag; the senior Shaikh, now old and infirm, did not approve of the step, and continued for a time to fly the Arab flag over his own house. On news of this event reaching Būshehr, Colonel Pelly, the Resident in

* *Vide* pages 795 and 799 *ante*.

the Persian Gulf, despatched his assistant, Major Grant, in H.M.S. "Magpie" to Dōhah, where the state of matters was found to be as described; the Shaikh assigned as a reason for his submission to the Turks that he lived on the mainland and that the Turks were a land power, also that the British Government had failed to do his subjects justice in a certain case of piracy. Meanwhile Colonel Pelly, with a view to ascertaining whether the Turkish proceedings at Dōhah had been authorised by the Turkish Government, telegraphed to Colonel Herbert, the British Resident at Baghdād, and was informed in reply that the Wālī of Baghdād professed not to know whether Turkish flags had been sent to Qatar or not, but claimed that Qatar was not covered by a previous Turkish assurance that there should be no interference with Bahrain. In August, the Turks having meanwhile taken possession of the Hasa Oasis, Qatar became a base for hordes of Bedouins who began to harass the Ottoman troops from the southward, and two or three months later Sa'ūd the Wahhābi himself retired to Qatar with a large Bedouin following who insisted that the settled inhabitants, on pain of having their property raided, should furnish them with supplies; during this crisis a warning was sent by the Political Resident to British Indian subjects in Qatar, probably to the effect that, if they remained, it must be at their own risk. In January 1872 a Turkish Commodore, accompanied by 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, visited Dōhah with the "Assur" and another Turkish steamer, from which, much to the disgust of the Shaikh and the inhabitants, a detachment of 100 Turkish troops and a field gun were landed; this garrison having established themselves in a fort of the Āl Musallam, the Turkish occupation of Dōhah was complete. The measures described seem to have been taken under the orders of Mid-hat Pāsha,—who himself visited Hasa at the end of 1871, in response to a request from the Shaikh of Dōhah for protection against Sa'ūd's Bedouins.

In 1873 the regular troops originally stationed by the Turks at Dōhah appear to have been withdrawn, a detachment of 30 Dhābitiyahs or gendarmes being substituted.

Removal of
Turkish
regular
troops, 1873.

Except in the internal affairs of Qatar, especially the administration of the chief town and its immediate environs, little or no change was produced by the presence of a Turkish post at Dōhah; tribal relations generally continued on the same footing as formerly, and the Āl Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah were still the principal factor in politics.

Internal
affairs, 1874.

In 1874 fighting occurred near Zubārah between the Na'im and the Bani Hājir, in which the latter were worsted; and in the same year

Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah held the Bani Hājir to account for a piracy committed near Khor Shaqīq, on a boat belonging to 'Abdul Karīm of Bahrain, in which more than \$2,000 in cash, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim himself, was taken, besides goods belonging to British Indian subjects. The Turkish gunboat "Iskanderia" made a cruise along the coast to enquire into the misbehaviour of the Bani Hājir, and the result was apparently to show that Shaikh Jāsim himself was partly to blame for the disorder that prevailed.

1875. Lieutenant Fraser, Assistant Resident, who visited Dōhah in 1875 in connection with a British claim, found that the Āl Thāni Shaikhs, who had at first welcomed the Turkish occupation as a means of shaking off British control in maritime matters, were now heartily tired of it; but, for fear of being deported to Constantinople, they concealed their dissatisfaction. The Turkish representative, Jāsim Āgha, who was also Qādhī, notwithstanding the smallness of the force of only 50 gendarmes at his disposal, insisted on being consulted by the Shaikhs in every matter and recovered considerable sums of money from the inhabitants of Dōhah.

1876. In the autumn of 1876, in the discharge at Dōhah of an errand relating to piracy, Captain Guthrie, commanding the B.M.S. "May Frere," obtained information that the town now paid from 9,000 to 10,000 Qrāns per annum as revenue to the Turkish Government, but that this amount was insufficient to cover the expenses of the small Turkish detachment, whose duties were of a police and not of a military nature. The worst of the Qatar piracies in this year was one committed in the Dōhah harbour, close to the house of Shaikh Jāsim himself, by a party of seven Bani Hājir who attacked an Abu Dhabi vessel at night while the crew were asleep, killing two men and carrying off a slave and a quantity of other property; the total compensation due was assessed at \$2,679, but it was not apparently obtained, though a reference on the subject was made by the British Government to the Porte. In this year Shaikh Jāsim was appointed by the Turks to be Qāim-Maqām or Deputy-Governor of Qatar, and thereafter his father Muhammad-bin-Thāni, who seems to have been better disposed to the British than to the Turks, and who died two years later in 1878, had no more voice in public affairs.

1879-81. In May 1879 the Mutasarrif of Hasa came to Dōhah in the "Iskanderia" and had interviews with various prominent individuals, including Shaikh Jāsim, whom he formally appointed to be governor over Dōhah town. In November there took place an exodus to Fuwairat of some of the Āl Bū Kuwārah inhabitants of Dōhah; it was traced to

jealousy of Shaikh Jāsim's new position and was said to have been instigated by the Shaikh of Bahrain; and a British and a Turkish gunboat both visited the coast to enquire into the incident. In 1880 the Bani Hājir pirate Zaid-bin-Muhammad relieved a boat of some pearls belonging to Shaikh Jāsim and captured a vessel belonging to Wakrah; and raids were committed near Dōhah by Manāsir and 'Awāmir. In 1881 the Āl Bū Kuwārah were joined at Fuwairat by some of the Na'im; and the 'Ajman tribe carried off 450 camels from Qatar. In December 1881 Ahmad, a brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain, landed on the west coast of Qatar with about 200 followers for purposes of sport, and Shaikh Jāsim sent a deputation from Dōhah to welcome him and invite him to an entertainment in the interior; but Ahmad insisted that Jāsim should come in person to greet him where he was, and his wishes were obeyed, after which he accompanied the Dōhah Shaikh to a camp. The strength of the Turkish detachment at Dōhah at this time, whether regular troops or gendarmes, was about 130 men.

In April 1884 a raid was made by Bani Hājir Bedouins upon the coast of Qatar, and a son of the Shaikh of Wakrah was killed. In the following month Shaikh Jāsim began preparations for an expedition by sea against the Bani Hājir in Dhahrān, representing to the British officials that he had obtained the sanction of the Turks and desired the leave of the British Government also; but his request was refused, and he abandoned his bellicose intentions. In July the 'Ajman, who by threats of attacking Dōhah had made it impossible for the inhabitants to proceed as usual to the pearl fisheries, encountered a force of their enemies the Manāsir at the wells of Banaiyān in the Jāfurah desert and were defeated with much loss,—a result that gave great satisfaction to Shaikh Jāsim. In this engagement the Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir tribes were divided, some of each fighting upon either side. 1884.

In April 1885 a boat belonging to Wakrah was wrecked off Fuwairat and plundered by the people of that village. In October about 100 persons belonging to Wakrah emigrated with 10 boats to Ghāriyah in consequence of a quarrel with Shaikh Jāsim, who in December made an attack on Ghāriyah, killing four of the inhabitants. The Turkish gunboat "Mirrikh" toured upon the coast for some time during the year. 1885.

In the following year a competitor with Shaikh Jāsim for influence in Qatar appeared in the person of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, a Turkish subject but son of the Wazīr of Bahrain, who assumed the headship of the Ghāriyah settlement and who, from his intrigues with the Turks, seemed to aim at supplanting Jāsim in the Qāim-Maqāmship of Qatar. A suggestion by the officer in charge of the Turkish gunboat, that the people of Ghāriyah should be allowed to live in peace under

Rivalry
between
Shaikh Jāsim
and Muham-
mad-bin-
'Abdul
Wahhāb,
1886-87.

Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, so irritated Jāsīm that he again attacked the place, but this time without success. Muhammad, after urging the establishment of a regular Turkish customs house at Dōhah, went away to Hasa; but he returned in May with 50 Dhābitiyahs, of whom 20, it was said, would be posted at Ghāriyah. By these proceedings Jāsīm was greatly incensed and at first threatened to withdraw from Dōhah and commence hostilities against Muhammad; but in July a reconciliation was arranged. In the winter of 1886-87, Muhammad, who all the time kept up an active correspondence with the Turkish authorities in Hasa and 'Irāq, visited Bahrain; he was met there by the inhabitants of Ghāriyah, whom, apparently with the approval of the Turks, he then settled at Dārīn on Tarūt Island, Ghāriyah being thus almost depopulated.

Disturbances,
1887.

The next year was of one considerable unrest in Qatar. Shaikh Jāsīm, who greatly feared the establishment of a customs house in Qatar and was generally upon bad terms with the Turks, considered that the best means of frustrating Ottoman designs would be to destroy the importance of Dōhah, a task which he now set himself to accomplish; retiring to Dha'ain, he announced that he had severed his connection with Dōhah and was no longer responsible for the affairs of Qatar, which would in future be "first referred to God and then to the Turkish Government." Disturbances in Dōhah and its neighbourhood, probably instigated by Shaikh Jasim, followed; and in June or July the bazaar was plundered by Bani Hājir Bedouins, the principal sufferers on this occasion being some Persian traders who had incurred Jāsīm's displeasure. In August the mischief extended to British subjects, and piracy at sea began, with the result that the British Political Resident was obliged to take action in the manner described in a later paragraph. By the middle of October all was quiet again.

Visit of the
Wālī of Basrah
to Dōhah
and replacement
of the
Turkish
military
garrison,
1888.

The year 1888 opened with a visit to Dōhah by Nāfīz Pāsha, Wālī of Basrah, who had an interview with Shaikh Jāsīm and promised him a title and decoration; a coal depôt was established; and, a little later, a military garrison of one infantry battalion or 250 men was stationed at Dōhah and a steam launch placed there. These arrangements may have been due to the remonstrances of the British Government regarding piracies in Turkish waters or to the disorders at Dōhah in the previous year, but they were suspected by the British authorities to be preparations for a Turkish advance in the direction of 'Omān,—the more so that the predominance acquired in Najd by the Amīr of Hāil over the Wahhābī ruler of Riyādh was supposed to favour a forward policy in Arabia on the part of the Turks.

In July 1889, in connection with a scheme, possibly his own, of establishing direct Turkish administration in Qatar, 'Akif Bey, the Mutasarrif of Hasa, paid a visit to Dōhah. His first interview with Shaikh Jāsim took place at the house of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb and cannot have been free from danger ; for, while the Mutasarrif was accompanied by his personal attendants only, the Shaikh appeared with a retinue of about 600 armed footmen and 60 or 70 horsemen and camel-riders, many of whom carried loaded Martini rifles. A second and more private meeting afterwards took place, at which the Mutasarrif suggested the institution of a regular administration and a customs house ; but the project was strongly opposed by Jāsim, who tendered his resignation of the Qāim-Maqāmship in writing.

Attempt by the Turks to establish close control over Qatar, 1889-91.

In the following year the proposals of 'Akif Bey for the better government of Hasa became known in some detail. He had recommended that Jāsim, on account of his frequent absences, should be provided with an Assistant in the Qāim-Maqāmship ; that Government buildings should be erected at Dōhah ; that cavalry as well as infantry should be stationed there ; that taxes should be levied on pearl dealers and other merchants ; and that a harbour-master should be appointed at Dōhah to collect dues from native vessels. Posts should be established at Zubārah and 'Odaid ; two steamers should be run between Dōhah, 'Oqair and Qatīf ; and at 'Oqair a mosque should be built. In the autumn of 1890 Mudirs intended for Zubārah and 'Odaid arrived in Bahrain from Basrah, but they did not proceed to their posts ; the hitch was apparently due to the departure of 'Akif Bey from Hasa, upon sick leave, at the beginning of 1891.

Meanwhile, in 1890, Shaikh Jāsim caused it to be proclaimed that the administration of Qatar had been transferred from himself to the Turkish officials ; but his resignation was not accepted by the Wālī of Basrah, who early in 1891 exhorted him instead to discharge his customary duties with zeal.

In 1889 a piracy, attended by loss of life, was committed by Bani Hājir on a Bahrain vessel off the coast of Qatar ; Shaikh Jāsim recovered the stolen property, but failed to arrest the offenders. In 1890 the Āl Morrah, at the instance of Mutasarrif of Hasa, were prohibited from entering Dōhah. At the beginning of 1891 a fight occurred between the 'Ajman on the one side and the Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir and Manāsir on the other ; and, during the pearling season, some Bani Hājir seized a vessel at Wakrah and carried off six boats of the Qubaisāt Bani Yās from an island in the neighbourhood,—an outrage for which Shaikh Jāsim professed himself unable to afford any redress. In 1892 there was a

Piracies and miscellaneous occurrences, 1889-1892.

serious crop of maritime outrages. A boat was seized near Wakrah, taken away, and abandoned near Zubārah ; another boat, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim, was boarded near Dha'ain and carried off, with the pearls she contained, after two of the crew had been killed and one wounded ; again a Persian boat from Jazeh in Shībkūh was attacked near Wakrah, 10 of the crew being killed and 18 wounded, and a quantity of pearls taken ; and finally a Shārjah pearl boat was seized and removed to Khor Shaqīq, but was recovered by Jāsim,—Jāsim, however, at the intercession of elders, released some prisoners whom he had taken. In 1872, from August to November, 'Abdur-Rahmān, the expelled Wahhābi Amir of Najd, resided at Dōhah under the protection of Jāsim.

British relations with Qatar during the same period, 1872-1893.

Case of
piracy and
complaints
of exactions,
1874.

A piracy has already been mentioned above, which was committed by Bani Hājir in the summer of 1874, near Khor Shaqīq, on a Bahrain vessel owned by a certain 'Abdul Karīm, and in which some British Indian traders were sufferers jointly with Shaikh Jāsim himself. Shaikh Jāsim promptly took measures for recouping his own losses ; but a year passed without any redress being afforded to the British subjects affected ; in 1875, however, compensation was obtained by Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, who despatched his Second Assistant, Captain Fraser, to settle the matter with Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Thāni.

Meanwhile a petition was received from the British Indian traders at Dōhah, who complained of exactions by the Shaikh and expressed a wish to leave the place ; but, as it appeared that the dues complained of were ordinary taxes taken for the purpose of providing protection against Bedouins, the petitioners were informed by the Resident, under the orders of the Government of India, that it was for themselves to decide whether they should leave Dōhah or not, and that, if they remained, they must conform to the local laws and system of taxation.

Incivility of
the Turks to
a British
vessel, 1867.

Captain Guthrie, commanding the B.M.S. " May Frere," experienced some discourtesy at a visit to Dōhah in 1876 from the officers in charge of the Turkish post, who, as he was returning from the shore to his ship, shouted after him that Dōhah was Turkish territory and that he must leave the port before sunset. As a number of Arabs had witnessed the scene Captain Guthrie was careful to remain at Dōhah for another 24 hours.

In 1876 Shaikh Jāsīm, who had then recently been appointed by the Turkish Government to be Qāim-Maḡām of Qatar, took advantage of his new powers to vent his spite against Chela and Rama, two of the British Indian subjects for whom compensation had been obtained by Captain Fraser in the previous year ; this he did by causing them to be summoned to the distant provincial capital of Hofūf on the frivolous ground that their depositions were required.

Ill-treatment
of Indian
traders, 1876-
1879.

In 1879 a fresh case occurred, in which a Hindu was beaten and otherwise ill-treated by the Turkish officer at Dōhah for having exported dates,—an act not known to be prohibited. Notwithstanding a recommendation by the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government that compensation should be claimed on behalf of the Hindus Chela and Rama, no satisfaction had as yet been obtained in the case of 1876 ; and Colonel Ross was inclined to recommend that, in view of the unfortunate effect of such incidents as these upon British prestige in the Gulf, steps should be taken to withdraw all British subjects from Dōhah. The Government of India, however, thought it better to press for the removal from Dōhah of the offending Turkish officer, by name Muhammad Āgha ; and this, in the end, was obtained.

In 1879 a warning by the Political Resident against connecting themselves with the Bani Hājir pirates, who at this time were giving much trouble along the Arabian coast, was conveyed to the Shaikhs of Qatar by Captain Woodroffe, accompanied by the Residency Agent in Bahrain. This was done in connection with a case in which the Bani Hājir buccaneer Zaid-bin Muhammad, having seized two vessels belonging to the Mahāndah of Khor Shaqīq, used them to plunder a fishing vessel anchored off Ras Laffān to the amount of 2,000 Qrāns, one of the crew also being killed.

Warning addressed to
the Shaikhs
of Qatar and
discussions
with Turkey,
1879-1881.

It should be noted that in March 1881 Shaikh Jāsīm represented to the British Resident that his authority did not extend to the whole Qatar coast and that he was only responsible for Dōhah and Wakrah under the Agreement of 1868 ; he requested therefore that the people of other ports, such as Fuwairat and Ruwais, should be compelled to remove and settle in his territory, after which he would answer for their behaviour.

A discussion with the Porte, relative to piracies off the Arabian coast generally, took place between 1879 and 1881 and is fully related in the history of Hasa.

In 1881, in consequence first of threats of an invasion of Bahrain by Nāsir-bin-Mubarak with the assistance of Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah, and

Question of
dealings and

political relations with the Shaikh of Dōhah, 1881-82.

later of projects on the part of Jāsim himself to proceed by sea against the 'Ajmān tribe near Qatīf and the Qubaisāt section of the Bani Yās, a question arose as to the degree of interference which might still with propriety be exercised by the British Government in such matters in Qatar ; in each of the cases mentioned, it should be added, Shaikh Jāsim had been advised by the British authorities in the Gulf to refrain from action and had complied with their advice. The Government of India, recognising that the agreement made in 1868 with Shaikh Jāsim's father, by which Shaikh Muhammad undertook not to make war by sea, could hardly, on account of its personal character and the subsequent assumption by the Turks of authority at Dōhah, be regarded as binding on Shaikh Jāsim, referred the point to Her Majesty's Government, whose orders, issued early in 1882, were to the effect that the Shaikh, though he had accepted the position of an Ottoman dependent on land, should be encouraged to maintain close and direct relations with the officers of the Government of India and to defer to them, as he appeared inclined to do, in all matters affecting the peace of the seas. As regards the course to be followed in event of the Shaikh of Dōhah or any other Shaikh similarly situated putting to sea with hostile intentions, either without reference to or in disregard of the warnings of the British Resident, Her Majesty's Government were unable to give the Government of India any precise instructions ; they held that it was for the Government of India to decide, upon general considerations of expediency, whether coercion should be employed in any individual case. It had been intimated to the Porte in July 1881, at the conclusion of the discussions mentioned in the last paragraph, that, as they declined to agree to a joint police of the seas, Her Majesty's Government were obliged to undertake that duty single-handed "without reference to the claims of the Sultān to territorial jurisdiction in those waters." The commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf were accordingly empowered to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbances of the peace at sea, avoiding, however, the raising of needless questions with Turkish authorities, where such might exist, and unnecessary encroachment upon the jurisdiction of the Sultān, wherever the same might be effectually established on the coast to the north of 'Odaid.

Promise by Shaikh Jāsim to adhere to the Agreement of 1868.

About the same time Colonel Ross, the British Political Resident, proposed that Shaikh Jāsim, whose character and conduct were as unsatisfactory as ever, should be compelled to acknowledge in writing the continued validity of the Agreement signed by his father in 1868 ; but the Government of India, being of opinion that proceedings to this end

might bring about a difficulty with the Turks, ordered that a verbal assurance only should be obtained. This was done ; and the renewal of his treaty obligations to abstain from war at sea and to refer his disputes with his neighbours to the British Resident appeared for a time to have a restraining effect upon the unruly Shaikh.

In October 1881 Shaikh Jāsim began to harass the British Indian traders at Dōhah, whose operations in pearls interfered with his own, and whose position he was therefore determined to render untenable ; but a visit of H.M.S. " Woodlark " to the port resulted in a temporary settlement of the difficulty. Eventually, however, in 1882, Jāsim forcibly closed the shops of the Indians and expelled them from the place, giving false reasons for his action. In May 1882 a Residency Agent was sent to him with a letter to warn him that he would be held responsible for loss caused to British subjects ; but he was obdurate. In November 1882 a confidential Agent of the Residency visited Dōhah in H.M.S. " Woodlark " to require compensation for the traders ; and again the demand was disregarded. At length, in December 1882, authority having been first obtained from Her Majesty's Government, Colonel Ross, the Resident, proceeded in person to Dōhah with H.M.S. " Woodlark " and H.M.S. " Arab " and insisted, on pain of instant hostilities, that the Shaikh should apologise to the British Government, pay compensation to the Indian traders, and grant the latter permission to return to Dōhah. With these conditions Jāsim found himself obliged to comply ; and the indemnity recovered, amounting to Rs. 8,000, was paid over to the Indians, who had meanwhile taken refuge in Bahrain.

No sooner did the Porte become aware of the direct recovery of damages from their so-called Qāim-Maqām by means of a British naval demonstration at Dōhah than they protested to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and the question was referred to Her Majesty's Government ; Shaikh Jāsim, it appeared, had represented the affair in strong colours to the Turkish authorities, and had threatened to resign the Qāim-Maqāmship unless the Rs. 8,000 recovered from him were refunded. The British Ambassador was at first directed to avoid, if possible, discussion of the subject ; but, if it were not possible, he was to state distinctly that the British Government could not admit that Turkey possessed any sovereign rights on the Qatar coast. Eventually, the matter still being pressed, Lord Granville on the 7th of May 1883 informed the Turkish Ambassador in London, in writing, " that the claims of the Porte to rights of sovereignty over the Qatar coast had never been admitted by Her Majesty's Government." Exception

Expulsion of British Indian traders from Dōhah and action of the British Government, 1881-83.

Protest by the Porte against the British proceedings, 1883.

having been taken to this reply, the Turkish Ambassador was further told in unequivocal terms, on the 22nd of September 1883, that the British Government were unable to accept the views of the Porte, and that they were not prepared to waive the rights which they had exercised at intervals, during a long period of years, of dealing directly with the Arab chiefs of the Qatar coast, when necessary, in order to preserve the peace of the seas or to obtain redress for outrages on British subjects or persons entitled to British protection.

Further ill-treatment of Indian traders by Shaikh Jāsim and piracies, 1883-86.

After the settlement in 1882 five of the Indian traders who had been expelled returned to Dōhah; but their position there was still disagreeable on account of the hostility of the Shaikh. In 1886, after taking precautions to disavow his responsibility for anything that might happen to the British traders in his absence, Shaikh Jāsim temporarily quitted Dōhah for 'Odaid; and immediately the Indians were attacked by Bani Hājir Bedouins and two of their number were wounded, but not seriously. The Assistant Resident, Khān Bahādur 'Abdur Rahmān Hakīm, who was sent to the spot to investigate, found reason to believe that the affair had been deliberately arranged by Shaikh Jāsim with his son, whom he left in charge at Dōhah, and that the object was to intimidate the Hindus into withdrawing from Dōhah and so to put an end to their rivalry in trade. Later, however, the Resident reported that Jāsim had emphatically denied his complicity in the matter and had apologised for the occurrence; and under orders from the Government of India the denial and apology were accepted.

In the autumn of 1886, several petty cases of piracy having been committed by Bani Hājir off the coast of Qatar, the Residency confidential Agent was sent in H.M.S. "Sphinx" to interview the headmen of the coast, and was successful in obtaining from them assurances of co-operation with the British Government, some of which were given in writing.

Wanton attack on British Indian traders at Dōhah and action of the British authorities, 1887.

In 1887, on the withdrawal of Shaikh Jāsim from Dōhah on account of differences between himself and the Turks, there was an outbreak of lawlessness in the town, most probably instigated by the Shaikh himself from his place of retirement. At the beginning of the troubles the Indian traders were protected by the Shaikh's relatives in Dōhah; but early in August two Indian British subjects were wantonly attacked and wounded by Arabs. Piracies also began along the coast, half a dozen being reported within a short time. The Shaikh of Bahrain, some of whose subjects were among the victims of these outrages, now requested permission to take forcible action on his own account; but the British

Resident instead directed that specie and pearls to the value of Rs. 20,000, belonging to Shaikh Jāsim in Bahrain whither the Resident had himself proceeded, should be impounded; and this was immediately done. Meanwhile all the British subjects at Dōhah had been removed by the Assistant Resident, who was sent there for the purpose and to remind Shaikh Jāsim of his responsibilities; H.M.S. "Osprey" had arrived in Bahrain; and the Turkish military commandant in Hasa had gone with a guard to Dōhah, and was engaged in consultation there with Jāsim and the other Shaikhs. The result of Colonel Ross's pacific expedient was eminently satisfactory, for Shaikh Jāsim presently sent an Agent to Bahrain to negotiate; and the case was settled by payment of Rs. 6,390 as compensation to the injured British Indian and Bahrain subjects out of the property attached.

Shaikh Jāsim, while through force of circumstances he was obliged to submit to the British demands, neglected no means of upsetting what had been arranged and appealed to the Wālis of Basrah and Baghdād, representing that he had been despoiled of "all" his property in Bahrain on account of his connection with the Turkish Government. The immediate result of his complaints was a threatening letter, probably unauthorised by higher authority, in which the Mutasarrif of Hasa demanded from the Shaikh of Bahrain the restoration of Jāsim's property; and later the inevitable protest was addressed by the Porte to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. With reference to the protest the British Ambassador was referred by Her Majesty's Government to the views which they had expressed in 1883, and to which, he was informed, they still adhered.

Protest by the
Porte, 1888.

In connection with the losses sustained by Persian subjects at Dōhah, the Shāh enquired whether the British authorities could assist his Government in obtaining the reparation to which the former were entitled, estimated at 30,000 Tūmāns; and a hope appears to have been held out of compliance with the request as soon as the claims of British subjects should have been adjusted. Early in 1888, however, the Persian Government seem to have had recourse instead to the good offices of the Porte, but whether they obtained any satisfaction by this means is uncertain. As mentioned in the history of Bahrain, it appears that a Persian Minister about the same time actually gave countenance to the idea of a raid to be made by Shaikh Jāsim upon Bahrain in the interests of Persia.

Assistance of
the British
authorities
requested by
Persia, but
not utilised,
1887-88.

In October 1888 Colonel Ross visited Dōhah and had an interview with Shaikh Jāsim, who came to meet him with a following of about

Visit of the
Resident to
Dōhah, 1888.

700 mounted Bedouins. The Shaikh complained of the injustice of the treatment which he had received.

Further correspondence between the British and Turkish Governments regarding the position of the Porte in Qatar, 1889.

The energetic proceedings of Nāfiz Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, in Qatif and Qatar occasioned, in 1888, some disquiet to Her Majesty's Government; but, as the steps taken were ostensibly due to British strictures on the prevalence of piracy, and as a discussion of boundaries was not desired, it was apparently resolved not to object to them. At the time it was believed that the Shammar Amīr of Hāil contemplated operations against 'Omān, and that it might be the intention of the Turks to assist him with troops from Hasa and Qatar. In 1889, however, with the plain object of asserting Turkish sovereignty over Qatar, the Turkish Foreign Office informed the British Ambassador at Constantinople that the garrison in Qatar would be reinforced from the Baghdad Army Corps; but Her Majesty's Government deemed it sufficient to remind the Porte, with reference to the state of war which then prevailed between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and by which the Turks might have been tempted to seek an extension of influence in the direction of Abu Dhabi, that Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference any attempt on the part of the Turkish authorities at interference or aggression in 'Omān.

Relations of Qatar with Bahrain, and affairs at Zubārah, 1872-92.

Qatar was the theatre, during this period, of various movements, dangerous, or at least interesting, to the Bahrain principality; but these are noted in the history of Bahrain, and here we shall confine ourselves to some remarks on the claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to Qatar and on affairs at Zubārah.

Claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to Zubārah, 1873.

The sovereignty of the Shaikh of Bahrain over Qatar, unquestioned before, was brought into discussion by the Turkish conquest of Hasa; and in 1871 Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, was desired by the Government of Bombay to report on the subject, but obtained leave to defer doing so on the ground that there was a probability of the Turks withdrawing from Hasa. The question then slumbered until the summer of 1873, when a Turkish officer was reported to have gone to Zubārah in Qatar for the purpose of persuading the inhabitants to acknowledge Turkish authority; by this occurrence the Shaikh of Bahrain was moved to formulate a claim to Zubārah on the ground that the Na'im of

Zubārah were his subjects and had acknowledged the fact in the presence of Colonel Pelly, the late Resident. Colonel Ross, after receiving a report on the subject from his Assistant in Bahrain, Major Grant, informed Government that the sovereignty of Qatar was indeterminate, though the whole of the coast had lately fallen under Turkish influence; and, the rights claimed by the Shaikh of Bahrain being uncertain and beyond the power of the possessor to enforce, he at the same time asked Major Grant to dissuade the Shaikh, as had been done in the past, from entangling himself in the affairs of the mainland. Colonel Pelly, the ex-Resident, to whom the papers were referred for opinion, considered that the question of territorial sovereignty should still, so far as possible, be avoided; and he thought that the Shaikh of Bahrain, while he was acknowledged to possess certain rights of pasturage, etc., on the Qatar coast, should not therefore be held to be empowered to put to sea for the purpose of coercing any port in Qatar. Meanwhile, in September 1873, the Shaikh of Bahrain had again asserted his claim to Zubārah and the obedience of the Na'im tribe and asked whether he must relinquish it; and at length, towards the end of the year, the Government of India expressed their general concurrence in the view that the Shaikh of Bahrain had no clear or important rights in Qatar and that he should be restrained, so far as possible, from raising complications on the mainland.

In September 1874, after attempts on their part to cross over from Qatar into Bahrain had been foiled by movements of vessels of the Bombay Marine, the Bani Hājir turned their attention to the Na'im village of Zubārah; and, but for the appearance of the "Hugh Rose" gunboat there, they would probably, notwithstanding a brave resistance by the small summer garrison, have taken the place and obtained possession of boats with which they might have invaded Bahrain. The delay gave the Na'im time to return in strength from Bahrain and the pearl banks to Zubārah, where they shortly inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Bani Hājir. Before the end of the year Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, a Bahrain refugee, appeared upon the coast of Qatar, and the prospect of Zubārah falling into his hands caused great alarm to the Shaikh of Bahrain, who asked permission of Colonel Ross, the Resident, to reinforce Zubārah, on the ground, first, that Zubārah was a dependency and invaluable outwork of Bahrain, and again that, if he failed to help his allies the Na'im in their extremity, he would forfeit their support for the future. Colonel Ross was moved by these arguments to agree to the reinforcement of Zubārah as a purely defensive measure; but his action was not altogether approved by the Government of India, who considered that, in view of

Zubārah attacked, and reinforced by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1874.

the decision reached in the previous year, the Shaikh should have been dissuaded from sending men to Zubārah and should have been encouraged to depend altogether upon the British Government for the defence of his islands. It subsequently transpired that an absurdly inaccurate account of the whole affair had been telegraphed to the Porte by their Wālī at Baghdad, representing the Na'im of Zubārah as a tribe in rebellion against the rightful authority of the Turkish Government whom the Bani Hājir had been employed to coerce, but who had escaped punishment through improper interference by the Shaikh of Bahrain. The dangers which threatened Bahrain from the side of Qatar were shown by the Resident to be chiefly due to the uncertainty whether the coast, on the side towards Bahrain, was or was not under the authority of the Porte.

Claim of the Shaikh of Bahrain to sovereignty in Qatar disallowed by the Government of India, 1875.

The Shaikh of Bahrain, though he had intimated his readiness to be guided by the advice of the British Government, once more in April 1875 put forth a claim to sovereignty over the whole of Qatar, which he asserted to be subject and tributary to Bahrain. On the fact being reported to them, the Government of India observed with regret the continued disposition of the Shaikh to entangle himself in the affairs of the continent and ordered that he should be made to understand that, if he persisted in a course opposed to their advice and thereby became involved in complications upon the mainland, the consequences would be upon himself, and they would hold themselves free to take such measures with respect to him as they might think necessary. The purport of this letter was communicated to Shaikh 'Īsa by Lieutenant Fraser, the Assistant Resident, in person; and the Shaikh, while denying that his rights in Qatar had become invalid or extinct, stated that he bowed to the orders of Government.

Evacuation of Zubārah by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1875.

The Shaikh afterwards made a request through his brother that he might be allowed to postpone the withdrawal of his men from Zubārah until the end of the pearl season; but it was not granted. In the neighbourhood of Zubārah, except for a few raids and counter-raids by the Bani Hājir and Na'im upon each other's cattle, matters remained fairly quiet; but in the pearl season some of the Beni Hājir put to sea to commit piracy,—a proceeding which led, as mentioned in the history of Bahrain, to excessive action by the Shaikh in very distant waters.

Matters at Zubārah, 1876-77.

In 1876 the Bani Hājir tribe was temporarily split into two factions, one of which connected itself with Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain outlaw, and the other with the Na'im of Zubārah. The precaution was taken of again warning the Shaikh of Bahrain to refrain from

interference on the mainland ; but it was not apparently necessary, for no visible results followed from the new combination. In 1877 there were complaints, as described in the history of Bahrain, that Shaikh 'Īsa still maintained undesirably close relations with Zubārah ; but enquiry showed that he was not, in fact, doing more than was required to keep the Na'im upon his side and to prevent their joining the Bani Hājir.

Destruction,
of Zubārah.
1878.

In September 1878, as related in the history of Hasa, a heinous piracy, accompanied by the murder of four persons, was committed by the inhabitants of Zubārah upon a passing boat ; and Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was directed by the Government of India to demand of the Turkish authorities that the place should be punished, and to offer British naval assistance for the purpose. These instructions he executed by starting on the 22nd of October in person for Basrah, where he had a not unsatisfactory meeting with the Wāli, 'Abdullah Pasha. In the meantime, or immediately afterwards, Zubārah, of which the inhabitants had made themselves obnoxious to all their neighbours by raids and piracies, was attacked by a large force under Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak. Colonel Ross, on becoming aware of this new complication, at once proceeded from Būshehr to Bahrain, where he arrived on the 17th of November in H.M.S. "Teazer," H.M.S. "Arab" being already anchored there. Shaikh 'Īsa came on board and earnestly besought that some action should be taken in favour of the Na'im ; but the Resident's reply was a refusal, at which he appeared greatly dissatisfied. On the 18th of November Colonel Ross landed at Zubārah from the "Teazer" and visited the camp of Shaikh Jāsim, pitched about half a mile from the square fort of Murair, in which the Na'im, to the number of about 500 souls, were besieged ; the village of Zubārah proper was already completely in ruins, and it was said that some boats had been burnt. The force with Shaikh Jāsim appeared to number about 2,000 armed men ; and, in consequence of the disparity in numbers between the attackers and the attacked, there had been no actual fighting. On his return to Bahrain Colonel Ross found a telegram from his acquaintance, the Wāli of Basrah, to the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif, in which the latter was directed to send the gunboat "Iskanderia" immediately to Zubārah in order to prevent any attempt by the besieging force to invade Bahrain ; and this order he at once forwarded to its destination. The Na'im besieged in Murair surrendered, on unfavourable terms, not long after Colonel Ross's departure, and Zubārah as a populated place ceased to exist ; the inhabitants,

between whom and Shaikh Jāsīm a peace seems to have been arranged by the commander of the "Iskanderia," were in the first instance mostly removed to Dōhah. It was considered at this time, both by the British Resident and by the Shaikh of Bahrain, that the best solution of the Zubārah difficulty, in so far as the security of Bahrain was concerned, would be the permanent occupation of the place by the Turks.

Rumours of
a Turkish
occupation of
Zubārah,
1888-91.

In 1888 it was reported that the Turks intended to rebuild Zubārah ; and, as it was feared that the agent selected would be the Bahrain outlaw Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the British Resident was instructed by the Government of India to inform that individual and Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah, who was his father-in-law, that a settlement at Zubārah would not be permitted. No actual attempt to re-occupy the place was observed. In 1890 and 1891 there were rumours of the appointment of a Turkish Mudir to Zubārah, and the post was at first offered to Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārīn, who declined it ; but the project, after a Mudir designate had arrived in Bahrain, was apparently abandoned.

Relations of Qatar with Abu Dhabi and affairs at 'Odaid, 1872-93.

The history of a colony of Bani Yās seceders at Khor-al-'Odaid, maintained from 1869 to 1878, will be found included in that of the Abu Dhabi principality,* within the territorial limits of which 'Odaid is situated ; but the bearing of certain events there upon the history of Qatar, which the inlet closely adjoins, should be noted.

Relations of
the Turks
with 'Odaid,
1871-76.

In 1871, soon after the arrival of the Turks in Hasa, it appeared that the Turkish flag had been offered to the Bani Yās colonists at 'Odaid ; but the latter, who professed themselves independent of all authority, were said not to have accepted it, though there was also a contradictory rumour that it was hoisted on Fridays. In 1873 four Turks visited 'Odaid and arranged that a sum of \$40 or 50 should be paid annually by the settlers through Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah, after which they went away, having been deterred by the inferior character of the water supply from establishing a post. In 1874 Shaikh Zāid of Abu Dhabi stated that local Turkish officials had written to him asserting 'Odaid to be under their protection, and calling on him to abstain from interference there ; he was unable, however, to produce their letters when called upon to do so. In

* *Vide* page 763 *ante*.

1875 it was ascertained that the headman of 'Odaid had both a Trucial and a Turkish flag and that he used one or the other as occasion required. On the 18th of October 1876, when Captain Guthrie visited 'Odaid in the "May Frere," he found the Trucial flag flying but learned that tribute was still paid to Turkey.

In 1876 and 1877 a number of piracies were committed by the Āl Morrah, a Bedouin tribe nominally dependent on Turkey, from boat harbours under 'Odaid; these proceedings the headman of 'Odaid was unable to prevent, and representations to the Turkish Government became necessary. Her Majesty's Government, while avoiding specific mention of 'Odaid, reference to which might have raised an inconvenient territorial question, drew the attention of the Porte to the increase of piracy along the Qatar coast which had resulted from the extension of Turkish sovereignty in that direction, and intimated their own resolve not to allow the peace of the Persian Gulf to be disturbed by marauders, whether proceeding from places like Dōhah actually in Turkish possession, or belonging to tribes that admitted Turkish supremacy and sailing from the ports of independent chiefs too weak to prevent the abuse of their territory. The Turkish Government in reply denied all knowledge of piratical outrages on the Qatar coast and asked for particulars.

Correspondence with the Porte regarding piracies committed from 'Odaid, 1877.

In 1878 the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs complained of action by the British authorities at 'Odaid a few months previously, which, as related in the history of Abu Dhabi, had resulted in the abandonment of the place by the Bani Yās colonists; and in the Turkish communication 'Odaid was stated to be a dependency of the Turkish district of Qatar. It does not appear from the records of the Government of India what reply was made to this complaint; but, from the correspondence which shortly after took place in regard to piracies off the coast of Hasa and Qatar, it seems clear that the British Government were resolved not to admit Turkish pretensions to jurisdiction at 'Odaid or at any place further to the eastward.

Complaint by the Porte of British action at 'Odaid, 1878.

From 1876 onwards, as a result of the presence of Bani Yās rebels at 'Odaid, hostile relations prevailed between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; and in 1880, by the return of the Qubaisāt to Abu Dhabi, the enmity between the Shaikhs was much embittered. During the sojourn of the Qubaisāt at 'Odaid that place had fallen largely under the influence of Shaikh Jāsim, to whom, by their removal, it was again lost; and his indignation was expressed in pecuniary claims which he now brought against their headman, Buti-bin-Khādim.

Protracted war between the Shaikhs of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi.

1881. In 1881 Jāsim intimated to the Resident an intention on his part of occupying 'Odaid and seizing the person of Buti-bin-Khādīm; but Colonel Ross was able to prevent him from attempting either enterprise. In December 1881 a raid was committed by Bani Hājir and other Bedouins from Qatar in the neighbourhood of Abu Dhabi and a number of camels were carried off and sold at Dōhah, whereupon the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi immediately prepared to retaliate and Shaikh Jāsim made dispositions for defence; but eventually, by the intervention of Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, the matter was settled without fighting.

1885. In 1885, after an interval of peace, Shaikh Jāsim re-opened his feud with Abu Dhabi, alleging that a debt due from Buti-bin-Khādīm, for which Shaikh Zāid had become surety, had not been discharged; that the Manāsir, who were protected by Shaikh Zāid, had plundered some natives of Qatar on Dalmah Island and had raided Qatar territory; and that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was interfering with 'Odaid, which belonged of right to Shaikh Jāsim and which he intended to occupy. The complaint in regard to the Manāsir probably referred to the carrying off from Na'aijah near Dōhah, by the Āl Bū Sha'ar section of that tribe, of some cattle and three female slaves belonging to Jāsim's dependents,—an act for which reprisals were at once made at Jāsim's instance by the Bani Hājir and the Āl Morrah. These tribes made a foray on the Bani Yās country, carrying off six camels which found a market at Dōhah, and recriminations between the two Shaikhs followed; but matters were once more temporarily adjusted by the agency of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain refugee. Meanwhile the Political Resident, in reply to a communication from Shaikh Jāsim, had desired him to relinquish his intention of occupying 'Odaid and to send particulars of his claims against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi with a view to a settlement; but with the latter invitation Shaikh Jāsim did not see fit to comply.

1886. In the summer of 1886 Shaikh Jāsim informed Shaikh Zāid that he had been directed by the Turkish authorities to rebuild 'Odaid, and he enclosed, as evidence of his statement, a letter from the commander of the Turkish vessel "Zuhaf." This correspondence was forwarded by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to the Political Resident, but in the meantime, apparently, Shaikh Jāsim made a movement from Dōhah in the direction of 'Odaid. The Resident, however, again warned him to desist from his proceedings and held a vessel of war in readiness to proceed to the spot, while a protest made to the Turkish authorities resulted in the disavowal and censure by the Wālī of Basrah, in writing, of the action of the commander of the "Zuhaf"; and accordingly no attempt to occupy 'Odaid was made by Shaikh Jāsim.

In 1887 a piratical Baqārah from Wakrah attacked a boat of the Qubaisāt Bani Yās on the pearl banks, and one of the crew of the latter was so severely wounded that he died. 1887.

In 1888 the protracted war between the Shaikhs of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi suddenly reached a crisis. In February of that year, the Wali of Basrah being then actually present in Dōhah, a raid was committed at Na'aijah in the immediate vicinity by Manāsir camel riders, chiefly of the Āl Bū Sha'ar section, who carried away 40 male and female slaves; and some of the Manāsir, advancing yet nearer, abducted two or three slaves from the very outskirts of Dōhah. Pursuit was attempted, but was unsuccessful. In March Jāsim made a retaliatory raid into the district of Liwah in Dhafrāh and carried off some 400 camels, which he divided amongst his followers; he also recovered, on this occasion, two of the slaves raided from Dōhah; and he caused 20 Liwah villagers to be soundly thrashed. In May the tables were again turned by a raiding party of 250 Bedouins whom Shaikh Zāid despatched against Dōhah under his son Khalifah; on their arrival before the place, Shaikh Jāsim himself being then at Dha'ain, the townspeople turned out against them in scattered detachments, were drawn by a simulated flight into an ambush, and lost 34 men killed, among whom was 'Ali, a son of Jāsim. Death of a son of Jāsim in the war, 1888.

Between rage and grief Shaikh Jāsim was all but distraught; he incited the Turks to invade Trucial 'Omān, he applied for help to Ibn-Rashīd, he opened a correspondence with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān other than Shaikh Zāid, and he subsidised freely a number of the Bedouin tribes. On Ibn-Rashīd making a favourable response to his overtures disturbances on a serious scale, and even an attack by Jāsim and his allies upon Abu Dhabi, began to be apprehended by the British political authorities. Prospect of Turkish and Central Arabian interference in the war, 1888.

The Turks, however, possibly on account of a warning against interference which the Government of India asked might be conveyed to the Porte, did not move; Ibn-Rashīd also remained inactive; and Shaikh Jāsim's reprisals eventually took the shape of incursions into Liwah, in January and February 1889, in which date plantations were cut down and men, women, and children barbarously murdered. Shaikh Jāsim also prohibited the subjects of the Shaikh of Dibai, who had now thrown in his lot with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, from landing in Qatar for trade or for any other purpose. In April the Bani Yās in their turn retaliated by an expedition to the distant region of Barr-al-Qārah, from which they carried away a large number of camels belonging to the Bedouin tribes that supported the Shaikh of Dōhah. In June a counter- 1888.

raid was made by Jāsīm's people in the direction of Abu Dhabi, from which they returned with camels taken from the Darū' and Āl Bū Shāmis Na'im. In August a number of the Āl Morrah transferred themselves to the side of Shaikh Zaid and promised to act with him against raiders from Qatar. In his eagerness to strike, Shaikh Jāsīm ventured upon one occasion to despatch armed men and ammunition by boat to Sila', a place on the coast considerably to the eastward of Khor-al-'Odaid and therefore under Abu Dhabi; but for this act he was severely reprimanded by the Resident under the orders of the Government of India, an intimation being added that repetition of the offence would entail serious consequences.

Turkish support of the Shaikh of Dōhah in the war, 1889.

During the continuance of the war the Turkish garrison at Dōhah received orders to assist Shaikh Jāsīm in defending the town, if attacked; but they were prohibited from operating at a greater distance than 4 hours' march from Dōhah. At the end of 1889 the Wāli of Basrah tried to arrange a reconciliation and wrote a letter to Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi, in which he exhorted him to submit to Turkish arbitration with a view to the avoidance of strife and bloodshed, and for the sake of the Muhammadan religion, common to the disputants, and of the "latent" sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey over both, which other powers were seeking to deny. To this communication the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, advised by the British Political Resident, replied that it was his own wish and intention, so long as the Shaikh of Dōhah abstained from aggressive movements, to confine himself to the government and protection of his own territories.

1890-91.

In 1890 raids and counter-raids continued, the advantage on the whole resting with the Shaikh of Dōhah; and in 1891 a raiding party from Qatar actually reached a point beyond Abu Dhabi town and succeeded in evading pursuit.

Rumoured design of the Turks to occupy 'Odaid, 1890-91.

In 1890-91, as already mentioned, there were rumours of an intention on the part of the Turks to post a Mudir at 'Odaid; but, though a Mudir designate actually arrived in Bahrain from Basrah at the end of 1890, they came to nothing.

Rising in Qatar against Turkish authority, 1893.

Relations between the Turks and the Shaikh of Dōhah, their nominal representative in Qatar, had for some time been growing more and more

strained, for Shaikh Jāsim had successfully obstructed the Turkish scheme of establishing a custom house at Dōhah, and the Turks believed him to be responsible for much of the tribal disorder and insecurity which prevailed in the country and along the coast. Matters were now brought to a crisis by a visit which the Wālī of Basrah paid to Qatar in the course of a tour to Hasa, doubtless with the object of setting matters right.

His Excellency arrived by land from Hofūf towards the end of February 1893, accompanied by 300 cavalry, who had marched from Basrah *viâ* Kuwait, and by a regiment of infantry. He summoned Shaikh Jāsim to his presence at Dōhah; but Jāsim, who feared arrest notwithstanding a promise of safety, refused to visit him; and the Wālī, suspecting treachery or unwilling to compromise his own dignity, declined a suggestion by Jāsim that they should meet with small escorts in the desert. The negotiations continued for nearly a month, Ahmad, a brother of Jāsim, being employed on a safe-conduct as intermediary: but Jāsim refused to come in from Wajbah, 12 miles west of Dōhah, where he had taken up his position, and the Wālī at length resolved on forcible action.

Negotiations
between the
Wālī and
Shaikh
Jāsim, Feb-
ruary-March
1893.

On the night of the 25th March, having first placed Ahmad and twelve of the principal men of Dōhah in confinement, the Wālī moved out with the Turkish troops and tried to surprise Shaikh Jāsim at Wajbah; but in this he failed, and the Arabs, collecting, attacked and defeated the components of the Turkish column, which were somewhat scattered. Most of the fighting appears to have taken place at Misaimir about 7 miles south of Dōhah from which it would seem that the Turks had attempted a circuitous approach on Wajbah, or that they found a convenient line of retreat by Misaimir. The troops, losing considerably as they went, eventually made their way back to the Dōhah fort; their retirement was covered towards the end by the guns of the Turkish vessel "Mirrikh," which afterwards opened on the town; and the Wālī took up his quarters on board the "Mirrikh." The total loss of the Turks on this day was estimated at 100 men, and of the Arabs at 400 souls—men, women, and children. By seizing the wells in the neighbourhood of Dōhah the Arabs compelled the Wālī to liberate Ahmad and the other leading men whom he held as hostages, and the Wālī had also to make terms for the return by land to Hofūf of the cavalry that he had brought with him from Hasa. After these events Dōhah was deserted by its inhabitants, who scattered to other places; Shaikh Jāsim continued to live quietly at Wajbah; and the "Mirrikh," with the Wālī on board, remained at anchor in the Dōhah harbour.

Defeat of a
Turkish force,
26th March
1893.

Attempted
British inter-
vention, May
1893.

A few days before the collision, Shaikh Jāsīm, who evidently felt that his position was growing difficult, had written to the British Political Resident imploring his protection; and he had also applied to the Shaikh of Bahrain for leave to settle, under his jurisdiction, in the northern part of Qatar. On the Misaimir affair coming to be known in London and at Constantinople, Lord Rosebery, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, requested that the British Political Resident or another officer should be sent to the spot to mediate between the Turks and Shaikh Jāsīm; and Colonel Talbot, at the end of April, accordingly proceeded from Būshehr to Dōhah. The Wālī, however, declined to discuss matters with him unless by order of the Porte, and in the meantime news of his dismissal arrived; so Colonel Talbot, leaving the Wālī behind, moved to Wakrah, where he had an interview with Jāsīm. Ahmad, having been appointed by his brother as plenipotentiary, agreed to accept any decision by the British Resident and asked to be provided with a place of refuge on the Qatar coast, where he might renew the Agreement of 1868 or undertake the same obligations as the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān. Here, however, the British proceedings ended.

Final settle-
ment, June
1893.

In June 1893 a settlement between the Turkish Government and the Shaikh was effected by the Naqīb of Basrah, who arranged that, on condition of the arms captured from the Turks being surrendered, Shaikh Jāsīm should be allowed to resign the Qāim Maqāmship in favour of his brother Ahmad, and should receive a free pardon.

General and internal history of Qatar since the rising against the Turks, 1893-1907.

Turkish
Assistant
Qāim-Maqām
posted at
Dōhah, 1893.

Notwithstanding this settlement and his own apparent unwillingness to serve them, Shaikh Jāsīm continued to be treated by the Turks as Qāim-Maqām of Qatar; but a regular Turkish official was also posted to Dōhah as Assistant Qāim-Maqām. The refusal of the Turks to accept Jāsīm's resignation was probably due to the consideration that he was less dangerous as an official than he might be as an irresponsible free-lance. The Turkish garrison at Dōhah was maintained, after 1893, at a considerable strength.

1894.

In 1894 the Assistant Qāim-Maqām of Dōhah and his wife were murdered by two Turkish soldiers, who at first escaped to Wakrah, but were in the end arrested and brought back.

In July 1896 the Bani Hājir carried off some 3,000 sheep and a number of camels belonging to the Na'im of Qatar; Ibn-Rashīd, however, intervened, and in November he demanded that reparation should be made by Shaikh Jāsim to the Na'im, which was immediately done. 1896.

In 1897 Shaikh Jāsim, acting on behalf of the people of Qatar, appears to have informed the Mutasarrif that they could not afford to contribute to a war fund opened by the Turks in connection with their war against Greece. 1897.

In 1898, during a temporary absence of the Turkish gun vessel usually kept at Dōhah, a small rising took place in which several Turks and Arabs were killed. The reason of it appeared to be that the Arabs considered a successful raid made by the Shaikh of Kuwait in April 1898 upon the Bani Hājir, who were under the protection of Shaikh Jāsim, to have been instigated by the Turkish authorities. After this affair the garrison of Dōhah was again strengthened. Disturbances at Dōhah, 1898.

In 1902 both Jāsim and his brother Ahmad declined an invitation to visit Hasa. 1902.

In September 1905 a Muhammadan Turkish subject was murdered at Dōhah by Shaikh Ahmad, the brother of Jāsim, in mistake for a Jew, the partner of the deceased, against whom Ahmad had a grievance; and difficulties with the Turkish authorities at Basrah were at first apprehended on account of this incident. Ahmad, however, on becoming aware of his mistake, at once apologised to the Turks and tendered Rs. 800 as blood-money to the relatives of the murdered man; but the latter refused to accept compensation. 1905.

In 1906 it was reported that the Turkish garrison at Dōhah was nominally 200 men, but that it generally stood, on account of desertions, at about half that strength. 1906.

In November 1905, through a visit by Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, much light was cast upon the administrative position in Qatar. It appeared that Shaikh Jāsim, though for five or six years he had been living in retirement at Lūsail and had nominally abdicated both the Qāim-Maqāmship and the chiefship, was still in reality ruler of Dōhah and all its dependencies, and that nothing of importance was done in Qatar without his being consulted. At the same time his brother Ahmad, who discharged the active duties of the Qāim-Maqāmship and who was accordingly the medium in all dealings with the Turks, had succeeded in acquiring a certain position of his own, and some jealousy prevailed between him and Jāsim. Semi-independent charge of Wakrah was held by Shaikh Jāsim's third son, 'Abdur Rahmān. In Administrative position in Qatar, 1905.

spite of his great age, probably well over 80 years, Shaikh Jāsim was found in excellent health and full possession of his faculties ; he appeared to be keenly interested in all matters of business.

Assassination
of Shaikh
Ahmad and
sequel, Dec-
ember 1905.

In December 1905, shortly after Captain Prideaux's visit, Shaikh Ahmad was murdered by one of his own servants, a Bani Hājir, on account of a private grudge ; it was generally suspected that Khalifah, the eldest son of Shaikh Jāsim, had also been privy to the crime. The old Shaikh proved himself quite capable of dealing with the emergency, for he obliged the elders of the Bani Hājir to resort in a submissive manner to his camp, where they gave an undertaking to hunt down and execute the murderer. At the close of one of his discussions with them an untoward incident occurred in the shape of a sudden and murderous attack on Salīm-bin-Shāfi', chief Shaikh of the Makhadhdhabah division of the Bani Hājir, by a slave of the deceased ; but, connection with the deed having been emphatically repudiated by the Āl Thāni, the progress of the negotiations was not disturbed. A few weeks later the murderer of Shaikh Ahmad was shot dead in Dhahrān by Bashīr, a nephew of Salīm-bin-Shāfi', and the feud arising from the death of Ahmad was declared closed. One result of the murder of Ahmad was to leave 'Abdullah, the fourth son of Jāsim, in charge of Dōhah, whereby he was considered to have obtained an advantage over his eldest brother Khalifah in respect of the ultimate succession to Shaikh Jāsim. It was noticeable that the Turks abstained very carefully from meddling in the nomination of the new Shaikh of Dōhah, and that they left the matter entirely to Shaikh Jāsim ; but, notwithstanding their respect for his independence in tribal matters, his foreign relations continued to be controlled by the Turkish military commandant of the Dōhah fort. In November 1906 an attempt was made on the life of Shaikh 'Abdullah by a negro slave, who was not shot down until he had killed two persons.

Tribal
matters,
1905-06.

In April 1905 Shaikh Ahmad of Dōhah headed a raid by Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir of the Makhadhdhabah division on 'Ajmān, Bani Khalid of the 'Amāir section and Bani Hājir of the Āl Muhammad division, who were then encamped in the Jāfūrah desert ; some spoil in the shape of flocks was obtained, but the raiders lost five men killed. In May 1906 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Dōhah undertook a small punitive expedition against the predatory Bani Hājir and Manāsīr tribes ; and in July he again forayed the Bedouins, proceeding himself as far as Dōhat-as-Salwa and sending a party, by whom twelve Bedouins were killed, through Barr-al-Qārah almost as far

as 'Oqar. In August 1906 the Shaikh of the Āl Morrah, who had suffered heavy punishment at the hands of the 'Ajmān and become a fugitive, visited Shaikh 'Abdullah; in September the 'Ajmān composed a long-standing feud with the people of Dōhah by surrendering 100 camels and entering into engagements; and in November the head of the Makhadhhabah Bani Hājir came to an arrangement with Shaikh Jāsim, which made it possible for the Makhadhhabah to camp again with safety in Qatar.

British relations with Qatar during the same period, 1893-1907.

The relations of the British authorities with Qatar continued after 1893 on the same unsatisfactory footing as before, being still partly with the Turks and partly with the Shaikhs of the Āl Thāni family.

On the 15th of April 1893, in the course of discussions relating to late events at Dōhah, a note was handed to Lord Rosebery by the Turkish Ambassador in London in which reference was made to Qatar as "a Turkish sub-governorship" and "a dependency of Najd." Attention having been drawn to these expressions by the Government of India, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook, as the communications had been of an informal nature, to remind the Turkish representative privately that Her Majesty's Government dissented from the view implied in the note.

Question of
the status of
Qatar, 1893.

In 1893 the Turkish authorities at Dōhah protested against the presence of H.M.S. "Brisk" in the harbour, forbade the Commander to hold torpedo practice in the bay, and prevented the officers of the ship from visiting the shore. Instructions for future guidance were solicited by the naval authorities; and it was laid down by the Government of India, with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, that, while Turkish rule should not be recognised at Dōhah and British naval officers might act there, as upon the coast of Hasa, in such manner as might be necessary to prevent or punish infractions of the maritime peace, it was desirable that no opportunity should be given to Turkish officials of asserting by overt action such nominal authority as the Porte might possess in the locality, and that, therefore, Her Majesty's ships should refrain from visiting the harbour of Dōhah except when special occasion for doing so should arise.

Question of
British war
vessels at
Dōhah and
British liber-
ty of action
in Qatar,
1893.

About the same time it was observed by Her Majesty's Government, in correspondence with the Government of India, that, as the actual authority of the Turks appeared to be confined to the town of Dōhah, there was no sufficient reason for allowing the pretensions of Turkey to interfere with British liberty of action in Qatar or prevent the Government of India from making such treaties with the chiefs of Qatar as might be considered advisable.

Insult to the
British flag
at Dōhah,
1894.

In the spring of 1894 a vessel owned by a British Indian subject was boarded, on entering the port of Dōhah, by a party of Turkish soldiers who at first hauled down and took possession of her British flag; on being satisfied, however, that the vessel was British and had a British certificate, they restored the flag. The Political Resident from Būshehr then visited Dōhah in H.M.S. "Sphinx," but the local Turkish officials, on the ground that the Resident's direct request was irregular, refused to offer any explanation of the incident and referred him to the superior Turkish authorities. The Government of India instructed the Resident to take no further action in the matter inasmuch as the mistake had been rectified as soon as discovered, while to press for explanations would only be to elicit an assertion of the Porte's jurisdiction at Dōhah, all occasion for which it was desired to avoid; but the Wāli of Basrah, having been informed of the occurrence by the British representative there, denied the lowering of the flag and gave assurances of the friendship of Turkey for Britain.

Attempted
invasion of
Bahrain from
Zubārah,
1895.

The history of an attempt to invade the Bahrain Islands, made by Shaikh Jāsim in 1895 with the countenance of the Turks, is given at length in the history of the Bahrain principality. As there related, the attempt was frustrated by the forcible action of British war vessels at Zubārah, and provided Her Majesty's Government with an opportunity of informing the Porte that they could not admit the part of the coast on which Zubārah was situated to lie within the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire.

Question of
a Turkish
sanitary post
in Qatar,
1897.

In 1897 the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Qatar; but the project was defeated by the opposition of the British delegate, who explained that Her Majesty's Government did not recognise the existence of Turkish jurisdiction over Hasa.

Question of
the renewal
of treaty re-
lations be-
tween Great
Britain and
the Al Thāni

The admission of Shaikh Jāsim in 1882 that the Agreement of 1868 was still valid and his willingness in 1893 to renew that Agreement or to contract engagements similar to those accepted by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān have already been mentioned. In 1898, at a private interview with Lieutenant Robinson of H.M.S. "Sphinx," Shaikh Ahmad, who then represented

his brother at Dōhah, declared his readiness to enter into the same relations with the British Government as were maintained by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman; and in November 1899, at a meeting with Colonel Meade, the Political Resident, at Wakrah, Shaikh Ahmad expressed a desire to form a closer connection with the British power and asked for permission to occupy 'Odaid; but no action was taken on his requests as he failed to confirm them in writing.

Shaikhs,
1898-99.

After the posting of Mr. Gaskin to Bahrain as Assistant Political Agent at the beginning of 1900, Shaikh Ahmad made indirect overtures to him for an understanding with the British Government; his proposals resembled the suggestions that he had made to Colonel Meade in 1899, and he continued to repeat them at intervals. At length, in the spring of 1902, a definite message was received by Mr. Gaskin from Shaikh Ahmad, who offered, on condition of British protection being extended to himself and his followers, to take up his residence at any point on the coast which might be appointed,* to hold himself responsible for the security of the adjoining waters, and to co-operate with the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain in such matters as might concern them on the mainland. The principal motives of the Shaikh's offer were undoubtedly fear of the Turks and a desire to strengthen his own position in the eyes of the people of Qatar; but, as the arrangement proposed might have satisfactory results, the offer was reported by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government. An investigation of Shaikh Ahmad's position was authorised, but it was directed that no obligations should be undertaken without further reference to the Secretary of State or without full consideration of the political and military aspects of the case. After enquiry it was reported that Ahmad was already virtual chief of Qatar; that his brother Jāsim, though still treated by the Turks as Qāim-Maqām of Qatar,—a title which he repudiated,—had retired in his favour; and that Ahmad was more likely to succeed his brother at his death than any of Jāsim's sons. Subsequent experience, as we have seen, showed this report to be partially erroneous, inasmuch as Jāsim's retirement from the chief power was, up to 1905, only ostensible; and the violent death of Ahmad in 1905 falsified the expectations current in 1902 regarding the succession to the chiefship.

* This is what was reported at the time; but it was afterwards stated that the instructions of Shaikh Ahmad's agent, one 'Abdur Rahmān, Wazzān, were to apply for leave to colonise 'Odaid. In reply to a query by Mr. Gaskin, however, the agent said that he thought Shaikh Ahmad would be equally well satisfied with a settlement at Zubārah or at some other place.

1903. It was thought that on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to Bahrain, in November 1903, Shaikh Ahmad might present himself in person to urge his wish for British protection; and, in view of this contingency, the answer to be given him was discussed between the Indian and British Governments. It was decided by His Majesty's Government that the *status quo* in Qatar, which the Porte on its side had recognised by the withdrawal of Mudirs appointed to Wakrah and Zubārah,—a matter which will presently be mentioned,—ought not to be disturbed by the conclusion of any fresh Agreement between the Shaikhs of Qatar and the British Government; but that the Shaikh might be assured of the friendship of the British Government being continued, so long as he should abstain from entering into engagements with another power. Ahmad, however, did not appear in Bahrain; and the necessity of making any communication to him was thus obviated. It was generally admitted at this time that an Agreement with the Shaikhs of Qatar would be advantageous, inasmuch as it would invest the British Government with a special position in regard to the maintenance of maritime peace off the coasts of the promontory, and would increase the weight of British opinion in any international question that might arise concerning the use of the adjacent pearl banks; but it was held expedient to defer a final decision until the British position in the Persian Gulf should have been examined by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and until tension at the moment prevailing between Great Britain and Turkey in Arabia should have subsided. In September 1903 Shaikh Ahmad was eager to be informed by Mr. Gaskin, who came to Lūsail, whether a petition by him for British protection was likely to be favourably received; but in 1905, when Captain Prideaux visited Qatar, he seemed to have grown indifferent on the subject, though he still complained of the Turkish incubus at Dōhah.

Attempt by the Porte to establish posts and officials at Zubārah, Wakrah and 'Odaid, 1902-04.

While the proposals of Shaikh Ahmad for closer relations with the British Government, made in 1902, were under consideration, a step was taken by the Turkish Government which temporarily diverted attention from that subject and added to the complications with which it was already beset. On the 27th of November 1902 it was suddenly announced in the "Iqdām," a semi-official Turkish organ, that Turkish Mudirliks were to be created at 'Odaid, Wakrah, Zubārah and Jazīrat-al-'Amāir * on the Arabian coast. Confirmation of the news was soon forthcoming in Bahrain, the Mudir designate of Zubārah

* The islands of Musallamiya and Jinnah are both known as Jazīrat-al-'Amāir : either or both may have been intended.

arriving in Hasa in February of 1903, and the official intended for Wakrah in the month after. It was further ascertained that the Turkish scheme involved the erection of guard-houses to connect Zubārah with 'Oqair. Towards the end of March 1903 a Turkish gunboat left Basrah for Qatar to assist in the execution of the general design. Exactly three days later, on the 23rd of March, assurances were received by the British Ambassador at Constantinople from the Grand Vazir that no intention of posting officials to the places in question existed; but the proceedings of the Turks continued to be suspicious and were closely watched. H.M.S. "Sphinx" was sent to visit Zubārah and 'Odaid, and called at Wakrah, where the Turkish flag was found flying. Meanwhile Yūsuf Bey, the Mudir designate of Wakrah, had reached Bahrain on his way, as was suspected, to Wakrah. Under the authority of His Majesty's Government obstacles were placed in the way of his sailing for Qatar, but he succeeded in evading them; he left Bahrain on the 27th of April; and a few days later, after one unsuccessful attempt, was reported to have established himself at Wakrah. In the interim, on the 27th of April, an assurance had been obtained at Constantinople that the *status quo* in Qatar should not be in any way disturbed. After a short time Yūsuf Bey was called to Dōhah to act for the Assistant Qāim-Maqām of Qatar, and a peremptory demand for his recall from Wakrah having been addressed to the Porte by His Majesty's Government, it does not appear that he subsequently returned to the place. Soon, however, it was discovered that 'Abdur Rahmān, son of Shaikh Jāsim, had been officially appointed to Wakrah in place of Yūsuf Bey with the title of Mudir and a salary of \$52 a month. This elicited a fresh protest from the British Government, who refused to recognise the right of the Turks to appoint any administrative official whatsoever in Qatar, even from among the local Shaikhs; and at last, in October 1904, 'Abdur Rahmān was, by order of the Porte, deprived of the status of Mudir. It seems, however, that he was allowed to retain his salary,* which the Turks represented to be a subsidy of old standing, as also the status which he enjoyed at Wakrah as local agent of the Turkish Government.

From 1893 to 1898 piracies were of rare occurrence upon the coast of Qatar. The only serious case, apparently, was one that occurred in 1895, in which a British Indian sailing vessel was plundered, one of the crew being killed and others wounded; and in 1896 'Ali, an Āl Bin-'Ali

Piracies on the coast of Qatar, 1893-1906.

* In 1906, however, it was stated that 'Abdur Rahmān had never actually drawn this salary

refugee from Bahrain settled at Ghāriyah, attacked a Bahrain boat and carried off Rs. 1,000 in pearls and money.

1899. The year 1899, however, was signalised by a renewal of insecurity. In February 1899 a Persian vessel, the "Mubāraki," was plundered by Arabs at Abu Dhulūf, losing two-thirds of her cargo. On the 16th of August a Bahrain jolly-boat was attacked and carried off by Bani Hājir Bedouins near Dhakhīrah, but recovery of the boat and part of the cargo was subsequently effected through the Shaikh of Dōhah. A few days after the piracy at Dhakhīrah, two Dangis belonging to Hindu British subjects were captured, again by Bani Hājir pirates, near the Fasht-ad-Dībal; one was pillaged and abandoned, the other was taken bodily to Rās-adh-Dhabaiyah, where she was beached and became a total wreck. The damage in these three cases amounted to over Rs. 16,000, of which amount only about one-fourth was made good by restitution. The remainder was still unrecovered when Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, visited Wakrah on the 25th of November 1899 and had an interview on shore with Ahmad, the brother of Shaikh Jāsim, principally with reference to the outrages.

1900. On the 18th of August 1900 some Bedouins of Qatar, disguised as pearl-fishers, boarded a Bahrain vessel at the Qaraimah bank, a few miles north of Rās Rakan, and plundered her; in this case the property lost scarcely exceeded Rs. 300 in value, but the principal loser was a shell-purchaser in the employment of a British mercantile firm. This fresh case revived the question of reparation for the earlier piracies.

1902. The proceedings, however, remained infructuous; and in February 1902 they were abandoned, chiefly on account of the time that had elapsed since the occurrences, and of the security which had since prevailed along the Qatar coast. The ability of the Shaikh of Dōhah to prevent piratical outrages was not entirely clear, and he asserted that the depredations were invariably committed by the Bani Hājir Bedouins, whom the presence of the Turks prevented him from chastising, and that some of the so-called piracies were committed by marauders who waded out from the coast and did not make use of boats belonging to villages. It was, however, decided by the Government of India that in future the Shaikh should continue to be held responsible for the behaviour of the Bedouins of Qatar, his property in Bahrain being if necessary placed under attachment until redress had been afforded, and that the inhabitants of coast villages should be treated as answerable for the use of their vessels by pirates.

After 1900 there were no further complaints of piracy on the Qatar coast until the 8th of January 1906, when the crew of a Persian boat belonging to Rīg arrived in Bahrain and stated that in the previous month, after being driven by stress of weather to Abu Dhulūf in Qatar and compelled by the elements to jettison part of their cargo, they had been plundered and otherwise ill-treated by the inhabitants of the village. Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, proceeded in H.M.S. "Sphinx" to the scene of the accident, where he remained from the 28th to the 30th of January; but 'Īsa-bin-Hamad, the headman of the place, though assured of good treatment, refused to come on board and professed himself a subject of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Captain Prideaux accordingly wrote to the headman requiring his presence before him in Bahrain and returned to his headquarters, but bad weather prevented the removal of two boats belonging to Abu Dhulūf which it had been intended to take away as security for the headman's appearance. 'Īsa-bin-Hamad eventually arrived in Bahrain on the 1st of March and stated that nothing had been taken from the Persians except salvage which they voluntarily paid; but, in the meanwhile, his contumacy had been reported to the Government of India and orders requested. In June 1906 a protest was lodged by the Turkish Ambassador in London, to the effect that Captain Prideaux's action would have a disturbing effect on the tribes and might give rise to difficulties. The Persian complainants, though duly summoned, did not return to Bahrain to answer the objections of the headman; and the case, as one of piracy, was then necessarily dropped, the headman being merely cautioned as to his future behaviour.

Some points, however, had been raised by the incident in regard to which the Government of India considered it necessary to issue instructions for the future guidance of their officers. These instructions, after being approved by His Majesty's Government, were issued in February 1907: their substance was that, as action against piratical communities on the coast of Qatar, especially when the sufferers were persons not entitled to British protection, required careful consideration, all cases of piracy and maritime disturbance should be reported, as they occurred, to the Government of India. This form of procedure the Government of India considered to be preferable both to the grant of discretionary powers to local officers and to the laying down by themselves of any general rule, and they did not anticipate that the slight delay which it might involve would have any disadvantageous results in regard to the final settlement of cases. They added that it appeared unnecessary to make a rule, as had been

Orders of
Government
in regard
to piracies,
February
1907.

suggested by the Political Agent in Bahrain, that petty chiefs should be required to come off or send a boat, without having been specially asked to do so, to every British Government vessel arriving in their vicinity.

Maritime
disturbance,
1900.

Of a non-piratical nature, but otherwise worthy of mention, was a collision which occurred off the coast of Qatar in 1900 between the Āl Bin-'Ali and the 'Amāmarah : these tribes, as related in the history of Bahrain, had a blood-feud with one another of several years standing. On the 16th of June 1900, five boats of 'Amāmarah and two of Dawāsir from Bahrain were driven by an adverse wind into the neighbourhood of Wakrah, where a fleet of Āl Bin-'Ali and other boats was engaged in pearling ; and the Āl Bin-'Ali, who were in greater strength than the 'Amāmarah, finding their blood-enemies unexpectedly at hand, hoisted their flags, as in honour bound, and made sail as if to attack. The 'Amāmarah replied by a fusillade from their boats, and a serious encounter might have ensued but for the intervention of a nephew of Shaikh Jāsim, who persuaded the 'Amāmarah to surrender their arms to the Āl Bin-'Ali and enabled them to depart in safety. As it appeared, from investigations held by the Assistant Political Officer in Bahrain, that the Āl Bin-'Ali were the aggressors,* they were in the first place fined Rs. 1,000 for breach of the maritime peace. Being required to deliver up the 'Amāmarah rifles, 20 in number, which had passed into their possession, they substituted some inferior weapons ; and for this further offence an additional fine of Rs. 500 was imposed on them. The fines were paid with a promptitude which showed the effectiveness of the means of compulsion held in reserve by the British Government, — the sequestration, namely, of property owned by the Āl Bin-'Ali in Bahrain.

Visits of
British
officers to
Qatar, 1899-
1903.

In 1899, as already mentioned, the Resident, Colonel Meade, paid a visit to Wakrah ; and in September 1903 Mr. Gaskin, the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, touched at Lūsail and at Wakrah and interviewed Shaikhs Jāsim and Ahmad separately.

1905.

In November 1905 Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, crossed over to Qatar in a native boat and went to see Shaikh Jāsim in his camp at Bū Hasa, 'about 10 miles inland from Lūsail : here he remained for three days, transacting business with the Shaikh, and had an interview with Nāsir-bin-Mubarak, the Bahrain refugee and claimant. On his return to the coast Captain Prideaux spent a day with Shaikh

* It may be mentioned, however, that the Āl Bin-'Ali have never ceased to deny the justice of this decision ; they allege that they got up sail to avoid the 'Amāmarah, not to attack them ; and they claim credit for not having fired back when fired upon.

Ahmad at Dōhah. By this visit a great addition was made to what had before been known, geographically and politically, concerning Qatar.

In May 1906, Major Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf, accompanied by Captain Prideaux, made a tour by sea in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to Lūsail, Dōhah, Wakrah and Khor-al-'Odaid. At Lūsail a friendly interview with Shaikh Jāsim and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, his son-in-law, took place; at Dōhah a call was made on the Turkish Commandant and business was discussed; at Wakrah, where no member of the Āl Thāni family happened to be present, the party visited the headman of the Āl Bū 'Ainain tribe and inspected the fort and wells; at 'Odaid the inlet was traversed for several miles in a steam-cutter, but not a single human being was described upon its shores. The visit to Dōhah was afterwards reported by the Turkish military authorities in Hasa to Constantinople, with a recommendation that efforts should be made to put down piracy in order to deprive the English of all excuse for interference on the Qatar coast.

Relations of Qatar with Najd, 1893-1907.

We have seen that before the crisis of 1893, and especially in 1888, friendly relations prevailed between Shaikh Jāsim and the Amīr of Jabal Shammar: nor were they discontinued, apparently, until the overthrow of Ibn-Rashīd's power in Najd. In 1894 Shaikh Jāsim sought an interview with Ibn-Rashīd, which was refused for fear of the Turks; and in 1896, as already mentioned, the Shaikh at the request of Ibn-Rashīd caused restitution of animals raided to be made by one tribe of Qatar to another.

Relations
with Ibn-
Rashīd,
1893-1896.

When Hāil declined and Riyādh obtained the ascendancy in Central Arabia, Shaikh Jāsim, in his later years a convinced Wahhābi and during most of his life a bitter enemy of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, had no difficulty in adapting himself to the change and began to send money and other gifts annually to Ibn-Sa'ūd; but his views in this respect were not shared by his brother Shaikh Ahmad. A visit paid by 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of the Wahhābi Amīr, in the summer of 1905 to districts adjoining Qatar brought out the divergence of opinion in the Āl Thāni family very clearly: for, while Shaikh Jāsim sent the Amīr a letter of welcome, with \$ 8,000 in cash and a present of rifles and rice, and himself visited him at the wells of 'Araiq, Shaikh Ahmad warned him that any attempt on his part to cross the border of Qatar would be opposed by the united forces of Dōhah and Abu Dhabi.

Relations
with Ibn-
Sa'ūd, 1905.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF BAHRAIN.*

Early History, 1602-1783.

Expulsion
of the
Portuguese
by the
Persians,
about 1602.

In tracing the course of events in Bahrain it is unnecessary to go back beyond 1602, about which year the Portuguese were expelled from the islands by the † Persians; the ruined fort on the northern coast of the main island, known at the present day as Qal'at-al-'Ajāj, is a relic of the Portuguese occupation.

Persian
occupation
of uncertain
duration.

After this the Persians appear to have retained possession for a considerable time; and in 1622 they must have had a military dépôt in Bahrain, for they brought thence a quantity of the gunpowder which they expended in the siege of Hormūz.

Seizure of
Bahrain by
the Imām of
'Omān, 1718.

In or about 1718 a descent was made on Bahrain by the Arabs of Masqat, then governed by Sultān-bin-Saif II, an Imām of the Ya'arabi

* The only authorities in regard to the recent history of Bahrain are the records of the Government of India and compilations based thereon, among which may be mentioned *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Bahrain Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Katar Affairs*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. For Agreements, etc., relating to Bahrain the reader is referred to Aitchison's *Treaties*, and for details of British naval action and similar matters to Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877. Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865, gives a view of the state of affairs in Bahrain in 1862-1863. The authorities for early events (1600-1800) are the same as those cited for the corresponding period in the footnote to the title of Chapter First.

† In this and in most other places where "Persians" are mentioned in connection with Bahrein affairs, the term must be understood to mean "subjects of the Persian Government." Persian subjects employed by their Government in matters at Bahrain have generally been Arabs of the Būshehr and Kangūn neighbourhoods.

dynasty; it is not clear whether the Bahrain islands were then derelict or whether a Persian garrison held them; but in either case the invaders seem to have had little difficulty in establishing their power. The 'Omāni occupation seems to have lasted for a short time only, and it is said to have been brought to an end by the voluntary removal from their homes of the indigenous population, who emigrated to other places in order to escape foreign oppression.

At the middle of the 18th century the Hūwalah Arabs, at the present day still strongly represented in the islands, were the chief resident tribe and controlled the politics of the archipelago; but in 1753 they were so much divided among themselves by feuds that the conquest of the islands appeared likely to prove an easy task for any foreign invader.

Predominance and proceedings of the Hūwalah, about 1751-53.

Apparently in that very year, invited by the local situation, Shaikh Nāsir, the ruler of Būshehr under the Persian Government, made a descent upon Bahrain and, with the assistance of Mīr Nāsir, chief of Rīg, established his own authority there. In this manner the islands again became a dependency, at least in name, of Persia.

Annexation to Persia, about 1753.

In 1755, partly because of his failure to pay 5,000 Tūmāns on account of the revenues of Bahrain during the three years that it had been in his possession, Shaikh Nāsir was imprisoned by the Vakil Karīm Khān at Shīrāz; and in 1767 the Vakil seems to have insisted that he should pay 4,000 Tūmāns a year on account of Būshehr and Bahrain together.

Revenue on account of Bahrain claimed by the Vakil of Shīrāz, 1755-67.

There is no information regarding the internal affairs of Bahrain during the Persian occupation established in 1753. In 1771 pirates of Khārag, having captured two ships under British colours—with several others—in the Gulf below Būshehr, carried their prizes to Bahrain and kept them there until they found an opportunity of removing them to Rīg. In 1779 a certain Shaikh Nāsir of Bahrain, who brought with him a vessel of his own, took part in the recovery of Būshehr, on behalf of Shaikh Nāsir of that town, from one Bāqir Khān into whose hands it had fallen. These affairs, which hardly concern Bahrain, are related in full in their proper places.

Events Bahrain, 1753-83.

English and other foreign views in regard to Bahrain, 1602-1783.

Bahrain was one of the first places in the Persian Gulf to attract the attention of the representatives of the English East India Company.

Thomas Aldworth, appointed chief of the Sūrat Factory on its foundation at the beginning of 1613, was soon engaged in a search for new markets outside India, and reported upon Bahrain, during his first year of office, in the following terms: "I find there is a seaport town called "Bareyn, whereunto a ship of 2 or 3 hundred tons may come, and I "understand this country spends much cloth, for the Venetians bring it "overland and so carry with them again all sorts of Persian Silks, which "trade is, as it were, offered us, and surely I think in short time will be "able to vent as much cloth as Suratt."

1625. The Company soon after this selected Jāshk, and subsequently Bandar 'Abbās, as their port in the Persian Gulf; but occasional references to Bahrain continue to occur in their records, as for example in 1625, when some information regarding the pearl fishery with its headquarters in Bahrain was extracted from Portuguese deserters.

1700-01. In 1700-01, when, after a brief re-approchement, the relations of the Old East India Company with the Persian Government had again become unsatisfactory, it was suggested by Mr. Owen, the Company's Agent in Persia, "that, if in future it should become necessary for the Company to "employ force for the preservation of their privileges and trade in Persia, "it would be expedient to take possession of the Island of Barrein near "Bassorah, a station which would not only afford a proportion of Persian "produce, but enable the Company's cruisers to overawe the trade."

In 1751, when an attack on Bandar 'Abbās was feared, the Company's representatives there asked that they might be authorised to remove elsewhere and pointed out that the present was "a fine opportunity of seizing the Persian Fleet and settling at Bahreen;" but the Bombay Presidency in reply to these proposals, while they sanctioned a temporary transfer of the Factory to some other place, strictly forbade any interference with Persian vessels.

1752. In 1752, the project of a removal from Bandar 'Abbās being still under consideration, enquiries were made in regard to various possible new locations: and Mr. F. Wood, the Company's Agent, reported in these terms on Bahrain; "I can get no better intelligence relating to "the Island of Bahreen, than its being a place held in superstitious "veneration by the Hoolah Arabs, and that it is very fertile, abounding with Springs and fresh water, but both the Air and Water are "extremely unwholesome according to the Account of several Persons "who have been formerly Inhabitants of that Place." Eventually, in 1763, Būshehr was chosen in preference to Bahrain as the base of the Company's operations in the Persian Gulf, just as Jāshk had been selected a century and a half before.

When the Dutch under Baron Kniphausen formed a settlement on Khārag at the end of 1753, it was strongly suspected that they meant to seize Bahrain, and the suspicion for some time continued to be entertained ; but, if they harboured the design thus attributed to them, they took no steps to carry it into effect.

Dutch view,
1753-66.

Conquest of Bahrain from the Persians by the Arabs, 1783.

The recent history of Bahrain may be said to date from 1783, in which year the Persians, then in possession, were expelled from the islands. The Arab horde which drove them out was led by the Shaikhs of the 'Utūb ; but it included contingents from numerous tribes of the Arabian mainland.

The conflict in Bahrain may have been provoked by Persian aggression upon Zubārah, a flourishing settlement on the adjacent coast of Qatar which had been founded a few years previously by 'Atbi settlers from the port of Kuwait. This place Shaikh Nāsir, Governor of Būshehr and Bahrain under the Persians, was commissioned by Karīm Khān, Zand, to reduce ; and as early as 1777, apparently, some attempt was made by him to carry out his instructions.

Invasion of
Bahrain by
the 'Utub,
1782.

After the death of Karīm Khān, the power of Persia as a Government being for the time paralysed, the Arabs of Zubārah retaliated, probably in 1782, by a descent on the Island of Bahrain ; they defeated Shaikh Nāsir in the field, drove him to his fort, plundered and destroyed the town of Manāmah, and took possession of a Būshehr vessel with which they retired to Zubārah.

As related in the history of Qatar, a counter-attack was next made upon the 'Utūb of Zubārah by the Shaikh of Būshehr with the aid of supporters from Rās-al-Khaimah and Hormūz ; but it was ignominiously repulsed. A message from Shaikh Nāsir informing his son, who had been left in charge of Bahrain, of the defeat of the Persians and urging him to hold out resolutely in Bahrain, was meanwhile intercepted at sea by a fleet of six large vessels and a number of boats despatched by the 'Utūb of Kuwait to the relief of their kinsmen at Zubārah ; and this expedition, having changed their destination, ran to Manāmah, seized and set fire to the town, and shut the Persian garrison up in the citadel. The northern 'Utūb were joined in Bahrain, as quickly as the available means of transport would admit, by the 'Utub of Zubārah and Ruwais

Capture of
Bahrain by
the 'Utub and
other Arabs,
1783.

and by contingents from various tribes of Qatar, among them Āl Musallam from Huwailah, Āl Bin'-Ali from Fuwairat, Sūdān from Dōhah, Āl Bū 'Ainain from Wakrah, Kibisah from Khor Hassān, Sulutah from Dōhah, Manāna'ah from Abu Dhalūf, Sādah from Ruwais, Āl Bū Kuwārah from Sumaismah, and Na'im Bedouins from the interior of the promontory. The Bahrain Islands were quickly occupied by the invaders ; and the Persian garrison of the Manāmah fort, after a siege of about two months' duration, capitulated on the 28th of July 1783 and were allowed to return to Būshehr.

Events from the foundation of the Bahrain Shaikhdом to the first attack on Bahrain by the Saiyid of 'Omān 1783-1800.

Secession
of the
Jalāhimah,
1783.

Bahrain was thus transformed from a Persian dependency into an Arab principality governed by Shaikhs of the Āl Khalifah section of the 'Utūb. The Jalāhimah section of the tribe, who had once before separated themselves from the rest of the 'Utūb in Qatar and who now considered themselves unfairly treated by the majority in Bahrain, shortly took their departure for the mainland, leaving the Āl Khalifah in undisputed possession of the new conquest. The disappointed Jalāhimah were at this time under the leadership of four brothers, sons of a deceased Shaikh named Jābir ; and one of these, named Rahmah, was destined to achieve great notoriety and to become the scourge of the Āl Khalifah of Bahrain.

Abortive
measures of
the Persians
for the
recovery of
Bahrain,
1783-1785.

The Persian Government, or rather the Arab Shaikhs representing them in the Gulf, could not at once reconcile themselves to the loss of Bahrain. During the latter part of the year 1783 preparations were on foot for an expedition on a large scale by the Shaikhs of Būshehr and Hormūz, assisted by Persian troops and by the Shaikh of the Qawāsim, against Zubārah and Kuwait ; but no armament actually sailed. Again, in February 1785, the fleets of Būshehr and Rīg rendezvoused at Kangūn, where a small land force had already arrived from Shīrāz, to await the Shaikhs of Hormūz and Rās-al-Khaimah ; but the death of 'Ali Murād Khān of Shīrāz dispelled the danger which thus threatened the Āl Khalifah of Bahrain. During the next few years, while the Shīrāz Government laboured under domestic difficulties, the Shaikhs of Bahrain remained unmolested ; and in 1798 they were still able to lend effectual aid to the Shaikh of Būshehr in affairs upon the Persian coast.

The conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utub gave a great impulse to the trade of the islands, for the Arab immigrants soon acquired a mercantile fleet and became the principal carriers of goods between Masqat, at this time the chief local emporium, and Basrah and the places on the western coast of the Gulf. There were no import duties in Bahrain under the first 'Atbi Shaikhs, and the interests of merchants were carefully protected. The pearl trade of the Persian Gulf was at this period almost entirely controlled by the people of Bahrain; and their annual imports from India, valued at 10 lakhs of rupees, were paid for by means of pearls, chiefly through the market of Masqat.

Growth of
trade, 1783-
90.

First attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1799-1802.

Throughout a whole generation following this short era of peace, the independence of Bahrain was more than once in serious jeopardy; but the cause, at this later time, was less the assertion by Persia of claims to sovereignty than the ambition of Saiyid Sultān and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat to annex, without any shadow of right, the comparatively rich and valuable islands of Bahrain.

In 1799 Saiyid Sultān of Masqat, not without encouragement from the Persian governor of Shirāz, declared war against the 'Utub of Bahrain; this he did ostensibly on the ground of their refusing to recognise a tax or due which he claimed the right to levy on all vessels passing Masqat, but really with the object of conquering Bahrain. The marine of the Āl Khalifah seems to have consisted at this time of three large vessels only, all of which were captured at sea, while returning from India, by the navy of Masqat; but Saiyid Sultān did not as yet venture to land in Bahrain. The 'Utub, alarmed by his proceedings, opened a correspondence with Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, who received their advances with alacrity and, on their offering to become tributary to Persia, proceeded privately to Bahrain and received from them an instalment of revenue on account of the past year. The 'Utub seem to have stated to the Persians on this occasion that Bahrain had once belonged to the Turkish Government, out of whose possession it had passed about seventy years previously.*

Outbreak of
war with
Masqat,
1799.

In 1800 the ruler of Masqat invaded Bahrain, capturing 25 of the leading families, whom he deported to Masqat, and establishing an 'Omāni garrison in a fort at 'Arād on Muharraḡ Island. Some of the

Invasion and
occupation of
Bahrain by
Saiyid
Sultān, 1800-
1801.

* This was of course incorrect. The Turks temporarily established themselves in Bahrain in 1559, but they were again expelled by the Portuguese in the same year.

chiefs of the defeated 'Utūb took refuge on this occasion at Zubārah, and others at Kuwait, to which last place Saiyid Sultān apparently pursued them. At his departure the Saiyid left his youthful son Sālim, with whom he associated a reliable adviser, in charge of his interests in Bahrain; but the position of the 'Omānis there was precarious, and in 1801, not long after the sailing of the Saiyid's fleet, they were invested in 'Arād by the 'Utūb and compelled to surrender and to evacuate Bahrain.

Renewed
invasion of
Bahrain by
Saiyid
Sultān, 1802.

In the following year, having obtained some assistance from Būshehr by permission of the Persian ruler of Shīrāz, Saiyid Sultān again landed in Bahrain and successfully engaged the 'Utūb; but the latter had now secured the support of the Wāhhābis, whose outposts by this time threatened the land frontiers of the 'Omān Sultanate; and in these circumstances the ruler of Masqat seems to have found it expedient to abandon his enterprise and return home.

Events from the first to the second attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1802-1816.

Extension of
Wāhhābi
influence over
Bahrain,
1803-1809.

After these events the 'Utūb of Bahrain succumbed for a time, but reluctantly, to the influence of the Wāhhābis. In 1803, at the bidding of the Wāhhābi Amīr, they sent their subjects to cruise against the people of Masqat at a season when they should have been more profitably engaged in pearl-diving, and suffered a heavy defeat at sea; and in 1805, during a dynastic dispute in the 'Omān Sultanate, a fleet largely 'Atbi proceeded to Masqat, apparently to watch events there in the Wāhhābi interest. In 1805, however, the Shaikhs of Bahrain were inclined to join Saiyid Badar of Masqat in an attack on the Qawāsim, of which the real object was to destroy the local influence of the Wāhhābis; and their disposition towards the Saiyid had become so favourable that they now paid him at Masqat the dues which they had formerly withheld. In the same year they proposed that the Bombay Government should, by promising the occasional assistance of one or two vessels of war in Bahrain, place them in a position to defy the Wāhhābis,—a request to which the British authorities, though it was recommended for acceptance by Captain Seton, the Political Resident at Masqat, and supported by the 'Atbi Shaikhs of Kuwait and Zubārah, were unable to agree; and in 1809 they ventured to disregard a summons by the Wāhhābi

Amīr to join with the Qawāsīm in a naval attack upon Basrah and upon their own 'Atbi brethren at Kuwait.

In 1810 the Wāhhābī Government, who had lately strengthened their position in the Persian Gulf by entering into arrangements with Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the head of the dissident Jalāhimah section and the most influential personage at the time in Qatar, appointed an agent or Wakil to superintend on their behalf the administration of Bahrain, Hasa and Qatar; this individual was named 'Abdullah-bin-'Ufaisān, and his usual residence appears to have been in Bahrain. The authority of the 'Atbi Shaikhs in local matters was maintained; but they were obliged to pay tribute through the Wakil, and Wāhhābī teachers were stationed in the principality to convert the people to the reformed doctrines.

Bahrain
under strict
Wāhhābī
control,
1710-11.

In 1811, however, embarrassments having arisen upon his western frontier in consequence of the gradual advance of the Egyptians upon that side, the Wāhhābī Amīr reduced his garrisons in Bahrain and Zubārah; and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat immediately profited by the opportunity to attack both places. Zubārah was burnt, and in Bahrain the Wāhhābī Wakil was taken prisoner and the 'Utūb were restored to power, but in subordination—so Saiyid Sa'id afterwards declared—to Masqat. In the same year a desperate action was fought at sea between the 'Utūb of Bahrain and Rahmah-bin-Jābir, of which the result was favourable to the Shaikhs of Bahrain.

Bahrain
freed from
the Wāhha-
bis by the
ruler of
Masqat,
1811.

In 1813 the 'Utūb of Bahrain, whose interests at this time coincided with those of the Saiyid of Masqat, volunteered to join the latter at Dibai with a fleet of 15 or 20 sail and a force of 2,000 men for an expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah; but they did not fulfil their undertaking. The unexpected failure of Saiyid Sa'id's attack in that year upon the Qāsimi stronghold may have been due, in part, to their defection.

Short-lived
alliance
between the
'Utūb of
Bahrain and
the Saiyid of
'Omān,
1811-1813.

Second attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān on Bahrain, 1816.

Towards the year 1816 some revulsions of feeling affected the powers interested in Bahrain, and new combinations were formed. The 'Utūb of the islands now sought the protection of the Wāhhābis and entered into a friendship with the Qawāsīm, while Rahmah-bin-Jābir ranged himself under the standard of Masqat.

Origin of the
rupture.

Proceedings
of the British
Resident.

On the 19th of July 1816, news having been received of the sailing of an expedition from Masqat against Rās-al-Khaimah and Bahrain, Lieutenant Bruce, Political Resident at Būshehr, arrived in Bahrain, where he had an interview with 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, the Shaikh of the principality. The Shaikh, to whom the Saiyid had held out a threat that British ships of war would participate in the attack on Bahrain and that the ports of British India would be closed to the 'Utūb so long as they were at enmity with himself, complained to Lieutenant Bruce that the treaty between Masqat and Bahrain had been wantonly broken by Saiyid Sa'id, who had treacherously seized 15 Bahraini vessels and their cargoes off Masqat. On being assured of the neutrality and even friendship of Britain—of which the Resident apparently undertook to convince him by the conclusion of an informal agreement not authorised by Government—'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad declared himself able to hold his own, at least with Wāhhābi assistance, against any force which might be brought against him; and the event fully justified his opinion.

Saiyid Sa'id, who was now approaching Bahrain, on his part professed, in a correspondence with the Resident, that he was compelled to act against the 'Utūb by their repudiation of his suzerainty, which they had admitted in 1811, by their alliance with the Wāhhābis, and by their indulgence in piratical practices. He turned a deaf ear to the dissuasion of the British representative, and he even neglected to answer a letter in which British mediation was offered.

Repulse of
the Masqat
expedition
July or
August 1816.

The Masqat armament, to which three Būshehr vessels were added by order of the Persian Government of Shīrāz and which was strengthened by Arab contingents from the Persian ports of Kangūn and 'Asalu, arrived on the scene a few days after Lieutenant Bruce's departure from Bahrain. A landing was immediately effected by the 'Omānis on the Island of Muharraḡ; but, in an engagement which followed, the invaders were signally defeated with the loss of two near relations of Saiyid Sa'id, one of whom was his younger brother Hamad.

Unsuccessful
negotiations
between
Saiyid Sa'id
and the
Persian
Government
of Shīrāz for
a fresh
attempt on
Bahrain.

The Saiyid with his fleet then crossed the Gulf to Kangūn to take on board 1,000 musketeers and 400 irregular horse whom the Persian Governor-General of Fārs had undertaken to provide on an understanding that, should the troops be embarked and the expedition then fail or be abandoned, the ruler of Masqat would defray the expenses incurred and in future remit an annual Pīshkash to Shīrāz, and that otherwise, in case of the islands, being taken, the Saiyid should pay 10,000 Tūmāns a year ever after to the Governor-General of Fārs. After some

time, however, Saiyid Sa'id discovered that the Persians really intended to seize him by treachery and carry him a prisoner to Shīrāz, so he abandoned the idea of accepting their assistance and returned home. Soon afterwards a Persian emissary arrived in Bahrain, by name Sikandar Khān, who accepted presents from the Shaikhs of Bahrain for the Prince of Shīrāz and conferred on them in return Persian robes of honour. Some political understanding, also, was probably arranged at the same time ; but it cannot have been one of any consequence.

In 1817 Rahmah-bin-Jābir visited Masqat and would fain have persuaded the Saiyid to equip another expedition against Bahrain ; but he found Sa'id's attention engrossed by domestic difficulties.

Close connection between the 'Utūb and the Qawāsīm, 1817-1819.

The attitude of the Shaikh of Bahrain, whose plausible assurances in 1816, backed as they were by an invitation to open a direct trade between India and Bahrain, had convinced the Resident of his attachment to commerce and his aversion for piracy, now became extremely unsatisfactory ; and he was shown to be assisting, with grain and every other kind of store, the piratical Qawāsīm, "who hourly frequented the ports of the island," and with whom he had now formed an alliance. In 1817 Lieutenant Bruce was constrained to report that Bahrain, which had become the principal mart for property plundered by pirates and the main dépôt from which the Qawāsīm drew their supplies of rice and dates, could itself hardly be regarded otherwise than as a piratical settlement, especially as numbers of the inhabitants were accustomed to proceed to Rās-al-Khaimah and there to enlist as temporary members of buccaneering crews. At this time craft engaged in piracy generally landed their booty direct in Bahrain, whence a portion of it was carried over to Būshehr and other places on the Persian coast by vessels belonging to Kuwait. Nevertheless, on the appearance of the Egyptians in Hasa about the end of 1818, Shaikh 'Abdullah appears to have offered to provide them with sea transport for a force that they proposed to send against Rās-al-Khaimah and the other piratical ports.

Sale of
plundered
property in
Bahrain.

In February 1819, a report having been received that several Indian women had been brought from Rās-al-Khaimah and sold in the Bahrain bazaar as slaves, H.M.S. "Eden," Captain Loch, with H.M.S. "Conway" and the H.E.I. Company's cruisers "Benares," "Mercury"

Inoperative
agreement
by the
Shaikh to
prevent the

sale of
plundered
British
property in
Bahrain,
1819.

Bani Yās
mistaken for
Qawāsim in
Bahrain,
1819.

and "Antelope," were despatched to Bahrain for an enquiry into the matter. The report was not substantiated, but Captain Loch succeeded in obtaining, by an exchange of prisoners through the Shaikh of Bahrain, the liberation of 17 Indian women who were held in captivity by the Qawāsim at Rās-al-Khaimah; and, before his departure from Bahrain, he persuaded the Shaikh to execute an agreement for preventing the sale of captured British property in his dominions,—an agreement which, unfortunately, the Shaikh afterwards treated as if it did not exist.

During his stay in Bahrain Captain Loch received information from the British Residency Agent, a native, that a squadron of Qāsimi vessels was lying in the "southern anchorage"—perhaps Khor-al-Qal'ai'ah; and immediately, without paying sufficient attention to the assertions of the Shaikh and his ministers that the crews were not Qawāsim but Bani Yās, or to the advice of the East India Company's officers, he sent a boat expedition under cover of the "Antelope" to take possession. The vessels, which were boarded and captured after a stout resistance, were wrecked in being brought out of the anchorage; the Shaikh of Bahrain professed great indignation at violation of the neutrality of his port; and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, to whom or to whose subjects the vessels were afterwards proved to belong, made a claim for reparation on the Bombay Government which, it is believed, was admitted and satisfied in respect both of property and of lives lost.

Bahrain affairs in connection with the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, 1819-1820.

British
policy of
neutrality in
regard to
Bahrain.

When in 1819 an expedition was despatched from Bombay against the piratical stronghold of Rās-al-Khaimah, the policy of the British Government in regard to Bahrain was defined as one of complete abstention from interference between rival claimants to possession; and it was resolved to inform the 'Atbi Shaikh that, so long as he restrained his subjects from piracy, he would reap the advantages of a friendly neutrality on the part of Britain, whereas, should a piratical spirit manifest itself in Bahrain, the same measures of coercion would be applied to the 'Utūb as to the Qawāsim. The conclusion with the Shaikh of "an engagement similar to that negotiated by Mr. Bruce in the year 1816," which would assure the 'Utūb of the benevolence of British intentions, was also contemplated by Government. From the general line of action thus marked out there seems to have been no deviation.

The idea of transferring Bahrain to Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, which had at first been entertained, was thus definitely set aside; but the Saiyid himself did not neglect to make use of his temporary close connection with the British at Rās-al-Khaimah for the purpose of advancing his interests in Bahrain. The crippling of their allies, the Qawāsīm, was a severe blow to the 'Utūb of Bahrain, who moreover suspected that the ruler of Masqat was encouraged and supported in his designs by the British Government; and so impressed were the Persians with the probability of the Saiyid's success on this occasion that at the beginning of 1820 the Government of Fārs, who had recently rather hung back in the matter, began to beg him to convey their troops to Bahrain; and the Prince Governor of Shīrāz, when these applications failed, actually addressed himself to the commander of the British expedition and requested the loan of four or five transports, — a demand which, needless to say, was refused. An active share was taken in the Persian preparations by the 'Atbi freebooter Rahmah-bin-Jābir, formerly of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who was now domiciled at Dammām in Hasa.

Designs of
Masqat and
Persia on
Bahrain,
1820.

When, early in January 1820, Saiyid Sa'id parted from Sir W. Grant Keir at Rās-al-Khaimah, it was believed that he would immediately attack Bahrain without depending on any except his own resources, and this he may have intended to do; but the Āl Khalifah, now thoroughly alarmed, anticipated action on his part by making full submission through an agent whom they sent to Masqat. The terms arranged were that the 'Utūb of Bahrain should pay an annual tribute of \$30,000 to His Highness, while he should release certain 'Atbi Shaikhs whom he had detained and restore some Bahraini vessels and other property which he had taken at sea on their way from India. Both parties appear to have stipulated for a guarantee of this arrangement by the British Government, but none was apparently, obtained; later, however, an instalment of \$12,000 seems to have been actually remitted by the 'Utūb to Masqat on account of the promised tribute; and as to the fact of the tribute having been promised, at least, there can be no doubt whatever.

Submission
of the 'Utūb
of Bahrain to
the Saiyid of
Masqat,
1820.

Some ten Qāsīmī craft which were liable to destruction by the British armament at Rās-al-Khaimah having taken refuge in Bahrain, Captain Loch was despatched from Rās-al-Khaimah with H.M.S. "Eden" and H.M.S. "Curlew" to demand their surrender. This on the 17th of January 1820 he obtained, as also an agreement by the Shaikh not to admit any more boats of the same character into his port until

Direct
British
dealings with
Bahrain,
January
1820.

authorised to do so by the British authorities. The agreement, it is obvious, was merely temporary, and it must have been meant to facilitate the destruction of piratical craft which was then proceeding upon the whole Pirate Coast.

Preliminary
Treaty of
Peace, 5th
February
1820.

On the 5th of February 1820 a Preliminary Treaty of Peace, binding Salmān-bin-Ahmad and 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikhs of Bahrain, to prevent the sale of plundered goods, likewise the supply of necessities to pirates, at places in their dominions and to deliver up all Indian prisoners, was executed at Shārjah by Saiyid 'Abdul Jalil, a Wakil representing the Shaikhs.

General
Treaty
Peace, 23rd
of February
1820.

Finally, as guaranteed to them in this Preliminary Treaty, the Shaikhs were admitted to the benefits of the General Treaty of Peace. It was signed by their agent at Shārjah on the same day as the Preliminary Treaty, and by the Shaikhs themselves in Bahrain on the 23rd of February 1820.

Events from the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah to the third and last attack on Bahrain by the Saiyid of 'Omān, 1820-1828.

Treaty and
other
relations
with
Britain.

The engagements with the British Government into which the 'Atbi Shaikhs had entered were, upon the whole, satisfactorily observed; and it was not found necessary for cruisers to watch the ports of Bahrain, during the next few years, as those of the Pirate Coast were watched. Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, on his part, went so far as to claim that the General Treaty of Peace established relations of protection and dependence between the British Government and himself; but this impression Lieutenant McLeod, the Political Resident, was careful to remove, while on a visit to Bahrain in 1823. A British marine survey of the waters surrounding and lying to the east of Bahrain was in progress at this time, and was assisted by all the superior and inferior chiefs concerned to the best of their ability.

At the end of 1822 a boat belonging to Būshehr was seized by a Bahrain Batil on account of a claim which the owner of the latter entertained against the Shaikh of Būshehr; and, the case at first appearing to be one of piracy, the Batil and her crew were captured in the Shatt-al-'Arab by H.M.S. "Sophie" and conveyed to Bombay. In this case the Shaikh of Bahrain made no attempt to shield his

subjects, whom he admitted to have been guilty of an impropriety ; but the charge of piracy was not established in the court of the Recorder of Bombay ; and, the accused Bahrainis and their vessels having been released, a suitable explanation was made to the Shaikh.

In August 1825 a case occurred of petty aggression by a Bahrain Baghlah at Mokha upon a vessel belonging to that port ; but a little later, on the arrival of the offending Baghlah at Masqat, the matter was easily settled by the intervention of the British authorities.

During this period not a single serious infringement of the maritime peace by Bahrain subjects was reported.

In the summer of 1821 the Bahrain islands were ravaged by Cholera. Four thousand persons, it was said, perished.

Cholera epidemic, 1821.

An extraordinary and unauthorised agreement, relating to the affairs of Persia in the Persian Gulf generally and therefore more fully discussed in the history of the Persian Coast, was signed at Shīrāz on the 30th of August 1822 by Captain W. Bruce, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of Britain, and by Mirza Zaki Khān, Minister to the Prince Governor of Shīrāz, on the part of Persia.

Agreement in regard to Bahrain between Captain Bruce, Political Resident, and the Government of Shīrāz, 1822.

With regard to Bahrain the Agreement laid down that the islands had always been subordinate to the Government of Fārs, against whose authority the 'Atbi Shaikhs had lately become rebellious ; that the flag assigned to the 'Utūb of Bahrain under the General Treaty of Peace with Britain in 1820 should accordingly, if already granted, be withdrawn ; that no assistance should in future be rendered by Britain to the 'Utūb of Bahrain ; and that, on the contrary, the British Government should, if requested, assist the Persians against Bahrain with "one or two" vessels of war. In other words the title of Persia to possession of Bahrain was explicitly admitted. Captain Bruce, in accepting these conditions, appears to have been actuated by a belief that a demonstration against Bahrain, which the Prince Governor of Shīrāz was believed to contemplate, would probably be successful ; and he held that, in any case, "the Island of Bahrain reverting again under the authority of Persia "will tend more to the tranquillity of the Arabian side of the Gulf than "almost any other act, and will at once do away with the petty acts of "aggression and retaliation existing between the different branches of "the Beni Attabee Arabs."

The views of the Resident were not shared by the Government of Bombay, who at once, in clear and emphatic terms, disavowed to the Government of Fārs the action of their representative at Būshehr, and, as a further mark of their disapprobation, removed Captain Bruce from his

appointment and recalled him to India. With reference chiefly to the clause of the Agreement that affected Bahrain, the Bombay Government remarked: "It acknowledges the King of Persia's title of Bahrain, of which there is not the least proof and which the British Government cannot assert without injuring the pretensions of the Imaum and the Attabees. It promises our aid against every power possessed of an island in the Gulf, and expressly against the Attabees, to whom we are bound by a treaty of friendship, and with whose conduct we have every reason to be satisfied." According to a report by Major G. Willock, the British representative at Tabriz, the Shāh also, "whilst refusing his accordance to the stipulations, expressed his displeasure that the Prince of Shiraz should have entered into any engagements with the British Government without his knowledge and injunctions."

Visit of
Lieutenant
McLeod,
Political
Resident, to
Bahrain and
the general
position
there,
January
1823.

In the course of an important tour along the Arab coast, undertaken by special order of Government, Lieutenant McLeod, the successor of Captain Bruce, landed on the 27th of January 1823 at Manamah, where he was hospitably entertained by the Shaikhs of Bahrain. The chief object of his visit was to reassure the Shaikhs in regard to Captain Bruce's unfortunate Agreement, by informing them that it was of no effect, and that no change of policy was contemplated by Government; but the case was also discussed of the Bahrain Batil which had been seized by H.M.S. "Sophie" and carried to Bombay on account of a technical piracy committed on a Būshehr vessel in the Shatt-at-'Arab. Shaikh 'Abdullah, the younger of the joint chiefs, who with a majority of the 'Utūb of the principality resided on Muharraq Island, was found to be in virtual charge of the state; his elder brother Salmān, who was now a very old man and was represented in most matters by his son Khalifah, had retired to spend the remainder of his days in Rifā'-ash-Sharqi on the main island, where the Resident had an interview with him also. Lieutenant McLeod reported that the authority of the Shaikhs of Bahrain in their own dominions did not appear to be so absolute as might have been expected, and that it was "borne with much reluctance by the inhabitants of the islands." Sons and servants already appeared to encroach upon the functions properly belonging to the Shaikhs alone.

1825.

The death of Shaikh Salmān occurred two years later, in 1825, when his son Khalifah succeeded to a half share of the net revenue of the principality; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, though the concurrence of his nephew in all acts of government was theoretically required, contrived to retain the entire executive power in his own hands.

Feud
between
Rahmah-

The feud between Rahmah-bin-Jābir, chief of the dissident Jalāhimah 'Utūb, and the Shaikhs of Bahrain was, until its termination,

by the death of the former, a source of constant unrest. Indeed Captain Bruce appears to have been betrayed into his maladroit concessions to the Prince Governor of Shīrāz partly by irritation at the petty warfare to which the enmity between the Āl Khalifah and the Jalāhimah gave rise.

bin-Jābir
and the
Shaikhs of
Bahrain,
1822-1826.

At the beginning of 1822 both sides appealed to the British authorities to mediate,—a request which was at once granted on condition that the British Government should not be understood to guarantee the observance by either party of such terms as might be arranged. An interview took place between 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad and Rahmah-bin-Jābir at Bāsīdu in the presence of Colonel Kennett, the Acting Political Agent at that place; but the differences of the chiefs proved at this time to be irreconcilable. From the fruitless meeting at Bāsīdu Shaikh 'Abdullah returned to Bahrain, while Rahmah proceeded to Masqat to lay his grievances before his friend and ally, Saiyid Sa'id; the only result of this movement, however, was that a few months later the ruler of Masqat informed the British Resident that he considered Rahmah to be an altogether unreliable character and declined to accept a responsibility for the actions of that chief which the Government of India wished to fix upon him.

In 1823 earnest but still unsuccessful efforts were made by Lieutenant McLeod to bring the principal disputants into accord.

At length, on the 24th of February 1824, an agreement was signed in Bahrain before Colonel E. G. Stannus, Political Resident, by Shaikh 'Abdullah and Rahmah-bin-Jābir, by which they undertook to be at peace with one another for the future upon certain conditions, principally the withdrawal by Rahmah of his protection from the Āl Bū Samait tribe and the indemnification by him of Bahrain subjects for certain losses which he had inflicted on them. This peace, which seems to have been observed by both parties for nearly two years, ultimately broke down; in 1825 an attempt was made by the Resident, but without success, to effect an accommodation between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Āl Bū Samait; and in the war which was then renewed, the blind and aged Rahmah, as related in the history of Hasa, perished in an extraordinary and dramatic manner by his own act.

In 1820, as we have seen, the Shaikhs of Bahrain submitted to the ruler of Masqat and undertook to pay him an annual tribute, of which one instalment was actually discharged; but by 1822, if not earlier, they had ceased to observe their engagements. In August 1822, when a naval attack on Bahrain by Saiyid Sa'id appeared imminent

Renewed
designs of
the Saiyid
of Masqat
upon
Bahrain.

letters were addressed by the Governor of Bombay to him and to his opponent, Shaikh 'Abdullah, deprecating war and suggesting to both sides that the tribute claimed should be rendered by the 'Utūb if it were of ancient origin and had been regularly paid, and that otherwise the demand for it should be withdrawn by the 'Omāni sovereign. In the spring of 1823, when rumours of a combined attack to be made on Bahrain by the Persian Government, the ruler of Masqat, and the Qāsimi Shaikh were current, the Government of Bombay addressed Major Willock, the British representative at Tehrān, requesting him to dissuade the Persians from disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf; and in 1825, when, on the death of Shaikh Salmān of Bahrain, Saiyid Sa'id proceeded to champion the claim of his sons to supreme power as against their uncle Shaikh 'Abdullah, a strong personal remonstrance was addressed to His Highness of Masqat by the Governor of Bombay.

Third and last attack by the Saiyid of 'Omān upon Bahrain, 1828.

Preparations
at Masqat
and in
Bahrain,
June—
October
1828.

About June 1828 a report became current that Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat was collecting ships and men for a fresh attack upon Bahrain; but it was immediately contradicted by the Saiyid himself, who even sent an envoy with presents and a reassuring letter to the 'Atbi Shaikhs. The duplicity of his conduct in this having become apparent, the 'Utūb presently sought the intervention of the British Government; but the Resident declined to interfere, unless by detaching the Bani Yās, whose junction with the Saiyid might, it was feared, induce the Qawāsim to make common cause with the 'Utūb. In August Saiyid Sa'id sent a written declaration of war to Shaikh 'Abdullah, bidding him expect his arrival after the expiration of one month; and early in September the Masqat armament, composed of a large number of European-built and native vessels, sailed for Qishm, where it arrived on the 17th of the month. After a few days' halt at Qishm the fleet crossed the Gulf to Abu Dhabi and was joined by Shaikh Tahnūn, whom the British Resident had not been able to restrain from interference, and by a contingent of the Bani Yās. On the 27th of October the Saiyid's fleet was scattered at sea by a storm; but it re-assembled, and on the last day of the month his ships cast anchor off Sitrah Island, near the entrance of Khor-al-Qalā'ah.

Meanwhile every disposition had been made by Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad for repelling the expected invasion. The larger craft belonging

to Bahrain had been massed in Khor Fasht, where they would be ready to meet any attack on Manāmah from the open sea; the vessels of medium and smaller size had been collected in the neighbourhood of Muharraḡ town, probably because that was a central position from which they could be quickly moved either to Manāmah harbour or to Khor-al-Qalai'ah; the entrance of Khor-al-Qalai'ah had been blocked by means of sunken boats filled with stones; all fortifications had been placed in a state of repair; and a large number of Arabs had been recruited from every direction for the defence of the islands. Meanwhile, too, efforts had been made by the 'Utūb to bribe the Abu Dhabi Shaikh to remain neutral, and from the event it may be inferred that they had not been altogether unsuccessful.

The shore opposite to the anchorage of the Masqat fleet was at first watched by a force under Khalifah bin-Salmān, the junior Shaikh of Bahrain; but after three days, during which the 'Omānis were engaged in removing the artificial obstructions at the mouth of Khor-al-Qalai'ah, the defenders fell back upon Hūrah, an eastern suburb of Manāmah town.

Apparently on the 5th of November, the entrance of Khor-al-Qalai'ah having been cleared, two small vessels and eleven Baghlahs entered, and a summons to surrender was addressed to the 'Utūb, who received it with disdain. On the night of the 5th November a part of the Masqat force was landed, on Sitrah, and took possession of a fort; and the next day a bombardment of Manāmah town and of the fort on Hālat Abu Māhur was attempted, without success, by some vessels of the fleet. Nothing further happened until the 9th of November, when Saiyid Sa'id learned to his dismay that Shaikh Tahnūn and the Bani Yās had begun to disembark without orders between Rās-al-Jufair and Rās Umm-al-Hasam. He immediately hastened ashore, accompanied by a Nubian bodyguard and such other men as he could collect; but, before he reached the spot, the force on shore was hotly assailed by the 'Atbi troops covering Manāmah town, and was thrown into disorder by an unexpected charge of cavalry, from behind the date groves of Māhūz, upon its flank and rear. It was noted as a significant fact that the Bani Yās were the first to fly in this engagement; and it was subsequently alleged that they had turned their arms against their allies, had plundered them, and had even done their best to prevent fugitives from escaping in boats. Saiyid Sa'id himself, who was brought off the field by his Nubians, had to swim some distance to safety and while in the water received a spear wound in the sole of his foot. The scene of this rout would appear to have been the south side of Khor-al-Qalai'ah, somewhere between the eastern entrance of that inlet and the

town of Manāmah. Meanwhile the fleet, seized by panic at the sight of what was passing on shore, instead of lending their assistance weighed anchor and ran out of Khor-al-Qalai'ah. In executing this manoeuvre a brig and a Baghlah grounded, and the latter was carried off by the 'Utüb; but the 'Omānis, under cover of night, succeeded in burning the other where she lay stranded, not however before she had been stripped by the enemy. The loss of the invading force was estimated at 500 men.

Depressed by this defeat, by the fear of further treachery, by his wound, by an outbreak of cholera on board his ships, and by evil tidings from his East African possessions, Saiyid Sa'id, after several undignified attempts to conclude a peace with the 'Utüb, finally sailed for home with his whole force on the 21st of November. The excuse to which he had recourse, that his enterprise was disapproved by Heaven, did not save him from heavy loss of prestige everywhere in the Persian Gulf; and his altered position there may have been one of the reasons for which, after 1828, he bestowed his attention chiefly on the distant and perhaps less arduous field of Africa.

Sequel of these events, 1828-1829.

Reference by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the British Political Resident, December 1828.

Immediately after the departure of the hostile fleet Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to Colonel D. Wilson, the Political Resident at Būshehr, to complain of the conduct of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in joining in the attack upon Bahrain: he appealed to the fourth Article of the General Treaty of Peace, by which both himself and Shaikh Tahnūn were bound, and in which it was stated that "the pacificated tribes should not fight with each other." In reply the Resident explained the meaning of the clause to be that the signatories should not fight with each other *in a piratical manner*, but only in the way of open and declared war.

Naval war between the 'Utüb of Bahrain and the Saiyid of 'Oman, 1829.

Having learned that to engage in regular hostilities was not contrary to the Treaty of 1820, the Shaikhs of Bahrain resolved to carry war into the enemy's waters and equipped for the purpose a fleet of seven large vessels, to meet which two frigates were sent to sea by Saiyid Sa'id. The 'Abi fleet sailed on the 21st of March 1829 under the personal command of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad.

The war-ships from Masqat shortly fell in with a Bahrain vessel from India, the "Saiyār," which they first tried to intimidate by long range fire and then to board; but, finding the 'Atbi crew prepared to receive them with combustibles, they sheered off again and continued the action

with their guns. The "Saiyār" made her escape during the night and eventually reached Bahrain with little damage, except to her cargo.

Meanwhile the 'Atbi squadron, after attacking on their way down the Gulf a large Baghlah belonging to the Shaikh of 'Asalu, by which they were beaten off after an encounter lasting several hours, found an easier prey in a vessel from Murbāt, which they seized at sea in the neighbourhood of Masqat. On the way home with their prize they found themselves intercepted by the two Masqat frigates near Kūh Mubārak, upon which they took the Murbāt vessel into shoal water, and, placing her between themselves and the enemy, proceeded to transfer her cargo to their own holds; darkness then coming on, they scuttled and sunk her, and by altering their course contrived to escape with their booty to Bahrain.

Case of a
Murbāt
vessel taken
by the 'Utūb.

Murbāt, situated far off on the south coast of Arabia, was not at this time a dependency of Masqat, and the treatment by the 'Utūb of the vessel belonging to that port which they captured was consequently piracy. The Resident immediately sent an ultimatum, in which restoration of the plundered cargo was demanded, to Bahrain by two vessels of war; and so effectual was this measure that property worth Rs. 8,000 was delivered up, besides which some of the goods consigned to persons in Bahrain were handed over to the owners. A balance remained for which it was proposed that the Shaikh of Bahrain should be compelled to pay compensation in cash; but the consideration that "it would be necessary to blockade the port with four ships of war, and perhaps to destroy the shipping by means of shells and congreve rockets, for which latter purpose a small vessel would be required" was considered serious and led to a decision that no further action should be taken.

In the meantime, in response to hints thrown out by Saiyid Sa'id, who professed to be fitting out another expedition against Bahrain, the Government of Bombay had in April 1829 instructed Colonel Wilson, the Resident at Būshehr, to offer his services as a mediator. The Saiyid, who was in reality anxious to proceed to Zanzibar, and who cannot but have been aware of the favourable disposition of the British authorities towards himself, accepted the proposal with great readiness; but the victorious 'Utūb found means to bring the proceedings to a standstill by insisting that the British Government should undertake full responsibility for enforcing the observance of any treaty that might be arranged. To this condition, though the Saiyid was anxious that it should be conceded, the British Resident steadfastly refused to accede; and, after some months of unavailing effort, he declared his intervention at an end. Partly, it would seem, to punish the Shaikhs of Bahrain for their

Conclusion
of peace
between the
'Atbi Shaikhs
and the
Saiyid of
'Omān, 2nd
December
1829.

obstinacy, a British cruiser ordinarily stationed on the pearl banks for the maintenance of order there was withdrawn during the season 1829.

By the apparent indifference of the British authorities Shaikh 'Abdullah was brought to a more reasonable frame of mind; and at length, on the 2nd of December 1829, by the intermediacy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Nāsir of Būshehr, a peace was concluded between the belligerents. The principal conditions were that tribute should not in future be paid by Bahrain to Masqat, and that neither ruler should henceforward interfere in the affairs of the other; but a verbal agreement was added by which the parties bound themselves to aid one another in case of an attack upon either by a third party. Shaikh Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi was admitted to the benefits of this peace; but the rebellious Āl Bū Samait of Bahrain were, on the demand of the 'Atbi Shaikh, specifically excluded.

General history from the peace with the Saiyid of 'Omān to the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1830-1838.

Submission
of the
Shaikhs of
Bahrain to
the Wāhhābi
Amīr, 1830-
1831.

A little later commanding influence was re-established in Hasa, where the power of the Central Arabian dynasty had for a time been in abeyance, by the Wāhhābi Amīr Turki-bin-Sa'ūd; and effects of this change upon the position of the Shaikhs of Bahrain were instantly perceptible.

At the end of 1830 the Wāhhābis presented the Shaikhs with a demand for payment of Zakāt and of compensation to the amount of \$40,000 on account of horses left under the charge of Shaikh 'Abdullah by the Wāhhābis many years before, and for cession of the fort of Dammām upon the coast of Hasa; at Dammām they proposed to locate Bashīr, a son of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the former deadly enemy of the 'Utūb of Bahrain. The Shaikhs of Bahrain endeavoured to obtain the intervention of the British authorities in their favour; but, failing in this and having reason to fear a combination between the Wāhhābis and Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat, they sent a near relation to treat on their behalf at Riyādh. In the end it was settled that the supremacy of the Amīr should be acknowledged, and that Zakāt should be paid; but the transfer of Dammām appears to have been waived by the Wāhhābis in consideration of the 'Utūb having made their submission. The Amīr in return undertook to protect Bahrain against external aggression but their intentions were distrusted by the Shaikhs, chiefly on account of their

unfriendly conduct in locating Bashīr-bin-Rahmah on Tārūt Island opposite to the town of Qatīf, where he was joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait, the constant allies of his father and the inveterate foes of the 'Atbi rulers of Bahrain.

In 1833 Shaikh 'Abdullah of Bahrain was encouraged by the departure to Masqat of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, who soon found his position on Tārūt untenable in consequence of the enmity of the people of Qatīf, to throw off his allegiance to the Wāhhābis. As the Shaikh had been careful, before venturing on a complete rupture of relations, to assure himself of the neutrality of the Saiyid of 'Omān, and as he was supported by the Arab tribes of the mainland, especially the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid who immediately began at his instigation to harass the Wāhhābis in Hasa, the ruler of the Riyādh was unable to make any effective rejoinder. In 1834 Shaikh 'Abdullah assumed the offensive and blockaded the Wāhhābi ports of Qatīf and 'Oqair. The assassination of the Wāhhābi Amīr a little later, by his nephew Mashāri, was generally attributed to the machinations of the Bahrain Shaikh, who celebrated the event with firing of guns and other demonstrations of joy, and who immediately profited by it to obtain possession, not without some expenditure in bribes, of the Island of Tārūt opposite to the town of Qatīf. In 1835, on the failure of an attempt by the new Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, to recover Tārūt, Shaikh 'Abdullah resumed the blockade of Qatīf and 'Oqair, which he had suspended, and began to plunder the shipping of both places.

Supremacy of
the Wāhhābi
Amīr repu-
diated by the
Shaikh of
Bahrain,
1833-1835.

In 1833, at the time of his breach with the Wāhhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah with his sons Mubārak and Nāsir had for some time been residing in Qatar to watch the proceedings of the enemy; but he seems thereafter to have returned to Bahrain. By the death of his nephew and colleague Shaikh Khalifah-bin-Salmān, which occurred on the 31st of May 1834, Shaikh 'Abdullah soon afterwards became sole ruler of Bahrain; but so headstrong and impatient of his authority did his near relations, including his sons, now become, and so corrupt was his partiality, so undue his leniency and so excessive his general misgovernment when left to himself, that the internal affairs of the Shaikhdom soon began to wear a most serious aspect.

Domestic
affairs of the
Āl Khalifah
family, 1833-
1835

In 1835 the people of Huwailah in Qatar revolted against him and entered into a correspondence with the Wāhhābis; one of his sons rebelled in concert with the Huwailah insurgents and began, with the assistance of some hundreds of Wāhhābis, to commit depredations upon the sea-borne commerce of Bahrain; and another son named Ahmad, after

Rebellion in
Qatar, 1835.

committing some irregularities at sea for which he readily afforded satisfaction on its being demanded by the British political authorities, made his way from Qatar to Masqat with the avowed intention of obtaining support against his father from Saiyid Sa'id. The latter, however, instead of complying with the wishes of Ahmad, sent his own son Saiyid Hilāl to compose the differences among the Āl Khalifah chiefs; and an agreement, more fully noticed in the history of Qatar,* was arranged by his efforts; but it was almost immediately violated by the partisans of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who induced the Āl Bū Kuwārah to attack the inhabitants of Huwailah,—an act for which the Shaikh refused to make any reparation. This last affair led to the secession of 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, the principal man of Huwailah, who at first took refuge with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, and whose later proceedings will claim notice further on.

Rapprochement between the Wabbābis and the Utūb, 1836.

About the middle of the year 1836 Shaikh 'Abdullah, alarmed by symptoms of an intention on the part of the Government of Shīrāz to revise, possibly with support from the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Persian claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, took steps for a reconciliation with the Wabbābi Amīr. Faisal-bin-Turki, to whose subjects in Hasa much inconvenience had been caused by the Bahraini blockade of the Hasa coast, and whom the Egyptians had now begun to press hard upon his western frontier, received the overtures favourably, and a settlement was speedily arranged. The Shaikh undertook to pay a nominal tribute of \$2,000 a year to the Amīr; the Amīr in return promised to supply troops for the defence of Bahrain against attacks from without, and to refrain from calling on the Shaikh for marine transport in case of his deciding on an expedition against Masqat by sea; and intercourse between Bahrain and the ports of Qatif and 'Oqair was re-opened.

Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1836-38.

Meanwhile, however, the lot of the Shaikh's subjects in Bahrain was growing, from day to day, less endurable; and the islands were being rapidly depopulated by emigration. The towns were in a state of ruin and decay, and house rents had fallen to one-eighth of what they had been only a few years before. Six sons of the Shaikh pretended to exercise separate and independent power, and their attention was chiefly devoted to extracting money from merchants and other men of means. The ordinary subject in Bahrain had no acknowledged rights; his domestic animals, even, were frequently seized on pretext of *corvée* and were not returned. The result was a general exodus of the inhabitants to every quarter of the Persian Gulf.

* *Vide* page 794 *ante*

The part played by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who was generally—but, as his subsequent doings proved, erroneously—supposed to have become effete by reason of old age, was ignominious in the extreme; he redressed no injuries, but merely advised the people to keep out of the way of his sons and their followers. In 1836 he declared that he was about to remove to Khor Hassān in Qatar; and the prospect of his taking such a step,—one for which they were unprepared and from which they augured trouble,—elicited transient professions of obedience and regret from the junior members of his family. That the Shaikh intended to make Qatar a base for operations against his unruly progeny in Bahrain appeared probable from a warning not to look to him for protection or redress in future, which, in the presence of the British Agent, he addressed to a Būshehri merchant for the general information of the foreign mercantile community. In 1837 he took further steps towards the execution of his threat by sending two of his wives, with their families and the furniture and even the doors of their houses, to Khor Hassān; by this proceeding his sons and other relations were considerably intimidated and induced to reform their conduct for a time.

British relations with Bahrain, 1830-1839.

One consequence of these differences in the Āl Khalifah family was an insult offered to the native Agent of the British Government in Bahrain, which almost brought about a rupture of relations between Britain and the Bahrain Government. The sons of the Shaikh, being aware that a sum of money on account of mercantile transactions was due by the Agent to their father, claimed that it should be paid to themselves instead; and on this pretext, by dint of abuse and ill-treatment, they succeeded in extorting some large amounts from the British representative. The Agent, from whom the Shaikh appears to have withheld his protection, then hid himself to escape from further exactions; but, having been obliged to appear for the official purpose of visiting a British ship in the harbour, he was again set upon and molested.

Insult to the
British
Residency
Agent in
Bahrain,
1834.

Reparation having been refused, a British naval force was despatched to Bahrain to obtain it, by coercion if necessary. Under this compulsion the Shaikh yielded to the demands which were now made upon him: *viz.*, that one of his sons, or in default thereof the Shaikh himself, should come off to the vessel of the Senior Naval Officer, bringing with him a robe of honour for the Agent; and that the persons who had taken an active part in the ill-usage of the latter should be flogged in presence of

the British crew, either on board the ship itself or in one of the Shaikh's boats alongside.

Non-inclusion
of the Shaikh
of Bahrain in
the Maritime
Truce, 1835.

When the first Maritime Truce was arranged in 1835 among the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, as related in the history of that region, the Shaikh of Bahrain, though his position resembled theirs in that he was a party to the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, was not invited to become a signatory. The reason for the omission was two-fold: in the first place it was believed that Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose conduct in regard to the maintenance of peace at sea had hitherto been unexceptionable, would not allow himself to be drawn into a course contrary to the policy of the British Government, who could easily punish him; and, again, it was feared that the Shaikh, if admitted to membership of the Maritime Truce, might, in the not improbable contingency of war between himself and the ruler of Masqat, claim the intervention of the British Government to prevent an attack on Bahrain.

Extension
of the
Restrictive
Line to
Bahrain,
1836.

A Restrictive Line, between which and the Persian coast no naval hostilities were in future to be permitted, was established in 1836 for Trucial 'Omān under the authority of the British Government, with the approval of the Shaikhs but without the execution of any formal engagement on their part. In the same year, in consequence of the disturbed relations which then prevailed between the ruler of Bahrain and the people of Huwailah in Qatar, the line was prolonged—with the assent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, conveyed in a letter dated 26th March 1836—from the Island of Hālūl so as to pass 10 miles north of Rās-Rakan, the northernmost extremity of Qatar, and thence through the island of Qraiṣin to Rās-az-Zor, where it met the Arabian coast.

Piracies by
'Amāir and
Bani Hājir,
1837.

In 1837 the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid and some Bani Hājir who were settled at Dammām—the latter being thus, in name at least, subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain—took advantage of the anarchy at the time prevailing in Hasa, as in all other parts of the Wahhābi dominions, to inaugurate a piratical campaign against the shipping of Qatif. Some Bahrain boats also having suffered by their depredations, Shaikh 'Abdullah sought and obtained the permission of the British Government to chastise them, and was quickly successful in capturing two of their boats; in these operations five of the pirates were killed.

Maritime
war between
Bahrain and
Abu Dhabi
averted,
1838.

Since his departure from Huwailah in Qatar in 1835, 'Īsa-bin-Tarif and his followers, who belonged chiefly to the Āl Bin-'Alī and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribes, had resided at Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān and had been restrained by the influence of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf from committing raids on the territories under the Bahrain chief.

In 1838 Shaikh 'Abdullah, who insisted that the emigrants should return and settle in Bahrain—a condition to which they would by no

means agree—obtained permission to coerce them by naval means after a fixed date, the Āl Bin-'Ali and the Āl Bū 'Ainain being on their part set free to fight with him after the same; but the Shaikh, at heart reluctant to embark on a war which would almost necessarily involve him in hostilities with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, hoped to induce the British Government to put pressure on the seceders to return; and, before the arrival of the decisive day, he offered, through the British Resident at Būshehr, to let them come back to Qatar. A British war vessel was then placed at his disposal to convey him or his accredited agent to Abu Dhabi for the purpose of negotiating on this basis; but at the last Shaikh 'Abdullah refused to make any arrangement with the rebels unless it were guaranteed by the British Government, a condition to which the British authorities could not agree. War was accordingly declared. Both parties had already been informed that their operations must be conducted within the Restrictive Line.

In the troubles which ensued the people of Bahrain appear to have been the heavier losers, and in 1839 the merchants of the principality invoked the good offices of the British Resident for bringing the contest to an end by a reconciliation; but the Assistant Resident, who was deputed for the purpose to the Arabian coast, found that the parties would not agree to any settlement without a guarantee by the British Government, which he was not authorised to afford.

Meanwhile, however, a friendly correspondence had been opened between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, the latter of whom was dissatisfied with the conduct of 'Īsa-bin-Tarif and had already required him either to leave the country or to settle down as a law-abiding citizen; and an offensive and defensive alliance was shortly afterwards concluded between the Shaikhs with especial reference to the presence of Egyptian forces in Hasa, by which the independence of Bahrain was threatened. The result was that 'Īsa-bin-Tarif decided to seek, after the pearl fishery of 1839, an asylum elsewhere than at Abu Dhabi, and consented, in the meanwhile, to a suspension of hostilities.

Bahrain affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-1840.

Towards the end of 1838 Faisal-bin-Turki, the Wāhhābi Amīr, was captured in Kharj by Khurshīd Pāsha, the commander of the Egyptian Arrival
of the

Egyptians in Hasa and demands of the Amir Khālid on Bahrain, 1838.

forces then overrunning Central Arabia; and, after his deportation to Egypt, a puppet named Khālid was set up by the Egyptians in his place. Hasa was immediately occupied, the Wabhābi governor of that province, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisan, taking refuge in Bahrain; and designs upon the Bahrain principality itself were shortly disclosed by successive demands on the Shaikh, preferred in the name of the Amīr Khālid, for payment of tribute at the former rate, for rendition of Tārūt Island and the fort of Dammām, and for the surrender of 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisan. Meanwhile emissaries of the Egyptians were engaged, in the Bahrain Islands as also in more distant places, in collecting supplies for the use of their troops.

Attitude of the Government of India.

The Indian Government, who were not indifferent to these events, directed their Resident in the Gulf to use all his influence to check the encroachments of the Egyptians; but in the absence of instructions from London they hesitated to adopt a decided line, and they felt themselves unable to hold out any definite pledge of assistance to the Shaikh of Bahrain, who now sought one. Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, in reply to a question by the Shaikh of Bahrain, consequently informed him, apparently in March 1839, that he could give no opinion as to the expediency of the Shaikh's sending a member of his family to wait upon Khurshīd Pasha in Hasa, and that the Shaikh himself must be judge of the matter.

Application for help by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Government of Persia.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, who was much alarmed by the proceedings of the Egyptians and perhaps even more so by a rumour, apparently well-founded, that the Saiyid of 'Omān was intriguing with the Egyptians to obtain and hold Bahrain as a fief under the Viceroy of Egypt, professed, in reply to the demands made on him in the name Khālid, to be a subject of the Persian Government.

Arrival of a Persian envoy in Bahrain.

For the purpose of substantiating this statement, probably at the nominee's own suggestion, the Prince Governor of Shirāz shortly sent an envoy in the person of a certain Hāji Qāsim to reside in Bahrain. This individual had formerly been the supercargo of a trading vessel, but now he was the bearer of a letter and a robe of honour for the chief of Bahrain and was escorted by a guard of 10 Persian infantry. His mission was a failure from every point of view, especially from that of his principals, who had somehow been led to suppose that the Shaikh of Bahrain was ready to pay an annual tribute in return for their countenance and protection.

First distinct orders of the

The intentions of Khurshīd Pasha in regard to Bahrain having become clear, the Government of India found themselves obliged to anticipate,

to some extent, the instructions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the policy to be pursued in the Persian Gulf.

Advantage was taken of the presence of a British naval squadron in those waters to authorise Sir F. Maitland, by whom it was commanded, "strongly to use his influence" to deter the Egyptian General from further encroachments, and in particular from invading Bahrain; and the British Admiral was empowered, in event of the Egyptians persisting in their schemes and of the Shaikh of Bahrain soliciting British aid, to afford the Bahrain Government every encouragement to resist and all the support that he could render without engaging in actual hostilities; these measures in the opinion of the Government of India were likely to suffice, for the moment, to maintain the *status quo*. The Governor-General of India was not disposed, at the time, to enter into any new engagement with the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the Admiral was instructed, in case such an engagement should be suggested, so far to encourage the proposals of the Shaikh as to transmit them for the consideration of the Government of India.

Government of India in regard to the designs of the Egyptians on Bahrain, 1st April 1839.

In a letter, dated the 1st of April 1839, the Resident, Captain Hennell, was ordered to remonstrate with the Egyptian commander in regard to his proceedings against Bahrain; to inform him that his action was contrary to an understanding between the British and Egyptian Governments and might lead to an interruption of amicable relations; and to report on the material strength of the various parties, especially of the Shaikh of Bahrain, in the region affected.

In the meantime Khurshid Pasha had written to the British Resident to sound him regarding the policy of the British Government in event of the conquests of the Egyptians being carried further; and Captain Hennell had replied, requesting that no active operations should be undertaken against Bahrain without notice sufficient to admit of a warning being conveyed to the British subjects resident in the islands,—an answer which the Government of India approved as well-timed and judicious and as tending to postpone a crisis until the arrival of Sir F. Maitland off Bahrain.

In a letter dated the 18th of April 1839, the Indian Government, advanced beyond the position that they had at first assumed, and empowered the Admiral, in event of the Shaikh of Bahrain having claimed British interposition and offered to place his territories under British protection, to assure him of the temporary protection of Her Majesty's squadron in the Gulf, and to intimate to Khurshid Pasha that he had done so, and that it was incumbent on the Egyptians

Subsequent stronger orders of the Government of India, 18th April 1839.

to abstain from further military proceedings until both officers should receive orders from their respective Governments ; should these measures fail of their object, Sir F. Maitland might inform Khurshīd Pāsha that he would be held responsible, if he crossed over to the islands of Bahrain, for commencing hostilities against the British Government, whose officers were authorised to defend the principality against invasion until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government should be known ; and, after making this declaration, the Admiral might exercise his discretion as to the best means of defending Bahrain.

Visit of a
British naval
squadron to
Bahrain.

About the same time Sir F. Maitland visited Bahrain in H.M.S. " Wellesley," accompanied by Captain Edmunds, Assistant Political Resident ; and Shaikh 'Abdullah gave the latter a promise that he would take no steps to place himself under the authority or protection of a foreign power without first consulting the British Resident. It does not appear that any correspondence passed between the British Admiral and Khurshīd Pāsha : possibly the former had not yet received the latest instructions of the Government of India.

Report on the
situation by
the British
Political
Resident, 7th
May 1839.

A full report on the resources of the Egyptians in Najd and Hasa, and on the power and attitude of all the Shaikhs and rulers of the Arabian littoral whose interests were threatened by their aggressions, was submitted on the 7th of May 1839 by Captain Hennell, the British Resident, in obedience to the orders of the Government of India.

In regard to the Shaikh of Bahrain it was stated that his means of resistance were such as to afford a prospect of success, if they were fairly brought into play. His insular position and the great superiority of his naval force, which included numerous war boats of the best class, were very much in his favour ; and the fighting men devoted to his cause, of whom 6,000 could be collected on the islands of Bahrain and Muharraḡ alone, while 3,000 more could be brought over in an emergency from the 'Atbi possessions on the mainland, were brave and determined, and accustomed to service at sea as well as on land. On the other hand Shaikh 'Abdullah was hampered by the enmity of 'Īsa-bin-Tarīf and the seceding Āl Bin'-Ali and Āl Bū 'Ainain tribes ; and the Shī'ah Bahārinah, the aboriginal but unwarlike inhabitants of Bahrain, groaning under the tyranny of the 'Utūb, would doubtless sympathise with any invading power. If Khurshīd Pāsha could once gain a footing on Bahrain Island and thereafter keep open his communications with Hasa, it was likely that the 'Utūb would succumb to his disciplined troops and artillery ; but, so long as the Shaikh maintained his naval superiority, an attack on the islands must necessarily be so difficult and dangerous that there was little

probability of its being attempted by the Egyptians. The naval advantage of the 'Utūb over the Egyptians could only be destroyed by the arrival on the scene of ships from Egypt or from Masqat ; and in regard to the latter it was not to be expected that the representatives of the Saiyid of 'Omān, after they had been made acquainted with the policy of the British Government, would agree to co-operate with the Egyptians.

On the 28th of July 1839 the Resident arrived off Bahrain in the H. E. I. Company's steamer "Hugh Lindsay" to interview Shaikh 'Abdullah, who had suddenly and unexpectedly acknowledged the supremacy of the Egyptians and covenanted to pay them \$2,000 a year as tribute, on condition that his local authority should be preserved intact and that no representative of Khurshid Pasha should be sent to reside in Bahrain.

Sudden submission of the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Egyptians and protest by the British Resident, July 1839.

In conversation with Captain Hennell the Shaikh endeavoured to explain away his disregard of his promise to Captain Edmunds by asserting that the agreement with the Egyptians, though but recently ratified had actually been concluded before the arrival of the "Wellesley" ; but he justified his action mainly on the ground of the Resident's refusal more than three months before to give him advice or a specific assurance of support, and of the virtual immunity from disturbance which he had purchased by a trifling and merely pecuniary sacrifice.

A written protest against the new arrangements, couched in nearly the same terms as another which he addressed to Khurshid Pasha, was delivered to the Shaikh by Captain Hennell, who further commented on the possibility of the Bahrain Government becoming involved, in consequence of the relations that they had formed with the Egyptians, in hostilities with Great Britain. The Shaikh, in reply, protested that he would never, even at the demand of the Egyptians, place himself in opposition to the British Government ; and he offered, on condition that a distinct pledge of protection should be given him in writing, to repudiate his agreement with the Pasha and to avow himself a dependent of the British Government ; on being pressed, however, to commit this proposal to writing, he declined ; and he added that his repudiation of the agreement, if carried into effect, must in any case be explained by him to the Egyptians as due to compulsion by the British authorities. In conclusion he assured Captain Hennell of the unpopularity of the Egyptians, and of the extremely precarious nature of their position in Eastern and Central Arabia.

The general impression brought away by the Resident from this interview was that Shaikh 'Abdullah, now advanced in years and incapable of exertion, had submitted to the Egyptians in order to avoid a

conflict disturbing to his personal comfort ; that the sustained political and military successes of Khurshid Pasha had so shaken his naturally acute mind as to make him doubtful of the ability of the British to cope with the Egyptians on land ; but that he would gladly be freed of the Egyptian yoke if this could be achieved by British influence without any effort on his own part.

Captain Hennell, in reporting his proceedings to Government, cast doubt upon the feasibility, hitherto unquestioned, of defending Bahrain against attack from the mainland by means of ships of war ; he had now been informed that there were places where a fleet of boats might cross in safety, and where larger vessels would be prevented by shoals from approaching ; and Shaikh 'Abdullah asserted that he had himself successfully adopted these tactics in former days, when at war with the Persians who were possessed of large vessels.

Retirement
of the
Egyptians,
1840.

Matters in Bahrain apparently continued as they were until the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians in 1840, whereupon their relations with the Shaikh of Bahrain were brought to an end and the affairs of the principality resumed their ordinary course. The action of the authorities in India and of the British officers on the spot was, it may be remarked, approved by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company when it reached their knowledge ; and they concurred in an opinion expressed by Captain Hennell, that it would not be expedient to assume a regular protectorate over Bahrain.

Civil war in Bahrain and expulsion of 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from the Shaikhship, 1840-1843.

Alienation of
the sympathy
of the British
Government
from Shaikh
'Abdullah,
1840.

By his conduct towards Khurshid Pasha the Shaikh of Bahrain was considered to have shown preference for an Egyptian alliance and to have forfeited the friendship of the British Government ; the possibility of his being displaced by a more favourably disposed Shaikh was discussed with equanimity by the Secret Committee of the Directors of the East India Company ; and the Government of India decided not to hold back the Saiyid of 'Oman, should he again resolve on attempting the conquest of Bahrain. Nevertheless, out of regard for the general maritime peace, 'Isa-bin-Tarif, who with his dependents had migrated from Abu Dhabi to the Island of Qais in 1839 or 1840, was refused permission which he sought to put to sea against the Shaikh of

Bahrain; and this refusal was repeated by the British Resident on a visit to Qais in May 1841. The technical ground of objection was the violation which such hostilities would involve of the Restrictive Line established in 1836. It is possible that the estrangement between the British authorities and Shaikh 'Abdullah reacted unfavourably upon the position of the latter in his own Shaikhdom; and it may have even conduced to the troubles that now began.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from Hasa, the inhabitants of that province, or some of them, sent one Mushrif to Bahrain to propose to Muhammad-bin-Khalifah-bin-Salmān, grand-nephew of the principal Shaikh of Bahrain, that he should himself assume the Government of Hasa and protect the people from Khālid, the usurping Amīr of the Wahhābis. Objections entertained by Shaikh 'Abdullah to this proposal led to a violent difference of opinion between Shaikh Muhammad and himself, which was temporarily smoothed over by a hollow reconciliation; but a little later, after offering his services to the British Government and soliciting their assistance against his grand-uncle, Shaikh Muhammad left Bahrain for Qatar, where he ingratiated himself with the inhabitants and set on foot a vexatious opposition to his aged relation. The sons of Shaikh 'Abdullah, also, had now provided themselves with retinues of 100 to 300 desperadoes each, and openly defied their father's authority; anarchy and confusion had overspread the whole Shaikhdom; and the trade of Bahrain quickly declined to little more than a half of what it had been only a few years before. In 1842, when Khālid, the ex-Amīr of the Wahhābis, paid a visit to Qatar and Bahrain, Shaikh 'Abdullah and Shaikh Muhammad had apparently exchanged places, for the former was then at Khor Hassān on the mainland and the latter in Bahrain.

Such was the position of affairs when an open conflict was suddenly precipitated by an attempt on the part of Shaikh Muhammad to prevent the marriage of a young girl, belonging to Muharraḡ town, with Ahmad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The old chief came over from Qatar to arrange a settlement; but, having failed in his endeavours, he took up the cause of his son. Both factions then began to enlist fighting men, chiefly Bedouins who poured over from the mainland in the hope of plunder. Muharraḡ was the headquarters of Shaikh 'Abdullah, Manāmah that of Shaikh Muhammad, and the possession of a superior marine force enabled Shaikh 'Abdullah to blockade effectually the harbour of his antagonist. Indecisive skirmishes followed, in which Dī'āij, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, was killed upon the one side, and

Breach
between
Shaikh
'Abdullah
and his
grandnephew
Shaikh
Muhammad,
1840 1842.

Expulsion
of Shaikh
Muhammad
by Shaikh
'Abdullah,
1842.

Muhammad-bin-Mubārak, a grandson of Shaikh 'Abdullah, upon the other. At length, in June 1842, the elder chief completely defeated the younger by attacking him simultaneously on land and sea; Manāmah fell into the hands of Shaikh 'Abdullah; and Shaikh Muhammad, escaping with a few followers to Qatar, proceeded to Hasa and thence to Riyādh to seek aid of the Wāhhābis. The town of Manāmah was sacked by the Bedouin auxiliaries of the victor, after which the old Shaikh crossed over to Qatar and gave up Khor Hassān also to partial plunder.

Shaikh 'Abdullah then began to rebuild Zubārah in Qatar, which had lain during a number of years entirely deserted.

Strained
relations of
Shaikh
'Abdullah
with the
Wāhhābis.

The relations with the Wāhhābis of Shaikh 'Abdullah, whose success was more apparent than real, were at this time extremely unfriendly. On the one hand Shāfi', a chief of the Bani Hājir and a relation and staunch adherent of Shaikh 'Abdullah, was detained as a prisoner by the Wāhhābi Amīr; and on the other three-fourths of the population of Saihāt, of which place the headman had been arrested by 'Umr-bin-Ufaisan, the Wāhhābi Governor of Hasa, had migrated to Bahrain, and a blockade of the Hasa coast was maintained by the navy of Bahrain. These circumstances inclined the Wāhhābis to make common cause with Shaikh Muhammad; but for the moment they were unable to afford him material assistance.

Permission
given to 'Isa-
bin-Tarif and
Bashir-bin-
Rahmah to
join Shaikh
Muhammad,
and
intimation of
the same to
Shaikh
'Abdullah.

At this juncture 'Isa-bin-Tarif, the Āl Bin-'Ali fugitive, and Bashir-bin-Rahmah visited the British Resident at Būshehr together and requested permission to ally themselves with Shaikh Muhammad and to embark on regular hostilities against Shaikh 'Abdullah. The required sanction, in view of the old Shaikh's unsatisfactory behaviour in 1839 and again in 1842 at the sack of Manāmah, was duly given, on condition that the Restrictive Line should be respected. 'Isa-bin-Tarif, it may be observed, was strongly suspected of having fomented the recent dissensions in Bahrain; while Bashir-bin-Rahmah, who could contribute 300 or 400 fighting men to the expedition, alleged that he was prevented by Shaikh 'Abdullah from enjoying the produce of his paternal estates near Dammām.

In November 1842 Captain Kemball, the Assistant Resident, was sent to Bahrain to warn Shaikh 'Abdullah of the permission for action granted by the British authorities to the hostile coalition. This communication was received by the Shaikh with consternation, almost with incredulity; he represented that, in the absence of most of his fleet and subjects, he would be unable to cope with his assailants; he hinted that

he would be obliged, therefore, to enter into relations with the Wahhābis; and he finally offered to allow Bashīr-bin-Rahmah to remove his produce from Dammām, provided that he did not, under this pretext, bring any large vessels into the vicinity. Captain Kemball reported these remarks to the Resident, but no further communication was made at the time to Shaikh 'Abdullah, who afterwards affected to have thought that the allies would be ordered by the Resident to suspend their operations and to have been prejudiced in his defence by this belief.

Negotiations
of Shaikh
'Abdullah
with the
Wahhābis.

Meanwhile Shaikh 'Abdullah had opened a correspondence with the Wahhābis and had apparently offered, on condition of the release of Shāfi' of the Bani Hājir, to restore 'Oqair, of which he had somehow become possessed. A little later, whether on these or on other terms, the Wahhābi ruler set Shāfi' at liberty and suggested to the Shaikhs of Bahrain that they should compose their differences; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, who seems to have distrusted the sincerity of the Amīr's mediation, replied discourteously, advising him to observe a strict neutrality. In these circumstances the Wahhābis, not unnaturally, reverted to their support of Shaikh Muhammad.

At the beginning of 1843 Shaikh Muhammad made his appearance in Qatar, of which promontory the inhabitants generally were favourable to his cause. He succeeded in occupying a small fort at Murair* before it had been garrisoned by the opposite party, and the troops sent by Shaikh 'Abdullah to hold Murair returned without making any effort for its recovery. From the point of vantage thus secured Shaikh Muhammad at once opened communication with his associates on Qais Island.

Active
operations
and expulsion
of Shaikh
'Abdullah
from
Bahrain,
January-
April 1843.

In February 1843, alarmed by the arrival of several boats from Qais, Shaikh 'Abdullah wrote to the British authorities requesting them to restrain 'Isa and Bashīr; but for various reasons, and partly in consequence of a misapprehension, no reply was vouchsafed to his application.

At length Shaikh Muhammad, from Fuwairat in Qatar where he was now established, despatched a considerable force in five Baghlahs to the eastern coast of Bahrain Island; and a landing was effected at a point opposite Rifā'-ash-Sharqi. Troops sent in haste by Shaikh 'Abdullah under the command of his son Nāsir, however, succeeded in reaching Rifā' before them; and an indecisive combat took place, in which several men were killed and wounded. An attempt to surround the invaders by land and to cut off their retreat by sea seems to have been unsuccessful.

* In the records this place is called "Meezeer," but no place with such a name is known, and the reference must apparently be to Qal'at Murair which then stood 1½ miles south-east of Zubārah.

In March or April of 1843 the town of Manāmah passed into the possession of a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, not without the connivance of the inhabitants, who remembered with bitterness the conduct of Shaikh 'Abdullah's Bedouins in the previous year; and shortly afterwards 'Isa bin-Tarif and Bashir-bin-Rahmah arrived in Bahrain with a large force.

In April the allies attacked Muharraq town, the seat of Shaikh 'Abdullah, and obliged him to take refuge in "a small fort, situated at no great distance from the town"—possibly that of Hālat Abu Māhur—where, finding himself completely invested, he capitulated; and the fort of 'Arād, held by his sons, then also surrendered at discretion. The sons of 'Abdullah taken prisoners at 'Arād remained, with the consent of the victor, in Bahrain; but the Shaikh himself, to whom his captors allowed only one Batil and one Ghunchah for the conveyance of his family, dependents and property, took his departure for Dammām. That place, the sole remnant of his possessions, was now governed by Shaikh 'Abdullah's son Mubārak.

Incidents of the civil war in Bahrain affecting the British Government.

Outrage
committed
at the house
of the
British
Residency
Agent,
1842.

In 1842, on the defeat of Shaikh Muhammad by Shaikh 'Abdullah, the town of Manāmah, as we have seen, fell a prey to the Bedouins of the successful party; and among the goods pillaged were some belonging to British subjects. But a more serious incident arose from the behaviour of the native Agent of the British Residency in Bahrain, a man of "timid and imbecile character." To this individual Shaikh 'Abdullah, in the beginning of the troubles, suggested that he should either remove to Muharraq or go on board a British vessel, then in the harbour, until the crisis was over; but the Agent preferred to stay at Manāmah, and, on the town being attacked, he extended the protection of his house—if not that of the British Government—to the persons and property of a number of people having no claim to it, probably in return for a pecuniary consideration. Among those who took refuge with the Agent were a son and other dependents of a blood-enemy of Shaikh 'Abdullah, one Hamūd of the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid tribe, and the Shaikh shortly appeared in person to demand, under

pain of destruction of the house, its inmates, and all that it contained, the instant surrender of these obnoxious refugees ; whereupon the Agent, losing courage, caused them to be thrown from the roof, and they were cut to pieces almost before they had reached the ground. The unwarrantable and impolitic behaviour of the Agent on this occasion was punished with immediate dismissal, and the countenance of the British Government was finally withdrawn from the Shaikh, on whom, however, it was not considered necessary, in the circumstances, to make any express demand for reparation.

In March 1843, after the landing of Shaikh Muhammad's partisans on Bahrain Island, an order was promulgated by Shaikh 'Abdullah, then at Muharraq, that no vessel should anchor near Manāmah town. This regulation having been broken by a Ghunchah which was entitled to use the British flag, and which carried a packet and stores addressed to the British Commodore at Bāsīdu, two boats manned by Bedouin mercenaries were sent with an order to the Nākhuda to move over to Muharraq ; but these unreliable and dangerous messengers, on reaching the vessel, boarded her, plundered the cargo, including the British packet and stores, and hauled down and tore to pieces the British flag. On behalf of the Shaikh, who denied having ordered or in any way countenanced this outrage, it was urged that the Ghunchah had not shown her colours on entering the harbour ; that her use of them was suspected to be a mere ruse ; and that the fleet of 'Īsa-bin-Tarif and Bashīr-bin-Rahmah was at the time momentarily expected. A British war vessel was immediately despatched to Bahrain to make full enquiries ; but, before any result had been reached, the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah by his rival rendered further action useless.

Piracy in
Manāmah
harbour,
March
1843.

About the same time as the last affair, but possibly before it, a Chārak boat under the Persian flag, into which goods from Bombay consigned to Hindu merchants in Bahrain had just been transhipped, was plundered in the harbour of Manāmah by Bani Hājir and Sulutah Arabs subject to the authority of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The hostilities in Bahrain prevented immediate attention being given to this case, and on the first accession of Shaikh Muhammad to power it was considered inexpedient to press the claim upon him too strongly ; but in February of the following year (1844), on the matter being brought to his notice, he submitted without demur to the British demand for compensation.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-KHALIFAH.

1843-1868.

Continuance of the civil war after the expulsion of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad from Bahrain, 1843-1849.

Interference
of the
Wahhābi
Amīr, 1843.

In June 1843, the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah having begun to make raids upon the commerce of the Bahrain Islands from his lair at Dammām, a flotilla was sent by Shaikh Muhammad, 'Īsa-bin-Tarif and Bashīr-bin-Rahmah which effectually confined his boats to the limits of the Dammām anchorage. The new Wahhābi Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, whose position at home was still insecure, at first amused himself by playing off each of the Bahrain claimants against the other, and obtained promises of advantage from both; but, in the end, antipathy to the ex-Shaikh determined his attitude. Muhammad, a son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, having sallied out of Dammām to procure boats upon the adjoining coast, was arrested by the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif; and a similar fate befell another son 'Ali, on his arriving from Lingeh to join his father with a small contingent of the Āl Bū Samait tribe.

Intervention
of the Shaikh
of Kuwait,
August 1843.

A disinterested attempt to save the ex-Shaikh by mediation from the worst consequences of his defeat and expulsion was now made by Jābir, Shaikh of Kuwait, who had hitherto refrained from interference. In August 1843, with the approval of the British Resident, Shaikh Jābir proceeded to Bahrain with a fleet of eight large vessels, and was successful in persuading Shaikh Muhammad to invite Shaikh 'Abdullah to a friendly conference; but the former, aware that his restoration to power was not to be expected, declined to appear; nor did he at this time return to live with Shaikh Jābir at Kuwait, as the latter had intended that he should do in case no settlement were arranged.

Appeal by the
ex-Shaikh to
the Shaikhs
of Shārajah
and Dibai;
His first
visit to
Būshehr.

An effort was next made by the sons of the ex-chief, Shaikh 'Abdullah, to interest the rulers of Shārajah and Dibai in their father's cause; and they obtained a promise that, on condition of there being no objection on the part of either the British Government or the Wahhābi Amīr, support would be given him at the close of the pearling season. 'Īsa-bin-Tarif and Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, with a view to neutralising this combination, at once opened communication with the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Umm-al-Qaiwain; and the latter, 'Abdullah-bin-Rāshid,

visited them at Qais Island, where he received a valuable present. In these circumstances, and more especially as it was understood that the Shaikhs of Shārjah and Dibai did not desire to be embroiled in the affair, the reply of the British Resident at Būshehr to the ex-chief, who waited on him there, was that, while the British Government were prepared to arbitrate between the parties without themselves guaranteeing a settlement, they could neither intervene to restore Shaikh 'Abdullah to power nor permit the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to be dragged into a dangerous war without advantage to themselves or to the original combatants.

It is probable that, at his visit to Būshehr, Shaikh 'Abdullah hoped to derive some benefit from a correspondence which had already been maintained for several months between himself and Shaikh Salmān, an individual who held no official position in Persia but was a nephew of the Shaikh of Būshehr. The interchange of views appears to have been commenced by Shaikh Salmān, who did not scruple, while Shaikh 'Abdullah was still blockaded in Dammām, to promise him the military assistance of Persia. In October 1843, doubtless with a hope of alarming the British authorities, Shaikh 'Abdullah professed himself ready, if disappointed by the British Government, to throw himself into the arms of Persia; but in reply, he was merely informed that the adherence of Persia to his cause would not be recognised by Britain unless it were open and declared.

After a short sojourn at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullah returned to Dammām, whence he had come, but soon afterwards he transferred his residence to Nāband on the Persian coast, and almost simultaneously 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, who chafed at the hindrances imposed on his operations by the Restrictive Line, removed his belongings from Qais Island and settled at Dōhah, then called Bida', in Qatar.

About the same time, or probably earlier, 'Īsa-bin-Tarif, who was at heart no less an enemy of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah than of his unsuccessful rival, suggested to Saiyid Thuwaini, regent of Masqat, that he should profit by the dissensions of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs to conquer Bahrain, and volunteered to assist him in the enterprise. Saiyid Thuwaini referred the proposal to his father Saiyid Sa'id, the sovereign of 'Omān, then absent in East Africa; and the result was an application to the British authorities, by whose advice 'Īsa-bin-Tarif's proposal was rejected. The principal reasons which influenced the British Government to dissuade Saiyid Sa'id from an invasion of Bahrain were the personal absence of His Highness from the scene; the incapacity of his representative, Saiyid Thuwaini; the probability of offence being

Persian
intrigues,
1843.

Migration of
Shaikh
'Abdullah
from
Dammām to
Nāband and
of 'Īsa-bin-
Tarif from
Qais to
Dōhah, 1843.
Attitude
of the
Government
of Masqat
towards
the struggle
between the
Shaikh and
the ex-
Shaikh, 1843.

given to the Wahhābis, which might lead to an invasion by them of 'Omān territory; the excuse which would be afforded to Persia for espousing the cause of the ex-Shaikh; and the veto which had already been placed by the British Government on action by the Shaikhs of Shārijah and Dibai.

Second visit
of the ex-
Shaikh to
Būshehr,
December
1843 to
March 1844.

In December 1843 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, accompanied by six armed vessels, again visited Būshehr with the object of influencing the British political representative in his favour; but he declined to agree to an interview on board a vessel in the harbour, chiefly, it was suspected, because he meant to make use of a visit to the Residency as a screen for a secret meeting with his sympathiser Shaikh Salmān. He proceeded however to press, in writing, a request for British assistance, mainly on the grounds that he had rejected overtures by the Wahhābi Amīr which tended to the establishment of Wahhābi influence over Bahrain, and that he was entitled, as a signatory of the General Treaty of Peace, to the naval protection of Great Britain. These arguments, however, were refuted; and the claims of the ex-Shaikh to British aid were disallowed.

A few days after his arrival at Būshehr Shaikh 'Abdullah landed and was received with much distinction by the local authorities, probably under orders from Shīrāz; three volleys of musketry were fired in his honour by the Persian regular troops; and he was provided with quarters in a bastion of the fortifications, his followers being at the same time accommodated in tents. His vessels, of which only two now remained, were brought into a backwater and drawn up on shore. It was soon rumoured that Shaikh 'Abdullah had applied to the Persian Government for the loan of 100 mounted men and 500 infantry, and that he had offered, if successful in recovering Bahrain, to repay the expenses of this force, to remit in future a large annual tribute to the Shāh, and to leave one of his sons in Persia as a hostage for fulfilment of the contract. For three months Shaikh 'Abdullah lingered at Būshehr, awaiting, but in vain, the acceptance of his proposals by the Persian Government.

In January 1844 the Shaikh, in a correspondence with the British Resident, resorted to the argument that he had been lulled into a false security, while still in possession of Bahrain, by the neglect of the British authorities to reply to certain of his communications,—a contention which was not admitted; and immediately before his departure, probably in March 1844, he had a personal interview with the Resident, at which he again pleaded hard, but unsuccessfully, for the countenance of the British Government. It was clear that the hopes which he had at first placed in the Persian Government had been disappointed.

Meanwhile the position of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons at Dammām, the last remaining foothold of the family in Arabia, had become precarious. In December 1843 the Wahhābi Amīr offered his services to the contending Shaikhs for the purpose of arranging a reconciliation between them; but his overtures were rejected by the ex-chief. Faisal-bin-Turki then declared war against Shaikh 'Abdullah and began to collect troops, partly for an investment of Dammām by land to supplement blockade by sea, and partly for the punishment of some of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood who had hitherto kept the Dammām garrison, commanded by Mubārak, Nāsir, and another son of Shaikh 'Abdullah, supplied with provisions. Two boats with commissariat and military stores for the defenders of Dammām, despatched by Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait, were captured by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah at Dōhat Balbūl, whence it had been intended to send the cargoes by camel to Dammām; but the incident, which might otherwise have led to a conflict between Shaikh Jābir and the *de facto* Shaikh of Bahrain, was adjusted by the friendly intervention of the British authorities. In March 1844 the garrison of Dammām, being reduced to great straits for supplies, proposed a capitulation; but their terms were not accepted by the Wahhābi Amīr. Shaikh 'Abdullah, on becoming aware of the critical position of affairs, crossed from Būshehr to the Arabian side of the Gulf and attempted to throw supplies into Dammām, but failed, the boat which he sent being captured by the blockading squadron. A little later the Dammām garrison surrendered to the Wahhābis on condition that their lives should be spared and that they should be allowed to carry away their personal property, and the fort of Dammām was occupied in the name of Faisal-bin-Turki, who thereafter showed little interest in the quarrels of the Āl Khalifah Shaikhs. The result must have been disappointing to Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, to whom Shaikh Muhammad had promised, as a reward for his services against Shaikh 'Abdullah, the restoration of his paternal possessions.

Reduction of
Dammām
by the
Wahhābis,
March 1844.

During the absence of the ex-Shaikh at Būshehr, a Batīl, described as belonging to Bahrain but owned apparently by Bashīr-bin-Rahmah or one of his family, was unwarrantably seized on the Persian coast, and therefore on the prohibited side of the Restrictive Line, by Shaikh 'Abdullah's dependents at Nāband. A remonstrance having been addressed by the Resident to the ex-Shaikh, the latter wrote to the chief local authority at Nāband asking him to restore the Batīl to the owners; but, while this message was in course of transmission by a British vessel, a change of authorities took place at Nāband, and the release of the Batīl was refused by the new governor. A lengthy correspondence ensued and redress

Maritime
irregularity.

was eventually obtained in July 1844, not however until Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, now settled like 'Īsa-bin-Tarif at Dōhah in Qatar, had seized two Nāband Batils by way of retaliation. Bashīr, it should be added, immediately gave up these prizes when ordered to do so by the Resident on the ground that the case was already in process of settlement by the British authorities.

Visit of the
ex-Shaikh to
Kuwait and
his third visit
to Būshehr,
1844.

Shaikh 'Abdullah, on the failure of his attempt to convey supplies to Dammām, was hotly pursued by four Batils detached from the blockading squadron, but he succeeded in making his escape to Kuwait, where for a short time he resided. On the fall of Dammām most of Shaikh 'Abdullah's sons came to Bahrain and were allowed to settle in Muharraḡ; but Mubārak took refuge with his father's friend Shāfi' among the Bani Hājir; and Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, in violation—so his adversaries alleged—of terms arranged in the presence of the Wāhhābi Amīr, refused to allow the ex-Shaikh to return to Bahrain unless as a private individual and on condition that his conduct in the future should be guaranteed by the British Government,—a requirement which the propounder well knew to be impossible. After a short stay at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah returned southwards and obtained, on the way, an interview with the British Resident at Būshehr; the meeting was held, by request of the ex-chief, at a place on the seashore about three miles from the town. The object of the visitor was clearly to extort help from the British Government by a threat of combining with the Wāhhābis and availing himself of their assistance to recover Bahrain; but, as no interest was shown by the Resident in his intentions or affairs, Shaikh 'Abdullah continued on his way and once more took up his residence at Nāband.

Proceedings
of the ex-
Shaikh
during a
residence,
at Nāband,
1844-45.

Soon after his arrival at Nāband, the ex-Shaikh, whose movements greatly alarmed the divers on the pearl banks, proceeded to the Qatar coast with the intention of attacking 'Īsa-bin-Tarif at Dōhah; but he found that vigilant enemy well prepared, and so sailed on into the home waters of Bahrain. Shaikh Muhammad, learning that his grand-uncle was in the neighbourhood, sent a deputation of merchants to invite him to return to his home; but Shaikh 'Abdullah, after evading compliance by insisting on conditions which he knew could not be accepted, proceeded to Qatif and thence despatched one of his sons on a friendly mission to the Wāhhābi Amīr. After this, seizing two small vessels by the way near the Fasht-ad-Dībal, he returned to Nāband. A letter was at once sent by the British Resident to the chief authority at Nāband, requesting him to restrain Shaikh 'Abdullah from such disorderly pro-

ceedings in future ; but, though the person addressed, Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Saif by name, received the representation in a proper spirit and apparently apologised to the Shaikh of Bahrain for the mischief already done, he was unable to control the actions of Shaikh 'Abdullah, who shortly after set out on another cruise and captured two more Bahrain vessels. Annoyed by these proceedings, to which the Restrictive Line prevented his making any rejoinder, the Shaikh of Bahrain appealed to the British authorities and sent his brother 'Ali to wait upon the Resident ; and the result was an injunction, issued by the central Persian Government at the instance of the British Envoy, directing the Governor-General of Fārs to compel Shaikh 'Abdullah to give up the boats he had taken and to prevent him from disturbing the peace of the Gulf. The ex-Shaikh, finding himself unsupported by Persia, gave the Resident a verbal promise to abstain, so long as he should continue to reside in Persia, from aggressions upon Bahrain ; but, as he refused to confirm this undertaking in writing, a British war vessel was despatched to Nāband, and he was told to consider himself as having been formally placed under restraint.

Proceedings
of the ex-
Shaikh at
Qatif, 1845.

Nāband having ceased, under these restrictions, to be a suitable place of residence for him, Shaikh 'Abdullah, in October 1845, informed the Resident of his intention to remove to Qatif. Soon afterwards an unsuccessful attempt was made by him, in conjunction with the Wāhhābis, to capture Bahrain, of which the details are given in a later paragraph on the relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with the Wāhhābi power. On the failure of this *coup* Shaikh 'Abdullah once more took refuge at Kuwait.

Proceedings
of the
ex-Shaikh
during a
residence
at Kuwait,
1845-46.

On becoming aware of these events, the British representative at Būshehr wrote to Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait expressing a hope that he would not allow Shaikh 'Abdullah, while living under his protection, to indulge in depredations upon the trade of Bahrain ; and the hint was apparently taken, for the ex-Shaikh, during his stay at Kuwait, remained altogether quiescent. In June 1846 Shaikh 'Abdullah received an invitation from the Governor-General of Fārs to return to Būshehr, where it was promised that he should be liberally entertained "until . . . the season for action had arrived" ; but in August the ex-chief, who was now well aware both of the duplicity of the Persians and of their inability to assist him, declined their flattering but insincere offer.

In September 1846, probably on account of the restraints to which he was subjected at Kuwait, Shaikh 'Abdullah removed to Hasa, where he settled at first, in the neighbourhood of Dammām ; and at the beginning of 1847 he was living, without any followers, on Tārūt Island. During the greater part of his stay in Hasa, as explained further on, war prevailed

Proceedings
of the ex-
Shaikh
during a
residence
in Hasa,
1846-47.

between the Wahhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain ; but no active part in the hostilities was taken by the ex-chief. It was not until August 1847, when a peace was concluded between the principal belligerents by which the Wahhābi Amīr bound himself not to abet Shaikh 'Abdullah in his machinations, that the exile suddenly woke to life, launched a vessel at Dammām with the supposed intention of proceeding to Qais to intrigue with some discontented 'Utūb there, and was joined by 'Isa-bin-Tarif of the Āl-Bin-'Alī, whose dislike of Shaikh Muhammad had now overcome his former hatred of Shaikh 'Abdullah. The demand made by the allies upon Shaikh Muhammad was for the restoration of his grand-uncle's vessels and other possessions. The immediate commencement of hostilities at sea was prevented by the arrival in the "Elphinstone" of Commodore Lowe, who required that the regular sanction of the Resident should first be obtained by the parties ; but, when this omission had been supplied, the war, which quickly took a turn unfavourable to the ex-chief, began without further delay.

Death in
battle of
'Isa-bin-
Tarif and
final ruin of
the ex-
Shaikh's
fortunes,
1847.

The Restrictive Line was violated, at an early stage of the proceedings, by Shaikh 'Abdullah, who crossed to the Persian coast to obtain reinforcements ; and Shaikh Muhammad, on his part, asked that the British Government would either restrain the 'Atbi malcontents settled on Qais or grant him leave to take suitable measures against them. This request of the Shaikh was referred by the Resident to Government ; but, before orders could be received from India, the campaign had been brought to an end by a battle fought on land, in which the troops of Bahrain, commanded by Shaikh Muhammad in person, defeated the allies near Fuwairat in Qatar ; 'Isa-bin-Tarif himself was among the slain. This disaster was the death-blow of Shaikh 'Abdullah's hopes. The orders of the Government of India, at length received, were that an invasion of Bahrain by the allies should be prevented, if necessary, by a British naval force ; but the decision was not communicated to Shaikh Muhammad, as it might have led him to neglect precautions for his own defence.

Correspondence of the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād with both parties.

About this time, probably in 1848, 'Abdul Jabbār Khān, the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād, opened a correspondence with both parties. To the ex-Shaikh he wrote assuring him of the active support of the Persian Government, "and begging him to make every preparation for "carrying into effect the plans he might have in contemplation,—however "momentous, however gigantic,—Persian assistance, full and powerful, "would most surely be accorded to him." His letter to Shaikh Muhammad was equally friendly and was apparently intended to blind

and mislead that overweening ruler. Steps taken by the British Resident at Baghdād resulted, however, in the discontinuance of the correspondence, on which the offending Persian functionary pretended that he had entered in ignorance of its impropriety.

The struggle between the chiefs was at length brought to an end by the death of Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, apparently in 1849. This event took place at Masqat, in the course of a voyage undertaken by the ex-Shaikh with the object of persuading his former enemy, Saiyid Sa'id, then at Zanzibar, to assist him in recovering his ancestral dominions.

Death of the
ex-Shaikh,
1849.

Relations of Bahrain with the Wāhhābis from the accession of Shaikh Muhammad to the death of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah. 1843-1849.

The interference of the Wāhhābi Amīr in the dynastic quarrels of the Āl Khalīfah, resulting in the transference of Dammām from their possession to his, has already been described; but it remains to notice some other transactions between the Wāhhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain which had no very direct connection with the dissensions among the Āl Khalīfah.

In the operations against Dammām the Amīr Faisal and Shaikh Muhammad acted in concert; and, on the fall of that place, it seems to have been arranged that the Shaikh, in return for the aid lent him, should acknowledge the supremacy of the Wāhhābis and pay an annual tribute, with arrears.

Rupture
between the
Shaikh of
Bahrain
and the
Wāhhābis,
1845-1847.

1845.

Before the end of 1844 a demand for settlement of the arrears had been twice presented by the Amīr and as often evaded by the Shaikh; and in 1845 it became known that 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wāhhābi Governor of Qatif, was plotting an attack upon Bahrain. The Wāhhābi official, his plans not being yet matured, pretended unusual friendliness for Shaikh Muhammad; but the latter, who without difficulty penetrated this artifice, assumed the offensive, placed the ports of Hasa under blockade, and engaged in his service a noted pirate named Hamaid-bin-Majdal. At this juncture Shaikh 'Abdullah, the ex-chief of Bahrain, landed secretly near Rās Tanūrah, and sent messengers to his son Mubārak and to the Wāhhābi Governor; his proposal was that he himself, with his vessels, should decoy the blockading force away from Qatif, and that, during its absence, Mubārak should cross over from the mainland and

take possession of Bahrain. The scheme, in itself not unpromising, was frustrated by some of the 'Amāir, into whose hands part of Shaikh 'Abdullah's correspondence fell and by whom it was carried to 'Ali, a brother of Shaikh Muhammad, in Bahrain. In the result, the ex-Shaikh found himself confronted, before he had reached Qatif, by the Bahrain fleet in battle array; and he had some difficulty in escaping capture by them.

1846.

Hostilities between Bahrain and the Wāhhābis, and the blockade by the former of the Hasa coast, continued throughout 1846 without advantage on either side. In September 1846 the ex-chief of Bahrain reappeared and settled in Hasa, first near Dammām and then on Tārūt Island, with the result that the blockade, which had been temporarily relaxed, again became more strict, and that two engagements took place on the mainland, in one of which the Wāhhābi governor was victorious, in the other the Shaikh of Bahrain; the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, however, did not himself take part in any of these proceedings. In October 1846 the Wāhhābi official was desirous of calling some of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān to his aid and sought permission to do so from the British Resident at Būshehr, and in November the Shaikh of Bahrain applied to the same authority for leave to form an alliance with the Shaikh of Dibai; but both requests were, as usual, refused.

End of the
war and final
settlement,
1847.

Early in 1847 the situation was changed by the action of Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his 'Amāir, who seceded from the party of Shaikh Muhammad and attached themselves to the Wāhhābis; and in August of the same year a settlement was arranged, under which the Amīr Faisal undertook not to encourage the ex-chief of Bahrain further, even though the latter should continue to reside in Hasa, while Shaikh Muhammad bound himself to pay tribute to the Wāhhābis at the rate of 84,000 a year.

Relations of Bahrain with Persia during the same period, 1843-49.

Beyond the intrigues of Persian agents and officials in favour of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, especially in 1843-44 and 1846, which have been recounted above, there is nothing to be noticed in the relations of Persia with Bahrain at this time,

Relations of Bahrain with Turkey during the same period, 1843-49.

The case of Turkey, however, is different; for a claim by the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrain, afterwards urged from time to time, was advanced apparently for the first time in 1847. The views of the Porte found expression, on this occasion, in a letter addressed by the Mutasallim of Basrah to the Shaikh of Bahrain, in which the latter was invited to declare his allegiance to the Sultān and to submit detailed lists of the shipping of his principality in order that the vessels might be registered under the Turkish flag. A Turkish brig-of-war which at this time was cruising in the Gulf did not, however, visit Bahrain,—probably in order to avoid attracting unnecessary attention,—and the overtures of the Turks were evaded by Shaikh Muhammad; but the incident, as will be shown presently, afforded matter for reflection to the British Government.

Relations of Bahrain with the British Government during the same period, 1843-49.

Certain transactions of the British authorities in regard to Bahrain have been noticed incidentally. Such were their repeated insistence on the observance of the Restrictive Line by both factions, their withholding of the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and Kuwait from participation in the war, and their discouragement of Persian intrigue and intervention; and such also, was the veto which they placed in 1846 on the design of the Wahhābis and the Shaikh of Bahrain to borrow aid against one another from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān.

On the 8th of May 1847, a treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, similar to that executed by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in the same year, was signed by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain.

The insidious advances of Turkey in 1847 led to a discussion of the politico-commercial position of Bahrain. The Shaikh complained that heavier harbour fees and other dues were levied on his vessels at Bombay than on those of Persia and Masqat; and he professed himself inclined, on account of this unfavourable treatment, to accept—as the Shaikh of

Matters arising out of the dynastic struggle and out of Wahhābi affairs.

Treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade, 8th May 1847. Proposal for a British Protectorate over Bahrain considered and rejected, 1847-49.

Kuwait had already done—the Turkish flag. Enquiry having shown that the extra charges at Bombay were levied on Bahrain vessels because they did not possess registers, a refund was authorised; and the Shaikh of Bahrain was informed that in future his subjects might avoid payment of the heavier rates at Bombay by providing themselves with certificates signed by the Resident. The question raised did not, however, end here; for, in the opinion of the Bombay Government, it was obviously desirable to exclude interference by foreign powers in the affairs of the Persian Gulf, inasmuch as, without retaining the supreme authority in their own hands, the British Government could not hope to secure the performance of the objects which they had attained in that quarter at a large expense; and the Board of Directors concurred in their recommendation that “any attempts upon Bahrain ought to be resisted by the British naval force” in the Gulf, and that the British Political Resident should be so informed. In the meantime the Resident, Major Hennell, had been authorised, while avoiding discussion with the Turks, to ascertain whether the Shaikh of Bahrain was inclined to enter into a closer connection with the British power; and some months later, apparently in 1848, Shaikh Muhammad expressed a wish that his principality should be taken under British protection. Major Hennell, whose opinion had at first been adverse to the project, now recommended the Shaikh’s offer for acceptance; but in September 1849, after a protracted discussion which resulted in an agreement between the Indian Government and Her Majesty’s Government that a change of policy would be inexpedient, the Resident was directed to decline the proposal of the Shaikh, but to assure him at the same time of continuance of the good will and friendship of the British Government.

Piracies
committed
by one of
the Qubaisât,
1848.

While this important question was pending, the conduct of Shaikh Muhammad towards the British Government was not free from reproach, especially in regard to a pirate named Khalifah, a member of the restless Qubaisât section of the Bani Yās tribe of Abu Dhabi. This individual, after plundering a number of vessels including one belonging to Bahrain, had somehow fallen into the hands of the Shaikh; and the question of his punishment was already under consideration by the British Resident, when the Shaikh, in violation of a promise given to the Residency Agent, again set him at liberty. A sharp remonstrance by Colonel Hennell produced a humble apology and a promise to re-arrest the pirate should occasion offer; but it does not appear that an opportunity of doing so was ever found.

Internal affairs of Bahrain, 1843-1849.

The Dawāsir who now inhabit Budaiya' and Zallāq on the main island appear to have arrived in Bahrain about 1845. On their way thither from their original home in Central Arabia, they are said to have sojourned for a few years on Zakhnūniyah Island.

Arrival of
the Dawāsir
in Bahrain,
1845.

Of the conditions prevailing in the Bahrain islands during the first years of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah's rule we have little information; but such indications as exist point to internal misgovernment. The existence, as early as 1847, of a colony of Bahrain refugees on Qais island has already been mentioned in connection with the struggle between the Shaikh and his grand-uncle; and this settlement, though the inhabitants did not actually assist the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, must have been regarded by Shaikh Muhammad as in some way prejudicial to his interests, for we find him at the end of 1848 endeavouring, but without success, to persuade the Shaikh of Chārak to expel the 'Utūb from Qais. In January 1849, disgusted by the arbitrary government of the Shaikh, four of the principal merchants among his subjects left Bahrain and after some stay at Lingeh went to reside on Qais,—a proceeding by which Shaikh Muhammad was so much disquieted that he sent his brother 'Ali to Būshehr to seek the advice of the Resident. In reply to questions, the Shaikh was told that the British vessels in the Gulf would endeavour while in the neighbourhood to prevent the seceders from attacking Bahrain, but that it behoved the Shaikh himself to be vigilant; and the adoption by himself of a more conciliatory policy was suggested. This counsel seems to have borne fruit. Three of the merchants afterwards returned to Bahrain in a British vessel; and an amicable, if temporary, adjustment of their differences with the Shaikh was secured in June 1849.

Existence of
a colony
of 'Atbi
malcontents
on Qais
Island,
1847-49.

General history of Bahrain and policy of the British Government during the remainder of Shaikh Muhammad's rule, 1850-68.

The affairs of Bahrain, in consequence of the irresponsible character of the ruler, of the close interest in the principality taken by Great Britain, and of claims to suzerainty advanced by the Wāhhābis, the Turks and the Persians, became, after the death of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, extremely intricate. In the words of Lieutenant Disbrowe, "we have the launching

“of Buteels and the expectation of attacks; seeking the Resident’s advice
 “and speaking disparagingly of him for giving advice; the oppression of
 “subjects, and the flight of the oppressed; the deputing of envoys, armed
 “with full powers, to effect agreements and the return of the envoys to be
 “censured for the agreements they had effected.” We shall treat the
 following period of nearly twenty years chronologically, without any
 attempt to separate the closely intertwined threads of the narrative.

Piracy by
 Bani Hājir
 and insolence
 of Shaikh
 Muhammad,
 1850.

About the end of June 1850 a small Ghunchah from Khārag Island, bound for Qatif, was captured off Rās Tanūrah by a party of 26 Bani Hājir who were returning to the mainland in a Bahrain Baqārah; and the Khāragis, after being plundered of all that they possessed, were landed, stripped, on the Hasa coast. On the grounds that he had connected himself by marriage with the guilty tribe, that he allowed them to frequent Bahrain in considerable numbers, and that he was secretly instigating their lawless proceedings, the Shaikh of Bahrain was compelled by the British Resident, although the Bani Hājir were not his subjects and the crime had been committed in the jurisdiction of the Wahhābis, to answer for the offence and to disburse 100 Tūmāns as compensation to the sufferers.

At nearly the same time, in the course of a correspondence relating to the death of a Bahrain subject, Shaikh Muhammad sent messages of an offensive character to the British Resident through Hāji Qāsim, the Residency Agent in Bahrain; his insulting remarks referred in part to Colonel Hennell personally, and in part to the British Government. A ship of war was immediately despatched to Bahrain to require an explanation, whereupon Shaikh Muhammad, repenting of his hasty conduct, deputed his brother ‘Ali to Būshehr to offer an apology. In so far as he was himself concerned, Colonel Hennell accepted this *amende* as sufficient; but he insisted that, at the next visit of Commodore Porter to Bahrain, the Shaikh should visit that officer personally on board ship and express regret for his remarks derogatory to the British Government,—a demand to which ‘Ali, on the part of the Shaikh, readily acceded and which was duly fulfilled.

Danger from
 the Wahhābis
 and sons of
 the ex-
 Shaikh
 ‘Abdullah
 averted by
 British
 action,
 1850-52.
 1850.

In 1850 a breach between Shaikh Muhammad and the Wahhābis seemed to be imminent; and the prospect was the more serious that the British Resident had failed in an endeavour to persuade the sons of the late ex-Shaikh ‘Abdullah to settle peaceably on Qais Island, in consideration of allowances to be granted by the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Ill-feeling was first excited by the Amīr Faisal’s treatment of an envoy named Muhammad-bin-‘Abdur Rahīm, whom he had himself sent to Bahrain and whom, on return from this mission, he despoiled of the presents with which Shaikh Muhammad had loaded him and even impri-

soned,—a course of behaviour so irritating to the Shaikh of Bahrain that he threatened to blockade Qatif unless reparation were made. A little later, in April 1850, a son of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the well known Wāhhābī agent at Baraimi, visited Bahrain; and the cold reception which he naturally met with there did not tend to improve the relations between Shaikh Muhammad and the Amīr.

Early in 1851 the Amīr Faisal in person made his appearance in 1851. Qatar, at a place only two marches distant from Dōhah, whereupon the people of Dōhah, Wakrah and Fuwairat repudiated their allegiance to Bahrain and went over to the Wāhhābīs. The Shaikh of Bahrain, against his own better judgment, then tendered a small annual tribute to the Amīr,—a circumstance from it may perhaps be inferred that he had failed to observe the agreement of 1847; but his adversary rejected the offer with scorn, proposed exorbitant terms instead, and invited the sons of the late Shaikh 'Abdullah to join him from their asylum on the Persian coast. Shaikh Muhammad then blockaded the Wāhhābī port of Qatif; but the sons of 'Abdullah, arriving with a fleet which they had equipped on the Persian side, broke through the line of his vessels and entered Qatif harbour. Matters now assumed an aspect very threatening for Shaikh Muhammad; and he was, in fact, on the point of succumbing to the hostile combination when a British squadron, arriving off Bahrain, took the islands under their protection. Thereafter, at the end of July 1851, a peace was concluded between the disputants by the efforts of Shaikh Tahnūn of Abu Dhabi; Dōhah in Qatar was restored to 'Ali, brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain, from whom it had been taken; and the Wāhhābī Amīr returned quietly to Hofūf.

In this year a claim by the Porte to sovereignty over Bahrain was summarily rejected by the British Government.

In 1852, enraged by the recent settlement of the sons of 'Abdullah 1852. at Dammām under Wāhhābī protection, Shaikh Muhammad proposed to withhold the instalment of tribute then due to the Amīr and indulged in imprudent speeches; but by the advice of Captain Kemball, the British Resident, and of his own brother 'Ali, a man of greater self-control than himself, he was persuaded to make the required payment to an agent whom Faisal had deputed to receive it.

Soon after this Shaikh Muhammad gave way to irrational fears,—fears not only of rivals belonging to his own family but also of the Saiyid of 'Omān and even of Shaikh Tahnūn, the recent mediator between himself and the Wāhhābīs; and hardly had Captain Kemball, whom he had recently insulted, undertaken a correspondence on his behalf with the

Difficulty of
dealings with
Shaikh
Muhammad,
1852.

sons of 'Abdullah, when the negotiations were frustrated by the instability and unreasonableness of Shaikh Muhammad. Yūsuf-bin-Ibrāhīm, the principal among the four Bahrain merchants who had migrated to Qais in 1849, still refused to return to his home without a guarantee of British protection, which could not be granted; and he eventually died at Lingeh in the following year (1853).

Supplementary engagement relating to the Slave Trade, 10th May 1856. Reparation obtained for the ill-treatment by Shaikh Muhammad of British subjects in Bahrain, 1858.

On the 10th of May 1856 an engagement relating to the Slave Trade, supplementary to the Treaty of 1847, was accepted by the Shaikh of Bahrain; in its terms it was identical with those obtained from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān in the same year.

In 1858 Shaikh Muhammad, now described as "a man who combined "in himself the worst qualities of a tyrant, the most unbridled lust "and greed of wealth, and an incontrollable temper, ignorance and impatience against restraint," proceeded to lay an embargo on a Baghlah under the British flag, to prohibit vessels owned by Indian merchants in Bahrain from visiting Qatif, and to levy duties on exports in addition to those on imports, which alone had been taken before; and it was complained that his tone to Hāji Qāsim, the Residency Agent in Bahrain, had become very insolent.

Accordingly, in September 1858, Captain Felix Jones, the Resident at Būshehr, sent his Assistant, Lieutenant Disbrowe, in the "Clive" sloop-of-war to convey a letter and a remonstrance to the chief. The release of the impounded British Baghlah having been at once obtained, the Shaikh's brother 'Ali became, as usual, the medium of communication, and explained that the prohibition against vessels under British colours visiting Qatif was intended to prevent complications that might otherwise occur through the enmity of the Wahhābi governor against the Shaikh of Bahrain; Lieutenant Disbrowe replied that "the British flag "was fully able to uphold its dignity in every corner of the globe without "assistance from other powers." In regard to customs duties, it was explained that the British Government desired that they should not be of an arbitrary or oppressive character, a proposition to which Shaikh 'Ali made no objection; and a promise was given that the Residency Agent should in future be treated with the respect due to his position. The Shaikh, after an unsuccessful attempt to induce Lieutenant Disbrowe to pay him the first visit on shore, then came off to the "Clive" and expressed his regret at what had occurred; and his call was then returned by Lieutenant Disbrowe and Commodore Jenkins under a salute to the British flag.

Notwithstanding the peace arranged in 1851, tension continued between the Wāhhābī Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, and a vigilant watch was maintained by the local British authorities. In May 1853, with reference to one of the alarms of an invasion of Bahrain that from time to time occurred, the Government of India authorised the Government of Bombay to offer every obstacle to an attack upon those islands by the Wāhhābī Amīr—who was now nominally subject to the Ottoman Porte—on the ground that Her Majesty's Government would not permit the occupation of Bahrain by the Turkish Government, or by any one acting for them or in their interest. In 1859 matters again came to a head, and, notwithstanding the presence at the time of a British corvette in Hasa waters, preparations for a descent on Bahrain were made at Qatīf and Dammām by the Wāhhābī governor of the littoral and by Muhammad, a son of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah; the object of the movement was to place Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in possession of Bahrain, and the excuse was that the Shaikh of Bahrain had instigated certain tribes of Qatar to attack the subjects of the Wāhhābī Amīr. Some Turkish and Persian vessels were seized by the confederates in a piratical manner and their crews impressed for service on the intended expedition. The British Resident immediately despatched Commodore Balfour to Dammām with the Persian Gulf squadron; and so threatening was the attitude assumed on arrival by that officer, whose conduct afterward received "the marked commendation of Government," that the allies at once discontinued their proceedings and the Wāhhābī governor even sued for pardon.

Renewed danger from the Wāhhābis and the sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah again averted by British action, 1859.

An inconclusive correspondence then followed between the Wāhhābī ruler, who was much annoyed at the intervention of the British authorities, and the British Resident, Captain Felix Jones, who believed that the fixed object of the Wāhhābis was "universal dominion along the coast." The Amīr asserted authority over Bahrain and declared himself a vassal of the Sultān of Turkey. The Resident, in reply, informed him of the determination of the British Government to preserve the independence of Bahrain, and remarked on the inconsistency of piratical seizures of Turkish shipping with professions of dependence on the Porte.

To Government Captain Jones made a recommendation that punitive action should be taken against the ports of Hasa; and a discussion was initiated as to the advisability of requiring Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah to leave Dammām.

Persian and Turkish protection simultaneously invited by the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1859.

Towards the end of the year 1859, probably in connection with this crisis, Shaikh Muhammad made simultaneous applications for protection to the Persian Governor of Fārs and to the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād. The response of the Turks was delayed by the absence of the Wāli from his headquarters; but a Persian agent in the person of one Mirza Mehdi Khān, a well-known Anglophobe, almost immediately arrived in Bahrain, the Persian flag was hoisted, and Persian sovereignty was proclaimed. Scarcely, however, had these ceremonies been performed, when Muhammad Baig, the emissary of Mustafa Nūri Pāsha appeared; the Persian flag was again lowered; and the Turkish flag was raised in its place. To complete the absurdity of the situation the Persian agent refused to leave Bahrain or to surrender his imaginary authority in the Shaikhdom.

Discussion of the policy to be adopted by Britain in regard to these events, 1860-61.

Sir H. Rawlinson, the British Minister at Tehrān, who differed from Captain Jones, the Resident, in regarding these matters as of slight account, contented himself with obtaining from the Shāh's ministers an assurance that no military occupation of Bahrain should be undertaken by Persia until the question of title had been settled by diplomatic discussion; and he advised Captain Jones that, while hostilities against Bahrain from any quarter were to be repelled by force of British arms, the voluntary tender by the Shaikh of allegiance to any other power might, so long as it was not followed by a military occupation, be ignored as of no practical importance. On consideration of the correspondence the Government of Bombay instructed the Resident at Būshehr not to interfere with the occupation of Bahrain, whether by Persia or by Turkey, otherwise than by protest and by an intimation that the matter had been reported to Her Majesty's Government; but at the same time the agents of both powers were to be distinctly warned that aggression by Bahrain, or in the name of Bahrain, upon neighbouring tribes would not be allowed by the British authorities, and would even be prevented by force if necessary. In referring the general question to the Secretary of State, the Government of Bombay observed that the tranquillity of the Persian Gulf, which had been so long preserved by the policy of the British Government, seemed to demand that Bahrain should be regarded as subject neither to the Sublime Porte nor to Persia; and they recommended that the independence of the principality should be recognised, and that those engagements which in the interests of commerce, humanity and public security had been concluded between it and the British Government should be maintained. This view was approved by Her Majesty's Government in February 1861.

In the meantime the Persian and Turkish agents had apparently vanished from Bahrain.

In May 1861 it became known to the Resident that Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, without reference to himself, had commenced a blockade of the Hasa coast and was harassing the pearl fishers of Qatif and Dammām, at the latter of which places Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, son of the late ex-chief of Bahrain, was still located.

Convention
with Britain
signed by the
Shaikh of
Bahrain,
21st May
1861.

Captain Jones immediately proceeded to Bahrain, where he arrived on the 18th of May, with the full Gulf squadron; but he could not prevail upon the Shaikh to discontinue the blockade of the Wahhabi coast. The explanation of the Shaikh's obstinacy was, or at least was believed to be, a promise by Persia to procure him the assistance of a French vessel. Having exhausted all his arguments in vain, the Resident placed the matter in the hands of Commodore Drought, who was immediately successful, without the firing of a single shot, in capturing two of the finest war vessels of Bahrain, the "Tawilah" and the "Hamrah."

The Shaikh then made submission, and, after some negotiations conducted through his brother 'Ali, consented to sign a Convention proposed by Captain Jones. By this agreement, executed on the 21st of May 1861, Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah acknowledged the validity of the treaties and conventions concluded with the British Government by his predecessors in office; he promised to abstain, on condition of being supported by the British Government against external aggression, from "the prosecution of war, piracy and slavery by sea"; he engaged to submit cases of aggression on himself or his subjects by sea to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf as arbitrator and to look to him for redress, as also to make reparation for such maritime offences as might in justice be charged against himself or his subjects; and he undertook to recognise the jurisdiction of the British Agent and Political Resident over British subjects of every kind in Bahrain, and to permit the latter to reside and trade in his dominions, subject only to an *ad valorem* duty of 5 per cent. in kind or in cash upon their goods, which should not be more than once levied. Matters having been thus arranged, the Resident restored the war vessel "Tawilah," but retained the "Hamrah." One result of the Convention was to assimilate the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain, who was not a party to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, to that of the Trucial Shaikhs.

The Government of Bombay approved the proceedings of Captain Jones and referred the Convention, which they considered to be advantageous notwithstanding that it had been obtained by the Resident without

previous express sanction, to the Government of India, by whom it was accepted on the 9th of October 1861. The Resident was at the same time instructed not to return the "Hamrah" until the Shaikh, by his conduct, should show himself worthy of such consideration.

Expulsion
of Muham-
mad-bin-
'Abdullah
from
Dammām,
November
1861.

Meanwhile a suggestion made by the Resident in connection with the attempted invasion of Bahrain in 1859,—that Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, who had repeatedly been warned not to disturb the peace and of whose proceedings the Shaikh of Bahrain had frequently complained, should be removed from Dammām—had been adopted by higher authority. It was intended by Government that the exile, on condition of residing at Kuwait or somewhere in Persia, should receive an allowance from the Shaikh of Bahrain. The Resident was warned, in case of force being required, to confine his operations to the sea and not to let himself be drawn into land operations.

Accordingly, in June 1861, the Resident wrote to the Wāhhābi Amīr, requiring him to eject Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām; and in November 1861, no reply to the letter having been received, he proceeded with the squadron to Dammām, from which, after a bloodless bombardment of an hour's duration, the son of the ex-chief with all his followers incontinently fled. No opposition to the proceedings of the squadron was offered by the Wāhhābi garrisons at Qatīf or Dammām; and the result was reported to be welcome to the traders of Hasa, and even to the Wāhhābi authorities, whose failure to expel the refugee was due merely to ordinary Arab notions on the subject of hospitality.

A protest against the action taken at Dammām was made soon after by the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād and was answered by the British Political Agent at that place; but, as it related to the political position of Hasa, not Bahrain, it need not be noticed here.

Misbehaviour
of the Shaikh
of Bahrain
in regard to
British
subjects,
1863-65.

Neither the treaty obligations which he had incurred nor the valuable assistance rendered to him in the expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām availed for long to keep the Shaikh of Bahrain in good relations with the British Government. In 1863, after the appointment of Colonel Pelly to the Persian Gulf Residency, the "Hamrah" was returned to Shaikh Muhammad at the suggestion of the new Resident, as the earnest of a policy of conciliation which he intended to pursue; but this concession failed to elicit any acknowledgment from the Shaikh beyond "a remark disrespectful to the Viceroy"; and ill-usage of British subjects commenced with such vigour that on one occasion the whole Indian community took refuge at Būshehr, whence the more wealthy among them refused to return.

Various claims arose against the Shaikh, of which one was in 1864 investigated by the Resident and settled by an agreement in writing, executed by the Shaikh and his brother, to pay a sum of 17,000 Qrāns. In the spring of 1865, on again visiting Bahrain, Colonel Pelly found that the compensation promised had not been paid, and that on the contrary a further sum of 3,000 Qrāns had been extorted by the ruler from the Hindu complainants. The Resident on this occasion confined himself to a written remonstrance; but in December of the same year, having failed to convince the Shaikh after a week's argument of the necessity of fulfilling his engagements, Colonel Pelly caused the Bahrain war Baghlah "Dinār," of 500 tons and pierced for 10 guns, to be seized. Hardly had the Resident recommended to Government the sale of this vessel for the benefit of the British Indian claimants than the Bahrain authorities came to their senses and satisfied the demand against them; but in the meantime the Baghlah had been severely damaged by a hurricane, while in tow of the "Berenice," and foundered on reaching port, apparently at Būshehr.

The Government of India directed that the "Dinār" should, if practicable, be restored to the Shaikh, and an attempt was made to fulfil their instructions; but the vessel sank and was lost on her way back to Bahrain. A general order was issued by Government, in connection with this case, that the Resident should not in future undertake the confiscation of vessels belonging to chiefs on his own responsibility.

The Persian Government, who in 1862 had protested against the seizure of the Bahrain war vessel "Hamrah," now complained of the proceedings in regard to the "Dinār" on the ground that Bahrain, under the Agreement concluded by Captain Bruce in 1822,* was a dependency of Persia.

Reassertion
by the
Persian
Government
of their claim
to Bahrain,
1866-67.

The Government of India, to whom the allusion was unintelligible referred to the Government of Bombay and were informed of the nature of Captain Bruce's Agreement and of its having been at the time instantly repudiated. Upon this the Government of India acquainted Mr. Alison, the British Minister in Persia, with the circumstances of the case and with their own opinion that, whatever might have been the pretensions of Persia (or the grounds of the same) to the sovereignty of Bahrain in former days, the Shāh could not now be regarded as possessing, in point of fact, any rights in the principality.

This communication to the British Legation at Tehrān was approved by Her Majesty's Government in 1867, and the matter apparently dropped

* *Vide* page 849 *ante*.

Claims of the
Wahhābi
Amir to
Bahrain,
1866-67.

At the time of Colonel Pelly's visit to Bahrain in December 1865, a rupture of Anglo-Wahhābi relations being then imminent, reason was found to suspect the existence of an understanding between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wahhābis; and the seizure of the "Dinār" was dictated, in part, by the expediency of clipping the wings of the Shaikh in case he should suddenly resolve to throw in his lot with the Amīr. The Shaikh, it is true, in making his submission, professed a wish to be delivered from the power of the Wahhābis; but his request was considered by the Resident to be insincere. Colonel Pelly was accordingly instructed to report on the political position of Bahrain with reference to the Wahhābi power.

The result of his enquiries was to show that the Shaikh held himself to be independent of the Wahhābis in so far as the islands of Bahrain were concerned, and that the annual tribute of \$4,000 which he indubitably paid was on account of his possessions in Qatar, the object of payment being to secure the latter against attack by Arab tribes under Wahhābi influence. In submitting this information Colonel Pelly reminded Government of the* decision of the Court of Directors in 1847, that any attempt upon Bahrain should be prevented by a British naval force, if necessary; of the orders† of the Government of India in 1853, that every obstacle should be offered to the Wahhābi Amīr, then regarded as a Turkish agent, should he seek to attack Bahrain; and of the‡ acceptance by the Secretary of State in 1861 of the view that the independence of Bahrain should be recognised and that the engagements between the Shaikh and the British Government should be maintained.

In March 1867, the Government of India enunciated an opinion that the Shaikh was independent of all other powers in respect of his insular possessions, and that he did not owe fealty to the Wahhābis unless in regard to Qatar.

Plunder of
the Qatar
coast by the
Shaikhs of
Bahrain
and Abu
Dhabi, and
retaliation
by the
inhabitants
of Qatar upon
Bahrain,
1867-68.

In 1867, disturbances of a very unusual and serious character broke out between the Shaikh of Bahrain and his dependents in Qatar. A Bedouin of the promontory having been seized and deported to Bahrain by Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Muhammad, the representative of the Bahrain ruler at Wakrah, the headmen of Wakrah and Dōhah combined to demand his release, and, on their request being refused, took measures to expel Shaikh Ahmad from Wakrah; but their action was forestalled by that individual, removing himself, with his family and goods, to Khor Hassān. A seeming reconciliation then took place, the Shaikh of Bahrain releasing

* *Vide* page 882 *ante*.

† *Vide* page 887 *ante*.

‡ *Vide* page 888 *ante*.

the imprisoned Bedouin and the headmen of Qatar apologising to the Shaikh for their behaviour; but on the part of the ruler of Bahrain the proceedings were merely a blind to cover preparations for revenge. Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, one of the Āl Thāni Shaikhs of Dōhah whose influence afterwards became paramount in Qatar, having been invited to Bahrain for the purpose of making a permanent arrangement in regard to the administration of the promontory, was on his arrival treacherously cast into prison; and no sooner had this capture been effected than Shaikh Muhammad despatched a fleet of 24 boats, carrying 500 men, under the command of his brother 'Ali, and a land force of 200 men under Shaikh Ahmad, his agent, to punish the people of Dōhah and Wakrah. At the same time he sought assistance from the Shaikhs of Dibai and Abu Dhabi; and the latter, disregarding the advice of the British Agent at Shārjah, sent about 2,000 armed men in 70 boats to the Qatar coast; but the Shaikh of Dibai, with greater prudence declined to join. The Abu Dhabi fleet was the first to arrive on Qatar, and succeeded in pacifying the suspicions of the inhabitants until the arrival of the Bahrain armament, by which about 40 vessels belonging to Qatar had been captured on the way over. The towns of Dōhah and Wakrah were then sacked by the allied forces, even the rafters and doors of the houses being removed; and the inhabitants, who had been ordered to go forth and settle elsewhere, were plundered, when they tried to obey, of such possessions as remained to them. A number of the people were deported, and most of those who were left then voluntarily dispersed and sought asylum at various places on the coasts of Arabia and Persia. These events took place in October 1867. The damage inflicted on the people of Qatar was estimated at over \$200,000.

The victims of this treacherous outrage immediately appealed for redress to the Wāhhābi Amīr, who maintained a claim to authority over Qatar, and it was soon reported that he had received their representations sympathetically and had assured them that, "as his intentions and those of the British Government coincided," no further harm should befall them from the direction of the sea. A demand by the Amīr for the return of the spoil taken and for the repatriation of the exiles was flouted, however, by the Shaikh of Bahrain, and led only to the deportation afresh of certain Qatari families who had meanwhile been allowed to return to their homes. Instructions were then issued by the Wāhhābi Amīr to his representative in Hasa to prepare for an attack on Bahrain; but, beyond the plunder of some Bahrain subjects by a tribe of the Hasa coast, no visible results followed.

In June 1868 the injured Qataris took the law into their own hands and attempted a retaliatory attack on Bahrain ; but the movement began and ended, it would seem, with a somewhat severe naval engagement.

Action of
the British
authorities
with
reference
to the
attack on
Qatar, 1868.

The secrecy and rapidity with which the campaign of the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi against Qatar was arranged and carried out had deprived the British Government of an opportunity for prevention or intervention ; but, the affair having quickly come to be regarded throughout the Gulf as a test of British preparedness to maintain peace at sea, it was resolved to inflict an exemplary punishment upon the offending chiefs and not to accept the excuse, which would probably be tendered by Shaikh Muhammad, that he was entitled to punish by any and every means his refractory subjects in Qatar.

Preparations
and
negotiations.

Much delay was caused, however, by the demands of the Abyssinian expedition upon the marine resources of the Government of India ; and, for the time being, the only vessel actually in the Gulf was the " Hugh Rose " gunboat, manned entirely by natives of India and unable to steam for more than eight consecutive hours. In May the steamer " Sind " was placed at the Resident's disposal for a blockade of Abu Dhabi, with the Shaikh of which place it was intended first to deal ; but, by an extraordinary oversight on which the Government of India afterwards animadverted severely, she arrived in the Gulf without any shot for her guns. Meanwhile the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi whom the Shaikh of Bahrain had privately agreed to reimburse for any indemnity that might be extracted from him by the British Government, had recourse to a policy of shifts and evasions ; but on the 8th of June 1868 these were cut short by a letter from the Resident, in which he was called upon to pay 125,000 Qrāns as damages, to restore to Qatar the persons and property that he had removed, and to express regret for the past and an intention of behaving better in future. The news, received in June 1868, of retaliatory action by the people of Qatar accelerated the progress of events ; and on the 23rd of July H. M. S. " Vigilant," which had arrived on other duty at Bombay, was despatched to the Persian Gulf. The commander, Captain R. A. Brown, was instructed to enforce upon the Shaikh of Bahrain, by all means at his disposal but in consultation with Colonel Pelly, the immediate payment of \$100,000, the surrender of the armed Baghlahs employed by the Shaikh in his expedition, and the provision by the Shaikh of such

security for good conduct as the Resident might deem suitable; and demands of a similar character, to be finally disposed of on the spot, were authorised in the case of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

No action was taken, however, until the beginning of September,* when Colonel Pelly with H.M.S. "Vigilant" and the gunboats "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose" proceeded to Bahrain, and Shaikh Muhammad, well aware that a reckoning was at hand, fled to Qatar. On the 6th of September 1868 an Agreement was executed by Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, a brother of the absconding ruler who had been to some extent associated with him in the administration, whereby he undertook to make over the war Baghlahs and Batils of the ruling family of Bahrain to the British Naval Commander and to pay \$25,000 in cash to the British Resident on the next day; to pay a further sum of \$75,000 in three annual instalments; and to appoint, for the better preservation of the peace at sea, an agent to represent him at Būshehr in his dealings with the British Residency. The Agreement also declared, on the authority of the principal inhabitants of Bahrain as well as of Shaikh 'Ali himself, that Shaikh Muhammad had by his piratical proceedings and flight forfeited the chiefship, and that Shaikh 'Ali had thus become sole ruler of Bahrain; and the latter pledged himself, in the event of his brother returning to Bahrain, to arrest him and hand him over to the Resident. The condition as to the surrender of the war fleet was duly performed; the vessels composing it were burnt; and the fort of Muharraḡ, or rather of Abu Māhur, was also destroyed along with its armament. When about one-fifth of the fine, however, had been collected, it was distributed rateably among the sufferers, and the remaining four-fifths were remitted.

Settlement
with Shaikh
'Ali-bin-
Khalifah,
6th
September
1868.

The subsequent proceedings of the Resident upon the coast of Qatar and at Abu Dhabi form part of the history of those districts and need not be related here; but it may be mentioned that Colonel Pelly succeeded in effecting an arrangement, in regard to tribute and other matters, between the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah and the new Shaikh of Bahrain. The tribute in question may have been the whole or a part of the sum that was paid by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Wahhābis on account of Qatar.

Protests against the action of the British political representative were shortly received from various Persian authorities; one, in which Bahrain

Persian protest against
the British

* These delays are not fully explained. That which occurred between the beginning of February and the middle of July was attributed by the Government of India to the inaction of the Bombay Government.

proceedings
in Bahrain
and reply
of Her
Majesty's
Government,
1868-69.

was claimed to be "the property of Persia," was addressed by the Shāh's ministers to Mr. Alison, the British Minister at Tehrān; another, of similar purport, was sent to Colonel Pelly by the Kārguzār at Shirāz; and a third, with which were enclosed two letters from the deposed Shaikh of Bahrain, was lodged at the Foreign Office on the 13th of April 1869 by the Persian Minister in London. A principal ground of complaint was that no previous notice had been given to Persia of the British intention to proceed against Bahrain.

In a reply, sent on the 29th of April 1869 after consultation between the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India, and the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Persian Minister was reminded that the Shaikhs of Bahrain had, at different periods in the past, entered into direct engagements with the British Government, he was further assured that the sole objects of the British Government in holding the Shaikhs to those engagements were the prevention of piracy and of the slave trade and the maintenance of the police of the Gulf—duties of which Great Britain would gladly, if it were possible, divest herself in favour of Persia. In conclusion a promise was given that, should punitive measures against the Shaikh of Bahrain again become necessary, Her Majesty's Government would, if practicable, cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand, and that in cases in which this might be impossible, in consequence of the delay which a reference to the Court of Tehrān would involve, a full communication on the subject would be made to the Persian Government. The object of this reply was to avoid causing irritation at Tehrān; but it is not clear that any decided departure from the established British policy was intended by Her Majesty's Government.

'ALI-BIN-KHALĪFAH.

1868-69.

The rule of Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, inaugurated by his Agreement of the 6th September 1868 with the British Government, was short and tragic; it lasted less than one year.

Intrigues of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad, 1869.

In January 1869, at the earnest request of Shaikh 'Ali, who believed

that he could restrain his brother most effectually if he resided in Bahrain, the ex-Shaikh Muhammad was permitted by the British authorities to return home; but he at once engaged in a course of intrigues which necessitated his deportation to Kuwait. From Kuwait the ex-Shaikh removed to Qatif, where he settled down and entered into communications of sinister meaning with his relation Nāsir-bin-Mubārak—a grandson of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah—whose mother was a woman of the Bani Hājir Bedouin tribe.

Invasion of Bahrain and death of Shaikh 'Ali, 1869.

In August or September 1869, Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak crossed over from the mainland in nine boats, accompanied by about 500 men of the Bani Hājir, and, landing in Bahrain, marched to Rifā'-ash-Sharqi, which was held in the name of Shaikh 'Ali by Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the chief who in 1861 had been expelled by the British from Dammām. A battle then took place, in which, owing mainly to treachery on the part of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Shaikh 'Ali was defeated by the invaders, and was killed on the field along with one of his sons. The usurping chiefs, over whom Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah appears to have acquired an immediate ascendancy, then occupied the towns of Manāmah and Muharraḡ; but they were unable to restrain their rabble of Bedouins, and the former place was plundered. The amount of the damage done at Manāmah, in which British Indian subjects suffered equally with others, was never clearly ascertained; but claims were afterwards registered to the amount of 21,53,797 Qrāns.

INTERREGNUM,

1869.

Immediate action by the local British authority.

When the news of this revolution reached Būshehr, the Resident, Colonel Pelly, at once despatched his Assistant, Captain Way, in

the "Dalhousie" to enquire into matters and to bring away any British Indian traders who might wish to leave ; but the passion for gain among the last mentioned class was so strong that they one and all declined to be removed, preferring to remain at their own risk and do business in plundered property, which was being openly sold in Bahrain and Qatif at one-fifth of its real value.

Further action under the orders of the Government of India.

Instructions
to the Resi-
dent.

Suggestions for dealing with the crisis were made by the Resident at the beginning of October, and at the middle of November he was authorised to blockade Bahrain and otherwise use force until the chief disturbers of the peace, namely Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Nāsir-bin-Mubārak and Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, should have been surrendered ; to recognise, if circumstances after execution of the first measure were favourable and the people generally seemed to approve of the appointment, 'Īsa, son of the deceased 'Ali, as Shaikh of Bahrain ; and to address the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān by letter, informing them of what had occurred and of the intention of Government to inflict adequate punishment. The questions of compensating persons plundered other than those who had bought in stolen property at nominal rates, and of blockading the Wāhhābi ports until the loot deposited there should have been restored, the offending Bedouins chastised and the Governor of Qatif removed, were reserved for later consideration ; and the Resident was directed to exercise great caution in any communication which he might make to the Wāhhābi Amīr.

Proceedings
in Bahrain,
19th Novem-
ber to 2nd
December
1869.

On receipt of these orders Colonel Pelly proceeded to Bahrain with H.M.S. "Daphne," Captain Douglas, H.M.S. "Nymph," and the gunboats "Clyde" and "Hugh Rose." Operations commenced on the 19th of November and were over by the 2nd of December. The Hālat Abu Māhur fort was attacked with boats on the night of the 19th November, and the garrison capitulated and surrendered Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, who was removed on board the "Daphne." Nāsir-bin-Ahmad, another Shaikh, was captured at sea. Nāsir-bin-Mubārak was shelled out of his fort—probably that of Manāmah, which was destroyed in the operations—and dislodged from another place in which he took refuge ; but he succeeded in escaping to

Hasa with his followers. Muhammad-bin- 'Abdullah, the head of the whole combination was outmanœuvred and gave himself up. Shaikh 'Īsa-bin-'Ali came over from Qatar, where he was residing, and was installed as ruler without interference on the part of the British Resident, amid every sign of popular rejoicing. Captain Douglas received some contusions by the explosion of a mine, but he was not seriously injured.

The three captured Shaikhs and two other ringleaders were deported to India, where they were at first confined in the fort of Asīrgarh, and subsequently in the fort of Chunār. Nāsir-bin-Ahmad died at Chunār in 1873, and Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in 1877; and the remaining three prisoners were then removed to Aden, where in 1880 two of them were released.

Treatment of the prisoners and compensation of sufferers.

An arrangement was made with Shaikh 'Īsa, at his accession, that the property of the ringleaders should be forfeited and the proceeds applied to the relief of the innocent sufferers by the invasion. The payment of this indemnity continued by instalments until 1876, when it was completed.

Connection of the Wāhhābis with the invasion.

It was at first suspected that the Wāhhābi Government were partially responsible for these ruinous disturbances in Bahrain, and a statement obtained currency that the Bani Hājir had at first refused to act without the authorisation of the Amīr, which Nāsir-bin-Mubārak accordingly obtained by a visit to Riyādh; but the Government of India, as we have seen, declined to hold the Wāhhābi Amīr responsible without fuller proof of his complicity and information as to the degree of his control over Hasa. The event proved the wisdom of this decision, for the Amīr subsequently wrote to the Resident disclaiming connection with the outrage; and, his guilt not being clear, it was ultimately found sufficient to remind him that the invasion had been made from his territory, where also Nāsir-bin-Mubārak had afterwards taken refuge and much of the plunder of Bahrain had been deposited, and to request, without the addition of any threat, that he would prevent in future such outrages as that which had occurred.

Position of the Government of Persia in regard to the invasion and to Bahrain generally.

Interception
of a Persian
message off
Bahrain.

After the arrival of the British expedition off Bahrain, a native vessel from Daiyir on the Persian coast, flying the Arab flag, attempted to run the blockade. On being boarded she was found to carry an emissary from Mīrza Mehdi Khān, the Persian envoy to Bahrain in 1859, with a dress of honour and letters in which Persian countenance and support were promised to Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the chief filibusterer; the letters stated that Mīrza Mehdi Khān had been deputed to "the Persian ports and islands," but they were unaccompanied by any proper Farman of the Shāh's government. The vessel was detained for having endeavoured to break the blockade; and the letters were delivered by the British authorities to the prisoner Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah and were by him handed over to Colonel Pelly.

Protest by
the Persian
Government.

In accordance with the orders of Her Majesty's Government issued a few months previously, a telegraphic communication had been made through the Resident, before the sailing of the expedition, to the British Minister at Tehrān for the information of the Persian Court. It stated that, under orders from India, Colonel Pelly was about to call the chief in possession of Bahrain to account for his breach of the maritime peace, and for his unprovoked attack on Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah who had been placed in power by the British Government. Later news of the Resident's proceedings was received with equanimity by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who merely observed that the Government of Persia were interested equally with the Government of Great Britain in the maintenance of the peace by sea, and that they had heretofore had no reason to object to the punishment of the delinquents; but he commented unfavourably on the action of the British authorities in preventing a Persian agent from landing and holding communication with the Shaikhs, and this complaint was repeated in an exaggerated form by the Persian Minister in London.

Shaikh 'Isa-bin-Khalifah, shortly after his installation, received a letter from Haidar Khān, Zābit of the Dashti district upon the Persian coast, in which he was advised to place himself under the protection of the Shāh; but the incident was of no importance.

Opinion of
the Govern-
ment of

In two despatches to the Secretary of State, dated the 22nd of February and the 20th of May 1870, the Government of India repelled certain charges which had been brought by the Persian Government

against their officers; and, in view of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the question of Persia and Bahrain, they dwelt at length on the evils that were likely to arise from a renunciation by the British Government of their beneficent supervision of the peace of the Persian Gulf, as also on the inconveniences of any policy by which it might be attempted to associate the Persian Government with the British in that task. They pointed out that Persia, having no navy whatever, was incapable of assisting Great Britain to maintain the peace at sea and even more so of taking Great Britain's place, should that place be relinquished; had the case been otherwise, even, and had Persia possessed some power at sea, her intervention would merely have embroiled her with the Sultanate of 'Omān, with the Arab principalities, with the Wahhābi power and with Turkey, to all of which she was antagonistic; indeed the assertion by Persia of claims to Bahrain had already caused the revival of similar obsolete pretensions on the part of Turkey and other powers. By their treaty engagements with Arab Shaikhs the British Government were themselves pledged to maintain the peace and to obtain reparation for maritime aggressions; and, in the opinion of the Government of India, the British protectorate in the Gulf should be regarded as a matter of obligation rather than of right. In the later of their two despatches the Government of India observed: "If we are no longer prepared to continue the performance of the tasks we have undertaken, we must withdraw altogether; but the consequences of such a step would be so disastrous, not only to our national honour, but to the peace of the Gulf, to the prosperity of the tribes inhabiting the littoral, and to the lives and property of our subjects, who, during the peace of the last fifty years, have settled on the shores and embarked enormous capital in the pearl fisheries and the trade with the mainland, that we cannot contemplate this course as one of which Her Majesty's Government could for a moment entertain." This conclusion does not appear to have been contested by the British Government.

Protest by the Porte against the action of the British Government in Bahrain.

A protest was also entered by the Turkish Minister in London against the recent proceedings of the British authorities in Bahrain, which were represented as acts of British sovereignty over "a portion of Turkish

territory." In reply to this remonstrance, however, the Ottoman Minister was informed that the British Government could not recognise the Turkish claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain.

SHAIKH 'ISA-BIN-'ALI,

from 1869.

The reign of Shaikh 'Īsa-bin-'Alī, begun in the somewhat striking manner described above, was disturbed during a number of years by the ambitious projects of the Porte and the formation of an Ottoman province upon the adjoining mainland. Against the danger of annexation by the Turks, however, Bahrain was steadily protected by the British Government; and in 1895, with the frustration by a British naval force of an invasion of the islands which had been attempted by Arabs with the countenance of the Turks, fear of aggression finally passed away.

Affairs Arising out of the Turkish Annexation of Hasa, 1871-72.

Turkish expedition to Hasa prevented from approaching Bahrain, 1871.

The Turkish annexation of Hasa in 1871 was accompanied by unmistakeable symptoms of a desire on the part of the Turks to lay claim to all the districts, including Bahrain, over which the Wahhābis had at any time exercised even transient sway. In 1870 Mid-hat Pāsha, Wālī of Baghdād, the prime mover in the affair, formulated a definite claim to "Bahrain and its dependencies" as appertaining to the "Qāim-Maqāmlīq of Najd," and therefore to the Ottoman Empire; and in 1871 the British Resident at Baghdād received information to the effect that, if the contemplated expedition to Najd were successful, the Turks would next turn their attention to Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate. Timely British protests, however, made at Constantinople in April and May 1871, drew from the Porte a repudiation of their supposed designs on these countries; and the leaders of the Turkish expedition received instructions from their Government which debarred them from even approaching Bahrain. At the end of May 1871, Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident, was instructed to visit Bahrain with the "Magpie," "Bullfinch" and "Hugh Rose"; to inform the Shaikh

who had asked for advice and protection, of the assurances obtained from the Porte ; and to promise that, so long as the Shaikh continued to observe the Convention of 1861, the reciprocal obligations of Britain towards him would be fulfilled.

At an early stage of the Turkish proceedings in Hasa, the Bahrain outlaw Nāsir bin-Mubārak had attached himself to the Ottoman expedition and had been employed as a medium of communication with the Arabs of the adjoining districts. In August or September 1871 an Arab of the Bani Hājir tribe was employed by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to convey a letter from the Turkish commandant in Hasa to Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar; and this individual, having imprudently embarked in a Kuwait vessel which touched at 'Aqāriyah on the coast of Bahrain and having, it was stated, been recognised there as one of the slayers of Shaikh 'Ali-bin-Khalifah in the invasion of 1869, was put to death by some subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Among other letters found on his body and delivered to the Shaikh of Bahrain, by whom it was opened, was one from the son of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah that ran : "The Turkish Government are mindful of Qatar, Bahrain and other places, in view of putting down their enemies, so that their friends may rejoice. Please God, you will soon receive news that may gladden you." The letter of the Turkish commandant was returned, unopened, to the master of the Kuwait vessel, by whom it was conveyed to its destination. Some fear was felt at first lest this incident should be utilised by the Turks as a pretext for aggression on Bahrain, and precautions were taken by the British Government and by the local British authorities to oblige the Turks to resort to diplomatic, and abstain from forcible methods. Among them was a reminder conveyed through the British Resident at Baghdād to Mid-hat Pasha, then on his way to inspect the new province of Hasa, of the assurances given by the Turkish Government that there should be no interference with Bahrain. A demand for reparation was eventually made on the Shaikh by a Turkish Commodore, who arrived off Bahrain on the 22nd of November 1871 with a corvette and gunboat; it was answered by 'Īsa-bin-'Ali in a conciliatory letter to Mid-hat Pasha, written apparently under the advice of Colonel Pelly, who had come to Bahrain. In his communication the Shaikh expressed regret that he had not been informed of the establishment of direct Turkish rule in Hasa, that a man belonging to a tribe at feud with the people of Bahrain and connected with Nāsir-bin-Mubārak should have been selected as a messenger and allowed to land in Bahrain, that this

**Murder of
a Turkish
messenger in
Bahrain,
1871.**

emissary should have been permitted to proceed on his journey without any credentials to prove his connection with the Turks, and, finally, that a person employed by the Turkish Government to carry a despatch should have been found at the same time in possession of a letter to a Shaikh of Qatar in which it was stated that the Porte desired to annex Bahrain. Colonel Pelly presently withdrew to Būshehr, leaving Major Grant, the First Assistant Resident, to watch events locally and meet any Turkish attempt at aggression. In a reply to the letter of the Shaikh, Mid-hat Pasha did his best to dispose of the objections raised, and concluded with a demand for "10,000 legal Dirhams of pure silver" to be paid to Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah, "Qāim-Maqām of Qatar," as blood-money on account of the murdered tribesman; he tried at the same time to convey the impression that he was empowered to take forcible action in case of a refusal. At the end of January 1872 the Shaikh of Bahrain, advised by Colonel Pelly, replied to this demand by a suggestion that the matter should be arranged between the British and Turkish Governments, by whose joint decision he would abide; but the Porte preferred that it should be settled direct between the parties by agents,—a course to which the British Government were willing to agree on condition that there should be no resort to compulsion or a show of force. No further steps, however, were taken by the Turks.

Demand by
the Turks for
the surrender
of two boats,
1871.

In December 1871, before the case of the messenger had been finally dropped, the Turkish Qāim-Maqām of Qatīf wrote to the Shaikh of Bahrain demanding, on behalf of a resident of Qatar, the surrender of two boats which had been presented by Sa'ūd, the Wahhābī Amīr, to certain inhabitants of Bahrain before the arrival of the Turks in Hasa. After some correspondence, in which the Qāim-Maqām adopted an arrogant and domineering tone, Shaikh 'Isa, under advice from Colonel Pelly, offered to hand the boats over in the presence of British officers to any person whom the Wālī of Baghdād might depute to receive them; this proposal was prompted by a doubt as to the justice of the means by which Sa'ūd had originally obtained possession of the boats.

Turkish
aggression
checked,
1871-72.

It may be added here that, before his return to 'Irāq, Mid-hat Pāsha questioned a respectable pearl-dealer of Qatīf as to the feasibility of arranging that a petition for the annexation of Bahrain to Turkey should be signed by 50 or 60 substantial merchants and others in the islands; and the general tendency of his proceedings made it clear what his intentions, or at least his wishes, in regard to the Shaikhdom were. The decided attitude of the British Government and the constant presence of British ships in Bahrain prevented, however, any actual

interference on his part with the principality ; and this result was felt, throughout the whole Gulf, to be a salutary and well-timed check to Turkish pretensions and encroachments. At the beginning of 1872 an assurance was obtained from the Porte that they did not contemplate any change of policy and that they had no idea of extending Turkish sovereignty to the "independent tribes" of the Persian Gulf ; but, during most of this year also, the British Assistant Political Resident continued to reside in Bahrain.

General history of Bahrain from the Turkish annexation of Hasa to an attempted invasion from the mainland, 1871-95.

In August 1871 'Abdul 'Azīz, a son of the late Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd, visited Bahrain and was received by the Shaikh with much ceremony. In October 1871 a misunderstanding arose between Shaikh 'Isa and two of his brothers in consequence of a claim by the latter to one-half, instead of one-third, of the revenues of the principality ; and, rather than compromise his position at a time when his difficulties with the Turks were at their height, the Shaikh appears to have conceded the demand.

Miscellaneous
affairs in
Bahrain,
1871.

No event worthy of notice occurred after this until 1874, when, in the course of the summer, fears began to be entertained of a descent by the tribes of Qatar upon Bahrain. The danger was a real one inasmuch as Manāmah and Muharraḡ were both open towns, while the Shaikh maintained no armed force, except a small guard, and was inclined to neglect all precautions and look to the British Government for protection. For the hostile movement Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, who lived in Hasa and was dependent on the bounty of the Turks, appears to have been partly responsible ; and it should be observed that a request of his to the British Resident to intercede with the Shaikh of Bahrain in regard to some ancestral property had at the time been recently rejected. In August some 300 or 400 of the Bani Hājir, headed by blood-relations of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, collected upon the Qatar Coast and made serious efforts to obtain boats for a piratical descent upon Bahrain ; but their proceedings were regarded with disfavour by Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah and were frustrated for the time by the presence of the Bombay Marine vessels "May Frere" and "Hugh Rose." Eventually the would-be raiders procured a few boats from Dōhah and plundered a

Threatened
invasion of
Bahrain and
the question
of Zubārah
in Qatar,
1874.

Bahrain trading vessel, but they were prevented by the British ships from approaching the islands. Meanwhile H. M. S. "Nimble" and H. M. S. "Magpie" arrived off Bahrain, and it was decided that one ship of the Royal Navy should be retained there until the danger was over. The Government of India also suggested to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte should be requested to control such of the restless tribesmen as were subject to its authority. Debarred from action at sea, the Bani Hājir turned against Zubārah on the Qatar coast, a village and fort of the Na'im, who were close allies of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the small summer garrison of Zubārah held out gallantly until relieved by their fellow tribesmen, who suddenly returned in strength from Bahrain and the pearl banks and inflicted a severe defeat upon the assailants. It was reported that Barrak-bin-'Arair, the tribal Mutasarrif who ruled Hasa under the Turks at this time, had encouraged the disturbances; but Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, was instructed to avoid addressing any local Turkish authority on the subject, and rather to concentrate his attention on the protection of British interests and the observance of British treaty obligations in Bahrain. Probably in consequence of representations made at Constantinople, the Turkish gunboat "Iskanderieh" soon after paid a visit to the coast of Qatar to enquire into the tribal movements. Not long afterwards, the redoubted Nāsir-bin-Mubārak left Hasa and appeared on the coast of Qatar, whence he wrote to Colonel Ross begging that he might not be prevented by the British Government from obtaining his just rights in Bahrain; but he was informed in reply that any attempt at aggression on his part would meet with active opposition from the British Government. At this stage of matters the Shaikh of Bahrain sought leave from the Resident to reinforce his Na'im allies at Zubārah, whom he considered to be in great danger, and the desired permission was granted on condition of his restricting himself to purely defensive arrangements. By the Government of India, who in 1873 * had adopted the view that the Shaikh of Bahrain had no possessions on the mainland of Qatar and that his rights there were of a very uncertain character, the action of the Resident was

* In 1871 the Government of Bombay requested Colonel Pelly to report on the question of sovereignty over Qatar, but Colonel Pelly asked permission to defer doing so as there was a probability of the Turks withdrawing from Hasa. In 1873 Colonel Ross reported † that the whole coast of Qatar had fallen under Turkish influence, and he was instructed by the Government of India to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain from interference on the mainland on account of the doubtful character of his alleged rights and influence.

† *Vide* page 815 *ante*.

not entirely approved and they requested that the Shaikh should be withheld in future from entanglements on the mainland and advised to rely exclusively on the naval protection of Britain.

At the beginning of 1875 fighting continued around Zubārah between the Na'im of that place and the Bani Hājir ; but the Shaikh of Bahrain under British advice held himself aloof, so far as he could, from the quarrel. A claim which he made to the sovereignty of all Qatar and a protest by him against the restraints imposed on him by the British Government are noticed in the history of Qatar. In August 1875, having been informed that a crew of Bani Hājir had put to sea to commit piracies, he allowed five armed vessels under his brother Ahmad to leave Bahrain and search for the pirates at a great distance beyond his own territorial waters ; and by this act, which was regarded as virtually one of aggression, he again incurred the disapprobation of the Government of India. In the autumn of 1877 it was stated that the Shaikh still maintained very close relations with the Na'im of Zubārah, whom he subsidised, permitted to visit Bahrain, and enlisted, to the number of 100, in his bodyguard ; that he allowed those in his service to return to Zubārah whenever that place was threatened ; and that he had again thrown reinforcements and supplies into Zubārah itself. Not all of these allegations were substantiated, however, and Colonel Ross, in reporting these matters, pointed out that, if the Shaikh were to offend the Na'im by withdrawing his favour from them, they would probably combine with the Bani Hājir. The Government of India accordingly decided that the question need not be pursued further.

Subsequent relations of the Shaikh of Bahrain with Zubārah, 1875-77.

During 1875 and 1876 peace and prosperity prevailed in Bahrain, and only occasional visits were paid to the islands by British war vessels and by the Assistant Resident in the Residency steamer. One or two political murders, however, occurred.

The connection of Bahrain with Zubārah, of which place the headman and his son were on one occasion hospitably entertained by Shaikh 'Isa bin-'Ali only a few days after an atrocious piracy committed by their people on a passing boat, reacted unfavourably on the conduct of Bahrain subjects at sea ; and more than one incident giving rise to complaint took place. On the 2nd of September 1878 two Bahrain vessels carrying 50 armed men, which had been sent on a cruise round the islands, crossed over to the Dhahrān coast and, after a fray with some Bedouins there, carried away a boat. Again, on the 4th of September, a fleet of three Bahrain craft, despatched by the Shaikh to patrol towards the Fasht-ad-Dibal proceeded instead to Rās Rakan and fired on two vessels which

Lawless proceedings at sea of Bahrain vessels, 1878.

refused to halt when ordered, wounding one of the crews. The sufferers in the latter case proved to be subjects of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and Shaikh 'Īsa-bin-'Alī was accordingly obliged by the Resident to apologise to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and to afford compensation to the wounded man, besides punishing the chief offenders in both cases. The boats in question appear to have been employed in guarding the seas between Bahrain and the promontory of Qatar, where dangers that might at any moment extend to Bahrain had begun to gather round Zubārah.

Fall of Zubārah, 1878.

In November 1878, as more fully related in the history of Qatar, the Na'aimi settlement of Zubārah was completely destroyed by a hostile combination of Bedouins under the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the Bahrain refugee; and fears, which subsequently proved to be unfounded, were entertained of an immediate attack upon Bahrain. During this crisis a vigilant watch over the safety of Bahrain was maintained by British vessels, and armed boats belonging to the Shaikh were stationed at various points under the orders of the British naval authorities; some of these boats, as shown in the last paragraph, occasionally exceeded their instructions. The Shaikh of Bahrain, who considered himself in honour bound to assist the Na'im of Zubārah, chafed angrily against the policy of inaction imposed on him by the British Government; and it cannot be questioned that the disappearance of Zubārah from the shore of Qatar exposed Bahrain to a greater risk of invasion, without warning, from the mainland. The homeless Na'im of Zubārah, to the number of about 300, soon afterwards took refuge in Bahrain.

Prevalence of piracy and general insecurity in Bahrain, 1878-79.

Meanwhile, as related in the history of Hasa, piracy, chiefly by Bani Hājir, became rampant in the seas adjoining Bahrain; and on land, simultaneously, an outbreak of robberies accompanied by murders took place. The most dangerous gang of criminals in Bahrain was one headed by a certain 'Alī-bin-Jābir, who was eventually arrested; but, while the hands of four of his associates were cut off as a punishment, 'Alī himself was suffered to escape—not, it was thought, without the connivance of the Shaikh himself—and joined the Bani Hājir. On the 11th of February, 1879, under the guidance of 'Alī-bin-Jābir, a gang of 30 Bani Hājir from Dhahrān made a raid at 'Aqārīyah on the west side of the main island and killed a Bahrain subject.

Action by the British authorities on sea and land, 1878-79.

The steps taken by the British Government for the suppression of piracy are described in their proper place in the history of Hasa; here it may be mentioned that H. M. S. "Spartan" and H. M. S. "Vulture" were stationed for a time in Bahrain waters, and that four vessels taken by pirates from Bahrain owners were recovered by the second of these

ships. For the restoration of security on land Captain Durand, Assistant Political Resident, was ordered to reside temporarily in Bahrain with an escort of Indian infantry, and he remained there until April, by which time the situation had greatly improved; during his sojourn in the islands he found time to study his surroundings and to write an interesting descriptive report. From the 11th to the 18th of March 1879 Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was present in Bahrain, and interviews with the Shaikh took place at which a number of subjects were discussed. Shaikh 'Īsa expressed a hope that the extradition of 'Ali-bin-Jābir might be obtained from the Turks, by whom that ruffian had now been arrested and sent to Hofūf; he desired that the island of Zakhnūniyah, which had become a resort of pirates, should either be kept uninhabited or be handed over to himself for occupation, and that the British Government should exact full reparation for the losses that had been inflicted on his subjects by pirates from the Turkish coast; and he referred to an intention on his own part of chastising the Dawāsir of Bahrain, whom he suspected of treason and of collusion with the Bani Hājir. In regard to Zakhnūniyah he was merely informed by the Resident that his wishes would be made known to the Turks, to whom the island belonged, and, with reference to the punishment of the Dawāsir, he was advised to act in such a manner as not to cause disturbances in Bahrain; but a demand for the surrender of 'Ali-bin-Jābir was made in accordance with his request on the Wālī of Basrah, and eventually, after some delay, was successful. On his arrival in Bahrain 'Ali-bin-Jābir was duly executed. In October 1879 matters had so far quieted down that Shaikh 'Īsa was able to proceed on a pilgrimage to Makkah, from which he did not return until the following January.

In December 1879 the Shaikh of Dōhah was annoyed by a migration of the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe from that place to Fuwairat; and, as the Shaikh of Bahrain was accused of instigating it, it became necessary to remind Shaikh Ahmad-bin-'Ali, then temporarily governing the principality in his brother's absence, of the British prohibition of interference by the ruler of Bahrain in affairs on the mainland.

In the summer of 1880 a rumour became current that Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, the outlaw, who was now the head of the Āl 'Abdullah branch of the ruling family of Bahrain, would attempt an invasion of the islands. Nāsir, it should be observed, had now married a daughter of Jāsim, Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, who would gladly have been free of the burden of supporting him and might have profited by his establishing

Preparations
by Nāsir-
bin-Mubārak
for an attack
on Bahrain,
1880.

himself in Bahrain; and the Turkish officials in Hasa also were believed to take a strong interest in the doings of Nāsir, to whom an allowance of \$ 60 a month was paid by the Turkish Government, and whose success might have afforded them an opportunity, better than any that had yet occurred, for advancing a claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. No actual movement took place until about the beginning of December 1880, when some 600 Bedouins of the Bani Hājir, Āl Morrah and Manāsir tribes under Nāsir-bin-Mubārak appeared at Ruwais and Abu Dhulūf and would have crossed over to Bahrain in boats belonging to those villages, had the inhabitants not refused their consent. Meanwhile preparations had been made to despatch a British vessel of war to the spot, and H.M.S. "Beacon" soon after visited the Qatar coast and H.M.S. "Woodlark" Bahrain.

Action by
the British
authorities,
1881.

After these events letters were written by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak himself and by Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah to the British Resident, begging that Nāsir might be allowed to return to his home and property in Bahrain; but Colonel Ross replied that the title of Nāsir to property in Bahrain was not admitted and that an allowance would be granted him by the Bahrain Government only on condition of his settling in some approved locality beyond the limits of Qatar. Colonel Ross was afterwards instructed by Government to warn the Shaikh of Dōhah that, if he made himself in any way accessory to an attack on Bahrain, he would be held directly responsible,—a liability of which Jāsīm now showed considerable anxiety to be free; and the Resident at Baghdād was directed to intimate formally to the Turkish authorities that, unless they could undertake to prevent and punish an attack on Bahrain from that part of the coast over which they claimed jurisdiction, the Government of India would be compelled, in event of measures for the protection of Bahrain or the redress of injuries becoming necessary, to take the matter into their own hands.

General
tranquillity
and miscella-
neous affairs,
1881—88.

After these events the situation gradually quieted down. Some distrust between the Shaikh of Dōhah and the Shaikh of Bahrain, which had arisen on account of the supposed intention of the latter to establish the Na'im of Zubārah at Fuwairat, was removed in December 1881 by an amicable meeting in Qatar* between Shaikh Jāsīm and Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the brother of Shaikh 'Īsa; and Ahmad-bin-'Ali even married a daughter of Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, but the match was not supposed to have any political significance. During the same year the

* See the history of Qatar. Ahmad apparently succeeded in inducing Jāsīm to treat him with the deference due from an inferior to a superior.

numerous sons of the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah became discontented with their allowances and left Bahrain for Qatar; but, by the good offices of the British Resident, a reconciliation was effected and they were persuaded to return.

In 1882 Ahmad-bin-'Ali, brother of the Shaikh, made the pilgrimage to Makkah for the second time, and Bahrain was several times visited by the British Political Resident. 1882.

Internal quiet prevailed during 1883; but some offences at sea were committed, probably by inhabitants of Hasa, for Shaikh 'Isa, on a visit which he paid to Būshehr in H. M. S. "Woodlark," asked permission to take action against pirates on the mainland. The Resident in reply pointed out the reasons which made it impossible to grant his request. There was some discontent among the Sādah of Hadd, who at one time threatened to emigrate to Tārūt Island; but in the end they did not remove. Mubārak, a brother of the Shaikh of Kuwāit, visited Bahrain in this year and was honourably received. 1883.

In 1884 a general increase of wealth and prosperity in Bahrain, due to several years of unbroken peace, became very apparent; and, while the Na'im tribe remained well affected to the Bahrain Government, presents were exchanged between Shaikhs 'Isa and Jāsim. A request from Nāsir-bin-Mubārak for the restoration of his confiscated date groves in Bahrain was rejected by the Political Resident. A visit to Basrah was paid in September by Ahmad, the Shaikh's brother. 1884.

Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, Wahhābi, visited Bahrain in 1886 and after receiving presents returned to the mainland; and a little later a similar visit was paid by 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd of the same family. Presents for the Shaikh of Bahrain arrived from the Persian Governor of Iār, but they were returned to the sender. The Na'im of Qatar continued friendly, but their friendship was dearly purchased by the sacrifice of a large portion of the public revenues of Bahrain, for which it did not appear that any adequate *quid pro quo* was obtained from the tribe. 1886.

On the occasion of the jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1887, partly at the intercession of the Porte, the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, was released from British surveillance at Aden on condition of residing at Makkah or Madinah. It may be added here that in 1889 he applied for leave to return to Bahrain, which was not granted, or for an increase of his allowance, which was refused, partly because he was in receipt of pecuniary assistance from the Turkish Government. In 1890 he died at Makkah. 1887.

1888. In 1888, probably in consequence of difficulties with the Bani Yās of Trucial 'Omān in which he was involved and to secure the safety of funds which he was accustomed to place in Bahrain, Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah sought the friendship of the Shaikh of Bahrain, to whom he deputed his son 'Abdullah, and vague terms of amity were arranged.

Death of
Ahmad-bin-
'Ali, 1888.

Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the brother of Shaikh 'Īsa, died of small-pox in October 1888. The position of the Shaikh was considered to have been greatly weakened by this event, for he had been accustomed to depend in everything on the advice and loyal support of Ahmad, and he was himself at this time slow and undecided in matters of business, whereas Ahmad, though sensual and devoted to field sports, possessed some ability and strength of character and was considerably feared because of his harshness. 'Abdul Wahhāb, kinsman and Wazīr of the Shaikh, retired about the same time on account of old age and was replaced at first by his son 'Abdur Rahmān, a Turkish subject, whose home was at Dārīn on Tārūt Island. After the death of Ahmad many of the mainland tribes of Qatar and Hasa, instigated by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak, began to frequent Bahrain and to play upon the fears of Shaikh 'Īsa, from whom they obtained presents on condition of not assisting Nāsir; and numbers of these unwelcome visitors even obtained free passages to Bahrain from the Shaikh of Saihāt or from 'Abdul Wahhāb, the late Wazīr, at Dārīn, upon whom they would quarter themselves until arrangements were made by their host. The revenues of the deceased Ahmad, amounting to half those of the entire Bahrain principality, were resumed by Shaikh 'Īsa, who instead granted allowances to Ahmad's numerous progeny,—an arrangement from which trouble afterwards sprang.

1889. In 1889 a considerable immigration of Na'im and Sulutah from Qatar into the Bahrain islands took place.

1891. After the battle of Buraidah in 1891, in which he was defeated by Ibn-Rashīd, 'Abdur Rahmān, the head of the Wahhabi interest in Najd, took refuge temporarily in Bahrain.

1892. There was considerable fear in 1892 of an invasion of Bahrain by Shaikh Jāsim of Dōhah and Nāsir-bin-Mubārak from Qatar, where they were said to be collecting forces; and the panic in Bahrain at one time reached such a height that the resident British Indian subjects embarked their valuables on board boats in Manāmah harbour. Letters of warning were addressed by the British authorities to the leaders of the movement; a promise was obtained from the Turkish Wālī of Basrah that he would direct his subordinates in Hasa to prevent

the intended raid; and in the end Nāsir-bin-Mubārak returned quietly from Qatar to Hasa. Nāsir at this time was endeavouring to procure a location for the Bani Hājir tribe in which they might settle down permanently; and a visit which he now paid to Kuwait appeared to have had some connection with the same object.

In 1894 Shaikh 'Īsa was attacked by small-pox, but by June he had recovered from the disease. In October there were fresh rumours of a descent on Bahrain to be attempted by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak; and the Political Resident caused a warning to be conveyed to Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah, without whose co-operation it was believed that Nāsir would not be able to effect anything. 1894.

Relations of Turkey with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-1895.

The anxiety of the Turks to assert authority over Bahrain has incidentally been made clear in reviewing the general history of the Shaikhdom, but we have still to refer to indications of Turkish policy that have not yet been mentioned. As Bahrain is in fact the ocean port of Hasa and affords a convenient retreat for fugitives from the Turkish coast, its continued independence must have been galling to the Ottoman authorities. They cannot but have regarded their own precarious administration of the mainland with dissatisfaction; and they may have thought that possession of the thriving and easily governed principality of Bahrain would remove their principal difficulties. If Bahrain could have been secured by indirect means it would soon have been in possession of the Porte.

In July 1872 the Porte, through their Ambassador in London, complained of acts of British sovereignty lately exercised in Bahrain, and in particular of the landing of a party of 20 British soldiers in the islands; but inquiry showed the charges to be without foundation, unless they referred to the measuring of base lines on shore in connection with a marine survey; and the Turkish Government were informed accordingly. In 1873 the preposterous statement was made by Turkish authorities that a Bahrain boat had been sunk by British officials in Bahrain for having supplied water to the Turkish steamer

Complaints
by the Porte
of British
action in
Bahrain,
1872-73.

“Assur”; the incident, on investigation, proved to be wholly imaginary.

Sojourn of
the Wahhābi
'Abdur Rah-
mān in
Bahrain
before his
invasion of
Hasa, 1874.

The Turks having alleged, as a serious grievance, that the invasion of Hasa by the Wahhābi 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Sa'ūd, described in the history of Hasa, had been undertaken from Bahrain, the circumstances of his descent were strictly investigated by the British authorities. It was found that the conduct of 'Abdur Rahmān during his stay of about two months in Bahrain had been outwardly correct; that the Shaikh of Bahrain, beyond entertaining him as a visitor and presenting him at his departure with a sum of about Rs. 200, had given him no assistance whatever; and that no military force had been raised by him in Bahrain, though about 50 armed Najdis had followed him from Bahrain to the coast of Hasa in a boat which they themselves hired. The Wālī of Baghdād appears to have requested leave of the Porte to proceed to Bahrain and punish the Shaikh for his complicity in the enterprise of 'Abdur Rahmān, but it was not given; and meanwhile, as a precaution, a British naval force was sent to protect the islands.

Alleged Bri-
tish fortifica-
tions and
projected
Turkish
lighthouse
at Manāmah,
1875.

The Porte in 1875 complained to the British Ambassador at Constantinople of the erection of British fortifications at Manāmah in Bahrain, where, they seemed to suppose, asylum would be given to fugitives from Turkish authority in Najd; and again the ungrateful task of inquiring into supposed misdeeds by their officers devolved upon the British Government. In the end it was shown that the Shaikh of Bahrain had, in May or June 1875, repaired his fort at Manāmah, but that no British official or British subject had been in any way concerned with the work. Immediately afterwards it became known, through the British Legation at Tehrān, that the Turks themselves contemplated building a lighthouse at Manāmah; and the British Government in their turn entered a protest, with the result that the project was abandoned.

Claims of
Qatar sub-
jects pressed
on the Shaikh
of Bahrain by
the Wālī of
Basrah, 1875.

In the same year the claims of two Qatar pearl merchants were pressed upon the Shaikh of Bahrain by Nāsir Pāsha, the Muntafik Wālī of Basrah, in a manner which seemed to indicate that the object of the Wālī was not so much to obtain satisfaction for the Qataris, who might have had recourse to the ordinary Sālifat-al-Ghaus, as to raise a political question. The Shaikh of Bahrain was accordingly advised by the Resident, under orders from the Government of India, to deal with the claims in a fair and courteous spirit; and at the same time remonstrances were addressed to the Porte through the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

In June 1879 there were rumours that the Turks intended to establish in Bahrain a coal dépôt which would gradually be converted into a political agency; but, if any such movement had been intended, it was frustrated by an Agreement concluded between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the British Government in the following year. In November 1880 a Turkish squadron paid a visit to Bahrain, and the commander was heard to assert that Bahrain was Turkish territory.

Proposed Turkish coal dépôt in Bahrain, and visit of Turkish vessels, 1879-80.

A petition against British interference in Bahrain was submitted in April 1879 by Nāsir-bin-Mubārak and his adherents to the Grand Vazīr of Turkey; in this document the writers described Bahrain as an Ottoman possession, protested against their own expulsion by the British, and requested that Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and one of his companions should be released, and that they themselves should be allowed to return to Bahrain and resume possession of their property. The matter was taken up by the Vazīr as something quite new, as a striking illustration of the high-handed proceedings of Great Britain, and as proof that an attempt had been made, in defiance of pledges, to assert British sovereignty over Bahrain; and Her Majesty's Government, after again disclaiming the exercise of sovereignty over Bahrain which they regarded, they said, as independent, promised to investigate the acts of violence of which the petitioners complained. The result of the enquiries which they made from the Government of India, however, was to show that the petition related merely to the punishment of the principal actors in the disturbances of 1869.

Cause of the rebels of 1869 taken up by the Turkish Government, 1879-80.

In 1879 and 1880 cases occurred in which the Turkish authorities in Hasa requested the Shaikh to extradite criminals and debtors who had absconded to Bahrain; and in one instance a certain 'Abdullah, who was accused of murder, was actually surrendered. The more difficult question of debtors absconding from Bahrain to Hasa was referred by the Political Resident to the Government of India, who ordered that the Shaikh should be discouraged from entering into direct correspondence with the Turks, and that a list of Bahrain claims should be obtained with a view to the disposition of the Turkish authorities being ascertained through the British Resident. In the opinion of the Government of India requests by the Turkish authorities for extradition could not affect the position of the Shaikh of Bahrain detrimentally, but were rather an admission of his independence.

Extradition of criminals and debtors between Hasa and Bahrain, 1879-80.

In August 1887, at the request of the British Political Resident, an embargo was laid by the Shaikh of Bahrain on pearls and specie to the value of \$20,000, the property of Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah in Qatar, which happened at the time to be deposited in Bahrain; this step was taken for the purpose of compelling Jāsīm to pay compensation for an outrage against British subjects which is described in the history

Turkish protest against the seizure of property of the Shaikh of Dōhah in Bahrain, 1887-88.

of Qatar, and the result, in so far as Bahrain was concerned, was a protest addressed by the Porte to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, leading to renewed consideration by the British Government of the political position of Bahrain. The instructions finally given to the British Ambassador at Constantinople were to the effect that Her Majesty's Government were unable to admit any claim by the Porte to jurisdiction over the Shaikh of Bahrain, whom, as had been intimated before, they regarded as an independent ruler, and with whom they were themselves in treaty relations.

Warning to the Porte against attempting to land troops in Bahrain, 1888.

A few months later, in connection with a design upon Bahrain which will be noticed further on under the head of Persian relations, the Grand Vazir of Turkey was requested by the British Embassy to issue strict orders to the Turkish officials in the Gulf to abstain from every kind of interference in Bahrain, and was informed that a British man-of-war which had been stationed there had orders to prevent any landing of Arabs, Persians, or Turks. On this occasion the Grand Vazir replied that there was no intention whatever of sending Turkish troops to the islands, and he even seemed indisposed to urge the claim of the Porte to sovereignty; but it was believed that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs would have regarded the matter in a different light, and in any case subsequent events showed that the Turkish claim had not been abandoned.

Insulting correspondence of the Turkish authorities with the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1888.

In 1888 much annoyance was caused by the style of address employed by the Turkish authorities in Hasa in their correspondence with the Shaikh of Bahrain, to whom they always wrote as to a subordinate official. The direction upon the envelope frequently ran "To the Shaikh of the Island of Awāl." The explanation of this absurdity was that a Wālī of Basrah, having discovered that the name "Bahrain" had in olden times been applied to a part of the mainland also, ordered that the former use of the term "Bahrain" should be revived, and that the island should be distinguished by its ancient appellation of "Awāl": he evidently thought that the case for Turkish sovereignty would in some way be helped by the change.

Demands of the Turkish authorities for the surrender of revenue defaulters, 1890-91.

In August 1890 a very insolent letter was addressed to the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif and one Saiyid Mustafa; in it they demanded the surrender of Shaikh 'Abdur Rahīm of Saihāt who had absconded, they said, to evade payment of revenue due to the Turkish Government. Shaikh 'Īsa having informed the Qāim-Maqām's agent that Shaikh 'Abdur Rahīm was not in Bahrain, an attempt was made by the party from Qatif to seize two of 'Abdur Rahīm's dependents; but it was frustrated by the servants of the Shaikh of Bahrain. As Shaikh 'Īsa,

notwithstanding the aggressive behaviour of the visitors, had succeeded in maintaining his dignity, Colonel Ross did not consider further action to be required in this case; but he promised the Shaikh that, if his authority should be invaded, he would come effectually to his assistance. In June 1891 the Mutasarrif of Hasa, in a polite letter to the Shaikh of Bahrain, requested the surrender of 28 persons, said to be revenue defaulters, and the matter was referred by Shaikh 'Īsa to the British Political Resident; but it does not appear how the question was ultimately settled.

In December 1892, the Wāli of Basrah being then on tour in Hasa, information reached the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah that the Porte had instructed the Wāli to treat Bahrain as a Turkish dependency, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf informed the Senior Naval Officer that he should take action, if necessary, to prevent the landing of Turkish troops in Bahrain. This step was approved not only by the Government of India but also by Her Majesty's Government, who caused the Porte to be informed of their decision. That some design on the independence of Bahrain had actually been entertained seems probable, for in the first week of January 1893 it was proclaimed at Qatif, under the orders of the Qāim-Maqām, that Bahrain and 'Omān had reverted to Ottoman jurisdiction, and Turkish flags were forced upon the owners of one or two Bahrain boats at Qatif. On the 20th of August 1893 a formal notification by the Qāim-Maqām, in which it was stated that the British Government had no connection with Bahrain and that Bahrain was a part of the Turkish Empire and would in future be treated as such, was pasted up in the bazaars and coffee-houses of Qatif. Representations to the Porte followed; and at length, in December 1893, the Turkish Government professed to have issued orders for the withdrawal of the obnoxious notification, as well as instructions to their officers not to enter into disputes with the representatives of the British Government in regard to Bahrain.

Turkish
sovereignty
over Bahrain
proclaimed
at Qatif and
Turkish flags
forced on
Bahrain boat
owners, 1893.

In March 1893 the despatch of a draft of 30 Turkish soldiers to Hasa *via* Bahrain was prevented by Lieutenant Beville, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, who warned the local representative of the British India Steam Navigation Company against accepting them as passengers. His action was upheld by the Government of India; and the Porte were subsequently informed, through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, that the transhipment of Ottoman troops in Bahrain waters could not be permitted.

Tranship-
ment of Tur-
kish troops
in Bahrain
waters prohi-
bited by the
British Gov-
ernment,
1893.

Political status of Bahrain subjects in the Turkish dominions, 1890-94.

A question deserving separate notice, which arose during this period, was the political status of natives or subjects of Bahrain when residing or travelling in the Ottoman Empire. The point was first discussed in 1890 on a report from Lieutenant Stratton, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, who stated that the Turkish authorities were endeavouring to exact military service from *soi-disant* natives of Bahrain settled at Basrah and at Abul Khasib on the Shatt-al-'Arab, on the ground that they were Turkish subjects and amenable to Turkish law. As it was not clear that the complainants in this case really belonged to Bahrain, and as no request for British intervention had been made by the Shaikh of Bahrain, the Government of India decided not to take action in the matter.

In 1892 the question came under consideration again, in consequence of certain taxes, recoverable from Ottoman subjects only, having been levied at Basrah upon natives of Bahrain; and a demand for a refund was preferred by the British Assistant Political Agent, who contended that Bahrain and its inhabitants were under British protection. On this occasion the Turkish Government addressed the British Embassy at Constantinople and denied the title of natives of Bahrain to British protection; but the reply, given under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, was to the effect that, as Bahrain was now under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England, no interference by the Ottoman authorities with natives of Bahrain could be admitted. A year later, in April 1893, the Turkish Government again protested against the assumption by the British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah of a title to protect natives of Bahrain; and once more Her Majesty's Government maintained the right of their diplomatic and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire to extend their good offices to the class of persons in question.

Meanwhile, in January 1893, a deputation of Bahrain subjects resident at Basrah had waited upon the British representative there to request British protection, and had been informed in reply that protection would be given on the condition that those claiming it should produce a letter from Shaikh 'Isa-'bin-'Ali certifying their Bahrain nationality. Arrangements were accordingly made, in 1894, for the regular issue of certificates of nationality by the Shaikh of Bahrain to boatmen and others among his subjects proceeding on voyages to Basrah.

In 1895 a test case arose through the robbery of a Bahrain subject on board a sailing vessel on the Shatt-al-'Arab at a place about 10 miles below Basrah; the crew and passengers were obliged by river pirates to

give up all their valuables ; and the sum lost by the individual principally in question was considerable. A claim for redress was immediately lodged on his behalf with the Wāli of Basrah by Captain Whyte, the British Assistant Political Agent ; but the Wāli refused to entertain it on the ground that the right of the British representative to protect natives of Bahrain was not recognised by the Porte. The British Embassy at Constantinople, on being informed of the incident by Captain Whyte, urged upon the Turkish Government the necessity of admitting the intervention of the British representative in the pending case and other similar cases ; but, though the controversy was continued in 1896, the Turkish Government could not be induced to abandon the position that they had taken up, and no redress was obtained in the case of piracy.

Relations of Persia with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-95.

The Government of Persia, notwithstanding the consolidation of British influence in Bahrain and the advantage gained by the Turks in the extension of Turkish sovereignty to the adjoining coasts of Hasa, still jealously maintained their own obsolete claims to Bahrain. In May 1871, while the Turkish occupation of Hasa was in progress, the Shāh sought, through the British Minister at Tehrān, information as to the probable effect of the movement on Bahrain ; and he was informed of the assurances given by the Porte that no encroachment upon the Shaikhdom would be attempted.

In September 1886 the Shāh of Persia, seized by a sudden and somewhat unaccountable desire to re-assert his sovereignty over Bahrain, verbally desired Mr. Nicolson, the British Minister at Tehrān, to convey a message on this subject to the British Government ; it was to the effect that His Majesty considered the communication made to him in April 1869 as tantamount to an admission of his rights in Bahrain, and that he was anxious to establish his authority over the islands either by sending a Governor to Bahrain or by recognising the Shaikh as his representative, but that he wished the maritime police to remain in the hands of the British naval authorities. An answer was prepared by Her Majesty's Government stating that they did not concur in His Majesty's interpretation of the communication of April 1869 ; that, on the contrary, they

Revival of
the Persian
claim to Bah-
rain, 1886.

considered Bahrain to be independent; and that they must continue to maintain their direct treaty relations with the Shaikh: as, however, the Shāh did not return to the subject, this reply was not delivered by Mr. Nicolson. The whole of this incident was attributed, at the time, to Russian suggestion.

Persian intrigues in regard to Bahrain and British action, 1887-88.

In 1887, in connection with the losses sustained by some Persian subjects in disturbances at Dōhah in Qatar, the Shāh of Persia enquired of the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān whether any assistance could be given by the British authorities in obtaining reparation, and a hope was apparently held out to His Majesty that, after the British claims for compensation at the same place had been satisfied, the good offices desired would be afforded. In the following year, however, partly in connection with the same affair and partly, it would seem, in connection with some general scheme for extending Persian influence in the Gulf, an independent and rather underhand line of action was adopted by the Persian Government, whose proceedings, on this occasion also, were thought to have been inspired by Russia. The principal agents employed were the Malik-ut-Tujjār, Governor of the Gulf Ports, and Hāji Ahmad Khān, a Persian General; and Bahrain, as well as Qatar and Trucial 'Omān, was included in the sphere of their operations. The active proceedings of these emissaries were practically confined to Qatar and Trucial 'Omān, in the histories of which regions they are described; but it afterwards became known, partly through the disclosures of the Malik-ut-Tujjār, whom the Persian Government presently removed from his post, and partly from copies of Persian official telegrams which were obtained at Tehrān, that the Amīn-us-Sultān had sanctioned a scheme proposed by Hāji Ahmad Khān for the seizure of Bahrain by Shaikh Jāsīm of Dōhah, who had seemingly undertaken to put the Persians in possession of the Shaikhdom. In these intrigues there were symptoms of concerted action between Persian and Turkish officials; but it was not believed that there could be any serious co-operation between the two Governments, whose interests on the Arab coast must necessarily be antagonistic.

In February 1888, while the principality was thought to be in danger from these intrigues, the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, caused two British vessels of war to be stationed off Bahrain with instructions to prevent, by force if necessary, any hostile attempt to land by Turks, Arabs or Persians. The Government of India, who approved of his action, requested the British Minister at Tehrān to inform the Persian Government of it; but, as the Amīn-us-Sultān on being questioned disavowed all

designs on Bahrain, Mr. Nicolson thought it better to avoid the reference to forcible action.

British relations with Bahrain during the same period, 1871-95.

Some large and important features in the relations of the British Government with Bahrain during this period have come under notice in the preceding paragraphs ; but others, of a more direct and in some cases confidential character, still remain to be mentioned.

Between 1871 and 1873 a survey of the reefs and anchorages of Bahrain was carried out by the Bombay Marine schooner "Constance." Marine Survey, 1871-73.

In 1873 one 'Abdullah-bin-Rajab, a Bahrain subject but the representative of the British India Steam Navigation Company in Bahrain and therefore constructively under British protection, was suddenly arrested by order of the Shaikh and thrown into prison without any accusation against him being formulated. The British Assistant Resident in Bahrain, on hearing of these proceedings, requested the release of the man and enquired what the complaints against him were ; and the Shaikh, though he protested in somewhat violent terms against Major Grant's interference, caused the prisoner to be set at liberty. The charges, it appeared, were one of assault upon some Bahrain subjects and another of cutting wood in plantations belonging to the Shaikh, of which the first was shown to be true, but the second could not be substantiated. On remonstrance being made by the Resident, Shaikh 'Isa eventually expressed regret for the hastiness of his proceedings and made a personal apology to Major Grant for the tone of his letter to him. Ill-treatment of the agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company, 1873.

On the 28th of April 1877 Fahad-bin-Ahmad, a first cousin of the father of Shaikh 'Isa-bin-'Ali, was killed in Bahrain by Ahmad-bin-'Ali, the Shaikh's brother ; the explanation given was that Fahad had rendered himself obnoxious and dangerous to the Government, and had threatened Ahmad-bin-'Ali when the latter was sent to deprive him of his arms. On the ground that the British Government, in consequence of the position which they had assumed in Bahrain, were bound to prevent grave outrage or oppression by the ruler, or at any rate not to remain unconcerned spectators of such acts of violence but rather use their influence to repress them, Colonel Prideaux, the British Resident, was authorised to convey to Shaikh 'Isa and to his brother the emphatic disapproval by Government of the act which they had committed and a warning against such conduct in future. The instructions were duly executed. British censure of a political murder by the Shaikh, 1877.

First Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh with the British Government, 22nd December 1880.

We have mentioned above the Turkish scheme of 1879 for establishing a coal dépôt in Bahrain and the subsequent visit of Turkish ships to Bahrain in November 1880 ; and here we may add that there were about the same time indications of an awakening interest in the Persian Gulf on the part of several foreign powers, and that French, American and even Japanese vessels had visited its waters. In these circumstances Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, believing that Bahrain as one of the principal commercial centres would soon become an object of foreign attention, and finding on a visit to the islands that the Shaikh was disposed to conclude a special arrangement with the British Government, took the opportunity to obtain his signature to an Agreement which he immediately submitted for the approval of the Government of India. This Agreement, which was executed on the 22nd of December 1880, bound the Shaikh to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties with other Governments except by the sanction of the British Government, and to refuse permission to any Government other than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling dépôts in Bahrain territory, unless with the consent of the British Government. It was stipulated, however, that the engagement should not apply to or affect customary friendly correspondence with the local authorities of neighbouring states on matters of minor importance ; and that the validity of the Agreement should depend on its approval and acceptance by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council. In justification of his unauthorised action Colonel Ross explained that the existence of a formal Agreement, besides being desirable from the British point of view, would be convenient to the Shaikh, who could point to it in refusing to accede to the overtures that he might receive from foreign powers. The Government of India, while they informed the Resident that it was as a rule inexpedient for political officers to enter, however guardedly, into negotiations of such a kind without special instructions, recommended the Agreement to Her Majesty's Government for acceptance ; and, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, it was ultimately ratified in 1881.

Final Exclusive Agreement by the Shaikh with the British Government, 13th March 1892.

In 1892, in circumstances which are explained in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Colonel Talbot, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, recommended that fresh Agreements, embodying a provision against cession of territory to foreign Governments, should be concluded with the Trucial Shaikhs ; and, on his proposals being adopted by the Government of India, occasion was found for obtaining the signature by the Shaikh of Bahrain, on the 13th March 1892, of a similar document. In

this new instrument the Shaikh undertook on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government; not to consent, without the concurrence of the British Government, to the residence within his territory of the agent of any other Government; and on no account to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of his territory save to the British Government.*

Attempted invasion of Bahrain from Qatar and subsequent proceedings, 1895-96.

In 1895 the danger, long foreseen, of an invasion of Bahrain from the mainland by Arab tribes under Turkish influence assumed a material shape, and was met by forcible intervention on the part of Great Britain.

Formation
of a hostile
Āl Bin-'Alī
settlement at
Zubārah in
Qatar, 1895.

In March 1895 the Āl Bin-'Alī, a discontented tribe of Bahrain, emigrated to Qatar under the leadership of a Shaikh named Sultān-bin-Salāmah and entered into relations with Shaikh Jāsim, with whose support they shortly formed a settlement at Zubārah. As the existence of the settlement constituted a grave danger to Bahrain, Shaikh Jāsim was at once informed that it could not be permitted to continue: but he paid no attention to the warning. Meanwhile the Turkish Mutasarrif of Hasa honoured Zubārah with a visit, the work of building continued to be pushed on, and it was reported that preparations were being made by the Mutasarrif and Jāsim for hoisting the Turkish flag. The attention of the Porte was consequently drawn to the matter through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and they were informed that, if the proceedings at Zubārah were allowed to continue, the Government of India would be obliged to take measures for the protection of the Shaikh of Bahrain. A sufficient interval having been allowed for these representations to take effect, H.M.S. "Sphinx" under Commander Pelly, a nephew of the former distinguished Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was sent to Zubārah with an order requiring the immediate return of Sultān-bin-Salāmah and his tribe to Bahrain; but the demand was met by a refusal on the part of the Shaikh, supported by a Turkish Mūdīr recently posted to Zubārah, who claimed the place as a Turkish possession and the Āl Bin-'Alī as Turkish subjects. The "Sphinx" accordingly returned to Bahrain, first seizing seven boats of

* The text of this Agreement will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this chapter.

the Āl Bin-'Ali; and on the 15th of July nine more of their boats were captured and removed by the same ship. The Āl Bin-'Ali then became desirous of a reconciliation with the Shaikh of Bahrain; but the Turkish Mudīr threw obstacles in the way, even to the extent of detaining some boats sent from Bahrain to fetch an Āl Bin-'Ali family who wished to return; and he was reported to have announced that Bahrain was wholly, and Qatar partially, included in the Ottoman dominions. The situation now became in various respects threatening: Shaikh Jāsīm was found to have collected a large number of boats, as if a descent on Bahrain were in view; the Mutasarrif of Hasa had assembled a force at Qatif, on the improbable plea that an expedition against Najd was designed; and the Turkish gunboat "Zuhāf" was cruising upon the coast of Qatar.

British preparations to defend Bahrain.

In these circumstances the Government of India proposed that any movement by the people of Qatar against Bahrain should be resisted by force, subject to a condition that if the hostile fleet came under Turkish colours explanations should first be demanded, and that, if the explanations were unsatisfactory, a warning should be given that the ships would be fired on if they advanced within three miles of the Bahrain coast. H.M.S. "Pigeon" was sent to join the "Sphinx" in Bahrain, and arrangements were at first made, but were subsequently cancelled, for despatching a battalion or wing of Indian infantry from Bombay. Eventually a third ship, the "Plassey," was added to the squadron of defence.

British representations to the Turkish Government.

Meanwhile, in consequence of the language and proceedings of the Turkish Mudīr at Zubārah, two separate communications had been made to the Porte: on the 12th of August a protest against the action of their officials was addressed to the Turkish Government through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, an intimation being added that Her Majesty's Government did not recognise Ottoman jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar, that Ottoman claims to Bahrain, which was under British protection, were inadmissible, and that measures would be taken to protect the islands from aggression; and on the 22nd of August the Turkish Ambassador in London was reminded that Her Majesty's Government had several times before informed the Porte that they did not recognise Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar and had likewise notified to them that Bahrain was under British protection.

Destruction and capture of the hostile fleet, 6th September 1895.

Upon the spot, a crisis was rapidly approaching. On the 19th of August the Mutasarrif of Hasa wrote a bombastic letter to the Political Resident, accusing him of breaking the peace of the coast of "Najd" by seizing boats; warning him that the people of Qatar felt

impelled to attack Bahrain; stating that he himself had restrained the Qataris hitherto, but could do so no longer; asking for the return of the boats seized by Commander Pelly; and advising the removal of British subjects from Bahrain within 17 days, reckoned from the 19th of August. To this communication the Political Resident, Colonel Ross, proposed to reply that the responsibility for whatever might happen would rest on the Turkish officials, and forcible recovery of the Bahrain boats detained at Zubārah was suggested by the Government of India and authorised by Her Majesty's Government; but meanwhile, on the 5th of September, Commander Pelly received a report that the "Pigeon," which he had sent to watch the hostile fleet at Zubārah, had been boarded by the Turkish Mudīr, who insisted on her immediate departure. The Mudīr added threats of hostile action in case of non-compliance and intimated that Shaikh Jāsim would attack Bahrain and that the Turks would assist his operations. On the next day, the 6th of September, Commander Pelly himself proceeded to Zubārah, where, finding the Qatar boats armed and prepared for sea, he decided that Bahrain could only be saved from invasion by destruction of the enemy's vessels; the period mentioned by the Mutasarrif of Hasa, moreover, had now expired. Accordingly, after one hour's notice given in writing had elapsed, the "Sphinx" and "Pigeon" opened fire and quickly disabled 44 vessels. By the morning of the 7th of September the Turkish Mudīr and his flag had disappeared, and Jāsim had hoisted a flag of truce and asked pardon, alleging that the boats had been collected not spontaneously but under the orders of the Mutasarrif of Hasa. The preliminary terms offered by Commander Pelly and accepted by Jāsim were that the Āl Bin-'Alī should evacuate Zubārah and return to Bahrain, that the Bahrain boats detained at Zubārah should be restored, and that the Shaikh's muster of Bedouins should be dispersed. The active operations concluded with the removal to Bahrain of about 120 vessels, distinct from those which had been disabled or destroyed.

With the exception of Sultān-bin-Salāmāh and a few of his adherents, the Āl Bin-'Alī now returned to Bahrain; but the question of punishing Shaikh Jāsim and his allies still remained; and eventually the Shaikh was informed, in February 1896, that a fine of Rs. 30,000 must be paid, otherwise the vessels captured at Zubārah would be destroyed. Jāsim however refused to pay, on the ground that he had nothing to do with the matter; and accordingly, after three boats belonging to Bahrain had been released free of charge and 17 others belonging to the Āl Bū Kuwārah tribe had been ransomed by permission of the Resident

Settlement
with Shaikh
Jāsim and
the guilty
tribes, Sep-
tember 1895
to April 1896.

for Rs. 6,386, the remainder, which the owners had neglected to redeem, were burnt as they lay off Bahrain in April 1896. The fines realised, as there was no compensation to be paid in the case, were credited to Indian Imperial revenues. The services of Commander Story, the Senior Naval Officer, and of the officers under his command were brought by the Government of India to the favourable notice of the naval authorities, and the conduct of the proceedings at Zubārah was deservedly commended. The most arduous part of the operations, however, was really the close watch maintained upon the place in very hot weather during the weeks preceding the active operations.

Friendly relations with Qatar were restored in 1896, when the reopening of trade with places there was formally notified in the Bahrain bazaars.

Turkish protest, 1896.

A protest was raised by the Porte against the action of the British ships at Zubārah, on the ground that it amounted to an attack upon a tribe in Turkish territory and under the protection of the Turkish flag, and therefore to an act incompatible with the friendly relations existing between Turkey and Britain. The British Government in reply merely referred to their own communications of the previous year, adding that the measures taken were necessary for the protection of Bahrain, and that Her Majesty's Government could not admit the coast on which Zubārah was situated to be part of the Ottoman Empire.

General history of Bahrain and British policy in the Shaikhdom from the attempted invasion of 1895 to the rupture of 1904.

After and probably to some extent in consequence of the failure of this attempt upon Bahrain, the affairs of the principality took a new departure and there was a change in the main subjects of interest and importance. The pretensions of Turkey ceased to be a cause of disquiet; trade increased and flourished in a remarkable degree; and the attention of the British Government, whose influence in Bahrain was now more powerful than before, was turned chiefly to schemes of internal improvement and reform, and to precautions against political competition on the part of European powers. Any distinction between British policy and the general course of events in Bahrain is henceforward impracticable; and we shall consequently, in what follows, deal with both together.

Shaikh 'Īsa, for reasons which he did not at the time explain and has not since divulged, thought it necessary, towards the end of 1897, to make arrangements for the devolution of the Shaikhship after his own demise; and, by a will written in October 1897 and attested by the seals and signatures of a number of his principal subjects, he appointed his eldest surviving son Hamad to be his successor. In November 1897 a visit was paid by Hamad to Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident, at Būshehr; and in February 1898, on the occasion of a visit by Colonel Meade to Bahrain, Shaikh 'Īsa approached him with a request that Hamād's position as heir-apparent might be recognised by the British Government. It may be mentioned that in 1890 Shaikh 'Īsa had expressed a wish that an elder son of his, Salmān, should be officially recognised as his successor; but up to the death of Salmān, which occurred in November 1893 in the neighbourhood of Riyādh as he was returning from a pilgrimage to Makkah, no steps were taken by the Shaikh in the matter. The recognition of Hamad, as it might have the effect of averting a dynastic struggle on the death of Shaikh 'Īsa, was recommended by the Government of India, and was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government at the end of 1898; but the announcement of the decision was postponed by the Resident, to whom discretion in the matter had been given, chiefly because efforts were being made at the time to induce the Shaikh to reform his customs arrangements and he had shown no disposition to conform to advice. Eventually, notwithstanding the continued obstinacy of the Shaikh in the matter of the customs, the communication was made to him on the 12th of February 1901. It was reported to have been received by Shaikh 'Īsa with tears of emotion and to have given satisfaction to the ruling family and to the people of Bahrain.

Regulation of
the succession
to the
Shaikhship
and domestic
affairs of the
ruling
family,
1897-1904.

In 1899 differences between Shaikh 'Īsa and his nephew 'Ali-bin-Ahmad came to light, and supplied a probable explanation of the anxiety shown by the Shaikh in the previous year in regard to the succession of his son Hamad. The relationship of the parties was somewhat complicated, inasmuch as 'Ali's mother, after being divorced by Ahmad, had married Shaikh 'Īsa and borne Hamad: thus 'Ali and Hamad were half-brothers, as well as cousins and rivals. Ahmad, the father of 'Ali and the younger brother of Shaikh 'Īsa, had in his lifetime, as we have seen, enjoyed half the revenues of Bahrain; he had, by arrangement with 'Īsa, assisted in the administration; and his house was an imposing edifice in Manāmah town, known as the Bait-ash-Shuyūkh, which through his occupation of it had become associated in the general mind

with the governorship of the port of Manāmah. 'Ali-bin-Ahmad, who at his father's death in 1888 was placed by Shaikh 'Īsa on an allowance, continued to occupy the Bait-ash-Shuyūkh and to fly the flag of Bahrain on a staff over it; and, as he grew up, he seemed inclined to assert a position of semi-independence,—a line of conduct which was favoured by the apathy of Shaikh 'Īsa in regard to details of administration at Manāmah. In February 1898 'Ali-bin-Ahmad complained to Colonel Meade that his uncle was keeping him out of the estates and income which he ought to have inherited; and in November of the same year he made an urgent appeal to the Resident for assistance. Shaikh 'Īsa, on enquiry being made from him, brought charges against 'Ali of interfering in the administration of Bahrain and of forming a party hostile to the Shaikh's government. At length, at the instance of Colonel Meade, 'Ali having first made proper submission to Shaikh 'Īsa, a family council was convened; and a monthly allowance of Rs. 600, in addition to a lump sum annually of Rs. 800, was assigned to the youth, who was at the same time confirmed in possession of landed property of considerable value; but the agreement was not reduced to writing. 'Ali remained discontented, and in June 1901 he made a journey to Masqat, where he complained to the Sultān of his treatment by his uncle and the British authorities, and would have interviewed M. Ottavi, the French Consul, had the latter not been absent at Sūr. It was then proposed by the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain and recommended by Major Cox, the Political Resident, that the resolution of the British Government to support the authority of Shaikh 'Īsa, conditionally upon his observing his obligations towards them, should be announced at a public Darbār in Bahrain; but the Government of India, who had a change in the representation of British interests in Bahrain in view, decided to postpone their decision until that change should have been carried out.

In 1902 Rāshid, the third son of Shaikh 'Īsa, died of consumption. In 1904 the Shaikh's second surviving son performed the Hajj and visited Cairo, where he was treated as a guest by the British Consul-General.

Efforts by the British authorities to secure an improvement in the administration of the Bahrain customs, 1899-1903.

A regular customs administration was first instituted in Bahrain about 1860 and remained under the direct control of the ruler until 1888, when a pernicious innovation was introduced, the collection of duty being thereafter farmed out to local contractors, generally a syndicate of Hindu merchants. About the time of the change of method the trade of Bahrain began, under the security afforded by British protection, to expand with great rapidity; and in 1899 it was calculated that the increase in less than a decade had been more than 40 per cent. But

the finances of the Shaikh of Bahrain failed to benefit in a corresponding degree; the enhanced profits went chiefly to the customs contractors; and the Shaikh resorted to irregular taxation to supplement his insufficient revenues. In 1899 the Government of India thought that a reform of the Bahrain customs was desirable in order to render them more productive, and they were prepared to lend the Shaikh an officer for the purpose of carrying out the necessary improvements; but their suggestions were obstinately resisted by the Shaikh. The ruler of Bahrain was attached to the contract system, chiefly because it enabled him to obtain ready money by selling the customs for years in advance, and because it was not incompatible with discrimination of persons in collecting the duties; but the true explanation of the pertinacity with which he rejected, and continued to reject, the suggested reforms was that he regarded acceptance of British advice, and the services of a British official as compromising to his dignity and independence. On the 7th of October 1899, in violation of a promise not to extend the current customs contract without reference to the British Resident, Shaikh 'Isa, being in need of money and anxious to postpone the question of reform, granted a fresh lease for two years from the 10th of March 1902, the date to which the customs were already farmed. At the same time he enhanced the general rate of duty from 4 to 5 per cent. without giving previous notice to the British authorities of his intention to do so; and to this step, though discourteous, no technical objection could be taken.

At the beginning of 1900 a European officer, as explained in a later 1900. paragraph, was posted to Bahrain; but the Shaikh could not be prevailed on to cancel the new customs contract which he had granted. He rejected the offer of a loan which would have enabled him to pay off his debts to the contractors, and he declined the good offices of the British Government when they were tendered for the purpose of persuading the contractors, who were British subjects, to forego their legal rights.

Towards the end of 1901, the appointment of a British Director of 1901. Bahrain Customs having been recommended by Sir N. O'Connor, Ambassador at Constantinople, as a measure which would appear to the Turks a material proof of British authority in Bahrain, a customs official and a sum of money sufficient to enable him to discharge his liabilities to the farmers was again pressed upon the Shaikh's acceptance; but the Shaikh, though his financial position was deteriorating, declined the offer; and, while he outwardly professed an intention of taking the customs once more under direct management, he

was really engaged in preparations for farming them out for a fresh period upon more favourable terms. At length, at the end of 1901, it became known that Shaikh 'Isa had extended the customs lease in favour of the actual holders to the end of February 1906.

1903. The question of the Bahrain customs was after this allowed to rest until Lord Curzon's visit to the Persian Gulf in November 1903, when it formed the chief subject of discussion between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Shaikh. Shaikh 'Isa was unable to show that the change proposed in the customs arrangements was in any way detrimental to his interests, or to answer Lord Curzon's arguments that it would extricate him from his pecuniary difficulties, increase the revenues of his state, and secure a sound position for his successor Hamad, whom the Government of India had agreed to recognise; he took refuge, instead, in assertions that the matter was one which only concerned himself; he asked that the question might be postponed until his death; and in the end, he said that he must consult his son and brother. His Excellency then gave the Shaikh a final warning that the matter could not and would not be dropped; and so the discussion terminated.

1904. An enquiry by the Resident, Colonel Kemball, which followed Lord Curzon's visit, revealed a state of matters worse even than had been suspected. It was shown that the Shaikh had already leased his customs on the basis of a 5 per cent. duty up to April 1906, and on the basis of a 4 per cent. duty up to January 1908. The amounts of the contracts were as follows :—

	Rs.
1903	1,16,200
1904	1,17,500
1905	1,23,200
1906	96,200
1907	96,200

or Rs. 5,49,300 in all; and against this amount the Shaikh had already drawn three sums aggregating Rs. 2,12,000 from the farmers. Moreover it was calculated that the customs should yield, under direct management, about Rs. 3,50,000 per annum, or three times as much as was actually being obtained by the Shaikh.

To coerce Shaikh 'Isa into acceptance of the much needed reform would have been easy, but it was thought better that he should spontaneously consent. The proceedings were therefore again dropped while steps were taken, with the object of acquiring greater influence

over the Shaikh, to improve the character of British political representation in Bahrain. The policy of the customs farmers, it may be remarked, was weak and conciliatory towards all traders; and there was no question of injury to foreign trade in Bahrain from their proceedings, but only of great financial loss to the Bahrain Government.

In 1899 it was felt that the time had come to replace the Native Agent representing the British Government in Bahrain by a European officer. In earlier days, before the reduction of the Būshehr Residency staff in 1879, an Assistant Resident had occasionally been sent to reside in Bahrain; and since then a great development of British interests, and especially of trade, had taken place. The Agent in 1899, a local merchant named Āgha Muhammad Rahīm, was moreover uncongenial to the Shaikh, over whom he possessed no influence; he was not free from suspicion of having abused his position in order to forward his own commercial interests; and the protection of British Indian traders from petty exactions was not so complete, nor the settlement of their cases so rapid, as could be desired.

British
political re-
presentation
in Bahrain.

Accordingly, in January 1900, the employment of a European officer in Bahrain was sanctioned as a temporary measure, and at the end of the year, with the approval of the Secretary of State, it was made permanent. Mr. J. C. Gaskin, an uncovenanted Political Assistant of the Būshehr Residency, was the first incumbent; he arrived at Manāmah and assumed charge of his office on the 10th of February 1900.

During the years 1901 and 1902 an official residence for the Assistant Political Agent was built on the shore to the east of Manāmah town at a total cost of Rs. 31,470; when completed it was the most commodious and imposing edifice on the main island.

In 1902 the question of investing the Political Assistant in Bahrain with powers under the Merchant Shipping Act, and with those of a Notary Public, was discussed. In the end it was decided, as the matter was not urgent and various technical difficulties existed, not to pursue the matter.

In 1904, after the failure of various attempts to induce the Shaikh of Bahrain to agree to a reform of his customs administration, a further enhancement of the status of the British representative in the islands was proposed by the Government of India and approved by His Majesty's Government; it consisted in the substitution of an officer on the graded list of the Indian Political Department for the subordinate officer whose appointment had been sanctioned in 1900. The change was carried into effect on the 18th of October 1904, Mr. Gaskin being on

that date relieved by Captain F. B. Prideaux, who was afterwards invested with the local rank of Political Agent and given a guard of about 30 regular Indian infantry.

Protection of
British
subjects.

During the period now in question wrongs committed upon British subjects and offences against the dignity of the British Government were few, and two only need be particularised.

1897. In 1897 Saiyid Khalaf, a bankrupt trader of Bahrain and not a British subject, escaped from the custody of Sharidah, one of the Shaikh's officials, and took refuge in the house of a certain Muhammad Khalil who was then acting as British Residency Agent; whereupon Sharidah entered the house and removed him, with the assistance of another man, notwithstanding the protests of the Acting Agent. Colonel Meade, the Political Resident, while admitting that Saiyid Khalaf had no claim to British protection, considered the violation of the British Agency to be a serious impropriety and requested that Sharidah and his companion might be fined Rs. 500 each and obliged to furnish written apologies for their behaviour. With this demand the Shaikh of Bahrain immediately complied, and the fines were credited to the Government of India in the Būshehr treasury.

1899. In 1899 an incident occurred which exhibited the weakness of Shaikh 'Isa as a ruler and even brought loyalty towards the British Government into doubt. A warehouse belonging to the Shaikh, in which had been deposited a quantity of arms, the property of the Anglo-Parsi firm of Francis, Times & Co. but at the time under sequestration at the instance of the British Political authorities, was feloniously entered by night; and two Hindus, British subjects, who occupied a part of the buildings and who imprudently disturbed the operations by appearing on the scene along with other Hindus, were wounded with daggers by the trespassers. The ringleaders in this case proved to be Sharidah, the same high-handed official of the Shaikh who has already been mentioned, his son Fahad, and one Amīr Salih-bin-Rāshid, an old and favourite servant of the Shaikh. The Shaikh showed great reluctance to deal properly with the case; and it was not until strong pressure had been brought to bear that the offenders were banished from Bahrain and a sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid up by way of indemnity. Of the amount thus recovered Rs. 400 were given to Farsi and Rs. 50 to Dhar Singh, the wounded Hindus, the remainder being retained by Government. Sharidah and his son returned to Bahrain after a few months without the consent of the Government of India and were again expelled; but, after their exile had

lasted about a year, the ban was removed on condition that the Shaikh should be responsible for their future good conduct.

In June 1900 Mr. Van Lennep, the manager of the Shīrāz branch of the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia, visited Bahrain and recommended the establishment of an agency of the Bank there. Accordingly a small experimental office was opened at Manāmah, in charge of an Arab British subject; but the Shaikh was influenced by Indian traders in his entourage, to whom he owed money, to discountenance and oppose the undertaking, and after about two months it was abandoned. In 1903 it was found that transhipment dues in Bahrain were levied at the high rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent *ad valorem* on all kinds of goods, but no action was possible at the time as there was no agreement with the Shaikh on the subject and a farm of the customs had been granted by him on the basis of this rate; the inexpediency, in his own interests, of a heavy duty on transhipment was however explained to Shaikh 'Īsa under orders from the Government of India. Great natural difficulties in connection with the landing of cargo at Manāmah were partially removed in 1904 by the construction by the Shaikh of a landing stage at a cost of about Rs. 30,000; and the wharfage dues for the use of this pier were arranged on a moderate scale in accordance with the views of the Government of India.

Matter relating to British trade.

A detailed survey of Manāmah harbour and its approaches was made by the R.I.M.S. "Investigator" in the winter of 1901-02; and in 1904 an asphalt deposit near Jabal-ad-Dukhān, which had been discovered in 1902 and yielded excellent specimens of bituminous rock, was examined by a scientific expert, but proved to be of small extent and commercially unworthy of attention.

A visit extending over the 26th and 27th of November 1903, was paid to Bahrain, by Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, in the course of his cruise in the Persian Gulf, which is fully described in another place.

Miscellaneous matters.

In 1901 the senior partner of the Indian firm of Ganga Ram, Tikam Das & Co. in Bahrain proposed that a charitable hospital should be established in Bahrain to commemorate Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and offered to open the subscription list with a donation of Rs. 5,000. About Rs. 15,000 more having been subscribed, and the amount of Rs. 20,000 thus obtained being considered sufficient to provide a hospital building and quarters for the staff, the Government of India undertook to maintain and equip the institution, which was eventually opened in 1905.

In 1903 Bahrain was visited by plague and in 1904 by cholera ; particulars of both epidemics are given in the Appendix dealing with Sanitary Organisation.

Internal history of the Shaikhdom during the same period, 1895-1904.

Feud between the Āl Bin-'Ali and 'Amāmarah.

In November 1895 a blood-feud arose between the Āl Bin-'Ali—the tribe whose secession to Zubārah in the preceding March had been the cause of trouble—and the 'Amāmarah of Bahrain ; it was occasioned by the act of some 'Amāmarah, who shot dead Sultān-bin-Salāmah, the head of that section of the Āl Bin-'Ali who had not consented to return to their homes, while he was alone in a boat off Rās Tanūrah on the Hasa coast. In December a petition was received by the British Resident from the family of the deceased Sultān, alleging that Shaikh 'Isa had instigated the murder and had deprived them of their property in Bahrain, and Colonel Wilson accordingly wrote to the Shaikh urging him to do justice according to Arab law ; but no steps were taken by Shaikh 'Isa, whose obvious reluctance to punish the 'Amāmarah tended to confirm the suspicions against him. In 1896 'Ali, a son of Sultān, collected a Bedouin following on the mainland and tried to incite some of the Āl Bin-'Ali who had returned to Bahrain to make reprisals on the 'Amāmarah ; in this he was not successful, but some Āl Bin-'Ali who sympathised with him again left Bahrain and joined him at Ghāriyah in Qatar, no attempt being made by the Shaikh to prevent their movements ; and a piracy was committed from Ghāriyah upon a Bahrain boat. Subsequently, in 1900, a fracas occurred at sea between some boats of the Āl Bin-'Ali and the 'Amāmarah, as is related in the history of Qatar.

Relations with Turkey during the same period, 1895-1904.

After the decided check to Turkish policy through the failure of the attempted invasion of Bahrain from Zubārah in 1895, very little interference in Bahrain affairs was exercised by the Ottoman authorities

on the mainland. In 1897, however, the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Bahrain; but the project was abandoned on the objections of the British delegate, who represented that Bahrain was an independent principality under British protection. In 1898 the Porte, professing to have heard that a British Vice-Consul had been appointed in Bahrain, requested Her Majesty's Government to apply to them for his exequatur; but it was decided to reply that the British Government could not admit the right of the Turkish Government to insist that British consular officers in Bahrain should be provided with an Ottoman exequatur. Towards the end of 1900 Salmān-bin-Di'a'ij, a cousin of the Shaikh of Bahrain, was murdered, along with a number of Bahrain subjects, in Dhahrān, where he had gone for sport, by Bedouins of the Āl Morrah tribe; this incident and the reclamations to which it gave rise are described in the history of Hasa.

Relations with Persia during the same period, 1895-1904.

In 1899 the question of the right of natives of Bahrain to British protection in Persia was raised by the French Minister at Tehrān in connection with a claim brought by a French protégé of Persian nationality against the widow of a Bahrain subject, who was herself the daughter of an emancipated slave. The case was referred to the British Legation in consequence of certain charges of misconduct made by a French consular official against the British Residency Agent at Lingeh; and the British Minister, on a suggestion by the Resident in the Persian Gulf approved by the Government of India, apparently stated in reply that the Shaikh of Bahrain had been precluded by treaty since 1880 from holding direct relations with any foreign power other than the British, and that his subjects abroad were under British protection.

Question of the political status of natives of Bahrain in Persia, 1899.

On the 31st of August 1901 a Belgian Director of the Imperial Persian Customs visited Bahrain in a Persian Government steamer and interviewed the Shaikh, to whom he represented that he had been sent by the Shāh to arrange for the posting of two Persian customs officials in Bahrain, and that the duty of these officials would be to examine the seals placed on the cargo hatches of vessels at the Persian port last visited and to seal the hatches again at the departure of the steamers from Bahrain. The Belgian called also on the British Political Assistant

Visit of a Persian customs official to Bahrain, 1901.

in Bahrain, whom he informed that vessels not complying with the proposed formalities in Bahrain would be repelled afterwards from Persian ports. On a protest made by the British Minister at Tehrān, the Grand Vazīr of Persia expressed his astonishment and regret at the incident and declared, as did also the Minister of Customs, that the proceedings of the Director were altogether unauthorised.

American interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

During the decade now in question a station belonging to the Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, which had come into existence in Bahrain as early as 1893, began to attract attention. In February 1899 Mr. Zwemer, author of "Arabia, the Cradle of Islam" and head of the mission, sought the aid of Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident, in purchasing a building site but the Government of India did not consider that British assistance could with propriety be given him, and Mr. Zwemer renounced for the time the idea of obtaining land by purchase. Subsequently complaints were made by the Shaikh and other inhabitants of Bahrain of attacks by Mr. Zwemer and his Scripture readers upon the Muhammadan religion, and the Government of India were anxious that steps should be taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about the recall of the missionaries, whom they considered to be exposed to some risk of personal violence. A communication was accordingly made by the Foreign Office to the United States' Embassy in London, resulting in an injunction addressed by the Board of American Missions to Mr. Zwemer in which he was urged to exercise the utmost caution compatible with the performance of his duties; and, after the proceedings of the missionaries had lost their novelty, no further complaints regarding them were received from Bahrain. In April 1901 Mr. Zwemer asked the British Resident whether there was any agreement between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain which would debar the latter from selling property, or allowing property to be sold, to the Arabian Mission in Bahrain for the establishment of a hospital, and Colonel Kemball replied that he was not aware of any such obstacle. The Government of India were inclined to consider that the Resident's reply was inconsistent with the Exclusive Agreement of 1892; but it was eventually ruled by His Majesty's Government that in the case in question, where no suspicion of a transfer of sovereignty or

administrative rights existed, it was unnecessary and undesirable to invoke publicly the terms of the Agreement of 1892. The first hospital and dispensary in Bahrain, with 21 beds, was opened by the Mission in 1902 under the name of the "Mason Memorial Hospital." From the 1st of November 1901 the services of the physician attached to the Arabian Mission were retained by the Government of India for the benefit of their political representative in Bahrain; and in 1903, notwithstanding the decision to establish the "Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital," it was resolved to continue this arrangement on account of the good work done by the Mission.

German interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

The appearance in Bahrain in 1901 of a German firm, doing business in mother-of-pearl shells, gave rise to various political questions; it was a branch of the Hamburg house of Traun, Stürken & Co. and was established by a Mr. Wöneckhaus, after whom, as he was a partner in the Persian Gulf branch of the business, it was styled Robert Wöneckhaus & Co. This Mr. Wöneckhaus, who originally came to the Gulf in 1897 and who until 1901 resided chiefly at Lingeh, was believed to have relations with the German Government; and, on a visit to the coast of Trucial 'Omān, he succeeded in obtaining by an artifice copies of the Treaties of the Trucial Shaikhs with Great Britain. Except an agency of the British house of Gray, Paul & Co. of Büshehr, who since about 1890 had been represented at Manāmah by an English-speaking native, this was the first European firm to secure footing in Bahrain.

Establishment of the firm Messrs. R. Wöneckhaus & Co., 1901.

As the Shaikh of Bahrain had reason to suppose that the new firm, then about to be established, would endeavour to deal in cheap spirits, he published, in 1900, an edict prohibiting the introduction of alcoholic liquor into Bahrain under penalty of confiscation; and the interdict, on the understanding that it should not be interpreted as preventing the importation of liquor by Europeans for their own consumption, was held by the Government of India to be unobjectionable.

Importation of alcoholic liquors into Bahrain prohibited, 1900.

The question of the purchase of house property by Mr. Wöneckhaus soon arose; and in 1902 it was ruled by the Government of India that, as the question was one of private ownership merely, no opposition need be made to the acquisition of premises by Mr. Wöneckhaus, but that it

Questions of status and protection.

should be explained to him, and also to the Shaikh of Bahrain, that no claim to extra-territoriality and no direct dealings between the Shaikh and the consular or other representatives of a foreign power could result from the title obtained. It had already been decided by the Government of India in 1900, with reference to Mr. Wönckhaus, that, in the event of mercantile or other cases arising between the subject of a European power and a subject of Bahrain, the good offices of the British representative should, as a matter of courtesy, be extended to the European subject; and that the British representative should, in case of necessity, claim the right to protect such a subject as he would a British subject.

French interests in Bahrain, 1895-1904.

In 1904, in connection with a scheme on the part of French subjects to engage in the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf, the French Ambassador in London enquired whether there would be any objection to the inclusion of Bahrain in the jurisdiction of the French Vice-Consulate at Būshehr. The Government of India, on being consulted, recommended that the reply should be delayed until certain political questions connected with the pearl fisheries which, as related in the Appendix on the pearl fisheries, were then pending had been settled; and the question, probably in consequence of the departure of the French prospectors from Bahrain, was not, apparently, repeated by the French Government.

Rupture between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1904-05.

Misbehaviour
of 'Ali-bin-
Ahmad, May-
September,
1904.

The differences between Shaikh 'Isa and his nephew 'Ali-bin-Ahmad have already been mentioned. In the beginning of 1904 a fresh estrangement seems to have occurred between them, for in May of that year the Shaikh complained to Mr. Gaskin that 'Ali had collected a number of bad characters in his service and had entered on a course of extortion and violence towards the general public and of disrespect, if not of disloyalty, towards the Shaikh himself. Another family council to

arrange matters was suggested; but it was considered desirable to postpone the proceedings until an improvement, then contemplated, in the status of the British political representative in Bahrain had been effected. Meanwhile, as subsequent events showed, the authority of the Shaikh in Manāmah, which he seldom or never visited, had fallen so low that there was little or no check on the disorderly doings of 'Ali's retainers, many of whom were professional negro bullies.

On the 29th of September an attempt was made by some of 'Ali's men, under the Sukhrah system, to impress a cooly in the employment of the German merchant Mr. Wöneckhaus; the premises of the firm were entered; and an assault was committed on a European assistant, a Mr. Bahnson, as well as on native members of the establishment. 'Ali himself was present and did nothing to prevent what occurred.

Outrage on
Messrs.
Wöneckhaus
& Co., 29th
September
1904.

On the evening of the 14th of November a second act of lawlessness on a more serious scale was committed. An accidental quarrel having arisen between a negro retainer of 'Ali and a Persian servant of Hāji 'Abdun Nabi, the chief Persian merchant at Manāmah, the opportunity was seized by 'Ali's bodyguard to commence an attack on all the Persians at hand. A cry was raised of "Kill the Mughals"; and Jāsim, one of the leading Sunni Mullas of Bahrain, having sent the worshippers at his mosque to join in the affair, it developed into a regular anti-Shi'ah riot and ended by the Persians taking refuge in their houses. Only sticks were used, but the father and brother of 'Abdun Nabi were dangerously wounded, and seven other Persians were injured, but less seriously. Captain Prideaux, the new Political Agent in Bahrain, who had been trying without success to arrange a compromise in the case of Mr. Bahnson now interviewed the Shaikh in regard to the riot; but the Shaikh, on the ground that the Persians were Muhammadans, declined to admit his interference and expressed an intention of having the case tried by the local Shara' courts, from which, composed as they were of Sunnis, no justice for the Persians was to be expected. Eventually it was arranged between Captain Prideaux and the Shaikh that the orders of the Resident, who was then on tour in a remote part of the Gulf, should be awaited. For several days the Persians kept their shops closed and 'Ali's men continued to behave arrogantly in the streets, for the Shaikh was afraid of his nephew and totally unable to control him; but confidence was partially restored by the arrival of H.M.S. "Redbreast" at Bahrain on the 27th of November.

Attack upon
Persians,
14th Novem-
ber 1904.

Meanwhile the German complainant had placed his case in the hands of the German Consul at Būshehr, who wrote direct to Shaikh 'Isa,

demanding redress, and in reply was referred by him to the British authorities. The Persian sufferers also had telegraphed to the Shāh and had been informed in answer that the British Government would take action on their behalf.

Visit of the
Political
Resident to
Bahrain, 30th
November to
10th Decem-
ber 1904.

Major Cox, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, arrived at Manāmah on the 30th of November, and the case of the German merchant was taken up first. On the 14th of December it was settled by the payment of Rs. 1,000 as compensation, and by a sound flogging publicly inflicted on four of the ringleaders in the assault, who were sentenced in addition to banishment from Bahrain. The next four days were spent in discussing the case of the Persians, but without result. The Shaikh at first endeavoured to argue that the Persians were the aggressors; but, the evidence being conclusively against this view, he eventually fell back on his original position, that the Persians were amenable to his jurisdiction alone, and that their case must therefore be tried by the Bahrain courts. The status of the Persians as foreigners resident upon an island under British protection, together with the certainty of injustice being perpetrated should the case be made over to a Sunni tribunal, forbade any concession on this point; and a deadlock ensued. Major Cox quitted Bahrain on the 10th of December to report the situation to Government, leaving the "Redbreast" to maintain order at Manāmah. In virtue of an undertaking by the Shaikh that 'Ali and his followers, within a week of the Resident's departure, should leave Bahrain for a period of three weeks, the turbulent young man sailed for Qatar on the 17th of December: his last act in Bahrain was to seize, for his own use, three Baghlahs which were at the time actually employed in discharging the cargo of the British steamer "Kangra."

Ultimatum
presented to
the Shaikh of
Bahrain,
25th Febru-
ary 1905.

On the 23rd of February 1905 Major Cox returned to Bahrain as bearer of the demands authorised by His Majesty's Government upon Shaikh 'Isa. He had been empowered to enforce compliance with the same by the naval force, if necessary; the British cruiser "Fox" and the gunboats "Sphinx" and "Redbreast" were now assembled in the harbour; and preparations had been made for landing a force of 150 seamen and marines to protect the lives and property of foreigners in case action by the ships should be required. On the morning of the 25th of February an ultimatum was presented to the Shaikh and 24 hours were granted for fulfilment of the terms. The demands of the British Government were that six of the ringleaders in the attack on the Persians, whose identity had been established, should be expelled from Bahrain, and along with them the four delinquents who had been banished in the former

case and had returned ; that Rs. 2,000 should be paid as compensation to the Persians through the British Political Agent ; that a special guard of the Shaikh's own men should be stationed for the protection of the Manāmah bazaar ; that 'Ali should leave Bahrain and not be permitted to return for five years ; and, finally, that the system of Sukhrah or forced labour, in so far as the employés of foreigners were concerned, should be prohibited by public notification. The Shaikh was warned, in the memorandum delivered to him, that further rejection of advice in important matters would not be tolerated by the British Government, and that their support might be withdrawn, and might even take another direction, if his attitude continued unfriendly. Lastly it was explained to him in the same document that the fulfilment of the terms concerning 'Ali and the other offenders involved * their surrender at the British Agency, whence they would be removed in a British man-of-war for conveyance to places of detention abroad. In the course of the day Shaikh 'Īsa intimated that 'Ali was likely to abscond and asked assistance for the purpose of capturing him at his house. The required aid was immediately given, but 'Ali was not found ; he had already fled. Shaikh 'Īsa vehemently denied having connived at 'Ali's escape ; he promised to have the islands scoured in pursuit of him during the ensuing night ; and he agreed in the meantime to send his own son Hamad on board the " Sphinx " as a hostage.

The next morning at 8-30 A.M., half-an-hour before the expiry of the period of grace, Shaikh 'Īsa arrived at the British Agency accompanied by his sons Hamad and 'Abdullah. He brought with him the compensation money and the notification in regard to Sukhrah, and he announced that the bazaar guard were ready for inspection ; but 'Ali and the ten men whose surrender was required were not produced, and it was stated that they could not be found. The Shaikh, however, who still continued to assert his own good faith, assisted in the attachment of his nephew's house and moveable property, including two boats which were burnt ; and on the 28th of February, when Shaikh 'Īsa finally intimated that 'Ali and the others whose surrender was required had absconded to the main land and were beyond his reach, Major Cox decided, on the Shaikh undertaking to offer large rewards for their arrest, that further proceedings were unnecessary. It had been suggested by the

Submission
of the Shaikh
to the British
demand,
26th February
1905.

* Major Cox considered that the appearance of the offenders in person was indispensable, in order that their descriptions and marks of identification might be recorded for future use ; and further, that unless they were removed from Bahrain under British supervision, there would be no guarantee for the order of expulsion being carried out.

Government of India that the custom houses of Bahrain should, in certain circumstances, be taken charge of but the proposal had not commended itself to His Majesty's Government; and, such being the case, further pressure could only have been brought to bear by means of a bombardment, which, in view of the Shaikh's partial compliance with the ultimatum, it appeared to Major Cox would hardly be justifiable. Hamad was next released; and the Shaikh, in token of renewed amity, presented the British Agency with a plot of land which it had been intended to purchase from him. Before leaving Bahrain, which he did on the 4th of March in order to communicate the position to Government, the Resident interviewed and sternly warned the Mullahs Jāsim and Ahmad, the two chief Sunni ecclesiastics in Bahrain; these men, who were brothers, had undoubtedly had a hand in the disturbances and were deserving of being classed with Sharidah, the offender of 1899, and with Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārīn, Turkish subject, as among the Shaikh's more mischievous advisers.*

Surrender of
'Ali-bin-
Ahmad, 18th
July 1905.

The result of the proceedings was regarded by the Government of India as on the whole satisfactory; but, as 'Ali remained at large, some apprehension continued to prevail at Manāmah. It ceased however, on the 18th of July 1905, with the voluntary surrender of 'Ali, who, accustomed to a life of ease at Bahrain, quickly tired of a wandering existence among the Bedouins of Qatar. During his absence from Bahrain he had more than once enquired on what terms he would be allowed to come in, and he had been told in reply that the original orders concerning him still held good, and that, as regarded details, he must trust to the clemency of the British Government. 'Ali was accompanied by four of the other men, his servants, whose surrender had been demanded; and it was arranged that he should reside for five years as a political *détenu* at Bombay, on an allowance of Rs.600 a month, while the rest should be imprisoned for six months in the Central Jail at Haidarābād, Sind. A warning was conveyed to Hamad, the heir-apparent, whose attitude throughout the crisis had been as little satisfactory as his father's, that the ultimate recognition of his claims by the Government of India would depend upon his future conduct.

* Mulla Jāsim in 1892 had caused some trouble in Bahrain by persuading the Shaikh to exact death duties at the rate of one-third of each estate, but the innovation caused great dissatisfaction and was soon abandoned. Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wāhhab appears to be the individual of that name who in 1886-87 caused some disturbance in Qatar and who temporarily succeeded his father as Wazir of Bahrain in 1888.

External affairs and foreign interests, etc., in Bahrain, 1905-07.

The position and influence of Great Britain in Bahrain were undoubtedly consolidated by the crisis of 1904-05; and the relations of the Shaikh with the British Political Agent, though the former still regarded offers of advice as attempts to undermine his authority in internal matters, improved slowly but steadily during the following year. Foreign trade continued to expand with extraordinary rapidity; in 1905-06 it was greater by $57\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. than in the most favourable year previously recorded, and in 1906-07 there was a further increase of $5\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., and a total value of Rs. 4,73,18,202 was attained.

Position of
Great Britain
in Bahrain.

The course of affairs was not, however, equally satisfactory in all departments. No progress was made in the matter of customs reform, on which so much stress had been laid by the British Government; and the existence of a large contraband trade to Persia, partially accounting perhaps both for the increase of trade and for the unwillingness of the Shaikh to allow any interference with his customs arrangements, came to be suspected.

It was felt also that some features of the internal administration of Bahrain were not altogether creditable to the protecting British power. The slave trade still flourished, and slaves were freely imported from Qatar and Hasa, and occasionally from Sūr in the 'Omān Sultanate. Oppression of subjects too was rife, carried on not only by the Shaikh and by members of the Āl Khalifah family, but also by petty magisterial and revenue authorities, and especially by the Qādhis, who were addicted to gross abuse of their functions; the chief sufferers from the arbitrariness of the administration were the aboriginal cultivating population, who lived in a condition of virtual serfage and were liable to forced labour and to other hardships.

The question of a remedy for these evils and of a stricter definition of the subordinate relations of the Shaikh with the British Government was raised after the crisis of 1904-05 and was duly considered by His Majesty's government, who resolved, however, to pursue a cautious policy. It was decided that, for the time being, the activity of the British political authorities should be confined to the direction and control of the Shaikh's external relations, and that amelioration of the internal government should be sought by indirect and pacific means,

through increase of influence with the Shaikh and by gaining his confidence and trust. In 1905 the Political Agent was authorised to manumit slaves, in suitable and deserving cases, without reference to the Resident at Būshehr; and in that year and in 1906 efforts were made to obtain confirmation, through the Shaikh of Bahrain, of an informal undertaking given in 1895 by some of the chief men of Bahrain to the commander of H.M.S. "Pigeon" that they would not in future buy, sell, or give away slaves; but the endeavour was not successful.

British
surveys, etc.

In the season 1904-05 a marine survey of Khor-al-Qalā'ah was carried out by H.M.S. "Redbreast," Commander Somerville; and in 1905 a plane-table land survey of the islands of the Bahrain archipelago was made on the scale of one inch to a mile. Excavation of some of The sepulchral mounds for which Bahrain is famous was commenced during the winter of 1906-07 by Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent, in the neighbourhood of 'Āli.

Turkish rela-
tions.

The Turkish Government showed an undue interest in the crisis between the British Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1904-05; and, though reminded that the Bahrain Islands and the inhabitants were under British protection, they continued to press for explanations until His Majesty's Government cut the matter short by declining to continue the discussion. With an interval, possibly from the autumn of 1905 to the spring of 1907, during which they were sent by land, the Turkish official mails between 'Irāq and Hasa continued to be exchanged *viā* Bahrain, as they had been for a long time previously; and in 1907 it was ascertained that a Turkish employé was maintained in Bahrain for the purpose of making the arrangements. Shaikh 'Īsa's relative and principal adviser, the Turkish subject Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārīn, maintained a pernicious influence over him; and in 1906 rumours were current, which were apparently not altogether devoid of foundation, that the Shaikh desired to place himself under the protection of Turkey.

Persian rela-
tions.

The Persian Government, though they gratefully concurred in the steps taken by the British Government in 1905 to obtain redress for their subjects who had suffered at Manāmah, re-asserted in the same year their ancient claim to sovereignty over Bahrain; and they obstinately refused to consider natives of Bahrain, while residing in Persia, in any other light than that of Persian subjects. In February 1906, after a prolonged argument and not without instructions from His Majesty's Government, the British Legation at Tehrān declared that they maintained the British right to exercise good offices on behalf of Bahrainis in

Persia and refused to entertain any further representations from the Persian Government on the subject of the Persian claim to Bahrain, which was now stated to be "entirely inadmissible"; but in September 1906 the question was once more revived by the Grand Vazir of Persia in a letter in which he referred to Captain Bruce's unauthorised Agreement of 1822. In reply to the Vazir's arguments it was pointed out that the Agreement in question, so far from having been ratified by the British Government, had been expressly repudiated; that Captain Bruce had been removed from his post; and that the Shāh of Persia, on his part, had withheld his approbation from the Agreement, and had censured the Prince of Shirāz for entering into such an engagement without proper authority.

In 1906 the German Hamburg-Amerika line inaugurated a service in the Persian Gulf, where their first steamer, the "Candia," called at Manāmah on the 26th of August. Mr. Wöckhaus, whose own business was not in a thriving condition, was appointed agent in Bahrain, and made an effort to obtain the privilege of flying the flag of the line over his house; but the Shaikh was inflexible in refusing to grant any such concession.

German,
French and
other inter-
ests.

In the summer of 1905 Bahrain was visited by a French family interested in the pearl trade, who were joined there by M. Goguyer, the notorious Anglophobe arms dealer of Masqat. A memorial against his own treatment by the British Government, which was sent by Shaikh 'Isa a little later to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy of India, was probably inspired by M. Goguyer.

In 1905 Bahrain was visited by plague for the second time in three years, as noted in the Appendix on Epidemics, the victim of greatest importance being this time the notorious Sharīdah. In 1906 the Shaikh was inclined to impose a special tax upon Jews, of whom about 50 had settled in the islands during the previous ten years; but he allowed himself to be dissuaded from doing so by the British Political Agent.

General
affairs.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAikh OF BAHRAIN WITH THE BRITISH GOVERN- MENT, 18TH MARCH 1892.

I, Esau-bin-Ali, Chief of Bahrain, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, do

hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors, to the following conditions, *viz.*:—

1st.—That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2nd.—That, without the assent of the British Government, I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3rd.—That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory save to the British Government.

Dated Bahrain, 13th March 1892, corresponding with 14th Shaaban 1309.

ESAU-BIN-ALI,
Chief of Bahrain.

A. C. TALBOT, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Resident, Persian Gulf.

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

•

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF HASA.*

First Wahnābi occupation of Hasa, 1795-1818,

When the Wahnābis first appeared from the interior upon the shore of the Persian Gulf, the Shaikhs of the Bani Khālid tribe were the rulers of Hasa ; and theirs was the first organised administration at the coast to go down before the onslaught of the ferocious sectaries. The rule of the Bani Khālid was mild and favourable to commerce. In 1790, import duties at Qatif amounted only to one per cent. *ad valorem* ; foreign merchants were well treated ; and there was a considerable trade with Najd. The residence of the Bani Khālid chiefs was in the Hasa Oasis.

Conquest of
Hasa by the
Wahnābis,
about 1795.

By the year 1795 the Wahnābi Amīr had broken the power of the Bani Khālid and had taken partial possession of Hasa, which he immediately converted into a base for the further extension of his influence towards Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and 'Omān. His proceedings in relation to those districts are described in their separate histories and here we are only concerned with events in the oases of Hasa and Qatif and in the deserts adjoining them.

Consolida-
tion of the
Wahnābi
position in
Hasa, 1795-
1810.

In 1799 the first actual crossing of swords between the Ottoman Porte and the Wahnābi power occurred, the place being near Thāj in the Hasa region ; this campaign, however, belongs rather to the history of Najd, in which it is related.

* Almost the only authorities, apart from the records of the Government of India, which deal with events or with conditions prevailing in Hasa are Sadleir's *Diary of a Journey across Arabia* (in 1819), published in 1866, and Palgrave's *Central and Eastern Arabia*, 1865 ; and both of these are rather descriptive than historical. The most useful compilations based on official sources are the following : *Bombay Records*, XXIV, 1856 ; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906 ; a *Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral*, by the same, 1904 ; a *Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854-1904*, by the same, 1904 ; a *Précis of Katar Affairs, 1873-1904*, by the same, 1904 ; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, 1877, supplies a number of interesting details regarding British naval action on the coast of Hasa.

In 1800 the Wāhhābis took the town of Qatif by storm, with great slaughter of the inhabitants. In 1801 opposition to Wāhhābi rule probably still persisted, or had been revived, in Hasa; for in that year it was reported that communication between Qatif and Najd was suspended, and that the Central Arabian trade from India, which ordinarily followed the Hasa line, was being carried on instead through Basrah and Kuwait; but by 1802 the position of the Wāhhābis in Hasa was sufficiently consolidated to admit of their helping the 'Utūb of Bahrain to cast off the yoke of the ruler of Masqat. In 1810 the Bahrain islands with the adjacent mainland districts of Qatif and Qatar were formed into a Wāhhābi governorship over which was placed a certain Abdullah-bin-Ufaisān, the seat of administration of the group being in Bahrain. In 1811 the progress of the Egyptians obliged the Wāhhābi Amīr to withdraw military garrisons which he had established at Hofūf and Qatif; but in 1814 his influence, though it had ceased in Bahrain, was still paramount in Hasa.

Settlement of Rahmah-bin-Jābir in Hasa.

Fort built
by Rahmah
at Damman.

The famous pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, an 'Atbi of the Jalāhimah section who had already a settlement at Khor Hassān in Qatar, about this time built himself a fort at Dammām on the coast of Hasa, at the extreme southern end of the Qatif Oasis.

Expulsion of
Rahmah by
the Wāh-
hābis, 1816.

Here he remained as a staunch supporter of the Wāhhābi interest until 1816, when, having deserted the Wāhhābi cause and joined with the Saiyid of 'Omān in an attack upon Bahrain, then more or less under Wāhhābi protection, he found himself obliged to cross the Gulf and seek an asylum in Persia. In July 1816, before his final departure from the Arabian side, Rahmah's fort at Dammām was blown up by the Wāhhābis.

First Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-19.

Arrival of
the Egyp-
tians in
Hasa, 1818.

After capturing the Wāhhābi capital of Dara'iyah in September 1818, Ibrāhīm Pāsha, the commander of the Egyptian forces, removed the inhabitants of the town to Hasa and himself proceeded thither: his intention seems to have been to make that relatively fertile province

the headquarters of his Arabian administration. Of the movements of the Egyptians in Hasa very few details are known; but it appears that Ibrāhim Pāsha was assisted by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, who came over for the purpose from Būshehr, in reducing by artillery fire the Wahhābi port of Qatif. Rahmah profited by his good understanding with the Egyptians to settle again at Dammām, where he at once began to rebuild the fort destroyed by the Wahhābis two years before. At the end of 1818 a large force of Arabs from the Pirate Coast arrived at Qatif in 17 war-vessels to assist the Wahhābis against the Egyptians; but they were too late, and returned peacefully *viâ* Bahrain.

Events during the first Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1818-19.

At noon on the 18th of June 1819, in carrying out a mission to Ibrāhim Pāsha of which the objects and incidents are described* in the history of Trucial 'Omān, Captain G. Forster Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment arrived off the coast of Hasa; but an ignorant Būshehri pilot ran the Hon'ble Company's cruiser "Vestal," on which he was a passenger, upon a sandbank, and there she remained fast during the night. The Egyptian authorities on shore were slow to render assistance; but on the afternoon of the 19th of June a complimentary deputation from Rahmah-bin-Jābir appeared on board, and on the next day the "Vestal" was brought safely into Qatif harbour with the morning tide by two intelligent pilots whom Rahmah sent. Captain Sadleir had intended to make 'Oqair the point of his departure for the interior, but he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Rahmah and the Egyptian sub-governor of Qatif, and on Monday the 21st he landed at Saihāt, towards the southern end of the Qatif Oasis. This change of plan, for which he cannot be blamed, probably cost him some valuable days, and so may have contributed to the failure of his mission.

Journey of Captain Sadleir through Hasa and evacuation of the province by the Egyptians, 1819.

At the time of Captain Sadleir's arrival, the Egyptians, having found it necessary to concentrate their forces in Arabia, were about to evacuate Hasa. Khalil Āgha, the Egyptian sub-governor of Qatif, had already received orders to return with two subordinates to Hofūf, making over his charge to Mushrif, a nephew of Shaikh Muhammad, the head of the Bani Khālid; the roads between Qatif and Hofūf were unsafe; and attacks on Egyptian convoys between Hofūf and the

* *Vide* page 661 *ante*.

military headquarters of Ibrāhīm Pāsha in Najd had begun to occur. As Khalil Āgha, whose authority had been maintained only by a force of 60 Arab hirelings and was now almost gone, appeared indisposed or unable to make any arrangements, Captain Sadleir decided to accept an offer of the Bani Khālid chiefs to forward him on his journey, and accordingly left Saihāt on the 28th of June 1819 under the protection of Mushrif; but the conduct of the latter in the desert was "that of a barbarian who had got his prey in his power, and determined not to lose the opportunity lest another so favourable should not offer;" and the behaviour of the senior Shaikh, Muhammad, who was incompetent and very deaf, and of his brother Majid was hardly better. Captain Sadleir did not reach Hofūf until the 11th of July; he had been dragged in the interval on a preposterous round to the wells of Badrāni, 'Aziz-al-Mā, Mulaihah, Abwāb, Umm Rubai'ah, Hafairah, 'Ain Dār and Dumaiyagh, and to the village of 'Ayūn; and in the course of his wanderings he had suffered extreme discomfort and anxiety, and had been obliged to submit to very unreasonable extortions on the part of the Bedouins.

At Hofūf the British envoy was well received by Muhammad Āgha, the Egyptian Kāshif or Governor of Hasa, who had lately received orders to transfer the province to the Shaikhs of the Bani Khālid and to rejoin Ibrāhīm Pasha in Sadair with the Egyptian garrison of Hasa. Of the latter only about 250 men now remained, and the Egyptian officers whom Captain Sadleir met, worn out with long service in a rude and inhospitable country, were delighted at being thus recalled to headquarters. Muhammad Āgha at first professed a strong interest in the object of Captain Sadleir's journey and offered to take him with him as a companion on his own withdrawal, for which the date fixed was the 22nd of July; but on the 21st, after sending some transport to Captain Sadleir, he slipped away privately without further notice. Captain Sadleir followed, later on the same day, with the main body of the Egyptian troops; and on the 24th, before leaving the Hasa district for Najd, he passed a second time by the wells of Umm Rubai'ah. While at Hofūf Captain Sadleir learned that the intruding Egyptians, during their occupation of the country, had enforced their authority by very arbitrary means, and that their departure was awaited by the inhabitants with the utmost impatience.

Ibrāhīm Pāsha seems to have hoped that by retaining a garrison at 'Anaizah in Central Arabia, he would be able to keep up communication with Hasa and to extract a regular tribute from the Bani

Khālid Shaikhs, whose authority over that province, overthrown by the Wahhābis, was re-established at the removal of the Egyptian officials.

At the time of Captain Sadleir's visit no Christians or Hindus were to be found at Qatif, nor, in the unsettled state of affairs then prevailing, could any person be induced to act as a broker ; for any man who gave signs of possessing money would have been immediately laid under contribution by the Egyptians. In 1823, however, at the time of the Political Resident's voyage along the Arabian coast, there was a native Agent of the Būshehr Residency at Qatif, whom Lieutenant McLeod proposed to transfer to Shārjah on the Pirate Coast.

Existence of
a British
Agent at
Qatif, 1823.

Proceedings of Rahmah-bin-Jābir, 1818-26.

After his re-establishment at Dammām in 1818 during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, Rahmah-bin-Jābir began to harass the 'Utūb of Bahrain with increased success ; and so disturbing to the general peace was this maritime struggle that between 1822 and 1824, as related in the history of Bahrain, the British political authorities constantly tried to arrange matters between the parties. At length in February 1824, as described in the history of Bahrain, a peace was concluded, of which one condition was that Rahmah should not interfere to prevent the punishment by the Shaikhs of Bahrain of the refractory Āl Bū Samait tribe, who had recently settled under his protection at Dammām.

Peace arranged
between
Rahmah and
the 'Utūb of
Bahrain,
1824.

Rahmah then paid a visit to Masqat ; and, on his return to Dammām, he proceeded to blockade Qatif, of which place the inhabitants had recently ceased to pay him tribute, or rather blackmail, for the protection of their commerce at sea. Rahmah was at this time approaching seventy years of age, and ill-fortune had made havoc of his material resources ; but he was animated by a spirit as haughty and indomitable as ever. On the Shaikh of Būshehr proceeding, under the orders of the Shirāz Government who were piqued at the reconciliation between Rahmah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain, to detain the family of one of his sons, Rahmah about June 1824 sought permission of the British authorities to declare war against the Shaikh ; but the incident was eventually settled by the release of the prisoners at the instance of the Resident and their return to Dammām. Meanwhile, whether by the submission of the people of Qatif or by profitable captures made in

Other events,
1824.

the course of his operations against them, Rahmah's financial difficulties had been to a great extent relieved.

Rahmah's
blockade of
Qatif, 1825.

Early in 1825 Rahmah paid another visit to Masqat; and he also obtained from the British Political Resident an authorisation, of which he did not apparently avail himself, to take part, on the side of Shaikh Tahnūn, in a war then in progress between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah in Trucial 'Omān. Towards the end of 1825, trouble having again arisen over the blackmail payable by the people of Qatif, Rahmah, in total disregard of remonstrances by the British political authorities, began to harry the defenceless merchant vessels of that port. Two British cruisers were accordingly stationed off Dammām, and it was at first intimated to Rahmah that, unless he discontinued these depredations, active proceedings would be taken against him; but ultimately it was decided to refrain from coercion unless he should extend his depredations beyond the shipping of Qatif, and a further remonstrance was addressed to him. The obstinacy of Rahmah was attributed to his confidence in the reviving power of the Wāhhābis, to whom, he believed, the renewal of piratical disturbances at sea would not be unwelcome.

New breach
between
Rahmah and
the Shaikhs
of Bahrain.

Meanwhile a fresh rupture had occurred between Rahmah and the 'Utūb of Bahrain; but the hostilities had not free course until after the removal, in consequence of the decision not to interfere between Rahmah and the people of Qatif, of the British cruisers from Dammām. Neither Rahmah nor the 'Atbi Shaikh being fully prepared for a regular war, both of them requested the British Resident to impose a truce, and their suggestions were apparently entertained; but, the Resident having insisted that the people of Qatif should be included in the truce—a condition to which Rahmah would not agree, matters were in the end allowed to take their course.

Last engage-
ment and
death of
Rahmah,
1826.

About the end of 1826, finding himself hard pressed by his enemies who had now invested Dammām, Rahmah crossed the Gulf to Būshehr and sought to interest the Resident in his case; but, failing in this, he recruited some 25 or 30 Balūchis for service and returned with them to Dammām, where a Bahrain fleet was then lying. On arrival at Dammām he fired a salute by way of insult,—an act which so incensed the 'Utūb that Ahmad-bin-Salmān, a nephew of their principal Shaikh, volunteered to attack him with his own Baghlah, and, the offer being accepted, immediately laid his vessel alongside that of Rahmah. A very determined struggle then ensued, in which the Bahrain warship once drew off to take more men on board from the rest of the

'Atbi fleet; and it continued till Rahmah, who was now totally blind, aware that his vessel must in the end be boarded and captured by superior numbers and that no quarter was to be expected, gave orders to grapple with the enemy. Taking his youngest son—a boy eight years of age—with him, he caused himself to be guided to the powder magazine, blew up the vessel with his own hand, and so perished along with all his companions. The explosion set fire to the attacking vessel, which also blew up, but not until after those on board had been rescued by their friends.*

In his appearance, vividly depicted by Buckingham in 1816, Rahmah seems to have been nothing short of repulsive. His clothing was squalid in the extreme. His face, "naturally ferocious and ugly," was disfigured by scars and by the loss of an eye, his "figure presented a "meagre trunk, with four lank members, all of them cut and hacked, "and pierced with wounds of sabres, spears, and bullets, in every part, "to the number perhaps of more than twenty different wounds." The bone between the shoulder and the elbow of his right arm was completely wanting, in consequence of a wound, but he could still grasp a dagger in his right hand and make shift to use it with the help of his left. His spirit was truculent and revengeful; but he bore calamity with a fortitude not less remarkable than the callousness that he showed in inflicting suffering. Among his own followers, many of whom were slaves, he was said to maintain discipline by free recourse to the death penalty; and none ventured to disobey his orders. He showed his prudence in avoiding, throughout his life, direct collision with the British Government; and, from the friendliness of his personal relations with some of the British officers at the Būshehr Residency, it may be inferred that he possessed redeeming qualities. Nevertheless his death was felt as a relief throughout the Gulf.†

Reconquest of Hasa by the Wāhhābis, 1824-31.

The Bani Khalid Shaikhs, replaced in authority over Hasa by the Egyptians, succeeded in maintaining their position for some years; but,

Indecisive
hostilities
between the

* This is the generally received account of the affair; but if, as appears to be stated, there were no survivors of Rahmah's crew, it is difficult to understand how the circumstances of the explosion ever became known.

† The only description of Rahmah by one who had seen him will be found in Buckingham's *Travels in Assyria, etc.*, pages 356 to 358. That censorious and somewhat pharisaical writer evidently failed to appreciate the old sea-wolf.

Wahhābis
and the Bani
Khālid,
1824-30.

as the Wahhābi Amīr, who now professed allegiance and paid tribute to the Egyptians, was soon at war with the Bani Khālid, it is improbable that money from Hasa can for long have continued to reach the Egyptian exchequer. The Bani Khālid made Hofūf their capital, and held possession besides of the seaport of Qatif. Hostilities between the Wahhābis and the Bani Khālid began about 1824, but until 1830 the results were inconclusive.

Final defeat
of the Bani
Khālid, by
the Wah-
hābis, 1830.

At the beginning of 1830 the Bani Khālid Shaikhs took the initiative by marching with a large body of their tribe upon Najd, and Faisal-bin-Turki, the son of the Wahhābī Amīr, moved out from Riyādh to meet them. At this juncture the Bani Khālid had the misfortune to lose their best military leader in the person of Shaikh Majīd, who was taken ill and died; and the command of the forces devolved, with the consent of Majīd's brother, the aged Shaikh Muhammad, who was conscious of his own incapacity, upon Barghash, a nephew of Muhammad. The new leader, after some delay, advanced against the Wahhābis who fell back before him; but hardly had he done so when Turki-bin-'Abdullah, the Wahhābi Amīr, who had left Riyādh in person on the night of the 23rd March 1830 at the head of 1,200 men, succeeded in passing round one of his flanks and seized Wabrah,* the base of his operations and the source of his water supply, which he had left unguarded in the rear. The Bani Khālid thus found themselves cut off from water and placed between two bodies of the enemy, who, after allowing a day to pass, attacked them next morning upon both sides, completely routing them and capturing the whole of their women, children, tents, horses, camels and cattle. The Shaikhs Muhammad and Barghash escaped in safety to Hofūf, where for a short time they prolonged their resistance; but, on the majority of the Beni Khālid making submission and the march of the Wahhābis being continued to Hofūf, the capital of Hasa fell, and Qatif, too, shortly surrendered.

Enlightened
policy of the
Wahhābi
Amīr in
Hasa, 1831.

The power of the conqueror, whose policy—unlike that of his ancestors and predecessors—was distinguished by tolerance and conciliation, was rapidly established in Hasa, where he placed some garrisons and contented himself with levying the usual Zakāt; and in 1831 Turki returned to the interior. The change of masters was beneficial to the country, inasmuch as the anarchy and civil war which had prevailed under

* The name is given as "Dabrah" in the records, but no such place is known. Wabrah, a well-known watering station and the crossing place of many routes in Summān, must be meant. The Arabic characters for "W" and "D" may sometimes, be mistaken for one another.

the Bani Khālid Shaikhs were quickly brought to an end. A few demonstrations against the Wāhhābis were attempted by Muhammad, the surviving Bani Khālid Shaikh ; but they were feeble and ineffective.

Events during the second occupation of Hasa by the Wāhhābis 1830-38.

From Hasa, as a base, the Wāhhābi ruler at once sought to extend his influence over the Bahrain Islands ; but his success in this direction was by no means so complete or so permanent as in Hasa ; and the friction with the 'Utūb of Bahrain which his ambition excited was prejudicial to the tranquillity and economic well-being of the mainland.

When, in 1830, the Amīr called upon the Shaikhs of Bahrain to acknowledge their allegiance to himself, it was his intention to establish Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, a son of the deceased pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, at Dammām, as a check upon the 'Utūb ; and the project was supported by Saiyid Sa'id of 'Omān, who had harboured Bashīr since the death of his father in 1826, and who looked for his assistance in case of a fresh expedition from Masqat against Bahrain. In their settlement with the 'Utūb of Bahrain however, in 1831, the proposal relating to Dammām was dropped by the Wāhhābis ; but almost immediately after, at the intercession it would appear of Saiyid Sa'id, they gave Bashīr permission to settle on Tārūt Island, opposite to the town of Qatif, and to build himself a fort there at Dārīn. Bashīr was shortly joined by a majority of the Āl Bū Samait tribe, who had, like his own family, an irreconcilable feud with the Shaikhs of Bahrain ; but, having incurred the enmity of the people of Qatif, he found himself unable, even with the help of the Āl Bū Samait, to maintain his position at Dārīn ; and in 1832, after destroying the fort that he had just built, he removed again to Masqat with his immediate followers.

Establishment of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah on Tārūt Island, 1831-32.

In 1831, encouraged by difficulties which had arisen in Najd between Turki-bin-'Abdullah and one of his own relations who claimed the Amirate of the Wāhhābis, some Bani Khālid of the 'Amāir section made a simultaneous attack on Hofūf and Qatif, but without success.

Difficulties of the Wāhhābis in Hasa, 1831-35.

A feud had meanwhile sprung up between the 'Amāir of Jinnah, supported by some of the Sūdān tribe, and the inhabitants of Qatif. The original cause was the refusal of the Qatif people to continue payment of certain blackmail claimed by the 'Amāir ; but feeling had been

greatly inflamed by losses, including a chief, suffered by the 'Amāir in attempts to enforce their demands; and the mediation of the Wāhhābi Amīr failed to appease the strife. It resulted from this feud that in 1832 the 'Amāir boarded a Bahrain vessel near Qatif and put to death 12 out of 30 natives of that town whom they found on board, and that in 1833, with the connivance of the 'Utūb of Bahrain, they established themselves at Dammām, blockaded Qatif, and began to prey upon its commerce.

Emboldened by these disorders the Shaikhs of Bahrain in 1833 renounced their allegiance to the Wāhhābi Amīr, and the Wāhhābi Governor of Qatif, apparently considering the situation of his master to be desperate, sought their protection; but, by the energy of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, the dangers which threatened his authority in Hasa were temporarily surmounted, and Zakāt was collected, possibly for the first time, from the inhabitants of the Hasa coast.

Seizure of
Tārūt Island
by the 'Utūb,
1834.

In 1834 the Bahrain Shaikh blockaded the Wāhhābi ports of Qatif and 'Oqair, and, on the assassination of Turki-bin-'Abdullah, annexed the island of Tārūt to Bahrain, besides instigating the Bani Khālid to attack the Wāhhābis in Hofūf, and Qatif; but the movement on Hofūf was frustrated by 'Umr-bin-Ufaisān, the Wāhhābi Governor, with great loss to his assailants, and the insurgent Bani Khālid were driven to seek refuge under the guns of the Bahrain garrison on Tārūt.

Authority
over Hasa
asserted by
the Egyptians,
1835.

About the middle of 1835 there arrived at Masqat from Makkah, a respectable merchant formerly of Bahrain, named 'Abdullah-bin-Mashāri, who brought with him letters from Ahmad Pasha, the Egyptian Governor of Hijāz, addressed to the Saiyid of 'Omān, the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wāhhābi Amīr; the purport of the credentials was that the bearer had been granted a farm of the revenues of Qatif for \$20,000 to \$24,000 per annum by the Egyptian Government, and that he should be allowed to assume and exercise his authority as lessee without opposition. It is probable that the object of the Egyptians in making this appointment was to prepare the way for a reconquest of Najd from the west by creating embarrassments on the Wāhhābi Amīr's eastern border. 'Abdullah-bin-Mashāri was courteously received by Saiyid Sa'id, who provided him with a Batil to carry him from Masqat to Qatif; but Faisal-bin-Turki, who had in the meantime removed his father's murderer, the usurper of the Wāhhābi Amirate, sent a body of troops to defend his rights at Qatif, and the would-be tax-gatherer disappeared from that place very soon after his arrival. The sons of Bin-Mashāri were subsequently found to have procured letters of recommendation from the Government of Bombay.

The Wahhābi force sent to expel Bin-Mashāri from Qatīf afterwards attempted to recapture Tārūt from the Shaikh of Bahrain, but their efforts were unavailing ; and the 'Utūb at once retaliated by resuming the blockade of Qatīf and 'Oqair, which they had withdrawn.

At the middle of 1836, Bahrain being now threatened by the Persians and Najd by the Egyptians, the 'Utūb and the Wahhābis found mutual advantage in a settlement of their differences. The first overtures proceeded from the Shaikh of Bahrain, but they were readily accepted by the Amīr ; the 'Utūb placed themselves under the protection of the Wahhābis, and the 'Atbi blockade of the Hasa coast was discontinued. In 1837, the power of the Wahhābi Amīr in Hasa being paralysed by a struggle which had begun in Najd between himself and an Egyptian nominee named Khālid, the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid, along with some Bani Hājir who had settled at Dammām under the protection of the Utūb of Bahrain, began to commit piracies on Qatīf and Bahrain boats ; but the Shaikh of Bahrain, having obtained the permission of the British Resident at Būshehr, immediately took measures against them and put an end to their depredations.

Failure of the Wahhābis to recover Tārūt and appropriation of Dammām by the Utūb, 1835. Rapprochement between the 'Utūb and the Wahhābis, 1836-38.

The second Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-40.

At the close of 1838 the active operations of the Egyptian army in Najd came to an end on the surrender of the Wahhābi Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, at Dilam in Kharj, whence he was sent a prisoner to Egypt. Before this event a conspiracy among the 'Amāir Bani Khālid at Hofūf in favour of the Egyptians had been detected and severely punished by the Wahhābi commander in Hasa, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, who put three of their principal men to death. On the fall of Dilam the Hasa and Qatīf Oases immediately submitted to the Egyptians, while the representative of the Wahhābi Government sought an asylum in Bahrain ; and the Egyptians, throwing off their disguise as supporters of the pretender Khālid, announced that their conquests were made in the name of Muhammad 'Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. It is not clear whether Khurshid Pāsha, the Egyptian general, whose headquarters during his occupation of Najd were first at Sulaimiyah in Kharj and later at Tharmidah in Washam, ever visited Hasa in person ; but a regular Egyptian administration was established there without delay, a garrison of 800 irregulars being placed at Hofūf, and smaller posts at Qatīf, Saihāt and 'Oqair upon the coast.

Expulsion of the Wahhābis by the Egyptians, 1838-39.

Proceedings
of the Egyptians
in Hasa,
1839.

For a time it appeared probable that the Egyptian commander would attempt to extend his conquests so as to include both Bahrain and 'Oman, and the proceedings on the part of the British Government to which this anticipation gave rise are described at length in the histories of Trucial 'Oman and Bahrain; but in the end no actual movement was made by him in either of these directions, and the submission tendered by the Shaikh of Bahrain to the Egyptians early in 1839 was consequently gratuitous and unnecessary. In 1839, during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, an expedition, consisting partly of Egyptian troops and partly of Bani Hājir of the Makhadhdhabah division, was despatched from Hofūf against the Na'im of Qatar who had refused to pay tribute; but the assassination of Muhammad Effendi, the Egyptian Governor of Hasa, by some Arabs in the vicinity of Hofūf necessitated its recall.

Evacuation
of Hasa by
the Egyptians,
1840.

The position of Khurshīd Pasha in Najd was one of great and increasing difficulty. The hostility of the country people made it difficult for him to provision his posts or to keep open his communications; four armed vessels with military stores, which he expected on the coast of Hasa from the Red Sea, did not arrive, and their place was ill-supplied by a Kuwait boat which in November 1839 brought a single cargo of ammunition; it gradually became clear that the reduction of Bahrain, which was probably the main object of his excursion to the shores of the Persian Gulf, would not be permitted by the British Government; and finally his master, Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt, had begun to regard his successes with jealousy and dislike. In the circumstances a general retirement became necessary; and in Hasa, the first district to be evacuated, it seems to have been carried into effect in April or May 1840. The last act of the Egyptians in Hasa was the execution of Barghash, a Shaikh of the Āl Humaid section of the Bani Khālid, who they were reported to have put to death in revenge for the shooting of their Governor, Muhammad Effendi. At the time of the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, the blockade of the ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair, which they held upon the coast, had begun to be seriously contemplated by the British Government.

Internal affairs of Hasa from the second occupation by the Egyptians to the present occupation by the Turks, 1840-71.

A distribution of events in Hasa, during the generation following the evacuation of that province by the Egyptians in 1840, under the heads

of internal affairs, relations with Bahrain, and British relations is necessarily somewhat artificial; but such a classification must, for the sake of clearness, be adopted.

At their own withdrawal the Egyptians left their creature Khālid in possession of the Amirate of Najd, supported by about 800 of their troops. The new ruler, apparently unconscious of the real weakness of his position, at first indulged in dreams of foreign conquest; and about October 1841 he moved down to Hasa with the intention, as was supposed, of sending an expedition against 'Omān; but difficulties nearer to the seat of his power soon recalled him to Najd. In December 1841, or early in 1842, he was expelled from Riyādh by 'Abdullah-bin-Thinaiyān, a more powerful rival, and retired to Qatif with his foreign troops, whose presence was obnoxious to his subjects and was one of the principal causes of his downfall. The inhabitants of Hasa had already opened a correspondence with the new Amīr, 'Abdullah; and the people of Qatif soon forced Khālid to dismiss his Egyptian soldiers and take refuge with Mubārak, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain, in the seaside fort of Dammām further down the coast. He was received by Mubārak as a welcome guest; and, in April 1842, he paid a visit to the Shaikh of Bahrain at Khor Hassān in Qatar, was treated there with much respect, and was encouraged to hope for assistance in recovering Qatif. Operations undertaken in his interest against the Hasa Oasis and the port of 'Oqair were temporarily successful, but Mubārak-bin-'Abdullah was soon in full retreat to the coast before the victorious army of 'Abdullah, and Khālid then left Dammām for Kuwait.

Hasa under
the Amīr
Khālid, 1840-
42.

No internal events of importance characterised the short reign of Khālid's successor, 'Abdullah, over the province of Hasa. At the end of 1842 the inhabitants who had so readily professed allegiance to him began, in consequence of his exactions in Qatif, to be discontented with his rule; but there was not as yet any open movement among the settled population against his authority. A number of the Bedouin tribes in the neighbourhood at first refused to submit to him, but these he appears to have coerced with success. In 1843 his sovereignty ceased.

Hasa under
the Amīr
'Abdullah,
1842-43.

In 1851 Faisal, the successor of the Amīr 'Abdullah, visited Qatar, and it may be presumed that he made a tour in Hasa at the same time. The object of his visit to the region appears to have been the chastisement of some of the Bedouin tribes; and at the present day he is remembered as the only ruler of Najd who ever pursued the wild Āl Morrah into their sandy retreats with any success.

Hasa under
the Amīr
Faisal, 1848-
65.

**Relations of Hasa with Bahrain during the same period,
1840-71.**

The affairs of Hasa at this time however, are of little interest apart from the relations of the province with Bahrain, and these last are so fully described in the history of Bahrain that it will be unnecessary to do more than briefly refer to them here.

Invitation to
the Bahrain
Shaikhs to
annex Hasa,
1840.

In 1840, on the retirement of the Egyptians from the country, Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah of Bahrain was invited by a section of the inhabitants through one Mushrif, possibly a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid,* to assume authority over Hasa and exclude the Egyptian puppet Khālid. This invitation, which was declined through the influence of 'Abdullah, the senior Shaikh, was one cause of the dissensions, ending in civil war, which shortly broke out between the joint chiefs of Bahrain.

Friction
between the
Wahhābis
and Shaikh
'Abdullah of
Bahrain,
1842-44.

In the first phase of the struggle between the rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, the elder, 'Abdullah, was successful; and the younger, Muhammad, in 1842 retired to Hasa and thence journeyed to Riyādh, where the new Amīr 'Abdullah showed a disposition to take his part. The result was an estrangement between the Wahhābi Amīr and the reigning Shaikh of Bahrain; the Shaikh blockaded the coast of Hasa and gave asylum in Bahrain to most of the inhabitants of Saihāt, who emigrated from that place on account of a grievance against the Wahhābi Governor of Qatif; and the Amīr, on his part, arrested a chief of the Bani Hājir, named Shāfi', who was closely related to the Shaikh. Dammām on the Hasa coast was still a dependency of Bahrain, but it was claimed, as a paternal inheritance, by Bashīr-bin-Rahmah. From the course of the negotiations for the release of Shāfi' it appears that the port of 'Oqair was also, at this time, held by the Bahrain Shaikh; but it cannot have remained long in his possession.

Recovery of
Dammām by
the Wahhā-
bis, 1844.

On his expulsion from Bahrain, in April 1843, Shaikh 'Abdullah established himself with his sons at Dammām, his only remaining possession; and there he was shortly blockaded from the sea by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, assisted by Bashīr-bin-Rahmah and 'Isa-bin-'Ali; while on the landward side the place was invested, at the end of 1843, by

* There is nothing, however, to show whether this was the Mushrif by whom Captain Sadleir was uncivilly treated in 1819.

a Wāhhābi force. In March 1844 Dammām surrendered to the Wāhhābis, Shaikh 'Abdullah himself being at the moment of capitulation somewhere outside the cordon by which the place was surrounded. The Wāhhābis then occupied Dammām in the name of their own Amīr, Faisal-bin-Turki, much to the disappointment of Bashīr-bin-Rahmah, to whom possession of it had been promised by Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain. These events are more fully related in the history of Bahrain.

In 1844 or 1845 the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah began to negotiate with the Wāhhābis for their support, which they readily granted, probably because they found that Shaikh Muhammad, since his accession, was no longer amenable to their influence. In 1845, on war being declared between the Wāhhābis and Bahrain, the Shaikh of Bahrain placed the Hasa coast under blockade and took into his service a pirate named Hamaid-bin-Majdal, of whom we shall presently have more to say under the head of British relations; while the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, on his part, landed secretly in Hasa near Ras Tanūrah. In correspondence with his son Mubārak, who since the fall of Dammām had been living among the Bani Hājir Bedouins on the mainland, and with 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wāhhābi Governor of Qatif, the ex-Shaikh attempted to arrange for an invasion of the Bahrain Islands; but his plans were frustrated, when on the point of execution, through their becoming known to the Shaikh of Bahrain. The blockade of the Hasa coast by the Shaikh of Bahrain's vessels continued throughout 1846; in September of that year the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah settled temporarily near Dammām, under Wāhhābi protection, removing shortly after to Tārūt Island; and some fighting occurred on the mainland between the principal belligerents, in which the ex-Shaikh did not take part. At the beginning of 1847 the pirate Hamaid-bin-Majdal and his dependents of the 'Amāir tribe deserted the Shaikh of Bahrain and joined the Wāhhābis, and terms of peace were shortly afterwards arranged between the Wāhhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, by which the former bound himself no longer to support the pretensions of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah. The latter, finding himself betrayed, soon after took ship at Dammām, and he did not again make Hasa a base for his operations.

Coalition
between the
Wāhhābis
and the
ex-Shaikh
'Abdullah of
Bahrain,
1845-47.

In 1850 the relations between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Wāhhābi Amīr again became strained, and in 1851 the Shaikh once more had recourse to a maritime blockade of Hasa; but the sons of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, crossing with a fleet from the Persian coast, forced their way into the harbour of Qatif and placed their naval resources at the disposal of the Amīr Faisal. Aggressive action against Bahrain by the

Sons of the
late
ex-Shaikh
'Abdullah
re-established
by the
Wāhhābis at
Dammām,
1852.

Wahhābis and their allies was prevented by the arrival of a British squadron off the islands ; but the sons of the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah received a reward for their services from the Wahhābis in the shape of permission to re-occupy Dammām.

Attempted
invasion of
Bahrain from
Qatif and
Dammām,
1859.

In 1859, as more fully related in the history of Bahrain, preparations were made at Qatif by the Wahhābi Governor of that place and at Dammām by Muhammad, a son of the late ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah, for an invasion of Bahrain ; but their plans were upset by the arrival on the scene of a British naval force under Commander Balfour, whose menacing attitude completely cowed the Wahhābi official

Expulsion of
Muhammad-
bin-'Abdullah
from
Dammām by
British
action, 1861.

The presence of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah at Dammām, in close relations with the Wahhābi power, had now for some years been a standing danger to the Shaikhdom of Bahrain ; and, after a discussion suggested by the events of 1859, the Government of India decided that he should be expelled. To a previous suggestion by the Resident, Captain Felix Jones, that Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah should be removed, the Wahhābi Amir had sent an indignant reply ; and in 1861, on a requisition to the same effect being addressed him under the orders of Government, he remained silent. Accordingly in November 1861, as described in the history of Bahrain, Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah and his dependents were compelled, under the fire of a British warship, to evacuate Dammām.

Invasion of
Bahrain from
Hasa, 1869.

The connection of the Hasa province, which served as a base to the marauders, with the successful invasion of Bahrain in 1869 by the ex-Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah and others, aided by the Bani Hājir tribe of the mainland, is fully noticed in the history of the Bahrain Principality.

British relations with Hasa during the same period, 1840-71.

Piracy by a
Dammām
boat, 1840-
41.

Early in 1840 a piracy was committed between Khor Mūsa and the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab upon a boat belonging to Kuwait. The perpetrators remained undiscovered until August 1841, when a follower of Mūbarak-bin-'Abdullah, then governing Dammām on behalf of his father, was shown to have been of their number. A demand was accordingly made upon the Shaikh of Bahrain for payment of 274 Muhammad Shāhi rupees or, alternatively, for the surrender of the pirate and his boat ; and compliance with the former condition was obtained.

Mission of
Lieutenant

The mission of Lieutenant Jopp, who in November 1841, visited the Wahhābi Amir in Hasa, had reference to the designs which that chief

was supposed to entertain in the direction of 'Omān, and will be more appropriately described in another place.

Jopp to
Hasa, 1841.

More than once between 1845 and 1854 the attention of the British authorities was attracted to the coast of Hasa by the misdeeds of Hamaid-bin-Majdal, a member of the 'Amāir section of the Bani Khālid tribe, who, as related elsewhere, combined with the Shaikh of Bahrain against the Wahnābis in 1845 and in 1847 transferred his support to the other side. Early in 1845, Hamaid, who had broken with a part of his tribe, had forsaken his usual residence on Abu 'Ali Island, and was already in the service of the Shaikh of Bahrain, seized a Baqārah belonging to Khārag as she was entering the port of Qatif with a cargo of wheat from Rīg and carried her to Abu 'Ali Island; the crew, after being despoiled of all their property, were allowed to make their way home in their empty vessel. The damages were estimated at 1,500 Muhammad Shāhi rupees; and it was reported that Hamaid-bin-Majdal, on being warned that the goods he was plundering belonged to a person under British protection, merely laughed and asked "Who are the English?"

Piracy by
Hamaid-bin-
Majdal
and his
punishment,
1845-1850.

Such open contempt of the maritime peace and its guardians could not be tolerated; and in May 1845 the Resident deputed his Assistant, Captain Kemball, to superintend the punishment of the pirate, who had now established himself on the island of Jinnah. This service, which was undertaken by Commodore Hawkins, I.N., with his flagship "Coote" and the schooner "Constance," supported by two armed Baqārahs, was attended by serious difficulties of navigation; and Hamaid, who seems to have believed his island inaccessible, replied insolently to the first summons to submit; but, when morning broke, he found himself surrounded by the boats of the squadron and hastened to apologise. He was obliged to surrender his Baghlah, which was retained till the following October and was then redeemed by him on payment of 2,059 Muhammad Shāhi rupees in cash and 141 in kind, the total demand against him being thus liquidated. The operations at Jinnah were extremely trying to those engaged in them on account of the terrific heat of the sun, the season being June; and the skilful management and successful issue of the expedition were highly commended by the Court of Directors.

In the summer of 1846 the Wahnābi Governor of Qatif had the presumption to address the British Resident, demanding that he should expel Hamaid-bin-Majdal from his abode and compel him to return a Ghunchah and five other vessels belonging to Qatif which he had seized; in case of failure the Governor threatened to give the Bani Hājir and other Bedouin tribes of the mainland permission to commit piracies. A

British naval
demonstration
at Qatif,
1846.

friendly but effectual admonition was immediately conveyed to the arrogant official by two British cruisers.

Fresh piracy
by Hamaid-
bin-Majdal
and
repetition
of his
punishment,
1854.

In 1854 Hamaid-bin-Majdal, who was now apparently settled at 'Anik near Qatif town, committed another piracy by seizing a large Baghlah which he refused to give up, though the Resident, Captain Kemball, went in person to demand its surrender; he seemed to consider himself completely protected by the Turkish flag, which he had hoisted over his dwelling. On the matter being referred to Bombay, orders were received to destroy a Baghlah belonging to the pirate, by force if necessary, but to avoid operations on land.

In November 1854 a squadron of vessels of the Indian Navy arrived off 'Anik; it consisted of the flagship "Clive," Commodore Robinson; the "Falkland," Commander Hewett; the "Tigris," Lieutenant Foulerton; and the "Constance," Lieutenant Crane. 'Anik itself was unapproachable from the sea; but a Baghlah, round which the Arabs had constructed a sand-bag battery, was observed on shore in an assailable position, and was attacked with a flotilla of 13 boats, one of which was a rocket-boat, while the other 12 carried two 12-pounder and six 3-pounder guns besides a force of 200 seamen and marines. During the attack the tide went out; the heavier of the British boats were left high and dry; and a large force of Arabs swarmed down to capture them, but were repulsed by a hot fire of artillery and musketry. When the tide again rose, Hamaid-bin-Majdal thought it prudent to send off a flag of truce, and the Baghlah was surrendered, and next morning was burnt by the boats of the squadron, which returned to shore for the purpose. On the British side only a few men were wounded in this affair, but the Arabs lost heavily and were much demoralised by the shells and rockets.

The British naval demonstration at Qatif and Dammām in 1859 and the expulsion of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah from Dammām by a British force in 1861 have already been noticed above in connection with Bahrain relations. The British proceedings at Dammām in 1861 elicited a strong protest from the Turkish Wali of Baghdād in the following year, on the ground that Dammām was in the territory of "Faisal Bey, the Qāim Maqām of Najd," and formed "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan"; to which the British Resident replied, denying the claim of Turkey, and asserting the right of Britain to deal directly with the Wāhhābi Amīr.

British
operations at
Qatif and

In 1866, in consequence of a rupture between the British Government and the Wāhhābi Amīr, operations were undertaken by H.M.S. "High-flyer," Captain Pasley, at Qatif and Dammām, the only points except

'Oqair in the Wāhhābi dominions which were accessible to a naval force : the circumstances and the general scheme of action are given in the history of Najd. On the 13th of January 1866 an ultimatum, in which 17 days were allowed for compliance, was transmitted to the Amīr at Riyādh through his representative at Qatif. On the 30th of January, after an interview in Elphinstone Inlet with Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident, Captain Pasley with the "Highflyer" again arrived at Qatif and ascertained that there was as yet no reply to the ultimatum. Accordingly, on the 2nd of February, boats under Lieutenant Fellowes entered Qatif harbour and destroyed the small fortification of Burj Abul Līf, as also a native vessel which was not worth removing. On the next day boats were sent under Lieutenant Long to demolish, if possible, the fort at Dammām. A party were landed, who had to wade a considerable distance, and attacked the place; but, finding the garrison much stronger than had been represented and being unable to effect an entrance, they retired with a loss of three men killed and two officers and three men wounded. On the 4th of February the attack on Dammām was renewed by Lieutenant Long at high water, and the fort was plied with shot, shell and rockets; but the wall could not be breached, and the place remained in the hands of the enemy. The British ship then returned from Hasa to the lower end of the Gulf, and more successful operations were carried out at Sūr. The failure of the proceedings on the Hasa coast may perhaps be attributed to the want on the "Highflyer," of a European officer possessing local knowledge and experience; for the only political representative with Captain Pasley was the Residency (Native) Agent from Shārjah, whom Colonel Pelly, in his own unavoidable absence, had deputed to accompany the expedition.

Dammām,
1866.

During this period a small trading colony consisting of Hindu subjects of the British Government came into existence at Qatif; they were engaged chiefly in the importation of general merchandise and in the exportation of boiled dates to India. The first British Indian house established at Qatif was that of Kalunga, a wealthy merchant of Kach, who commenced business in Hasa about 1864. Two other Hindu firms followed about 1866.

British
commercial
interests.

Annexation of Hasa by Turkey, 1871.

So far back as 1866 designs of territorial expansion in Eastern Arabia had been betrayed by the attitude of Turkish officials in 'Irāq

Meaning of
the Turkish

forward
movement.

towards the Shaikh of Kuwait; and in 1871 the forward policy of the Ottoman Government, or of its local representatives, suddenly took shape. The causes which led to this movement are not discoverable in the Persian Gulf itself: they were probably of a general nature, connected with a desire on the part of the Turkish Government to assert their authority over the Arabian continent as a whole.

In the Persian Gulf, where much jealousy of the position acquired by Great Britain had for some time been shown by Turkish officials, the object of the Porte appears to have been nothing less than the extension of their influence over the coast and islands of the Arabian sea-board from Kuwait to Masqat; but, as will be shown, the realisation of their scheme was confined within narrower limits by natural obstacles and by British opposition.

The principal promoter of the movement was Mid-hat Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of 'Irāq at the time; and an opportunity for action was provided by dissensions in the Wahhābi ruling family of Najd. Soon after the death of the Amīr Faisal-bin-Turki in 1865, a conflict had broken out between his sons 'Abdullah and Sa'ūd; and the Turks profited by the situation to recognise 'Abdullah, the elder, as Qāim-Maqām of Najd on their behalf, and so to obtain from him an admission of their suzerainty over Central Arabia.

Discussions
between the
Porte and
the British
Government.

Some hint of the intentions of the Turkish Government appears to have reached the Government of India at the beginning of 1871, and in February, Colonel Herbert, the British Political Resident at Baghdād, was ordered to enquire into the matter. At first no confirmation of the rumour was forthcoming; but eventually, at the end of March, the Resident reported that a Turkish expedition would shortly be sent by sea from 'Irāq to Qatif for the purpose of supporting the cause of the Amīr 'Abdullah in Central Arabia. The Government of India immediately drew the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the undesirability of the warlike operations contemplated by the Porte, which would involve a breach of the maritime peace and might be destructive of British trade, besides leading to political complications. Colonel Herbert having been further informed at Baghdād that it was intended to establish Ottoman supremacy over "Bahrain, Masqat and the independent tribes of Southern Arabia," a further communication was made by the Indian to the Home Government; and, at the end of April or beginning of May, an assurance was obtained from the Porte at Constantinople that they did not harbour the ambitious designs attributed to them. It was added by the Turks on this occasion that their sole object was to restore tranquillity

in Najd, and that there was no question of disturbing the peace at sea, but only of transporting a force by water to a point on the coast from which it could march into Najd. In May it was ascertained that Mid-hat Pasha, who in 1870 had described Bahrain and its dependencies as "countries of the Ottoman dominions, appertaining to the Qāim-Maqāmlīq of Najd," was aware of the pledges given by the Port; and he stated that the commander of the expedition had received explicit instructions that "he should on no account turn his eyes on Bahrain." Meanwhile the Shāh of Persia had enquired of the British representative at Tehrān about the intentions of the Turkish Government in respect of Bahrain, and had been informed of the assurances given at Constantinople. Considerable irritation at the interest shown by Great Britain in the Turkish movements in Arabia was expressed by the Grand Vazīr at Constantinople; and it became necessary to disabuse him of an impression, which he appeared to entertain, that resistance by Arabs to lawful authority of the Sultān of Turkey was encouraged by the British Government.

The prospect of a disturbance of the peace of the Gulf, so unusual in its nature, placed the Government of India in a difficult position; and the narrowness of the legal or treaty-basis on which the established practice of interdicting all armed movements by sea rested now became for the first time fully apparent. The question was one not of hostilities between signatories of the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, but of a possible war between signatories and non-signatories, for which that treaty made no provision. The Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Pelly, was soon approached by Arab chiefs with indirect queries whether the British Government would prevent the maritime tribes from proceeding to the assistance of the Wahhābi Sa'ūd, against the Turks; and Sa'ūd made an explicit request in writing that either the Shaikh of Kuwait should be prevented by the British Government from assisting the Turks or he himself should be considered at liberty to take action by sea. On the one hand it was felt by the British authorities that to restrain the Arabs would be to give indirect assistance to the Turkish expedition, on the other that to let them loose might be to upset the political equilibrium of the whole Gulf and at the same time to provide the Porte with an excuse for conquering and annexing their countries. Ultimately, on the 30th of May 1871, the Resident was instructed to visit Bahrain and to assure the Shaikh that, so long as he continued to observe his Convention of 1861 with Britain, the obligations of the British Govern-

British policy
in the Persian
Gulf in
connection
with the
Turkish
expedition.

ment towards him would be* fulfilled; and on the 5th of June Colonel Pelly was further instructed to interdict the Trucial Shaikhs from maritime operations, whether on the side of or against the Turks, and to use his influence with all other chiefs for the purpose of maintaining the peace at sea. No reply was sent at the time to the Wahhābi Sa'ūd. When the crisis arose there was not a single British war vessel in the Gulf; but eventually the "Bullfinch" reached Bahrain on the 3rd of June, the "Magpie" passed Jāshk on the 5th of June, and the "Lynx" arrived at Hanjām on the 16th of July.

The Turkish Government were subsequently informed of the instructions given to the British Resident, and the Grand Vazīr expressed his thanks; he added, however, that, if any of the Trucial Shaikhs should voluntarily offer their services to the Porte, the same would be accepted, as the Turkish Government had no cognisance of the arrangements in regard to the maritime peace in the Gulf. To meet this evasion the Turkish Minister was immediately supplied with copies of the engagements between the British Government and the Trucial Shaikhs.

Occupation
by the Turks
of the Qatif
Oasis.

Precise details regarding the Turkish operations are, for the most part, wanting. The naval portion of the expedition, seen by Colonel Herbert at Basrah at the beginning of May, consisted of the steam corvette "Broussa," 23 guns; the steamer "Ninone" originally unarmed, in which four guns had been placed; the "Khojah Bey," an old wooden guardship long deemed unseaworthy, 18 guns; and three Basrah-built brigantines, little better than the "Khojah Bey," carrying 12, 6 and 4 guns. Two other steamers were added later; but the bulk of the transport must have been provided by the Shaikh of Kuwait, who was subsequently found to have joined the expedition in person with 300 vessels belonging to his port. Saiyid Muhammad Sa'id, a son of the Naqīb of Basrah, Mansūr, a Shaikh of the Muntafik, and other influential Arbas from 'Irāq accompanied the troops, apparently as "parlementaires" or political intermediaries. The Turkish force, which consisted of about 4,000 regular troops and 1,500 Arab auxiliaries with nine guns, disembarked at Rās Tanūrah on the 26th of May 1871 and marched by land to Qatif town, meeting with slight opposition by the way. The Wahhābi Governor of Qatif having refused to surrender, the town was attacked by land and sea on the 3rd of June and was taken after a three hours bombardment. A column was then sent out which occupied 'Anik after a show of resistance,

* A general assurance of support must have been intended. In the Convention, however, protection by Britain except against "Chiefs and tribes of this Gulf" does not appear to be promised.

capturing there three guns and a quantity of ammunition; it proceeded next to Dammām, which fell on the 5th of June. 'Abdul 'Aziz, a son of the Wāhhābi Sa'ūd, escaped from Dammām before it was taken; he left behind him a prisoner, Muhammad-bin-Faisal, whom the Turks released; and nine iron and two brass guns and a quantity of military stores also came into their hands. At the end of June the Kuwait fleet had returned home and the Turkish force was still in the Qatif Oasis; but an advance was contemplated.

On his first reaching Qatif town a manifesto was published by Nāfiz Pāsha, the Turkish Commander, in which it was announced that the expedition had come to restore the authority of 'Abdullah, the Qāim-Maqām of Nājd; that Sa'ūd, the rival of 'Abdullah, and his supporters would be pardoned if they came in and made submission; and that, in the meanwhile, the tribes which remained peaceably in Qatif and Hasa would enjoy Turkish favour and protection.

Turkish
proclamation
at Qatif.

Early in July the Turkish force left Qatif for Hofūf: the march across the intervening desert occupied, though unopposed, 15 days. Thereafter, the Hasa Oasis having been occupied without any fighting, the Arab contingent of Muntafik and others, as also the political intermediaries, were dismissed to their homes; the cause of this appears to have been, in part at least, commissariat difficulties; and the Muntafik, who returned by land *viā* Kuwait, lost many horses on the way from scarcity of fodder and of water. From the time of disembarkation the Turkish expedition had been a prey to starvation, enteric fever and cholera; the march to Hofūf had further weakened its strength; and it was now brought to a complete standstill in Hasa by hot winds and a violent outbreak of malaria. In August, when the total Turkish force in Hasa was estimated at 3,400 men,—*viz.*, 2,500 at Hofūf, 500 at Qatif, 150 at 'Oqair and 250 on the march,—one third of the whole were reported sick and ineffective; and the Turkish Commander, who had become uneasy in regard to his communications with the coast, enlisted 900 natives of the country as soldiers on pay of \$6 a month. A shock was given to Muhammadan sentiment throughout the province by the arrival at Qatif of a ship-load of wine sellers and Baghdād prostitutes; but the trading classes seemed on the whole to prefer the disadvantages of Turkish administration to the greater severities and exactions of the Wāhhābis.

Advance by
the Turks
into the Hasa
Oasis.

At the time when the Turkish force first landed in Hasa, the Wāhhābi brothers 'Abdullah and Sa'ūd were fighting with each other in the interior, at a distance of some 200 miles from the coast. The advantage appeared to rest with Sa'ūd, the opponent of the Turks, who had obtained posses-

Proceedings
of the
Wāhhābis.

sion of the capital, Riyādh. In August 'Abdullah arrived at the Turkish headquarters, having been prevented by the insecurity of the roads from coming in earlier; but in October, seeing that the intention of the Porte was not to re-establish but to supplant his authority, he fled, preceded by his brother Muhammad and accompanied by his son Turki, from Hofuf to Najd. In October no movement took place upon either side. In November Sa'ūd attacked the Turks in Hasa; but he was beaten off and retired with his Bedouins to the deserts in the direction of Qatar, where he remained for a considerable time. Correspondence with a view to a reconciliation and joint action against the Turks then began between Sa'ūd and his brother 'Abdullah, but it had no result.

Visit of Mid-hat Pāsha to Hasa, November-December, 1871.

On the 9th or 10th of November 1871, Mid-hat Pāsha, the Wāli of Baghdād, anxious to see the fruits of his action with his own eyes, left the Shatt-al-'Arab for Kuwait, where he spent one day, and thence proceeded with three steamers, carrying a considerable number of troops, to Qatif. He reached that port on the 13th or 14th of the month, and on the 21st embarked again with an escort of 300 men for 'Oqair, from which he made his way to Hofuf. The objects of the Pāsha's visit to Hasa, as stated by the Turkish Commodore in conversation with Colonel Pelly, were to enquire into certain complaints of corruption, to settle the administration of Hasa, and to arrange for the further advance of the Turkish troops to Riyādh; but the garrison of Hasa was found in so miserable a plight, able only to act on the defensive, that the last of these ideas was necessarily abandoned. Mid-hat Pāsha contented himself, accordingly, with proclaiming the deposition of the Wahhābi rulers of the Al Sa'ūd family and the appointment in their place of Nāfiz Pāsha as Mutasarrif of Najd; but he had not relinquished his unexecuted schemes. On his way back to Baghdād, where he arrived on the 28th of December, the Wāli purchased the "Snipe," a steamer formerly British, to maintain communication between Fasrah and Qatif. Mid-hat Pāsha had brought a large number of invalid soldiers back with him to Baghdād, and on the 1st of January 1872 he despatched a fresh draft of 300 men from there to Hasa.

Bearings of the Turkish expedition on Qtaar and Bahrain affairs.

The assurances given by the Turkish Government that no aggression would be committed upon Bahrain, or upon independent Arab tribes, were not very rigidly construed by the agents of their policy. About June 1871 Mid-hat Pāsha denied, in a communication to Colonel Herbert, the possibility of the existence of independent tribes in Najd; and the comprehensiveness of the name "Najd" in his estimation was indicated by a list, published in the Baghdād official journal, which included among

the "houses and gardens" of Najd the towns of Sharjh Dibai and Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān. As related in the history of Qatar, the Turkish flag was hoisted at Dōhah on the coast of that promontory in July 1871 and a Turkish garrison established there in January 1872; and it seems not improbable that, but for the attitude of the British Government and the constant presence of their war vessels, some similar measures would have been attempted in Bahrain, where, as described in another place, more than one endeavour was made by the Turks to intimidate the Shaikh. From an early stage of the proceedings the Bahrain exile Nāsir-bin-Mubārak was found to be present with the Ottoman forces; and a disposition to intrigue with the Turks was at one time shown by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in Trucial 'Omān, but after a visit which he paid to the Sultān of O'mān in 1872 his attitude was found to have changed. Early in 1872 the Turkish Government gave fresh assurances that their action would be confined to vindicating their authority in districts to which their title was undisputed, and they referred to the recent recall of Mid-hat Pāsha from Baghdād as a proof that they did not mean unduly to extend the field of operations.

Military occupation of Hasa by the Turks, 1872-74.

In the spring of 1872 negotiations with Sa'ūd were opened by Raūf Pāsha, the new Wālī of Turkish 'Irāq; and Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdur Rahmān with a certain Fahad-bin-Sanaitān, arrived in Hasa to treat with the Turks. 'Abdur Rahmān was induced to visit Baghdād, where he was detained under surveillance until August 1874; and not long afterwards Fahad-bin-Sanaitān was accused of intrigue by Muhammad Pāsha, who had meanwhile succeeded Nāfiz Pāsha as Mutasarrif, and was sent in irons from Hasa to Baghdād. Muhammad Pāsha was followed in the Mutasarrifate by Faiz Pāsha; and in 1873, while the garrison were relieved and efforts were made to establish regular steam communication between Basrah and Qatīf, the scheme of advancing to Riyādh seemed to have been abandoned.

Negotiations
with the
Wahhābis.

Meanwhile the inhabitants of Hasa began to tire of Ottoman rule and to complain loudly of oppression by the Turkish officials and soldiery; and it was reported that the Government had no well-wishers left among the local Arabs. The Turkish troops continued to be decimated by disease.

Internal
affairs.

British
relations.

In 1873-1874 a marine survey of the Hasa coast was carried out by the British schooner "Constance" under special arrangements with the Porte and with the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq.

Government of Hasa by the Turks through a Shaikh of the Bani Khālid, 1874.

Installation
of Barrāk-
bin-'Arair,
March 1874.

In March 1874 the Turks, finding the Hasa province a serious drain upon their military and financial resources, made a short-lived experiment in economical administration: it consisted in a sweeping reduction of the garrison and in the substitution of *Barrāk-bin-'Arair, head of the once dominant Bani Khālid tribe, as Mutasarrif in place of a Turkish official. The new Governor was installed by Nāsir Pāsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, who arrived at Rās Tanūrah with the steamers "Athaur," "Ālūs," "Lebanon" and "Sinope"; he brought with him Ahmad Pāsha, who had been appointed to command the remaining troops, and a supply of grain for the Turkish posts. A large assembly was held in Hasa, in which the appointment of Barrāk was announced; and Nāsir Pāsha then returned to Basrah with the bulk of the troops and a number of prisoners, the latter being persons who had sent in memorials against the exaltation of Barrāk. The tribal Mutasarrif was provided with a corps of Dhābi-tiyahs or military police, by means of which, and of the tribes well affected to himself, it was hoped that he would be able to maintain his authority.

Rebellion,
and
overthrow
of Barrāk.

These arrangements lasted for some months; and at first, but for frequent complaints of the exactions of the Mutasarrif and for various symptoms of the unpopularity of Turkish rule, affairs seemed to progress smoothly enough. Early in the autumn of 1874, however, the Wāhhābi 'Abdur Rahmān, having been permitted to leave Baghdād, proceeded to Bahrain and thence opened a secret correspondence with some of the tribes on the mainland.† A few weeks later he landed at 'Oqair; thousands flocked to his standard; and Shaikh Barrāk shortly found himself invested in the fort of Hofūf. The Turks, with unusual promptitude, despatched a force of 2,400 infantry and 4 guns under Nāsir Pāsha, who was responsible for the arrangement made with

* The name also occurs as "Bazih," "Bazeh," etc., but Barrak appears to be the correct form.

† A protest made by the Turkish Government in regard to 'Abdur Rahman's proceedings in Bahrain is noticed in the history of that principality.

Barrāk, by sea to the scene of the revolt; and "the work of retribution was quick, decisive and terrible." 'Abdur Rahmān fled; his force dispersed in all directions; and the Hasa Oasis was given up during several days to the excesses of the Turkish soldiery. Order being restored, Nāsir Pāsha in February 1875 returned to 'Irāq, leaving his son, Mazaiyid Pāsha, in charge of the province *vice* Barrāk deposed; and about the same time Hasa and the other districts depending on Basrah were separated from Baghdād and formed into a separate Basrah Wilāyat under Nāsir Pāsha,—an arrangement which continued until 1880.

Subsequent events in Hasa, 1875-77.

During the next three years few reports, except such as related to the occasional relief of Turkish troops, were received of affairs in Hasa. In 1876 Mazaiyid Pāsha was succeeded as Governor by one Sa'id Bey. In 1877 abortive negotiations took place between the Turks and 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, Wahhābi, with a view to the appointment of the latter as Turkish Mutasarrif of Hasa.

Miscellaneous
affairs, 1875-
78.

Serious outbreak of piracy upon the Hasa Coast, 1878-80.

In 1878, in consequence of an alarming outbreak of piracy with which the Turks showed themselves unable to deal, Hasa became for a time the chief centre of interest in the Persian Gulf; the Bahrain Islands and the promontory of Qatar were affected by the rapidly spreading disorder; and large questions of British policy and of the position and responsibilities of the Turkish Government in Eastern Arabia arose and were discussed. The piratical trouble appears to have been closely connected, in its origin, with a rebellion in Qatif.

In order to enable the seriousness of the situation to be appreciated, it is necessary first to give a brief account of the depredations committed by the pirates; and in doing so it will be advisable to include some crimes belonging properly to the Qatar district which cannot be conveniently treated of elsewhere.

Piracies from
August to
November
1878.

A gang of Bani Hājir, having crossed the Gulf, seized and plundered some Persian vessels near Shaikh Shu'aib Island, wounding two men; then, attacking a boat of unknown nationality, they murdered the Nākhuda,

carried off Rs. 10,000 in cash, and returned to Qatar. Another gang, consisting partly of Bani Hājir and partly of Āl Morrah, seized a Shū'ai belonging to 'Amāir of Qatīf; put to sea in the same and captured a Qatīf Baqārah, which they carried to Dammām; took and plundered a Qatīf Māshuwah; proceeded in the Qatīf Baqārah to the Qatar coast, where a Baqārah of Dōhah fell a prey to them off Rās Laffān; and finally carried their plunder to Dōhat-as-Salwa and there released the prize in which their cruises had been made. A party of Bani Hājir Bedouins under Zāid-bin-Muhammad, one of the Bani Hājir of Dhahrān, having embarked at Dōhah as passengers in a Rās-al-Khaimah vessel, compelled the master to put ashore at a place on the coast of Qatar; re-inforced there by 17 other Bedouins they sailed for the Persian coast; between the islands of Qais and Hindarābi they captured a Māshuwah, owned upon the Persian side, wounding the Nākhuda and his son; they then returned to Rās Laffān on the coast of Qatar, where they transferred four of their victims to the Rās-al-Khaimah boat and let it go, but two of the Māshuwah's crew they retained as prisoners. A Bahrain Māshuwah, on her way from Qatīf to Bahrain, was attacked and plundered by Bani Hājir near Dammām, and two slaves on board of her were carried off. Another Bahrain Māshuwah met with similar treatment in the same neighbourhood at the hands, it was supposed, of the same gang. On the 4th of September a Qatar Māshuwah bound for 'Oqair was attacked, while passing Zubārah, by the people of that place in two Bēqarahs; three passengers were killed on the spot, six were wounded of whom one died, a girl was kidnapped, and property worth \$700 was taken; the attack was led by Muhammad-bin-Rāshid, son of the headman of Zubārah, whose father, looking on from the top of his fort, found nothing to censure in his proceedings except that the lives of any of the victims should have been spared. At Dārīn on Tārūt Island a boat belonging to a Baghlah owned by Ibrāhīm-bin-Yūsuf, a naturalised British subject, was seized by a gang of 25 Bani Hājir under the aforesaid Zāid-bin-Muhammad, who carried it off to Dammām; the crew were then released except a boy and a slave; these the pirates kept. A Būm, anchored in the inner harbour at Qatīf town, was seized by Bedouins, probably 'Amār, and was carried off along with her cargo of dates, the Nākhuda and two sailors being at the same time kidnapped; she was afterwards seen prowling in a piratical fashion off the Bahrain islands. A Dangi, while lying in the inner harbour of Qatīf, was surrounded by four boats of the Amāir and plundered of \$200, a large sail and her small boat. A boat from a Ghunchah belonging to Rās-al-Khaimah was attacked on shore by six or seven 'Amāir under the very walls of the Qatīf fort, and

property worth more than \$360 was plundered ; the robbers fired after their victims, as they attempted to escape by swimming, and wounded the Nākhuda ; the boat was taken to 'Anik. A Māshuwah, carrying passengers for Bahrain, was seized at the town of Qatif by a gang of 'Amāir and carried off. On the 27th of September a Bahrain Baqārah, arriving near Qatif town, was attacked by a Būm and a Māshuwah, containing respectively 13 and 16 Bani Hājir, and was robbed of her sails, small boat and gear ; the personal effects of the crew were taken and a slave kidnapped by the pirates, who landed with their spoil at Dammām.

All the above cases, which are probably not given in their strict chronological order, appear to have occurred during the months of September and October 1878.

At the end of December 1878 Mansūr-bir-Manākhir, a Shaikh of the 'Ajmān, and Zāid-bin-Muhammad, already mentioned, having seized by force a boat belonging to Bahrain, put to sea and plundered two vessels near Qatif town, from one of which they carried off property worth Rs. 20,000 ; ten vessels carrying Turkish troops from Qatif to 'Oqair were in sight at the time, but disregarded the appeals of the victims for assistance. Early in 1879 a new gang of Bani Hājir, encouraged by the successes of Zāid-bin-Muhammad, started under another leader and took two Bahrain vessels laden with dates ; after despatching their booty to the interior they sailed again in quest of fresh plunder. On the 11th of February a daring raid was committed in Bahrain by a band of 30 Bani Hājir from Dhahrān, who landed at 'Aqāriyah and killed a Bahrain subject. A whole series of piracies ensued, committed by Zāid-bin-Muhammad of Dhahrān and his Bani Hājir followers with the assistance of some of the 'Ajmān ; it culminated, in July 1879, in an attack upon a Bahrain pearl vessel, in which one of the crew was killed and three were wounded, while the vessel herself with property worth 2,000 Qrāns and two slaves, was carried off but ultimately recovered.

In June 1879 the pecuniary loss caused by these offences was estimated to have reached 67,000 Qrāns, in the recovery of 8,834 Qrāns out of which the British Government, through its subjects, was interested. In one case two native vessels bound for Kārachi, the " Harsingar " and the " Futtehkar, " had been fired into and plundered by pirates at a distance of only two miles from Qatif town.

In June and July of 1880 fresh piracies by Zāid-bin-Muhammad and his associates were reported.

The Turkish administration would gladly have ignored these atrocities, though committed invariably by their nominal subjects and to a large extent in Turkish territorial waters ; but the British Government, by

Piracies from
December
1878 to July
1879.

Local action
by Turkish
and British
Governments.

whom peace in Hasa waters had formerly been maintained, could not acquiesce in a policy of inaction.

1878. In October 1878, in connection with the serious crime then recently committed off Zubārah, Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, was instructed to ask the Turkish Wāli of Basrah that the offending township should be punished, and to make an offer of British naval assistance. About the same time H.M.S. "Vulture," Commander Pringle, succeeded in capturing fifteen piratical vessels of the 'Amāir off Qatif and three vessels and four boats belonging to the Bani Hājir, two of which were prizes from Bahrain, in the waters to the south of Qatif. All these craft were handed over to the Turkish Governor of Qatif on a receipt; and the important services rendered by the ship were subsequently acknowledged both by the Government of India and by the Foreign Office in London. In a friendly interview with Colonel Ross at Basrah in the month of October, 'Abdullah Pasha, the Turkish Wāli, declined the help of British ships, but promised to punish Zubārah if the guilt of the place were established to his own satisfaction; in the meanwhile, however, Zubārah ceased to exist, having been destroyed by tribal enemies as described in the history of Qatar.

1879. In January 1879, the disorders still continuing, a Turkish force marched by land against the small coast settlement of Qal'at-al-Husain in Dhahrān; but it did not succeed in capturing any of the pirates or in recovering any of the stolen property; and meanwhile two Turkish vessels of war, the "Broussa" and the "Iskanderia," which had been sent to the coast of Hasa by the Turkish Ministry of Marine, had both broken down. In February, chiefly for the protection of Bahrain, H.M.S. "Spartan" was stationed off the coast of Qatif, and the Assistant Political Resident, Captain Durand, was posted temporarily in Bahrain; and by April two Bahrain vessels carried off by pirates had been recovered by H.M.S. "Vulture," and matters had to some extent quieted down. In July, in consequence of the renewed piracies of Zāid-bin-Muhammad, representations were made to the Porte and to the Turkish Governor of Basrah, but without satisfactory, or indeed any, result. In November Zābit Pasha, the successor of 'Abdullah Pasha at Basrah, was urged to take action for the suppression of piracy in Hasa; but he showed no disposition to comply. In December the Shaikhs of Qatar were warned by letters from the British Resident in the Gulf, delivered through the Senior Naval Officer, to avoid becoming implicated in the crimes of Bani Hājir.

1880. In April 1880 Zābit Pasha was addressed regarding the pirate Zāid-bin-Muhammad and replied that he had not yet been able to effect his capture

Finally in March 1881, worn out by the importunity of the British authorities, by whom further complaints had been raised in consequence of fresh misdeeds by Zaid in the months of June and July preceding, the Wāli of Baghdād informed the British representative there that “no piracy or plunder of vessels had been committed by Zaid-bin-Muham-mad” and “that perfect tranquillity and security prevailed on the Qatar coast by land and sea.” 1881.

In short, though Hasa had become in name a Turkish province, maritime security along the coast—so far as it existed at all—was maintained by the action, now legally unjustifiable, of the British Government.

Discussion as to Turkish jurisdiction and responsibility on the coast of Hasa, and orders as to British action in future upon the same, 1878-81.

A very difficult problem had thus arisen through the substitution of nominal Turkish jurisdiction for virtual British jurisdiction upon the coast of Hasa, and through the uncertainty which prevailed as to the extent of littoral over which Turkish rights were claimed, or should be admitted to exist. On the one hand it was desired to avoid giving offence to Turkey: on the other it was abundantly clear that any concession to the Porte would result in a proportional increase of piracy.

The Government of India, who began to consider the question in 1878 and whose opinions were expressed in May 1879, deprecated the recognition of Turkish authority anywhere to the southward of 'Oqair, except at the town of Dōhah in Qatār only, where a Turkish garrison was maintained. They considered that the Shaikhdoms of Trucial 'Omān should be expressly placed beyond the sphere of Turkish influence not only in regard to the coast but also in regard to the interior; and that stipulations should be made in respect of Bahrain implying British protection of that principality and enabling the Shaikh, though otherwise debarred from interference on the mainland, to pursue aggressors upon his islands into Turkish jurisdiction. To mark and secure, from an international point of view, the political position of the Arab Shaikhs in question, it was suggested that arrangements should be made for the payment by them in future of a small tribute to the British power in return for its protection. With reference to the prevention of piracy it was proposed

View of the
Government
of India.

that pirates should continue to be pursued by British vessels into Turkish waters, and even upon the Turkish coast within the range of naval fire, but that otherwise operations upon the mainland should devolve upon the Turkish authorities ; that pirates captured by British ships under these conditions should be dealt with by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf ; and that the Turkish administration should be held responsible for obtaining redress in the case of all piracies committed from Turkish jurisdiction.

Opinion of
Her Majesty's
Government.

The India Office were at first disposed to concur in the recommendations of the Government of India ; but the Foreign Office considered that the acceptance of the scheme by the Porte, involving, as it did, the abandonment of considerable territorial pretensions on the part of Turkey and the admission of foreign interference in waters admittedly Turkish, was not to be expected. The establishment of a declared protectorate over the Arab principalities concerned was likely, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, to give rise to inconveniences even more serious than those which it was sought to avoid. The Foreign Office inclined to the view that British naval interference in Turkish waters should only be exercised in special circumstances, when the consent of the local Turkish authorities had been obtained.

Action by
British
vessels on the
Hassa coast
suspended
May 1879.

Meanwhile the question of the employment of British ships of war against pirates in Turkish waters or on the Turkish coast, authorised by the Government of India in March 1879, had been referred by the Naval Commander-in-Chief in India to the Admiralty, and by the Admiralty to the Foreign Office. In May 1879 a suspension of the operations in question was directed ; and later, as the Law Officers of the Crown held them to be internationally unjustifiable even in the peculiar circumstances of the Hassa coast, they were prohibited.

Negotiations
with Turkey.

As time went on, however, and insecurity in the Gulf showed no signs of abating, it became necessary to insist on attention being paid to representations, from time to time addressed by the British Government to the Porte, which had hitherto been met by evasion and delay. Sir H. Layard, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, was accordingly instructed to suggest an arrangement by which the Turkish Government should permit action, when indispensable for the suppression of piracy, by British vessels within the three-mile limit to the north of 'Odaid ; and it was intended that certain stipulations for Turkish co-operation when available, for the transfer of prizes to the Turkish authorities, and generally for the maintenance of the dignity of Turkey in her own waters should form part of the understanding. Negotiations on this basis continued at

Constantinople during a part of the year 1880, but were altogether fruitless.

All efforts to arrange the matter by conciliatory action having thus failed, it was ultimately decided by Her Majesty's Government, in 1881, that British Naval Officers on the East India Station should not be hampered by the three-mile limit in pursuing piratical craft in Turkish waters; and subsequently it was explained by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India that the intention of this order was somewhat wider than it appeared to be; for it meant, in fact, that "the commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf should have liberty to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbance of the peace of the seas, avoiding, however, the raising of needless questions with the Turkish authorities, where they exist, or unnecessary encroachment upon the jurisdiction of the Sultān, wherever it may really be effectively established along the coast north of 'Odaid." No decision as to the proper limits of Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Eastern Arabia resulted from the correspondence and negotiations described above; indeed care was taken to avoid raising the question with Turkey, whose claims were understood to be excessive, comprising Bahrain and all 'Omān; and, apart from a resolution not in any circumstances to recognise Turkish sovereignty over Bahrain or over countries to the east of Khor-al-'Odaid, Her Majesty's Government themselves abstained from forming any conclusion

Final orders
in regard to
British naval
action.

Turkish Governors of Hasa, 1878-1907.

The narrative of internal affairs in Hasa, from the year 1878, may now be resumed. We shall first mention the names of the governors by whom the province was successively ruled, and then notice the events of the period, on which their personalities do not appear to have exercised much influence.

Sa'id Bey, appointed in 1876, remained in power until the next year, when he was recalled, not before he had earned for himself a good reputation as an administrator.

Mutasarrifs
of Hasa,
1876-77.

Sa'id Pāsha, his successor, was a native of Baghdād, of non-Turkish birth, and a man of some intelligence and activity; during this, his first term of office, he gained the esteem and good-will of the people of Hasa and maintained an efficient administration. His removal, in 1879,

1877-79.

resulted from the disgrace and dismissal of his patron, 'Abdullah Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, by whom he had been nominated.

- 1879-80. In December 1879, Sa'id Bey was re-appointed to the Mutasarrifate and sustained his previous good reputation until his final departure in 1880. In 1880 Hasa, with the other districts depending on Basrah, was again incorporated in the Wilāyat of Baghdād.

Sa'id Bey was relieved by 'Abdul Ghani Pāsha, sent from Constantinople, who was described as a religious fanatic of weak intellect. A revolt of the 'Ajmān tribe in 1880 led to the suspension and confinement of this governor by the military officer commanding the troops; and, though a commission which was sent to enquire into the case reported in his favour, 'Abdul Ghani Pāsha was removed in the following year.

- 1881-85. Sa'id Pāsha was then appointed Mutasarrif for the second time, and discharged the duties of his office with ability and in a conciliatory spirit from 1881 until 1885. In 1884 the Basrah districts, including Hasa, were finally separated from Baghdad and constituted into a separate Wilāyat.

- 1885-86. Nazih Pāsha relieved Sa'id Pāsha in November 1885, but his term of office was short, terminating early in 1886.

- 1886-87. His successor, Muhammad Sālih Pāsha, remained in power from March 1886 till some time in 1887.

- 1887-90. From 1887 to January 1890 Hasa was governed by Rifa'at Bey, during whose term of office a visit was paid to Qatif and Qatar by Nāfiz Pasha, Wāli of Basrah. His removal was attributed, by one account, to friction between himself and the military authorities in Hasa; but it may have been due merely to a change of Wāli at Basrah, where Nāfiz Pasha about the same time made way for Hidāyat Pasha. Rifa'at Bey appears to have been an energetic administrator.

- 1890-91. The post of Mutasarrif was held from 1890 to 1891 by 'Akif Bey, a military officer with a large programme of political reform and aggrandisement, the greater part of which he was unable to execute. He left, on account of ill-health, early in 1891, and was said to have died on the way home.

- 1891-94. In May 1891 Sa'id Pāsha assumed the governorship of Hasa for the third time; he remained until April 1894, when he resigned. During his Mutasarrifate the Wāli of Basrah made a tour in Hasa, which lasted from October 1892 till May 1893 and is described further on; and some effort was apparently made to improve the administration, the Qāim-Maqām of Qatif being removed in July 1893 and replaced, in January 1894, by one Ra'ūf Effendi.

The next Governor was Ibrāhīm Pāsha, formerly in charge of 1894-96.
Hodaidah, who held office until 1896.

Sa'id Pāsha was then appointed to Hasa for the fourth time ; he was 1896-1900.
recalled for the last time in 1900. In conversation with the British Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, on his final return to 'Irāq in January 1901, Sa'id Pāsha attributed his removal to the machinations of the military commandant in Hasa, whom he described as "an ignorant Turk." It seemed that his later policy in Hasa had been to supersede the regular Turkish garrison, in part, by a locally raised force ; and that the commandant, annoyed by his aspersions on the troops, had succeeded in convincing the superior authorities that the pro-native policy pursued by Sa'id Pāsha had been responsible for the introduction of modern rifles into the country in quantities which endangered the safety of the Turkish army of occupation. Sa'id Pāsha died in retirement at Baghdād in 1905.

The military Commandant who had traduced Sa'id Pāsha succeeded him as Mutasarrif ; but his rival's depreciatory estimate of his character was evidently not erroneous, for he only retained his position until September 1901, when he was dismissed on account of the universal discontent excited by his high-handed proceedings.

Another military officer, named Taufiq Bey, then acted as Mutasarrif. 1900-01.

A civil Mutasarrif was again appointed in 1902, in the person of 1902-05
Saiyid Tālib Pāsha, son of the Naqib of Basrah, who arrived in June of that year. He showed considerable energy in dealing with tribal disorders ; but his illegal exactions were boundless, and culminated, early in 1903, in his plundering the house of Hāji Mansūr Pāsha, one of the Bahārinah of Qatif, manager of the Dāirat-as-Saniyah properties in Hasa and probably the richest merchant in the whole province, whom he charged with disloyalty to the Turkish Government, and whose brother, Ahmad-bin-Juma, he imprisoned. The spoil of Hāji Mansūr's house filled three sailing vessels, of which the departure was reported by the British representative in Bahrain, while their arrival at the Naqib's residence at Sabiliyāt on the Shatt-al-'Arab came in due course to the notice of the British Consul at Basrah. Tālib Pāsha was temporarily recalled in October 1903, when Fāiq Pāsha, the military Commandant, was nominated to act as Mutasarrif during his absence ; but he was not finally removed from his appointment until February 1905. His treatment of Hāji Mansūr appears to have been the cause of his dismissal. *

* Tālib Pasha appears to have been the author of a long iminute, pan-Islamic in tendency, on Turkish policy in Arabia, of which a copy was obtained by the British Embassy at Constantinople.

1905-07.

The next Governor was Najib Pāsha, under whom troublesome bickering continued between Hāji Mansūr and the customs farmers of the province: the cause of the latter, who had been under the protection of Talib Pāsha, was now supported by the military authorities generally and by a number of the civil officials. Najib Pāsha was still in power at the beginning of 1907.

Fiscal and
general
administra-
tion of
Hasa, 1877-
1907.

From the first the government of Hasa by the Turks has been carried on at a financial loss; and many of the political difficulties with which local Governments have had to contend may be traced to the efforts of successive Mutasarrifs, doubtless under orders from Constantinople, to develop the local revenue and make it balance the expenditure.

1882.

At the beginning of 1882, probably under 'Abdul Ghani Pāsha, harbour dues began to be collected at Dārīn from vessels entering or leaving the port of Qatif; and vigorous efforts were made to collect arrears of agricultural revenue, fixed at Rs. 1,70,000, from the villages of the Qatif Oasis. The latter demand, in some cases at least, referred to plantations once owned by the Wāhhābi Amīrs which had escheated to the Turkish Government and had greatly deteriorated through inattention. In one case troops with a gun were marched out to coerce a refractory village, but it was found deserted.

1887-88.

In 1887, under Rifa'at Bey, a spasmodic attempt was made to create an ocean port at Dārīn, for the purpose of capturing the Hasa and Central Arabian trade of Bahrain; but the experiment was a failure and was discontinued in the following year.

1891.

In 1891 great discontent was reported to prevail at Qatif on account of "new laws" regarding land tenures, succession, and probate duty. The cause of these troubles may have been the institution in Hasa of a branch of the Department of Land Records; for the Tāpu, established in 'Irāq in 1889, would naturally be extended to Hasa soon afterwards.

1894-95.

Throughout 1894 a struggle was maintained at Qatif between the merchants and the Turkish collectors of revenue; it related to the enhancement of a tax upon dates for export; and it was accompanied by a demand for arrears on account of two previous seasons. Notwithstanding deputations to Basrah and emigration to Bahrain, the authorities appear in the end to have carried their point. These events occurred under Ibrāhīm Pāsha, who also attempted to recover increased tribute from the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah, and other nomads; but the main result, as will be seen further on, was the dragging of the Mutasarrif into a quarrel between two Bedouin tribes.

About the end of 1900 the Governor of Hasa was directed to levy an extraordinary contribution of 12,000 Lirahs on the province for the benefit of the Imperial Turkish Treasury. This demand accentuated general dissatisfaction that already existed among the wealthier inhabitants of Hasa, by whom it had to be met. 1900.

In 1901 it was stated in Bahrain by the retiring Mutasarrif of Hasa that the annual revenue of the province was 60,000 Lirahs, of which 54,000 was swallowed up by army expenditure, leaving a deficit after civil charges had been met. 1901.

An enumeration of the date palms in the Qatif Oasis, made in 1903, was said to have resulted in an immense increase in the registered number of taxable trees. 1903.

The customs of the province for the year 1905-06 were leased for an amount greater by $37\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. than in the preceding year; and in 1906-07 the amount of the farm was higher, by $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., than in 1905-06. In the autumn of 1905 and spring of 1906 a census of the population was attempted in the Qatif and Hasa Oases, apparently with a view to the imposition of a poll tax; but serious riots resulted at Hofuf and Mubarraz, and the proceedings were stopped. 1904-06.

Political administration and tribal disturbances, 1878-1907.

The political condition of Hasa, outside the two principal oases, was during this period one of chronic insecurity: in this respect no progress appears to have taken place during the last thirty years, but rather the reverse.

In the summer of 1878 a rising against Turkish authority, headed by Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān, sons of the late Wabhābi ruler Sa'ūd, took place in the Qatif Oasis; Dammām passed temporarily into the hands of the Wabhābis; and the town of Qatif was closely invested for a time by hordes of Bedouins. These were dispersed in the first instance by the accidental appearance of H.M.S. "Vulture," and afterwards large Turkish reinforcements arrived from 'Irāq. In December the sons of Sa'ūd, unable to make head against the Turks, took refuge in Bahrain; but they were not allowed to remain there. Many of the people of Qatif had also sought an asylum in Bahrain during the investment of their own by the Bedouins. Rebellion, 1878.

1879. In 1879, in consequence of raids committed by some of the Bani Khālid about Qatif, Sa'id Pasha with the gunboat "Iskanderia" visited and destroyed one of their forts, apparently that of Qasr Āl Subaih upon the coast to the northwards, after which the guilty section submitted and gave hostages for their future good behaviour. The Mutasarrif was unable, however, to make any impression on the marauding Bani Hājir; and a respectable merchant of Hasa was at this time waylaid and murdered by Zāid-bin-Muhammad, the well-known pirate belonging to that tribe.
- 1880-81. In 1880 the 'Ajmān tribe attacked the Hasa Oasis, expecting to take the Turkish garrison at a disadvantage; but the Commandant, who had been apprised of their intentions, gave them a warm reception, killing 60 of the 'Ajmān and capturing two of their Shaikhs. The civil Mutasarrif, 'Abdul Ghani Pasha, seems to have been locally considered accountable for this incident; and, as already mentioned, the military authorities in Hasa even proceeded so far as to place him under arrest on some charge arising from the affair. On his return to the province in 1881, Sa'id Pasha tried to induce the chiefs of the 'Ajmān to return to Hasa, whence they had fled; but for some time they refused to be cajoled.
- 1882-92. During several years after this, the province enjoyed peace; but about 1890 disturbances again became rife; and at length, in 1890 or 1891, a large date caravan was plundered by Bedouins of the Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir, and other tribes. This necessitated a temporary withdrawal of the tribal subsidies paid by the Turkish Government; and several camelmen were executed in connection with the raid. 'Akif Bey, the Mutasarrif at the time, seems to have advocated the formation of a camel corps to deal with the Bedouins and to escort caravans between Hofūf and 'Oqair; and he also proposed the establishment of a number of posts, some of which were sanctioned.
- 1892-93. Possibly in consequence of these arrangements, travellers by the Hofūf-'Oqair road passed unmolested during the rest of 1891 and part of 1892; but on the 14th of May 1892 a very serious outrage was committed by 300 Bedouins of the Manāsir, Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah tribes, who attacked a caravan proceeding under an escort of 25 Turkish soldiers from Hofūf to 'Oqair, killed 15 and wounded 10 persons, carried off cash and goods to the value of Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 20,000 respectively, and plundered 40 pilgrims who were marching with the caravan. Numerous robberies, attributed to the Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah, began to occur in the vicinity of Hofūf; and the townspeople no longer dared

to make journeys, unless in armed parties of 20 or more and protected by the presence of tribal Rafiqs. About the middle of October 1892 the Wālī of Basrah arrived at Qatīf, evidently to enquire into the state of affairs in Hasa, and proceeded *via* 'Oqair to Hofūf. At Hofūf his first act was to take security from the chief people of the town and neighbourhood that they would have no dealings with the marauding tribes, whereupon the latter retired into the desert. In February 1893, when the Wālī made an excursion to Qatar, Arabs were engaged to protect caravans travelling by the Hofūf-'Oqair road; and the regular troops were employed in raiding the Bedouins, not altogether without success. About the same time the help of the Shaikh of Kuwait appears to have been invited, for in March Shaikh Mubārak of that place arrived in Hasa by land with a number of mounted men. In May 1893 the Wālī, after witnessing with his own eyes a serious Turkish disaster in Qatar, returned to Basrah by way of Qatīf; he had failed to restore security; and the Hofūf-'Oqair road was still considered unsafe. In June 1893 a grand attack by the Manāsīr, Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah upon the Bani Khālīd was expected, and caravans for 'Oqair were again provided with military guards; but the raid did not take place.

In February 1894 a caravan on the way from Hofūf to Qatīf was 1894-95.
 attacked and plundered by Bedouins of the Dawāsīr tribe; but the robbers, on finding that it was under the protection of a Dōsiri Rafīq, made restitution. In 1895, the Mutasarrif having required the Bedouin tribes of Hasa to render an increased tribute, the 'Ajmān pleaded their inability to pay until property raided from them by the Mutair should have been recovered, whereupon the Governor, with the assistance of the 'Ajmān and other tribes, attacked the Mutair and captured some of their animals.

In April a post-runner was waylaid and robbed between Qatīf and 1898.
 Hofūf by some Āl Morrah, and pursuit of the raiders was undertaken by mounted troops from Hofūf. Meanwhile, however, the Āl Morrah gang were attacked by Dawāsīr, and the troops, coming up, saw and fell upon these last, with the result that two Turkish soldiers were killed and two wounded and that the Dawāsīr took three of the cavalry horses.

In 1901 the road from Hofūf to 'Oqair again became very unsafe; 1901-02.
 and on the 30th of April 1902 a large caravan, while moving down to the coast under an escort of 120 regular cavalry, 30 regular infantry and 80 mounted Dhābitīyahs, was attacked and captured at Qōfdīyah, about 15 miles from 'Oqair, by Āl Morrah and Bani Hājir; among the Āl Morrah the Āl Bahaiḥ section were prominent in this affair. The

escort were for the most part, either killed or taken prisoners and kept by the Bedouins as hostages for the safety of fellow-tribesmen then in jail at Hofuf. The booty of the robbers consisted of goods worth about Rs. 1,00,000 in addition to some 600 camels and 300 donkeys. In June 1902 Tālib Pāsha arrived as Mutasarrif of Hasa, and in July the Turkish garrison of the province was increased by 500 infantry, 200 cavalry and 4 light guns. On the 10th of September a column, sent out from Hofuf, succeeded in surprising a large camp of Āl Morrah at Zarnūqah, about 40 miles south of the Hasa Oasis; many Arabs were killed, including a brother of one of the Shaikhs of the Āl Bahaih, and much Bedouin property fell into the hands of the Turks. The new Mutasarrif further interdicted the people of Hasa from trading with the Āl Morrah; and in October, after a skirmish with an Āl Morrah escort, a caravan of 80 camels, laden with rice and dates for the tribe, was captured by the Turks; on this occasion there were several casualties on the Turkish side. Probably with a view to strengthening their hold upon the Arab tribes, as also to asserting their sovereignty over the coast to the northward, the Turks, in 1902, established Dhābitiyah posts upon the islands of Musallamiyah and Jinnah.

At the beginning of 1903 the internal position must still have been unsatisfactory, for, in January of that year, another battalion was added to the Hasa garrison.

1906-07.

In January 1906 a serious fracas occurred at Ruqaiqah, a great Bedouin camping ground one mile to the south of Hofuf, between the 'Ajmān and Āl Morrah tribes; but the Turks intervened and stopped the fighting. A day or two later Muhammad-bin-Sharaim, the chief Shaikh of the Āl Morrah, was murdered, and the tribe seem to have considered the Turks in some way responsible for the event; the result was that, on the 3rd of March following, a large caravan on the Hofuf-'Oqair road was ambuscaded by Āl Morrah, Bani Hājir and Manāsir at Baraimān, a place only five miles from Qofdiyah, where a similar disaster had taken place in 1902. On the present occasion the Turkish escort of 45 men and a number of camelmen and travellers were killed, and property to the value of Rs. 3,00,000 was carried off. No retributory measures were undertaken by the Turks; and in April, August and September other caravans were surprised and looted by Bedouins on various roads leading to or from the Hasa Oasis. In August a collision occurred between the inhabitants of Mubarrāz and an encampment of the 'Ajmān, in which several lives were lost; and in October a more serious conflict took place between the townspeople of Hofuf, aided by the Turks, and

Bedouins of more than one tribe : in this last affair the troops suffered about 20 casualties and temporarily lost a gun.* At the end of December military reliefs from Basrah began to reach Hasa, and advantage was taken of the temporary increase of the garrison to overawe, and to some extent pacify, the Hasa Oasis and surrounding districts ; the withdrawal of the relieved troops, who appeared somewhat shaken by the experiences which they had undergone on their service in Hasa, then commenced. In February 1907 Sa'adūn Pasha, the chief man of Mubarraz, and his son left in haste for Basrah to assure the Turkish authorities there of their innocence in regard to the disturbed state of Hasa.

Piracies upon the Hasa coast, 1881-1907.

Meanwhile the scourge of piracy continued upon the coast of the Hasa province, though generally in a milder form than during the epidemic of maritime lawlessness in 1878-80.

Piracies from
1881 to 1888
and Turkish
inaction.

In May 1881 the celebrated Bani Hājir pirate, Zāid-bin-Muham-mad, tried unsuccessfully to seize some boats belonging to the 'Amāir ; petty piracies near Qatif and between Qatif and Bahrain followed ; and finally the Bani Hājir attacked an 'Amāir boat and killed two men. Notwithstanding the fact that these outrages were committed in the immediate neighbourhood of Qatif, no steps were taken by the Turks to secure or chastise the Bani Hājir.

1881.

In June 1883 Bani Hājir pirates seized a Bahrain vessel near the coast of Qātif and plundered it, after mortally wounding the Nākhuda. A month later four slaves who had been carried off in the affair were restored to the owners through the Turkish authorities in Qatif.

1883.

In August 1884 Bani Hājir committed a piracy on a Qatar boat anchored off Qatif, and some members of the tribe were arrested by the Turkish authorities.

1884.

In 1886 a number of piracies occurred in the harbour of Qatif, in which boats belonging to Bahrain suffered. Their continuance unpunished was a cause of much disgust to the Shaikh of Bahrain, and a general

1886.

* According to a letter received at Basrah from the Tābur Aghasi at Hofuf, the losses of the Turks were very much more severe : viz., two officers and 76 men killed, 59 men wounded, and 85 mules, 141 rifles and one gun lost : and the village of Shaqīq was plundered and burned by the Arabs. The gun, according to the same authority was bought back for \$700

feeling of insecurity was diffused along the coast. A Turkish government steamer was anchored at Qatif when these outrages occurred, yet no attempt was made by the Turkish authorities to prevent them or to punish the malefactors.

1887. In 1887 there was a large crop of offences. On the 1st of August a Bahrain boat was taken by Bani Hājir and robbed to the amount of Rs. 645 ; in July a Kuwait fishing boat was plundered off Rās Tanūrah of property worth \$400, four of the crew being wounded ; in September a boat belonging to a brother of the Shaikh of Bahrain was looted by 30 Bedouins, in Qatif harbour, of every article of value ; on the 14th of September a Kuwait boat off Dārīn suffered loss, at the hands of a large band of Bedouins, to the extent of Rs. 2,318; on the 16th of October a Bahrain boat was pillaged off 'Anik by a gang of Bani Hājir ; on the 22nd of October a Tārūt boat was similarly treated, also by Bani Hājir ; and on the 27th of October two vessels, one belonging to Kuwait and the other to Bahrain, were attacked by Bani Hājir near 'Oqair, two sailors and five passengers were wounded, and everything moveable on board of either was carried off.

1888. In April and May 1888 two or three more cases of piracy occurred in Qatif waters notwithstanding that Nāfiz Pāsha, Wālī of Basrah, had visited Qatif in the preceding February and taken security from Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Dārīn for the prevention of piracy in the neighbourhood.

Discussions
regarding
Piracy
between the
British
Government
and the
Porte, 1883-
89.

In 1883, in connection with the piracy committed in that year, a reference was made to the Porte by Her Majesty's Government ; but, in consequence of redress having been afforded, though incomplete, and of the undesirability of raising the question of Turkish jurisdiction on the eastern coast of Arabia, the proceedings were ultimately allowed to drop. In 1887 and 1888 several remonstrances were addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of maritime disorders in the neighbourhood of Qatif ; but the only result was the despatch of an additional Turkish gunboat to the Hasa coast. This was a futile proceeding, for the Bani Hājir, whom it was chiefly necessary to coerce, were not a maritime tribe and only carried on their piratical practices by means of borrowed or stolen boats, while the waters which they frequented were generally too shallow for effective action by an armed steam vessel. An increase of the Turkish naval force in the Persian Gulf, besides being useless, was undesirable ; and an effort was therefore made to impress on the Porte the greater need for action on land, with the result, apparently, that in 1889 a military post for the prevention of piracy was temporarily estab-

lished on Rās Tanūrah. The trouble taken by Her Majesty's Government was not altogether thrown away, for there was now a brief cessation of piracy, and, when outrages recommenced, some attempt was made by the Turks to deal with the pirates on land.

In the pearl fishing seasons of 1891 and 1892 piratical offences abounded once more on the coast of Hasa. On the 18th of June 1891 a gang of 14 men, believed to be Bani Hājir, boarded a Shū'ai lying at Saihāt, killed one of the crew, and threw the others into the sea; Turkish troops were apparently sent in pursuit of the raiders. The same gang then attacked another boat, which, after killing one of the crew, they completely stripped; and a Turkish gunboat went to search for them, but they could not be found. In July a Qatif Shū'ai was boarded by 18 Bani Hājir near 'Oqair, one of the crew was wounded, all property on board and the gear of the vessel herself were taken, and two slaves and a cousin of the Nākhuda were carried away; in this case a Turkish military detachment turned out, but effected nothing. On the 20th of August, 16 Bani Hājir took possession of a Shū'ai from Tāhiri, a place on the Persian coast, with cargo for Bahrain and plundered her of goods to the value of Rs. 2,495, which they landed at Dōhat-as-Salwa; the Turks in this case took no action. In the next year, on the 1st of May 1892, a Bahrain boat putting into Dārin on the way to Qatif was pillaged by three Bedouins. On the 21st of May two Qatif Shū'ais were seized by Bani Hājir; but one was recovered, after pursuit of the pirates, by Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb, a notable of Qatif. On the 6th of June a gang of 25 Bani Hājir seized a Baghlah at Qatif and plundered a Qatif vessel of her cargo and gear besides Rs. 1,300 in cash; an armed boat was sent after the pirates by the Turks, but failed to come up with them. Finally, in September, a party of Bani Hājir Bedouins attacked a boat from Hasīneh on the Persian coast while beached at Qatif, killed the Nākhuda, wounded two of the crew and carried off \$700; in this instance Turkish troops went in pursuit and captured 10 of the robbers, but none of the booty was recovered. In 1892 a boat containing 20 Turkish soldiers was detailed by the authorities at Qatif to convoy boats passing between that place and Bahrain; but even after this some petty piracies occurred and went unpunished.

Fresh outbreak of piracy and ineffectual action by the Turks, 1891-1892.

With a view to the restoration of order it was proposed in 1891 by Colonel Talbot, Resident in the Persian Gulf, and recommended by Colonel Mockler, Resident at Baghdād, that the consent of the Ottoman Government should be obtained to the action of British cruisers in Qatif waters, either in combination with or independently of Turkish vessels;

British proceedings in regard to the piracies of 1891-1892.

but Her Majesty's Government decided that the scheme of separate action by British cruisers adopted in 1881 should continue to be followed, and that Turkish co-operation should not be invited. In some of the cases of piracy partial redress had been afforded by the Turks ; and it was decided by Her Majesty's Government to refrain, in these circumstances, from further demands for reparation.

Further
piracies.

In September 1893 a Kuwait vessel, beached at Qatif, was attacked by 15 robbers ; one of the crew was wounded and one of the marauders killed. Pursuit was made by Turkish customs guards, but was ineffectual.

In 1895 a single Arab,* while travelling as a passenger in a boat from Qatif to Bahrain with Tek Chand Dwarka Das of the Indian firm of Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Co. in Bahrain, made a brutal and treacherous attack upon his Hindu fellow passenger. The Baniyah, by throwing himself overboard, escaped with the loss of a hand and other severe wounds ; and the Arab then caused himself to be landed upon the coast with all the valuables—chiefly pearls—which the boat contained, estimated at Rs. 40,000. From the records it does not appear that satisfaction was ever demanded or obtained for this heinous outrage upon a British subject.

1896.

In 1896 Turkish gunboats were present more continuously than usual on the Hasa coast ; but the Bani Hājir, nevertheless, committed some piracies in Bahrain waters.

Serious
recrudescence
of piracy,
1899-1900.

In 1899 a fresh outbreak of piracy began along the shores of Hasa ; it was directed, as usual, chiefly against Bahrain shipping, the richest and the most defenceless in those seas.

The first case brought home to Turkish subjects was the plunder, on the 11th August 1899, of a Bahrain jolly-boat upon the Shiqqatah pearl bank to the north-west of Bahrain ; the robbers were 'Amāir of Hālat Dārīn on Tārūt Island, and the loss caused was estimated at Rs. 1,500.

The next year, on the 17th of August 1900, another Bahrain boat was boarded off Rās Tanūrah, again by natives of Dārīn ; property to the value of Rs. 3,924 was carried off, and a passenger who threw himself into the sea to escape the pirates was drowned. On the 2nd of September 1900 a Bahrain vessel was taken at sea, only a few miles north of Manāmah town, by Bari Hājir buccaneers, the damage done on this occasion amounting to Rs. 732 ; and on the same day a predatory attack was made, likewise by Bani Hājir, upon some Arabs on the island

* This Arab was apparently Ahmad-bin-Salman, who afterwards became a notorious pirate. See two pages further on.

of Umm Na'asān. On the 6th of September a Bahrain boat was attacked near 'Oqair by Bani Hājir of the Āl Muhammad section ; two men were wounded and much property was carried away, of which the bulk belonged to merchants of Hasa.

In the last of these instances Sa'īd Pāsha, the Mutasarrif of Hasa, bestirred himself to the extent of sending out troops by whom tribal camels were seized and Shaikhs arrested, and the Hasa merchants received compensation, but none was obtained by such of the sufferers as happened to be subjects of Bahrain ; and in the Shiqqatah and Rās Tanūrah cases partial redress only was afforded to the Bahrain complainants. The matter was accordingly brought, through the British Consul at Basrah, to the notice of the Wālī ; but the latter treated the subject nonchalantly and ultimately refused to discuss it on the ground that Bahrain was a Turkish, not a British, dependency.

Behaviour of
the Turks in
regard to the
piracies of
1899-1900.

In August 1901 fresh demands for indemnification and for the suppression of piracy were made on the Wālī of Basrah, but without apparent result. So far as could be learned, the only Turkish measure for maintaining security at sea off Hasa continued to be, as in the past, the rare despatch from Qatif to Bahrain of an armed boat, which, after remaining for a few days at Manamah, was accustomed to return direct to the Turkish coast.

Accordingly, with a view to ascertaining the steps, if any, taken by the local Turkish authorities, a visit by H. M. S. "Sphinx" to Qatif was authorised, and in February 1902 was carried out ; but the results were unsatisfactory, and no information of the kind desired was obtained. On the other hand the Commander of the British vessel and the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, who accompanied him, were treated with marked discourtesy ; they were detained first at the customs house and then at the port office, they had great difficulty even in obtaining an interview with the Qāim-Māquam, and they were prevented from entering the town.

Visit of
H.M.S.
"Sphinx"
to Qatif,
1902.

In 1902 a fresh series of maritime outrages began, and a new pirate leader made his appearance, who soon proved himself a worthy successor of Zaid-bin-Muhammad ; this was Ahmad-bin-Salmān, the son of a member of the ruling family of Bahrain by a daughter of a Shaikh of the Āl Muhammad section of the Bani Hājir. Ahmad had been for long an outlaw from the Bahrain islands and had lived for a time in Qatar, but he was now virtually domiciled in Turkish territory.

Piracies of
Ahmad-bin-
Salmān,
1902-1907.

Early in July 1902 this individual, with some Bani Hājir companions, stole a boat from Saihāt near Qatif and put to sea for nefarious pur-

1902.

poses ; but, having been driven on shore shortly afterwards by adverse winds, the boat was recovered by an armed party from Saihāt. On the 4th of August Ahmad succeeded in carrying off another boat from Sanābis on the island of Tārūt ; and, after crossing on the same day to the island of Umm Na'asān in the Bahrain principality, he seized a Bahrain boat of 28 tons burden, which he took over to Dhahrān along with its crew and cargo. On the 12th of August, he utilised his new prize to capture another Bahrain vessel off Dha'ain in Qatar and returned to his base of operations, which was now at Dōhat Dhalūm, with plunder worth Rs. 5,400, chiefly in pearls. Up to this time Ahmad had retained some connection with Qatar, where his family in September 1902 were still living at Sumaismah, and he had disposed there of part of the proceeds of his Umm Na'asān raid ; but the fruits of his second piracy were bestowed in Turkish territory, and his family soon followed him thither. In October 1902, on representations made by the British authorities to the Wālī of Basrah, Ahmad seems to have been captured by the Mutasarrif of Hasa. That official, in response to a request made direct and not through British intermediacy, returned a slave taken in the second piracy to the owner at Bahrain, and intimated that the rest of the stolen property was being recovered.

1903. In July of 1903 news was received that Ahmad, who had meanwhile been released or allowed to escape, was encamped with four 'Amāir companions at 'Anik, and subsequently at Saihāt, waiting for an opportunity to recommence his depredations. The fact was brought to the notice of the Ottoman authorities, who professed in reply that an effort had been made to arrest him and that he had escaped along the coast in the direction of Kuwait ; but the worthlessness of their assertions was soon demonstrated by Ahmad's reappearance in Hasa, where on the 15th of August he made an unsuccessful attempt to seize a boat at Dammām. He was then tried in his absence by the Hasa courts and was said to have been condemned " par contumace " to fifteen years' imprisonment.

1904. Nothing more was heard of Ahmad until the summer of 1904, when, early in August, he commandeered a boat on the Qatif coast near Safwa ; and a few days later, with 14 companions, he boarded a Qatar vessel anchored on the 'Asht-ad-Dibal and carried off plunder to the value of Rs. 3,642. This was the only piracy in connection with which his name was specifically mentioned in 1904 ; but the Turkish coast continued unsafe, and, on the night of the 4th of December 1904, a Persian Būm lying at Qatif was entered by robbers who killed three of the crew and carried off property worth \$2,000. In this case

the authorities at first arrested three inhabitants of Tarūt Island and two others, on suspicion ; but in the end the Persians got no satisfaction. A few weeks later the Persians returned in a sailing boat with a considerable force and attacked the first local boat they saw, which happened to belong to Dārīn, killing three Turkish subjects.

On the 25th of June 1905, his family being then settled at 'Anik 1905. near Qatif, Ahmad-bin-Salmān re-appeared and captured a boat, and on the next day he took another boat ; in these proceedings two men were killed and two wounded, and property valued at Rs. 3,600 was carried away. A month later 10 Bedouins in a Shū'ai, calling themselves followers of Ahmad, held up a vessel between Qatif and Bahrain, from which, after killing a boy and wounding two men, they removed property worth about Rs. 1,000. In October three Bedouins, who were proceeding as passengers in a boat from Dōhah in Qatar to Bahrain, suddenly fell upon and murdered another passenger, robbed all the other persons on board, and compelled the boatmen to change their course and sail to the Dhahrān shore in Hasa.

Early in July 1906 Ahmad-bin-Salmān woke to life once more and 1906. seized two small Bahrain boats on the coast of Dhahrān while the crews were collecting firewood ; one he disabled, and in the other he embarked with his companions, some 10 men of the Bani Hājir and Āl Morrah tribes. The pirates, most of whom, being landmen, suffered severely from sea-sickness, spent a week ashore near Rās-al-Buraiqat during a spell of bad weather, after which they moved to Dōhat 'Ain-as-Saih. On the 14th of July they fell in with a Budaiya' Būm, carrying passengers for Qatif ; this vessel carried only two firearms, but the owners made good use of them and not only wounded Ahmad himself but killed his most enterprising lieutenant, one of the Āl Morrah. This misadventure put an end to the proceedings of the gang for the season.

In June and July 1905 Captain F. B. Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, made two sailing trips of about four days' duration each in search of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, on which he was accompanied by about 50 of the armed retainers of the Shaikh of Bahrain ; but the whereabouts of the pirate could not be discovered. A fugitive slave of Ahmad, an eye-witness of the second piracy committed by his master during the season, was however found by Captain Prideaux and was sent to Qatif to give evidence before the Turkish authorities ; the Qāim-Maqām there apparently threw the witness into prison, but he also arrested four of the followers of Ahmad,—a step to which the gang replied by a third piracy, committed in July. In September Captain Prideaux visited Qatif and had

British
action in
regard to the
piracies of
Ahmad-bin-
Salmān.
1905-07.

a friendly interview with a new Qaim-Maqām who had recently arrived ; the meeting resulted in the release of the slave witness, who was subsequently manumitted.

In the summer of 1906, in consequence of the re-appearance of Ahmad-bin-Salmān, a British gunboat remained at Bahrain or on the banks during the greater part of the pearl-fishing season. In August the pirate paid a visit to Dōhah, and, though it appeared to have been of a furtive character, an explanation was required of Shaikh Jāsīm ; but no further action was taken.

1907.

In June 1907, in consequence of a report that Ahmad was about to recommence his depredations, H.M.S. "Lapwing" visited Qatif in order that her commander might discuss the subject amicably with the Qaim-Maqām ; but the meeting was declined, and the British officer and his party were treated with gross discourtesy, regarding which representations were made to the Porte by His Majesty's Government.

British relations with Hasa, 1871-1907.

Political and
general
relations.

The relations of the British Government with Hasa during the period now under examination, for the most part either arose out of piracies, and have therefore been already described, or had reference to Bahrain and will be noticed in a later paragraph. Here it may be mentioned that in 1884 the "Mubārak," a vessel belonging to a British Indian trader in Bahrain, was impressed by the Turkish authorities at Qatif to carry troops to 'Oqair ; but, the matter having been represented at Constantinople, compensation was promised and assessed at Rs. 50.

Commercial
relations.

We have adverted above* to the establishment at Qatif, before the Turkish annexation, of an Indian trading community ; and we may now trace the subsequent history of the settlement.

1871-1890.

With the effective occupation of Hasa by the Turks and the institution of custom houses the period most favourable to foreign trade probably came to an end ; but the affairs of the British Indian colony remained in a flourishing condition for some years longer. It has been estimated that, when the prosperity of the Hindu merchants was still at its height, trade worth not less than 15 lakhs of rupees per annum used to pass through their hands ; and in the busy season when temporary visitors were added to their number, as many as 60 trading Hindus, all however unaccompanied by their families, might be found simultaneously

at Qatif. About 1880 Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Company, one of the leading Hindu firms in Bahrain, made an effort to improve their position by establishing a strong agency in charge of Hindus at Qatif; and their example was followed by another Indian house.

Ultimately, however, in consequence of the exactions of the customs contractors and of obstacles thrown in their way by the port officials at the instigation of local merchants, the trade of the Hindus began to decline. Merchandise exported to India was liable to a duty of 1 per cent. only; but the duty was collected at the time of shipment at a rate of 8 per cent., the amount leviable on goods exported to Persia, and in practice the rebate of 7 per cent., legally recoverable on proof of arrival of the consignments in India, was seldom or never obtained from the contractors. The excess duty thus recovered from the Indian traders in three seasons was estimated, at the end of 1894, at Rs. 19,500; but the refund obtained in consequence of representations by the British Government amounted to Rs. 5,012 only. The other principal difficulties from which the Hindus suffered were intentional delays in weighing of their goods by the customs authorities, detention of their vessels for unreasonable periods in quarantine, executive orders which made it impossible for them to obtain animals for transport, and failure of the Turkish authorities to assist them in the recovery of debts. Political disorders and lawlessness eventually increased the difficulties of the situation; and, after the serious outrage committed in 1895 on one of the agents of Messrs. Ganga Ram Tikam Das & Co., the Hindus gradually withdrew from Qatif altogether. Their business, by 1897, had fallen to a half or even one-third of its former amount; and what remained was conducted on disadvantageous terms through local Muhammadan agents. 1890-97.

With characteristic pertinacity, however, the British Indian traders of Bahrain clung to the idea of re-establishing their position at Qatif; and in 1901 they offered to contribute Rs. 1,200 a year for 5 years towards the pay of a British consular representative at Qatif, should one be appointed. In November 1903, on the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit to Bahrain, they renewed their request for consular protection in Hasa; and they subsequently offered to guarantee a contribution of Rs. 2,000 a year. The necessity for some action was clear, inasmuch as the sum wrongly recovered as customs duty at Qatif from British Indian merchants amounted, in the year 1903 alone, to not less than Rs. 25,000. Representations were accordingly made to the Turkish Government on the subject of these exactions, and a promise was obtained from the Wali of Basrah that they should be discontinued, and that items already levied 1901-03.

in excess should be refunded. In consequence of these assurances a scheme which had been prepared for British consular representation, *viz.*, to obtain recognition of the Political Agent in Bahrain as Vice-Consul for Hasa and to post a native agent under his orders to Qatif, was again laid aside.

External relations of Hasa other than those with Great Britain, 1871-1907.

The close connection of Hasa with Bahrain, due to the commercial dependence of the province upon that Shaikhdom, necessarily continued under Turkish rule. Bahrain was the principality most seriously affected by the piratical developments, already described, upon the Turkish coast; and Hasa was naturally the base from which, as explained in the history of Bahrain, the Turks sought to assert their influence over those islands.

Massacre of
Bahrain
Shaikhs
and their
followers
in Hasa,
and British
representa-
tions,
1900-04.

One tragic incident, however, unconnected with either of these questions, falls to be noticed here. At the end of 1900 Salmān-bin-Di'aij, a first cousin of 'Īsa-bin-'Alī, the ruling Shaikh of Bahrain, proceeded on a hawking expedition, with his sons Di'aij and Bishr and a nephew named 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Rāshid, to the coast of the Dhahrān district in Hasa. The Shaikhs were accompanied by 20 servants and by four Bedouin Rafiqs; of the Rafiqs one belonged to the Āl Morrah, one to the 'Ajmān, and two to the Bani Hājir tribe. In the early morning of the 3rd of December 1900 the party were suddenly attacked in their camp at the Bin-'Aqdān well, five miles inland from Dohat 'Ain-as-Saih, by a band of about 50 Āl Morrah Bedouins of the Āl Bahaih section, headed by Rāshid-bin-Maqārih, a chief of the Āl Bahaih, one of whose sons had been killed in the previous year, in pursuance of a blood feud, by 'Amāmarah subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Of the Bahrain party only Bishr, the son of Shaikh Salmān, and two of the tribal representatives escaped,—alive though not unwounded; and a Dōsiri of Bahrain, who belonged to a separate hunting party but happened to be in Shaikh Salmān's tent when the surprise took place, shared the fate of his entertainers. On the side of the assailants the leader Rāshid with one of his sons was killed, and one or more tribesmen were wounded. Thirty camels and twenty rifles were part of the spoil carried off by the Āl Bahaih, whose object was probably plunder rather than reprisals—not warranted in the circumstances by any Arab custom—against the Shaikh of Bahrain.

The corpses of Shaikh Salmān and his party were buried by Muḥammad-bin-'Abdul Wahhāb of Qatīf who went to the spot for the purpose.

Through the British Consul at Basrah this massacre was brought to the notice of the Wālī of the Basrah without delay, and the Turkish authorities at first held out hopes of early redress. At this early stage of the matter they probably underestimated the difficulty of coercing the Āl Bahaiḥ and feared retaliatory measures by the Shaikh of Bahrain against the tribe ; indeed their apprehensions of action by the Shaikh were unmistakably betrayed in letters which they addressed to him. Soon, however, having become aware of the elusive habits of the offending section and also, no doubt, of the intention of the British Government to restrain the Shaikh of Bahrain from immediate reprisals, their anxiety to placate the latter grew perceptibly cool.

Serious representations to the Porte were delayed for a time by doubts on the part of His Majesty's Government as to the expediency of admitting that Turkish territory extended so far south as the scene of the occurrence ; but they were eventually made, in August 1901, on the ground that the Āl Bahaiḥ had retired into country under Turkish control. Before the occurrence of a Turkish disaster, which has already been mentioned above, at Qōfdīyah near 'Oqair in April 1902, the Turkish Government had so far yielded to the British representations regarding the Dhahrān massacre as to send stringent orders to their local officers for the arrest and punishment of the murderers. The fact that the Āl Bahaiḥ had taken a leading part in the Qōfdīyah affair subsequently supplied the Turks with a separate incentive to action ; and for a short time the negotiations in the Shaikh of Bahrain's case assumed a more promising aspect, especially after the success of the Ottoman troops against the Āl Morrah in September 1902.

Meanwhile the Shaikh of Bahrain had been asked by the Government of India to state the reparation to which he considered himself entitled, and had replied that the murder of three of his own relations could only be expiated by the surrender to him, without conditions, of an equal number of the Āl Bahaiḥ ; that blood-money to the amount of Rs. 23,520 was due to him on account of the 20 retainers and the Dōsiri visitor ; and that the value of the property plundered was Rs. 11,620. The Turks demurred to the claim, both on account of its nature and its amount ; and it is probable that their successes against the tribe were not, in fact, more than sufficient to wipe out their own claims arising from the Qōfdīyah outrage. In the interim the Āl Bahaiḥ, through the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Qatar, had made advances to the Shaikh of Bahrain for

an amicable settlement, and the Shaikh had been authorised by the British Government to respond ; but the Āl Bahaiḥ eventually hung back, and the intended negotiations did not take place.

In 1903, no steps having as yet been taken by the Turkish authorities to compensate the Shaikh of Bahrain for the massacre, discussion of the case was resumed between the British Government and the Porte. An assertion by the Porte that the murderers had all been killed in subsequent encounters with the Turkish troops having been disproved, and the unwillingness or inability of the Turks to take further action having become clear, His Majesty's Government decided that the Shaikh of Bahrain might be authorised to proceed in his own way against the Āl Bahaiḥ, provided that nothing was done in territory recognised as Turkish. This decision was communicated to the Porte in October 1904, but it was withheld from the Shaikh in consequence of his misconduct in certain matters which form part of the history of Bahrain.

In February 1905 a fresh outrage on Bahrain subjects was committed by the Āl Bahaiḥ tribe at Dōhat Huwaiqil in Barr-al-Qārah. The victims on this occasion were the crews of two Māshuwahs from Hadd on Muharraḡ Island, who had landed to collect firewood ; they were attacked by a gang of 35 Bedouins, two of their number were dangerously wounded by the bullets of the Āl Bahaiḥ, and a slave belonging to the party was carried off. In 1907 it appeared that the Āl Bahaiḥ, whom the Shaikh had prohibited from visiting Bahrain, considered themselves, on this account, as at feud with the whole Arab population of the islands.

Relations
with Qatar
and Trucial
'Omān.

The Turkish Mutasarrifs of Hasa were, after the occupation of the province, the principal instruments of the Turkish policy of expansion on the side of Qatar and Trucial 'Omān ; but their proceedings in this respect, belonging rather to the history of Qatar, are described in another place.

Relations
with Kuwait.

The use of Kuwait to some extent as a base of operations and the assistance given by the Shaikh of Kuwait in the Turkish conquest of Hasa in 1871 have been noticed above, as has also the co-operation of a Kuwait contingent under Shaikh Mubārak to restore order in Hasa in 1893. Towards the end of 1899 an Iradé, authorising the construction of a line of telegraph from Basrah to Qatif which would necessarily have passed through Kuwait, was issued by the Sultān of Turkey ; but no steps were taken to give the scheme effect.

Relations
with Najd.

The negotiations and other dealings of the Turks in Hasa with the Wahhābi rulers of Central Arabia have been described above in so far as

they related to the occupation of Hasa by the Turks and to the further designs of the Porte upon Najd. In 1892 asylum and a pension were provided by the Turks for 'Abdur Rahmān, the fugitive head of the Āl Sa'ūd of Najd, who had been expelled from Central Arabia by Ibn-Rashīd.

Occasional communication was held also with Ibn-Rashīd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar. Thus in March 1894 the 'Ajman tribe, having been attacked by Ibn-Rashīd, apparently in the coastal tract of Salū' towards Kuwait, appealed to the Turks for redress on the ground of their being tributary to the Porte, and the Mutasarrif of Hasa wrote on their behalf to the Amīr ; but to his letter Ibn-Rashīd merely replied that the 'Ajman were robbers, and that action had been taken against them in the interests of law and order. In 1895 Ibn-Rashīd complained that intercourse between Kuwait and Najd was being interrupted by the raids of the 'Ajman, Āl Morrah and other tribes nominally subject to Turkey, and requested the Mutasarrif of Hasa either to reduce them to order or to permit him to do so ; but the only response to this request seems to have been an attack by the Turks assisted by the 'Ajman upon the Mutāir, a tribe generally regarded as under the protection of the Amīr, of which an account has already been given above.

In July and August 1905 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of the Wahhābi Amīr, whose power had again superseded that of Ibn-Rashīd in Central Arabia, paid a visit to the part of the Jāfūrah desert adjoining Dōhat-as-Salwa. His presence, though he was nominally at this time a Turkish official, appeared to be embarrassing to the authorities in Hasa ; but he hospitably received a Turkish Tābūr Āghāsi who was deputed to call on him in his camp at Da'a'ilij in Jāfūrah.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF KUWAIT.*

Early History.

Foundation
of Kuwait by
the 'Utūb,
1716.

The foundation of the town of Kuwait, though a modern event, is the subject of various and conflicting traditions. The first settlers, however, almost certainly belonged to the 'Utūb, a tribe consisting of three principal divisions, the Jalāhimah, Āl Khalīfah and Āl Subāh, and said to be derived from the 'Anizah of northern Central Arabia. † Kuwait seems to have come into existence about the commencement of the 18th century, according to one account in 1716; and from the name it may reasonably be conjectured that the place was in the beginning an ordinary Arab settlement protected by a small fort. According to a tradition preserved by the Āl Subāh family who now govern Kuwait, the reason why the ancestors of their section came to Kuwait was that they had been expelled by the Turks from Umm Qasr upon Khor Zubair, an earlier seat from which they had been accustomed to prey as brigands upon the caravans of Basrah and as pirates upon the shipping of the Shatt-al-'Arab. When the settlement at Kuwait was formed, the Jalāhimah section were headed by one Jābir, the Āl Khalīfah by Khalīfah-bin-Muhammad, and the Āl Subāh—according to one tradition—by a Shaikh named

* For facts in regard to the history of Kuwait, we are not so entirely dependent as in the case of Qatar, Bahrain and Hasa on official records and compilations, and the following published works may be cited: Ives' *Voyage*, 1773; Seetzen in Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz*, July to December 1805; Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahabys*, 1834; Stocqueler's *Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage*, 1832; Pelly and Colvill's *Recent Tour round the Northern Portion of the Persian Gulf*, in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, Volume XVII, 1865; Pelly's *Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, 1866; and Pelly's *Report on the Tribes, etc., around the shores of the Persian Gulf*, 1874. The official publications containing most information are: *Bombay Selections*, XXIV, 1856; a *Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53*, by Mr. J. A. Saldanha, 1906; a *Précis of Kuwait Affairs*, by the same, 1904; a *Précis of Najd Affairs, 1804-1904*, by the same, 1904; and the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency.

† There is also a division known as the Āl Fādhil, but they have played no part in history.

Sulaimān-bin-Ahmad ; and the Āl Subāh enjoyed some sort of political predominance over the other divisions of the tribe. According to another authority the chief Shaikh of the Al Subāh at the time of the foundation of Kuwait was one Rahim.

In the first fifty years after its foundation, the town of Kuwait grew rapidly in wealth and importance ; and the 'Utūb, partly by means of matrimonial alliances with other tribes in the neighbourhood, succeeded in making their position good against the Bani Khālid, who till shortly before had dominated the whole north-eastern coast of Arabia. The chief of Kuwait from about 1756 to about 1762 was Shaikh Subāh, who was succeeded by his son, Shaikh 'Abdullah.

Rapid growth of the settlement, 1716-66.

In 1758, when Dr. Ives and his party passed through Khārag on their way from India to Europe, friendly relations prevailed between Baron Kniphausen, the head of the Dutch settlement on Khārag, and the Shaikh of Kuwait, "a man greatly obliged to him, and in some measure under his influence"; and it occurred to the Baron that arrangements might be made through the Shaikh for the British travellers to accompany a caravan proceeding from Kuwait by the desert to Aleppo—a route which, though more arduous, was shorter in time than that by Basrah and Baghdād. A boat was accordingly sent, on the 31st of March, to fetch the Shaikh from Kuwait to Khārag ; but he did not make his appearance until the 14th of April ; and his demands, when he came, were so extortionate and so firmly maintained as to make the Baron secretly doubtful of the expediency of the plan which he had himself proposed. The British party, on becoming aware of this, relieved him from his embarrassment by suggesting that, for various reasons, they should continue their journey by the Basrah-Baghdād route.

Relations of the Dutch at Khārag with the Shaikh of Kuwait, 1758.

In 1766, in circumstances of which no explanation except one probably fanciful is extant, the Āl Khalifah division of the 'Utūb separated themselves from the rest of the tribe and removed to Zubārah in Qatar, where they became an independent colony. They were followed, after a short interval, by the Jalāhimah ; and the Āl Subāh remained in exclusive possession of Kuwait.

Emigration of the Āl Khalifah and Jalāhimah from Kuwait to Zubārah in Qatar, 1766.

Friendly relations between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and those of Zubārah must, if ever interrupted, have shortly been resumed, for in 1776 one of the Shaikhs and a number of the chief inhabitants of Kuwait took refuge at Zubārah in consequence of the capture of Basrah by the Persians. The fall of Basrah did not, however, injure Kuwait ; on the contrary, a considerable part of the trade of Basrah was diverted, during the Persian occupation of that place, to Kuwait.

Effect on Kuwait of the capture of Basrah by the Persians, 1776-79.

Opening of
British
relations
with Kuwait,
1775-78.

The recorded history of British relations with Kuwait opens in 1775, when, on the investment of Basrah by the Persians, the British desert mail from the Gulf to Aleppo began to be despatched from Kuwait instead of Zubair. This arrangement was continued during the Persian occupation of Basrah until 1779, but it did not work very satisfactorily as the messengers were not under any proper control, and one packet was lost *en route* about the end of 1778.

Kuwait a
dependency
of Basrah,
1775.

In 1775 Kuwait was regarded as a dependency of Basrah; and, at the breaking up of the Anglo-Turkish squadron at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab on the departure of the British Agency to Bûshehr, it was considered a safe place at which to drop the Turkish and Arab personnel.

Arrest of a
French officer
at Kuwait by
a member of
the H. E. I.
Company's
Basrah
Factory,
1778.

An unusual incident occurred at Kuwait at the end of 1778, or possibly in January 1779. On the 3rd of August 1778 M. Borel du Bourg, a young French officer, left Marseilles with despatches in cypher for the French authorities in Pondichery and Mauritius. He was travelling from Aleppo to the Persian Gulf, when, in the desert at about 15 days' journey from Basrah, a party of Bedouin Arabs threatened him, and he had the misfortune to shoot one of their number. Severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he saved his life by throwing himself on the protection of the oldest of the robbers and promising to pay a sum equal to £100 English on condition of being conveyed in safety to Kuwait. On arrival at Kuwait he succeeded in borrowing the promised amount from an Armenian of the place, after which he wrote to M. Rousseau, the French Consul at Basrah, desiring to be supplied with the means of continuing his journey to Pondichery. The French Resident having refused or hesitated to honour the draft of his fellow-countryman, it was carried by the Arab messenger to the British Factory at Basrah, of which the staff in this manner became aware of M. du Bourg's presence in Kuwait.

A difficult question was thus raised, for a report had reached Basrah of war having been* declared between Britain and France, in which case it would be incumbent on British officials abroad to seize wandering French emissaries; but, on the other hand, the consequences to the British Resident were likely to be serious if he took action against M. du Bourg on information which subsequently proved to be incorrect. Mr. W. Digges Latouche in charge of the British Factory,

* The report was not incorrect. From 1778 to 1783 there was war between France and Britain, in consequence of the former power having openly sided with the United States of America in their War of Independance.

"perhaps as benevolent, humane and generous a being as ever existed," decided in the end that the Frenchman must be arrested, and sent his Second in Council, Mr. Abraham, in a cruiser, to put the resolution in effect. The vessel anchored out of sight of the town; and after dark Mr. Abraham, accompanied by the captain Mr. Sheriff, a man of remarkably powerful physique, proceeded on shore in a boat. The chief obstacle to the execution of their orders was the opposition of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who, though a well-wisher of the British Government, was strongly averse to the seizure of a person at the time enjoying his hospitality; after a protracted argument, however, his objections were withdrawn, principally, it would seem, in consequence of an assertion that M. du Bourg was a fraudulently absconding debtor. The British representatives then proceeded to M. du Bourg's house, and, on the door being opened by the French officer, who was in momentary expectation of a reply from the French Resident at Basrah and appeared dressed in nothing but his shirt, Captain Sheriff seized him in his arms and held him fast, while Mr. Abraham searched his apartments. The despatches were found; but M. du Bourg succeeded in destroying the key of the cypher, which was concealed in the lining of his coat, and their meaning was never ascertained.

It is pleasant to know that on arrival at Basrah M. du Bourg, whose misfortunes seem to have excited the greatest commiseration in his captors, and who was so incensed against M. Rousseau that he refused to hold any communication with the French Consulate, became the object of "every respect and attention" in the British Factory; that his wound, which for want of treatment had grown dangerous, was cured; and that he was eventually despatched on his homeward journey *via* Aleppo "with every assistance he could receive from the gentlemen of our Factory."

As related in the history of Bahrain, the 'Utūb of Kuwait took a leading part in the expulsion of the Persians from those islands and in the reduction of Bahrain to an Arab principality under their 'Athi kinsmen of Zubārah. Three years previously, in 1780, they and their fellow-tribesmen of Zubārah had been at war with the Ka'ab tribe of 'Arabistān; but the circumstances are not known.

Participation
of the 'Utūb
of Kuwait in
the 'Athi
conquest of
Bahrain,
1783.

Kuwait, of which the prosperity was at this time considered to stand necessarily in an inverse ratio to that of Basrah, benefited greatly through the occupation of the latter town by the Persians, in consequence of which the whole Indian trade with Baghdād, Aleppo, Smyrna and Constantinople was between 1775 and 1779 diverted to it. Even

Trade of
Kuwait,
1775-90.

after this, until 1781, merchandise for Aleppo was sometimes forwarded by direct caravan from Kuwait, thus escaping the duties levied by the Pāsha of Baghdād on goods forwarded through Basrah. By 1790 Kuwait had begun to share in the commercial prosperity which the seizure of Bahrain had brought to the whole 'Utūb tribe by drawing them into the carrying trade; and goods were imported from Masqat, Zubārah, Bahrain and Qatif. Merchants were efficiently protected at Kuwait, and the duty on imported goods was levied at the low rate of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Temporary location of the Basrah (British) Factory at Kuwait, 1793-95.

Staff and
establish-
ment of the
Factory.

On account of difficulties with Turkish officials, described elsewhere in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, the staff of the British Factory at Basrah withdrew from that place on the 30th of April 1793* and established themselves temporarily at Kuwait, where they remained until the 26th of August 1795. From the selection of Kuwait as a place of retreat from the Turks, it is clear that, whatever may have been the case in 1775, it was not in any real sense a Turkish dependency in 1793. The head of the factory was Mr. S. Manesty, a gentleman who played a conspicuous and somewhat eccentric part in the relations of Britain with Turkish 'Iraq about this period; and among those who accompanied him in his migration were the Joint Factor, Mr. Harford Jones, afterwards Sir Harford Jones Brydges, British Envoy to Persia; also a Mr. Reinaud, who at a later time attained celebrity as the first European visitor to Dara'iyah in Najd. For the protection of the British Factory at Kuwait a small cruiser was kept anchored in the bay, and a guard of sepoys under a native officer was stationed on shore. The staff of the Factory suffered much discomfort at Kuwait from the intense heat, which caused them sleepless nights, and from "the supply of water,.....infamously bad in quality, being at once salt, sweet and bitter"; and failure of health after a time obliged Mr. Harford Jones to proceed on leave to Europe.

* In Sir Harford Jones Brydges' *Wahauhy* the date is given as 1792, but this is probably a misprint.

During the sojourn of the factory at Kuwait the Wāhhābis were at war with the place, which they were anxious to reduce to submission, and they frequently showed themselves in the neighbourhood, causing incessant alarms. The town was at this time poorly defended by a mud wall, which, in the rainy season, frequently crumbled down in large breaches to the great alarm of the inhabitants; but the courage of the people was sustained by their confidence in Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, described as a venerable old man of commanding appearance, whom they regarded more as a father than as a governor. In general a Wāhhābi attack did not amount to more than a temporary seizure of the wells by a party of ten or twenty Bedouins, whom the matchlockmen of the town ordinarily succeeded in dislodging after a bloodless skirmish at very long ranges; but belated wanderers near the town were treated by the Wāhhābis with great inhumanity, the women being carried off and the men instantly put to death. It is recorded, on the authority of Dr. Seetzen, that Mr. Reinaud on one occasion actually saw two Wāhhābis murder an unfortunate Kuwaiti upon the seashore and wash their hands in his blood. During the stay of the East India Company's servants at Kuwait only one serious attack in force, which was easily repulsed, was made by the Wāhhābis. The real attitude of the British Factory towards these conflicts is uncertain: in theory it was one of neutrality.*

Wāhhābi
aggressions
on Kuwait,
1793-95.

* The statements made by Sir H. J. Brydges in his *Wahauhy* (pages 12 to 16) and by Mr. Reinaud in his conversations with Dr. Seetzen (see Von Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz*, July to December 1805, pages 234 to 235) are irreconcilable. Sir Harford represents the grand attack as having been made by about 500 Wāhhābis, who were driven off by a single shot from an old gun that had been brought ashore by the Shaikh from one of his vessels; and he is careful to explain that the Factory had no share in the proceedings, and that good relations were, on the contrary, studiously maintained with Ibn Sa'ūd. Mr. Reinaud, on the other hand, places the strength of the enemy at 2,000 camels, each carrying two men, the front rider armed with a gun and the other with a lance to protect his companion while reloading; he alleges that, under Mr. Manesty's orders, two guns were landed from the British cruiser, that the sepoy guard of the Factory took part in repelling the attack, and that the Wāhhābis lost heavily in their flight along the beach by the fire of the cruiser herself; and he adds that the resentment of the Wāhhābis at this interference expressed in depredations upon the Company's desert mail, was the cause of his own mission to Dara'iyah. Sir Harford may be the more reliable authority; but, on the other hand, it seems unlikely that Mr. Reinaud's circumstantial story should be altogether a fiction.

History of Kuwait from the removal of the British Factory till the arrival of the Egyptians in Hasa, 1795-1838.

Internal
history.

During more than 40 years after the return of the British Factory to Basrah, the name of Kuwait was seldom mentioned in the political correspondence of the Persian Gulf.

In 1820 Kuwait was represented as containing an armed population of 5,000 to 7,000 men, of whom only a few hundred were 'Utüb by race, and as dependent for its water supply upon the island of Failakah. In 1829 the authority of the Shaikh of Kuwait was partially acknowledged by the Bedouin tribes upon the coast as far to the southward as Räs Khafji; the annual imports of Kuwait were estimated at \$5,00,000, the exports at nearly \$1,00,000; and the place, which was flourishing in consequence of the peaceful policy of its ruler, was credited with the possession of a mercantile marine of 15 Baghlahs from 450 to 100 tons, 20 Batils and Baghlahs from 120 to 50 tons, and 150 other boats from 150 to 15 tons. In 1831 the town extended one mile along the shore with a depth of quarter of a mile, and the streets were wider than those of Masqat or Būshehr; but the only defence was a wall less than a foot thick on the side towards the desert, outside of which was a trench; and two honey-combed pieces of ordnance protected each of the three gates. The Shaikh in 1831 levied a duty of 2 per cent. upon all imports, but maintained no armed force.

The solidarity of the 'Utüb of Kuwait with those of Bahrain and Qatar appears to have been maintained during this period; and the Shaikhdom continued to resist, on the whole with success and latterly under the protection of the Turks, the efforts of the Wahhābi Amīrs to incorporate it with their dominions. Shaikh 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh governed Kuwait until 1812, when he died, much regretted by all on account of the mildness of his rule, which favoured commercial development, and under which the population of the town had increased very greatly. Shaikh 'Abdullah was succeeded by his son Jābir-bin-'Abdullah.

In 1831 the fleet of Kuwait assisted that of the Ka'ab Arabs to blockade Basrah in the interest of Dāwud Pāsha, who was about to be displaced from the governorship of Turkish 'Irāq; and about the same time Kuwait began to flourish with increased vigour in consequence of misfortunes by which Basrah had been overtaken.

In 1800 or 1801, in consequence of asylum having been afforded to some of the 'Atbi leaders whom he had recently expelled from Bahrain, ai yid Sa'id of Masqat appears to have visited Kuwait with a fleet by way of naval demonstration, if not of attack; and it is possible that on this occasion he succeeded in obtaining from the Shaikh the homage which he now apparently claimed as his due from all the 'Utüb. In 1809, on the eve of the first British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, the pirate-politician Rahmah-bin-Jābir of Khor Hassān in Qatar, who extended to the 'Utüb of Kuwait his desperate hatred for those of Bahrain, captured 20 Kuwait Batils which were making a voyage to Masqat. 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, Shaikh of Kuwait, one of whose sons was in charge of the convoy and lost his life in the affair, then vowed to punish Rahmah by means of a naval expedition against Khor Hassān; but it does not appear that he ever carried his threat into execution. In 1817 vessels from Kuwait frequented the ports of Bahrain and were the chief means by which plunder brought to Bahrain by Qāsimi pirates was conveyed across the Gulf for disposal in Persia.

Relations of
Kuwait with
Bahrain.

In consequence of the descents by the Saiyid of 'Omān upon the Bahrain Islands in 1800 and 1802, a temporary *rapprochement* seems to have taken place between the 'Utüb of Kuwait, as well as those of Bahrain, and the Wāhhābis; and in 1803, at the bidding of the Wāhhābi Amīr and not without reluctance on their own part, the people of Kuwait abandoned the pearl fishery for the year and proceeded to cruise, along with their kinsmen of Bahrain and the Qawāsīm of Trucial 'Omān, against the flag of Masqat; but in this enforced and distasteful employment they seem to have met only with reverses.

Relations
of Kuwait
with the
Wāhhābis.

In 1805, alarmed by the evident intention of the British authorities in India to take action against the piratical Qawāsīm, the 'Atbi Shaikhs of Kuwait and Zubārah, after describing themselves as subject to the Wāhhābi Amīr, represented the probability of their being compelled by him to engage in depredations on British trade, and suggested that the British Government should guarantee to them, in case of their severing their connection with the Wāhhābis, a safe retreat in Bahrain; but their proposals were not entertained.

At some time before this, apparently about 1801, some impetus was given to the development of Kuwait by troubles between the Wāhhābis and their subjects in the region of Hasa; by these disturbances the ordinary route of Indian merchandise to Central Arabia was closed for a time, and the place of Qatif and 'Oqair as ports of entry for the interior was taken by Kuwait and Basrah. In 1809 the Wāhhābi ruler, on

account of the refusal of tribute by the Shaikh and the repulse of a Wahhābi expedition from Kuwait in 1808, was found to be urging the Qāsimi Shaikh and the Saiyid of 'Omān to undertake a naval expedition against Kuwait and Basrah,—a summons which neither saw fit to obey. In 1813-14 the port of Kuwait was reported to be independent of Wahhābi influence.

Relations of
Kuwait with
Turkey.

In 1829 it was stated that the Shaikh of Kuwait acknowledged the authority of the Turks, to whom he paid an annual tribute of 40 bags of rice and 400 Frāsilahs of dates, and from whom he received every year a dress of honour. About 1836 Shaikh Jābir, being called upon to do so by the Turkish authorities, assisted them to reduce the rebellious town of Zubair to submission; but his part in the operations was confined to a blockade of the approaches to Zubair by water. On the fall of the town one of the Zuhair family of Zubair, named Ya'qūb, took refuge at Kuwait, where he was subsequently alleged to have sold to the Shaikh the estate of Sūfiyeh in the Ma'āmīr district on the Shatt-al-'Arab,—a circumstance which was to give rise to many troubles in the future.

In 1809 the Shaikh of Kuwait offered to join the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah with his own fleet, which was larger than that of the Qawāsīm, but his proposal was not entertained by the British commanders.

Relations of
Kuwait with
'Arabistān.

In 1837 Shaikh Thāmir, Chief of the Ka'ab tribe, in 'Arabistān, seems to have temporarily taken refuge at Kuwait, in consequence of the occupation of his town of Muhammāreh by the Turks.

British
relations
with Kuwait.

In 1821-22, on account of difficulties with the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq, the British Residency at Basrah was for a short time removed from that place to an "island," possibly Failakah, in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Kuwait.* Captain Taylor, then in temporary charge of the Residency, struck his flag at Basrah on the 15th of December 1821 and remained in Kuwait territory until the 19th of April 1822, when he returned to Basrah with his whole establishment.

After this Kuwait appears to have escaped notice by the British authorities for a considerable period; and in 1831, when the traveller Stocqueler visited the port, he was assured that no European had been seen there for many years,—an assertion which the curiosity manifested by hundreds of people in his appearance and dress seemed to corroborate.

* An inference that Kuwait was not as yet fully subject to the influence of Turkey (see preceding paragraph) might perhaps be drawn from this circumstance. The reference to an "island" may have been made in error.

Kuwait affairs during the Egyptian occupation of Hasa, 1838-40.

In 1838, on reaching the coast of the Persian Gulf in Hasa, the Egyptians sent an agent to reside at Kuwait, nominally to purchase supplies ; and some boat-loads of barley, obtained from the Shatt-al-'Arab, were in fact forwarded by this individual to Qatif. It was believed, however, that his real functions were those of a political emissary and news writer, in connection with the design of Khurshid Pasha to wrest 'Irāq from the Turks ; and he was treated with much distinction by the Shaikh of Kuwait, who gave him the seat of honour in all assemblies. The only consignment of military stores that reached the Egyptians by sea during their occupation of Hasa was one brought to Qatif, in November 1839, by a Kuwait Ghunchah from Hodaidah in the Red Sea. The fleet of Kuwait, at this epoch, was said to be large and well-appointed.

Posting of
an Egyptian
agent to
Kuwait,
1838-39.

Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait had always been regarded as a good friend of the British Government, and in his written correspondence he had never failed in courtesy ; but in 1839, estranged possibly by the neglect of the official representatives of the British Government to conclude treaties or cultivate personal relations with him, and overawed, like the Shaikh of Bahrain, by the successes of Muhammad 'Ali's troops in Arabia, he was guilty of marked discourtesy to a British officer. On the 30th of October 1839, Lieutenant Edmunds, the Assistant Resident at Būshehr, deputed by the Resident to interview Shaikh Jābir with reference to the establishment of a British line of post across the desert from Kuwait to the Mediterranean, arrived at Kuwait in a British war vessel, which on anchoring fired the usual salute in honour of the Shaikh. The salute was not acknowledged, and, when a letter from the Resident was sent to the Shaikh on shore, only a verbal message was returned promising an answer the next day. The deputation of relatives and followers, moreover, ordinarily sent on board by Arab Shaikhs to welcome a British official visitor, did not make their appearance ; and Lieutenant Edmunds remained on board his ship, without any further communication taking place between himself and the Shaikh, until the third day. He then requested a meeting with Shaikh Jābir, which was granted ; but on his arrival the old man, whom he found surrounded by a concourse of people, only half rose from his seat, did not lay aside the pipe which he was smoking, and denied that it was a custom at Kuwait to return the

Discourtesy
of the Shaikh
of Kuwait to
the British
political
authorities,
October-
November
1839.

salutes of British vessels ; he produced however a reply, ready written, to the Resident's letter. Lieutenant Edmunds and Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, both considered the unusual conduct of the Shaikh on this occasion to be due not to ill-will but principally to a desire to mislead the Egyptian agent at Kuwait as to the nature of his relations with the British power ; and, this view having been adopted by the Government of India, it was decided that no formal remonstrance need be addressed to the Shaikh.

Question of establishing a British settlement in the vicinity of Kuwait, 1839.

In returning to Būshehr Lieutenant Edmunds visited Failakah Island, on the suitability of which for the site of a British naval and military station to replace Khārag he reported unfavourably ; but he was much impressed with the potentialities of Kuwait itself, and thought that the place might be found well adapted for certain purposes by the British Government. Perhaps in the same connection Lieutenant Felix Jones of the Indian Navy also reported on the harbour of Kuwait in this year.

History of Kuwait from the evacuation of Hasa by the Egyptians to the annexation of that province by the Turks, 1840-71.

During the 30 years that followed the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Eastern Arabia, the political relations of Kuwait were mainly with the Turkish province of 'Irāq ; but friendly intercourse was maintained with the representative of Britain in the Gulf, and there were signs of increasing intimacy between the rulers of Kuwait and Central Arabia. On the other hand the close connection, founded on kinship, between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Bahrain, which had been suspended since about 1820, appeared, after a short revival in 1843-46, to die a natural death.

Internal history.

During the greater part of this period Kuwait was ruled by Shaikh Jābir, who died in or about 1859 and was succeeded by his son Shaikh Subāh. The Government of Shaikh Subāh,—who in 1863 was described as a fine, stout, hale old man, more than 80 years of age, rough in appearance and manner but kind of heart,—was patriarchal ; and he sat daily at the gate to superintend the affairs of his subjects. In the town of Kuwait there was little interference by officials with the life of the people, and punishments were seldom inflicted ; political authority was exercised by the Shaikh, but judicial power belonged to the Qādhi alone ; there

were no customs or other taxes, the revenue for public purposes consisting of about \$20,000 a year which was voluntarily contributed by merchants and others; and religious toleration, extending even to Jews, was the rule. Beyond the limits of the town the influence of the Shaikh reached some 8 or 10 miles. Bedouins were not allowed to enter Kuwait armed. Shaikh Subāh, at his death in or about 1866, was succeeded by his eldest son 'Abdullah.

The intervention of Shaikh Jābir of Kuwait in Bahrain affairs, occasioned by the struggle there between Shaikhs 'Abdullah and Muhammad of the ruling Āl Khalifah family, is described at length in the history of the Bahrain principality. Here it will be enough to recall the facts that in August 1843 the Shaikh of Kuwait of his own motion, but not without the approval of the British authorities, visited Bahrain and tried, in vain, to reconcile the rivals; that in 1843 or 1844, at the imminent risk of a collision with Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain, which in fact was only averted by the intervention of the British authorities, he attempted, unsuccessfully, to provision the ex-Shaikh 'Abdullah's fortress of Dammām, then invested by the Wāhhābi forces on land and blockaded by the fleet of Shaikh Muhammad at sea; that in 1844, after the fall of Dammām, he harboured for a short time the fugitive Shaikh 'Abdullah at his town of Kuwait; and, finally, that he allowed the ex-Shaikh to remain at Kuwait from 1845 to 1846, during which period, as particularly requested by the British Resident at Būshehr, he was careful to restrain his guest from the commission of maritime irregularities. In 1869 Muhammad, an ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, was deported to Kuwait, but he did not remain there long.

Relations of
Kuwait with
Bahrain.

At the epoch now under consideration, the attitude of the Kuwait Shaikh towards the Wāhhābi power, hitherto that of a declared opponent or at best of a nominal and unwilling feudatory, became decidedly less antagonistic. In 1841 'Abdullah-bin-Thaniyān, a relative and competitor of Khālid, the *de facto* Wāhhābi Amīr, took refuge at Kuwait, where he stayed for a short time only; but before the end of the same year, on 'Abdullah, who had meanwhile returned to Central Arabia, obtaining the upper hand, Khālid in his turn sought and found an asylum at Kuwait. In 1863 friendly relations existed between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Faisal-bin-Turki, who then ruled Najd, but no tribute was paid by the former to the latter. In 1866, as we shall see further on, the Wāhhābi Amīr 'Abdullah, who maintained an agent at Kuwait for political purposes as his father too had done even so early as 1851, was prepared to assist the Shaikh in a quarrel which occurred between the

Relations
of Kuwait
with Najd.

latter and the Turks; and it may have been at this time that, as described in the history of Najd, he passed near to Kuwait in returning from a raid upon the tribes of Turkish 'Irāq.

Relations of
Kuwait with
'Arabistān.

In 1841 the Ka'ab Shaikh Thāmir appears to have sought an asylum at Kuwait for the second time, having been expelled from his hereditary possessions in 'Arabistān by the Persian Governor of that province; but he soon migrated to Basrah.

British
relations
with Kuwait.

Official intercourse between the British Resident in the Gulf and the Shaikh of Kuwait appears to have been infrequent; but personal relations continued on an excellent footing. On his visit to Kuwait in 1863 Colonel Pelly, the Resident, accompanied by Dr. Colvill, arrived at Jahrah by land from Basrah on the 3rd of March; the next day he was conducted by Mubārak—a son of the ruler—to Kuwait, where he spent a couple of days with Shaikh Subāh; on the 7th of March, under arrangements made by the Shaikh, Colonel Pelly left Kuwait by sea for Turkish territory; and he passed two days, on the way there, in the Khors adjoining Bubiyan Island. Colonel Pelly's remarkable journey to Riyādh in the spring of 1865 was begun at Kuwait, where he spent several weeks, including one at Jahrah, in making his arrangements and awaiting the permission of the Wahhābi Amīr. The possible future of Kuwait as a commercial port and as a meeting-place of sea-borne and other trade, together with its suitability in certain circumstances for the site of a British telegraph station or coal dépôt, were clearly realised by Colonel Pelly, who even remarked, with extraordinary prescience, that Khor 'Abdullah might hereafter become the chief line of approach by steamer to the commercial capital of Turkish 'Irāq, and that its head might one day be connected by a railway with the Mediterranean. By April 1866 the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company had begun to call frequently at Kuwait; but their visits were suspended soon after for political reasons which will presently be explained.

Relations of
Kuwait with
Turkey,
1840-63.

The relations of other powers with Kuwait were less close however than those, arising from contiguity, which were maintained by Turkey. In 1847 the example of the Shaikh of Kuwait was quoted by the Shaikh of Bahrain in justification of the latter's own avowed intention of placing himself, in certain conditions, "under the guardianship of the Porte." In 1863 Shaikh Subāh assured the Resident that the rulers of Kuwait had always been tributary to the Turkish Government; but it was ascertained by Colonel Pelly, from another source, that the use of a distinctive flag had at one time been practised by the Shaikh of Kuwait for some

years together, and that it had only been discontinued because trade carried on under it did not meet at Bombay with treatment so favourable as that under a recognised flag: the reason of discontinuance was thus the same as that which in 1847 inclined the Bahrain Shaikh also to seek the protection of Turkey. In 1863 there was no mention of tribute paid by Kuwait to Turkey, but complimentary presents of dates were sent to Kuwait by the Turks in token of their own suzerainty, and as payment for the supposed protection by the Shaikh of the mouth of Shatt-al-'Arab.

In 1866 trouble arose out of the possession by Shaikh Subāh of Sūfiyeh, the estate on the Shatt-al-'Arab alleged to have been purchased by Shaikh Jābir from a member of the Zuhair family of Zubair some 30 years earlier.* This property was now sequestered by a Turkish Qāim-Maqām in consequence of a claim, raised by the Zuhair, that the vendor had been owner of a share only and not of the whole of Sūfiyeh. At the same time Shaikh Subāh was required to expel from other lands, owned by him at Fāo, some cultivators who had immigrated from Persian territory. The Turkish officials from the first showed a strong prejudice in favour of the Zuhair claimants; and 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh, who went to Basrah as his father's agent in the case, narrowly escaped being thrown into jail there because he refused to make payment, on his own responsibility, of the value of seven years' produce which the plaintiffs were held by the 'Turkish authorities to be entitled to receive. Eventually, however, the dispute was settled by the Wālī of Baghdād in favour of the Shaikh of Kuwait. The proceedings of the Turks in this case were regarded by the inhabitants of Kuwait as intended to bring them into collision with those of Zubair; but they were prepared for a conflict; and the British Agent at Basrah, in reporting the matter, remarked that "rather than submit to a Turkish Government at Kuwait the people to a man would abandon the place." The final order of the Wālī, upholding the Kuwait Shaikh's title to Sūfiyeh, was perhaps due to a report that Shaikh Subāh, with the object of attacking Zubair if the decision should go against him, had obtained a promise of countenance and armed support from the Wahhābi Amīr.

Dispute
regarding
the Sūfiyeh
estate in
Turkish
territory.

In 1866 Nāmiq Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of 'Irāq, evinced intentions of converting the nominal suzerainty of the Porte over Kuwait into a real control; the arrival of two Turkish corvettes from Constantinople was looked for; and it was apprehended by Colonel Kemball, the British Resident at Baghdād, that "the prescriptive freedom of Kuwait"

Designs of
the Turks on
Kuwait and
suspension of
the British
steamer
service, 1866.

* *Vide* page 1008 *ante*.

might shortly become a thing of the past. The visits of British merchant steamers to Kuwait were regarded with extreme jealousy by the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq, and the latter appeared to be collecting statistics to prove that the prosperity of Kuwait was injurious to Basrah. The Shaikh of Kuwait, alarmed at the prospects raised, begged that his town might not be made a port of call by British steamers ; and a suspension of the service was accordingly recommended by Colonel Kemball.

SHAIKH 'ABDULLAH-BIN-SUBĀH.

1866-92.

From the death of his father, probably in 1866, until his own demise in 1892, Kuwait was ruled by 'Abdullah-bin-Subāh.

Relations of Kuwait with the Porte, 1866-92.

Participation
of Kuwait in
the Turkish
expedition to
Hasa, 1871.

During the whole period of his rule Shaikh 'Abdullah appears to have maintained very close relations with the Turks, and to have been an obedient and even enthusiastic instrument of Turkish policy. In 1870 or 1871 he became the medium of overtures from 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, the displaced Wāhhābi Amīr, for the assistance of the Turks. In 1870 he supplied sea transport, to the amount of about 300 native vessels, for the Turkish forces sent to conquer Hasa ; he accompanied the expedition in person ; and it was chiefly through his agency that the Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar was persuaded to accept the Turkish flag.

Visit of
Mid-hat
Pāsha to
Kuwait, 1871.

When Mid-hat Pāsha, Wāli of Baghdād, went on a tour of inspection to the new Hasa province at the end of the year, he halted on the way for one day at Kuwait, where he was said to have "installed" the Shaikh. The investiture of the latter was probably with the rank of Qāim-Maqām on the part of the Turkish Government, which he subsequently held ; for, from language held by the Porte in 1901, it appeared that the Turkish Government considered Kuwait to have been annexed at the same time as Hasa.

Relations of Kuwait with the Wāhhābis, 1866-92.

At some time between 1872 and 1874 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, a claimant of the Wāhhābi Amirate whose attitude towards the Turks was

somewhat uncertain, was apparently permitted by the Shaikh to reside in the neighbourhood of Kuwait. In 1872, as related in the history of Najd, the town of Kuwait was threatened by the Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd; but the Shaikh, after drawing away his leading supporters, attacked him and put him to flight. About 1884 the Shaikh of Kuwait appeared to favour the cause of the Shammār Amīr, who had then begun to commit aggression on the Wahhābis.

Relations of Kuwait with Great Britain, 1866-92.

In the time of Shaikh 'Abdullah direct relations with Kuwait do not appear to have been cultivated by the British political authorities in the Persian Gulf; and the place was evidently regarded as under the exclusive influence, if not the sovereignty, of the Porte. In 1876 the Acting Political Resident, Colonel Prideaux, mentioned Kuwait along with Qatif and 'Oqair, as a Turkish port on the Arabian side of the Gulf. In 1888, in consequence of fears of an advance by the Turks against 'Omān, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was informed by Her Majesty's Government that they admitted the existence of Turkish jurisdiction on the Arabian coast as far south as Qatif and were anxious that it should be effectively exercised within those limits, but that beyond Qatif they considered the local chiefs to be independent; no communication, however, in this sense was made to the Porte at the time. The orders under which, as described in the history of Hasa, British naval officers were authorised, in 1881, to take measures even in Turkish territorial waters for the suppression of piracy were doubtless intended to apply to the littoral of Kuwait as well as to that of Hasa and Qatar.

British
indifference
to Kuwait
affairs.

Relations of Kuwait with Arab states and tribes, 1866-92.

In 1869 the ex-Shaikh Muhammad of Bahrain was deported to Kuwait; but he did not remain there long. In 1883 Mubārak, a younger half-brother of the Shaikh of Kuwait, paid a friendly visit to Bahrain, where he was warmly welcomed and hospitably treated and received many presents at his departure. Before this Mubārak had been occasionally employed by the Turks upon diplomatic errands, and the fact

Visit of
Mubārak to
Bahrain,
1883.

caused his proceedings in Bahrain to be watched with attention ; but it did not appear that his journey in this instance had any political motive.

Friction
with the
Bani Hājir,
1892.

In March 1892 an attack was made on the marauding Bani Hājir, probably in Hasa, by a relative of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who killed four of them and carried off a number of their camels and sheep ; and somewhat later the Bani Hājir retaliated by surprising a Kuwait boat at night and killing two of the crew.

SHAIKH MUHAMMAD-BIN-SUBĀH.

1892-96.

Internal history of Kuwait, and relations with the Turks, 1892-96.

Shaikh 'Abdullah was succeeded by his full brother Muhammad, whose Shaikhship was short and, except for the manner of its ending, uneventful.

Despatch of
a force to the
aid of the
Turks in
Hasa, 1893.

Shaikh Muhammad was before long invited by the Turks to co-operate in restoring order in Hasa, where in 1892 serious troubles had broken out ; and in March 1893 Mubārak-bin-Subāh arrived in Hasa for this purpose with a large force of Bedouins, having marched all the way by land from Kuwait.

Assassina-
tion of
Shaikh
Muhammad,
1896.

In May 1896 Shaikh Muhammad, along with his full brother Jarrāh, was assassinated in the interests of his half-brother Mubārak ; Muhammad, it was said, fell by the hand of Mubārak himself, while Jarrāh was killed by another of the family, assisted by a man of the 'Ajmān tribe. It is not clear whether this event was due to public or domestic differences, or whether it was prompted solely by greed and ambition on the part of Mubārak. According to one account Shaikh Muhammad was generally unpopular as a ruler ; and this much at least is certain, that the Kuwait public showed no signs of disapproval.

British relations with Kuwait, 1892-96.

Political
status of
Kuwait.

During the short period of Muhammad's rule British relations with Kuwait were still in abeyance, and there was no sign as yet of any

change in the views of the British Government regarding the political position of Kuwait. In April 1893 Sir C. Ford, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, stated officially to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government admitted the existence of Turkish sovereignty along the coast from Basrah to Qatif. In 1895, however, a piracy was committed in the Shatt-al-'Arab on the "Haripasa," a British-protected vessel; and, partly from the proceedings to which this case gave rise, but not before the death of Shaikh Muhammad, there arose a doubt in the mind of the British authorities as to the nature of the connection between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turkish Government.

SHAIKH MUBĀRAK-BIN-SUBĀH,

from 1896.

General history of Kuwait from the accession of Shaikh Mubārak to the Exclusive Agreement with Britain, 1896-99.

During the first three years of his reign the position of Shaikh Mubārak, in danger as he was of revenge from members of his own family and without external support, seemed very precarious.

The sons of the murdered Shaikh Muhammad and his brother Jarrāh removed, after remaining a short time at Kuwait, to Turkish 'Irāq, where their cause was warmly taken up by their maternal relation * Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah (generally known as Yūsuf Bin-Ibrāhīm) of Dorāh on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab, a wealthy merchant and landholder of the Basrah Wilāyat. Efforts were made by Yūsuf to interest the Wāli of Basrah and even Ibn-Rashīd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, in the case of the young men, and no means of harassing Shaikh Mubārak was neglected. On the 30th of June 1897 a boat expedition, organised by Yūsuf on the coast of the Hindiyān district in Persia, appeared off

Proceedings
of the sons
of Muham-
mad and
Jarrāh,
1896-98.

* The relationship was rather complicated. 'Ali-bin-Jābir, who was the youngest brother of Shaikh Subāh of Kuwait, married the youngest daughter of 'Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhīm, and had by her three daughters, of whom the eldest married Shaikh Muhammad and became the mother of his sons Subāh, Sa'ūd, Khālīd and 'Adhbi, while the second married Jarrāh and bore a son Hamūd and a daughter who married her own first cousin Subāh-bin-Muhammad. An elder daughter of 'Ali-bin-Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhīm married 'Abdullah, a first cousin of her own father, and became the mother of Yūsuf.

Kuwait ; but it retired, as the place was found in a state of defence, without firing a shot. Possibly at the instigation of Yūsuf, the inhabitants of the Turkish frontier town of Zubair petitioned the Porte for the removal of Mubārak from Kuwait ; and one of the sons of the late Shaikh Muhammad made overtures to the British political authorities, offering to accept British protection if his birthright was restored to him through their influence. In August 1897 Yūsuf was in Bahrain, having perhaps been obliged by the Turks to leave 'Irāq in consequence of his escapade at Kuwait, and solicited the good offices of the British Government ; but he was told that no support could be given him against the Shaikh of Kuwait. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubārak had proposed that the question between his nephews and himself should be referred to the arbitration of the Shaikh of Bahrain ; but, partly through the unwillingness of the Shaikh of Bahrain to act as arbitrator, this suggestion, to which the Government of India were ready to agree, came to nothing. During 1897 and 1898 it was frequently reported that an attack on Kuwait by the Shaikh's nephews was impending ; but Mubārak, with great steadiness, professed his ability to repulse any attempt that might be made.

Attitude of
the Turkish
authorities
towards
Shaikh
Mubārak.

The attitude of the Turks towards Shaikh Mubārak was for a considerable time one of neutrality. His usurpation of the Shaikhship had been represented to the Porte by Hamdi Pāsha, then Wāli of Basrah for the first time, as a favourable opportunity for establishing close Turkish control over Kuwait ; and, though Mubārak on his accession had professed loyalty to the Sultān and even hoisted the Turkish flag, as was observed by the officer commanding H.M.S. " Sphinx " at a visit to Kuwait in July 1896, his fate, as regarded Turkish recognition, remained for long in suspense. On one side were ranged the influence of the Shaikh's nephews and of their relations and the political considerations urged by the Wāli of Basrah ; on the other were the bribes lavished by Shaikh Mubārak on Rajab Pāsha, Mushir of the Baghdād Army Corps, on the Shaikh-ul-Islām and Shaikh 'Abul Huda at Constantinople, and on others ; and these last in the end prevailed. Meanwhile, however, the Wāli's policy of administrative absorption was not altogether rejected ; and in February 1897, in anticipation of a resolution passed in that year by the Board of Health at Constantinople, a Turkish quarantine official arrived at Kuwait and took up his residence there, *à titre provisoire*, without any protest, so far as is known, on the part of the Shaikh. At length, in December 1897, Muhsin Pasha, who had replaced Hamdi Pasha as Wāli of Basrah, was informed by telegram of

the appointment of Shaikh Mubārak by Imperial Iradé to the Qāim-Maqāmship of Kuwait; the Shaikh's name began to appear in the official almanac of the Wilāyat, and his correspondence with Basrah to be carried on, under that style; and an annual allowance of 150 Kārahs of dates was assigned to him, which was subsequently, it would seem, commuted into a cash salary of about £300 a year.

Besides the constant danger from his own relations, Shaikh Mubārak had before long to face a wide but ineffectual combination contrived by Yūsuf Bin-Ibrāhīm of Dorah during his visit to Bahrain in the summer of 1897. In September of that year it was reported that Jāsim-bin-Muhammad, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar, was making preparations for an attack on Kuwait by land and sea in conjunction with the Shaikh's nephews, and was endeavouring to draw Ibn-Rashīd into the scheme and to detach the 'Ajmān tribe from Shaikh Mubārak. In the beginning of November this attack, though discountenanced by the Turks, seemed to be on the point of execution; but eventually it did not take place. On the other hand the Shaikh of Kuwait inflicted some loss on the Bani Hājir tribe, who were among the adherents of the Shaikh of Dōhah; and early in 1898 a small rising against the Turks took place at Dōhah, which was attributed to a belief that the attack by the Kuwait Shaikh on the Bani Hājir had been instigated by the Turkish authorities.

Hostility
of the
Shaikh of
Dōhah in
Qatar,
1897-98.

In November 1898 the Naqīb of Basrah was sent by the Turks to arrange a settlement between the two Shaikhs; but his mission was a failure.

By these and other events the attention of the British Government was gradually attracted to Kuwait; and an opinion began to gain ground among British officials that the connection of the Turkish Government with Kuwait was less close than, in recent times, had generally been supposed. An absurd rumour which obtained currency in Palace circles at Constantinople in 1896, that the murder of his brothers by Mubārak had been instigated by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, led to enquiries being made by the British Embassy in the Turkish capital; and these showed that there were persons, even there, who asserted Kuwait to be entirely independent of the Porte. At the end of 1896, the case of the "Haripasa" piracy being then under consideration, it was suggested that the Shaikh of Kuwait, for reasons described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, should be held accountable; but this proposal did not commend itself to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Sir P. Currie thought that the Shaikh of Kuwait,

British
doubts as to
the nature
of the
connection
between the
Shaikh of
Kuwait and
the Turkish
Government,
1896-97.

while he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was in reality an independent potentate and only nominally subject to the Sultān; but the Government of India, considering that for practical reasons such a view was to be avoided, were inclined, early in 1897, to advise that the responsibility for the actions of the Shaikh should be fixed upon the Turkish Government. At length, in consequence of information supplied at Constantinople in March 1897 by Captain Whyte, who had shortly before been Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, Sir P. Currie enquired the view of Her Majesty's Government regarding Turkish authority at Kuwait. He was informed in reply that Her Majesty's Government had never admitted Kuwait to be under the protection of the Turkish Government, but that the existence of Turkish influence would probably be difficult or impossible to deny.

Overtures of
the Shaikh
for British
protection,
February-
August 1897.

No remonstrances on the crime by which he had attained the chiefship were ever addressed to Shaikh Mubārak by the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; but the Shaikh in July 1896, when his port was visited by H.M.S. "Sphinx," showed evident signs of alarm, declined to visit the ship, and made evasive replies to questions about his use of the Turkish flag. The impression formed by Commander Baker on this visit was that Kuwait, in theory an independent principality, had fallen greatly under Turkish influence, especially since the accession of Mubārak. Matters remained unchanged until February 1897, the month in which the Turks sent a sanitary official to Kuwait, when Shaikh Mubarak suddenly requested an interview with Colonel Wilson, the Political Resident, or with an agent deputed by him. In view of the rumours that had prevailed at Constantinople a few months previously concerning British interference at Kuwait the matter was referred to Her Majesty's Government, who replied that the interview might be granted, subject to the discretion of the Political Resident; and shortly afterwards it became known that the object of Shaikh Mubārak was to ask for British protection. Meanwhile the "Haripasa" piracy case had been proceeding; and at the beginning of May, under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, the Resident in the Gulf was directed to warn the Shaikh of Kuwait, when he should meet him, that his responsibility would be enforced if his subjects were not restrained in the future from committing attacks upon British Baghlahs: this order was the first sign of a changed view of the political position of the Shaikh of Kuwait on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Towards the middle of July, or about three weeks after the attack attempted

by Yūsuf of Dorah on Kuwait, no interview having as yet taken place between the Resident and Shaikh Mubārak, it became known that a delegate from the Shaikh had arrived in Bahrain and was on his way to visit the Resident, Colonel Meade, at Būshehr; but, on hearing that Yūsuf of Dorah was also expected in Bahrain, this individual returned to Kuwait without accomplishing his mission. Meanwhile another case of piracy occurred in the vicinity of Kuwait.

In August Mubārak represented that he had no one sufficiently intelligent to send as a representative to Būshehr and asked that a delegate from the Residency to whom he could explain his views might be sent to visit him. In accordance with his wish Mr. J. C. Gaskin, Extra Assistant to the Resident, was deputed to Kuwait in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," and arrived there on the 5th of September 1897. Shaikh Mubārak, whose negotiations for recognition by the Porte were still pending, declined to go on board the "Lawrence" lest by doing so he should give offence to the Turkish authorities; and two interviews, at both of which Captain Hewett of the "Lawrence" was present, took place on shore. As regards piracy at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the Shaikh denied that subjects of Kuwait had ever engaged in piracy, but he admitted that some of the inhabitants of his estates on the banks of the river, over whom he had no control, might be guilty; he had, he said, offered to police the river mouth, but the Turks had declined to allow him to do so, and Kuwait boats were now unable to visit the Shatt-al-'Arab unless in twos and threes for mutual protection; to the best of his ability, however, he would co-operate with the British Government for the suppression of piracy. With reference to his own overtures, which it was the principal object of Mr. Gaskin's visit to investigate, Shaikh Mubārak stated that he and his people, in order to prevent the annexation of Kuwait by the Turks, who had shown themselves grasping and unreliable, desired to be taken under British protection in the same manner as the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān; and he promised that, if this were done, he would assist the British Government with all the force at his command in maintaining law and order in his part of the Gulf.

Mr. Gaskin's
visit to
Kuwait,
September
1897.

The request of the Shaikh was at once reported to Her Majesty's Government, who replied that they were not disposed to bring Kuwait under protection or to interfere more than was necessary for the maintenance of the general peace in the Persian Gulf. A few days later, on the 20th of October, in consequence of a report that a Turkish gunboat was about to leave Basrah for Kuwait, the question was again raised

Overtures of
the Shaikh
declined by
the British
Government,
October
1897.

by the Government of India, who mentioned that Kuwait appeared to be a centre of piracy * and an emporium of the slave trade, and enquired whether, in these circumstances, a modification of policy might not be desirable; but the Secretary of State for India adhered to his original instructions, adding that there was nothing in the political situation of Kuwait to hamper naval officers in bringing home to the Shaikh his responsibility for piratical acts.

Overtures of
the Shaikh
renewed,
November
1897.

In November 1897, when an attack on Kuwait by Shaikh Jāsim of Qatar and Yūsuf of Dorah was believed to be imminent, H.M.S. "Pigeon" was sent to Kuwait to watch events, the commander being instructed not to interfere unless British interests were directly menaced; and Shaikh Mubārak seized the opportunity to repeat his request for British protection.

Danger to
Kuwait from
Russia and
Turkey, 1898.

At length, in 1898, circumstances arose which compelled the British Government to consider measures for the exclusion of foreign influence from Kuwait. There was reason to think that the Russian Government wished to establish a coaling station at that place; and attempts were being made to obtain from the Porte a concession in favour of Count Kapnist, a Russian subject, for the construction of a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, a scheme which, in the absence of any arrangement between the British Government and the Shaikh, might end in the creation of Russian territorial rights at Kuwait. At the same time, notwithstanding the recent recognition of Shaikh Mubārak as Qāim-Maqām, tension of which the causes were not evident appeared to exist between the Shaikh and the Turkish authorities; the appointment of a Turkish Commission to investigate complaints against the Shaikh was reported; and rumours began to circulate of the possible despatch of a Turkish force from Basrah by sea to Kuwait.

The Exclusive Agreement with Britain, 23rd January 1899.

Orders of
Her
Majesty's
Government.

In January 1899, with a view to forestalling Russian action, it was decided by Her Majesty's Government that an engagement on the model of the Agreement of 20th March 1891 by the Sultān of 'Omān should be obtained from the Shaikh of Kuwait, binding him and his successors

* The correctness of this allegation seems to be doubtful; there may have been some confusion between Kuwait and the Shaikh's estates in Turkish 'Iraq. At no time before or since have there been complaints of piracy by inhabitants of Kuwait

not to alienate any portion of his territory to foreigners without the consent of the British Government ; and it was hoped that, in this manner, the necessity of taking overt steps towards the establishment of a British protectorate would be avoided. The consideration to be offered the Shaikh was a single payment of £5,000 or less, or an annual subsidy not exceeding £200.

Under these orders Colonel Meade, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, proceeded in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" to Kuwait, where he arrived on the 21st of January 1899 ; the Turkish corvette "Zuhāf" was then in the harbour, but she left on the following day. On the 23rd of January the desired Agreement was signed by Shaikh Mubārak, who in it pledged himself, his heirs and his successors not to receive the agent or representative of any foreign power or government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government ; and not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation, or for any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the government or subjects of any other power without the previous consent of the British Government. This last obligation was to extend to any portion of the Shaikh's territory which might at the time be in the possession of the subjects of any other government. Hamūd and Jābir, the brothers of Mubārak, were present at the signature of the Agreement, but they refused to attest it as they disapproved of its terms ; the Shaikh, however, assured Colonel Meade that the concurrence of his brothers was not necessary to make the Agreement binding on his successors.

Signature
and terms
of the
Agreement,
23rd January
1899.

A letter was then given to the Shaikh by Colonel Meade, in which, on behalf of the British Government, he assured the Shaikh, his heirs and his successors of the good offices of the British Government, so long as they on their part should continue to observe the obligations of the Agreement. In this document the secret character of the Agreement was emphasized, and payment was promised of a sum of Rs. 15,000 which had been fixed as the consideration for its execution.*

Letter
supplementary
to the
Agreement,
23rd January
1899.

It was subsequently explained by Colonel Meade that the condition against the reception of foreign representatives was inserted by him because Shaikh Mubārak stated that advances had been made to him by the French, and that the reference to territory already in the possession of foreign subjects was intended, primarily, to guard against the transfer of house property owned by Turkish subjects at Kuwait to Russians or others.

Explanation
of
unauthorised
conditions.

*The text of both Agreement and letter will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this chapter.

Ratification
of the
Agreement,
16th
February
1899.

Her Majesty's Government, on the proceedings being reported to them, approved the action of the Resident and authorised ratification of the Agreement, notwithstanding that it went beyond what they had intended ; and it was accordingly ratified on the 16th of February. A hope was also held out to Shaikh Mubārak, under the orders of the Secretary of State, that the British authorities would do what they could to protect his interests and those of his brothers in the matter of their estates at Fāo, a share in which was claimed by the nephews in Turkish territory. Of the sum of £1,000 paid to Shaikh Mubārak half was contributed by the Home Government and half was charged to Indian revenues.

General history of Kuwait from the Exclusive Agreement to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1899-1904.

Attempts
by Turkey to
assert
authority at
Kuwait and
resistance of
the Shaikh,
January-
September
1899.

The next few months witnessed strenuous efforts by the Turkish authorities at Basrah, possibly due to their having become aware of the Shaikh's Agreement with Britain, to assert themselves at Kuwait ; Shaikh Mubārak on his part showed a new intractability in his dealings with the Turks ; and a rather strained situation arose. On the occasion of Colonel Meade's visit to Kuwait objections were made by the Turkish sanitary *préposé* there, an ordinary Arab, to the landing of the Resident's party from the "Lawrence," as being a breach of the Turkish sanitary regulations. They were disregarded, and a protest by the Turkish Government followed, but had no result. In February 1899 a movement against Kuwait by sea was apprehended on the part of the Turks, and the question of protective measure was considered by Her Majesty's Government, who decided that in case of need a serious warning should be addressed to the Porte, and that until this had been done no forcible action should be taken by British ships. In March the state of affairs seemed so critical that the Government of India caused H.M.S. "Lapwing" to be stationed for a time in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, and the employment of a secret newswriter at Kuwait was sanctioned. In the same month, the Russian gun-vessel "Gilyak" called at Kuwait, and the Russian Consul from Baghdād, who was on board, had an ordinary interview with the Shaikh. In May Shaikh Mubārak, who now appeared anxious to precipitate matters with the Turks, established regular customs at Kuwait and began to realise an enhanced duty of 5 per cent. on all imports, including those from

Basrah and other Turkish ports which had hitherto passed altogether free. On the 2nd of September a Turkish harbour-master, with five soldiers, arrived to take charge of the port of Kuwait; but the Shaikh declined to receive him, and he was obliged to return to Basrah the next day; instructions, however, reached Basrah from Constantinople that the matter should not be dropped. Next it was reported that the Turks intended to establish a customs house at Kuwait and to connect Fāo with Qatif by a telegraph through Kuwait, and that the Turkish military authorities were demanding forcible action against Kuwait.

In consequence of these indications of a forward Turkish policy, a warning was in September 1899 conveyed to the Porte by the British Ambassador at Constantinople under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government: it was to the effect that the British Government, while they entertained no designs on Kuwait, had friendly relations with the Shaikh; and that, if any attempt were made to establish Turkish authority or customs control at Kuwait without previous agreement with Her Majesty's Government, a very inconvenient and disagreeable question would be raised. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply gave assurances that the reception of a harbour-master by the Shaikh would not be pressed any further; that there was no intention of establishing an Ottoman custom house at Kuwait; and that no military expedition against Kuwait was contemplated, for, though operations had been proposed by the Wāli, the Sultān had withheld his sanction. Later it was represented to the British Ambassador that his language had greatly disturbed the Sultān, who regarded it as indicative of a desire on the part of the British Government to interfere with Turkish liberty of action in Turkish territory; but Sir N. O'Connor, while avoiding the direct issue—that of the dependence of Kuwait on Turkey—reiterated the warning already given; and the matter was dropped for a time. The Wāli of Basrah also was cautioned, through the local British Consul, not to take hostile action against Kuwait.

Warning
by the British Govern-
ment to the
Porte, Sep-
tember 1899.

In the following month, October 1899, it was ascertained that Shaikh Mubārak had undoubtedly applied through the Shaikh of Muhammareh to be taken under the protection of Persia; but this move, which the Shaikh took no pains to conceal, was perhaps contrived by him merely to test the degree of interest taken by the British Government in Kuwait. His advances were rejected by the Shāh.

Dalliance of
the Shaikh
with Persia,
October
1899.

Meanwhile Mubārak had taken precautions, by means of intrigues at Basrah, to counteract the more dangerous results of his uncompromis-

Change of
Wāli at
Basrah, 1899.

ing policy towards Turkey; and, acting in concert with the Naqīb of Basrah, he succeeded in procuring the removal of Hamdi Pāsha, the Wālī of the day, an honest but unpopular official, and the appointment in his place in autumn 1899 of Muhsin Pāsha, a military officer, who was prepared to represent Kuwait affairs to the Porte in a new light. One of the chief dangers which Shaikh Mubārak had at this time to avoid was arrest while making an official visit to Basrah in person,—a mark of submission on which the Turkish Government strongly insisted. Muhsin Pāsha played his part well; and not only were no further encroachments on the Shaikh's independence attempted by the Turks for more than a year and a half, but, as we shall presently see, Mubārak safely paid the required visit to Turkish territory, received a Turkish official decoration from the Sultān, and was enabled to harass with impunity the Turkish vassal Ibn-Rashid of Najd, and even to invade and temporarily occupy a part of his principality.

Visit of a
German
Railway Com-
mission to
Kuwait,
January
1900,

Before these occurrences, however, a German Commission visited Kuwait in search of a suitable terminus for the projected Baghdād Railway; it was headed by Herr Stemrich, the German Consul-General at Constantinople; and, but for the Agreement of 1899, concluded chiefly in view of a similar Russian project, and a warning conveyed to the Shaikh by the Commander of H.M.S. "Melpomene" that he should make no arrangement with the Commission without the approval of the Government of India, the incident might have had results prejudicial to the position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. From Mubārak's account of his interview with the Commission, which took place at Kuwait on the 19th of January 1900, corroborated as it was by a subsequent report of the Commission itself, it seems that the Shaikh expressed himself unfavourably as regards the establishment of a railway terminus within his jurisdiction, and that he made it clear to the members of the Commission that the real control of the country rested with himself and not with the Sultān of Turkey. The Commission apparently tried to open negotiations with him for the sale of Kādhamah at the head of Kuwait bay and for the lease of the lands surrounding Kawaikib and Ghadhāi,—a scheme involving the acquisition in all of a plot of about 20 square miles; but their intentions were frustrated by Mubārak's strict observance of his obligations to the British Government, in which he was probably fortified by a doubt of the good faith of the Commission, and by a suspicion that their proposals might be a skilfully disguised movement on the part of the Turks. At

Basrah the head of the Commission had given out that it was the intention of the promoters of the railway to deal with Turkey direct and to ignore the Shaikh of Kuwait.

These proceedings of the Baghdad Railway Commission made it necessary that the views of Britannia in regard to Kuwait should be stated clearly to the Porte and the German Government. Accordingly, on the 15th April 1900, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, in the course of an interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, insisted on the fact that, although the British Government did not wish to interfere with the Sultān's authority in the Persian Gulf, still they were desirous of maintaining the *status quo*, and could not view with indifference any action which would alter it or give to another power rights or privileges over territory belonging to the Shaikh of Kuwait. On the same day Sir N. O'Connor saw the German Ambassador, and, in order that no doubt should remain in his mind, placed before him in explicit terms the British position with reference to Kuwait, making it clear that the Shaikh was not at liberty to cede or in any way to alienate to the Baghdad Railway Company either Kādhamah or any part of his territory, without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

British
declaration to
Turkey and
Germany in
regard to in
Kuwait,
April 1900.

We may now resume the main thread of our narrative. In the summer of 1900 there began a series of movements which led, first, to a remarkable incursion by Mubārak into the very heart of Central Arabia, and eventually to the restoration of the Wahhābi dynasty in Southern Najd. Since 1897, 'Abdur Rahmān Ibn-Sa'ūd, the rival in Najd of 'Abdur 'Azīz Ibn-Rashīd, had been residing at Kuwait as a pensioner of the Shaikh,—a circumstance in itself sufficient to predispose Ibn-Rashīd to enmity against Mubārak. The natural resentment of the Shammar Amīr against the harbourer of his enemy had doubtless been inflamed by Mubārak's fugitive nephews and Yūsuf of Dorah, who early sought Ibn-Rashīd's assistance and by 1900 appeared to have become his permanent clients. How exactly hostilities in the interior commenced is uncertain; this much is known, that Ibn-Sa'ūd departed from Kuwait in August 1900 and in the following month, having achieved some substantial successes, appealed to his protector Mubārak for reinforcements. About the same time or a little later, from his haunt on the Euphrates, Sa'dūn Pāsha, a Muntafik outlaw of Turkish 'Irāq, raided some of the nearer tribes dependent on Ibn-Rashīd; and indications were not wanting of his having acted, in this matter, in collusion with the Shaikh of Kuwait. Shaikh Mubārak himself was absent from his capital while the French Government vessel "Drome" was at Kuwait

Outbreak of
hostilities
in Central
Arabia, 1900.

from the 14th to the 16th of October; and at the end of the month, when Colonel Kemball, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, called at Kuwait with orders to impress on the Shaikh the advisability of abstaining from action that might afford a pretext for Turkish interference, Mubarak was still invisible. In the light of what followed it is not unreasonable to conclude that at the time he was actively employed in the desert in forwarding the interests of his protégé Ibn-Sa'ūd

Intervention
of the Wālī
of Basrah,
November
1900.

At the end of October 1900 Ibn-Rashīd appeared at Samāwah on the Euphrates with a large following; he demanded of the Turkish Government redress for the injuries inflicted on his subjects by Sa'dūn, satisfaction from the Shaikh of Kuwait, and justice for the nephews of the latter; and he threatened to attack Kuwait if his requests were not conceded. Meanwhile Shaikh Mubarak had effected a junction with Sa'dūn, and an armed collision between the allies and Ibn-Rashīd appeared to be imminent, when the Turks suddenly intervened with marked success. Through the influence of Saiyid Ahmad and Saiyid Tālib, sons of the Naqīb of Basrah, Ibn Rashīd was persuaded to return home and Shaikh Mubarak to meet the Wālī of Basrah at Rāfidhiyah, a country house of the Naqīb near Zubair; while Sa'dūn, by other means, was induced to vanish temporarily from the scene. On the 17th of November Mubarak came in with the Wālī, his friend Muhsin Pasha, to Basrah, where he passed the following day, received the order of the Mejidieh of the second class, and promised to abstain from relations with "foreign powers;" and by the 24th of the month he had returned in safety to Kuwait. The Turkish demand for an official visit by the Shaikh had thus been satisfied and a decided triumph achieved by Muhsin Pasha, who, besides averting a serious crisis, had successfully asserted the authority of the Porte over two of the principal chiefs in Arabia.

Invasion
of Central
Arabia by
the Shaikh
of Kuwait,
December
1900—March
1901.

But the arrangement thus concluded was a hollow one, for the Shaikh's submission was feigned, and he was in reality on the point of adopting an audacious and independent policy. Ibn-Rashīd was now harrying the Bedouin adherents of Kuwait in the Dahānah and Summān deserts; and, on the 18th of December 1900, Mubarak, after announcing that he could not abstain from hostilities while Yūsuf of Dorah was harboured by Ibn-Rashīd, placed himself at the head of his forces and marched on Hafar, where the enemy was supposed to be encamped. The Kuwait force was composed mainly of 'Awāzim, Rashāidah, Mutair, 'Ajmān, Bani Hājir and Bani Khālid Bedouins; but it included also a number, estimated at 1,000, of

Kuwait townsmen and refugees from Najd. At the beginning of February 1901 the Shaikh was compelled, by the defection of some of his Mutair allies, to fall back into the neighbourhood of Kuwait; but the check was of short duration. He had before this been informed by letter of the desire of the British Government that he should abstain from compromising displays of activity; and, as he had disregarded the advice, it was thought inexpedient to repeat it. The account of his subsequent Central Arabian expedition will be found in the history of Najd. At the outset it was a brilliant success: Qasim was occupied; the son of Ibn-Sa'ud was appointed titular governor of Riyadh; some members of the family of Ibn-Rashid entered into negotiations with the triumphant invader; and Mubarak strengthened his position among his Bedouin adherents by espousing a daughter of Sultān-ad-Dawish, a leading chief of the Mutair. A severe engagement, however, which took place on the 17th of March at Sarif, about 20 miles north-east of Buraidah in Qasim, though it was attended by heavy loss on both sides, so altered the aspect of affairs that Shaikh Mubarak was obliged to beat a hasty retreat from Najd. Much anxiety prevailed in Kuwait and rumours that the Shaikh himself was among the slain had obtained currency there, when, on the 31st of March, he regained his capital safe and unwounded, followed at an interval of four days by Ibn-Sa'ud and Sa'dun. The dispersed Kuwaitan army straggled home in small detachments during the following month; but there were at least 50 * who never returned, among them the Shaikh's brother Hamud with his son Subah and the Shaikh's nephew Khalifah, all of whom fell in the battle of the 17th March.

The seriousness of the situation created by this adventure was quickly brought home to the Shaikh. It seemed to be the intention of the Turkish Government to make the Mushir of Baghdad their agent in investigating the affair from their side,—a measure which would have deprived Shaikh Mubarak of the benefit of his understanding with Muhsin Pasha and might even have brought that official himself into trouble; but, for the time being, the negotiations remained in the hands of the Wali. Muhsin Pasha was the guest of the Shaikh at Kuwait from the 19th to the 23rd of May 1901, and he took advantage of Mubarak's dejection and alarm to press on him the acceptance of a Turkish military garrison at Kuwait. The Shaikh, however, while he treated his visitor with respect and courtesy and even accompanied him

Visit of the
Wali of
Basrah to
Kuwait and
request of
the Shaikh
for British
protection,
May 1901.

* Possibly the loss was greater than 50. Local tradition already had it in 1907 that no less than 700 townsmen of Kuwait fell, of whom 150 were put to death as prisoners, in cold blood, after the battle!

as far as Fāo on his return voyage to Basrah, retained firmness enough to concede nothing ; but he felt a greater need of support after the insidious attempt just made to beguile him into surrendering his independence ; and on the 28th of May, through the commander of H. M. S. " Sphinx," he approached the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf with a request that the British Government would assume a permanent protectorate over Kuwait as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it is certain, he had also held communication with the Russian Consul-General at Baghdād. The declaration of a British protectorate over Kuwait, involving as it must large international questions and responsibility in future for controlling the actions of the Shaikh, did not recommend itself to His Majesty's Government ; and at the end of June the proposal was rejected. Overtures for British protection received from Ibn-Rashīd about the same time were similarly repelled.

Incident at
Kuwait and
arrangement
between
Britain and
Turkey to
maintain the
status quo
there, August
—September
1901.

While the Shaikh of Kuwait's request was still under discussion the attitude of the Turks grew menacing. A considerable military force, of which the destination was at the time believed to be Kuwait, was assembling on the Euphrates ; and the Sultān of Turkey, under the influence of the German and Russian Embassies at Constantinople, was urging the Wālī of Basrah by telegram to arrange for the establishment at Kuwait, by pacific means, of a custom house and telegraph office, as tangible proofs of Ottoman authority. To meet these dangers the commander of the British gunboat " Perseus," then at Kuwait, was authorised under instructions from His Majesty's Government to prevent, by force if necessary, the landing of Turkish troops ; and Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident, who visited Kuwait for the purpose, gave Shaikh Mubārak a qualified assurance of support, conditional on his continuing to observe the Agreement of 1899. On the 24th of August 1901 the Turkish sloop-of-war " Zuhāf," heavily laden with stores, entered Kuwait harbour, where the " Perseus " was already lying ; and the Turkish commander was immediately warned by the commander of the " Perseus " of the order against the landing of Turkish troops. On the 25th of August the Turkish officer had an interview with the Shaikh, at which he tried in vain to obtain from him an admission of Ottoman sovereignty ; he then left for Fāo, threatening the Shaikh with future punishment. Protests against the action of the " Perseus " were soon received in London from the German and Turkish Ambassadors ; in that presented by Turkey the British Agreement of 1899 was declared to be invalid, as having been made with a Turkish official. The British reply

was, in both cases, that His Majesty's Government had no desire to disturb the *status quo* at Kuwait; and, on the 9th of September, the controversy between the British Government and the Porte regarding Kuwait was closed, to all appearance, by a mutual engagement to respect the *status quo*.

While the discussions just described were proceeding in Europe Ibn-Rashīd was not inactive. At the end of September 1901 his partisans raided a camp of the Rashāidah not far from Jahrah; and, though eventually driven off, they succeeded in carrying away a considerable booty and killed several men of a Kuwait force which was sent against them. The Bedouin inhabitants of the whole country-side then flocked into the neighbourhood of Kuwait town for protection, and a huge camp was formed, containing thousands of Bedouins with their flocks and herds, which extended along the coast as far as Rās-al-Ardh; but, a second raid by Ibn-Rashīd's men in the neighbourhood of Jabal 'Amūdah and Rās Misha'ab having proved less successful than the first, the invaders retired towards Central Arabia, and the enormous gathering of refugees at Kuwait melted away as suddenly as it had formed. Ibn-Rashīd lingered for some time longer at Hafar, and his protracted stay there, taken in conjunction with the proceedings of the Turks, caused Shaikh Mubārak much uneasiness. During this disturbed period several British gunboats were held in readiness at or near Kuwait; the naval authorities were empowered by the Government of India to use force to repel an attack by Ibn-Rashīd; and a scheme for the defence of the town was arranged by the Senior Naval Officer. The experience gained and the observations made on this occasion showed that Kuwait was not defensible against a land attack by naval means alone. Shaikh Mubārak, in return for the good offices exercised on his behalf, was required to promise compliance with such British advice as might be given him, and he did so.

At the middle of November 1901, Ibn-Rashīd having in the meantime moved down from Hafar to Safwān, a place on the frontier between Turkish 'Irāq and Kuwait, the Naqīb of Basrah visited Kuwait with a telegram from the Sultān of Turkey. In this telegram the Wālī of Basrah was directed to send the Naqīb to interview Shaikh Mubārak and warn him that his course of action was rash and impious, and that he should seek safety by returning to his religious duty and propitiating the Sultān. According to one account, Shaikh Mubārak in reply made commonplace professions of loyalty to the Porte and complained of the doings of Ibn-Rashīd and Yūsuf of Dorah; but the Naqīb seems to have reported to his own Government that the Shaikh repudiated the suzerainty of the Sultān and that he had referred the

Panic at
Kuwait on
the approach
of Ibn-
Rashīd,
September—
October—
1901.

Crisis at
Kuwait due
to attempts
by Turkey to
upset the
status quo,
November-
December
1901.

Turkish authorities to the British Government. In consequence of a representation by the British Ambassador at Constantinople these proceedings of the Naqīb were disavowed by the Porte. A more determined effort to upset the *status quo*, the maintenance of which had so lately received the assent of the Ottoman Government, was made a fortnight later, when on the 1st of December the "Zuhāf," carrying the Naqīb and a brother of the Wālī of Basrah, once more steamed into Kuwait harbour, the British cruiser "Pomone" and gunboat "Redbreast" being then anchored in the bay. A Turkish ultimatum was presented to the Shaikh, requiring him either to receive at Kuwait a Turkish military detachment—which, it was promised, should be under his own orders—or to leave Kuwait and retire to Constantinople or its neighbourhood; and great stress appears to have been laid on the alternative demand. On the 3rd of December three days' grace was obtained by the Shaikh in order that he might consider his reply; but on the 4th of December, the "Redbreast" having left with correspondence for Būshehr, this concession was withdrawn, and Mubārak was informed that he must give his answer immediately. The "Sphinx" having arrived from Būshehr without a written guarantee of protection from the Resident, such as he had hoped might be given, Mubārak evidently wavered; but, under pressure from the senior naval officer present at Kuwait, he at length informed the Sultān's messengers that he was prevented from giving a reply by threats of force on the part of the British naval authorities—a statement which Captain Simons personally confirmed in the presence of the Turkish emissaries. The Naqīb and the Wālī's brother, finding their purpose frustrated, then withdrew on board the "Zuhāf," which took her departure early the next morning; while Captain Simons, as a precaution, spent the night at the Shaikh's house. Not until the 6th of December, when the crisis was already past, did the orders of His Majesty's Government reach Kuwait: they were to the effect that, as the Naqīb's action amounted to a breach of the understanding between Turkey and Britain, His Majesty's Government would support the Shaikh and would not tolerate an attack by Turkish troops or ships on Kuwait, that the Shaikh should not leave Kuwait, and that he should continue to observe his engagements with the British Government. This message was received with much satisfaction by the Shaikh, who communicated it to all his principal men. About the time of the Naqīb's mission, or possibly after its return, Muhsin Pasha was superseded in the Waliship of Basrah.

The proceedings of the Turkish agents at Kuwait were immediately repudiated at Constantinople by both Porte and Palace. Nevertheless, towards the end of December 1901, the continued presence of Ibn-Rashid with a part of his forces in the vicinity of Basrah, his constant communications with the Wali and the Mushir, his orders for great quantities of supplies, and instructions which were sent from Constantinople to provide him with a large sum of money from the Basrah treasury, then empty, caused lively apprehensions to be entertained of a land attack on Kuwait by the combined forces of the Turks and the Amir; and simultaneously a prohibition of the export of goods from Basrah to Kuwait came into force, confirming these fears. Dispositions were instantly made by the British naval force at Kuwait to co-operate in the defence of the town; two Nordenfeldts and two Maxims were temporarily placed in the Shaikh's fort at Jahrah near the foot of Kuwait bay; and on the 1st of January 1902 the "Fox" and "Perseus" were ordered from Bombay to join the "Pomone," "Sphinx" and "Redbreast," which were already at Kuwait, with extra guns. Ibn-Rashid, deterred by these significant measures or perhaps held back by the Turks, did not approach any nearer, and he was soon reported to have withdrawn as far as the wells of Lainah in his own country, whereupon the general alarm subsided and the naval guns which had been landed were re-embarked. The crisis at Kuwait was witnessed by the Russian protected cruiser "Varyag," which arrived on the 21st December 1901 and left again on the 24th, after offers made to the Shaikh "to assist him in maintaining his independence."

Attack on Kuwait threatened by the Turks and Ibn-Rashid and preparations made by a British naval force to defend Jahrah and Kuwait, December 1901—January 1902.

The Turks, however, had not abandoned their determination to coerce, by one means or another, the ruler of Kuwait; and the cessation of their activity in one direction was followed by an advance in another, which indicated a change in their tactics and initiated a new phase of the Kuwait question. A report having been received that Turkish military posts had lately been established at Umm Qasr and Safwān, the despatch of a British gunboat to Khor 'Abdullah and Khor-as-Sabiyah to verify the facts was authorised. This duty was carried out by H.M.S. "Sphinx," which left Kuwait on the 14th February 1902 and returned within a week after ascertaining that a Turkish post of 40 men existed at Umm Qasr and a larger garrison at Safwān; in the course of his cruise Commander Kemp collected important data regarding Khor 'Abdullah, the extreme value of which in relation to railway projects had not previously been realised; and on his return journey he discovered a Turkish outpost of 20 men upon the eastern side of Būbiyān

Occupation of Safwān, Umm Qasr and Būbiyān Island by the Turks, 1902.

Island, where it had been established only a fortnight before. In March the Turkish garrison of Basrah was largely increased, and it was feared that the occupation of Haqaijah and possibly of Sabīyah, two places on the mainland opposite to the west side of Būbiyān, was contemplated; by way of forestalling such a movement Shaikh Mubārak was advised to occupy Haqaijah effectively, which he did by placing 40 men there. About the same time it transpired at Constantinople that the Turks no longer regarded Kādhamah in Kuwait bay as the probable terminus of the Baghdad railway; and it was reported that their attention had now been directed, in this connection, to Khor 'Abdullah and its branches. His Majesty's Government considered that, on the information available as to previous ownership, it would neither be safe to contend that the establishment of Turkish posts at Umm Qasr and on Būbiyān was a breach of the *status quo* nor justifiable to demand their abolition; but the Porte were informed that their occupation of those places could not be regarded as prejudicing the rights of the Shaikh of Kuwait. Incidentally, in the course of these discussions, His Majesty's Government informed the Government of India that they acknowledged Kuwait to be a part of the Ottoman dominions, subject however to the qualifications on which they had always insisted, *viz.*, that the Sultān's authority was of an unsubstantial character, and that the Shaikh enjoyed a large measure of practical independence; but this view was not, it should be observed, communicated to the Porte, as had at one time been intended. Shaikh Mubārak was so alarmed by the new Turkish policy of gradual encroachment that in March he offered the Wāli of Basrah a large bribe, which was not accepted, in order that it might be stopped.

In April 1902 the Shaikh complained of the attempted occupation of Musallamīyah Island, at the southern end of his territories or sphere of influence, by a Turkish detachment from Qatif; but, as it appeared that the island might legitimately be regarded as falling within the Turkish Sanjāq of Hasa, he received no encouragement from the British Government to contest the rightfulness of the Turkish claim.

Other means
employed by
the Turks to
harass the
Shaikh of
Kuwait,
1902.

The Turkish Government meanwhile resorted to other means besides territorial encroachment of harassing the Shaikh of Kuwait and making him repent his estrangement from them. A serious claim in respect of the family estates situated on the Shatt-al-'Arab was brought against him by his fugitive nephews in the Turkish courts; and the sequestration of some of the lands, *pendente lite*, caused him pecuniary inconvenience. Frequent raids upon the flocks and herds of Kuwait subjects

on the border near Safwān took place ; they were generally organised by Yūsuf of Dorah at Zubair, and the Turkish garrison at Safwān made no effort to prevent them ; but in some instances they were answered by reprisals from the Kuwait side. An attack was made also on Sabīyah, upon Khor-as-Sabīyah, by Yūsuf of Dorah's men, and some camels were carried off. On the 28th of May 1902 the Shaikh's agent at Basrah was arrested, and his house searched, on the charge of his being a subscriber to an Arabic newspaper called " Khilāfat," at that time published in London and treated throughout the Ottoman dominions as a seditious print ; and having been found guilty of the charge, he was sentenced to ten years' incarceration in a fortress. The result of this case was a severe blow to the prestige of the Shaikh of Kuwait ; nor was the event without political significance, for among the papers seized at the agent's house were some that cast light upon the Shaikh's relations with the British Government. The title-deeds of the Shaikh's properties in Turkish 'Irāq, which fell into the hands of the Ottoman officials by the same chance, were subsequently recovered through the good offices of British diplomacy,—a matter of no little importance to the Shaikh inasmuch as the land dispute between him and his nephews was still unsettled.

Raids on Kuwait territory by Bedouin supporters of Ibn-Rashīd still continued to occur ; and in August 1902 a fight between some of them and the subjects of the Shaikh of Kuwait took place at a spot, apparently the wells of Subaihiyah, only 30 miles from Kuwait itself. At this time events in Najd had turned, temporarily, in favour of Ibn-Rashīd ; and, as there was a fear that Shaikh Mubārak might proceed to the assistance of his ally Ibn-Sa'ūd, he was expressly warned by the British Resident, Colonel Kemball, under orders from His Majesty's Government, not to encourage any action by which he was likely to become involved in difficulties with Najd or with the Turkish Government. Meanwhile the Shaikh, in view of the aggressiveness of enemy, had formally applied to the Resident for two or three guns, to be mounted on his fort at Jahrah for defence against Ibn-Rashīd in case he should approach from that side ; but the request was refused as it was feared that he might use the guns, if supplied, for offensive operations ; and instead he was informed, after the middle of October 1902, that, if he remained at Kuwait and observed his engagements to Britain, the British Government would charge themselves with the defence of such of his districts as adjoined the bay of Kuwait. The Shaikh expressed himself much disappointed, but he promised to abide by the advice given him.

Relations of
Kuwait with
Najd and res-
tricted guar-
antee of
support by
the British
Government,
August to
October 1902.

Attempted
surprise of
Kuwait by
the Shaikh's
enemies,
September
1902.

The most dangerous and direct assault to which Mubarak had yet been exposed,—one of which the Turkish Government may or may not have been cognisant,—was arranged in the early autumn of 1902 by Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah of Dorah and came within a measurable distance of success: its object was to seize the town of Kuwait by a *coup de main* and, probably, to assassinate Shaikh Mubarak. A large body of Sharifāt Arabs from the Persian side, under the command of 'Adhbi-bin-Muhammad and Hamūd-bin-Jarrāh, Shaikh Mubarak's nephews, and well armed with rifles, embarked in boats at Dorah on the Shatt-al-'Arab; after leaving the river they loitered on the open sea, probably waiting for night. News of the expedition was received at Fāo on the 3rd of September by Commander Armstrong of H.M.S. "Lapwing," and he immediately hastened to Kuwait to give the alarm, but he found the town already under arms in consequence of information which had reached the Shaikh through his own people. The next day search was made without success for the enemy and their boats; but on the morning of the 5th they were discovered by the British gunboat in Khor 'Abdullah; and two of their Būms, which contained altogether 100 to 150 Arab riflemen and hoisted no flag, were pursued by the armed boats of the "Lapwing." Headed off from the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the fugitives eventually ran their boats ashore in deep mud to the east of the river, and, concealing themselves in the long grass, opened a hot fire at close range on their pursuers. One British bluejacket was killed and two were wounded; but the Būms with their contents, including scaling-ladders, were captured and taken away. One of the Būms was subsequently proved to be the personal property of Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah, and both were ultimately destroyed at sea outside of the three-mile limit. The later history of this case will be found elsewhere; but the chief result, in so far as Kuwait was concerned, was the flight or expulsion of Yūsuf from Turkish 'Irāq to Najd, where he attached himself to Ibn-Rashīd. Before leaving the country, however, he took part in a final attack from Zubair upon tribesmen residing near Jahrah under Shaikh Mubarak's protection.

Demonstra-
tion by Ibn-
Rashīd
against
Kuwait,
1902-03.

With the episode just described serious attempts from without to overthrow the power of Shaikh Mubarak came to an end; and the attention of the Turks was diverted from Kuwait to Central Arabia, where a contest between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashīd was now being waged. One other set of small movements in the neighbourhood of Kuwait remains, however, to be mentioned. In December 1902 Ibn-Rashīd again entered Kuwait territory and advanced within 12 hours

of the town, but was driven back by Shaikh Mubārak's men upon Hafar; and the Shaikh himself then moved to Jahrah, where he began to collect a force for purposes of defence, or possibly for offensive action. Fears having been expressed by the Turkish authorities that the concentration at Jahrah portended an attack upon Zubair, the Secretary of State requested that the Shaikh might be warned, as before, to avoid measures likely to involve him in difficulties in Central Arabia or with the Turkish Government; but these instructions had been anticipated by Colonel Kemball, the British Resident, who on the 18th of January 1903 had a long and friendly interview with the Shaikh at Kuwait and impressed on him the advisability of abstaining from action against Ibn-Rashīd, especially as the power of that chief was now, according to Mubārak's own admission, on the wane. After this, at the beginning of March 1903, the Wahhābi Amīr, accompanied by his brother Muhammad, visited Kuwait to confer with Mubārak, whose son Jābir was still at Jahrah, holding that place with an armed force. This was the end of the alarms caused at Kuwait by Ibn-Rashīd.

In these improved circumstances the visit of the Russian cruiser "Askold" to Kuwait on the 14th of December 1902 and the joint visit of the French cruiser "Infernet" and the Russian cruiser "Boyarin," which lasted from the 4th to the 8th of March 1903, caused no anxiety in regard to the local situation. On the latter occasion, however, an interview at which Central Arabian affairs were discussed took place between the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr and 'Abdul 'Azīz, son of Ibn-Sa'ūd, who happened to be present in Kuwait.

Visits of
Russian and
French war
vessels to
Kuwait,
1902-03.

A visit paid to Kuwait by His Excellency Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on the 28th and 29th of November 1903, which is described fully in another place, marked the consolidation of British influence in the principality and placed in a clear light the Shaikh's cordial relations with the British Government and his dependence upon the British power; indeed the Shaikh, on receiving a presentation sword from the hands of the Viceroy, spontaneously described himself as a "military officer of the British Empire." The ovation which Lord Curzon received on landing seemed to bear witness to the popularity of British connection; and the impression produced on the minds of the people and their chief by the sight of the East India Squadron must be reckoned among the important political results of His Excellency's tour in the Persian Gulf. Shaikh Mubārak was shown over the flagship "Hyacinth" and was much interested by what he saw, this being the first time that he had set foot on the deck of a man-of-war. At a

Visit of Lord
Curzon to
Kuwait,
November
1903.

private interview on the R.I.M.S. "Hardinge" His Excellency impressed on Shaikh Mubārak the inadvisability of his embroiling himself in the strife of Central Arabia, as, though the British Government had promised to protect him against an attack on Kuwait, they would be unable to interfere if he involved himself in difficulties in the interior; and to this the Shaikh replied that he fully understood His Excellency's advice and that he would be guided by it. On the 30th of November the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," carrying Lord Curzon, entered Khor 'Abdullah and proceeded up the creek as far as the junction of Khor Umm Qasr and Khor Zubair, where a short halt was made

Appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, 1904.

Proposal to establish a British post office and dispensary at Kuwait, 1901-04.

Soon after His Excellency the Viceroy's visit, the British Government decided to take advantage of what seemed a convenient opportunity of securing, by a single measure, the improvement of postal communication with Kuwait, the extension to the town of the benefits of medical skill, and an increase in the efficiency of British political representation with the Shaikh. In July 1901 the British India Steam Navigation Company had established an agency at Kuwait and made the place a port of call for their steamers, and in November of the same year Shaikh Mubārak himself had suggested the establishment of a British post office; but, as a post office could not be established except as an adjunct to a British Political establishment and the time was not propitious for a change in the status of the British representative, who was as yet merely a native news-writer, the project remained for a time in abeyance. In accordance with a renewed request for a post office made by the Shaikh at the time of Lord Curzon's visit, however, it was resolved in 1904 to establish one in charge of a native medical subordinate, who could also carry on medical work among the people. The only condition insisted on by the British Government was one to which the Shaikh readily assented, that he should undertake not to allow the establishment of a post office by any other country; and an Agreement to this effect was obtained from him, of which the text is given in another place.* In July 1904, however, after the necessary preliminaries had been arranged, it was found advisable to suspend action lest certain negotiations should be prejudiced, which, as related further on, were then proceeding at Constantinople for the evacuation of Būbiyān Island by the Turks.

* See Annexure 4 to Appendix K.

The post office scheme was in fact destined to remain inoperative ; and it was in the end superseded by a measure of greater importance that had been under consideration by the British Government in the summer of 1903,—the appointment to Kuwait, namely, of a British officer whose principal duty, it was originally intended, should be to curb the aggressive tendencies of Shaikh Mubārak. In the spring of 1904, in consequence of interference which the Turks had begun to exercise in Central Arabia to the disadvantage of Shaikh Mubārak's ally Ibn-Sa'ūd, the project of stationing a British political officer at Kuwait was revived, but with a different purpose and a considerably enlarged scope. On the 24th of June 1904 the despatch of a European Political Agent to Kuwait was authorised by His Majesty's Government ; and on the 6th of August Captain S. G. Knox arrived at Kuwait from Būshehr duly accredited to the Shaikh, by whom he was well received, and the existing news-agency was abolished. An Assistant-Surgeon soon afterwards joined the Agency in his professional capacity ; but, though he was accompanied by a postal subordinate, the establishment of a regular post office was still deferred.

Establishment of a British Political Agency at Kuwait, August 1904.

The instructions given to Captain S. G. Knox on his appointment reflect the policy of the Government of India and were as follows. The Agent's first object should be to cultivate and maintain close and friendly relations with Shaikh Mubārak and the other principal personages in Kuwait. The interests of British trade and traders at Kuwait and in the adjacent tracts of Arabia should be safeguarded. A vigilant watch should be kept over the proceedings of the Turks on the boundaries of Kuwait territories, and the Political Agent should endeavour to ascertain the true limits of Mubārak's effective occupation upon Khor-as-Sabīyah. Matters showing an intention on the part of the Turks, or of any other power, to interfere with or disturb the existing *status quo*, or anything which would lead to a belief that other powers had designs on or in connection with possible harbours within or without Kuwait territory, should be at once reported ; and special but unobtrusive attention should be paid in this respect to Khor 'Abdullah and the waters adjacent to Būbiyān Island and Umm Qasr. The Political Agent should also endeavour to secure early and accurate information regarding the struggle between the Ibn-Rashīd and Ibn-Sa'ūd families for the supremacy in Najd. Finally, he should investigate the alleged importation of arms at Kuwait, especially of rifles for Ibn-Sa'ūd ; but, pending further instructions, he should neither authorise nor forbid the Shaikh to continue the existing trade in arms.

Instructions of the Political Agent on appointment.

In November 1904 the Turkish Government complained of the appointment of the British Political Agent at Kuwait as an infringement of the *status quo*. Important questions relating to the Aden frontier were then pending between the British and Turkish Governments, which made the occasion an unfavourable one for raising the whole question of Kuwait; and it was accordingly decided by His Majesty's Government that the newly appointed Agent should be withdrawn as soon as it was possible to do so without inconvenience, the withdrawal however to be temporary only, and to be so carried out as not to bear the appearance of a concession to Turkey. During his sojourn at Kuwait Captain Knox had successfully carried out, in complete harmony with Shaikh Mubarak, such of his instructions as depended for their fulfilment on himself; and his tenure of office had not been marked by a single untoward incident.

Captain Knox remained at Kuwait until the 16th of May 1905, when he was obliged by illness to take leave to England, his temporary withdrawal being thus brought about in such a manner that its cause was disguised from the Shaikh and that the unfortunate results which might otherwise have followed were averted. The current duties of the Agency were carried on, until Captain Knox's return on the 25th of October 1905, by the Assistant Surgeon, Dāwud-ar-Rahmān.

General history of Kuwait since the establishment of the Political Agency, 1904-1907.

We may now trace the history of one or two questions which continued to occupy attention after the arrival of Captain Knox at Kuwait; but some of the facts which it will be necessary to mention belong to a period earlier than 1904.

Case of the
Shaikh of
Kuwait's
estates in
Turkish
'Iraq, 1901-
1904.

Reference has already been made to a dispute between Shaikh Mubarak and his fugitive nephews regarding certain family estates situated in Turkish territory on the Shatt-al-'Arab; and we have seen that a hope was held out to the Shaikh, soon after the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement in 1899, that British influence would be used to prevent injury to his interests in that direction. The estates in question, of which the proprietary shares were in dispute, were situated at Gardilan and on 'Ajairāwiyah Island near Basrah, at Zain opposite the mouth of the Kārūn River, at Sūfiyah in the Dawāsir tract, and at Fāo. The Shaikh

was able to protract matters for a couple of years by declining to submit to the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts; but in December 1901, the Turks having resolved to break down his opposition to their authority at Kuwait, he was called upon to defend his case in a Basrah tribunal; and, on his failing to do so, judgment was given against him in default, and he was ordered to make over the estate at Zain to his nephews.

Shaikh Mubarak at once appealed to the Sultān of Turkey with the result that, early in 1902, an Imperial Iradé was issued for the appointment of a Commission to settle the whole dispute between him and his nephews. After much difficulty and delay a settlement was arranged by Hāji Mansūr, representing Shaikh Mubarak, and 'Abdul Wahhāb-al-Qirtās, representing the opposite side, in communication with Mr. Crow, H. B. M.'s Consul at Basrah, who, under instructions from Constantinople, had been admitted to a share in the proceedings; and this settlement, after being approved by the Commission and accepted by the parties, was embodied in a deed executed at Basrah on the 11th of July 1904 and attested, not only by the Wālī of Basrah and his Council, but also—at the request of Shaikh Mubarak—by the British Consul. The general effect of the settlement was to confer on Shaikh Mubarak undivided ownership and possession of the whole property at Fāo, while an absolute and exclusive title to the Gardilān, 'Ajairāwiyah, Zain and Sūfiyah estates and a money payment of £T7,296 $\frac{3}{4}$ was obtained by the opposite party. The share of the nephews in ancestral moveable property at Kuwait was mentioned in the deed but was not affected by it, the rights and shares of both parties therein being maintained unaltered; but the title of Shaikh Mubarak to certain moveable property at Kuwait was expressly validated.

Early in 1904 the Shaikh applied for a loan of Rs. 1,00,000 from the Government of India to enable him to carry out the terms arranged; and this was readily granted, without interest, on condition that he should not borrow from any other lender without the consent of His Majesty's Government until the debt had been repaid in full, and that repayment should be completed by the end of 1905. The Shaikh, who has always shown himself a good man of business, discharged the obligation nearly a year before expiry of the period fixed.

A peculiar incident, which gave some trouble at the time but had no political consequences, occurred at the Shaikh's Fāo estate on the 10th of October 1904, when the Shaikh's land agent brought off to H.M.S. "Merlin" the dead bodies of an Arab man and woman together with three Turkish gendarmes in custody, by whom, he alleged,

they had been murdered. The commander of the "Merlin" refused to receive the agent's prisoners on board, and the matter thus lost its importance.

Discussions
regarding
the Turkish
occupation
of Būbiyān
Island, 1904.

In 1904, after Lord Curzon's inspection of Khor 'Abdullah, representations were made by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government as to the extreme undesirability of allowing both sides of that inlet—perhaps the most convenient terminus for a railway from Baghdād to the Persian Gulf—to fall permanently into the hands of a power not very amenable to British influence. The question of Būbiyān Island, which the Shaikh of Kuwait asserted to belong to his principality, and the occupation of which by the Turks was regarded by His Majesty's Government as a breach of the engagement to respect the *status quo* at Kuwait, was raised diplomatically at Constantinople; but no favourable opportunity of pressing for evacuation of the island could be found, and the Turkish post on Būbiyān was not withdrawn.

Relations of Kuwait with Turkey and Central Arabia during the same period, 1904-1907.

Mediation of
the Shaikh
of Kuwait
between the
Turkish
authorities
and Ibn-
Sa'ūd, Feb-
ruary 1905.

In the history of Najd it is related how a Turkish force was despatched in May 1904 from 'Irāq to the aid of Ibn-Rashīd, only to be overwhelmed in Qasīm in the course of the following summer, by Ibn-Sa'ūd and his allies; also how in the winter of 1904-1905 the Turks prepared a second expedition, and thereby so alarmed Ibn-Sa'ūd that he agreed to a settlement which included the pacific occupation of Qasīm by an Ottoman force. Here it is enough to observe that the arrangement in question was brought about largely through the instrumentality of Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, who assumed, somewhat unexpectedly, the role of intermediary. Two meetings for discussion were held on the frontier between Kuwait and 'Irāq—the first at Safwān on the 8th, and the second at the Qash'āniyah wells on the 13th of February—between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Mukhlis Pāsha, the newly appointed Wālī of Basrah, and at both of these Shaikh Mubārak was present with a large escort; but he declined, content with having brought the principals together, to become *in propria personā* a party to their arrangements.

The use by Shaikh Mubārak in his correspondence in this business of the title "Ruler of Kuwait and Chief of its Tribes," instead of that of

"Qāim-Maqām," gave some offence to the Turks ; but it did not affect the course of the negotiations. A suggestion made by the Wālī at these meetings, that Turkish civil officials and troops should be sent to Kuwait, was met by Shaikh Mubārak, according to his own subsequent statement, with a *non possumus* reply and with a declaration of his loyal adherence to the connection which he had formed with the British Government.

Probably in consequence of the services which he rendered upon this occasion, the relations of Shaikh Mubārak with the Turkish authorities at Basrah were, from 1905 onwards, much more friendly. In August 1905 the Shaikh subscribed £T450 towards the erection of new Turkish barracks at Basrah ; and, on the donation being cordially acknowledged, he professed devotion to the Sultān of Turkey and promised a further subscription of £T200. In 1905 a continuous stream of Turkish military deserters and officials escaping from Najd began to pour into Kuwait, where they arrived in a miserable plight : they were invariably fed and sent on to Basrah by Shaikh Mubārak. The number of these refugees up to March 1906 was about 500 ; in August Fariq Sadiq Pasha himself came in with an escort of about 150 men ; and at the end of December some 800 more men, almost the last remnants of the Turkish army of occupation in Qasīm, reached the neighbourhood of Kuwait. This last body were not allowed by the Shaikh to enter the town, probably from fear that an occupation might be attempted. For the purpose of collecting and forwarding this rabble, the Shaikh of Kuwait's imprisoned agent, 'Abdul 'Aziz, the conditions of whose imprisonment had already been mitigated at the instance of His Majesty's Government, was allowed by the Turks to proceed to Kuwait ; and there he was afterwards allowed to reside in a sort of open arrest, as the property which he owned in Turkish 'Irāq afforded a sufficient security against his attempting to escape. From the autumn of 1905 until the spring of 1907 the Turkish official mail between 'Irāq and Hasa was sent by land through Kuwait territory, instead of by British steamer *via* Bahrain, as had hitherto been the rule ; but Shaikh Mubārak declined to have anything to do with the arrangements or to accept responsibility for the safety of the mails, which in the end returned to the original route by sea. In August 1906 it was announced that Shaikh Mubārak had contributed £T500 to the Hijāz Railway fund, but this was not his first subscription, for he had already, in January 1904, received the medal conferred by the Sultān on distinguished subscribers.

Subsequent
relations of
Shaikh
Mubārak
with the
Porte,
1905-1907.

After 1905 amicable relations continued to prevail between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Wahhābi Amir ; the former, as related in the history

Subsequent
relations of
Shaikh

Mubārak
with Central
Arabia,
1905-1907.

of Najd, began in 1906 to exert himself, at the request of Ibn-Rashīd, to arrange a reconciliation in Najd; and after the death of Yūsuf-bin-'Abdullah near Hāil in January 1906 the Shaikh of Kuwait even showed some sympathy for the Shammar Amīr. In March 1906 Shaikh Mubārak appeared (or pretended) to entertain a utopian scheme for a friendly partition of Central Arabia under which Jabal Shammar would fall to Ibn-Rashīd and most of Southern Najd to Ibn-Sa'ūd, while he himself would take possession of Qasīm and of the Wahhābi districts of Sadair and Washm. In July 1906 his efforts in the cause of peace were finally successful. The Kuwait Hajj to Makkah, for some time interrupted by the wars in Najd, was resumed; and in 1906 the number of persons who travelled in it was about 2,000 souls.

Relations of Kuwait with Great Britain, 1904-1907.

Notwithstanding the cessation of hostility between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Turks, the relations of the former with the British Government and with the officers representing them at Kuwait continued to be excellent. The only exception was a temporary and partial estrangement at the beginning of 1906 due to remonstrances, made by Captain Knox under the orders of Government in regard to the arms trade at Kuwait, which are noticed in the Appendix dealing with that subject.

Question of a
distinctive
flag for
Kuwait.

A question which in 1907 had been pending for a considerable time, but remained unsettled, was that of the adoption by the Shaikh of Kuwait of a flag distinguishable from the Turkish. A change was first proposed in 1901, when a differentiation of the Kuwait flag from that of Turkey appeared desirable for more than one reason, but principally on account of the inconsistency of preventing the disembarkation of Turkish troops at a place where the Turkish flag was flown. The Government of India considered that the Shaikh ought to fly the red Arab flag; and the Shaikh, though he urged that the crescent had been used by his grandfather, his father and himself as a Muhammadan, not as a Turkish emblem, was willing to abandon it. In consequence, however, of the arrangement made by the British Government with the Porte in September 1901, for the maintenance of the *status quo* at Kuwait, the matter was dropped for a time.

In 1904, in connection with a discussion—which will be mentioned further on—as to the protection of Kuwaitis in Persia, the question of the flag was revived; and the Shaikh, having been approached under the

instructions of His Majesty's Government, in July 1905 expressed his willingness to adopt a flag of crescent design distinguished from the Turkish flag by the addition of the word "Kuwait," as also certificates of nationality for vessels belonging to his port. In March 1906, however, Shaikh Mubarak demurred, in the absence of an explicit guarantee that Kuwait vessels would not be harassed at Turkish ports, to the use of Roman letters on the flag; but he agreed that the name "Kuwait" might appear on it in Arabic characters. The adoption of the proposed flag, as thus finally modified, was then approved by His Majesty's Government; but again, in September 1906, the Shaikh represented that even the slight innovation to which he had consented might lead to unfavourable treatment of Kuwait vessels in Turkey, and requested an assurance on the subject by the British Government. The matter was then once more referred by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government.

Advantage was taken of the favourable disposition of Shaikh Mubarak, after the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, to obtain fuller information about the surroundings of Kuwait both on land and at sea. In December 1904 a party of officers employed on this Gazetteer marched by land, in company with Captain Knox, from Kuwait to the Turkish border; and the opportunity was utilised to carry a plane-table survey, on a large scale, from Jahrah and the northern shores of Kuwait Bay up to the Turkish frontier posts of Safwān and Umm Qasr. In April 1905, Captain Knox made a tour into the country to the south of Kuwait, and in January 1906 he attained the distant but important point of Hafar, never before visited by a European, on the border between Kuwait territory and Central Arabia, Bedouin reports being provided on both occasions by Shaikh Mubarak. In the winter of 1906-1907 the Political Agent made two more interesting journeys to the south of Kuwait, on the first of which it was found possible for Mrs. Knox to accompany him.

Land explorations and marine surveys, 1904-07.

A marine survey of Kuwait Bay by the R.I.M.S. "Investigator" was begun in November 1904, and continued season by season until November 1907, when the work was completed.

Relations with Persia, 1904-1907.

In September 1904 considerable feeling was aroused at Kuwait by the unjustifiable seizure of two Būms belonging to the port by the

Harassment of Kuwait

subjects by
the Persian
Imperial
Customs,
1904-05.

Persian Customs steamer "Mozaffari," and a general disposition was remarked about this time, on the part of the recently re-organised Persian Customs, to interfere in a vexatious manner with Kuwait subjects and their boats upon the Persian side of the Gulf. The suspicion that Kuwait boats were engaged in running arms to Persia may have been, in some cases, not devoid of foundation; but gratuitous interference with Kuwait vessels generally was now pushed to such a point that the Government of India were constrained to draw the attention of the Secretary of State and the British Minister at Tehran to the matter.

Status and
protection of
Kuwait sub-
jects in
Persia,
1904-06.

In March 1905 the general question of the status and protection of Kuwaitis in Persia was discussed by the British Minister at Tehran with the Persian Government in connection with the difficulties just described. Sir A. Hardinge explained that Kuwait was *de facto* independent of Turkey, which had not established or maintained an effective control over the country; and he endeavoured, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to secure for Kuwaitis in Persia the same position in respect of the good offices of Great Britain as was conceded in the case of Afghans, *viz.*, "that the friendly recommendations and wishes of the British Government on their behalf should be accepted." It appeared, however, that the Persian Government, while not averse in principle to the intervention of British diplomatic and consular representatives on behalf of Kuwaitis in Persia, were unwilling to concede the point in practice lest by doing so they should give umbrage to Turkey, whose representatives had already protested against the intervention of the British Resident at Būshehr in Kuwaiti cases. Instructions were in the end given by the Persian Government to the Director-General of Customs at Būshehr not to treat Kuwaitis with such harshness as to bring Kuwait cases into prominence, but at the same time he was enjoined not to admit the intervention of the British Political Resident on their behalf. Up to 1907 no real settlement had been reached.

Friendship
of Shaikh
Mubārak and
the Shaikh of
Muhamma-
reh.

A strong personal friendship of some length of standing existed between Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait and Shaikh Khaz'al, the Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh; but its basis, unless it consisted in a certain similarity in their political position, was not apparent. Frequent visits were paid by Shaikh Mubārak to Muhammareh and Faiilyeh.

Relations with European powers other than Britain, 1904-07.

After 1904 an overt interest in Kuwait affairs was not displayed by any European power other than Great Britain. In September 1904,

soon after Captain Knox's arrival at Kuwait, the Shaikh received a communication from Basrah suggesting that he should profit by the visit of certain Russian officials, then at Basrah, to obtain a reconciliation with the Turks; and it was added that the Russian and French Governments, if the Shaikh consented to receive a Russian and a French Consul at Kuwait, would guarantee the arrangements made. The exact source of this message, to which Shaikh Mubarak sent a formal and meaningless reply, was not discovered. In September 1905 Mr. Bahnson, representing the German firm of Wöneckhaus and Company in Bahrain, arrived in Kuwait to enquire into prospects of trade, but the Shaikh did not allow him to remain long.

Internal affairs of the Kuwait principality, 1904-07.

Previously to the appointment of a British Political Agent at Kuwait, no cognisance at all was taken by the British political authorities of the internal affairs of the Kuwait Shaikhdom; and after that event only so much attention was given them as the interest of the British Government in the general prosperity and stability of the Shaikh's Government warranted. It appeared that no one could be more competent than Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait to manage his own affairs.

Two of the sons of Shaikh Mubarak died in 1906, one of them being Fahad, his youngest, who two years before had been sent for medical treatment to India. The establishment of a British dispensary in Kuwait was partially due to the solicitude of the Shaikh for the life of this child.

Dynastic matters.

Notwithstanding a great increase in the trade of the port the Shaikh enhanced all taxation at Kuwait, and some discontent was occasioned thereby. Custom duties, in particular, were augmented; but care continued to be shown for the convenience of merchants, for the reception of whose goods a stone warehouse, spacious and secure, was provided, and the Customs Department in general, under the management of one of the Shaikh's slaves, appeared to be well administered. Export and import duties by land were likewise increased; and in 1907 there were complaints of new and burdensome dues levied on the pilgrims of the Kuwait Hajj at their return. The most serious grievance of the tax-payer was, however, a sudden demand, made in January 1907, on the owners of houses in Kuwait town built on land which had been provided free by the Shaikh. A large part of the

Finances.

town was included in this category, and here it was required of the occupants that they should either pay three-fourths of the value of the buildings, when the property would remain their own, or accept one-fourth the value from the Shaikh and surrender their houses. Heavy taxation was a new feature in the administration of Kuwait, and the reasons for resorting to it in a time of exceptional peace and prosperity were not altogether clear. In 1906-07 Shaikh Mubarak purchased a new steam-yacht at a cost of over a lakh of rupees; and this, with expenses of maintenance, may have accounted in part for the pecuniary difficulties which he now began to allege.

Tribal
affairs.

The tribal affairs of the Kuwait principality were ordinarily so well managed that nothing was heard of them, and opposition to the wishes of Shaikh Mubarak was rare on the part of the tribes subject to his influence. Towards the end of February 1907, however, a raid was committed by some of the 'Ajman on Arabs living in the desert immediately around Kuwait town and depending on the Shaikh's protection; but Mubarak at once took steps to revenge the outrage, and the 'Ajman would have been attacked in force had they not submitted, promised restitution, and surrendered Muhammad-bin-Hithlain, one of their principal Shaikhs, who was then imprisoned at Kuwait. A levy of the inhabitants for military service against the 'Ajman and also, on another occasion, for the collection of Zakat from various Bedouin tribes, caused considerable dissatisfaction against the Shaikh in the town of Kuwait.

ANNEUXRE NO. 1.—AGREEMENT BY THE SHAIKH OF
KUWAIT REGARDING THE NON-RECEPTION OF FOR-
EIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND THE NON-CESION
OF TERRITORY TO FOREIGN POWERS OR SUBJECTS,
23RD JANUARY 1899.

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, on behalf of the British Government on the one part, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or

at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government ; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the former on behalf of the British Government and the latter on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures on this, the tenth day of Ramazan 1316, corresponding with the twenty-third day of January 1899.

(Sd.) M. J. MEADE,
*Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.*

MUBARAK-AL-SUBAH.

(L.S.)

Witnesses.

(Sd.) E. WICKHAM HORE,
Captain, I.M.S.

MUHAMMAD RAHIM BIN
ABDUL NEBI SAFFER.

(Sd.) J. CALCOTT GASKIN.

(L.S.)

Letter accompanying the execution of the above Agreement.

Dated the 23rd January 1899.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL M. J. MEADE, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SHEIKH MUBARAK-BIN-SUBAH, Sheikh of Koweit.

After compliments.—In view of the signing to-day of the agreement, so happily concluded between you, Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah, on behalf of yourself, your heirs and successors, on the one part, and myself, on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, I now assure you, as Sheikh of Koweit, of the good offices of the British Government towards you, your heirs and successors as long as you, your heirs and successors scrupulously and faithfully observe the conditions of the said bond.

The three copies of the bond will be sent to India to be ratified by His Excellency Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Her Imperial Majesty's Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and, on their return, one copy, duly ratified, will be conveyed to you, when I will take measures to send you, as agreed, a sum of Rs. 15,000 from the Bushire Treasury. A most important condition of the execution of this agreement is that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and not divulged or made public in any way without the previous consent of the British Government.

●

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF NAJD OR CENTRAL ARABIA.*

The Wahnabi movement.

The present era of Central Arabian history began with the rise of Wahhabism, by which the course of events in Najd has since been largely determined. Consequently, in dealing with the era, it is necessary first of all to enquire into the origin of Wahhabism.

Concerning the founder of the Wahnabi sect, though he lived only a century and a half ago, and though general attention was early drawn to his proceedings by their political results, few authentic details have been preserved and the extant information is conflicting. It is agreed that he came of the Bani Tamim, a solid agricultural tribe of Najd, and 1691 is given as the year of his birth; but the honour of having been his birthplace is contested by the southern town of Hautah and the village of 'Ayainah in Wadi Hanifah. Even his name is doubtful; by some it is said that he was called 'Abdul Wahnab, by others that this was his patronymic, and that he himself was Muhammad-bin-'Abdul Wahnab-bin-Sulaiman. He studied abroad at Basrah, at Damascus, and perhaps elsewhere; but finally he returned to his native country, where, about the year 1742, he began to expound and inculcate the doctrines which he had evolved during his years of study. According to the account which represents 'Ayainah as his native place, it was there that he began his public mission and there that he met, after a time, with opposition

The founder
of Wahnabi-
bism.

* The following are the principal authorities for the history of Najd: Corancez *Histoire des Wahabis*, 1810; Sadleir's *Diary of a Journey across Arabia in 1819*, published 1866; Mengin's *Histoire de l'Égypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly*, 1823 (not obtained by the present writer); Burckhardt's *Materials for a History of the Wahabys*, 1831; Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahabys*, 1834; *Bombay Selections XXIV, The Persian Gulf*, 1856; Palgrave's *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 1862-63*, published in 1865; Colonel L. Pelly's *Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, 1866; Colonel E. Ross's *Memoir on Nejd*, in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1879-80; Mr. C. M. Doughty's *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 1888; Baron E. Nolde's *Reise nach Innerarabien*, 1895; and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1804-1904*, printed in 1904. The writings of Mr. C. Huber also contain some historical information regarding Najd.

which obliged him to transfer the scene of his activities to the neighbouring town of Dara'iyah; but all authorities concur in stating that his later and more influential years were passed at Dara'iyah. He is said to have been married twenty times and to have had eighteen children. The 14th of June 1787 is mentioned as the day of his death.

Wahhabism
in its religi-
ous or origi-
nal aspect.

Wahhabism was at first a purely religious movement; afterwards, through force of circumstances, it acquired a secular and political character. In the beginning it was a reformation of Muhammadan doctrine and practice, inspired by the ideal of a return to the pristine purity of Islam, and took the form chiefly of a protest against superstition and luxury in the Muhammadan world. That the Wahhābi belief, if tried by the standard of the Qurān and the best accredited traditions of Islām, will be found strictly orthodox seems to be generally admitted; and the difference between the true Wahhābi and the ordinary Muhammadan appears to be due to the declension of the latter from the spirit of his own religion rather than to any eccentricity on the part of the former.

Wahhabism
in its political
or secondary
aspect.

The adhesion of numbers of converts to the reformed faith in Central Arabia, together with the failure of that faith to find acceptance elsewhere, soon invested the movement in Najd with a political, a national, and even a military importance. Community of belief first paved the way for submission to a common administrative authority; by this authority individuals were compelled to obey the law and warring townships and districts were welded together into a solid and well-ordered principality; and, once internal unity had been established, a militant enthusiasm for the propagation of their religious principles abroad, not unmingled perhaps with a patriotic desire to cast off the hegemony of the Red Sea districts of Hijāz and Yaman, awoke in the hearts of the people. For the sharp conflicts between the Wahhābis and their neighbours which soon began, and which continued so long as the Wahhābis retained their religious fervour, neither party can be held solely responsible. The Wahhābis on their part displayed great intolerance, especially towards the Turks, whose morals they regarded as lax and non-Muhammadan; while their opponents, conscious of the logical soundness of Wahhābi doctrine and exasperated by the pharisaism of Wahhābi virtue, had recourse to calumnies and misrepresentations. The result was that each side virtually placed the other outside the pale of Islām, and that the Wahhābis, who were the more warlike, declared the lives and property of their antagonists to have been forfeited by religious infidelity and applied themselves to execute the sentence. On the one hand it must be admitted that the opposition to

the Whahābis proceeded largely from persons, such as the Sharīfs of Makkah, whose pecuniary interests the discouragement of honours paid to the memories and tombs of the illustrious dead threatened to affect; and, on the other, that the common herd of Wahhābis, while they did not understand the higher principles at issue but rather dwelt with narrow-minded complacency on such details as the prohibition of gold and silk attire, of rosaries, and of tobacco, revelled in the pillage and plunder which the punishment of the unbelievers rendered lawful and even obligatory. With Christians and Jews the early Wahhābis did not come much in contact; but their feelings towards such appear to have been much less bitter than towards those whom they regarded as false Muhammadans.

These preliminary observations will be illustrated by the history which follows of the Wahhābi power in Najd.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-SA'ŪD, before 1765.

The first secular chief to adopt Wahhābi principles, and to bring his policy and administration into harmony with them, was Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, Shaikh of Dara'iyah, in whose town and under whose protection the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wahhāb lived during the later and most active part of his career. Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd belonged to a family, known as the Āl Maqrān, of the Misālīkh section of the Wāld 'Alī division of the 'Anizah tribe; and from the name of his father was derived the alternative family name of Āl Sa'ūd, which has been transmitted to his descendants, and in virtue of which the Wahhābi Amīr is to the present day called "Ibn-Sa'ūd," in contradistinction to "Ibn-Rashīd," the Amīr for the time being of Jabal Shammar. At the time of his adopting Wahhābi beliefs Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd was at feud with Daham-bin-Daus, Shaikh of the neighbouring town of Riyādh; and the strength which Wahhabism gave to his cause enabled him to break the power of this rival, whom he at first reduced to the position of a tributary. He also carried his arms into the eastern province of Hasa; but against the Bani Khālid Shaikhs, who for about a century had been predominant in that region, he failed to obtain any success.*

* According to another account however, Muhammad, though he achieved the unification of a great part of Central Arabia, including possibly Jabal Shammar, made it his maxim "not to undermine the cliff," or, in other words, not to provoke neighbouring powers of dangerous strength. If so, his policy of caution and restraint must very soon have been abandoned by his successor for one of aggression.

'ABDUL 'AZĪZ-BIN-MUHAMMAD.

1765-1803.

Muhammad was succeeded on his death by his son 'Abdul 'Aziz, who had frequently commanded the Wahhābi forces in the field, and who had taken in marriage a daughter of the reformer Muhammad or 'Abdul Wahhāb.

Affairs in Najd, 1765-1803.

On his accession to power 'Abdul 'Aziz delegated the duty of directing military operations to his son Sa'ūd, who conducted them on the whole with striking success.

Reduction of
Riyach, 1772.

Riyādh, already made tributary, was finally reduced in 1772, the Shaikh Daham-bin-Daus taking refuge in Hasa, and was incorporated with the Wahhābi dominions.

Assassination
of the 'Amir
Abdul 'Aziz,
1803.

The histories of the time contain no further notice of events in Najd until they mention the assassination of 'Abdul 'Aziz, which took place at Dara'iyah on a date variously given as the 4th of October and the 12th of November 1803. The scene of this deed was a public mosque at the time of evening prayer, and the perpetrator was a Persian Saiyid,* whose relations the Wahhābis had murdered. The assassin was immediately put to death. 'Abdul 'Aziz had attained, it is said, the age of 82 years.

Operations of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia, 1765-1803.

A strong outward movement of the Wahhābis, zealous to propagate their doctrines, had now begun ; and in no direction was their pressure more severely felt than in the Turkish districts of the Red Sea basin.

War with the
Sharif of
Makkah,
1792—1802.

In 1792 or 1793 hostilities broke out between the Wahhābi Amīr and Ghālib, Sharif of Makkah, whose religious and political views were naturally irreconcilable with theirs ; and the war continued for several years in the form of desultory raids and counter-raids by the tribes

* Corancez (*Histoire des Wahabis*) is more explicit. He says that the assassin, who used a dagger, was a Kurdish dervish and had taken service with 'Abdul 'Aziz on purpose to kill him, three of his own sons having been slain by Wahhābis at the sack of Karbala in 1801.

dependent upon either. At one time Ghālib had the advantage, and during a whole year he held possession of the desert village of Sha'arah in Najd; but again he narrowly escaped being surrounded by the Wāhhābis and escaped, with a few followers only, to Bīshah. In 1799 Sa'ūd, the son of the Wāhhābi Amīr, came to Makkah on pilgrimage with a large number of armed followers, and in the next year he repeated the visit: in the light of later events both of these journeys should perhaps be regarded as military reconnaissances. In 1801 the tribes in the vicinity of Taif fell under the influence of the Wāhhābis and were placed by the Amīr in charge of a Bedouin Shaikh 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah, who was a brother-in-law of the Sharif Ghālib but had been for several years at enmity with him.

In 1802 Taif itself, the "Garden of Makkah," situated only a couple of days' journey to the east of the Holy City, was taken by 'Othmān; the inhabitants, including even children, were mercilessly put to the sword; and, before the end of the year, the harbour of Qunfidah also, on the Red Sea coast, was lost by the Sharif to the Wāhhābis.

Capture of
Taif and
Qunfidah
by the
Wāhhābis,
1802-03.

In April or May 1803, after a defence of two or three months' duration, Makkah succumbed to a loose investment by the Wāhhābi forces which had reduced the inhabitants to great straits for food and drinkable water, and Sa'ūd took possession of the city. During their stay in Makkah, which was not long, the Wāhhābis behaved with considerable moderation; but tombs forming objects of pilgrimage were razed to the ground; a Wāhhābi reformation of manners and morals was instituted; and, before the departure of the army, a Wāhhābi governor was installed in the person of 'Abdul Ma'in, a brother of the Sharif Ghālib. Ghālib himself, when he found the surrender of Makkah to be inevitable, had slipped away to Jiddah on the sea, and thither the Wāhhābis followed him, but they were unable to storm the fortifications and after eleven days gave up the attempt. The bulk of the Harb tribe, however, who had hitherto opposed them, now made submission, and Yanbō' on the coast submitted; but Madinah, though beleaguered, still held out, and dysentery had begun in the invaders' camp.

Capture of
Makkah by
the Wāhhābis,
1803.

In July 1803, the bulk of the Wāhhābi forces having then returned to Najd, Ghālib came back from Jiddah, obtained the surrender of two small Wāhhābi garrisons that had been left behind in Makkah, and resumed the government of the town; but a little later he submitted to the Wāhhābi ruler and was granted favourable terms.

Peace and
restoration of
the Sharif of
Makkah,
1803.

He was confirmed in possession of his revenues and political influence, and he was exempted, along with the whole population of Makkah, from paying tribute to the Amīr. On his part he agreed to take no customs duty at Jiddah from true Wāhhābis.

Operations of the Wāhhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1765-1803.

Seriously occupied as the attention of the Wāhhābis must have been in the littoral districts of the Red Sea, their energy and resources were at this time such as to permit of a simultaneous and hardly inferior display of activity along the whole Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, where their cause made considerable progress.

Wāhhābi
attacks
on
Kuwait,
1793-95.

During the period from 1793 to 1795, while the British Factory from Basrah was temporarily established at Kuwait, frequent demonstrations and one more or less serious attack were made upon the town by the Wāhhābis, but here they gained no success: some details of these hostilities are given in the history of the Kuwait principality. In regard to the nature of the relations subsisting between the British representatives at Kuwait and the Wāhhābi Amīr there is some doubt; for on the one hand it is stated that presents were regularly sent to the Amīr, who in return * protected the British desert mail to Europe, and on the other it is alleged that the Factory once helped the people of Kuwait to repel a Wāhhābi attack, after which 'Abdul 'Azīz showed unmistakable signs of resentment. In 1798-99, and again in 1802, Turkish expeditions against the Wāhhābis marched, as will be shown further on, through Kuwait territory.

Wāhhābi
conquest
of
Hasa, 1795.

The province of Hasa, reduced for the first time in 1792, was finally conquered by the Wāhhābis in 1795, when it was placed under Wāhhābi governors and religious instructors. Hasa thus came to form a base in Eastern Arabia for the wider extension of Wāhhābi influence; and a few years after, as we shall see in a later paragraph, it became the first battleground of the Wāhhābi and the Turk.

Wāhhābi
intervention
in Bahrain,
1802-03.

Established in Hasa, the Wāhhābis soon began to exert an influence on Bahrain affairs; and it was largely through their aid that as related in the history of Bahrain, the 'Atbi rulers of the principality were able

* According to Corancez (page 50) the Amīr undertook to protect the British mail only so long as he should be at peace with the Pāshā of Baghlāl. but once put a man to death for tampering with it.

to prevent Saiyid Sultān of Masqat from obtaining a permanent footing in the islands. In 1803 Salmān-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Bahrain, appears to have visited the Wāhhābi Amīr with a sum which he offered as tribute, but the payment was excused.

It was also from Hasa that a Wāhhābi force commanded by Hariq, a Nubian slave, proceeded to the Baraimi Oasis, which they seized and occupied with a view to future action against Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate: the particulars of their operations on this side are given in the histories of the regions mentioned. By the middle of 1802 Wāhhābi influence extended along the whole coast from the neighbourhood of Kuwait to Dibah; and in 1803, in consequence of help lent by Saiyid Sultān of Masqat to their enemy the Sharif of Makkah, the Wāhhābis declared war against 'Omān and, by compelling the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Bahrain and the Qawāsīm of Rās-al-Khaimah to take the sea against him, reduced the Saiyid to serious straits; but peace was made on condition that tribute of \$12,000 a year should be paid by the ruler of Masqat to the Wāhhābi Amīr and that a Wāhhābi political representative should be received by him at his capital. This peace was almost immediately violated by the Wāhhābis, whose object seemed to be the complete subjection of 'Omān by an invasion; but news of the assassination of the Amīr 'Abdul 'Azīz, received at the end of the year, obliged them to suspend their proceedings for a time. Meanwhile Saiyid Badar, who ultimately succeeded Saiyid Sultān at Masqat, had left 'Omān and joined himself to the Wāhhābis.

Wāhhābi
occupation
of Baraimi
and relations,
with 'Omān
1800-08.

Aggressions of the Wāhhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1765-1803.

So early as 1784 the proceedings of the Wāhhābis had begun to cause alarm to the Turkish rulers of 'Irāq, and during the next ten years the danger from them steadily increased; their attacks, being made suddenly at unexpected points, were often successful; and "the ease with which the Wāhhābis assembled a force, and the rapidity with which that force marched, when assembled, astonished and confounded the slowly moving Ottoman." The open country and the villages and smaller towns on the western borders of 'Irāq became a prey to Wāhhābi depredations, especially towards the lower end of the province near Basrah; and in some cases, in default of that protection

Wāhhābi
raids on the
borders of
'Irāq, 1784-
98.

which the Pāshaliq of Baghdād was unable to afford, the inhabitants paid blackmail to the Wāhhābis. The power of the Bani Khālid tribe, who might otherwise have served as a partial bulwark against these assaults, was broken by the Wāhhābis in their conquest of Hasa between the years 1792 and 1795; and from that time onward the necessity of steps by the Porte, if they cared at all for the security of their own dominions, was evident. The intrigues of the Sharif of Makkah and the complaints of Persian and other pilgrims, who now underwent considerable extortion on the journey across Arabia, also operated to incite the Turks to action.

First Turkish
expedition
against the
Wāhhābis,
1798-99.

For two or three years the Porte were unable to induce their representative at Baghdād, albeit he was none other than the once able and energetic Sulaimān Pāsha, to undertake an expedition against the Wāhhābis; but at length in 1798, when even the town Hillah had begun to suffer from Wāhhābi annoyance, he allowed his objections, which were probably of a personal and pecuniary nature, to be overcome. The Pāsha raised and equipped a force of about 5,000 Turkish troops, with an imposing but not very effective train of artillery, to which was added later a contingent of twice the strength drawn from the Shammar, Dhafir and Muntafik tribes; and the regular part of this force, which in September 1798 was encamped on the right bank of the Tigris at Baghdād, appears to have reached Basrah by the beginning of December. The whole expedition was under the command of 'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah or steward of Sulaimān Pāsha, a Georgian slave, but married to his master's daughter; this individual has been described by one who knew him* as "ignorant, bigoted, irascible, obstinate, ill-mannered and brutal;" and his lack of military knowledge and his absurd and haughty treatment of the chiefs of the tribal contingent, on whom he had largely to rely, caused the failure of the expedition to be predicted by many before it had even started. The objective of the force was the Wāhhābi capital of Dara'iyah, and it was determined to proceed thither by the circuitous but otherwise eligible route of Hasa, that Oasis being reduced on the way.

From Basrah 'Ali Pāsha marched by land to the Hasa Oasis, where he secured all the Wāhhābi posts except the Kūt of Hofūf and Qasr Sāhūd at Mubarrāz; but, these having held out for more than two months against his languid attacks and unskilful bombardments, he desisted from the siege and, on the advice of his Arab associates,

* Sir H. J. Brydges; but Mr. Manesty considered him "a brave and enterprising young man."

among whom Muhammad Baig, the most important, was suspected of correspondence with the Wāhhābis, marched again for Basrah. His way was barred at Thāj in Wādī-al-Miyāh by Sa'ūd, son of the Wāhhābi Amīr, and the armies remained halted opposite to each other for three days, during which neither ventured to attack the other in force. A truce for six years between the Wāhhābis and the Pāshaliq was then arranged, in May 1799; and, to obtain ratification of the same, a Wāhhābi envoy returned with the Kehiyah to Baghdād. Meanwhile Sa'ūd visited Hasa; rewarded the garrisons of Kūt-al-Hofūf and Qasr Sāhūd; and punished those who had submitted to the Turks in the usual Wāhhābi manner, by wholesale confiscation of their property. Matters between the Pāsha and the Amīr were eventually adjusted at Baghdād, but not without some extraordinary displays of arrogance on the part of the Wāhhābi delegate.*

The chief result of this ill-managed expedition was to inspire the Wāhhābis with contempt for the Turkish troops, and in these circumstances it is no matter for surprise that the truce was, after the first, but indifferently observed by the Wāhhābis; nor were they entirely without excuse, for presently a Persian pilgrim caravan, escorted by a Wāhhābi guard, was attacked and plundered between Hillah and Najaf by local Arabs whom it was the duty of the Turks to restrain. Roving bands of plunderers now appeared again in the vicinity of Basrah; and at length, in 1801 a crowning humiliation at the hands of the Wāhhābis overtook Sulaimān Pāsha, which shortened his days, "spread a gloom over the Muhammadan world, and elated to a high degree the character and confidence of the sectaries."

On the morning of the 18th of Zul Hijjah, corresponding apparently to Wednesday the 20th of April 1801, a Wāhhābi host suddenly appeared before Karbala, which at the time was partially deserted in consequence of a pilgrimage to Najaf,—a circumstance that doubtless had not escaped the observation of the enemy. The strength of the invaders on this occasion has been estimated by more than one authority at not less than 6,000 camels, mostly carrying two men. After halting and pitching a small camp in the gardens on the west side of the town, and after detaching two bodies which took up positions to the north and south, the Wāhhābis proceeded to attack a gate opposite the Khaimahgāh

Sack of
Karbala by
the Wāhhā-
bis, 20th
April 1801.

* A ludicrous scene which occurred at the Wāhhābi envoy's first reception by the Pāsha is well described by Sir H. J. Brydges, who was an eye-witness: see his *Wakavy*, pages 23-27.

from a caravansarai by which it was adjoined ; and before long their guns* effected a breach in the town wall. The Naqib, Saiyid Murtaza, and the civil governor, Mulla 'Umr, then fled by another gate, and a general *sauve qui peut* of the inhabitants ensued, while the Wahhābis made straight for the shrine of the Imām Husain, the adoration offered at which was particularly obnoxious to their principles. In the course of the day the Wahhābis wrecked and plundered the tomb to the best of their ability, destroying about half of the gilded copper dome ; and they also thoroughly scoured the streets, except in the quarter of the tomb of 'Abbās, pillaging the houses and slaying every male inhabitant whom they met. In the late afternoon they withdrew again from the town and disappeared into the desert, taking with them, it is said, about 200 camel loads of the sacred treasure and of other spoil, besides many prisoners. The whole tragedy was the work of only eight hours.

The number of the inhabitants of Karbala massacred on this fearful day was at first supposed to be about 3,000, but subsequent enquiry showed that it was even greater and exceeded 5,000, of whom some 500 fell within the precincts of the Imām Husain's tomb. The Wahhābis, it has been stated, lost not a single man. Much distress existed during the whole year following among the survivors of the massacre, but some relief was administered by Mr. Harford Jones (afterwards Sir H. J. Brydges), Resident at Baghdād, on account of the Hon'ble East India Company ; and a fund subscribed by Persians for the ransom of prisoners was also managed entirely by the British Resident, through whose efforts over 200 captives were released and sent, at their own desire, to Persia.

After their retirement from Karbala the Wahhābis attacked Najaf, but were repulsed, and raided settlements upon the Shatt-al-'Arab near Basrah, from which, however, they were driven out by the people of Zubair.

Second expedition of the Turks against the Wahhābis, probably in 1802.

The position of Sulaimān Pasha after this affair was critical ; for, though the Porte had not themselves the means of removing him from his government, it was not impossible that the Shāh of Persia, whose subjects were the principal sufferers, might take effectual action against him and demand compensation for all losses sustained, including the damage done to the great Shi'ah shrine. To guard against a disaster at Najaf similar to that which had befallen Karbala, the treasures of the

* So one account clearly implies, but the Wahhābis did not take artillery with them.

shrine of 'Ali were removed temporarily, it is said, to the tomb of Imām Mūsā at Kādhimain near Baghdād ; and, to placate the indignant sovereigns of Turkey and Persia, Sulaimān Pasha once more set on foot an expedition, largely tribal in its composition, against Dara'iyah. This force was commanded by Thuwaini, chief Shaikh of the Muntafik, and included contingents from the Dhafir, Shammar and Ka'ab tribes, as well as from the Muntafik ; but, like the expedition under 'Ali Pasha, it ended in disaster. During a halt at the wells of Subaihiyah, 30 miles south of Kuwait, the commander Thuwaini was murdered by a slave ; Sa'ūd, the Wahhābi, approached ; and the whole force dispersed in confusion. The non-Bedouin portion, unable to find their way in the desert and dying of thirst, mostly surrendered to the Wahhābis, and those who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the more fanatical tribes of Southern Najd, such as the Qahtān and the 'Ataibah, were put to death in cold blood. Broken down by these accumulated misfortunes, Sulaimān Pasha expired on the 7th of August 1802.

The general supineness of the Turks in face of the serious provocations which they received from the Wahhābis is only intelligible in connection with their situation in Europe, which from 1768 to 1808 was continuously grave, at first by reason of foreign wars and later from internal causes. *

* In 1768 the Sultān Mustafa III unadvisedly declared war by land and sea against Catharine of Russia ; the Russians occupied the Crimea ; and further losses to Turkey were only averted by an armistice, during which the partition of Poland took place. In 1773 war broke out afresh and continued till the peace of Kutchak Kainardji in 1774, by which the Crimea was made independent of Turkey, while Azoff, Kertch and Kinburn became Russian possessions. In 1783 Catharine definitely annexed the Crimea to Russia ; and in 1788 Austria and Russia made a joint attack on Turkey with the object of spoliation. In 1791 the Russian armies crossed the Danube ; and in 1792 the treaty of Jassy transferred Tiflis and the country between the Crimea and the Dniester from Turkey to Russia. After the accession of Paul, Russia and Turkey stood for a short time on the same side, as members of the second coalition against Napoleon who had invaded the Turkish Province of Egypt in 1798 ; but mutinous Janissaries, insubordinate provincial governors, and disaffected Christian subjects soon brought the Turkish Empire to the verge of dissolution. In 1804 Serbia revolted, at first against the tyranny of the Janissaries, but ultimately against Turkish rule ; in 1805 Turkey, now allied with France, was again attacked, but languidly, by Russia, and later a British naval force operated against Constantinople ; in 1807 the Janissaries deposed the Sultān Salim III. Under Mahmūd II, who reigned from 1808 to 1839, this ebb of the Turkish fortunes was partially stemmed, (See footnote on page 1100).

SA'ŪD-BIN-'ABDUL 'AZĪZ.

1803-14.

Sa'ūd, whose succession to the Amirship on the death of his father seems to have been unopposed, perhaps because he had been nominated by 'Abdul 'Aziz in his lifetime, was a good specimen of the Wāhhābi chief, and the administration in his day was typical of Wāhhābi methods; a glance at his personality and system of government will therefore not be out of place. *

Personality
of Sa'ūd.

Sa'ūd was handsome, even among his own family; he wore a beard of more than usual length, and so heavy was the growth of hair on his upper lip that it earned for him the sobriquet of Abu Shuwārib or "the Mustachioed"; his voice was sonorous, sweet, and persuasive. His knowledge of Muhammadan law was intimate; in power to apply it to actual cases he was not surpassed by any of the professional students of his own country; and his justice was as much applauded as his severity was feared. The strength of Sa'ūd's domestic affections, his sincerity of mind, his fidelity to his friends and the reliability of his word were unquestioned; but he was intolerant, especially of deceit, and somewhat choleric in disposition. In dress he was simple, in manner unassuming; as a ruler he was accessible in public audience; he avoided all ceremonial and instead maintained the dignity of his position by a princely hospitality. In personal and family expenditure Sa'ūd was frugal; by some he was accused of avarice, especially after the plunder of Karbala and the towns of Hijāz had whetted—as was supposed—his desire for wealth; and the rigour of his fines and confiscations has been attributed to interested motives as well as to zeal for the law. His only extravagance was in horseflesh, and he owned the finest mares in Arabia; three or four hundred he kept at Dara'iyah and others in Hasa, where lucerne was abundant. He was also well provided with the best riding camels. Sa'ūd is said to have fought by his father's side in battle at the early age of twelve years, and in his youth he bore a not undistinguished part in the exploits of the Wāhhābi armies, many of which he commanded; but after his accession he avoided exposing himself in the field, and doubts of his

* The principal authority here is of course Burckhardt, in the existence of whose masterly and convincing *Materials for a History of the Wahabys* students interested in the subject are indeed fortunate.

personal courage came to be entertained. For several years after his father's assassination he wore a secret coat of mail; during his visits to Makkah he caused himself to be surrounded by extraordinary precautions; at Dara'iyah he seldom left his house except on Fridays; and throughout his reign a private interview with him was difficult to obtain. He showed some distrust of his brothers, and he allowed no power to his sons except the eldest, 'Abdullah; but he made much use of his sons in his military enterprises.

The position of Sa'ūd was never that of an absolute or arbitrary monarch; it was rather that of a great Arab Shaikh, ruling by influence, whose subordinate allies and subjects possessed a large degree of local freedom, and even rights, that he could not with safety invade. The authority of the Amīr was superior to all others but, only because he was recognised as the visible embodiment of the Wahhābi principle; and the people, for this reason, submitted voluntarily to his guidance. The Amīr was careful to maintain, so far as possible, the hereditary power of families devoted to the Wahhābi cause, but of those which were not loyal he destroyed the influence by removing their chiefs to Dara'iyah and substituting strangers in their place at home. In most cases new appointments to positions of authority were made by local election, the result of which the Amīr merely confirmed. The Wahhābi dominions were divided into districts of which the principal, in the time of Sa'ūd, were 'Āridh-cum-Hasa, Qasīm, Jabal Shammar, the Haramain (*i.e.*, Makkah and Madīnah), Hijāz (in the Bedouin acceptation of the hilly country to the south of Ta'if), and Yaman: Bahrain, Qatar and 'Omān hardly, perhaps, formed regular districts. The executive government in each division, except in 'Āridh-cum-Hasa which contained the capital and was kept by Sa'ūd in his own hands, was carried on by officials, generally no doubt—as in the case of the Sharīf Ghālib of Makkah—influential hereditary chiefs; and the principal duties of these executive governors were, besides political vigilance in their charges, to attend to the collection of the revenue and to furnish such military contingents as the central government might require. In matters of law and justice, however, the authorities were not the executive governors but Qādhis, carefully selected and sent down to the divisions from Dara'iyah; and from these, as from the governors, an appeal seems to have lain in all cases to the Amīr. In time of peace the Amīr relied largely on the advice of the family of the founder of Wahhabism, known as the "Aulād-ash-Shaikh", who seem to have formed in fact a sort of standing but informal council of state.

General administration of the Wahhābi Amir.

Civilising
tendency at
home of the
Wahhābi
government.

The tendency of the Wahhābi government in Najd, in comparison at least with the system or no-system which had preceded it, was essentially civilising. Among the principal objects kept in view were the establishment of law and order, the suppression of local wars and private feuds, and the substitution for the latter of state-inflicted punishments and state-awarded compensation; and considerable severity was used in the prosecution of these aims with the result that Arab license, though far from being abolished, was tempered and held in check. Local responsibility for the prevention of crime, especially robbery, was very strictly enforced; and punishment was even inflicted on bystanders who failed to interfere in personal affrays. By discouraging facility of divorce the Wahhābi Amīr sought to raise the level of morality among his subjects. A great part of the new system was repulsive to the Bedouins, who had been accustomed to live by plunder; and the innovation of disregarding, in the case of criminals, the ancient principles of tribal protection or sanctuary must at first have been regarded with consternation.* The security established by the Wahhābi ruler was, however, appreciated by the non-nomadic population, though these too had their grievances; and, on the whole, public opinion appears to have supported the Amīr in most of his reforms. Punishments were severe, but generally took the form of fines beneficial to the treasury; the death penalty however, though rare, was not unknown, and was inflicted in cases of homicide committed with a dangerous weapon. For men of position the gravest penalty was shaving of the beard, and enormous fines were sometimes paid in order to escape this last extremity of degradation.

Religious
aspects of
the adminis-
tration.

The administration was characterised by less of religious austerity than might have been expected from the principles of those by whom it was conducted. After the first few years it was not attempted, even in Najd, to prevent the smoking of tobacco in private; and after 1810, an effort that had been made to avoid communication with heretics having been abandoned as impracticable, commercial intercourse with 'Irāq and Syria was gradually resumed. The punctual and regular observance of the fixed prayers was however enforced, when necessary, by beating with sticks. The commercial policy of Sa'ūd was liberal; and, though usury was forbidden, he did not interfere with speculators who bought cheap and held up their stocks, even in times of scarcity, for a rise in prices.

* For the rules of tribal protection, see Pelly's *Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh*, Appendix XIII.

The financial arrangements of the Wahhābi government were simple and effective. The state domains were the principal source of revenue; they consisted chiefly of the confiscated lands of rebels and other offenders, leased in many instances to the original owners on a rent of one-half or one-third of the produce; and they were very extensive, embracing in Qasim, for instance, almost all the cultivated ground of the district. Another principal item of revenue was Zakāt or tribute, literally "alms," taken from many classes and professions in accordance with the precepts of the Qurān; under this head unirrigated cultivation was assessed at one-tenth and irrigated at one-twentieth of the actual produce, and merchants were taxed at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon their capital, the amount of which they were required to declare on oath. One-fifth of the booty taken from "heretics" was appropriated to public purposes, the remainder being divided among the troops by whom it was captured; and in the early days of the Wahhābi power, when wars were being waged simultaneously in Hijāz and Yaman, in 'Irāq, and on the Persian Gulf littoral, this must have been a productive source of income. Ordinary miscellaneous fines also brought something into the treasury, and from the Bedouins were taken in kind, *viz.*, in horses, camels, and sheep.

Financial
system of
the Wah-
habis.

The whole of this revenue, with the exception of the Bedouin Zakāt, which was paid to the Wahhābi Amīr direct and retained by him for his personal expenditure, was collected with elaborate precautions against fraud and extortion and deposited in the Bait-al-Māl or treasury which existed in each administrative district; and of the amounts received at each place one-fourth was forwarded to the great public treasury at Dara'iyah, while the rest was expended locally for the public benefit. The aggregate value of the contributions received at the head treasury from local treasuries did not ordinarily exceed \$1,000,000 per annum; but in one particular year, under the rule of Sa'ūd, it was said to have reached \$2,000,000. From the central treasury compensation was paid to Wahhābis who had suffered at the hands of the enemy and assistance was given to those who had lost cattle by accident or disease; but in Sa'ūd's time the outgoings were small in proportion to the income, and there must have been a great accumulation of treasure at Dara'iyah. From the Bedouin Zakāt, collected in spring at prescribed watering places and delivered over to the Amīr for private disbursement, were met the cost of his magnificent hospitality and that of the maintenance of his bodyguard: the dependents and guests whom he fed were estimated at 400 to 500 persons daily, and the expenditure on the bodyguard

was probably not less than £10,000 a year. It was a favourable point in the Wahhābi fiscal system that irregular extortions and forced gifts were not permitted ; and Sa'ūd, at the worst, was only suspected of occasionally taking steps to bring about the forfeiture by legal means of a mare which he particularly coveted. The Wahhābi ruler had no currency of his own and dollars were the principal medium of exchange in Najd, but Turkish coin was rejected and treated as abominable.

**Military
system of the
Wahhābis.**

Warfare was conducted by the Wahhābis on Bedouin principles. Apart from the Amīr's mercenary bodyguard or Manjīyah of about 300 men, and from the retinues of his sons, there was no standing force ; but every man between the ages of 18 and 60 was a soldier and was liable to render military service against those who had not accepted the reformed faith, whenever he might be called upon to do so. At times only a proportion, at times the whole, of the military strength of a particular district was called out ; and very heavy fines were levied on those who, after being summoned, neglected to appear. This compulsory service in the field was probably the most unpopular feature of Wahhābi rule, at least with the settled population ; and it fell so severely upon the owners of mares that many sold their animals, and the number of horses available in Najd became by degrees considerably reduced. The matchlock men of the towns and villages were a *corps d'élite* and took a leading part in the sack of Karbala. Substitutes might be hired by those called out for service except when the levy was universal. The Wahhābi soldier proceeding to the front was required to provide, in addition to his arms and a horse or camel, his rations for the campaign ; these were fixed at 100 lbs. of flour, 50 or 60 lbs. of dates, 20 lbs. of butter, a sack of wheat or barley for his animal, and a skin for water. The Wahhābi military system was a good one for raids and incursions, but it supplied no men for the permanent occupation of foreign conquests ; and, in fact, no regular Wahhābi garrison was ever maintained abroad for any length of time except at Madinah. The Wahhābis certainly excelled in those destructive raids on which they relied for breaking the spirit of their adversaries, and these they carried out with extraordinary secrecy and despatch, the leader generally assembling his men at an unlikely rallying place and moving off at first in a false direction. In a great invasion of the Syrian Haurān, in 1810, the Wahhābi forces marched for 35 days before reaching their objective and looted a large number of villages before the Pāsha of Damascus, who had only two days' notice of their approach, could make any defensive preparations. The courage of the Wahhābi in war was stimulated by a belief that his soul, if he died fighting, went straight to Paradise ; and he was chiefly terrible

to his foes on account of his consistent refusal to grant quarter to any who opposed him in arms. In the hostilities in Hijāz during the latter part of Sa'ūd's rule not a single instance, it is said, occurred of a Turkish soldier's life being spared by a Wāhhābi. On the other hand "Amān" or quarter, either partial and extending in that case to little but life, or complete and extending to both life and property, was invariably granted to such as made submission; and, when granted, it was most honourably observed. The honour of women was in all circumstances strictly respected.

We have dwelt at some length upon these particulars because they make the course of Wāhhābi history more intelligible; and it is probable that, even at the present day, some such system as that which prevailed in the time of Sa'ūd constitutes the Wāhhābi ideal of good government.

Internal history of Najd, 1803-1814.

The great activity of the Wāhhābis under Sa'ūd beyond their own borders tended to obscure such events as occurred in Najd, and hostility and the absence of communication between the people of Najd and their neighbours made the veil over Central Arabian affairs almost impenetrable. An internal rebellion, of which the exact time and circumstances are not known, is said to have taken place in the district of Harīq, but it was apparently suppressed. In 1808 there was scarcity in the interior, where drought had then prevailed for two or three years. By 1809, at latest, the northern oasis of Jauḥ-al-'Āmir had been added to the Wāhhābi dominions for in that year the Pāsha of Damascus made an effort, which ended in nothing, to organise an expedition against the place. Sa'ūd died of fever at Dara'iyah in the spring of 1814; the exact date is given as the 10th or 17th of April, and his age at his death is stated to have been 68 years.*

Proceedings of the Wāhhābis in Western Arabia, 1803-1814.

The conquest of the Turkish districts of the Red Sea littoral was completed by the Wāhhābis under Sa'ūd-bin-'Abdul 'Aziz. Madinah succumbed to a blockade in the spring of 1804 and was treated with some

Madinah
taken by the
Wāhhābis,
1804.

* Burckhardt says 45 or 50 years, but this seems almost inconsistent with his statement that a child of one of Sa'ūd's younger sons was presented to the Amīr at Makkah on one of his visits there.

severity on account of the favourable disposition of the inhabitants towards the Turks ; thus, while private property was respected, the town was not exempted, like Makkah, from payment of tribute to the Amīr. The Turkish representative was expelled from the place ; a Shaikh of the Harb tribe was installed as governor ; the treasures of the tomb of Muhammad—or such as had not been divided among themselves by the people of Madīnah before the surrender—were appropriated by the Wāhhābis ; and an attempt was made to destroy the dome of the building itself.* The desecration of the tomb of the prophet was a shortsighted and impolitic act ; it filled the whole Muhammadan world with horror, and it finally alienated all Sunnis from the Wāhhābi cause in no less a degree than the desecration of the Karbala shrine had already alienated all Shī'ahs.

In the same year Abu Nuqtah, the principal Shaikh of 'Asīr, overran the coast of Yaman from Qunfidah to Bait-al-Faqīh, in the name of the Wāhhābis, plundering the ports of Lahiyah and Hodaidah ; and during the next three or four years he frequently repeated his incursions into the same tract. No attempt, however, was made to capture San'ah,—chiefly, it was believed, because the Wāhhābi Amīr was anxious to defer the taking of that place until he could himself be present and secure a main share in the plunder.

General
position on
the Western
Coast of
Arabia,
1804-08.

Under Wāhhābi rule tranquillity prevailed in the conquered districts of the Red Sea coast, and, as communication with Najd was free and intercourse with Egypt unimpeded, provisions were abundant and prices low ; but general trade, in consequence of the check to pilgrimages and to the resulting influx of foreign merchants, was stagnant. The local influence of Ghālib, Sharif of Makkah, which was an obstacle to the free exercise of authority by the Wāhhābis, had begun to decline ; but everywhere it was considerable, and at Jiddah as yet almost unimpaired ; and the adroitness of the Sharif was such that the Amīr could find no pretext for taking measures against him. By persuading Sa'ūd to forbid public prayers being made in the mosques on Fridays for the Sultān of Turkey Ghālib succeeded in bringing about a yet more irreconcilable difference than already existed between the Porte and the Wāhhābis.

Treatment of
the Hajj by
the Wāhhā-
bis, 1802-10.

The Wāhhābis had always regarded with disfavour the great organised annual pilgrimages to Makkah and Madīnah which were made under Turkish official arrangements from Damascus and Cairo and also, by

* According to Colonel Ross the spoliation of the tomb and the attempted destruction of the dome did not take place until the year 1810, when the Amīr visited Madīnah in person.

large concourses of people, from Yaman and Persia. They were themselves exact in performance of the pilgrimage to Makkah, which was frequently made by Sa'ūd himself, and they had apparently no conscientious scruples even against pilgrimages to Madīnah; but the irreverent and licentious conduct of many of the pilgrims was repugnant to their feelings, and they had doubtless strong objections to the intervention of the "heretical" Turkish Government. In 1802 the Hajj from Damascus had difficulty in carrying out the pilgrimage to Makkah, and in 1803* it was obliged to turn back before even reaching Madīnah; the Egyptian and Persian Hajjs also came to an end in 1802 or 1803; and in the latter year the Cairo Mahmal, sent by sea from Egypt, was not suffered to proceed beyond Jiddah where it was landed. In 1810, however, an organised Hajj from Morocco and Northern Africa was permitted by Sa'ūd to visit Makkah in consideration of the religious character and propriety of the Maghrabiyīn. The performance of the pilgrimage by individuals who professed acceptance of Wāhhābi tenets and comported themselves with decency was never, apparently, either prevented or hindered by the Wāhhābi authorities in Hijāz.

In 1804 Muhammad 'Alī† was appointed Pāsha of Egypt, chiefly in order that he might recover Hijāz for the Sultān of Turkey. In the same year 400 or 500 troops under Sharif Pāsha had been sent to Jiddah, of which place their commandant was appointed governor by the Porte; but Sharīf Pāsha died at Jiddah, and the position remained

Preparations by the Viceroy of Egypt for the recovery of the Holy Cities, 1804-10.

* From Corancez' *Histoire des Wahabis*, 1806 (not 1803), would seem to be the year in which the caravan was repulsed.

† Muhammad 'Alī Pāsha was an Albanian soldier of fortune and a self-made man.

Ibrāhīm Pāsha, who is generally regarded as Muhammad 'Alī's eldest son, but according to some historians was only a step-son, entered soon after the conclusion of his campaign in Najd on a military career in Europe; and in 1848 he was regent of Egypt for only two months, predeceasing his father for whom he acted. 'Abbās II, the present Khedive of Egypt, is Ibrāhīm's great-grandson in the male line.

Tūsūn, who was Muhammad 'Alī's third (or second) son, died of plague at Rosetta in 1816, less than a year after his return from Najd. 'Abbās I, who ruled Egypt from 1848 to 1854, was his son; but in the character of that miserable voluptuary and bigoted Muslim we fail to trace a single lineament of the soldierly Tūsūn.

From the appointment of Muhammad 'Alī until 1841 Egypt was practically independent of the Porte and was actually stronger, both on land and sea, than the rest of the empire to which it nominally belonged. It is therefore necessary to emphasize the fact that the Central Arabian campaigns and occupations of 1815-18 and 1835-41 were Egyptian, not Turkish. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the so-called Egyptian forces included a large proportion of Albanians, Libyan Bedouins, etc., and doubtless, a number of genuine Turks.

unaltered. Suez fell into Muhammad 'Ali's hands in 1805 and Qusair in 1808, and, had he declared those ports closed to trade with Hijāz, it is possible that the inhabitants of that province would have been obliged, through failure of the food supplies for which they are dependent on Egypt, themselves to undertake the expulsion of the Wahhābis; but, either from respect for the Holy Cities and their inhabitants, or from unwillingness to injure the export trade of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali shrunk from this obvious expedient and deferred the recovery of Hijāz until he was in a position to attempt it by force of arms. The Pāsha's preparations were not commenced in earnest until the end of 1809; nor was he entirely at leisure from internal preoccupations until he had disposed of the Mamlūk rebellion, which continued into 1811. Once begun, however, his measures were thorough and systematic; and, before commencing the campaign he was careful to provide a sufficient fleet of transports at Suez and to establish and garrison a chain of posts reaching down the eastern shore of the Red Sea as far as Wajj. As soon as the Sharīf Ghālib of Makkah became aware of Muhammad 'Ali's intentions he opened a correspondence with the Pāsha

Occupation of
Yanbō' by
the Egypt-
tians and
their repulse
from Madi-
nah, 1811-12.

Command of the expedition was entrusted to Tūsūn Bey, son of Muhammad 'Ali, a youth who was only eighteen years of age but had distinguished himself by his courage in the Mamlūk wars. The infantry, consisting of 1,500 to 2,000 Albanians, arrived by sea near Yanbō' in October 1811; and that place, which was held by a nominally Wahhābi garrison of 100 men on the part of the Sharīf Ghālib, surrendered after a feeble resistance of two days to the Egyptian commanders. A fortnight later Tūsūn Bey himself arrived by land with the cavalry, who numbered about 800 and consisted partly of Turkish horsemen and partly of mounted Bedouins: he had experienced no opposition by the way. In January 1812, the Sharīf Ghālib as yet declining on various pretexts to assist either side, the Egyptians advanced from Yanbō' through the hills towards Madīnah; but in a gorge near the village of Jadaid they were taken unawares by a huge force of Wahhābis, just arrived from Najd, of whose presence they were altogether ignorant and by whom the mountains on either side were occupied in great strength. The result was a complete disaster for the invading force, who lost four guns, about 1,200 men, 200 horses, the whole of their baggage, and nearly all their camel transport; but pursuit by the Wahhābis was checked by the courage of Tūsūn Bey himself and of his Āgha,* Thomas Keith, *alias* Ibrāhīm,

* Thomas Keith was a native of Edinburgh; he was originally an armourer in the 72nd Highlanders; but, having been taken prisoner in Egypt, he became a Muhamadan and rose, after extraordinary adventures, to be the chief of Tūsūn's Mamlūks.

who between them succeeded in rallying a few of the Egyptian cavalry. The Sharif Ghālib, on learning what had befallen the Egyptians, proceeded in person to join the Wahhābis; but the latter, soon after the action at Jadaid, returned to the interior, leaving the Harb tribe to watch Yanbō'.

In October 1812, having received large reinforcements from Egypt, having conciliated part of the Harb tribe, and having been approached by the Sharif Ghālib, who again offered, as he had done before, to hand over Makkah and Jiddah to the Egyptians as soon as they should have taken Madīnah, Tūsūn Bey advanced once more against Madīnah. This time there was no resistance by the way; but the inner or walled town of Madīnah, from which the Wahhābis had expelled the inhabitants in order that they might occupy it themselves, held out for fourteen or fifteen days. At length, a breach having been opened in the wall by means of a mine as the Egyptian artillery was too light for the purpose, the troops entered headed by Thomas Keith, killed about 1,000 of the astonished Wahhābis, and plundered the town. About 1,500 of the Wahhābis gained the citadel, in which they stood a siege of three weeks; but at the end of that time their provisions gave out and they surrendered on favourable terms, which the Egyptians immediately violated by killing as many of them as they could,—an act of perfidy that caused a strong revulsion of feeling among the Bedouins in favour of the Wahhābis. The skulls of the dead Wahhābis were collected by the Egyptians and built into a tower upon the Yanbō' road, of which a portion still remained in 1815 and was seen by the traveller Burekhardt.

Madīnah
taken by the
Egyptians,
1812.

On the fall of Madīnah a force of 1,500 men under Mustafa Bey, a brother-in-law of Muhammad 'Ali, marched from Yanbō' in the direction of Makkah; the Sharif Ghālib favoured their advance; and the local Wahhābi leader, Ghālib's brother-in-law 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah, was too weak to oppose it. In January 1813 the Egyptians entered Makkah, Jiddah being at the same time occupied by a detachment; and a fortnight later Taif also, in the hills some 60 or 70 miles to the eastward of Makkah, was taken by Mustafa Bey, assisted by the Sharif Ghālib, after a slight skirmish with 'Othmān. From Taif, Mustafa Bey pushed on towards Turabah, to the east of Taif; but he was defeated in the hills and returned, having lost 400 or 500 men. Tūsūn Bey, now created Pāsha of Jiddah, arrived at Makkah as a pilgrim in the course of the winter; and later, in September 1813, 'Othmān-al-Madhāifah was taken prisoner near Taif and was sent to Constantinople, where he was beheaded.

Makkah,
Jiddah and
Taif occupied
by the Egyp-
tians, 1813.

Arrival of
Muhammad
'Ali in Hijāz
and deportation
of the
Sharif Ghā-
lib, 1813.

On the 28th of August 1813, Muhammad 'Ali, who had received strict orders from Constantinople to proceed in person to Hijāz and feared that he might lose the Pashāliq of Egypt if he did not obey, arrived at Jiddah; he brought with him a reinforcement of 2,000 infantry; and in the meantime 2,000 cavalry and 8,000 transport camels had been despatched by the land route from Egypt. The Pāsha at once turned his attention to the problem of provisioning his forces, which had become one of great urgency, for the Turkish garrisons of Makkah and Taif depended on the port of Jiddah for their supplies and transport was so scarce that it was hardly possible to forward them as fast as they were required. Sea transport, too, was inadequate; and to supplement this deficiency Muhammad 'Ali took up the whole of the shipping of Jiddah and Yanbō' and arranged to hire 20 vessels for one year from Saiyid Sa'id of Masqat. The Pāsha quickly conceived a distrust of Ghālib, partly on account of the failure of the latter to provide camels when called upon to do so, and partly because it was obvious that the Arabs regarded the Sharif as their protector equally against the Wahhābis and the Egyptians. Muhammad 'Ali's suspicions led before long to the arrest of Ghālib by artifice, followed by his deportation to Turkey, where he died of plague at Salonika in 1816; but the local effect of this stroke of policy was unfortunate and caused the flight of many influential Arabs to the Wahhābi camp. Among these was Rājah, a relation of Ghālib, whom the Wahhābi Amīr appointed his representative in Hijāz in place of 'Othmān.

Unsuccessful
expedition of
Tūsūn Pāsha
against Turabāh,
1813.

Such being the position of affairs, Muhammad 'Ali, at the end of October or beginning of November 1813, determined on an expedition against Turabāh, where Rājah had now fixed his headquarters and where many others of the adherents of Ghālib had assembled. The Pāsha had succeeded in collecting a small quantity of supplies at Taif, and he therefore ordered his son Tūsūn Pāsha to advance from that place with 2,000 men and provisions for 30 days. The force was delayed on the way by troublesome hill operations against the 'Atābah, and their provisions were almost exhausted before they came in sight of Turabāh, where lived the Buqūm tribe, presided over by an old woman named Ghāliyah, whom the Turks regarded as a sorceress. After one unsuccessful attack on Turabāh a retirement was commenced, and the Egyptians, closely pressed by the enemy during a four days' retreat to Taif, lost 700 men by the way; on this occasion, as in the disaster at Jadaid, the force was only saved from utter destruction through the exertions of Tūsūn Pāsha, the commander, seconded by his faithful Scottish Āgha. As Taif was the only point from which operations

could at this time be carried on, it became a matter of the first necessity to re-provision that post; but in doing so great difficulty was experienced, for of the 8,000 camels sent from Egypt only 500 survived their arrival in Hijāz by as much as three months, and from the whole surrounding country not more than 500 local camels could be got together at one time. The route between Jiddah and Tāif, moreover, was very unsafe, being exposed to Wāhhābi raids and surprises; and about one-third of the load of each convoy was consumed by the escorts and drivers on the march. During the winter of 1813-14 the Egyptian troops remained perfectly inactive.

An organised pilgrim caravan from Egypt apparently reached Makkah at the end of 1812; but it was not until November 1813 that a Syrian Hajj, the first to pass since 1802, was conducted in safety to the sacred city by Sulaimān Pasha. On his way the Pasha had been obliged to yield to the insolent demand of the Bedouins that he should pay up their allowances for the ten years during which the Hajj had been intermitted. Many pilgrims from Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe also made their way to Hijāz *viâ* Suez and Jiddah; and the townspeople of Makkah were cheered by prospects of returning prosperity.

Reopening of
the Hajj.
1812-13.

Proceedings of the Wāhhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1803-14.

The details of Wāhhābi action in Eastern Arabia during the reign of Sa'ūd will be found in the separate histories of the Arab principalities upon the coast of the Persian Gulf, chiefly in those of Bahrain, Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate; and here it will be enough to take a general view of the Wāhhābi proceedings in that quarter.

In 1808 the 'Utūb of Kuwait, whose attitude towards the Wāhhābi Amir had generally been one of defiance, withheld or refused to pay tribute; and a strong Wāhhābi force was despatched against the town, but was repulsed with loss. This check to an enemy from whom he had much to fear was very welcome to the Pasha of Baghdād, who did not fail to show his pleasure by sending a robe of honour and other gifts to the Shaikh of Kuwait. In the following year the Wāhhābi Amir, desirous of wiping out the defeat, ordered the 'Utūb of Bahrain, the Qawāsīm of Rās-al-Khaimah and the Saiyid of Masqat to undertake an

Action of the
Wāhhābis at
Kuwait.

expedition by sea against Kuwait and Basrah ; but the Qawāsim alone expressed their willingness to obey, and even they in the end took no action.

Action of the
Wahhābis in
Bahrain,
Qatar and
Hasa.

Sa'ūd endeavoured, at the beginning of his reign, to consolidate the power obtained in his father's time over Bahrain and Qatar ; and, so long as he remained free from embarrassments in other quarters, his efforts were not unsuccessful. In 1805, a dynastic quarrel being then in progress in 'Omān, he was able to despatch an 'Atbi fleet from Bahrain to watch the course of events at Masqat in the Wahhābi interest. In 1809 he won over to his side the dangerous pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, with whose assistance his power was quickly established in Qatar ; and in 1810 he was able to appoint a Wahhābi governor over Qatar, Bahrain and Hasa with headquarters in Bahrain. In 1811, in consequence of the dangers threatening from the direction of Egypt and Hijāz, he was obliged to relax his hold on the newly acquired eastern districts ; Zubārah in Qatar was successfully attacked by the ruler of Masqat ; and the Wahhābi garrisons were either expelled or withdrawn from that place and from Bahrain, and were withdrawn from Qatīf and Hofūf in Hasa. By 1814 the influence of the Wahhābis in Bahrain affairs had ceased ; but in Hasa, where there was no strong local power to contest the field, it remained paramount.

Action of the
Wahhābis in
Trucial
'Omān.

The establishment of a Wahhābi post in the Baraimi Oasis in 1800 did not long remain without effect on the affairs of the district known at the present day as Trucial 'Omān, and in 1804-05 there was a marked increase of lawlessness on the part of the piratical Qawāsim ; but whether this was due to the direct incitement of the Wahhābis, or was an indirect result of their interference in local politics, must be considered a doubtful point. At the end of 1808 Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, the chief of the Qawāsim, was deposed by the Wahhābis from his general authority over the tribe ; and in 1809 Husain-bin-'Alī, Shaikh of Rams, who had recently visited Dara'iyah, was appointed governor, on behalf of the Wahhābis, over the whole Pirate Coast. In 1808-09 a serious renewal of piracy took place and symptoms of fanaticism were perceptible, but conclusive proofs of Wahhābi instigation were still wanting ; it was stated, however, that Husain-bin-'Alī had undertaken the usual obligation of a Wahhābi governor to forward to Dara'iyah one-fifth of the spoils taken in war from "heretics" by those over whom he was placed. In 1809 the Wahhābis consolidated their hold upon the 'Omān promontory by occupying with Wahhābi garrisons the forts of Fujairah, Bithnah and Khor Fakkān in Shamailiyah, and in the same year they succeeded in decoying Shaikh Sultan-bin-Saqar

to Dara'iyah, where he was detained under surveillance; but the Shaikh before long escaped from their custody and made his way through Yaman to the port of Mokha, whence he returned by sea to Masqat. At the end of the year, when the piratical port of Rās-al-Khaimah was attacked by a British armament, it was stated that Mutlaq, the Wāhhābi leader at Baraimi, had moved to the assistance of the Qawāsīm; but, if he did, he arrived too late. In 1812 piracy again revived upon the coast subject to the Qawāsīm; but the connection of the Wāhhābis with the outbreak, if they had any, was not clear.

We have already adverted to the interference of the Wāhhābis in a dynastic quarrel at Masqat in the year 1805. The result of the struggle there was favourable to the Wāhhābi protégé Saiyid Badar, who obtained the chief power and ruled Masqat from 1805 to 1807; but in the latter year he was assassinated by his cousin Saiyid Sa'id, Wāhhābi influence at Masqat received a severe check, and a garrison which the Wāhhābis had placed at Barkah fled from their post. The new sovereign, Saiyid Sa'id, professed a favourable disposition towards Ibn-Sa'ūd, who continued to be represented at Masqat by a political agent and some religious emissaries; but the Wāhhābis were perfectly well aware of the Saiyid's secret hostility to their influence; and in 1809, after Sa'id had evaded compliance with an order to proceed in the Wāhhābi interest against Kuwait, the Wāhhābi general Mutlaq-al-Mutairi was sent to Baraimi with orders to organise and conduct a campaign against him. It was at this point that the British expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah took place, designed partly for the chastisement of the Qāsimi pirates and partly for the relief of the ruler of Masqat from the Wāhhābi danger; it ended early, in 1810, with the recovery of the Saiyid's town of Shinās from the grasp of the Wāhhābis, by whom it had been seized; but the effect of the operations was temporary and in the end probably unfavourable to the interests of Masqat. In 1811 Mutlaq, nothing daunted, proceeded with his task of subjugating 'Omān; after an unsuccessful blockade of Barkah and Matrah, he made himself master of Hisn Samāil in the heart of the Saiyid's dominions; and, having placed a garrison in that fort, he withdrew again to Baraimi. In 1812 the Saiyid's subjects, aided by a Persian contingent, retook Hisn Samāil; but this success was followed by a severe engagement in the neighbourhood of Izki, in which the 'Omānis and their allies were completely worsted. In the same year, or perhaps in 1813, the Wāhhābis took a fearful revenge on Saiyid Sa'id; their forces, accompanied by Turki and Faisal, two sons of the Wāhhābi Amīr, devastated the districts of Masqat and Eastern Hajar; and they

Action of the
Wāhhābis in
the 'Omān
Sultanate.

encamped for a time in Ja'alān, which they made a base for their destructive raids, and where they succeeded in permanently converting the Bani Bū 'Alī and the Bani Rāsib, two important local tribes, to Wahhābism. They then returned, apparently without loss, to their principal post in the Baraimi Oasis.

Later in 1813, Saiyid Sa'id having opened a correspondence with 'Tūsūn Pasha and undertaken to restore the displaced Shaikh of the Qawāsīm, the Wahhābi general Mutlaq invaded Bātinah in irresistible force and extorted from the ruler of Masqat a payment of \$40,000. Mutlaq then proceeded to Najd; but, his successor Ibn-'Azdah having been murdered, he quickly returned to 'Omān—only however to meet his death, in November 1813, at the hands of the Hajriyīn. His place at Baraimi was taken by one Ibn-Mazrū'.

First contact between British and Wahhābi policy.

The events described above, in Trucial 'Omān and the 'Omān Sultanate, brought the Wahhābis for the first time into contact with the British power, and that in a not altogether friendly manner; for the Wahhābis were suspected of instigating the piracies of the Qawāsīm, and they certainly aimed at destroying the independence of the Saiyid of Masqat, which the British Government desired to maintain.

British settle-
ment with
the Qawāsīm,
1806.

At the same time every precaution was taken by the British authorities to avoid the appearance of a conflict with Ibn-Sa'ūd. In 1805, when British action was first taken, in concert with Saiyid Badar, against the Qāsimi buccaneers, Captain Seton, the agent employed, was strictly enjoined by the Bombay Government to refrain from proceedings which might be displeasing to the Wahhābi Amīr; and, in the treaty which he arranged with the Qawāsīm in 1806, the supposed connection of the Wahhābis with that tribe was studiously ignored.

British
expedition
against
Rās-al-
Khaimah
and Shinās,
1809.

In 1809, on the occasion of the expedition against Rās-al-Khaimah, the same indirect policy was observed, and the commander of the British force was instructed to avoid a direct collision with the representatives of Ibn-Sa'ūd; but the peculiar circumstances of the imbroglio at Shinās led to an involuntary contravention of these orders, and some Wahhābi blood was apparently shed by the British arms in the capture

of that stronghold.* Rahmah-bin-Jābir, however, the pirate of Qatar, escaped punishment by the expedition, partly at least on account of his connection with the Wahhābis. At the conclusion of the campaign a letter was apparently addressed by the British authorities to Ibn-Sa'ūd, requiring him to restrain those under his influence from committing piracy; and an answer was received from the Amīr, in which, while he affected not to be impressed by the British operations on the coast, he stated that he had no quarrel with Christians and would prevent aggressions upon the British flag.

The increasing difficulties of the Wahhābis in Western Arabia led, however, before the death of Sa'ūd, to another and more friendly exchange of communications with the British Government. In 1811 or 1812, possibly as a countermove to the journey of Saiyid Sālim from Masqat to Shiraz for the purpose of obtaining help from Persia, the Wahhābi Amīr sent an envoy named Ibrāhīm-bin-'Abdul Karīm to the Governor of Fārs, by whom he was well received; and this envoy, after discharging his duty at Shirāz, waited on the British Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, at Būshehr, where he expressed, on behalf of his master Ibn-Sa'ūd, a desire that amicable relations should be established between the British and the Wahhābi Governments and that the ports of either should be thrown open to the commerce of the other. These overtures were submitted in due course to the Government of India, who decided, apparently in 1814, that it would be inexpedient to enter into a treaty or to form intimate relations with the Wahhābi Amīr; but they considered that friendly intercourse should be maintained with him, and that every effort made to confirm him in his favourable disposition.

Overtures of the Wahhābi Amīr to the British Government, 1811-12.

Attacks by the Wahhābis on Turkish 'Irāq, 1803-14.

Under the Amīr Sa'ūd raids upon the borders of Turkish 'Irāq continued; but the people of that province were now thoroughly upon their guard, and no considerable successes were any longer achieved by the Wahhābis. The Wahhābis made, however, almost annual incursions, and they sometimes even crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia.

At the end of 1803, apparently by way of revenging the assassination of the late Amīr 'Abdul 'Aziz, which the Pāsha of Baghdād was

Harmless Wahhābide-monstration, 1803.

*From Burekhardt (II. 208) it would seem that a cousin of the Amīr Sa'ūd was among those killed.

suspected of having instigated, a force of Wahhābis plundered the environs of Najaf; but when the Pāsha, who had now taken into his counsels a chief named Fāris of the northern Shammar, advanced against them, they retired without fighting.

Unsuccessful
Wahhābi
attack on
Zubair and
Basrah, 1804.

In 1804 Wahhābi troops overran the neighbourhood of Zubair and Basrah, but, though they captured a Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe and by his means brought pressure to bear on his brother, who was governor of Zubair, they were unable to make any impression upon either place. A tower, however, covering the water supply of Zubair, was destroyed by an accidental explosion in which the whole garrison perished, after having successfully resisted the attempts of the Wahhābis during several days.

Turkish ex-
pedition from
Hillah
against the
Wahhābis,
1804-05.

In November 1804 'Ali Pāsha, the Wāli of Baghdād, determined to try conclusions with the Wahhābis and moved out to Hillah with an expeditionary force; he was accompanied by 'Abdullah Pāsha, by whom the last attempt had been made in 1803 to conduct the Syrian Hajj from Damascus to Madinah, and also by his own Arab adviser Fāris. The troops remained inactive at Hillah until early in 1805, when a column of 400 picked men was detached, apparently to seek a combat with the enemy in the desert; but their operations seem to have begun and ended with a visit to 'Ain Said in the modern Qadha of Samāwah, of which place the inhabitants had hitherto professed Wahhābism but now readily submitted to the power of the Turks. A few days after their departure Sa'ūd arrived on the spot and reproached those who had made submission to the infidel, but the people were apparently disinclined to change sides again and even resented his threats, and a number of the inhabitants of the district migrated towards Baghdād in order to be out of the way of his vengeance.

Unsuccessful
Wahhābi
attacks on
Najaf, Samā-
wah and
Zubair, 1806.

In April 1806, after making a raid on the Dhafir and 'Anizah Bedouins, 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd, doubtless in reprisal for the action of the Pāsha of Baghdād in the previous year, attacked Najaf and Samāwah, but without success; and in the following month he sustained a further reverse at Zubair. At Najaf the Wahhābis, whose presence in the neighbourhood was not suspected, succeeded in gaining the walls by night; but the inhabitants of the town rushed to arms and drove them out again with heavy loss. Samāwah was found prepared; and 'Abdullah, after some attempts on the place which were characterised chiefly by indecision, was fain to retire with a still greater number of casualties than he had sustained at Najaf. He next appeared before Zubair and Basrah, and, though the surrounding country was at this time flooded

up to the very walls, some consternation at first prevailed in Basrah. The Wāhhābis, however, were encumbered with wounded and otherwise in distress; and their foraging parties were quickly driven out of the surrounding villages by Muntafik and Ka'ab tribesmen, who inflicted on them further losses.

In 1807 a fresh attack of the Wāhhābis on 'Irāq was apprehended, and the Pāsha of Baghdād moved out to Hillah to ward off any attempt that might be made on Karbala or Najaf. In June of 1807, with the reluctant consent of the Pāsha of Baghdād, the British Resident at Basrah began to construct for himself a fortified residence at Gardilān on the eastern side of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Basrah.*

Apprehension of a Wāhhābi attack, 1807.

In 1808 a force of Wāhhābis appeared in the vicinity of Karbala, and a large army under their banner was reported to be marching on Baghdād itself, where great anxiety for a time prevailed. The bazaars were closed, and even Turkish merchants were ordered to arm themselves and reinforce the garrison; but the expected host did not arrive, and it was afterwards stated that their departure had been prevented by internal disturbances in Najd. The raiders near Karbala, however, established themselves in the Shifāthah Oasis to the west of that town, blockaded Karbala, invested Hindiyah (corresponding to the modern Tawairij), and showed themselves at 'Ain Said near Samāwah; but Sulaimān Pāsha, hastening from Baghdād with a force, drove them from all these places, and, after executing the principal man of Shifāthah on account of his refusal to abjure Wāhhābism,† returned in triumph to Baghdād, where he arrived on the 15th of August.

The Wāhhābis driven from Shifāthah and Hindiyah, 1808.

About 1810 a plundering expedition was carried out by 'Abdullah, son of Sa'ūd, who penetrated to within a short distance of Baghdād.

Wāhhābi raid, 1810.

In 1812 Wāhhābi influence was still sufficiently powerful on the borders of 'Irāq to make it possible for Sa'ūd's tax-gatherers to assemble the surrounding Bedouins and collect Zakāt from them at Hindiyah near Karbala.

Wāhhābi influence near Karbala, 1812.

Proceedings of the Wāhhābis in the direction of Syria, 1803-14.

Flying raids were executed by the Wāhhābis during this period on the confines of Syria; they began, apparently, with an incursion by Hark,† a black slave of Sa'ūd, between the years 1806 and 1808.

Commencement of Wāhhābi raids on Syria, about 1806.

* This seems to depend on the statement of Corancez (page 111), who gives, however, a precise date.

† Hark may possibly be identical with the Hariq who in 1800 founded the Wāhhābi post at Baraimi in 'Omān.

Great raid in
Haurān,
1810, and
establish-
ment of
Wahhābi in-
fluence,
1810-12.

In 1810 the Wahhābis struck terror into the heart of Syria by a sudden foray into the Haurān district, where, in the space of three days, they sacked no less than 35 villages; and the provincial capital of Damascus would probably have fallen, had they cared to attack it. The northern 'Anizah in 1810 still refused to pay Sa'ūd tribute, but he refrained from a breach with their chiefs, and by 1812 his influence over the tribe seems to have become established, for in that year the Jalās or Qalās section yielded him Zakāt at a watering place only twelve hours distant from Aleppo.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1814-18.

Succession of
'Abdullah.

The successor of Sa'ūd was 'Abdullah, his eldest son by his first wife, whom, according to one account, he had caused to be recognized as his heir so early as 1805. The last words of Sa'ūd are said to have been an injunction, addressed to 'Abdullah, never to engage the Egyptians in the open plain,—a counsel which the Wahhābis would have done well to observe. The succession of 'Abdullah was disputed by an uncle, brother of Sa'ūd, who also was named 'Abdullah; but, though this individual had a strong following among the 'Ulama of Dara'iyah, he was not able for long to maintain the contest.

Character
and capacity
of 'Abdullah.*

As a child 'Abdullah was precocious and at five years of age could gallop his mare; later he became popular among the Bedouins on account of his liberality and the frankness of his manners. His wife was taken from a family in the district of Hasa. Before his accession he was regarded as a paragon of all the virtues; but his career as a ruler, while it justified his early reputation for courage and skill in war, brought to light a serious lack of statesmanship. Inability to maintain combined action among the tribes subject to his authority was perhaps the chief cause of his failure; and it was observed that, after the death of Sa'ūd, the Wahhābis of the south had to carry on their struggle against the Egyptians almost without help from those of the north.

* A portrait of 'Abdullah will be found in Brydges' *Brief History of the Wahabys* (frontispiece).

Proceedings of the Egyptians in Hijāz and Yaman, 1814-15.

For more than a year after Muhammad 'Ali's arrival in Hijāz his affairs, chiefly on account of the fewness of his troops and the scarcity of transport and supplies, made little progress. As a first step towards the conquest of Yaman an expedition was sent against Qunfidah, which was taken in March 1814 before the death of the Amīr Sa'ūd; but in May the Egyptians were again driven out of the place with the loss of the whole of their artillery, 400 horses, and a considerable number of camels. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1814, Muhammad 'Ali established himself at Taif; and, in the course of the summer, Hasan Pāsha, a distinguished leader who arrived in June with 1,500 of the best infantry in Egypt, was sent to occupy Kulākh, a place some 30 miles to the east of Taif on the way to Turabah.

Expedition
to Qunfidah,
March-May
1814.

The condition of the army of occupation, of which the strength did not exceed 5,000—a number sufficient to protect the Holy Cities from attack, but not to overthrow the Wahhābis—was at this time far from satisfactory. The troops were dispirited by the length of their sojourn in an unhealthy country, where the cost of living exceeded their scanty and irregular pay, and they were demoralised by the successes of the enemy and by his invariable refusal of quarter. According to the traveller Burckhardt, who himself saw them at this time, “discontent, and a kind of panic, were universal among the soldiers.”

Condition of
the troops.

Muhammad 'Ali, aware that to fail in Hijāz meant his removal from the Pashāliq of Egypt and the ruin of his career, clung to his task with great tenacity and adopted a new and more conciliatory policy both with the settled population and with the Bedouins of Hijāz; but he and his officers continued profoundly ignorant of the circumstances and mutual relations of the various Arabs with whom they had to deal. In August 1814 some of the adjoining tribes began to be attracted to the Pāsha's side by his liberality and friendly demeanour; and in the next month the Sharif Rājah himself came in, and was placed by Muhammad 'Ali in command of a Bedouin contingent that had now been raised.

Relations
with the
Bedouins.

Difficulties of commissariat, however, continued unabated. Up to this time about 30,000 camels belonging to the army had died in Hijāz, and even in Egypt camels had become scarce, while such as remained there

Transport
and supplies.

were required for forwarding supplies to the coast by the Qanah-Qusair and Cairo-Suez lines. The Harb, from whom local camels were obtained, refused to let their animals go beyond Taif; and even at Taif there was often not more than ten days' supplies for the garrison. Scarcity prevailed at Kulākh also, and at advanced posts which had been thrown out in the direction of Zahrān.

Defeat of
the Egyptians
in
Zahrān, Sep-
tember 1814.

The fortune of the field also continued adverse to the Egyptians. In September their best troops, under one of their best commanders, were surprised and defeated in Zahrān by Bakhrūj, a chief of the southern Wāhhābis; they lost in this action about 80 cavalry and 800 infantry, and were obliged to fall back upon Taif; but they brought in with them about 60 heads of Wāhhābis. Meanwhile the Wāhhābis and the tribes favourable to the Egyptians continued to raid each other mutually, the advantage generally resting with the former.

Egyptian re-
inforcements
and additions
to trans-
port.

Soon after this disaster, however, the aspect of affairs began to improve for the Egyptians. Eight hundred Bedouin horsemen, drawn from the tribes of the Libyan desert, arrived in Hijāz, where half were posted to Madīnah and half to Taif; and they at once proceeded to make forays on the Wāhhābis in the Bedouin manner. In November the Hajj arrived; the caravan from Syria brought with it 4,000 camels for the troops, of which 1,000 were stopped at Madinah; while from Egypt there came along with the Mahmal, accompanied on this occasion by soldiers and officials only, 2,500 additional camels and a reinforcement of 1,000 Turkish horsemen. Twelve thousand camels belonging to the Syrian Hajj were temporarily requisitioned to carry stores from Jiddah to Makkah.

Great defeat
of the Wāh-
hābis at Bīsal,
13th Janu-
ary 1815.

At length a forward movement began. On the 15th of December 1814 the bulk of the infantry, then at Makkah, left for Kulākh; and on Saturday, the 7th of January, after a short delay caused by a Wāhhābi excursion towards Qunfidah, Muhammad 'Ali followed with about 1,200 cavalry and other troops. He had not gone far when he received news of the occupation by a Wāhhābi army of Bīsal, a place between Taif and Kulākh, where on Thursday, the 12th of January, assisted by a Bedouin levy under the Sharīf Rājah and by a part of the 'Ataibah, he brought them to action. The result of the first day's fighting was indecisive; but on the second day the Egyptians, having succeeded by means of a pretended flight in drawing the Wāhhābis from the hillsides on which they were stationed into the open plain, achieved a success of which the completeness left nothing to be desired.

The defeated force, of whom not less than 5,000 men are said to have fallen, partly in narrow valleys among which they became entangled in their flight, consisted chiefly of southern Wāhhābis from Yaman; but a northern contingent under Faisal, a brother of the Wāhhābi Amīr, were present, and the survivors among these carried back news of the disaster to Najd.

The battle of Bisal was the turning point in the contest between the Egyptians and the Wāhhābis, and the scene of operations was soon after this transferred to the north; but the conquest of the south was first completed by the capture of Turabah and by a march of the victorious troops to Kanyah and Bishah, whence they returned to the coast near Qunfidah. This southern expedition, though successful from the military point of view, occasioned a great expenditure of life and resources; of 4,000 troops who started on it only 1,500 returned, completely exhausted; and of 10,000 camels, half of which had been captured from the enemy at Bisal, only 300 lived to reach Makkah. A letter demanding his submission was addressed to Ibn-Sa'ūd by Muhammad 'Ali.

Successful expedition of the Egyptians in the south.

First invasion of Qasim by the Egyptians and resulting treaty, 1815.

We now return to the north, where the fate of the Wāhhābi power was eventually decided. In June 1814 the Harb tribe, in consequence of the murder of one of their Shaikhs by the Egyptian governor of Madinah, had closed the communications between that place and the coast, and in August Tūsūn Pāsha was despatched by his father to arrange matters. This he succeeded in doing, after some difficulty at Jadaid and not without great concessions made to the Arabs; and in October 1814 he reached Madinah with about 500 cavalry and 300 infantry, the former of whom he immediately sent to Hanakiyah to watch the Wāhhābis of Najd and to make raids into their territory. In the course of the autumn of 1814, and especially on the occasion of the Hajj, Tūsūn Pāsha received, as we have already seen, considerable reinforcements; and in the early spring of 1815, when the news of the Wāhhābi disaster at Bisal began to produce its effect in Najd, he was ready to take advantage of proposals that were now made to him by many of the leaders in Central Arabia, particularly by the chief men of Qasim. In January 1815 the Wāhhābi

Tūsūn Pāsha sent to Madinah, 1814.

Amir was in Qasim, prepared to oppose the movements of Tūsūn ; but on learning of the disaster at Bīsal he returned to Dara'iyah, dreading, it would appear, an advance against his capital by the Egyptian forces in the south.

Advance of
Tūsūn Pāsha
into Qasim,
March-May,
1815.

About the end of March 1815, Tūsūn Pāsha left for Qasim, whither he had already despatched about 400 cavalry ; he took with him 200 or 300 cavalry, 400 infantry and about 400 transport camels ; and a few hundred Bedouins of the Harb and Mutair also followed his standard. On the way he halted for a month at Hanakiyah, and while there he received orders from Muhammad 'Ali to return to Madinah ; but Tūsūn, who was now his father's equal in rank, declined to obey the command. Muhammad 'Ali, it should be observed, was now at Madinah, where he had arrived unexpectedly on the 14th of April, after his son's departure ; but his time there was fully occupied in dealing with local troubles. Early in May Tūsūn Pāsha arrived in Qasim, and he was joined at Rass by his political friends among the Qusmān and by the cavalry whom he had despatched in advance ; but Hijailān, the principal man in Qasim, who was warmly attached to the cause of Ibn Sa'ūd, would have no dealings with him and instead collected a hostile force at Buraidah.

Precarious
position of
the Egypt-
ians in
Qasim, May-
June 1815.

On the arrival of the Amir 'Abdullah at Shinānah, with a considerable force, both Bedouin and non-Bedouin, Tūsūn Pāsha found himself in a serious position ; for the Wahhābis were able to prevent his drawing supplies from any but a few of the nearer villages, and in the meantime a detachment of 250 horsemen, sent as a reinforcement from Madinah, had been surrounded and cut up by Wahhābis on the road. This ill-fated party was commanded by Ibrāhīm Āgha or Thomas Keith, whom Tūsūn Pāsha had left in charge of Madinah as governor, and who sustained his reputation for courage to the last by killing four of the enemy with his own hand before he fell. Meanwhile Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha, who showed no interest in his son's operations but rather appeared jealous of his achievements, hurriedly left Yambō' on the 20th of May and returned to Egypt : in extenuation of his conduct it is alleged that his health had suffered by his residence in Arabia, and that he feared an attack by the Turkish fleet upon his port of Alexandria.

Treaty and
return of
Tūsūn Pāsha
to Madinah,
June 1815.

The weakness of the Egyptians was not, it would seem, fully apparent to the Wahhābis, or the Amir, believing that the resources of Egypt must in the end prevail over his own more slender means, thought it prudent to retire from the contest ; whatever the reason, 'Abdullah readily responded to the suggestions for a settlement which now proceeded from Tūsūn. A treaty was arranged by which the Amir abandoned his claim

to the Holy Cities, reserving a right to visit them freely on pilgrimage, and by which he recognised the Sultān of Turkey as his overlord; the Pāsha on his part promised to withdraw from Qasīm; and Hanakiyah was made the boundary between the spheres of Egyptian and Wāhhābi political influence.* Tūsūn regained Madīnah about the end of June 1815; his halt in Qasīm had lasted exactly four weeks.

In August two Wāhhābi envoys arrived in Cairo to obtain ratification of the treaty, but they were eventually dismissed with an ambiguous answer in which Muhammad 'Ali seemed to offer peace upon condition that the Wāhhābis should cede to him the province of Hasa upon the Persian Gulf littoral. Tūsūn Pāsha himself returned to Cairo on the 7th of November 1815 and met with a cold reception from his father.

Non-ratification of the treaty.

Second invasion of Qasīm by the Egyptians, 1817-1818.

Matters remained in *status quo* for some months after this, chiefly in consequence of a conviction on the part of Muhammad 'Ali that a descent upon Egypt was meditated by Great Britain; but, as this fear passed away, he began preparations for continuing the war in Arabia. Disturbances had broken out in southern Hijāz, and the Egyptian garrisons had been obliged to retire from Bīshah, Ranyah and Turabah. In August 1816 Ibrāhīm Pāsha, the eldest son (or possibly a step-son) of Muhammad 'Ali, left Cairo, having been provided with a force of 2,000 infantry and 1,500 Libyan Bedouin horsemen and ordered, it was believed, to advance from Madīnah through Qasīm to Dara'iyah.

Preparations for the expedition, 1816.

A considerable time elapsed, however, before Ibrāhīm Pāsha could give effect to his instructions; and it was not, apparently, until some time in 1817 that he reached Hanakiyah, from which place, as a centre, he commenced a series of raids upon the surrounding tribes. The Harb and the 'Ataibah were among the Bedouins who suffered from these, and their fate induced many to declare for the Egyptians. The next enterprise of the Pāsha was an expedition into the Jabal Shammar region, in which the friendly Arabs were driven into action against the enemy by a body

Operations of the Egyptians from Hanakiyah.

* According to another account 'Abdullah also agreed to give hostages; to hand over Dara'iyah to any governor whom the Sultān might appoint; to restore the treasure plundered from Muhammad's tomb; and even to repair in person to Constantinople if required to do so.

of Egyptian cavalry behind them and suffered heavy loss, the Egyptians themselves escaping with less than 20 casualties.

Egyptian
victory at
Jabal Mawiyah,
1817.

At the request of the friendly Arabs, whom the Bedouins of the Wahhābis had now begun to annoy, a force with two guns was sent by the Egyptian commander to Jabal Mawiyah, on the road from Hanakiyah to Rass, and was there attacked by the enemy under the Amīr 'Abdullah; the result of this engagement was very unfavourable to the Wahhābis, whose bleaching skeletons still strewed the plain when it was traversed by Captain Sadleir in September 1819; and the Amīr himself fled through Rass to 'Anaizah in Qasīm. Ibrāhīm Pāsha, who was in the rear and did not arrive until the fighting was over, followed the barbarous example of the Wahhābis upon this occasion by putting all his prisoners to death. Having collected his entire force at Mawiyah, to the *number of 1,200 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, he advanced against Rass and was openly joined by the Shaikh of the Mutair tribe, who had a feud against the Wahhābi Amīr; on the way, apparently, he made an excursion against the 'Anizah tribe.

Unsuccessful
siege of Rass
by the Egyptians,
1817.

Arrived before Rass, Ibrāhīm prepared to carry that place at once; but the walls resisted the fire of his artillery for three days; and, when a breach had been opened, his troops were repulsed with heavy loss in attempting to storm it. The siege was then continued without success for three and a half months, and was ultimately abandoned. The Egyptians lost some 900 men killed and 1,000 wounded in these operations, and they expended 400 camel loads of small arms ammunition and 30,000 artillery rounds, but the casualties among the besieged only amounted to 50 killed and 70 wounded. A sort of agreement was apparently formed with the inhabitants of Rass, under which the fate of their town should be decided by that of 'Anaizah, the capital of Qasīm.

Capture of
Khabrah and
'Anaizah by
the Egyptians,
1817.

The Pāsha consoled himself for his failure at Rass by taking Khabrah, which only stood one day's siege. He next advanced against 'Anaizah, while the Amīr 'Abdullah retreated upon Buraidah; 'Anaizah fell after a six days' bombardment; and the Amīr then retired southwards to Shaqrah, where he remained during the next two months. Ibrāhīm Pāsha occupied Buraidah on its evacuation by 'Abdullah, and the whole of Qasīm submitted to the Egyptians.†

Shaqrah
taken, 22nd
January
1818.

On the 13th of January 1818, Ibrāhīm Pāsha arrived near Shaqrah, the principal place in Washam, and reconnoitred the environs with 800

* Captain Sadleir makes the strength of the Egyptians at this time very much less.

† Sadleir gives a somewhat different version of this part of the campaign.

cavalry ; and on the next day, after an arduous march across loose sand, he established himself on the southern and eastern sides of the town, which he at once proceeded to attack with a force raised by reinforcements to a strength of 4,500 regulars. On the 16th of January the suburbs were occupied after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, the Egyptians losing about 150 men and the Wahhābis leaving 68 men dead upon the ground. A number of prisoners taken by the Egyptians were at once decapitated. Ibrāhīm-Pāsha then had recourse to siege operations, and Shaqrah surrendered on the 22nd of January, when the garrison were permitted to lay down their arms and disperse. During the second stage of the operations the Egyptians had 130 casualties, while among the Wahhābis 170 men were killed and 240 persons wounded.

After a short halt at Shaqrah, due to heavy rains, the Egyptian commander, leaving the sick and wounded behind, resumed his march on Dara'iyah. On the way he passed Dhrumah, where, some unorganised opposition having been offered to the troops, he caused a large number of the inhabitants to be massacred. The Wahhābi governor, who had shut himself up in the fort, was given a safe conduct to Dara'iyah on condition of leaving behind all his property, which comprised a number of valuable horses, and of not again bearing arms against the Egyptians.

Massacre at
Dhrumah.

On the 22nd of March 1818, after being again delayed by bad weather, Ibrāhīm not without difficulty crossed the hills between Dhrumah and Wādi Hanifah. His force now amounted to 5,500 men, horse and foot, and his artillery consisted of twelve pieces, of which two were mortars and two howitzers.* A camp was formed at 'Ayainah and a reconnaissance was carried up to the walls of Dara'iyah. On the 6th of April Ibrāhīm took up a position before the Wahhābi capital, to defend which the inhabitants, sallying out, threw up advanced entrenchments. On the 14th the Egyptians opened fire from two batteries upon an advanced work and captured it with a loss to the Wahhābis of two guns and some prisoners : the latter the Egyptians at once put to death. An eminence on which two guns were mounted, and which was held with much obstinacy by the Wahhābis, was taken a little later ; and this mishap compelled the defenders of Dara'iyah to abandon their advanced positions, in which Faisal, the Amīr's brother, had hitherto commanded.

Arrival and
preliminary
operations at
Dara'iyah,
March 1818.

At this juncture the arrival of reinforcements and stores from Egypt on the one side, and of provisions from 'Irāq on the other, encouraged the Egyptian general, to whom the evil results of delay were becoming

Dangerous
situation of
the Egyptian
force, May-
June 1818.

* According to Captain Sadleir there were 1,950 cavalry and 5,600 infantry ; but the sources of his information are not known.

apparent, to assault a work defending the Ghasibah* quarter; but his troops, after a breach had been opened by artillery fire, refused to advance to the storm. The failure of this operation greatly compromised the prestige of the besiegers, and the Wahhābis entered on a series of daily attacks upon the Egyptian camp, causing them heavy losses. By the end of May the Egyptians were in serious straits. The Wahhābis kept them perpetually in play; the number of ineffectives in their camp was steadily increasing; they could not properly invest Dara'iyah; and supplies from Hasa were constantly entering the town without their being able to prevent it. On the 21st of June, after a sharp action in which the Egyptians lost 160 men including many officers of rank, a gust of wind suddenly carried fire into the Egyptian magazines; a terrific explosion took place; and the besieging army were left in the presence of an overwhelming enemy, hundreds of miles from support, with no ammunition but what remained in the soldiers' pouches and in the batteries. The next day the Wahhābis, aware of the disaster that had overtaken the Egyptians, attacked them in force with 1,500 men; but † Ibrāhīm Pāsha, whose courage was unshaken, was able to infuse his own spirit into the troops, and the assault was at length repulsed, with great loss to the Arabs, by a heavy fire of grape from the artillery. The Wahhābis then lost heart and resumed the defensive.

Improved position and increased efforts of the Egyptians.

After an interval of more than three weeks, stores began to arrive from 'Anaizah and other advanced bases, and the Egyptians again obtained the superiority. On the 16th of August, however, during the absence of Ibrāhīm Pāsha on a punitive expedition against some outlying villages, the Wahhābis attacked the Egyptian camp and were not beaten off without great difficulty. At length, stimulated to greater exertions by the news that Muhammad 'Ali had despatched Khalil Pāsha with a large force to assist or supersede him, Ibrāhīm began to press his attacks. Faisal, the Amīr's brother, who played an important part in the defence, was struck down by a musket shot. A work containing three guns and artillery ammunition was taken by the Egyptians, who thus arrived in the immediate neighbourhood of the Ghasibah quarter and were able to lay siege to a fort commanded by Sa'ad, a son of the Amīr; and after two days this fort capitulated, being without provisions, and Sa'ad became a prisoner, but was well treated. The quarters of Ghasibah and Sahil ‡

* Ghasibah is still the name of one of the quarters on the left or northern bank of Wādī Hanifah.

† Ibrāhīm was at this time only 26 years of age. There is a certain analogy between the position of the Egyptians before Dara'iyah and that of the British force upon the Ridge during the earlier stages of the siege of Delhi (1857).

‡ The quarter of Dara'iyah now adjoining Ghasibah on the left bank of Wādī Hanifah is called Saraihah.

were bombarded and surrendered. The ex-governor of Dhuramah, who had given his parole not to fight against the Egyptians, was taken in arms and executed. The defenders of the Tarfiyah quarter laid down their arms; and only* Taraif, in which the Amīr 'Abdullah himself was shut up, continued to resist.

At length on the 9th of September 1818, at the earnest request of his advisers, the Amīr hoisted a white flag, and negotiations began. An interview took place on the same day between 'Abdullah and Ibrahim, in which the Arab, though unable to disguise his emotion, bore himself with dignity and fortitude; while the Turk, on his part, showed every respect and consideration for his fallen foe and even released his son Sa'ad.† Ibrahim Pāsha offered peace on condition that 'Abdullah should at once proceed to Egypt and allowed him 24 hours for consideration of the offer; it was greatly feared that 'Abdullah, during this interval, might commit suicide or even escape to the desert; but at last, on the understanding that Ibrāhīm should intercede for his life, that the town of Dara'iyah should be spared, and that no punishment should be inflicted on those who had fought against the Egyptians, the Amīr agreed to what was required of him and began to prepare for his journey.

Surrender of
the Amīr
'Abdullah,
9th September
1818.

The remainder of 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'ūd's story is quickly told. Accompanied by his treasurer, his secretary and his most trusty slaves, he travelled down to the coast under a guard of 400 men; and in November he reached Cairo and had a reassuring interview with Muhammad 'Alī, to whom he exhibited a few of the treasures taken from Muhammad's tomb, brought with him by way of restitution; but his treatment at Constantinople belied the favourable expectations that he had been led to form. After being paraded as a public spectacle through the streets of the capital, he suffered death by decapitation in the square of St. Sophia, along with some of his companions in misfortune.

INTERREGNUM.

1818-19.

First occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1818.

The power of Wahhābi Najd as an organised state was for the time completely broken, and the Egyptians assumed the direct administration

Deportation
of 'Abdul-
lah's bro-
ther.

* Taraif, on the southern or right bank of Wadi Hanifah, again exists at the present day under the same name.

† Captain Sadleir's account again differs from that of Mengin.

of the country. Four brothers of the deposed Amīr 'Abdullah were deported to Egypt and kept under surveillance at Cairo, one of these being Khālid ; but the escape of another brother, probably Mashāri, caused much anxiety to the invaders.

Destruction
of Dara'iyah,
etc,

Dara'iyah was first pillaged, Ibrāhīm Pāsha reserving for himself the houses of the Āl Sa'ūd, in which it is believed but little of value was found, while the common soldiers seized what they could lay their hands upon, and torture was applied to persons who were suspected of concealing their property. The complete destruction of the town and its date gardens had been ordered from Constantinople and was eventually carried out, but not until many of the inhabitants had been deluded into paying large sums for personal exemption from the sentence ; when all that could be got in this manner had been extracted, the houses were demolished, every fragment of building timber was burned, and the palms were cut down to the last tree. The homeless inhabitants were mostly removed by the Egyptian commander to Hasa or themselves took refuge at Manfūhah, where they camped in the date groves.

The fortifications of every town and village in Najd were then razed to the ground ; and the thoroughness with which this operation was carried out is attested, in the case of Manfūhah, Riyādh, Tharmidah, Shaqrah and 'Anaizah, by the British traveller Captain Sadleir, who passed over the ground in 1819. Houses and date plantations were generally spared, except at particular places such as Dara'iyah and 'Anaizah.

Occupation of
Kharj and
Hasa.

An Egyptian post having been established at Sulaimīyah in Kharj, Ibrāhīm Pāsha passed onwards to the province of Hasa, which at this time he seems to have intended should be the headquarters of his conquests. Arrived in Hasa, he was joined by Rahmah-bin-Jābir, the famous 'Atbi pirate of Qatar, who, after assisting the Pāsha to take the town of Qatif by bombardment, was permitted in return to establish himself at Dammām on the Hasa coast. Ibrāhīm at first entertained designs of further aggression in the direction of 'Omān, but these the natural difficulties of his position soon compelled him to abandon.

Punishment
of Bedouin
tribes.

Punitive expeditions were undertaken in all directions against the Bedouin tribes that had helped the Wahhābis ; and vengeance fell in particular upon some of the Sabai', who were found at the wells of Rumāh in 'Urmah.

General rela-
tions of
Turks and
Arabs.

Everywhere, during the occupation, the Egyptian army appear to have lived on the worst possible terms with the people of the country, whose resources they consumed ; and their own condition was evidently one bordering on misery. After a two years' sojourn in Najd some of the

principal Egyptian officials there were still as ignorant of the geography of the country as if they had never left Cairo.

Partial withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, 1819.

Gradually it became apparent that a complete occupation of Najd could not be maintained by the Egyptian forces, whose communications between post and post were maintained with difficulty on account of the hostility and increasing audacity of the Bedouin tribes, especially the 'Ajman and the Sa'adah.*

About June 1819 it was resolved to make over to tribal representatives the whole of the country to the east and south of Qasim, and the process of evacuation was witnessed by Captain Sadleir of His Majesty's 47th Regiment, who accompanied the rearguard of the retiring forces, and whose mission to Ibrahim Pasha on behalf of the Government of India is described in the history of Trucial 'Oman. The Khashif of Hasa, to whose column, consisting of about 250 troops with 600 transport camels, Captain Sadleir attached himself, had prepared for his departure by extorting about 1,000,000 piastres from the inhabitants of Hasa; and, when he left, he installed the Shaikhs of the Bani Khalid as the representatives of the Turkish Government in Hasa. These Shaikhs were the hereditary foes of the Wahhabis, by whom their power had been previously overthrown, and it seems to have been hoped that they would continue to remit the annual tribute of Hasa to 'Anaizah in Qasim, where it was intended to maintain an Egyptian garrison.

Evacuation
of Hasa, July
1819.

The usual line followed by the Turks between Hasa and Qasim lay by Sulaimiyah in Kharj, and the Khashif gave out that he intended to move by this route; but on the second day's march, fearing lest he should be attacked by the Sa'adah, who had recently been giving trouble near Sulaimiyah, he altered his course and made for the wells of Rumah in 'Urmah, where, according to his arrangements, the Sulaimiyah detachment, consisting of 50 to 100 cavalry, ought to have joined him. They did not appear however,† being then shut up in their post by Bedouins; and the Khashif was obliged to proceed to Manfuhah, where he arrived on the 3rd of August *via* Banban, and to despatch half of his own escort to extricate them.

March from
Hasa to Man-
fuhah, July-
August 1819.

* The Sa'adah, though separately mentioned by the historian in this connection, were probably the sub-section so named of the 'Ajman.

† The reason of this is instructive. Ibrahim Pasha, in ordering the withdrawal of the Sulaimiyah detachment, directed the officer in command first to destroy four obnoxious Shaikhs of Dilam, who had hitherto been treated as friends of the Egyptians; being unable to effect this by force, the official invited the Shaikhs to an entertainment, at which he caused them to be murdered; he was then himself immediately besieged.

March from
Manfūhah to
Rass, August
1819.

On the 13th of August the Sulaimīyah garrison reached Manfūhah in safety, and the march to Qasim was begun; the whole surrounding country was now up in arms; and the Kāshif was unable to give effect to a design that he had formed of butchering the principal Wahhābis of Manfūhah before he left. The ruins of * Dara'iyah, untenanted by any living creature, were passed on the same day; and the force camped for the night at 'Ayainah. On the next day the Haisiyah pass in Jabal Tuwaiq was surmounted, which still bore the tracks of Ibrāhīm Pāsha's † guns; that officer had apparently marched from the neighbourhood of Dara'iyah not far in advance of the Kāshif. The retiring troops passed Barrah, which was found deserted, on the 15th of August; on the 16th they arrived Tharmidah, and on the 17th at Shaqrah. At Shaqrah the Turks were in time to pursue and overtake a body of the 'Ataibah, who had just raided the flocks and herds of the town; 20 of the enemy they despatched on the plain, and five they brought in as prisoners and beheaded. The camel transport, supplied by the Bani Khālid, should have been relieved at this place by animals belonging to the Mutair; but some hitch occurred, and eventually the Egyptians confiscated all the camels and dismissed the Bani Khālid without pay or compensation. During the whole march the Turks had not permitted the Arabs to take their camels to any distance from the camp for grazing, fearing lest they should desert. Mudhrib was reached on the 23rd of August, 'Anaizah on the 24th, and Rass on the 26th. Ibrāhīm Pāsha had taken his departure from Rass for Madinah on the 24th; but an extraordinary mixed camp of Turks, Albanians, Libyan Bedouins and Bedouins of Najd still remained, to which Captain Sadleir added his quota of Persians, Indians, Portuguese and Armenians.

March from
Rass to
Hanakiyah,
August-Sep-
tember 1819.

The Egyptian authority at Rass having refused to facilitate his return to India by way of Basrah, Captain Sadleir was obliged to continue on his way towards the Red Sea in the company of the retiring troops. On the 31st of August he arrived in the Wādi-al-Miyāh; on the 2nd of September he passed the former battlefield of Jabal Mawiyah; and on the 4th of September he reached the Egyptian post of Hanakiyah, after an exhausting continuous march of 29½ hours without water.‡

Departure
of Ibrāhīm
Pāsha for
Egypt, Nov-
ember 1819.

The subsequent proceedings of Captain Sadleir in Hijāz are related in the history of Trucial 'Omān; and here it only remains to add that

* Captain Sadleir has left an interesting description of Dara'iyah as he saw it.

† In his operations the Pāsha's guns were generally dragged by camels.

‡ The features of this long and arduous retirement, in its mingled panic and brutality, are admirably brought out by Captain Sadleir in the graphic pages of his *Journal*.

Ibrāhīm Pāsha lingered at the coast until the 17th of November, when he finally sailed from Jiddah for Qusair.

MASHĀRI-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1819-23.

Soon after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Egyptian forces from Najd, Mashāri, a brother of the late Amīr, perhaps the same who had escaped from custody before the evacuation, gathered a party and assumed authority in Najd, apparently in defiance of the Egyptians. The Egyptian occupation, however, was still to some extent maintained. In 1822 a reinforcement of 700 cavalry was sent to 'Anaizah in Qasīm; orders were issued by Muhammad 'Ali that a fort should be built at Dara'iyah for the reception of an Egyptian garrison; and a little later 100 Egyptian cavalry stationed at Riyādh, which had now apparently supplanted Dara'iyah as the capital of Southern Najd, were surprised and cut up by Bedouins in the neighbourhood. The manner in which Mashāri's rule ended is uncertain; possibly, as one authority seems to indicate, he was overthrown by the Bani Khālid governors of Hasa, or, as stated by another, he fell into the hands of the Egyptians and was put to death.

TURKI-BIN-'ABDULLAH.

1824-34.

General and internal history, 1824-34.

Mashāri was succeeded by a relative named Turki, belonging to an elder branch of the Āl Sa'ūd family; the father of Turki was one 'Abdullah, a son of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the first Wahhābi Amīr. Turki seems to have come into power by expelling an Egyptian detachment from Riyādh, and to have obtained immediate recognition among his fellow-countrymen as head of the Wahhābi cause. After his first success, which occurred at the end of 1823 or beginning of 1824, Turki appears to have undertaken offensive operations further to the westward; and, from

Expulsion of
the Egyptians,
1824.

the fact that after this time no Egyptian posts are mentioned as existing in Qasim, it may perhaps be inferred that the Egyptians were altogether ejected from Najd. Amicable relations must however soon have been established, for Turki throughout his reign paid a small annual tribute to the ruler of Egypt; but in other respects his position was that of an independent sovereign.

Internal
policy of
Turki.

The internal administration of Turki, when his power became established, was in accordance with the best Wāhhābi traditions; but, at the same time, it was more liberal and enlightened than that of his predecessors. Like the first Amirs he restrained tribal disorder and punished robbery with a strong hand, but unlike them he encouraged the passage through his dominions of Sunni and Shi'ah pilgrims to the Holy Cities and even guaranteed their safety. Under Turki the religious prejudices of the Wāhhābi sect, except that against the smoking of tobacco in public, were not obtruded upon those who did not share them.

Rebellion of
Mashāri and
assassination
of Turki,
1834.

In 1831 a nephew of Turki named Mashāri, having obtained the support of the Qahtān and other tribes, rebelled against his uncle; but, though his opposition to some extent unsettled the country, he was unable to effect anything against the Amir by fair and open means. In 1834, however, he succeeded in compassing the death of Turki by assassination.

Proceedings of the Amir Turki in Eastern Arabia, 1824-34.

Under Turki the Wāhhābis regained for a time their former position of influence in Eastern Arabia, and by 1833 the whole coast of the Gulfs of 'Omān and Persia as far north as Qatif owned their sovereignty, or at least their suzerainty, and payed tribute.

Wāhhābi re-
conquest of
Hasa, 1824-
1834.

One of the first objects that Turki set himself to accomplish after his accession was the recovery of the province of Hasa, which had been retained by the Bani Khālid Shaikhs since their installation by the Egyptians in 1819. From 1824 to 1830 the contest remained undecided, but in the latter year, as related in the history of Hasa, the Bani Khālid finally succumbed to the forces of the Amir; in the conclusive battle, fought at Wabrah, the Wāhhābis were led by Turki and his son Faisal in person. In 1831, encouraged by the rebellion of Mashāri, the Bani Khālid ventured to attack Hofuf and Qatif; but they were repulsed.

Strong in possession of Hasa, the Amir in 1830 demanded tribute of the Shaikh of Bahrain ; and in 1831 the Shaikh, fearing a combination between the Saiyid of Masqat and the Wahhābis, of which there were symptoms, admitted the obligation to pay. The settlement, however, was far from being of a cordial or permanent character on either side ; the Wahhābis on their part endeavoured to establish Bashir, a son of the pirate Rahmah-bin-Jābir, at Dammām as a check upon the 'Utūb of Bahrain ; and the Shaikh of those islands, as soon as he dared, which was not until 1833 after the departure of Bashir, repudiated his agreement and incited the Bani Khālid to annoy the Wahhābis in Hasa. There is some reason to think that the assassination of the Amīr Turki by Mashāri in 1834 was instigated by the Bahrain, Shaikh, to whom it was at least highly agreeable, and by whom, before that event, war had been declared and the ports of Qatif and 'Oqair blockaded from the sea.

Wahhābi relations with Bahrain, 1824-1834.

No sooner was Turki firmly seated on the throne of Najd than the more restless among the chiefs of what is now Trucial 'Omān began to cultivate his good graces, especially the Shaikhs of Shārjah and 'Ajmān. In 1825 the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah secretly professed great fear of the Wahhābis and solicited a promise of British assistance in case a refusal by him to comply with the desires of the Amīr should bring him into trouble ; no assurance, however, was given ; but the Shaikh was strongly advised by the British authorities to refrain from joining in any movement against the Saiyid of Masqat.

Wahhābi influence in Trucial 'Omān, 1824-1834.

The appearance of the Wahhābis on the coast of Hasa in 1830 gave rise to a fresh commotion in Trucial 'Omān, and their probable advent was anticipated with delight by the Shaikhs of 'Ajmān and Umm-al-Qaiwain, who hoped with their help to throw off the suzerainty of the Qāsimi Shaikh, while by the latter it was naturally regarded with apprehension. The Shaikh of Shārjah once more sought British support, of which no hope was held out to him ; and the Shaikh of 'Ajmān, perhaps remembering the days when Husain-bin-'Ali of Rams had lorded it over the country in the name of the Wahhābi Amīr, begged Turki for a commission as Wahhābi agent. This last request was prudently refused by the Amir, on the ground that he could recognise no chiefs in 'Omān except the Shaikh of Shārjah and the Saiyid of Masqat only ; but later he made the Shaikh of 'Ajmān the medium of a friendly communication from himself to the British Government.

Relations between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Saiyid of Masqat were, owing to the great distance intervening between their frontiers, but

Wahhābi relations with

the 'Omān
Sultanate,
1824-1834.

slowly resumed. The initiative seems to have been taken by the Saiyid, who in 1831 despatched an embassy with presents to Riyādh to request the assistance of the Amīr in reducing Bahrain,—a proceeding that Turki turned to his own advantage in order to extort submission and tribute from the Shaikh of Bahrain. In 1833 the direct pressure of the Wahhābis was felt once more in the 'Omān Sultanate, and in that year the ruler of Masqat was obliged to come to an understanding with the Wahhābi general, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the principal terms of the settlement being that the Saiyid should pay \$5,000 a year as Zakāt or tribute to the Amīr, and that either party should assist the other in suppressing rebellions among his subjects. The latter clause of the agreement was deemed imprudent by the British authorities; but the Saiyid assured them that he would be guided, in his observance of it, entirely by their wishes.

Relations of the Amīr Turki with the British Government, 1824-1834.

The relations of Turki, during his reign, with the British authorities in India were restricted to one simple incident. About the middle of 1831 a message for the Governor of Bombay was received from the Amīr through the Shaikh of 'Ajmān; it expressed his desire "to have the treaty renewed which was made between you, the British, and Imām Sa'ūd."* On receipt of this communication, search was made in the archives of the Bombay Government for a treaty with the Wahhābis; but none could be found; and eventually an answer in general but friendly terms was transmitted to the Amīr through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.†

FAISAL-BIN-TURKI (FIRST REIGN). 1834-1838.

General history and relations with the Egyptians, 1834-1838.

Accession of
Faisal, 1834.

At the time of Turki's assassination, his son Faisal was engaged in defending the province of Hasa against the aggressions of the Shaikh of Bahrain; but he immediately left for Riyādh, where he besieged Mashāri,

* See also pages 1122 and 1125 *post*.

† It is characteristic of the ignorance of Central Arabian affairs which prevailed at this time that in the Bombay Government's letter Sa'ūd, who had died only 17 years before and who belonged to the same generation as Turki himself, was described as "your great ancestor."

the murderer and usurper, in the fort. Before long, aided by treachery on the part of some of the garrison, Faisal succeeded in entering the fort by night; and Mashāri with 20 of his associates was put to the sword. One of the assistants of Faisal in this enterprise, and the actual slayer, it was said, of Mashāri, was 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, Ibn-Rashīd, whom the Amīr soon after appointed Mahfūdh or warden on his behalf of Jabal Shammar, and who thus became the founder of the present ruling family of Northern Najd. Faisal at once obtained general recognition as Amīr of the Wahhābis; his age at the time was about 40 years.

Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt was not satisfied with the nominal suzerainty to which the progress of events had reduced his authority in Najd, and shortly after the accession of Faisal he took measures to re-assert his power. The first step was the appointment of a Bahrain merchant as customs farmer of the Wahhābi port of Qatif in Hasa, by order of Ahmad Pāsha, governor of Hijāz; but this device, perhaps merely experimental, was frustrated by the firm action of Faisal, whose troops, as related in the history of Hasa, obliged the Egyptian nominee to take a hasty departure from Qatif. In 1836, a large Egyptian force having in the meanwhile been concentrated at Madinah, Muhammad 'Ali insisted that Faisal should join with his officers in a campaign against 'Asir; but the Amīr excused himself on the plea of sickness and deputed a brother instead to present some horses and his excuses. It was believed, moreover, that Faisal had secretly sent help to the opponents of the Egyptians in the south. Muhammad 'Ali accordingly determined to replace Faisal by a more subservient Amīr, and for this purpose he released Khālid, a brother of the late Amīr 'Abdullah, from surveillance at Cairo, and sent Ismā'il Bey with an Egyptian force to assist the pretender in making good his claims, which had, it would appear, some supporters among the people of Najd. Alarmed by these preparations Faisal sent messengers and submissive letters to the Pāsha of Egypt; but it was too late. In 1837, supported by an Egyptian force of 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry and 500 infantry with 12 guns and 4 mortars, Khālid occupied Qasīm and defeated Faisal in the neighbourhood of Riyādh; and the Amīr, when he fell back upon his capital, found that the fort had been occupied in his absence by some of his rival's adherents. The military command in Najd was then assumed by Khurshīd Pāsha, who had arrived with reinforcements for the Egyptians.

Re-establishment by the Egyptians of their control in Najd, 1835-38.

The Amīr Faisal, having retreated to the district of Kharj, established himself in Dilam, where he was shortly beleaguered by three separate forces, one under Khurshīd Pāsha, another under the pretender Khālid,

Surrender and deportation of Faisal, 1838.

and a third under a hostile Arab Shaikh. Seeing that resistance would be vain, he shortly surrendered ; and he was deported to Egypt in December 1838.

Position of the Wāhhābis in Eastern Arabia, 1834-38.

Relations of
the Wāhhābis
with Bahrain,
1834-38.

In the confusion following the murder of the Amīr Turki in 1834, the Shaikh of Bahrain found opportunity to annex the island of Tārūt, which belonged to the Wāhhābis. In 1835 an attempt to recover the island was made by the force which Faisal despatched to eject the Egyptian customs farmer from Qatif ; but the endeavour failed, and the Shaikh of Bahrain resumed the maritime blockade of Qatif, which he had meanwhile suspended. In 1836 efforts were made by the Wāhhābi agent in Bahrain, under instructions from his master, to induce the Saiyid of Masqat and some of the tribes of the Arabian coast to attack Bahrain by sea in the interest of the Wāhhābis ; but the ruler of 'Omān replied that he could not join in such an enterprise without the knowledge and consent of the British Government, and this project, too, came to nothing. Very soon afterwards a reconciliation took place between the Wāhhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Bahrain, who were now both in danger, the former from the designs of the Egyptians and the latter from those of the Persian Government ; and the result was a treaty by which the Shaikh pledged himself to pay a tribute of \$2,000 a year to the Amīr, while Faisal on his part undertook to protect Bahrain from external aggression, and not to demand help from the Shaikh of Bahrain in case he should himself proceed against the Saiyid of 'Omān. In 1838, after putting to death three chiefs of the 'Amāir Bani Khālid, supporters of the Egyptians who were now rapidly advancing towards Hasa, the Wāhhābi Governor of that province, 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, took refuge with the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Relations
of the
Wāhhābis
with the
'Omān
Sultanate,
1834-38.

An attempt by the Wāhhābis in 1836 to draw the Saiyid of Masqat into operations against Bahrain upon their own side has already been noticed above. In the same year, the town of Sohār in Bātinah having fallen into the hands of Hamūd, a rebel belonging to his own family, the Saiyid obtained help from Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wāhhābi representative in 'Omān, who, it was arranged, should operate against the place by land

while the Saiyid attacked it by sea ; but sudden distrust of his ally's intentions caused the Saiyid to dissolve the combination thus formed before any attempt had been made on Sohār.

INTERREGNUM.

1838-40.

Second occupation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1838-40.

After the deportation of the Amīr Faisal, the Egyptian commander, whose forces, regular and irregular, now amounted to about 3,000 men, established his headquarters at Sulaimiyah in the district of Kharj and despatched 300 irregulars to Hasa, where he caused the ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair to be garrisoned. The position of Khālid, who from the first had been merely a puppet in the hands of the Egyptians, was now anomalous and uncertain ; for, though the Egyptians in their dealings with neighbouring states pretended only to enforce the rights of the Wahhābi Amīr and at one time held a ceremony for the installation of Khālid and invested him with a robe of honour, Khurshid Pāsha appears, nevertheless, to have kept the entire management of affairs in his own hands and to have proclaimed the absolute sovereignty of his master, Muhammad 'Ali, over the whole of Najd.

Direct
administra-
tion assumed
by the
Egyptians.

The designs of the Egyptian Government had this time a much wider scope than in 1818-19 ; and their object seems to have been now nothing less than the reduction of the whole of Eastern as well as Central Arabia, and the appropriation of the Turkish province of 'Irāq. An assurance which Muhammad 'Ali had given in 1838 to the British political representative at Cairo, that he did not mean to extend his authority in the direction of the Persian Gulf, was presently violated by the proceedings of his officers ; and these consequently aroused British opposition, and were in the end, as we shall see below, completely frustrated. The growth of Muhammad 'Ali's power in Europe was regarded by the British Government

Policy of the
Egyptians
and its
conflict with
British
interests.

with *disfavour; and in the Persian Gulf it was felt that a serious decrease of British influence must result if the Egyptians should obtain a permanent foothold in Eastern Arabia. In February 1839 the British Political Resident at Būshehr was expressly instructed to use his influence to check the encroachments of the Egyptians.

Egyptian intrigues in Eastern Arabia and relations with the British Government, 1838-40.

We may now pass on to consider some aggressions on the states of the Persian Gulf, which the Egyptians, from the base that they had acquired in Hasa, now attempted to commit.

* It is necessary here to revert to the European situation, and to continue the footnote at page 1061.

The accession of Mahmūd II to the throne of Turkey, though his reforms made possible the survival of the Ottoman empire to the present day, did not at once check the course of disaster. In 1812 Russia took Bessarabia, the province between the Dniester and the Danube; and in 1820, while the Porte was engaged in crushing the rebellious Pāsha of Janina, Greece rose in insurrection. The Sultān then turned for aid to his vassal Muhammad 'Ali, who had consolidated his power in Egypt during the troublous period following the expulsion of the French, and who now possessed a better fleet than his master, besides an army trained and organised in the European style. Ibrāhīm Pasha, whom his father placed in command of the Egyptian forces, soon reduced Crete and Greece, as he had done Qasim and Najd. Crete was taken in 1824; Samos fell, and the Morea was invaded; Missolonghi was captured in 1826, and the Abropolis of Athens in 1827. But at this point Ibrāhīm's victorious career was interrupted by the battle of Navarino, in which his whole navy was destroyed by the combined fleets of Britain, France and Russia; and in the following year, after a war between Russia and Turkey ended by the Treaty of Adrianople, Greece obtained her freedom.

In 1831 Muhammad 'Ali, whose heart was set on the aggrandisement of Egypt, threw an army into Syria under Ibrāhīm. War between Egypt and Turkey followed, and in 1832 Ibrāhīm inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turks at Konia in Asia Minor: the cession of Syria to Egypt and closer relations between Turkey and Russia, initiated by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, were the result. In 1839, in spite of improvements effected by Moltke and other Prussian officers, the Turkish Army was again shattered by Ibrāhīm at Nisib, and the Turkish admiral with his whole fleet deserted to Muhammad 'Ali; but this was more than Europe, except France who favoured Muhammad 'Ali, could tolerate. Acre was accordingly captured by the British, Austrian and Turkish fleets, and Ibrāhīm was obliged to withdraw from Syria. As the result of this intervention, in which Britain played the leading part, Syria was restored to Turkey, the Egyptian army was cut down to 18,000 men, and the Egyptian fleet was condemned to rot in the harbour of Alexandria; but Muhammad 'Ali, on making formal submission to the Sultān, was recognised as hereditary Governor of Egypt.

From the foregoing it will be evident that the Egyptian advance into Central Arabia in 1837, was part of a large forward policy, and that the withdrawal in 1840 was due to a collapse of the same.

Early in 1839 Khurshīd Pāsha disclosed his intentions in regard to Bahrain by demanding of the Shaikh of the islands the tribute formerly paid to the Amir Faīsal, the rendition of Tārūt Island and Dammām, and the surrender of 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, the refugee Wahhābī governor of Hasa. The Shaikh would at first have thrown himself upon the protection of Britain; but the Government of India, not fully informed of the attitude of the Home Government towards Muhammad 'Alī, could not at once give the assurances that he desired; and the Shaikh then sought to stave off the Pāsha's demands by describing himself as a vassal of Persia. In April 1839 the Indian Government, on their own responsibility, authorised Admiral Sir F. Maitland, who was cruising in the Persian Gulf with a British squadron, to discourage the Egyptian commander from aggression upon Bahrain and even to afford the Shaikh as much support as could be given him without provoking a direct collision with the Egyptians; the object of these instructions was to gain time, while maintaining the *status quo*. Two or three weeks later stronger orders were issued, empowering the Admiral in certain circumstances, after a warning delivered to the Egyptian commander, to undertake the defence of Bahrain against Khurshīd Pāsha; and at the Admiral's visit to Bahrain, which possibly took place before receipt of the revised instructions, the Shaikh formally promised not to place himself in subordination to any foreign power without first consulting the British Resident. In the meantime Khurshīd Pāsha had written to the Resident with the obvious intention of discovering how the British authorities intended to act in the event of his attacking Bahrain, but the only answer that he received was a request that he would not move without notice to the Resident sufficient to allow of provision being made for the safety of British subjects in Bahrain; and subsequently the Resident was instructed by Government to remonstrate with the Pāsha on the subject of his designs against Bahrain, which order, no doubt, was duly executed. Notwithstanding the measures thus taken to strengthen him, the Shaikh, apparently in July 1839, entered into a secret agreement with the Egyptians by which he bound himself to pay them \$2,000 a year as tribute, on condition that there should be no interference in the administration of Bahrain and that no Egyptian representative should be stationed in the principality; his chief motives for his action, which was highly displeasing to the British authorities, appear to have been the desire to escape from an anxious position and a doubt as to the ability of the British Government to protect him on land against Egyptians. A protest against

Relations of
the Egyptians
with
Bahrain,
1838-40.

the agreement was addressed by the Resident both to the Shaikh of Bahrain and to the Egyptian commander, but the case had no further developments ; and in the following year, on the departure of the Egyptians from Hasa, the agreement ceased to be of any practical importance. These matters are treated of at greater length in the history of Bahrain.

Relations of
the Egyptians with
Trucial
'Omān,
1838-40.

In Trucial 'Omān, likewise, the British authorities were obliged to take precautions against encroachment by the Egyptians. Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, whom the Amīr Faisal before the end of his reign had removed from Baraimi, joined Khurshīd Pāsha in Najd at an early stage in the occupation, and was commissioned by him to proceed to Trucial 'Omān and obtain the submission of the principal Shaikhs to the titular Amīr Khālid. Sa'ad arrived at Shārjah in March 1839 and was received with distinction by the Qāsīmī Shaikh, who provided him with a residence. With him came a detachment of Wahhābī soldiers, whom he wished to place in Baraimi ; but the Na'im, who held the Baraimi fort at this time and enjoyed the support of Saiyid Hamūd of Sohār, would not agree to admit them ; and Sa'ad, though he induced the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to support his demand, was not in a position to coerce the fort-holders. Meanwhile a British political officer had visited the coast with Admiral Sir F. Maitland, and the Shaikhs of the Trucial ports had promised not to help, but on the contrary to resist, the Egyptian agent in his intrigues ; nevertheless, after the departure of the fleet, the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Abu Dhabi began to compete with each other for the agent's favour. In Trucial 'Omān, as in Bahrain, an impression seems to have prevailed that the Egyptians were invincible on *terra firma*. In July 1839 the British Resident visited the coast and obtained from each ruling chief a written engagement to support British and oppose Egyptian policy ; he took steps, through the Shaikh of Shārjah, to bring about the expulsion of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq from the country ; and he encouraged the Na'im of Baraimi to stand firm, at the same time causing the Egyptian agent to be informed that the Na'im had been taken under British protection. Completely foiled in his purpose by these measures, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq embarked at Shārjah for 'Oqair, where, after carrying off 400 sheep with other property from the island of Qais, he arrived in due course ; but he had apparently forfeited the confidence of his Egyptian employers, for soon after his return, he was placed under surveillance and removed to Riyādh. In connection with these events the chief man of Qatif received warning that an expedition by sea from Hasa against any part of the 'Omān coast would be opposed by the British naval force in the Gulf ; and in January 1840 the Resident paid a second visit to the coast of Trucial 'Omān, where at 'Ajmān he arranged a defensive alliance against all enemies

between the Na'im and Dhawair of the Baraimi Oasis. A British officer also visited Baraimi. Most of these proceedings are more fully described in the history of Trucial 'Omān.

The Egyptians continued the bullying policy of their predecessors the Wahhābis, towards the Saiyid of Masqat; and they even used some of the same agents for the purpose, especially Sa'ad-Bine-Mutlaq and a certain Bin-Battal. The Saiyid was at first inclined to attach himself to the Egyptians, through whom he hoped to obtain possession of Bahrain; but later he adopted the views of the Government of India and conducted his correspondence with the Egyptians according to the advice of the British political authorities. The reconciliation between the Saiyid and his kinsman Hamūd, effected by British intervention in 1839, had reference to the Egyptian danger; and the ruler of 'Omān, in the treaty which resulted bound himself to assist Hamūd, who was a stanch opponent of Muhammad 'Ali, against all his enemies.

Relations of
the Egyptians
with
the Sultan-
ate of
'Omān.

Kuwait was among the more distant places to which the Egyptians, on their arrival on the shores of the Persian Gulf, despatched emissaries; and the duties of the individual whom they posted to Kuwait were probably political and not unconnected with a scheme for the conquest of 'Irāq, though his ostensible employment was merely that of a purveyor to the Egyptian forces. The Shaikh of Kuwait gave this Egyptian officer the highest seat in all assemblies; and his presence seems to have been the cause of an otherwise inexplicable discourtesy offered by the Shaikh in 1839 to the British Assistant Resident,—an incident of which the details will be found in the history of Kuwait.

Relations of
the Egyptians
with
Kuwait.

Evacuation of Najd and Hasa by the Egyptians, 1840.

The uncompromising opposition of the British Government to the more ambitious and distant designs of the Egyptians was seconded by the difficulties in which the latter soon found themselves involved with the inhabitants of the countries actually in their occupation; and early in 1840 a retrograde movement of their forces commenced. The Egyptian governor of Hasa was shot and killed by Arabs in the vicinity of Hofūf, and it was found necessary to recall a small force which he had despatched against the Nāim of Qatar. The attitude of the 'Ajmān tribe, whose principal Shaikh had been imprisoned by the Egyptians but contrived to escape from their custody, was bitterly hostile. Communications became unsafe, and even at Tharmidah, to which place the Pāsha had now removed his headquarters, supplies could not be brought in

except under heavy escorts. To add to the serious local difficulties of the Pāsha he was now in disgrace with Muhammad 'Ali, whose jealousy had been excited by his exploits, and very little assistance had reached him by sea, only one vessel with stores arriving at Qatif in November 1839, in place of four vessels of war which he had expected at an earlier date. In May 1840, when a blockade of the Egyptian ports of Qatif, Saihāt and 'Oqair by British war-vessels was imminent, news was received of the actual withdrawal of the greater part of the Egyptian forces from Najd. Their departure had been heralded by a tour which Khālīd, accompanied by a body of Egyptian cavalry, had undertaken in the districts of the interior in order to receive the allegiance of the local Shaikhs, whom he was in future to govern unaided. In Hasa the order to retire was celebrated, as it had been once before in 1819, by an abnormal display of rapacity on the part of the retiring officials; and Barghash, a Shaikh of the Bani Khālīd, was at the same time put to death in retaliation for the murder of Muhammad Effendi. It was intended that Najd should for the future be controlled, through Khālīd, from Madīnah; and, to enable the Egyptian nominee to maintain his position, a force of 800 Egyptian troops, of whom about two-thirds were infantry, were left at his disposal.

KHĀLID-BIN-SA'ŪD.

1840-42.

General and internal history, 1840-42.

Weakness
of Khālīd's
position.

The reign of Khālīd, who as the creature of the Egyptians was generally disliked, and who appears to have possessed no capacity for government, was short and troubled. His prestige was impaired from the first by rumours that the ex-Amīr, Faisal-bin-'Abdullah, had escaped or had been liberated in Egypt, and by the check which his Egyptian patrons were known to have sustained in Syria at the hands of European powers. Claims also were advanced by the Porte to suzerainty over Najd; and Khālīd, acting perhaps under the advice of Khurshīd Pāsha, made the professions of loyalty that were required of him and sent presents

to the Sultān of Turkey,—acts of submission which the Egyptians probably intended should be disavowed at the first convenient opportunity,—and was appointed in return Turkish Wālī of Central Arabia. The Egyptian troops by whom Khālīd's power was supported received no pay and became discontented; moreover they were regarded with intense jealousy by the Arabs of the country, who considered that a Wahhābī Amīr should rely on the swords of his fellow-countrymen alone.

In October 1841, notwithstanding these difficulties, the Amīr Khālīd descended to Hasa and appeared to be contemplating an expedition against 'Omān; his proceedings drew remonstrances from the British authorities and occasioned the despatch of a British officer to Hofūf, as will be related further on.

Visit of the
Amīr to
Hasa, 1841.

The Amīr's ideas of foreign conquest, however, if he entertained such, were speedily dispelled by an insurrection at home, headed by his distant relative 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, whose cause was supported by Turki-al-Hizānī, one of the leading Shaikhs of the Kharj district in Najd. This rival, finding himself suspected by Khālīd, at first fled to Kuwait; but in September 1841 he returned to Central Arabia, took possession apparently of Dhrumah, Hāir and Manfūhah in 'Āridh, and provided himself with the sinews of war by confiscating the estates of two wealthy inhabitants of those places, who were opposed to him and whom he executed. The Sahūl and other tribes attached themselves to his cause; and he was able to secure the neutrality, if not the support, of the important tribes of the 'Ajmān, Āl Morrah and Sabai'; but the 'Anizah, Mutair and Bani Hājir still followed the Amīr Khālīd. In December 1841 'Abdullah found himself in a position to threaten Riyādh, but was repulsed in a skirmish; he had, however, an influential body of supporters in the town itself, who, on the very day of his defeat, admitted him by the southern gate after dusk and proclaimed him Amīr of Najd. The leaders of Khālīd's army fell into his hands, and he put three of them to death; but he spared the life of a resolute individual named 'Umr-bin-'Ufaisān, probably the same who had governed Hasa under the ex-Amīr Faissal. The Amīr Khālīd escaped to Hasa and undertook, as he had done once before, to dismiss the Egyptian troops whose presence was offensive to his leading supporters; but again he failed to observe his promise, and the people of Hofūf then tendered their allegiance to 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān. Khālīd found himself obliged to flee to Qatīf, where he was rejoined by his troops; but here too the popular feeling was strongly adverse to him; his partisans deserted him; and, after dismissing his mercenaries, he took refuge at Dammām with Mubārak, a son of the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Rebellion of
'Abdullah-
bin-Thanai-
yān, Sep-
tember 1841-
April 1842.

From Dammām Khālid visited Khor Hassān in Qatar, where the Shaikh of Bahrain in April 1842 gave him an honorific reception ; but attempts made in his interest upon Hofūf and 'Oqair ended in failure. He finally retired to Kuwait, with the intention of renewing the struggle from the side of Qasīm, where he possessed some interest.

Relations of the Amīr Khālid with Arab states, 1840-42.

Relations
with Trucial
'Omān, 1840-
42.

The dealings of the Amīr Khālid with other states in Arabia were slight, and were practically confined to Trucial 'Omān. Some of the chiefs of that region undoubtedly opened a correspondence with him, particularly the Shaikh of Shārjah, a letter from whom, relating to designs on Baraimi, was intercepted by the Na'im of that oasis in 1841. In October of the same year Khālid appeared to be organising an expedition against Baraimi ; but, if this was the case, he was prevented from undertaking it by the rebellion, already in progress, which ended in his expulsion from his dominions.

Relations of the Amīr Khālid with Great Britain, 1840-42.

Corre-
spondence.

Early in his reign Khālid addressed a letter to the British Residency Agent in Bahrain, expressing a strong desire that "the amicable and cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his late father, Sa'ūd, and the British Government" should be renewed, and indicating that he would have taken earlier steps to this end had he not been prevented by Muhammad 'Ali.

Lieutenant
Jopp's
mission,
November
1841.

In regard to Trucial 'Omān, however, as we have already mentioned, Khālid's attitude was ambiguous ; and the British Political Resident, taking advantage of the instructions of Government to keep a watch upon the Amīr's movements and warn him, if need be, that an attempt on his part to invade 'Omān would be resisted by the British Government, deputed an officer, Lieutenant Jopp, to interview the Amīr at Hofūf and explain the position to him. The Government of India, who did not intend that the proceedings of the Amīr should be scrutinised with the same strictness as those of the Egyptians, were inclined, when they became aware of this mission, to

doubt its expediency ; but a satisfactory assurance was elicited from the Amīr, that he entertained no designs upon 'Omān ; and incidentally some new and interesting geographical information was recorded by Lieutenant Jopp on his journey from 'Oqair to Hofūf and from Hofūf to Qatif in November 1841.*

'ABDULLAH-BIN-THANAIYĀN.

1842-43.

Internal affairs, 1842-43.

The rule of the successful rebel, 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaiyān, was brief and troubled. In Hasa the severity of his taxation soon estranged the inhabitants, who had in the beginning generally supported his cause ; and a number of the Bedouin tribes on that side continued to be hostile to his authority. The ex-Amīr Khālid at first threatened an attack from Qasim ; and in March 1843 the ex-Amīr Faisal, who had in fact regained his freedom, appeared in that district and at once became an even more formidable danger. In June 1843 Faisal marched southwards unopposed and besieged 'Abdullah in the citadel of Riyādh, to which he had retired with a few followers, and 'Abdullah was quickly obliged to surrender at discretion. Faisal had at first offered to associate the ex-Amīr Khālid with himself in his operations ; but that helpless individual, who had now withdrawn to Madīnah, refused to join him and so vanished from the page of history. Valuable assistance was given to Faisal in his operations by 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, his loyal Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar.

Relations with Bahraīn, 1842-43.

In 1842, a breach having occurred between the joint Shaikhs of Bahraīn, the younger, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, was expelled from the

**Bombay Selections XXIV*, pages 111-115. Lieutenant Jopp was apparently the first European to travel between 'Oqair and Hofūf by any, and between Hofūf and Qatif by the ordinary route.

islands by the elder and made his way to Riyādh, where he succeeded in enlisting the sympathy of the Wahhābi Amīr. 'Abdullah, the elder Shaikh, then blockaded the Wahhābi coast, temporarily seized 'Oqair, and gave asylum to discontented emigrants from Saihāt in the Qatif Oasis. In April 1843 'Abdullah was in his turn driven out of Bahrain by Muhammad and established himself at Dammām on the coast of Hasa. The Wahhābi Amīr was not in a position to interfere actively in these affairs.

Designs on Trucial 'Omān, 1842-43.

However weak an Amīr of the Wahhābis might be, it was considered necessary to his honour at this period that he should assert his claims to sovereignty over distant 'Omān; and this obligation 'Abdullah fulfilled by informing the Shaikhs of the Trucial coast that he intended to depute Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq to represent him at Baraimi. The Shaikhs of Baraimi, who were also addressed, openly alleged a connection with the British Government, which, they may have hoped, would deter the Amīr from meddling with their oasis; but they were divided among themselves, and the secret correspondence of some among them with the Wahhābis had, it was believed, a different tenor.

Relations with the British Government, 1842-43.

The letters of 'Abdullah to the Trucial Shaikhs, except one addressed to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi who refused to exhibit it, were procured by the British Resident in the Persian Gulf and became the occasion of a remonstrance by that officer against the Amīr's proceedings: the ground taken by the Resident was that Wahhābi influence had in the past conduced to piracy in Trucial 'Omān and necessitated punitive action by the British Government. 'Abdullah, in reply, professed a desire to co-operate with the British Government in the suppression of piracy and stated that he had enjoined the inhabitants of 'Omān to refrain from maritime offences; but it was observed that in his letter he claimed the people of 'Omān as his subjects,

FAISAL-BIN-TURKI (SECOND REIGN).

1843-65.

General and internal history, 1843-65.

The manner of Faisal's second accession has already been related, and the remainder of his reign was, at home, practically devoid of incident.

Character
and life of
Faisal.

Faisal was distinguished by his dignity and self-possession and was respected for the justice of his decisions, but he was greatly feared, especially by the Bedouins, on account of his merciless severity. Like Sa'ūd, the most distinguished of his predecessors, he was regarded by his subjects with mingled feelings, in which dislike and admiration blended. In his later years Faisal became blind and infirm; but, until a few months before his death, his faculties were unimpaired, and he continued personally to carry on the government. In June 1865 the Amīr was attacked by paralysis, and on the 2nd of December following he died at Riyādh; the immediate cause of his death is said to have been cholera.

In his dominions Faisal seems to have maintained perfect order, and from the very first year of his reign he showed great energy in protecting the yearly pilgrimages to the Holy Cities against marauding Bedouins. In the jail at Riyādh there were always many political prisoners of rank and influence. Grave offences were generally expiated by capital punishment and lighter ones by exile to Qatif, a sentence which was regarded by the people of the Central Arabian plateau as tantamount to a lingering death by fever. In 1848, or within the next few years, the Amīr recovered most of the Qasīm district which had seceded to Jabal Shammar; but he could not take the town of 'Anaizah. In 1853 and 1862 he made fresh efforts to reduce 'Anaizah; but they were unsuccessful.

Administra-
tion of Najd,
1843-65.

In Hasa, where Wahhabism was uncongenial to the character of the people, the Amīr's rule was maintained chiefly by fear; and in that province, where disaffection consequently abounded, the temper of the Wahhābi officials was most suspicious and their methods were most inquisitorial. In 1851 Faisal visited the Hasa Oasis and the deserts to the

Government
of Hasa,
1843-65.

south of it in person, chastising the Bedouin tribes who harassed the trade and pilgrim routes ; and his name is remembered at the present day as that of the only Amīr who ever pursued the Āl Morrah tribe in their own country with any measure of success. It is stated, however, that the condition of the Wāhhābi troops, when they finally brought the Āl Morrah to bay in the Jāfūrah desert, was such that the Amīr had to be satisfied with a merely nominal settlement.

Resources.

The total annual revenue of the Wāhhābi dominions, including Hasa, was computed item by item in 1865 at over \$800,000 of which about six-sevenths were derived from the settled population.

Relations of the Wāhhābi Government with adjacent states in Arabia, etc., 1843-65.

With peace and order prevailing at home and a revenue sufficient for the needs of Government, it was natural that the energies of the Wāhhābi Amīr should take an outward direction, and that the proceedings of the Wāhhābis abroad should become more aggressive than they had been for a considerable time past.

Relations with Turkey and Egypt, 1843-65.

Some uncertainty overshadows the relations subsisting, during the earlier part of Faisal's reign, between his government and the governments of Turkey and Egypt. In 1851 the Amīr was understood to pay tribute to the Porte ; but accredited envoys of the Pāsha of Egypt were present in his camp, and the Wāhhābi agent at Kuwait professedly supported Egyptian interests. In 1855, in correspondence with the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Amīr asserted himself to be "a dependent of the exalted Turkish Government" and stated that his differences with Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt had been due to the conflict in policy between that Pāsha and the Porte. About 1860, in the course of discussions relating to Bahrain, the Amīr Faisal again wrote, somewhat ambiguously, that "in accordance with treaties between the Wāhhābi Amīr and the Sultān 'Abdul Majid, there are matters which everyone is precluded from meddling with, unless on special grounds." These periodical declarations show that the Amīr was not averse, when it suited his interest, to admit dependence on the Porte ; and the Turks, on their part, clearly asserted their suzerainty over the Wāhhābis. An illustration of the Turkish claims was afforded by a protest, lodged by the Pāsha of Baghdad in 1862, against the bombardment of Dammām in Hasa by

British war-vessels in the previous year; for the place in question was described as lying within the territory of "Faisal Bey, the Qāim-Naqām of Najd" and as forming "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultān." At the close of Faisal's reign, the tribute rendered by him to the Porte was merely nominal and seems to have been paid through the Sharif of Makkah.

So long as 'Abdullah, the first Mahfūdh, continued to rule Jabal Shammar, the loyalty of that province to the Wahhābi Amīr remained unquestioned; and Faisal, on his return from Egypt, seems to have been assisted by his old dependent to recover his position in Najd. Talāl, the son of 'Abdullah, married a daughter of Faisal and continued, until his death in 1867, to pay a yearly visit to Riyādh, where he was accustomed to deliver his tribute of horses in person. About 1848, however, Qasīm, which had hitherto been directly dependent upon the Wahhābi Amīr, appears to have obtained the protection of the Shammar chief as a sort of an intermediate overlord.

Relations
with Jabal
Shammar,
1843-65.

About 1851, as we have seen, the Amīr Faisal maintained an agent at Kuwait; and it was ascertained that in 1863 his relations with that place were friendly, although no tribute was paid him by the Shaikh.

Relations
with Kuwait,
1843-65.

When Faisal came to the throne of Najd, a contest between 'Abdullah and Muhammad, the two rival Shaikhs of Bahrain, was in progress. The Amīr availed himself of their mutual opposition to assert his own authority; and, but for the opposition of the British Government, who had determined to confine Wahhābi influence to the mainland, it is not improbable that he would have succeeded in reducing the Bahrain Shaikh to a position of strict dependence on himself.

Relations
with Bahrain,
1843-65.

The Amīr at first sided with the younger claimant, Muhammad-bin-Khalifah, who had lately been driven out by 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad; and, when the latter was in his turn displaced, it was principally by a Wahhābi force that, early in 1844, he was deprived of the fort of Dammām, his last remaining possession, of which the Wahhābi Amīr considered himself to be the rightful owner.

1843-44.

For some time after this the Wahhābis, having achieved their principal object in the recovery of Dammām, remained quiescent; but in 1845, on Muhammad-bin-Khalifah becoming intractable and refusing to pay an annual tribute with arrears to which he had agreed on the fall of Dammām, 'Abdullah-bin-Sa'id, the Wahhābi governor of Qatif, began to arrange an attack on Bahrain, and Muhammad, anticipating his designs, placed the Wahhābi coast under blockade. An invasion of Bahrain from Hasa by a stratagem was then planned by the ex-Shaikh

1845-47.

'Abdullah and the Wahhābi governor of Qatif; but it miscarried, when on the point of execution, through the scheme of action becoming known in Bahrain. In 1846 two collisions between Wahhābi and Bahrain forces occurred on the mainland and each side was able to boast of one victory. At length, in August 1847, the Shaikh of Bahrain having been weakened by the desertion of some of the Bani Khālid from his side, terms were arranged whereby the Wahhābi Amīr undertook to withdraw his active support from the ex-Shaikh, and the Shaikh in return engaged to pay \$4,000 a year to the Wahhābis as Zakāt.

1850-51.

In 1850 relations between Shaikh Muhammad and the Amīr Faisal again became strained, in consequence of the punishment by the Wahhābi ruler of one of his own envoys to whom the Shaikh had given a flattering welcome, and of a cold reception which Muhammad had subsequently accorded to a son of Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, the Wahhābi agent in 'Omān. In 1851 the Amīr arrived in person in the neighbourhood of Qatar, seduced the inhabitants of the principal places in that promontory from their allegiance to Bahrain, and demanded an extravagant increase in the Bahrain tribute, of which payment had probably been withheld altogether. Muhammad thereupon blockaded the Hasa coast; but the preparations of the Wahhābis, who were now joined by the sons of the late ex-Shaikh, had assumed formidable proportions; and it is probable that the Shaikh was only saved from destruction by the appearance of a British squadron which the Resident sent for the protection of the islands. In July 1851 peace was again arranged by the efforts of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but secretly tension continued; and the Wahhābi Amīr established the sons of the late ex-Shaikh of Bahrain at Dammām.

1855-56

After these events, particularly in 1855-56, some correspondence in regard to Bahrain took place between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Būshehr Political Residency; the Amīr claimed the right to chastise at pleasure his dependent, the Shaikh of Bahrain; and the warning returned by the British representative under the authority of the Government of India, that no interference with Bahrain would be permitted, caused him intense irritation and dissatisfaction.

1859.

In 1859 the Amīr, who alleged, and perhaps not without truth, that the Shaikh of Bahrain was inciting the tribes of Hasa to hostile action against his subjects, having disregarded the warnings of the Resident and the presence of a British corvette off his coast, caused preparations to be made by his governor of Qatif, assisted by a son of the late ex-Shaikh of Bahrain, for a serious invasion of the islands. A British squadron was then despatched to threaten Dammām; and, in the result,

the enterprise collapsed, and the Wāhhābi official even apologised to the British commander for his proceedings. This successful act of intervention greatly increased the bitterness of Faisal against the British Government and their representatives.

In 1861 the Shaikh of Bahrain assumed the offensive against the Wāhhābi Amīr without first consulting the British Resident. He blockaded the Wāhhābi ports and sent six war vessels to cruise against Dammām; and only by most stringent measures, amounting to compulsion, could he be induced by his British advisers to discontinue his unwarrantable action. It was now clear, however, that tranquillity in Bahrain waters could only be restored by the removal of the sons of the late ex-Shaikh from Dammām; and this was accordingly effected, by British naval action, in November 1861. The dislodgment of these disturbers of the peace from their stronghold was reported to have been not altogether displeasing to the local Wāhhābi officials in Qatif, who could not themselves have done what was required without committing a breach of Arab hospitality. 1861.

Incidentally we may remark that, but for the vigilance with which the independence of Bahrain was watched over by the British Government during this period, the principality might have become attached to Hasa and afterwards have passed with that province into the possession of the Turks.

In Trucial 'Omān, during the whole of this period, the Wāhhābis were extremely active. In July 1843 letters and messengers from the Amīr reached the principal Shaikhs of that region, informing them that at the end of the hot weather the Wāhhābi agent Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq would arrive with troops to subdue the country; and all the chiefs, except those of Dibai and the Baraimi Oasis, appear to have professed in reply their satisfaction at the prospect.

Relations
with Trucial
'Omān, 1843-
65.

Early in 1845 Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq appeared in Baraimi with a small force. He was, apparently, by no means confident of success; but the surrounding tribes at first displayed considerable enthusiasm for the Wāhhābi cause, and he was encouraged to form designs of occupying Dhank and Dhaid, and even Zora upon the coast. His arrogance and extortions, however, quickly alienated and disgusted most of his supporters; and his direct communications with Najd were then cut, his messengers beaten and insulted, and complaints against him made to the Wāhhābi Amīr. At one time it appeared probable that Sa'ad would be visited with his master's displeasure; but, by one means or another, he succeeded in justifying his conduct and in retaining his post. A remittance of 1845.

treasure which he made by sea to Hasa no doubt contributed to restore him to favour.

1848. In May 1848 the Baraimi forts were captured by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, assisted by the ruler of the Sohār principality and by the Na'im and Dhawāhir tribes; and Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq, who had been absent when the attack began, took refuge with the Shaikh of Shārjah. Tribal jealousy then came into play, and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān as a whole turned against the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi; but the latter defied the combination against him and continued to hold Baraimi until February 1849, when he voluntarily restored it to the Wāhhābis at the intercession of an envoy sent by the Sharīf of Makkah.

1850-51. In March 1850 the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, after communication with the regent of the 'Omān Sultanate, again attacked the Wāhhābis in Baraimi, but this time he failed to make any impression; and an assault on the place, made in the following November by a combination of the Bani Yās, Qawāsīm and Na'im, was equally unsuccessful. In 1851 the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shārjah formed an alliance against the Wāhhābis; but nothing came of it.

1852-53. At the end of 1852 'Abdullah, the son of the Wāhhābi Amīr, arrived in Baraimi; but his proceedings there, as will be seen in the next section, had reference chiefly to the 'Omān Sultanate. The chiefs of Trucial 'Omān, however, except the Shaikh of Dibai, who avoided waiting on him in person, and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, who did his best to dissuade him from aggression to the eastwards, visited Baraimi and fawned upon him in a servile manner.

1854-55. A certain Ahmad-as-Sadairi was appointed about this time to the Wāhhābi agency in Baraimi, in succession to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq. In 1854 this individual appeared to be exerting himself to restrain the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān from mutual aggressions and to curb the license of the Bedouins; but in 1855 his activities took a mischievous turn, and it was found that he was scheming to obtain possession of the seaboard village of Hamriyah. In 1865 the Wāhhābis were represented at Baraimi by Turki-bin-Ahmad, probably a son of Ahmad-as-Sadairi, but his attention was directed chiefly to the affairs of the 'Omān Sultanate.

In 1855, in a correspondence with the British Resident at Būshehr, the Amīr Faisal described his mission in Trucial 'Omān as that of a benefactor by whom the savage tribes of the interior were restrained from preying upon and slaughtering the helpless populations of the coast.

The Wahhābi post in Baraimi was used as a base for extremely aggressive action against the Sultanate of 'Omān in 1845, in 1853, and again in 1865.

Relations
with the
'Omān Sul-
tunate, 1848-
65.
1845.

On his arrival in Trucial 'Omān in 1845, Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq demanded tribute, at the rate of \$5,000 and \$20,000 a year respectively, from the rulers of Sohār and Masqat, and, to enforce compliance, he ravaged the Bātinah district and took Majīs, butchering the garrison; \$5,000 was then paid him on account of Sohār and it was agreed that the question of the Masqat payment should be referred to Saiyid Sa'id, who was absent in East Africa. The Wahhābi soon violated the truce that had been arranged; but the action of the British authorities in support of the regent of Masqat, Saiyid Thuwaini, obliged him in the end to be content with a total annual tribute of \$5,000. A douceur of \$2,000 was paid by Saiyid Thuwaini to Sa'ad-bin-Mutlaq in consideration of the settlement, and Majīs was restored to the former owner.

In 1853, during his sojourn in Baraimi, 'Abdullah, the heir-apparent to the Wahhābi Amirship, insisted that the Saiyid of Masqat should cede to him the town and district of Sohār and pay a greatly enhanced tribute for the remainder of his dominions: from the exorbitance of these demands it was believed that the Wahhābis merely sought a pretext for declaring war. Encouraged by British support, Saiyid Thuwaini prepared to defend Sohār; the Wahhābis abandoned their intention of invading Bātinah; and the ultimate result was an agreement under which the Saiyid was to retain Sohār and pay an increased tribute of \$12,000 a year for the whole 'Omān Sultanate. It was further arranged that the Wahhābi agent and the ruler of Masqat should mutually assist one another against all enemies, and in pursuance of this undertaking Saiyid Thuwaini, in the following year, was actually helped by the Wahhābis to coerce some refractory tribes in Bātinah. The Wahhābi agent, after these transactions, paid a visit on his own account, probably in the capacity of tax-collector, to the district of 'Omān Proper in the interior.

1853.

In 1864 the Wahhābis brought indirect pressure to bear on the Sultān of 'Omān—now Saiyid Thuwaini, who had succeeded his father Saiyid Sa'id—by supporting a rebel, Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais of Rustāq, against his authority; but the Sultān immediately sought the aid of the British Government, and the Political Resident in the Gulf, Colonel Pelly, was directed to report on the situation. In March 1865 Colonel Pelly paid a personal visit, which will be described later on, to the Wahhābi Amīr in his capital of Riyādh; and there he ascertained that

1864-65.

the intimidation of the Sultān had been ordered by the Amīr himself, who regarded Saiyid Thuwaini with the utmost contempt and wished to enhance his annual tribute from \$12,000 to \$40,000. In April 1865, on his return to the Persian Gulf, Colonel Pelly proceeded to Masqat, where he learned that Saiyid 'Azzān had now definitively placed himself under the protection of the Wāhhābis, and that the latter were demanding an increased tribute and were threatening an invasion of 'Omān. In these circumstances Colonel Pelly, whose name the Sultān had already in 1864 without proper authority proposed to the Amīr as that of a mediator, wrote to his late host Faisal tendering his good offices for a settlement; but no notice was taken by the Wāhhābi of this communication. In August 1865 Masqat was visited by the usual Wāhhābi deputation, who demanded on this occasion four times the customary annual tribute; but, under British advice, the Sultān paid only the established amount, and stated that, with reference to the balance, he awaited the result of Colonel Pelly's offer of mediation. In the same month the Wāhhābi agent at Baraimi, in response to an invitation by the disaffected Jannabah inhabitants of Sūr, sent a Wāhhābi contingent to that place; a fort occupied by a garrison on behalf of the Sultān was taken after two days' resistance, Sūq Sūr was plundered, and one British Indian subject was killed and another wounded. Saiyid Thuwaini then weakly submitted and paid two sums, aggregating \$16,000, to the Wāhhābis as the price of peace; but the British Government, as we shall see later, did not allow matters to remain in this position.

Relations between the Wāhhābi Amīr and the British Government, 1843-65.

British policy of non-intervention on the Arabian coast, 1843.

We have still to analyse the policy of the British Government in face of these systematic aggressions by the Wāhhābis along an extensive line of coast: it may be described as one of *laissez faire* in Trucial 'Omān, of modified resistance in the 'Omān Sultanate, and of uncompromising opposition in Bahrain. During the occupation of Najd by the Egyptians, in 1838-40, the British political representatives in the Persian Gulf had been authorised to resist their encroachments at every point; and when the Wāhhābi Amīr, having succeeded the Egyptians in Hasa, showed himself inclined to pursue the same aggressive policy, they proposed to counteract it by similar means. The Government of India, however, considering the danger from the ambitions of a Faisal to be much less

dangerous than those of a Muhammad 'Ali, decided to await developments and to maintain a policy of reserve and—so far as possible—of non-intervention; and they accordingly disapproved of a suggestion made by the Government of Bombay in 1844, that a fixed principle of action should be laid down and that an effort should even be made to bring the Wahhābi Amīr within the circle of chiefs who were bound to the British Government by engagements relating to the maritime peace. In accordance with their views the Shaikhs of Baraimi, whom the attitude of Government with reference to the Egyptians had encouraged to hope for British support against the Wahhābis, were informed that the British Government would not interfere on their behalf, having withdrawn from all connection with the internal affairs of Arabia; and, to a letter received from the Wahhābi Amīr, in which he expressed a desire “for the renewal of the amicable relations which existed between his father Turki and the British Government”, a favourable reply was sent, assuring him that the British Government had no object in view except the preservation of the peace at sea, regarding which he had in his own communication declared himself to be solicitous. It was thought that, if a friendly intercourse between the British authorities and the Amīr could be established and maintained, the effect upon the Arab tribes along the coast would be highly beneficial.

Soon, however, it became apparent that the Amīr entertained ambitions which were not compatible with the integrity of the Bahrain Shaikhdom or the 'Omān Sultanate; and the Government of India, by a fear that changes too rapid and too extensive might otherwise result, were led to modify their policy of abstention.

In 1845, in connection with Wahhābi menaces against Masqat, the Political Resident, while he was cautioned to avoid threats which could not be carried out except by despatching troops from India, was authorised to express the views of Government and to make a naval demonstration. He accordingly wrote both to the Wahhābi Amīr and to the Wahhābi agent in Baraimi, at the same time assembling a strong squadron upon the Bātinah coast; and the result, as we have seen above, was satisfactory, inasmuch as a becoming reply was received from the Wahhābis, Majis was evacuated by their troops, and the demand for tribute was reduced to moderate dimensions.

In 1851, when the Bahrain islands were threatened with invasion by the Amīr who was himself present on the mainland adjoining, the danger was averted by the despatch to the scene, apparently by the Resident on his own responsibility, of the whole British naval force in the

British policy of non-intervention modified, from 1845, except in Trucial 'Omān.

British support of the Saiyid of Masqat, 1845.

British protection of Bahrain, 1851.

Gulf; and it was noticed that after this incident Faisal's attitude to the British Government became, for a time at least, more conciliatory. It had been necessary before this, in 1846, to address a stern warning to the Wahhābi Governor of Qatīf, who had permitted himself to use threats of encouraging piracy.

British support of the Saiyid of Masqat, 1853.

Again in 1853, when 'Omān was menaced with invasion by the son of the Wahhābi Amīr, the Resident, by summoning the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān from Baraimi to the coast, where he was waiting to conclude with them the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, by remonstrating with 'Abdullah on his detention of the Shaikhs at Baraimi, by sending a vessel of war to cruise along the coast, and by promising to assist the Sultān of 'Omān, if need be, in the defence of his capital, averted the cession of Sohār to the Wahhābis and enabled the Sultān to obtain peace on terms, far less disadvantageous as to tribute, than might otherwise have been extorted from him.

British protection of Bahrain, etc. 1859-61.

In 1859 Bahrain was again saved by British naval interposition from a Wahhābi descent which might have had serious and permanent consequences. This action and a demand that the sons of the ex-Shaikh of Bahrain should be removed from Dammām elicited bitter reproaches and a denunciation of British policy from the Wahhābi ruler.

Reparation for the Sūr outrage, 1865.

For the outrage committed at Sūr in 1865 the British Government undertook to obtain from the offenders the reparation due, which the Sultān of 'Omān was himself too weak to claim with any hope of success.

British policy of non-intervention maintained in Trucial 'Omān.

It was only in Trucial 'Omān that the representatives of the British Government continued to repeat—particularly in 1855, when the Na'im suggested that help should be given them to expel the Wahhābis from Baraimi—that they could not interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia; and even there they assisted the cause of tribal independence by ignoring, in all their political dealings, the very existence of the Wahhābi agent.

Attitude of the Wahhābi Amīr towards piracy.

It is due to the Amīr Faisal to mention that he never, so far as was ascertained, attempted to reply to the opposition of the British authorities by instigating piracy at sea; on the contrary, in 1855, he referred appreciatively to the "understanding between us and the British Government, of a hundred years' duration, for the security of traders and travellers passing on the seas."

Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, February-March 1865.

Mention has already been made of the remarkable journey to Riyādh undertaken by Colonel Pelly, the British Political Resident at Būshehr, in 1865; his principal object was to remove the animosity against Britain which anti-slavery proceedings at sea and frustration of Wahhābi policy upon the Arabian coast were believed to have excited in the Amīr, and

which, by 1863, had brought about a total cessation of intercourse. Colonel Pelly was also anxious to prove that Central Arabia was not inaccessible to a British officer travelling on duty, and he hoped to cast much light upon the geography and natural history of the country.

The starting point of the journey was Kuwait, where Colonel Pelly arrived in January 1865 and remained for some weeks, awaiting the permission of the Amīr to proceed; this came at last, but in a laconic form, and no guide was sent. Colonel Pelly was accompanied by Dr. W. H. Colvill, the Residency Surgeon, whom he placed in medical charge of his camp and charged with geological and botanical research, and by Lieutenant E. Dawes, I. N., of the Residency steamer, "Berenice," whose duty it was to take observations for latitude and longitude; and the interpreter was G. Lucas, a native Christian of Mūsāl, who passed himself off as a Muhammadan under the name of 'Abdullah. The Resident's entire caravan consisted of about 30 camels; and his party including two Indian sowars, servants, and camelmen, numbered about 33 persons. Only one small tent was taken. The travellers took their departure from Kuwait on the 17th of February, the Residency steamer proceeding to await their return at 'Oqair, and marched by Wafrah, Wabrah and Rumhiyah to Sidūs in 'Aridh; here they turned and took their way down Wādī Hanīfah to Riyadh, where they arrived upon the 5th of March, in uniform.

On the 6th Colonel Pelly, accompanied by his whole staff, paid a visit of ceremony to the Amīr Faisal in the fort in the middle of the town; and the next morning a private interview took place, at which the Resident was attended by his interpreter only. The Amīr was now old and altogether blind, but he appeared to be held by his subjects in the greatest awe; his immediate dependents, it was observed, generally mentioned him by the religious title of Imām. On both occasions the Resident's conversation with the Amīr was general; and, though political topics were introduced, Colonel Pelly was careful to avoid discussion of particular questions such as that of the Masqat tribute, in regard to which he did not feel himself to be sufficiently well informed; but, incidentally, the Amīr claimed sovereignty over all Eastern Arabia from Kuwait to Rās-al-Hadd and beyond. Faisal's manner was dignified, but friendly and at times even cordial; he appeared on the whole to be pleased by the Resident's visit; and it was arranged that Colonel Pelly, on his way from Riyadh to the coast, should visit Saih in Kharj for the purpose of seeing the Amīr's stud of horses. At this point, however,* hostile influences began to work

* A useless guide, Shaikh 'Ali of the Sabai, whom Colonel Pelly had employed, gave a mendacious account at Riyadh of the proceedings of the party by the way.

in the Amir's unscrupulous and fanatical entourage; the manner of his confidential secretary Mahbûb, a "frivolous and vindictive mongrel," suddenly became insolent; Lieutenant Dawes' sketches were burnt, as a precaution; and on the 8th an attempt was made to detain the British party at Riyâdh by withholding their camels. No arrangement for a final interview with the Amir could be made, and, in the afternoon Colonel Pelly thought it necessary to proceed without an appointment to the fort, where, however, he had a farewell meeting with the Amir, no less friendly than the interviews that had preceded it. The Amir, on this occasion, requested that he might be informed of cases of piracy or wrecking upon the Hasa coast, with a view to the severe punishment of the offenders; he asked that his maritime interests upon the coast of Persia might be protected by the Resident; he assured Colonel Pelly of his own sincere friendship; and, finally, he expressed a wish that correspondence should be maintained between them. About 9 P.M. on the 8th of March Colonel Pelly's caravan cleared the town of Riyâdh, and the next day the march to the coast was begun in earnest; on the 17th of March the travellers passed Hofûf, and on the 18th they embarked on the Residency steamer at 'Oqair.

From this adventurous journey, as we shall shortly see, little or no political benefit resulted, probably in consequence of the helpless state into which the Amir sank only three months later; but the observations of Lieutenant Dawes supplied invaluable data, to which no addition has since been made, for a correct map of the most important district of Southern Najd. Lieutenant Dawes had a sunstroke on the way to Riyâdh and suffered much from fever during the return journey.

Relations of the Wahnâbi Amir with France, 1843-65.

Mr. Palgrave's mission, 1862.

Colonel Pelly was preceded at Riyâdh by the traveller Mr. W. G. Palgrave, who passed through the Wahnâbi capital in 1862 on his way across Arabia. Mr. Palgrave's mission, though he was a British subject, was not undertaken on behalf of the British Government; and it has been conjectured that he represented Napoleon III, who took a strong interest in Syria and Egypt, and who may at this time have turned his attention to Najd in connection with the Suez Canal, already projected.

Correspondence with the French.

In his talks with Colonel Pelly at Riyâdh the Amir Faisal admitted having twice received general offers of assistance from the French; and on the latter of these occasions, which synchronised somewhat closely with

Mr. Palgrave's visit, the Amīr was—by his own account—invited to send his reply to the French Consul at Damascus, whom he accordingly thanked and informed that he did not at the time stand in need of help.

**'ABDULLAH-BIN-FAISAL (FIRST REIGN),
1865-71.**

Internal position at 'Abdullah's accession, 1865.

Faisal was succeeded at his death by his eldest son 'Abdullah, who had acquired considerable reputation as a military leader, and had been employed in 1852-53 as his father's representative at Baraimi to arrange with the Saiyid of Masqat for an increase of tribute. 'Abdullah was present in Riyādh during Colonel Pelly's visit in March 1865; but he mortified his curiosity and avoided an interview, fearing lest the Resident, through personal acquaintance with his defects, should obtain some advantage over him in his future career. One immediate result of 'Abdullah's succession was the downfall of the confidential secretary Mahbūb. The position of the new Amīr was weakened from the first by the rivalry and personal enmity of his next brother Sa'ūd, who at the time of Colonel Pelly's journey to Riyādh, was regarded as of a milder character than 'Abdullah, but eventually, by his frankness, liberality and daring, supplanted 'Abdullah in the affection of the Bedouins. 'Abdullah and his brother Muhammad were the sons of Āl Sa'ūd mothers and were consequently bigoted Wāhhābis, whereas his half-brothers Sa'ūd and 'Abdur Rahmān were of Bedouin descent on the female side and had more generous dispositions. Sa'ūd, whose home was in Kh̲irj, at once rebelled against 'Abdullah with the support of the Dawāsir; but at first he was defeated.

**Rupture between the British Government and the Wāhhābi Amīr,
1865-66.**

An unpleasant legacy remaining from Faisal to his son was the settlement of the Sūr case, in which British Indian subjects and others

Resolution of
the Govern-
ment of India

to assist the
Sultān of
'Omān.

had suffered at the hands of tribesmen instigated by the Wāhhābī agent at Baraimi. Before the death of Faisal it had been resolved by the Government of India to encourage the Sultān of 'Omān to more active resistance of the Wāhhābis; it was ordered that material assistance in the shape of munitions of war, and, if absolutely necessary, of money also, should be afforded him; and naval action in his favour was authorised on condition that operations on land were not to be undertaken.

Letter from
the Amīr and
intention of
the Govern-
ment of India
not to
demand com-
pensation for
British
sufferers at
Sūr from the
Wāhhābis.

Apparently in November 1865, Colonel Pelly being then on his way to Bombay after leave in Europe, a letter, which purported to come from the Amīr Faisal and to be an answer to representations made regarding the behaviour of the Wāhhābis at Sūr, reached the British authorities at Būshehr. In this communication it was stated that the Amīr had ordered the release of British subjects taken prisoners at Sūr and the restoration of their property; and, while the question of compensation was ignored, reference was made to an agreement between the British and the Wāhhābī Governments "originally effected in the time of the late Sa'ūd, and again ratified in the time of the present ruler." On consideration of the letter, and after various enquiries, the Government of India decided that the Amīr should be invited to send a copy of the alleged treaty; that the Amīr should be given to understand that the Sultān of 'Omān was a friend and ally of the British Government who, while they hoped for a happy settlement of the Sultān's differences with the Amīr, could not regard encroachment on the Sultān's territory without grave concern; and that the Amīr should not be pressed to pay compensation for the recent injuries to British subjects at Sūr.

Ultimatum
sent by the
Resident to
the Wāhhābī
Amīr,
January
1866.

Meanwhile, however, decisive action, leading to an open breach with the Wāhhābis, was taken by the local British authorities in pursuance of the instructions which they had received to help the Sultān of 'Omān. The chiefs of Trucial 'Omān were informed that they were at liberty to aid the Sultān against the Wāhhābis; arrangements were made for the despatch of a Masqat fleet under Saiyid Turki, the Sultān's brother, to blockade the Wāhhābī ports of Qatif and 'Oqair; and, the attitude of the Shaikh of Bahrain appearing suspicious, one of his war-vessels, the "Dīnār", was seized by the British authorities, partly to prevent his helping the Wāhhābis but partly also to compel satisfaction of claims which there were against him. On the 22nd December 1865 H.M.S. "Highflyer", Captain Pasley, left Bombay carrying two 18-pounder guns with ammunition for the Sultān of 'Omān, which she disembarked at Sohār, and early in January 1866 a consultation

was held at that place between Colonel Pelly and the naval commander. At this juncture an attack was made by a Wāhhābi force on Saham in Bātinah, and the British Indian traders residing there were driven into the sea, one of them being drowned. The result of Colonel Pelly and Captain Pasley's deliberations was a demand made by letter on the Wāhhābi Amīr for a written apology in regard to the Sūr affair, for a written assurance that in future such outrages would be prevented, and for payment of compensation, to the extent of \$27,000, on account of property lost or destroyed; and it was added that, if in seventeen days from the delivery of the letter to the Wāhhābi Governor of Qatif the required satisfaction had not been afforded, the Wāhhābi forts on the seaboard would be destroyed, and the craft in their harbours confiscated. Colonel Pelly was prevented, by the necessity of sustaining with his presence the courage of the Sultān of 'Omān, who was to make an attack on the Wāhhābi post at Baraimi, from himself accompanying Captain Pasley; but he sent instead the Residency Agent at Shārjah, who was landed in Bahrain on the 13th of January 1866 as bearer of the letter for the Wāhhābi Amīr. The "Highflyer" left Bahrain on the same day for Abu Dhabi and thence cruised along the Trucial Coast, destroying on the way a Qāsīmi tower which had been erected, in the Wāhhābi interest, on the insulated tract of Zora. On the 23rd of January Colonel Pelly and Captain Pasley met again in Elphinstone Inlet, where a British telegraph station then existed and a rendezvous had been arranged.

The "Highflyer" left again on the 28th of January for Qatif, where she arrived on the 30th, and where Captain Pasley learned from the Residency Agent that no reply had as yet arrived from the Amīr, and that the Wāhhābi Governor of Qatif was asking for a respite of twelve days to allow of his communicating with Riyādh. Captain Pasley waited until the 2nd of February and then, the period of grace having expired, proceeded to carry out the threats conveyed in the ultimatum by sending armed boats to Qatif under Lieutenant Fellowes; these demolished the island fort of Abul Līf and destroyed a single Wāhhābi vessel which was found in the harbour and was not worth removing. On the 3rd of February a party under Lieutenant Long was despatched against the Dammām fort, which, according to the information of the Residency Agent, was held by a garrison of only twelve men; but the boats, on account of the shallowness of the water, could not approach within 200 yards of the beach. The party waded ashore and the outworks of the fort were taken, but the garrison was much larger than had been represented, and the assault was eventually repulsed with a loss of three men killed and two officers and

British naval operations on the Hasa coast and repulse from Dammām, February 1866.

three men wounded. On the 4th of February, at high water, Lieutenant Long renewed the attempt on Dammām and plied the fort with shot, shell and rockets; but the range was excessive and no breach could be effected. On the 9th of February the "Highflyer" rejoined Colonel Pelly at Masqat, and operations were carried out on the 11th and 12th, with eminent success, against the Jannabah tribe of Sūr. The orders of the Government of India not to demand compensation from the Wāhhābi Amīr were at length received by Colonel Pelly, and the "Highflyer" left the Gulf for Bombay.

Reply of the
Wāhhābi
Amīr to the
British ultimatum, etc.,
February
1886.

Colonel Pelly next proceeded to Elphinstone Inlet and was there awaiting news of the capture of Baraimi by the Sultān of 'Omān, when, on the 20th or 21st of February, he suddenly received intelligence of the violent death of Saiyid Thuwaini with attendant circumstances by which the 'Omāni operations against Baraimi were at once brought to a standstill. Almost simultaneously two letters from the Wāhhābi Amīr reached the Resident. In one of these, dated the 28th of January, 'Abdullah accepted the proposal made to his father some months earlier that Colonel Pelly should mediate in the dispute between the Amīr and the Sultān of 'Omān; and in the other, which was a reply to the British ultimatum, 'Abdullah stated that he desired a consultation and would send an agent. He added that the Jannabah were guilty of the outrage at Sūr, but that it was incumbent on himself, the Amīr, to recover compensation from them.

Peace
arranged by
a Wāhhābi
envoy to
Būshehr,
21st April
1886.

Soon afterwards a Wāhhābi envoy named Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah-bin-Manāh arrived at Būshehr with definite proposals of peace; and Colonel Pelly, on his return to that place on the 21st of April, gave him an interview. A written declaration was taken from the envoy, in which, on behalf of the Amīr 'Abdullah, he expressed a desire for peace, assured the Resident that British subjects would be protected in the Wāhhābi dominions, and promised that, beyond collecting the tribute established by ancient custom, the Wāhhābis would not in future interfere with Arab principalities in alliance with the British Government, in particular the Sultanate of 'Omān. These terms having been duly submitted to the Government of India, the Resident under their orders informed 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, in a letter which he handed to the envoy, that the British Government did not wish to intervene or to become the guarantor of any agreement which might be formed between the Amīr and the Sultān, but that they had authorised the Resident to use his good offices in arranging the details of a settlement. It transpired, in the discussions held at Būshehr, that the "treaty" with the British Government mentioned by the Wāhhābi ruler at an early stage of the

proceedings did not in fact exist, and that the Amīr referred only to the friendly letters from the British Government which had from time to time been received and were regarded by the Wāhhābi Government in the light of agreements. It also appeared that the Amīr 'Abdullah had many enemies, and that his position in his own country was precarious. The Government of India regarded the outcome of the operations of February 1866 as on the whole satisfactory; but they considered that the procedure followed, both at Dammām and at Sūr, had been unnecessarily hasty.

Relations of the Wāhhābi Amīr with the Turks, 1866.

About the same time that 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal sent an envoy to Būshehr, he despatched an agent named 'Abdul 'Azīz-as-Suwaylim to the Turkish Wālī of Baghdād, apparently to complain of the British attack upon the Wāhhābi seaboard and to solicit the intervention of the Porte to prevent its repetition. Namīq Pāsha was at first inclined to request, through the British Resident at Baghdād or directly by telegram from himself to the Viceroy of India, that further action might be deferred until the question could be discussed between the British and the Turkish Governments; but later on some difficulty, not wholly explained, arose between the Wālī and the envoy; and the latter, on the 3rd of May, left Baghdād in disgrace.

Wāhhābi
mission to
Baghdād
April 1866

One reason for the breakdown of these negotiations may have been a raid, which was led by the Amīr 'Abdullah in person, apparently during the month of April, upon Arab tribes on the borders of Turkish 'Irāq. The Amīr, it seems, had made an expedition by way of Jabal Shammar against the Dhafīr and part of the 'Anizah tribe; and, in pursuing the Dhafīr towards the Euphrates, he came in conflict also with the Muntafīk. Some severe fighting ensued, of which the final result was not clearly ascertained, and the Amīr, after halting with his force for a time in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, returned to Riyādh. The Turks were at first informed that their subjects had been defeated in the encounter, and, while this opinion prevailed, the Wālī of Baghdād directed his subordinate at Basrah to write to the Amīr "deprecating hostilities between tribes subject to the same authority and recommending the mutual restoration of plunder as the basis of accommodation"; but later the same official accepted for himself 10 Arab horses and 10 camels which the chief of the Muntafīk professed to have captured from the Wāhhābis.

Wāhhābi raid
on the Tur-
kish border,
April 1866.

Relations of the Wāhhābis with Kuwait, 1865-71.

The use of Kuwait territory by the Wāhhābi Amīr as a line of retirement after his raid on the frontier of Turkish 'Irāq in 1866 has already been noticed ; and in the same year 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal apparently offered to join the Shaikh of Kuwait in an attack on Zubair in case the Turkish Wālī of 'Irāq should decide against the Shaikh in a dispute about property, then pending, between the Shaikh and some residents of Turkish territory.

Relations of the Wāhhābis with Bahrain and Qatar, 1865-71.

Tribute paid
by the Shaikh
of Bahrain
to the Wāh-
hābis, 1866.

An enquiry, held by Colonel Pelly under the orders of Government after the crisis of 1865-66, showed that the Shaikh of Bahrain was now entirely independent of the Wāhhābi Amīr in so far as his insular possessions were concerned, but that he paid an annual tribute of \$4,000 to secure his dependencies in the Qatar promontory from attack by tribes under Wāhhābi influence. At some time between 1852 and 1866 the Wāhhābi Amīr had a representative of his own at Dōhah in Qatar ; but it is probable that this representative was merely the local headman of the place.

Invasion of
Bahrain from
Wāhhābi ter-
ritory, 1869.

The invasion of the Bahrain Islands in 1869, in which the ruling Shaikh, 'Ali-bin-Khalifah, lost his life, was carried out from the Wāhhābi coast ; but there was no clear evidence of complicity on the part of the Wāhhābis, and, the Amīr having written to disavow all connection with the affair, the Government of India merely ordered that he should be requested, without threats, to prevent similar occurrences in future.

Relations of the Wāhhābis with 'Omān and Trucial 'Omān, 1865-71.

Destruction
by a British
force of a
tower at Zora,

The destruction by a British war-vessel of a tower erected in Zora by the Shaikh of Shārhjah, who at this time was hand in glove with the Wāhhābis, has been mentioned above in connection with the operations of

1866; and by this measure the peace of the Trucial Coast, which the tower had endangered, was re-established. January 1866.

On the 7th of April 1869 the Sadairi representative of the Wahhābi Amīr in Baraimi, having proceeded to Shārajah and involved himself there in the internal intrigues and dissensions of the ruling Qāsimi family, was shot dead in a broil which arose in the town, and a number of his followers perished with him. Death by violence of the Wahhābi agent in Baraimi, 7th April 1869.

This event was shortly followed by the disappearance of the Wahhābis from Baraimi, which they had occupied, almost continuously, for nearly 70 years. Probably before the death of the Wahhābi agent at Shārajah a peremptory demand for payment of tribute had been addressed to Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais, who had recently usurped the Sultanate of 'Omān, and a raid had been made by the Wahhābis on Sohār; consequently, when the Na'im of Baraimi, after the mishap to the agent, invited Saiyid 'Azzān to join them in expelling the Wahhābis from the Oasis, he complied—being a man of bold and decided character—without hesitation. On or about the 18th of June the Wahhābi garrison of Baraimi surrendered, after a trifling resistance, to 'Azzān's force of about 1,500 men; and the Saiyid, after installing a garrison and forming an alliance with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, returned in triumph to Masqat. Capture of Baraimi from the Wahhābis by the Sultān of 'Omān, 18th June 1869.

'Abdullah-bin-Faisal was not inclined to submit tamely to the loss of Baraimi and, with it, of his whole position in Trucial 'Omān and 'Omān; but various circumstances incapacitated him for effective action for its recovery. Early in 1870 'Abdullah came down to Hasa, where he proceeded to collect a force; it was believed that large numbers of boats were being collected by his order along the coasts of Hasa and Qatar for an expedition to Trucial 'Omān and thence against Baraimi; and subsequently the Amīr himself was reported to have reached 'Oqair. He was reminded, however, of his promise, given in 1866, not to commit aggressions upon Arab states having friendly relations with the British Government, and the overthrow by a British naval force of some usurping chiefs who had seized Bahrain served as a timely illustration of the dangers of a conflict with Britain, besides which he was aware that the invasion of Bahrain, committed as it had been from the coast of Hasa, might be laid to his charge by the British Government. A combination formed by the Shaikh of 'Abu Dhabi, the Amīr's rebellious brother Sa'ūd, and Saiyid 'Azzān of Masqat greatly increased the difficulty of his task in 'Omān; and the dryness of the season had made water scarce upon the routes by land from Hasa to Baraimi. In April 1866, dispirited by these obstacles, 'Abdullah seems to have Abortive preparations by the Wahhābi Amīr for the recovery of Baraimi, 1869-70.

Dawāsir tribes, but unsuccessfully. After his failure he established himself in the neighbourhood of Qatar, where he compelled the coast population to contribute to the support of himself and his following, and from time to time he made raids upon the Turkish lines of communication.

Complete annexation of Hasa by the Turks, 1871-72.

After the flight of 'Abdullah and the attack on Hasa by Sa'ūd, Mid-hat Pāsha, Wālī of Baghdād, who visited Hofūf on tour at the end of November 1871, announced that Wāhhābi rule in Najd was at an end and that direct administration of the country had been assumed by the Turks; and Nāfiz Pāsha was installed as the first Mutasarrif. These steps were professedly taken in consequence of a petition submitted by the people of Hasa, but it appears that the meaning of their representations was misunderstood or, more probably, misrepresented. At this early period, however, it is possible that Turkish rule may have been preferred by the inhabitants, on account of its laxity in some respects, to the domination of the Wāhhābis, which had never been popular in Hasa.

Political results of the annexation of Hasa to Turkey.

The subsequent history of Najd was greatly influenced by the Turkish annexation of Hasa, which brought the shortest of all the routes from the sea to the Wāhhābi country under Ottoman control; indeed all practicable lines of access to Central Arabia, except that from Kuwait, ran after this through Turkish territory, and a powerful hold upon Najd was thus obtained by the Porte. It should be observed, however, that the Turkish occupation of Hasa, which can only be supported from the sea, has made the position of Turkey in the Persian Gulf more vulnerable than before *vis-à-vis* of maritime powers.

Behaviour of the Wāhhābi leaders, 1872.

'Abdullah after this wrote from Riyādh reproaching the Turks with their duplicity, and more than once a nominal reconciliation between him and his brother Sa'ūd was arranged; but the combination was always broken up, as soon as formed, by the treacherous behaviour of 'Abdullah in attacking the tribes most devoted to Sa'ūd, such as the Shammar and the 'Ajmān. The Amīr Sa'ūd, on his part, wasted the strength which he should have reserved for fighting the Turks in quarrels with various petty tribes in his neighbourhood.

Subsequent movements of the Wāhhābi leaders, and their relations with the Turks, 1872-74.

Early in 1872 the Amīr Sa'ūd appeared in the neighbourhood of Kuwait with a force greatly distressed for provisions and threatened to plunder the town unless his necessities were relieved ; but the Shaikh, after judiciously enticing his principal supporters away from his camp, attacked him, and he fled accompanied by only 15 followers.

Defeat of the Amīr near Kuwait, 1879.

The Turks had now for some time been in negotiation with Sa'ūd, and they had offered to recognise his authority on condition that he should admit his subordination to the Porte, relinquish his authority upon the coast, pay the same tribute as his father Faisal, indemnify the Turks for the cost of their operations in Hasa, and send two of his sons to reside as hostages at Baghdād. After his reverse at Kuwait, finding himself reduced to the utmost straits, the Amīr wrote to Hāji Ahmad Khān of Būsbehr, lately Deputy-Governor of Bandar 'Abbās and once Wazīr of the Sultān of 'Omān, empowering him to treat on his behalf ; and, after a visit to Ra'uf Pasha, Wālī of Baghdād, the Hāji arrived in Hasa in September 1872. The Amīr Sa'ūd, who distrusted the intentions both of his brother 'Abdullah and of the Turks, refused to leave the district of Kharj, where he then was, and a personal meeting became impossible ; but there appeared in Hasa, to represent him, his brother 'Abdur Rahmān and a certain Fahad-bin-Suwaitān, whom he had appointed to be his agent in Hasa. 'Abdur Rahmān was conducted by Hāji Ahmad Khān to Baghdād and was there detained as a hostage ; nor did Fahad experience better treatment, for in February 1873 he was arrested on a charge of intrigue, thrown into irons, and sent after 'Abdur Rahmān to Baghdād.

Mission of Hāji Ahmad Khān and treacherous seizure by the Turks of the Amīr's brother and agent, 1872-73.

The position of Sa'ūd at length showed signs of improvement : the seizure by the Turks of a leading 'Ajman Shaikh brought many recruits to his standard ; he defeated 'Abdullah in Kharj and shut him up in Riyādh ; and finally he took the capital, while 'Abdullah fled to the neighbourhood of Kuwait, or, according to another account, found an asylum among the western Bedouins of the Jabal Shammar principality.* 'Abdullah was closely connected with the house of Rashīd, having married first Nūrah,† a celebrated daughter of the Shammar Amīr 'Abdullah, and, after her

Expulsion of 'Abdullah from Southern Najd, 1873.

* Possibly this statement refers to his earlier flight to Jabal Shammar about 1870.

† Her brother, the Shammar Amīr Muhanmad, was accustomed to use Nūrah's name as a sort of oath or asseveration.

death, a sister of Hamūd-bin-'Obaid ; yet the Amīr Muhammad would not allow him to approach Hāil, nor do more than supply him with such horses, camels and sheep as he required for his subsistence.

Negotiations
of Abdullah
with the
Turks.

'Abdullah was at this time advised by his full brother Muhammad to submit to Sa'ūd, but he declined to entertain the idea ; he responded, however, to advances made to him by Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik, on the part of the Turks. He could not be persuaded to visit Baghdād or even Kuwait ; but he sent the confidential secretary Mahbūb, now restored to favour, whom he had at one time placed over the Baraimi Oasis but who had been driven out thence, to convey his proposals : these were to the effect that Qatif and Hasa should be restored to him, in which case he would pay revenue, but that he should not be required to place himself in the power of the Turks.

Unsuccessful
rebellion,
headed by
the Amīr's
brother 'Ab-
dur Rahmān
against the
Turkish re-
presentative
in Hasa,
1874.

In March 1874, on the advice of Nāsir Pāsha, the Muntafik chief, the Turks withdrew from their military occupation of Hasa, leaving Barrāk-bin-'Arar, a Shaikh of the Bani Khālīd, to represent them as governor with the support of a body of gendarmerie. In August of the same year 'Abdur Rahmān, the brother of Sa'ūd, and soon after him Fahad-bin-Suwaitān were released from their captivity at Baghdād ; 'Abdur Rahmān shortly arrived in Bahrain and opened a correspondence with the tribes of the mainland ; a few weeks later he landed at 'Oqair and was joined by thousands of the 'Ājmān, Al Morrah and other tribes ; a number of the Turkish gendarmerie were slain, and Barrāk was besieged in the fort of Hofūf. Dissensions, however, broke out among the 'Ājmān supporters of 'Abdur Rahmān ; and, on the approach of Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik, who was responsible for the arrangements with Barrāk, with a Turkish military force, the Wahhābi army dispersed and 'Abdur Rahmān proceeded to join his brother the Amīr at Riyādh. The Turks, after his departure, punished the insurgents of the Hasa Oasis with merciless severity.

Death of
Sa'ūd, 25th
January
1875.

On the 25th of January 1875 the Amīr Sa'ūd died of small-pox.

Relations of the Amīr Sa'ūd with the British Government, 1871-75.

General policy
of the
British Gov-
ernment.

Sa'ūd, during his short and troubled reign, corresponded freely with the British Resident at Būshehr ; but he did not receive that assistance which it was his object, in so doing, to obtain. The policy of the British

Government with reference to the Turkish occupation of Hasa is fully described in the history of that province ; it was, briefly, to reassure the rulers of Arab principalities adjoining Hasa, to prevent them from embroiling themselves with the Turks, and to restrict as much as possible the scope of the Turkish operations.

At the beginning of the war Sa'ūd requested the British authorities either to restrain the Shaikh of Kuwait from aiding the Turks with vessels or to permit him, the Amīr, to take action against the Shaikh at sea ; but to this communication no answer was returned. In September 1871 Sa'ūd urged that the proceedings of the Turks against himself belonged to that class of maritime aggressions which the British Government had been accustomed to prevent, and he suggested that Great Britain should arbitrate between him and the Turks. In June 1872 and in March and May 1873 Sa'ūd again invoked the help of the British authorities upon various grounds, especially the old friendship between the Amīr of Najd and the British Government and the traditional policy of that Government itself in preventing maritime descents upon the coasts of the Gulf,—relying upon which, so Sa'ūd stated, he had neglected to defend his province of Hasa. Later the Amīr dropped his argumentative tone and merely asked for British friendship and good wishes. The Resident was instructed, should Sa'ūd revert to the question and demand assistance as a right, to explain to him that, as he was not a party to any maritime treaty with Britain and had received no assurances of protection, he could not claim the benefit of British intervention.

Correspondence with Sa'ūd, 1871-73.

On the arrest of his agent in Hasa, Fahad-bin-Suwaitān, Sa'ūd complained to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf of the treachery of the Turks and was courteously informed in reply that the British Government could not interfere in the matter ; but the case was referred by the Resident at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and it was possibly through the instrumentality of the latter that 'Abdur Rahmān and Fahad were subsequently released.

Release of the Amīr's brother and agent, 1874.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-FAISAL (SECOND REIGN), 1875-87.

General history of Najd, 1875-81.

The death of Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal left the sovereignty of the shrunken Wahhābi dominions in dispute among his relations. 'Abdur Rahmān-
Dissensions among the Al Sa'ūd.

January to
July, 1875.

bin-Faisal was inclined to make terms with his half-brother 'Abdullah, but the Wahhābi priesthood, on account of the latter's connection with the Turks, would have none of him ; and a force seems actually to have been despatched against him from Riyādh. About April 1875 Muhammad, the eldest son of the late Amīr Sa'ūd, joined the party of 'Abdur Rahmān in the capital, while 'Abdullah, it would appear, was excluded from the town and obliged to camp outside the walls. In July the British Political Resident at Būshehr and the Residency Agent in Bahrain received letters from 'Abdur Rahmān, in which he announced that he was now ruler of Najd and held the capital, and that 'Abdullah had become a fugitive in the desert ; but no reply was sent to his communication.

Reconciliation
among
the Āl Sa'ūd,
August 1875.

About August, however, 'Abdullah defeated 'Abdur Rahmān and re-entered Riyādh, where he set himself, at least in appearance, to conciliate all the members of his family. 'Abdur Rahmān became 'Abdullah's Wazīr and confidential adviser ; and Muhammad and 'Abdul 'Azīz, the two eldest sons of the late Amīr Sa'ūd, who were as yet young and without influence, made peace with their uncle. This reconciliation among the Āl Sa'ūd caused the Mutasarrif of Hasa to withdraw from a correspondence with 'Abdullah on which he had been induced to embark while 'Abdur Rahmān was in the ascendant. The 'Ajmān were the only tribe that did not immediately submit to 'Abdullah's authority.

Rebellion in
Hasa against
the Turks,
1878.

From the end of 1875 to the end of 1878 tranquillity apparently prevailed in Central Arabia ; but in the summer of 1878 there was a rising in Hasa against the Turkish administration, headed by Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān, the sons of the late Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd. This rebellion failed, as related in the history of Hasa, after some initial successes in the Qatif Oasis ; and in December 1878 the defeated Wahhābi leaders arrived in Bahrain with about 60 followers and were received there by the Shaikh, who was prevailed upon, however, by the British authorities to refrain from showing them favours.

Dissensions
and recon-
ciliation
among the
Āl Sa'ūd,
1879-80.

In 1879 the Amīr 'Abdullah was again at variance with his nephews, the sons of Sa'ūd, whom in the month of April he expelled from Kharj. Muhammad, the eldest of these youths, recovered Kharj in the following September or October ; but his success was short-lived, for his uncle, who had just returned from a successful raid against the Mutair, made a sudden expedition to Kharj and took him prisoner. The Amīr did not apparently detain Muhammad for long ; and in 1880 it was reported that, while 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal with his brothers Muhammad and 'Abdur Rahmān lived at Riyādh and held possession of the 'Aridh, Sadair and Washam districts, the children of Sa'ūd ruled, with his consent, over

Kharj, Hautah, Harīq and Aflāj and disposed of the 'Ajmān, Dawāsir and Āl Morrah tribes. In this year another attack by the Wāhhābis upon the Turks was apprehended, and alarming rumours were circulated, perhaps by friends of the Muntafik tribe, who were then in rebellion in 'Irāq; but nothing occurred to justify the general expectation of trouble.

In 1879 a new claimant of the Wāhhābi Amirship appeared in the person of 'Abdullah, a son of the former Amīr 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaīyān. This individual, who had resided at Basrah since 1876, now undertook a journey to Constantinople with the object of obtaining for himself a grant of Najd and Hasa from the Porte in consideration of tribute and fealty, or at least of recovering his share of the property of the Āl Sa'ūd in Hasa, which the Turkish authorities had confiscated. On his way down the Gulf in October 1879, 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah called upon Colonel Ross, the British Resident at Būshehr, and sought to impress on him the advantages which would result to the Turks from his appointment; and he suggested at the same time that he should be supported in his proposals by the British Ambassador at Constantinople. From Jiddah, where he had an interview with Mr. Zohrab, the British Consul, 'Abdullah-bin-'Abdullah again wrote to Colonel Ross, pointing out how his scheme might benefit British and Turkish interests and hinting at the advisability of a British money loan to himself. 'Abdullah then visited Cairo, where he saw Mr. Malet, the British Consul, and in July he waited on the British Vice-Consul at Damascus. The British Government, however, decided to have nothing to do with 'Abdullah's application to the Porte; and, after his arrival at Constantinople in August 1880, nothing further was heard of him or of his proceedings.

Journey of
'Abdullah-
bin-'Abdul-
lah to Con-
stantinople,
1879-80.

In 1881 the Amīr 'Abdullah was still in possession of Riyādh, where from time to time he was visited in a friendly manner by his nephew Muhammad; and some 'Ajmān chiefs, who were discontented with Turkish rule and refused to reside in Hasa, maintained personal relations with him.

Position in
1881.

Early hostilities between the Amīr of Jabal Shammar and the Wāhhābis, 1877-84.

Meanwhile trouble, of which the ultimate consequences to the Wāhhābi state were not at once foreseen, arose between the ruling

family of the Āl Rashīd in the north and the rulers of Riyādh. The first unpleasantness appears to have been occasioned by an expedition which the Amīr of Jabal Shammar undertook in 1877 against the 'Ataibah, a tribe devoted to the Wahhābi chief; and soon afterwards the northern Amīr began openly to encroach upon the dominions of his nominal suzerain and seized the Wahhābi districts of Qasīm and Sadair, occupying, it would appear, the towns of Buraidah and Majma'; 'Anaizah in Qasīm, however, apparently held out against him. In February 1880 an understanding was understood to have been reached between Ibn-Rashīd and Ibn-Sa'ūd; but, if so, it did not long endure. In 1882 an effort was made by the Wahhābi Amīr to recover Qasīm and Sadair by military operations; but his troops were outnumbered by those of the Shammar Amīr and he fell back upon Riyādh. He next discovered that Ibn-Rashīd had been intriguing with his nephews, the sons of Sa'ūd, with a view to their joining the Shammar interest or remaining neutral; whereupon, to give greater cohesion to the Wahhābi cause, 'Abdullah, in March 1883, resigned the command of his forces in favour of Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, retaining for himself only the spiritual title of Imām and his authority as such. Each side made raids upon the dependents of the other, and in 1885 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd obtained a transient success in Qasīm against the Shammar Amīr, whom he obliged temporarily to evacuate Buraidah; but, discovering from intercepted letters that his uncle intended him to be defeated and murdered, he relinquished the conduct of the operations and retired to his home in Kharj. After this Ibn-Rashīd, who possessed four moveable guns and a large number of Martini rifles, whose military organisation was more efficient than that of the Wahhābis, and who was reported to enjoy the benefit of a friendship with the Shaikh of Kuwait, had generally the advantage in the field.

Continued dissensions of the Āl Sa'ūd and deposition of the Amīr 'Abdullah, 1884-87.

The differences between the Wahhābi Amīr and his nephews were apparently irreconcilable, but the meagreness of the information which we possess regarding them precludes conjecture as to their real cause. We know that the sons of Sa'ūd maintained some connection with Fāhrain, for Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd arrived there in February 1886 and

remained a month, and his brother 'Abdullah visited the islands in August of the same year, chiefly, it was suspected, for the sake of obtaining presents. Meanwhile the authority of the Amīr 'Abdullah in Najd was, somewhat unaccountably, on the wane ; but he remained in possession of the capital until the autumn of 1887, when he was suddenly seized and imprisoned by his nephews. Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd then wrote to the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān announcing his own accession to the Amirate of Najd ; but his triumph, as we shall see, was not of long duration.

Relations of the Turks with Central Arabia during this period, 1875-87.

From what has gone before it will have been gathered that the relations of the Turks with the Wahhābis during the second reign of 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal were of the slenderest sort, and that they were not characterised by any remarkable feature except the Hasa revolt of 1878 ; but Turkish influence, while it remained in abeyance in Southern Najd, was being gradually extended to Jabal Shammar. As explained in the separate history of that principality, there was friction between the Shammar Amīr and the Turks on the Syrian frontier in 1872, and possibly in 1880 ; but in 1886 the Amīr accorded a friendly reception to a Turkish mission, of which the object was to obtain leave for the erection of an Ottoman mosque and school at Hāil, and dismissed them with presents, though without granting their request. It was during the period now under consideration that the Turks first showed jealousy of the influence which they erroneously supposed the British Government to possess in Central Arabia.

British relations with Central Arabia during the same period, 1875-87.

In reality the British authorities had, as we have seen, no relations at all with Najd ; and even their information regarding the course of events there was extremely defective. The omission of the British Government to reply to a letter from 'Abdur Rahmān in 1875, their

advice to the Shaikh of Bahrain against entangling himself in Wahhābi affairs in 1878, and their indifference to the proposals of 'Abdullah-bin-Thanaīyān in 1880 have already been mentioned above.

INTERREGNUM, 1887-1902.

Conquest of Southern Najd by the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, 1887-92.

Administra-
tion of
Southern
Najd usurped
by Ibn-
Rashīd,
1887-88.

On learning of the displacement of the Amīr 'Abdullah by his nephew Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar—at this time Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Ibn-Rashīd—marched against Riyādh, which capitulated and opened its gates to him after a short defence. At his departure Ibn-Rashīd carried the deposed Amīr away with him to Hāil, leaving an agent of his own at Riyādh to carry on the administration of the Wahhābi districts with the assistance of Muhammad-bin-Faisal, a brother of the ex-Amīr; and he at once informed the Turks of his success, which he pretended to have achieved in their name. In August 1888, possibly at the suggestion of the ex-Amīr 'Abdullah, the agent of Ibn-Rashīd at Riyādh hunted down and killed, in Kharj, Muhammad, Sa'ad and 'Abdullah, the only surviving sons—except 'Abdul 'Azīz who shared his uncle's captivity at Hāil—of the former Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal. This massacre, perpetrated with impunity by the Shammar agent with a retinue of only 18 men, was an illustration of the paralysing prestige which the northern Amīr had now acquired in Southern Najd; for Muhammad, "the modern Bayard of Arabia," was much beloved, and months passed before his adherents relinquished the hope that he might be still alive and in hiding.

Partial suc-
cess of the
Al Sa'ūd
against Ibn-
Rashīd,
1890.

The deported ex-Amīr 'Abdullah, being no longer considered dangerous, was permitted in the autumn of 1889 to return from Hāil to Riyādh, and there he died almost immediately on his arrival; but in the following year 'Abdur Rahmān, his brother and former adviser, took Riyādh and captured Bin-Sabhān, the Shammar agent by whom the sons of Sa'ūd had been put to death. It was believed that 'Abdur Rahmān had acted on the advice of sympathisers in Qasīm to frustrate a plan formed by

Ibn-Rashīd for the destruction of all the remaining descendants of the Wahhābi Amīr Faisal. A Shammar governor who had been installed in Kharj then capitulated, according to one account, without fighting; and the chiefs of 'Anaizah and Buraidah, and the people of Qasīm generally, declared for 'Abdur Rahmān. These proceedings brought the Shammar Amīr in anger from the north, accompanied by the Shammar, the Harb, and other tribes; but his siege and bombardment of Riyādh were ineffectual, sallies were made against his force, his Bedouin supporters began to melt away, and eventually a peace was arranged by which the districts of Kharj, Sadair and Washam were secured to him, but Riyādh and the rest of Southern Najd reverted to the Āl Sa'ūd. At the end of the year the people of Qasīm and Southern Najd as a whole, with the Bedouin tribes of the Mutair and 'Ataibah, had leagued themselves together to overthrow the power of Ibn-Rashīd; and bloody feuds had been suspended, and hereditary foes united, by the universal hatred of Shammar tyranny. The confederation against Ibn-Rashīd was commanded by Zāmil, Amīr of 'Anaizah, from whose house the declaration of war was despatched.

By February 1891 the opposing forces were in contact in Qasīm, the flanks of the allies resting on the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah; and the number of men in the field is said to have been greater than in any other war within living memory in Central Arabia. Hasan-bin-Mahanna, chief of Buraidah, on whose assistance the Shammar Amīr relied, deserted to the side of the confederates as soon as hostilities began. For a month fighting continued without decisive results, and, though vast numbers of camels were employed by day and night in bringing up water and other supplies, the provisions of Ibn-Rashīd's force began to fail. Towards the end of March Ibn-Rashīd made several desperate attempts to storm the position of the allies; but all of them, notwithstanding that his men were better armed than the enemy, were repulsed with loss. At length he braced himself for a final effort; his troops advanced to the attack driving some thousands of camels in front of them as a screen; and this time, though the loss in camels was very heavy, the Qusmān were driven from their ground. A hundred men are said to have fallen in the battle of Buraidah or *Mulaidah; the veteran Zāmil and his second son 'Ali were among the slain; two of their relatives were killed in the battle and several others

Battle of
Buraidah and
complete vic-
tory of Ibn-
Rashid, 1891.

* In Najd this battle appears to be generally known by the name of Mulaidah, a place which is said to be near Shaihiyah. The account given in the text is taken chiefly from Baron Nolde's *Reise nach Innerarabien*.

were deported to Hāil; Hasan-bin-Mahanna, Amīr of Buraidah, was captured in the desert and imprisoned at Hāil; the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah surrendered; Rass, Shaqrah and even Riyādh sent deputations to the victor to treat for peace; 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd, sought a refuge in Bahrain; and the Shammar Amīr placed a governor of his own in charge of Qasim.

Unsuccessful
renewal of
the struggle
by 'Abdur
Rahmān, Ibn
Sa'ūd.

A little later Ibn-Rashīd's governor of Kharj, after plundering a pilgrim caravan, was killed in an attack upon the 'Ajman tribe, and 'Abdur Rahmān profited by the opportunity to re-occupy Kharj and Riyādh; but he was soon surprised and totally defeated by the Shammar Amīr, who caused the fortifications of Riyādh to be levelled with the ground by the forced labour of the inhabitants, destroyed half of the date plantations, and laid the castle-palace of the Wahhābi Amīrs in ruins. The war was now over. All Central Arabia owned the sway of Ibn-Rashīd, and the Āl Sa'ūd had become a band of homeless wanderers.

Subsequent
movements
of 'Abdur
Rahmān,
1891-92.

'Abdur Rahmān at first joined the Bedouins of Hasa, among whom he sojourned in constant fear of capture by the adherents of the Shammar Amīr; from August to November 1892 he lived in Qatar under the protection of the Shaikh of Dōhah, being joined there by his family from Bahrain; and finally, in November 1892, at the invitation of the Turkish Wālī of Basrah, he settled down in Hasa on a pension of £T33 a month, granted him by the Porte.

Relations of the Shammar Amīr with the Turks during his tenure of Southern Najd, 1891-1900.

Profession
by Ibn-
Rashīd
of allegiance
to the Porte,
1888.

In 1888, after his first decided victory over the Āl Sa'ūd, Ibn-Rashīd communicated with the Turks, professed himself a dependent of the Porte, and declared that he held his conquests at their disposal. This announcement was received with much satisfaction by the Turkish Government.

Expected
expedition
against Tru-
cial 'Omān
and policy of
the Porte in
Najd, 1888-
89.

In the same year there were persistent rumours that an expedition against Trucial 'Omān was about to be undertaken, in the Turkish interest, by Ibn-Rashīd and the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah in Qatar; the details of this question, in its local aspect, are given in the history of Trucial 'Omān. It may now be doubted whether such a project was ever actually entertained, unless perhaps by the Āl Thāni Shaikh; but

the danger at the time appeared so real that representations were made by the British Government to the Porte, in reply to which the Turkish Government stated that, apart from an occasional exchange of presents, no communication existed between the Sultān and the Shammar Amīr. In 1889 it was ascertained by the British Ambassador at Constantinople that there was in fact a conflict of policy between the two, for, while Ibn-Rashīd desired to extend his authority over Hasa and yet to be, except in name, independent of the Turks, the Porte aspired to establish direct control over Central Arabia as well as Hasa.

In 1890, when a temporary settlement had been arranged in Najd between the Āl Sa'ūd and the Āl Rashīd, both sides sought the favour of the Turks; the Shammar Amīr accused his adversaries of entertaining designs on Hasa; and the Wahhābi chief, to whom the Turkish authorities at this time appeared inclined to listen, complained of the aggressions of Ibn-Rashīd and professed his own desire to submit to the Porte. As already mentioned, the head of the Āl Sa'ūd, after being worsted by Ibn-Rashīd, was granted asylum and a pension in Hasa in 1892.

In 1895, as related in the history of Hasa, some friction arose, out of tribal affairs upon the borders of that province, between the Shammar Amīr and the local Turkish authorities; but it had no serious results. In the same year a request for an interview, received from the Āl Thāni Shaikh in Qatar, was declined by Ibn-Rashīd for fear of giving offence to the Turks.

Correspondence of both parties in Najd with the Turks, 1890.

Friction between Ibn-Rashīd and the Turks, 1895.

Renewal by the Āl Sa'ūd of the struggle for possession of Southern Najd, 1900-1902.

In 1900 or three years after the death of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, the formidable Amīr of Jabal Shammar by whom Southern Najd had been conquered, 'Abdur Rahmān, the fugitive chief of the Āl Sa'ūd, began to move again; it is possible that he was encouraged by signs of disorganisation which the Shammar state, under 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Mat'ab, nephew and successor of Muhammad, was now manifesting. About 1897 'Abdur Rahmān, having left his refuge in Hasa, settled at Kuwait and became a recipient of the bounty of Shaikh Mubārak as well as of that of the Turkish Government; and the Shaikh, irritated by support which Ibn-Rashīd had extended to certain rebellious nephews of his own, was before long induced to take an even more active interest in the case of his Wahhābi guest.

Residence 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd. at Kuwait, 1897-1900.

Commence-
ment of
hostilities,
1900.

In August 1900 'Abdur Rahmān, having received encouragement from well-wishers in Najd, suddenly left Kuwait for the interior, where he gained some successes over the Bedouins of Ibn-Rashīd's party ; and in September of the same year he invited Shaikh Mubārak to join him with reinforcements. What action was taken in the first instance by the Shaikh of Kuwait is not clear ; but during the greater part of October he was absent from his capital, and in November a collision on the borders of Turkish 'Irāq appeared imminent, between Ibn-Rashīd on the one side and Shaikh Mubārak and Sa'dūn Pāsha, a Muntafik outlaw, on the other. It was averted, however, by the Turkish authorities at Basrah, as is related at length in the history of Kuwait.

Expedition of
the Shaikh of
Kuwait to
Qasīm and
battle of
Sarīf, 1901.

The Shaikh of Kuwait, notwithstanding the intervention of the Turks, had by no means renounced his intention of lending effectual aid to Ibn-Sa'ūd, and on the 18th of December 1900 he placed himself at the head of a large mixed force of Bedouins and settled Arabs and started for Qasīm. His preliminary operations are described in the history of the Kuwait principality. After the Summān and Dahānah deserts had been cleared of the enemy, declarations of loyalty to Ibn-Sa'ūd began to be received from many places in Southern Najd and Qasīm ; and 'Abdul 'Aziz, the eldest surviving son of 'Abdur Rahmān, was nominated by anticipation, for Riyādh was as yet in possession of the enemy, to the governorship of the Wahhābi capital. On the arrival of Sa'dūn Pāsha, which had apparently been awaited in the desert or on the confines of Qasīm, the allies resumed their advance ; but the Shammar Amīr was now in the neighbourhood, and, when they reached Tarfīyah in Qasīm, he took up a position at Sarīf a few miles in their rear. On the 17th of March 1901 a decisive battle, known as the battle of Sarīf, was fought in the bed of Wādi-ar-Rummah at an equal distance from the two camps ; it ended in the complete discomfiture of Shaikh Mubārak and Ibn-Sa'ūd. On the side of Ibn-Rashīd, Sālīm and Mahanna, sons of the Amīr's cousin Hamūd, were slain ; but the losses of the allies were considerably the heavier and included at least three near relations of the Shaikh of Kuwait and six members of the ruling Abul Khail family of Buraidah. According to a Shammar version of the affair, the defeated army made no stand at all and suffered heavily in its flight, many of the fugitives were dragged out of hiding places in cultivated fields or in stacks of straw, and of these some were put to death in cold blood by townsmen and slaves under the orders of Ibn-Rashīd. Within a fortnight Shaikh Mubārak, Ibn-Sa'ūd and Sa'dūn Pāsha had regained Kuwait in safety, while their dispersed troops continued to straggle home.

The failure of this expedition proved a serious matter or some of those who had engaged in it, especially for the Shaikh of Kuwait and for those among the inhabitants of Qasim who had taken his part. On some of the latter Ibn-Rashid took summary vengeance; but the partial success of the hostile combination had greatly alarmed him; and about the end of May, through an agent at Basrah, he made overtures, which met with no encouragement, to obtain the protection of the British Government.

Consequence
of the expedi-
tion, 1901-
1902.

The only outsiders interested in the situation that had arisen were the Turkish Government, who were anxious to acquire influence over the Shaikh of Kuwait; and they immediately deputed the Mushir of their 6th Army Corps from Baghdad to Basrah, where he arrived about the beginning of May and remained for several months. The task of this high officer was to arrange a reconciliation among the principal disputants, and this he proceeded to attempt by opening a correspondence with each; but it is not clear that he met with a favourable response from any one of them except Ibn-Rashid. In August the Turks, who now seemed to be drifting into a pronounced partisanship of Ibn-Rashid, began to concentrate troops upon the Euphrates; and in September 1901, on raids being made by Ibn-Rashid into Kuwait territory, a panic arose in the town and its neighbourhood, and preparations were made by the British naval authorities for assisting the Shaikh in case an emergency should arise. In November and December 1901, Ibn-Rashid being then at Safwan, a place upon the Kuwait border not far from Basrah, strenuous efforts were made by the Turkish authorities at Basrah to induce the Shaikh to submit to the Porte and even to admit a Turkish garrison to his capital; but they were foiled by the decided attitude of the senior British naval officer at Kuwait. A crisis followed which is described in the history of Kuwait; but it passed over harmlessly in consequence, it is probable, of British naval preparations for the defence of Kuwait; and the Shammar Amir moved off, slowly and reluctantly, to the wells of Lainah on the eastern border of his own dominions.

At this juncture the cause of Ibn-Sa'ud suddenly began to make progress in the south. About the 15th of January 1902 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān made a sudden dash from the side of Hasa, where he had for some time been engaged in collecting adherents, and recovered Riyadh for his father. He entered the town by night, accompanied at first by eight picked men; later he was joined within the walls by the rest of his party, who only numbered 80 all told; and with this force he surprised and slew the Shammar governor and took possession of Riyadh, to the general satisfaction of the inhabitants. Ibn-Rashid's garrisons were then expelled

Recovery of
Riyadh by
the Wahābis,
January
1902.

from the neighbouring districts of Kharj and Harīq; and it was represented to the Porte by Ibn-Sa'ūd that the country thus recovered would be ruled by him as a loyal subject of the Sultān.

'ABDUR RAHMĀN-BIN-FAISAL,
since 1902.

With the recovery of Riyādh the interregnum in Southern Najd may be considered to end, and the reign of 'Abdur Rahmān as a Wahhābi Amīr to begin.

War between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashīd, 1902-04.

Difficulties
of Ibn-
Rashīd,
1902.

Ibn-Rashīd was now fully aware of the precariousness of his situation. The port of Kuwait being in unfriendly hands, he could no longer obtain in sufficient quantities the arms and ammunition which were essential to the maintenance of his power in Najd; and he was conscious that many even of his hereditary subjects had been alienated by cruelty, rapacity, and general maladministration. Accordingly, at the middle of March 1902, he sent an envoy to the Turkish Wālī of Basrah praying for Turkish aid to subdue the "revolt," with which, as he confessed, he could no longer cope; and in a letter which he sent about the same time to the Grand Wazīr at Constantinople, he attributed to the British Government a design of entering into close relations with Central Arabia through the agency of Ibn-Sa'ūd and the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Progress of
the Wahhābi
arms, 1902.

In Najd the tide of war continued to roll steadily northwards. On the 8th of April, near Majma', 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān inflicted a signal defeat on a body of the Qahtān tribe, who were supporters of Ibn-Rashīd; and by this time the 'Ataibah, Dawāsir, Sabai', 'Ajman, Āl Morrah and Mutair tribes in the south and east had declared for Ibn-Sa'ūd, so that there remained to Ibn-Rashīd only the Qahtān, Harb and Dhafir, besides the Shammar to which he himself belonged. Many leading Wahhābis, who had gone into voluntary exile during the Shammar domination of Southern Najd, began to return from Basrah and other

places abroad ; the people, even in Qasīm and the districts adjoining it, were as a rule favourable to the cause of the Wahhābi dynasty ; and a general impression prevailed that the supremacy of Hāil must ere long yield to that of Riyādh. On the 11th of May 1902 the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān left Kuwait for Riyādh, where he was soon established in the seat of his ancestors, having inflicted some loss on the hostile Shammar and Dhafir Bedouins by the way. On the 27th of May his son 'Abdul 'Azīz succeeded in capturing some of the relations of Ibn-Rashīd ; and the reconquest of Southern Najd seemed all but complete.

Ibn-Rashīd, however, had resolved on a strong effort for the recovery of the southern districts, deprivation of which seemed to threaten him with the loss of Qasīm also at no distant period. At the end of July 1902 some of his supporters made an incursion into Kuwait territory and reached the wells of Subaihiyah, but were there repulsed. A little later the Shammar Amīr himself began to move southwards. Occupying Buraidah in Qasīm and Washaiqir in Washam as he passed, he detached some of his mounted troops to attack Riyādh and pressed on in person in search of 'Abdul 'Azīz, who was then in Kharj ; he took Sulaimiyah ; and he pitched his camp at Dilam, the capital of Kharj. At Dilam he remained inactive for a few days, during which the bulk of the inhabitants of the Hautah and Hariq districts, as also the Dawāsir tribe, flocked to the standard of 'Abdul 'Azīz at Muhammadi, a place with cultivation some two or three miles to the northward. On the 1st of November 1902, after three days of inconclusive skirmishing, a general engagement took place in which, after five hours' heavy fighting, Ibn-Rashīd was totally defeated, and fled, leaving his camp, many horses and camels, and one of his standards in possession of the enemy. 'Abdul 'Azīz followed up his success by advancing so far in the direction of Qasīm as Shaqrah ; while Ibn-Rashīd, after making good his escape, took up his position for a time at Zilfi in the extreme north of Sadair. At the end of December 1902 a raid, headed, it is said, by Ibn-Rashīd in person was made on Kuwait subjects in the neighbourhood of Jahrah and did some damage ; but the raiders were ultimately beaten off. Ibn-Rashīd then retired into Qasīm, and a short interval occurred in the active operations, during which 'Abdul 'Azīz paid a visit to Kuwait.

Serious
defeat of
Ibn-Rashid
in Kharj,
1902.

Ibn-Sa'ūd at this point received some encouragement from a European power. At an early stage in the Central Arabian conflict it had become known at Basrah that the agents of the Russian Government were taking an interest in the struggle, and now, on the occasion of 'Abdul 'Azīz's visit to Kuwait, an interview took place between him and

Interview
of the son
of the Wah-
hābi Amīr
with a Rus-
sian official
at Kuwait,
1903.

the Russian Consul-General from Būshehr; this official had arrived on board the Russian cruiser "Boyarín," which was visiting the port in company with the French cruiser "Infernet". It was reported from Kuwait that the Russian Consul-General on this occasion offered to help 'Abdul 'Aziz with money and arms, and the statement received some corroboration from an independent source. The interview in question took place at the beginning of March 1903.

Sadair recovered by the Wahhābis, 1903.

Ibn-Rashīd, meanwhile, occupied himself in chastising some of the outlying nomad tribes who were favourable to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd, and he endeavoured to enlist upon his own side the services of the Muntafik outlaw Sa'dūn Pāsha. On the night of the 3rd of April 1903 he made an attempt to retake Riyādh, where the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān was now firmly established; but he was repulsed with loss. A few days later the Wahhābi 'Abdul 'Aziz, who after his visit to Kuwait had been recruiting followers at Ntā', made a counter-attack upon Ibn-Rashīd's Bedouins, inflicting considerable injury. The year 1903 ended with the capture of Zilfi, and the consequent recovery of the district of Sadair, by this active scion of the Āl Sa'ūd.

Ibn-Rashīd's petition for assistance granted by the Porte, 1904.

Ibn-Rashīd now redoubled his efforts to obtain the active assistance of the Turks; and on the 7th of January 1904 he wired to the Grand Wazir at Constantinople, soliciting the orders of the Porte and representing that Ibn-Sa'ūd was seeking to form relations with the British Government, and that he would probably be furnished by them with guns and ammunition. His petition must have been granted, for in April he was supplied with some specie, rifles and ammunition from Baghdād; and orders were issued for the concentration of a Turkish force at Samāwah on the Euphrates.

Recovery of Washam and Qasim by the Wahhābis, 1904.

In the interim the successes of 'Abdul 'Aziz had grown even more rapid and decisive. On the 7th of February 1904, at Faidhah in Wādī-as-Sirr, he attacked and defeated a force under Husain Jarrād, Ibn-Rashīd's governor of Qasim, killing the governor himself, whose standard and seal he despatched to Kuwait in token of victory. A number of other Shammar notables lost their lives in this encounter; and Southern Najd, by the submission of the district of Washam, was at last recovered in its entirety. 'Abdul 'Aziz, Ibn-Sa'ūd, next fell upon Qasim; a district inclined to independence but generally, through force of circumstances, in semi-vassalage either to Hāil or to Riyādh. The town of 'Anaizah was entered on the 22nd of March, not without assistance from sympathising citizens; and Mājid, a son of Ibn-Rashīd's cousin Hamūd, who was encamped outside the place to defend it, was defeated on the same

day with considerable slaughter, while another son of Hamūd, named 'Obaid, was among those who perished in the battle. This decisive action seems to have brought the whole of Qasim, including the town of Buraidah, under the influence of the Wahhābis with very little delay.

It was probably the events just related that finally determined the Ottoman Government to intervene actively in Central Arabia, where the influence of their protégé Ibn-Rashīd appeared to be at an end and his complete subjugation by Ibn-Sa'ūd already appeared as a not remote contingency.

Turkish military expedition to Qasim, 1904.

The Turkish expedition, when it marched from Samāwah on the Euphrates in the last days of May 1904, consisted of about 2,000 infantry and six light guns, each carried in a litter between two mules, and it was escorted by a large contingent of Shammar and 'Anizah Bedouins; but its proportions were considerably reduced by disease and desertion before it reached the scene of action. It was too late to save Buraidah; but an attack on Hāil, which was threatened by the Wahhābis, was probably averted by the timely arrival of the expedition; and war was carried into the enemy's country by an advance southwards into Qasim.

The opening engagement took place at Bukairiyah, on the afternoon of the 15th of July, and appears to have been a confused affair. The first attack on Ibn-Rashīd and his Turkish allies was made by an 'Aridh contingent under the command of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān; but it failed, and the assailants were routed and driven off the field with considerable loss by Ibn-Rashīd's mounted troops. Meanwhile, however, the men of Qasim, unaware of the fate of their associates who were separated from them by some low hills, were advancing on the Turkish camp; and in the evening they captured it. The Turkish commander, about a dozen of his officers, and a large number of his men were killed in the fight; all the Turkish guns and a large number of Turkish prisoners fell into the hands of the Qusmān; and Mājid, the eldest son of Ibn-Rashīd's cousin Hamūd, was killed in a cavalry *mêlée* at the close of the day,—the fourth of his family to fall in a vain endeavour to retrieve the sinking fortunes of Jabal Shammar. After this success the Qusmān withdrew to 'Anaizah. The remains of the Turkish force then resumed possession of their guns, except one which had been removed by the enemy and was

Battle of
Bukairiyah,
15th July
1904.

subsequently sent to Riyādh; but of those recovered, three had been rendered useless.

Subsequent
operations
and retreat of
the Turks to
Kaháfah,
July to
October
1904.

In order to secure a better position or, possibly, to maintain an appearance of acting on the offensive, the Turks and their allies about the beginning of August moved some miles to the south-westward and occupied Shinānah, one of the separate villages forming the township of Rass. Here they remained immobile for about six weeks, drawing their supplies from the village of Nabhāniyah a considerable distance to the westward, while the enemy held the country to the east of them and even, it would appear, the remainder of Rass. Finally, about the 27th of September, the Turks and Ibn-Rashīd issued from Shinānah and attempted to bombard a fortified enclosure in the vicinity known as Qasr Ibn-'Aqaiyil, a few miles to the west of Rass, which was occupied by Ibn-Sa'ūd's friend, the chief of Buraidah. The enemy, observing this movement made a sally from Rass, upon which the Turkish troops broke and fled, and Ibn-Rashīd disappeared. Another gun and much booty were taken by the Wahhābis and Qusmān; but on this occasion there was little loss of life. After this the remnants of the Turkish force, not numbering more than 700 men, took up a position at Kaháfah about midway between Buraidah and Hāil, for Ibn-Rashīd had, it is said, refused to allow them, though sent to his assistance, to approach any nearer to his capital. The Turkish expedition had thus ended in complete failure; but the Ottoman authorities, if they knew the facts, were far from admitting them; and banners, supposed to have been captured from Ibn-Sa'ūd, were carried in triumph through the streets of Karbala more than a month after the first Turkish defeat.

Negotiations
and amicable
settlement
between Ibn-
Sa'ūd and the
Porte, 1904-
1905.

Ibn-Sa'ūd seems to have been somewhat alarmed at the completeness of his own success against the Ottoman troops; and, about the end of October 1904, an apologetic letter was received from him by *Fakhri Pāsha, the acting Wāli of Basrah, an able and enlightened official trained to the military profession. In this letter the Wahhābi Amīr sought to exculpate himself in respect of the attacks on the Turkish forces in Qasim, asked that his submission might be accepted, and begged that payment of the allowance which he had been accustomed to receive from the Turkish Government might be continued. His proposals were referred to Constantinople and apparently met with acceptance; but preparations which had been commenced at Najaf for the despatch of a second Turkish force to Central Arabia were not discontinued. By

*According to another version it was Fakhri Pasha and not Ibn-Sa'ud who made the first advances.

this time, however, it was generally understood that the objects of the expedition were pacific and not punitive,—a circumstance which may be held to indicate that Ibn-Sa'ūd's promises of good behaviour, although he had not yet appeared in person to confirm them, were regarded by the Porte as satisfactory and sufficiently reliable. Nor was the necessary confirmation long wanting. Hardly had the Turkish field force started from Najaf, when the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān in person, accompanied by Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, arrived from the Kuwait side at the little village of Safwān on the Turkish frontier and was there met by Mukhlis Pāsha, who had recently assumed charge of the Basrah Wilāyat. The first meeting, held at Safwān on the 8th of February, was followed by official telegraphic discussions between Basrah and Constantinople. At the second meeting, which took place on the 13th of February at the wells of Qash'āniyah, Ibn-Sa'ūd appears to have been informed that the Sultān had appointed him Qāim-Maqām or governor of Southern Najd under the Porte, and that Ibn-Rashīd would not be allowed to interfere with the affairs of his districts; while Ibn-Sa'ūd, on his part, seems to have agreed to the location of Turkish civil officials and military garrisons in Qasīm.

Pacific occupation of Qasīm by the Turks, 1905.

Meanwhile, at the end of January 1905, the Turkish military expedition organised at Najaf towards the end of 1904 had marched for Qasīm; it consisted of about 3,000 men with six guns and it was commanded by Ahmad Faizi Pāsha, Mushir of the 6th or Baghdād Army Corps, "a corrupt old rascal," more than 70 years of age, but by no means deficient in physical energy. The agreement concluded with Ibn-Sa'ūd shortly after its departure rendered the task of the expeditionary force an easy one. A junction was effected with a column of 750 men and a battery of field artillery sent from Madīnah, but neither the rendezvous nor the subsequent route of the combined force can be identified with certainty from such reports as are available. No opposition was experienced; for the people of Najd were weary of war, and for the moment they welcomed the prospect of peace even under a Turkish ægis. Buraidah in Qasīm was occupied on the 15th of April 1905 and 'Anaizah three days later; a military post of 100 men or less was apparently established at either place; the Ottoman flag was hoisted,

Military entry of the Turks into Qasīm, April 1905.

the Hamīdiyyah march was played, and public prayers were recited in the name of the Sultān of Turkey. It was observed that Ibn-Rashīd was not present, even as a spectator, at these ceremonies; and the conclusion was drawn that the inhabitants of Qasīm, in submitting to the Porte, had stipulated that the Shammar Amīr should be allowed no *locus standi* in their affairs,—a point on which Ibn-Sa'ūd had from the first laid great stress in his negotiations with the Turks.

Civil organi-
sation of the
countr by
the Turks.

The country of Najd was next parcelled out into administrative divisions on the usual Turkish system. Buraidah was constituted a Qadha under Sālih-bin-Hasan as Qāim-Maqām, and 'Anaizah became a Mudirlik with 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-'Abdullah as Mudīr; but the relations of these two officials to one another were not, apparently, defined. Whether the new districts were administratively dependent on Basrah or on Madinah remained unknown to the Arabs; but by the Turkish officials they were believed to have been attached to the Basrah Wilāyat, and Southern Najd was understood to have become a Qadha under the Wālī of Basrah, with Ibn-Sa'ūd for Qāim-Maqām and headquarters at Riyādh. These dispositions, which were the more easy to carry out that they were purely nominal, had no sooner been completed than the veteran Ahmad Faizi Pāsha, having received orders to suppress a rebellion in Yaman, threw himself on the back of a camel and hurried off by way of Madinah to the port of Yanbō' on the Red Sea.

General history of Central Arabia during the Turkish occupation of Qasīm, 1905-06.

Visit of
'Abdul 'Azīz,
Ibn-Sa'ūd to
Qatar, etc.,
July to Aug-
ust 1905.

The proceedings of the Turks in Qasīm may have momentarily impressed the Wāhhabī Amīr, for he discontinued his operations against Ibn-Rashīd and turned his attention instead to the coast of the Persian Gulf. In July and August 1905 the Amīr's son 'Abdul 'Azīz proceeded on a tour to the Jāfūrah desert and the borders of Qatar, and his unexpected visit was a source of embarrassment to the Turkish authorities in Hasa, who seemed uncertain how to behave but in the end sent a Tābūr Āghāsī to wait upon him at the wells of Da'ailij in Jāfūrah. Two caravans having been stopped at this time by robbers on the Hasa-'Oqair route, 'Abdul Azīz took advantage of the circumstances to put to death or mutilate a few Bedouins and so to pose as a friend of law and order; and he claimed to have reconciled the 'Ajman, Pani Hājir and

Āl Morrah tribes, which were previously at feud. He made several halts at watering places in the neighbourhood of Salwa Bay; and he had a meeting at the 'Araiq camping ground in Qatar with Jāsim, the Āl Thāni Shaikh of Dōhah, from whom his father was believed to have obtained valuable assistance in 1904. Eventually 'Abdul 'Azīz, finding the heat excessive, returned home *via* the wells of Zarnūqah in Kharmah; but, before his departure, he wrote letters to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, announcing his intention of visiting 'Omān in the following spring. These missives, as related in the history of Trucial 'Omān, created some excitement among the chiefs to whom they were addressed, and the British political authorities were obliged to take cognisance of the matter.

The hostilities of the Wahhābi and Shammar Amīrs, suspended for a short time out of a transient respect for Turkish authority, were renewed towards the end of the year. Between the two rivals, as subsequently explained by a Turkish Pasha who had dealt with both, there was a decided contrast in character, for, while Ibn-Rashīd was the "desert warrior" pure and simple, Ibn-Sa'ūd was more of the "desert diplomatist"; but the deficiencies of the Wahhābi chief were more than made good by the soldierly qualities of his son 'Abdul 'Azīz. Towards the end of 1905 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-'Abdur Rahmān, assisted by his brother Muhammad, began to raid the Harb tribe and the Bani 'Abdillāh branch of the Mutair to the westwards; he had now made Qasīm his base, and the headquarters of Ibn-Rashīd were at Kahāfah on the north-western frontier of the same district. At the end of March 1906 the Wahhābis were encamped at 'Ain Ibn-Fahaid in Qasīm, and Ibn-Rashīd was at Thamāmi, a watering place in the Bātin, about 70 miles to the north-east of their position. Ibn-Rashīd had by this time sought the mediation of Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait, whom he begged to regard him as a son, and that wily politician had already begun to weave a scheme for restoring peace in Najd by the creation of a buffer state to lie between the territory of the two Amīrs, to be under the Shaikh's own control, and to consist of the Qasīm, Washam and Sadair districts. Meanwhile, however, on the night of the 11th April 1906, the Wahhābis succeeded in surprising Ibn-Rashīd, while he was encamped in fancied security at a place known as Ruwaidhah, 20 or 30 miles to the east of Buraidah. A duststorm was raging at the time, and Ibn-Rashīd might perhaps have escaped; but he boldly declared his presence and fell, reciting his Rajaz or war-song, under the concentrated fire of his assailants' rifles. A number of the Amir's followers perished with him; and his head, having been cut

Renewal of hostilities between Ibn-Sa'ūd and Ibn-Rashīd and death of the latter, 1905-06.

off, was fixed on a pole and paraded round the country in triumph; but this last enormity was condemned by all respectable Arab opinion, and some regret for Ibn-Rashīd's death was shown even by the Shaikh of Kuwait, to whom his signet ring was immediately sent, in proof of his success, by Ibn-Sa'ūd.

Elation of
Ibn-Sa'ūd,
April to
June, 1906.

The Wahhābi Amīr despatched letters or emissaries to announce his victory to the Sultān of Turkey, to the Turkish Wālis of Baghdād and Basrah, and to the Arab chiefs of Hasa, Qatar and Bahrain. The deputation sent to Basrah was reported to have been well received by the Governor, and most of the Shaikhs who had been addressed returned their congratulations, accompanied by handsome presents. Ibn-Sa'ūd also proclaimed himself ruler of "Sharq", by which he probably meant all Eastern Arabia. A temporary coldness shortly afterwards sprang up between the Wahhābi Amīr and the Shaikh of Kuwait out of disputes relating to the tribute and allegiance of some Bedouin tribes,—perhaps the commonest cause of dissension among potentates in Central Arabia,—and it was reported that Ibn-Sa'ūd, in the first arrogance of his success, had spoken disparagingly of Shaikh Mubārak; but the support of the Shaikh was essential to the Amīr's safety, and the estrangement between them was not of long duration.

Deportation
of the Qāim-
Maqām of
Buraidah and
other aggres-
sions commit-
ted by the
Wahhābis,
April to June,
1906.

'Abdul 'Aziz, after the destruction of Ibn-Rashīd, proceeded to take full advantage of his success. In April or May, disregarding both the official rank of his victim in the Turkish service and the presence of Turkish troops in Qasīm, he seized Sālih-bin-Hasan, Qāim-Maqām of Buraidah, by a stratagem and deported him to Riyādh along with his brothers Mahanna and 'Abdul 'Aziz; the reason appeared to be that Sālih had taken his own position as an Ottoman Qāim-Maqām too seriously and was working in the interests of the Porte; but the measure, on account of Sālih's personal popularity in Qasīm, was generally felt to be one of doubtful policy from the standpoint of Wahhābi interests. 'Abdul 'Aziz then carried his raids far to the northward, and, apparently in May, began to harry the Bedouins in the neighbourhood of Hāil and to demand arrears of the tribute formerly paid by the Shammar Amīr to Riyādh; but the gates of the town were closed against him, and scarcity of forage and supplies soon obliged him to retire. Some members of the Āl Sa'ūd family who had been prisoners at Hāil were now released, among them a youth named 'Abdul-'Aziz-bin-Muhammad, a grandson of the Wahhābi Amīr Sa'ūd-bin-Faisal, who early in July arrived at Kuwait and received medical treatment in the British dispensary there. Several political *detenues* belonging to the ruling families of 'Anaizah and Buraidah were also set at liberty about the same time.

Meanwhile Mat'ab, the son and successor of the deceased Wahhābi Amīr, maintained a correspondence with the Shaikh of Kuwait, whom he begged to proceed with the negotiations begun on his father's behalf ; and the influence of Shaikh Mubārak apparently continued to be exerted in favour of a settlement. In July peace was arranged in Qasīm, and hostilities ceased ; but a Wahhābi messenger, sent by Ibn-Sa'ūd to apprise the Shaikh of Kuwait of the circumstance, was murdered on his way in the desert by a Shammar tribesman, either in revenge for the death of the Amīr 'Abdul 'Azīz or because the murderer was not aware that peace had been made. It is not clear that the Wahhābi Amīr himself ever, during the whole of these proceedings, quitted his capital of Riyādh.

Peace declared
between Ibn-
Sa'ūd and Ibn-
Rashid, July
1906.

We may now enquire in what light the recent proceedings of Ibn-Sa'ūd, exhibiting as they did complete disregard and even contempt for Ottoman authority in Central Arabia, were regarded by the Turkish Government. A deputation sent by the Wahhābi Amīr met, as we have already seen, with a not unfavourable reception at Basrah ; but the sympathies of the Porte naturally lay with the family of Rashid, who had for some time professed allegiance to the Sultān of Turkey, and by whose downfall, consequently, Turkish prestige in Najd could not but be lowered. The Wālī of Basrah attributed the disastrous end of Ibn-Rashid to the intervention of the Shaikh of Kuwait, in the guise of a peacemaker, between the parties ; but the Porte were inclined to suspect that there had been undue interference by the military in the work of the civil officials,—in other words that the commanders of the Turkish army of occupation had been attempting to exercise too much authority over the indigenous chiefs.

Attitude and
action of the
Turks with
reference to
the successes
of Ibn-Sa'ūd,
July to Sept-
ember 1906.

Before the end of April a telegram was received at Basrah from the Sultān's Secretary, directing that Mat'ab, the new Amīr, should be informed of the regret of the Sultān at the death of 'Abdul 'Azīz, of the intention of the Porte to punish the late Amīr's murderers, of Mat'ab's own confirmation as his father's successor, and of the continuance in his favour of his father's salary and allowances. The subsidy of Ibn-Rashid from the Turks at this time was reported to amount to £T200 a month and 200 Taghārs of rice per annum, while that received by Ibn-Sa'ūd was £T90 a month ; the former was disbursed from Baghdād through Karbala, and the latter from Basrah through Kuwait.

At the beginning of July, Sāmi Pāsha, who had been appointed military commandant and civil Mutasarrif of Najd about a year previously but had contrived until now to defer his actual departure, left Madīnah

with an escort of 500 infantry and one gun ; and a month later he reached Qasim and made his headquarters at Shaihiyah, about 30 miles to the south-west of Buraidah. He then summoned 'Abdul 'Aziz, the son of Ibn-Sa'ud, to his presence ; but the Wahhabi declined to enter his camp ; and ultimately a meeting was arranged in the open country between Shaihiyah and Buraidah, at which the chief subjects of discussion were, apparently, the construction of forts at 'Anaizah and Buraidah for the reception of permanent Turkish garrisons and the release by Ibn-Sa'ud of the Qaim-Maqam Salih-bin-Hasan. With regard to the former demand 'Abdul 'Aziz, supported by the people of Qasim, seems to have insisted successfully on the observance by the Turks of a promise, previously given, that not more than 100 men should be placed in either of the towns ; and the question of Salih was apparently dropped in consequence of an assertion—which afterwards proved to be false—that he had escaped from custody at Riyadh and been murdered by Al Morrah Bedouins in the desert.

Fariq Sadiq (or Sudqi) Pasha, who had commanded the Turkish forces in Najd before Sami Pasha's arrival, now took his departure for Kuwait, where he arrived safely on the 21st August *via* Zilfi, the Safah wells in Summan, and Subaihiyah. He brought with him an escort of 142 men and had no casualties by the way.

About the end of September the new Mutasarrif sent a party of troops to purchase supplies at 'Anaizah ; but the elders of the town refused to assist them on the plea of scarcity ; and the Turks, as they were returning by night to their camp, were attacked and lost several of their number.

Meanwhile Talib Pasha, an aide-de-camp of the Sultan of Turkey and probably identical with the ex-Mutasarrif of Hasa of the same name, was travelling from Baghdad to Hail as bearer of a Turkish decoration for the young Amir Mat'ab, and at the end of September it was reported that he had reached his destination. The allowance of the Shammar Amir from the Karbala treasury was at this time irregularly received, apparently because Mat'ab declined to pay certain bribes that were demanded by the Turkish officials.

Virtual withdrawal of the Turks from Najd, November 1906.

Hardships
endured by

It was now evident to the Turkish Government that their occupation of Qasim, which was no longer approved by the people, had

become both unprofitable and dangerous. It was difficult to ensure supplies for the troops, who, according to the statements of deserters, could never obtain any tobacco and were sometimes reduced, for want of food, to eating the pith of date palms. The forces were clothed in rags. The Arabs, it was stated, frequently committed aggressions against the soldiers, while the latter, if they attempted to retaliate, were handed over by their officers to deputations of murmuring Shaikhs, by whom they were put to death. For these reasons the whole army of occupation, themselves largely Arabs, looked on the country as accursed and spoke of it as *Bint-Iblis* or "*Satan's Daughter*"; sickness and desertion were rife; and many sold their arms and ammunition to the people of the country, merely in order to provide themselves with the necessaries of life.

In the circumstances described the Turkish Government seem to have *decided, in the autumn of 1906, to reduce the garrison of Qasim from the strength of 2,500 or 2,000 men, to which it had been raised by the arrival of Sâmi Pâsha's escort from Madinah, to one of 200, and ultimately to one of 100 men only; and in November the withdrawal commenced. The first to move were the units belonging to western Army Corps, which left Qasim about the 3rd of †November; and some three weeks later the troops belonging to the Baghdad command started on their march to the coast. These last, numbering about 800 men with two field and four light guns, were supplied with 2,000 camels belonging to private owners at Buraidah, 'Anaizah and Zilfi for transport; they marched in 25 days from Buraidah to Kuwait, which town the Shaikh did not permit them to enter; and they eventually reached Basrah in safety. The evacuation, in consequence of difficulties made by the Qusmân about the strength of the posts to be left, was perhaps more complete than had been intended by the Porte; and it is clear that not more than 50 men actually remained in Qasim, while one report placed the number as low as 26.

If the total number of Turkish troops despatched to Qasim from 'Iraq in 1904 and 1905 be estimated at the lowest possible figure, viz., 4,500, and the number of those who either were left in Qasim or returned to 'Irâq as soldiers be taken as probably 1,000 altogether,

* According to another account the evacuation was carried out by Sâmi Pâsha, who retired on Madinah, upon his own responsibility, the reason being that he could get no help or even instructions, from Constantinople.

† According to the authority quoted in the last footnote Sâmi Pâsha did not fall back on Madinah until February 1907. The last of the troops withdrawing on that side had sometimes to subsist on locusts.

the army of occupation.

Almost complete withdrawal of the Turkish forces, November 1906.

Military and political results of the occupation and withdrawal.

it will be apparent that the wastage by desertion and death in Najd must have been abnormally heavy. Desertions to Kuwait began in 1905, and it was estimated that, by March 1906, 500 Turkish deserters from Najd had already passed through the town. Of those who died in Qasim by far the greater number, it was stated, succumbed to disease.

The evacuation of Qasim was very injurious to Turkish prestige in Arabia. Disturbances which occurred in Hasa were attributed to the confidence with which the withdrawal had inspired the Arabs, and there was much anxiety in the spring of 1907 lest the troops employed in the construction of the Hijaz Railway should be attacked by Ibn-Sa'ud. It was, however, by no means certain that the Turkish withdrawal from Najd would be permanent, especially as the completion of the Hijaz Railway, then rapidly approaching Madinah, could hardly fail to influence and strengthen the policy of Turkey in Central Arabia.

General history of Central Arabia after the Turkish evacuation of Qasim, 1906-07.

Relations of
Ibn-Sa'ud,
Ibn-Rashid
and the
Shaikh of
Kuwait,
1906-07.

After the departure of the Turkish forces an uneasy peace, broken by frequent but apparently incorrect rumours of renewed hostilities between Ibn-Sa'ud and Ibn-Rashid, prevailed in Najd. In January 1907, as related in the history of Northern Najd, Mat'ab, the young Shammar Amir, was murdered by his relation Sultan-bin-Hamud, who then usurped his position. The attitude of the new Ibn-Rashid, doubtless because he felt his position to be precarious, was conciliatory towards Ibn-Sa'ud; and the Shaikh of Kuwait, who, like the townsmen of Qasim and even the Turks themselves, did not wish a complete and permanent supremacy to be established in Najd by the ruler of either Riyadh or Hail, seemed inclined to transfer his support from the Wahhabi to the Shammār Amir, whose cause had become undeniably weak. Shaikh Mubarak had previously alleged the government of Ibn-Sa'ud to be wanting in system and organisation, and he now criticised the character of Ibn-Sa'ud himself as being both "too quick to anger and too easily appeased;" it is possible, however, that this remark was intended to apply not to the actual ruler, 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Faisal, but to his son 'Abdul-'Aziz, who was now frequently spoken of as "Ibn-Sa'ud", perhaps on account of his greater activity and conspicuousness.

In Southern Najd the town of Majma' in Sadair continued to defy, in some sort, the authority of the Wahhābi Amīr, agreeing to pay to him the tribute which it had formerly rendered to the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, but refusing to consent to any enhancement of the same, or to enter into close relations with him. It was at length ascertained beyond doubt that Sālih-bin-Hasan, the deported Amīr of Buraidah, was alive in confinement at Riyādh; and his brothers Sulaimān and 'Abdur Rahmān were reported to have joined Ibn-Rashīd.

Miscellaneous political matters, 1907.

Relations of the British Government with Central Arabia, 1900-07.

In consequence of its physical inaccessibility and economic unimportance, Central Arabia has generally lain—as will be apparent from what has preceded—almost beyond the purview of the British and Indian Governments; but, after the revival of the Wahhābi power in Najd in 1900, the situation was modified in this respect by the alliance between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn-Sa'ūd and the espousal of the cause of Ibn-Rashīd by the Turks.

At the beginning of 1901 the Government of India contemplated the despatch of Muhammadan agents to obtain reliable information regarding the political and religious conditions prevailing in Central Arabia, the obscurity of which was a cause of hesitation in policy; but execution of the scheme was deferred on account of the disturbed condition of the interior at the time.

Deputation of Muhammadan agents to Najd contemplated by the Government of India, 1901.

When Ibn-Sa'ūd, in May 1902, started from Kuwait to reoccupy his ancestral capital, he addressed a letter to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in which he begged that he might be regarded "as one having relations with the British Government" and that "the eyes of the benevolent British Government might be fixed on him," and intimated that at Kuwait he had declined overtures from a Russian official because he preferred that his relations should be with Great Britain. The action of the Resident in not replying to this letter was approved by the Government of India, and he was instructed that no encouragement should be given to Ibn-Sa'ūd, because the policy of the British Government was to abstain from connection with the affairs of Najd, especially while they remained in an unsettled state.

First overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd to the British Government, 1902.

In 1904, when the Porte were about to despatch a military force to the aid of Ibn-Rashīd in Najd, the British Government found that they

Action of the British Government with

reference to
the Turkish
expedition to
Najd and
request for
their protec-
tion by Ibn-
Sa'ūd, 1904.

could not remain indifferent, for they were deeply interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* at Kuwait, and they feared that it might be imperilled if the help given to Ibn-Rashīd should oblige Shaikh Mubārak to take the field once more on behalf of his friend Ibn-Sa'ūd. Accordingly, in February 1904, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to claim fulfilment of a pledge given by the Turkish Government in October 1901, that they would restrain the Amīr of Jabal Shammar provided the British Government restrained the Shaikh of Kuwait; and again, on news being received that Turkish troops had been ordered to proceed from Madinah to Qasim, a remonstrance on the subject was addressed to the Porte; but the British Ambassador felt that the aggressiveness of the Wahhābis weakened his arguments, and he doubted whether the reconstitution of the Wahhābi empire in Najd would be in every respect an advantage. The Government of India, however, pointed out that the power of the Wahhābis was now territorial, not fanatical; that British prestige would suffer at Kuwait, if the Shaikh were restrained from assisting his ally; and that the absorption of Najd by the Turks might be a greater evil than a Wahhābi domination and might lead to encroachments on Kuwait from an unexpected direction in which the boundaries of the principality were undefined. Further remonstrances at Constantinople were authorised; but they were ineffectual, and the Turkish expedition marched. The only practical outcome of the discussion between the British and Indian Governments was the appointment, a month or two later, of a British Political Agent at Kuwait.

Ibn-Sa'ūd, alarmed at the prospect of Turkish intervention, had in the meantime written to the Resident in the Persian Gulf requesting British protection; but no answer was returned to his letter.

Contemplated
deputation
of a British
officer to
Riyādh,
1904.

At the beginning of 1904 the Government of India had been led to consider the advisability of despatching a British officer to Riyādh* for the purpose of studying the situation and possibly of entering into closer relations with Ibn-Sa'ūd, and enquiry showed that such a mission could easily be arranged through the Shaikh of Kuwait. His Majesty's Government, however, in the state of affairs then prevailing, regarded the proposal with some apprehension and directed that, without their previous sanction, no steps should be taken to enter into relations with Najd or to send agents there; and eventually the Government of India informed the Home Government that, while recognising that it might shortly become incumbent on them to take a closer interest in the affairs

* In 1903 it was intimated to the present writer, then on leave in Europe, that he would probably be selected in event of an officer being required to travel in Central Arabia, —a contingency at that time already under consideration.

of Central Arabia, they did not propose to move immediately in the matter. To this conclusion His Majesty's Government readily assented, but they admitted the desirability of obtaining further information about Najd, and they did not discountenance the idea of the subject being re-opened at some future and more favourable opportunity. Again, at the end of the year, His Majesty's Government expressed a desire that it should be clearly understood that their interest and influence were to be confined strictly to the coast line of Eastern Arabia, and that nothing should be said or done to connect them, even indirectly, with warfare in progress in the interior. Their prudent self-restraint the Turkish Government would have done well to imitate.

Hardly had the Turks put into execution their designs upon Qasim, when the proceedings of the Wahhābi Amīr himself in the direction of the Persian Gulf began to occasion anxiety to the British Government. The facts relating to his son 'Abdul 'Aziz's visit to Jāfūrah and Qatar in 1905 and to his correspondence with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān are given in an earlier paragraph of the present chapter and in the history of Trucial 'Omān; and as related in the latter place, Ibn-Sa'ūd through the Shaikh of Kuwait subsequently disclaimed all serious designs in the direction of 'Omān, and expressed regret for any accidental remark on his part which might have occasioned disquiet. Before the receipt of these satisfactory assurances, however, the Government of India had advised His Majesty's Government that, in their opinion, it was desirable to ascertain from Ibn-Sa'ūd—through the Shaikh of Kuwait, the Sultān of Masqat, or some other intermediary—whether he was prepared to abide by the engagement, given by his predecessor 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal in 1866,* not to molest British subjects in his own dominions and not to commit aggression on Arab states in alliance with the British Government; and they considered that, in event of the Amīr's reply proving unsatisfactory, he should be informed that the British Government would regard any attempt to interfere in 'Omān as an unfriendly act and would take suitable measures to frustrate it. Ultimately it was decided by His Majesty's Government that the steps proposed by the Government of India need not be taken unless the Wahhābi chief appeared at the coast for the purpose of carrying out the designs with which he was credited, and that, in the case supposed, the necessary warning should be conveyed to him directly.

Attitude of the British Government towards the designs of Ibn-Sa'ūd in the Persian Gulf, 1905-06.

Throughout the year 1906 persistent efforts to open negotiations for support by the British Government were made by the Wahhābi Amīr, or more probably by his son 'Abdul 'Aziz, through various intermediaries.

Renewed overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd to the British

* *Vide* page 1124 *ante*.

Government,
1908.

The subject was first broached to Captain Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, by Musā'ad-bin-Suwailim, an emissary of Ibn-Sa'ūd who arrived from Qatar and suggested that, in case the Amīr should succeed in driving the Turks out of Hasa, a treaty should be arranged between him and the British Government whereby the latter should undertake to protect the Amīr against subsequent attacks by the Turks from the sea, while they in return should be allowed to maintain a political officer in the oasis of Hasa or of Qatif. Captain Prideaux gave no encouragement to these suggestions; and the emissary at once left for Būshehr, where he avoided visiting the British Residency and instead despatched a long telegram from Jāsim, the Āl Thāni Shaikh in Qatar, to the Sultān of Turkey, recommending Ibn-Sa'ūd to the favour of His Ottoman Majesty. The next advance was made by Ibn-Sa'ūd through Shaikh Jāsim, who, at an interview in Qatar between himself and Major Cox, the British Resident, made proposals similar to those brought forward by Musā'ad in Bahrain, and suggested that the Amīr should have a meeting with a British officer at some place upon the Arabian coast. In August 1906 Shaikh Mubārak of Kuwait endeavoured to convince the Political Agent there, Captain Knox, of the desirability of Ibn-Sa'ūd being taken under British protection, especially in the interests of British trade. In October an urgent request for a personal interview was received from Shaikh Jāsim by Captain Prideaux in Bahrain; and that officer, being unable to go to Qatar himself, sent his interpreter, Mr. In'am-ul-Haqq. The explanation of the Shaikh's letter was that he had received a further communication from 'Abdul 'Azīz, who feared that his case had not been pressed with sufficient warmth by the Shaikh of Kuwait, and who now sought an interview with Captain Prideaux at a rendezvous in the desert, either in person or through a brother; and it appeared that 'Abdul 'Azīz, being determined to recover Hasa, the most valuable portion financially of the former Wahhābi dominions, was anxious to be assured of British protection by sea in event of his being successful; also that he would in return bind himself by agreements to the British Government, probably resembling those of the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, and would agree to the residence of a British political officer at his court. These proposals were at once reported by Captain Prideaux to higher authority. In November the subject was revived by the Shaikh of Kuwait. It will be observed that the advances of Ibn-Sa'ūd in 1906 were made before the withdrawal of the Turks from Qasīm, and that they were most urgent after the arrival there of Sāmi Pasha with his escort from Madinah.

In February 1907 the question of the answer to be returned by the Political Resident to the spokesmen of Ibn-Sa'ūd was formally referred by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government, and the latter, in the month of May following, directed that Major Cox should, if possible, avoid the subject; otherwise he should inform the Amir's agents that, as Ibn-Sa'ūd's proposals involved considerations which it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to entertain, no reply should be expected.

Orders of His Majesty's Government in regard to the overtures of Ibn-Sa'ūd, 1907.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—SEPARATE HISTORY OF THE JABAL SHAMMAR PRINCIPALITY OR NORTHERN NAJD.

The external history of Northern Najd is given in full in the preceding chapter; but it appears advisable to add here a supplementary notice, referring chiefly to the internal affairs of the principality.

Early history of Jabal Shammar.

Of events in Jabal Shammar before the rise of the present ruling family, the Āl Rashīd, very little is known. The Wahhābis probably overran the country towards the end of the 18th century, at an early stage of their victorious career in Central Arabia; for, by 1809 at latest, their power was so firmly established in the northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Āmir, that the Turkish Pasha of Damascus could not even collect a force for the purpose of dislodging them.

Relations with the Wahhābis, 1809.

In 1817 Ibrāhīm Pasha, while on his way to overthrow the Wahhābis at their capital, made an expedition from Hanakiyah against the tribes of Jabal Shammar. It was not, apparently, successful; and it resulted in heavy loss to the Arab tribes who fought upon the Egyptian side.

Relations with the Egyptians, 1817.

The predominant family in Jabal Shammar in those days were the Bait 'Ali, who belonged to the Ja'far subdivision of the 'Abdah division of the Shammar tribe and had their seat at Hāil. About the year 1818, when the power of the Wahhābis was temporarily broken by the Egyptians, a young Shaikh of the Ja'far subdivision, whose family formed part of the Khalil section, challenged the predominance of the Bait 'Ali; this was 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali-bin-Rashīd, the founder of the present dynasty of the Āl Rashīd. 'Abdullah succeeded in gaining to his side a majority of the citizens of Hāil; but the people of the neighbouring town of Qafār, at that time not inferior to Hāil in population and resources, unanimously supported his adversaries.

Rise of the Āl Rashīd.

'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, after a contest, was obliged to fly the country, and took the road by Jauf-al-'Āmir to Syria. Beyond Jauf his party

Adventures of Abdullah.

bin-'Ali,
1819-34.

were attacked by hostile 'Anizah, and he himself was severely wounded and left for dead; but a passing merchant took him up and carried him to Damascus, where he recovered. After this 'Abdullah sought service with the Wahhābis, and he apparently took a prominent part in their successful campaign, in 1830, against the Bani Khālid in Ḥasa. In 1834 he was still in Ḥasa, assisting Faisal, the son of the Wahhābi Amīr Turki, to repel the aggressions of the Shaikh of Bahrain upon that province; and, when the assassination of the Wahhābi ruler took place at Riyādh in the same year, he was one of those who helped Faisal to recover Riyādh and make good his claims to the Amirate. The usurper Mashāri himself fell, it is said, by the hand of 'Abdullah.

'ABDULLAH-BIN-'ALI,

1835-47.

Abdullah
bin-'Ali
appointed
Mahfūdh of
Jabal Sham-
mar by the
Wahhābi
Amīr, 1835.

The Wahhābi Amīr Faisal was no sooner established on the throne of his ancestors than he rewarded his late associate, 'Abdullah bin-'Ali, by conferring on him the governorship of Jabal Shammar together with the title of *Mahfūdh; and he commissioned him to subjugate the southern branches of the great 'Anizah tribe, supplying him at the same time with men and material resources. The first task of 'Abdullah, however, was to overcome the Bait 'Ali; but he soon drove them from Hail to Qafār, and from Qafār they were expelled by 'Abdullah's brother 'Obaid.

Conquest by
Abdullah of
Qasim,
Ḥāyat and
Jauf-al-
'Amīr.

Finally the Bait 'Ali took refuge in Qasim, of which district the inhabitants were their partisans, and 'Abdullah thereupon sought the further assistance of the Wahhābi Amīr, which he obtained on the condition that any new territory conquered should be added, not to his own governorship, but to the districts directly under Riyādh. With the assistance thus lent he devastated Qasim, taking its villages one by one, and almost exterminated his opponents of the Bait 'Ali; and finally, in accordance with the terms of his contract, he handed over the newly acquired district to the Wahhābi Amīr.† His commission against the 'Anizah 'Abdullah partially executed by depriving them of Ḥāyat, in the west, with its much prized springs of water; and by the instrumentality of his brother 'Obaid, whom he sent to compose dissensions in the distant northern oasis of Jauf-al-'Amīr, he succeeded in establishing a sort of suzerainty over that place also.

Internal pol-
icy of 'Abdul-
lah.

The domestic policy of 'Abdullah is represented as having been unpopular with the majority of his subjects. He established Wahhābism

* Or perhaps "Muhāsidh" which would appear to be more natural, though not so given in the principal authority. "Mahfūdh", which has been translated "Warden," can only have that meaning if it is a contraction of some longer title.

† Perhaps the foregoing, so far as it relates to aid lent by the Wahhābi Amīr, should be dismissed as unhistorical; it depends chiefly on traditions collected by Palgrave 25 years later, and it is inconsistent with the account given by Wallin, an earlier and more careful enquirer. 'Abdullah's services in Ḥasa and his share in the removal of Mashāri are, however, confirmed by Wallin.

as the state religion and encouraged Wāhhābi propagandists. He showed favour to the Bedouin tribes, and utilised them to break the strength of the towns and villages,—a process which, of necessity, was soon reversed under his sons. Towards the end of his reign he began to build a new quarter in Hāil town exclusively for the residence of himself and his relations with their dependents.

To the end of his days 'Abdullah appears to have remained a loyal and contented feudatory of the Wāhhābi Amīr Faisal, whom in 1843, after his return from Egypt, he assisted to recover his power in Najd; and no tribute seems to have been required of him by the Amīr except an annual gift of horses.

Relations of
'Abdullah
with the
Wāhhābis.

'Abdullah was probably unfriendly to the Egyptians; and the loss of an Egyptian detachment in the Nafūd Desert, where they perished of thirst,—probably one of the Egyptian garrisons withdrawn from Najd about 1840—was, if local tradition may be trusted, deliberately arranged by the Mahfūdh through his brother 'Obaid. It is believed that George Augustus Wallin, the able Swede who visited Hāil in 1845, and again in 1848 a year after 'Abdullah's death, was sent there by Muhammad 'Ali, Pāsha of Egypt, to investigate the rising power of Jabal Shammar or, possibly, with some more definite political aim.

Relations of
'Abdullah
with Egypt.

TALĀL-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1847-67.

'Abdullah left three sons, Talāl, Mat'ab and Muhammad, of whom the eldest, Talāl, was about 20 years of age. Talāl's succession was unopposed; he profited throughout his reign by the loyal support of his uncle 'Obaid and of his brother Mat'ab; and under him the boundaries of Jabal Shammar continued to extend. One of his first expeditions was against Khaibar and was conducted by the formidable 'Obaid, with whom Mat'ab was associated in the command to temper his severity; Khaibar fell and was placed under a governor sent from Hāil. About 1848 the people of Qasīm after secret negotiations, transferred their direct allegiance from Riyādh to Hāil, where Qasīmi refugees from Wāhhābi tyranny had become accustomed to find a refuge; and the Wāhhābi Amīr for a time acquiesced, though unwillingly, in the new arrangement. Operations against Taimah, directed by Talāl in person, were successful and enabled him to round off his western frontier. Finally, in 1855, he completed the work begun at Jauf-al-'Amir in his father's reign by proceeding thither in person, subduing the oasis, and placing it under a Shammar governor and three sub-governors of his own nomination.

Expansion of
Jabal Sham-
mar under
Talāl, 1847-
55.

The internal policy of Talāl was progressive and pacificatory. He relied on the settled population and addressed himself to the task of curbing the Bedouins, whom his father had unduly encouraged. Life and property, both on the roads and in the villages, were secure in his day. His chief pleasure was in the construction of palaces, markets, shops, streets and fortifications; he introduced foreign merchants—many of them Shi'ahs, for Talāl was not a strict Wāhhābi—from Basrah and Mashhad 'Ali, and even from Madinah and Yaman; and he tried, it is

Domestic
policy of
Talāl.

said, but without success, to induce Jews and Christians from the north to settle at Hail.

Relations of
Talāl with
the Wabhā-
bis, Turkey,
Egypt, and
Persia.

Notwithstanding the umbrage given by his protection of the refractory Qusmān and the scandal which his irreligious habits of wearing silk any smoking tobacco occasioned to rigorous Wabhābis, Talāl, who had married a daughter of his father's friend the Wabhābi Amīr Faisal, remained to the last on friendly terms with his suzerain at Riyādh; and he continued throughout his life to pay a yearly visit to Riyādh for the purpose of delivering his tribute of horses in person. At the same time, however, he professed allegiance to Turkey, caused the Sultan's name and titles to be proclaimed at Friday prayers in Hail, and pretended that all his conquests were made in the Ottoman interest and in this attitude, which was partly forced upon him by increasing contact with the Turks on north and west, an interesting premonition of the subsequent fate of his family may be discovered. While he declined to enter into the schemes of 'Abbās I of Egypt, who sought, by means of an alliance with the Bedouins of the north and an understanding with the Wabhābi government in the south, to render himself independent of the Porte and master of the Arabian peninsula, Talāl maintained friendly relations with that Pasha and even with his successor Sa'id; but he early discovered the inability of the latter to afford him the slightest protection against either Turkish or Wabhābi aggression. With Persia Talāl cultivated somewhat intimate relations, chiefly in the hope that one of his favourite projects might be realised,—the diversion, namely, of the Persian Hajj, with its incidental trade and foreign intercourse, from a route through Buraidah in Qasīm, which it then followed, to a route through Hail.

Death of
Talāl, 1867.

On his return from one of his annual visits to Riyādh, Talāl fell into ill-health, and, dreading the loss of his reason or having actually lost it, he committed suicide by shooting himself. This happened in 1867.

MAT'AB-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1867-71.

Death of
'Obaid, 1869.

Talāl was survived by his uncle 'Obaid and by his brothers Mat'ab and Muhammad, and he left also several sons of his own, of whom the eldest was Bandar, born about 1850. The succession fell to Mat'ab, whose short reign of about four years was remarkable chiefly for its tragic end, and for the death in 1869, at a very advanced age, of the veteran 'Obaid. 'Obaid was a true Wabhābi; but, notwithstanding this fact and a harsh, overbearing temper, he was extremely popular. His reputation for capacity and personal prowess also stood very high, and, according to one authority, he was the virtual ruler of the country after the death of his brother 'Abdullah. 'Obaid left six sons, well endowed with property in the shape of lands at Hail, date-palms at Jauf-al-A'mir and a title to half the produce of Hāyat; but the eldest suffered from the family weakness of insanity, and the others except Hamūd, of whom more hereafter, exhibited various abnormalities and defects

Mat'ab was a mild and intelligent man ; but his amiable character did not protect him from the ambition of his nephews Bandar and Badar, sons of Talāl, who assassinated him, probably in 1871. It was probably during the reign of Mat'ab that the Wāhhābi Amīr 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, having been expelled from power by his brother Sa'ūd, for the first time found a temporary asylum in Jabal Shammar.

Assassination
of Mat'ab,
1871.

BANDAR-BIN-TALĀL,

1871-72.

Bandar, after he had thus usurped the Amirship, took the young widow of his murdered uncle to wife ; and she bore him a son, 'Asar. To his subjects it seemed that the vengeance of Heaven followed him ; for cholera ravaged the country in his day, and power and life were his only for a short twelve months. Muhammad, the only surviving brother of the deceased Mat'ab, took refuge at Riyādh, and for a short while he lived there under the protection of Ibn-Sa'ūd ; but ultimately, by Wāhhābi mediation, he was enabled to return to Hāil and to resume his place there as manager of the Baghdad-Makkah pilgrim route under the orders of his nephew the Amīr. The inevitable collision between the two relations was not long delayed. In a quarrel outside the gates of Hāil, which seems to have been unpremeditated on the part of Muhammad, and in the presence of Badar and Hamūd, who had accompanied Bandar to the interview, the uncle stabbed the nephew dead. Badar fled ; Hamūd joined Muhammad, with whom there is reason to think he had from the first sympathised ; and the people of Hāil remained passive.

MUHAMMAD-BIN-'ABDULLAH,

1872-97.

General history of Jabal Shammar under Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, 1872-97.

In this manner the power passed to Muhammad, the third and last remaining son of 'Abdullah, the first Mahfūdh ; for fate had willed that until the elder generation of the family was exhausted the sway should not fall permanently to any younger member. The first act of Muhammad was one of sanguinary precaution. Except 'Asar, the infant son of Bandar, and Nāif, a son of Talāl, whose lives were unaccountably spared, all the male descendants of Talāl, including Badar who had been captured, were put to death along with their slave foster-brethren ; and others also from whom danger was apprehended by the new sovereign, among them, it is said, four sons of his own sister by one Jabbār, perished at his accession.

Accession of
Muhammad
and murder
of the sons
Talāl, etc.,
1872.

Reception of
the Wāhhābi
ex-Amīr,
1878.

In 1873 the Wāhhābi Amīr 'Abdullah-bin-Faisal, having been expelled by his brother Sa'ūd, again found an asylum in Shammar territory; but Muhammad, though he supplied his wants, would not allow him to approach Hāil. 'Abdullah married Nūrah, a favourite sister of Muhammad, and after her death a daughter of 'Obaid, thus connecting himself by a double affinity with the Al Rashīd.

Conquest of Southern Najd by the Shammar Amīr, 1877-91.

The history of the great contest for the supremacy in Najd which now occurred, resulting in the victory of Muhammad, is given at length in the preceding chapter; and here the facts need only be recapitulated in such a manner as to avoid a breach in the continuity of our narrative.

First en-
croachment
on the Wāh-
bābi domi-
nions, 1877-
84.

In 1877 Ibn-Rashīd forayed the 'Ataibah, a tribe regarded as subject to Riyādh. A little later he detached the district of Sadair and a part of Qasim from the Wāhhābi dominions; and his possession of these conquests was apparently confirmed by a short-lived peace arranged in 1882. In 1882 the Wāhhābis failed in an attempt to retake Sadair; and the recovery of Buraidah by the Wāhhābi commander Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd in 1885 was only temporary. From 1884 onwards the Shammar Amīr possessed a decided advantage in the field.

Complete
overthrow of
the Wāhhābi
power and
subjugation
of Qasim,
1891.

In 1887 Muhammad profited by family broils at Riyādh to seize the Wāhhābi capital, which he placed under a Shammar governor, and to carry off to Hail, where he detained him for two years, the Wāhhābi Amīr 'Abdullah. In 1888 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, the most active of the Wāhhābi family, was killed in Kharj along with two of his brothers. In 1890 Riyādh was taken by 'Abdur Rahmān, a younger brother of the late Wāhhābi Amīr, and Ibn-Rashīd attempted to recover the place by bombardment, but did not succeed. Towards the end of the same year a strong confederation against Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah was formed by the Wāhhābis, the people of Qasim, and a number of Bedouin tribes; but in March or April 1891, after successfully resisting him for a time, the league was overthrown by the Shammar Amīr at the memorable battle of Buraidah or Mulaidah. 'Anaizah, which had hitherto successfully resisted the attempts of Ibn-Rashīd to reduce it by siege and bombardment, then fell into the hands of the victor, and Riyādh was to a large extent destroyed; while the power of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah became absolute throughout Central Arabia and so continued until the end of his life.

Relations of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah with the Turks, 1872-97.

Attempt of In 1872, immediately after Muhammad's accession, his northern town
the Turks to of Jauf-al-'Amīr was surprised by a small Turkish force from Ma'an,

composed of Syrian and Moorish irregulars, and submitted without resistance. The Amīr hastened to the spot and entered into negotiations with the leader of the Turks, and it was finally arranged that Jauf should continue to be included in the Shammar territories, but that Ibn-Rashīd should pay 1,500 Majīdis a year as tribute on account of it to the Sultan and that a Turkish Qāim-Maqām and garrison should remain. In 1874 the Moors of the garrison mutinied, not having received their pay, and handed over the place to Ibn-Rashīd, who resumed possession in his own name and enrolled most of the Turkish deserters in his bodyguard. Jauf possessed a special interest for Muhammad, who had been wounded in the foot at its capture during the reign of his brother Talāl.

establish themselves at Jauf-al-Amir, 1872-74.

In 1880 the Amīr Muhammad invaded the Haurān country, penetrating as far as Basrah, only 70 miles from Damascus; the result was a reconciliation with the northern tribes, whom it had been his object to coerce; and the conclusion of peace was celebrated by a great feast.

Raid by the Amīr on the Syrian border, 1880.

Towards the end of his reign the relations of the Amīr Muhammad with his Turkish neighbours appear to have become more friendly and more direct: this may have been the result of attentions paid by the Turks, who no doubt were anxious to profit by the rapid expansion of Ibn-Rashīd's power in Central Arabia. In 1886, the way having been prepared by despatch of presents in the preceding year, an Ottoman mission visited Hail to arrange for the establishment of a Turkish Government mosque and school at Hail and were dismissed with gifts, but without a favourable answer. In 1888, when his successes in Southern Najd began to be considerable, the Shammar Amīr was careful to inform the Porte of his victories and to pretend that he was acting in the Turkish interest. In the same year reports were circulated that Ibn-Rashīd was about to invade Trucial 'Omān with the countenance of the Turkish Government; but they turned out to be premature if not baseless, and the existence of any such design was denied by the Porte.

Closer relations with the Turks and occasional friction on the Hasa border, 1885-97.

As noticed in the history of Hasa, some friction, arising out of tribal questions and raids, occurred in 1894 and 1895 between the Shammar Amīr and the Turkish authorities in Hasa.

Government, personality and death of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah.

In almost every year of his reign the Amīr Muhammad rode against some offending Bedouin tribe; and the 'Anizah, 'Ataibah and Mutair, in turn, felt the weight of his hand. In April 1885, in retaliation for injuries committed upon some of his subjects, Ibn-Rashīd actually raided and plundered a camp of the 'Ajmān so far distant from his capital and so near to the Persian Gulf as 'Awainah in Wādi-al-Miyāh; but on this occasion the 'Ajmān were successful, by a pursuit of his party, in recovering some of their horses that had been carried off. Allusion has just been made above to the Amīr's difficulties in 1894 and 1895 with Arab tribes on the borders of Hasa.

Repression of the Bedouins by the Amīr Muhammad.

Character and
appearance of
the Amir Mu-
hammad.

The career of Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah seems in itself to prove that he was a man of more than average energy and ability; but he owed much to the constancy and force of character of his cousin Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, and the personality of the latter seems to have made a deeper impression on most European visitors to Hail than that of the Amir himself. It was during the reign of Muhammad that Northern Najd was visited by Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt, by the Frenchman Mr. C. Huber, and by Mr. C. M. Doughty, of whom the last was without doubt at once the greatest, the most exact, and the most sympathetic of all Central Arabian explorers.

Muhammad was barely of the middle height, but in build he was strong and thick-set. His beard was of the shape known as Spanish.

His personal
history and
death in
1897.

The Amir Muhammad was many times married. Some of his matrimonial alliances were dictated by political considerations, as for instance that which he contracted with the ruling family of Buraidah by marrying a sister of Hasan-bin-Mahanna, but his principal object was undoubtedly to found a family. In this, however, he was disappointed, and he died childless in 1897,—a fate which popular superstition did not fail to connect with his cruel butchery of the sons of Talāl.

'ABDUL 'AZİZ-BIN-MAT'AB, 1897-1906.

Position of 'Abdul 'Aziz at the beginning of his reign.

The favourite of the late Amir among his younger relations had been 'Abdul 'Aziz, the only son of his murdered brother Mat'ab; and 'Abdul 'Aziz it was who now succeeded to the Amirship. Nothing is known regarding the behaviour of Hamūd and his sons on this occasion; and 'Asar, the son of Bandar, was perhaps already dead. The situation of 'Abdul 'Aziz was difficult on account of the extent of the dominions which, relying on the small resources of Jabal Shammar only, he must hold and govern. At the outset he appears to have further weakened his position by oppressing his more distant subjects, of whose loyalty he was doubtful, by ignoring his father's influential cousin Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, and by making an enemy of Mubarak, Shaikh of Kuwait. The quarrel with Kuwait, which arose out of disputes about the allegiance of Bedouin tribes and was greatly embittered by encouragement subsequently given at Hail to some rebellious nephews of the Kuwait Shaikh, was especially detrimental to the interests of 'Abdul 'Aziz; for the remarkable personality and far-reaching influence of Shaikh Mubarak were of great service to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd, and the port of Kuwait was closed to Ibn-Rashid, who thus became dependent on his suspicious neighbours the Turks for his entire supply of arms and warlike stores. The results were the loss, within a few years, of all Southern Najd and Qasim, and the reduction of Ibn-Rashid himself to a state of complete dependence upon the Porte.

Gradual subversion of the power of the Shammar Amīr by the
Wahhābis, 1899-1906.

In 1899, not apparently without incitement on the part of the Turks, Ibn-Rashīd assumed a threatening attitude towards the Shaikh of Kuwait; and in the next year open warfare began between the Shammar Amīr and 'Abdur Rahmān, the head of the Wahhābi ruling family, who had for some time been harboured, and was now openly assisted, by the Shaikh of Kuwait. The course of the campaign has been fully related in the chapter on the history of Najd, and here it will suffice merely to mention the principal events. In August 1900 the Wahhābi chief left Kuwait for the interior and achieved some preliminary successes; and two or three months later a collision between Ibn-Rashīd and the Shaikh of Kuwait on the borders of 'Irāq was with difficulty averted by the Turks, whose assistance the former had invoked. Early in 1901 the Shaikh of Kuwait advanced into Qasīm, accompanied by 'Abdur Rahmān, Ibn-Sa'ūd, and the position of Ibn-Rashīd appeared somewhat critical; but on the 17th of March, at the battle of Sarif, the Shammar Amīr succeeded in inflicting a serious defeat on the invaders, by which their force was entirely broken up; on the side of the Shammar, however, Sālīm and Mahanna, sons of Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, were killed. In autumn of the same year Ibn-Rashīd took the offensive against Kuwait, making his headquarters at Hafar; and in September a panic was caused at Kuwait by the raids of his partisans in the surrounding district. From November 1901 to January 1902 acute anxiety prevailed in consequence of a movement by Ibn-Rashīd to Safwān not far from Basrah, where he remained in close correspondence with the Turkish officials, and an attack upon Kuwait was believed to be imminent. Dispositions were made, however, by the British naval authorities to assist the Shaikh in repelling any act of aggression; and in the end the Shammar Amīr returned quietly to his country *via* the wells of the Lainah. About the time that Ibn-Rashīd withdrew from Safwān, the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd recovered Riyādh and the districts of Kharj and Hariq for his father; and the Shammar Amīr then sought aid from the Wālī of Basrah and from the Grand Wazīr at Constantinople, enforcing his appeal by insinuations that the British Government were assisting his adversary. Qasīm generally had now become favourable to the Wahhābi cause; and in November 1902, having attempted an invasion of Southern Najd, Ibn-Rashīd sustained a serious reverse in Kharj by which, apparently, the whole of that province except Sadair, Washam and Wādī-as-Sirr was lost to him. At the beginning of 1903 the Shammar Amīr still held Zilfi in Sadair; but by the end of the year that town, too, had been regained by the Wahhābis; and in February 1904, on the defeat of a Shammar force in Wādī-as-Sirr, Southern Najd in its entirety reverted to Ibn-Sa'ūd.

The Wahhābis immediately followed up their successes by advancing into Qasīm; and on the 22nd of March 1904 a decisive battle was fought under the walls of 'Anaizah in which Mājīd-bin-Hamūd, the

Invasion of
Qasīm by the
Shaikh of
Kuwait and
reconquest of
Southern
Najd by the
Wahhābis,
1900-03.

Recovery of
Qasīm by the
Wahhābis,
1904.

commander of the northern forces, was defeated with loss, and his brother 'Obaid killed. By this unsuccessful action the whole of Qasim was lost to Ibn-Rashid.

Defeat of the
Turks and
Ibn-Rashid
in Qasim,
1904.

The Turks then sent troops from 'Iraq to assist Ibn-Rashid to recover his position in Qasim; but the allied forces were defeated in two disastrous engagements, the first at Bukairiyah on the 15th of July, and the second at Qasr Ibn-'Aqaiyl on the 27th of September. The remains of the Turkish expedition retired upon Kahafah.

Turkish occu-
pation of
Qasim and
domestic re-
bellion
against Ibn-
Rashid, 1905-
06.

In April 1905, in consequence of arrangements made by the Porte with Ibn-Sa'ud, a Turkish force, drawn partly from 'Iraq and partly from Hijaz, occupied Qasim without opposition; and the farce was enacted of placing Qasim under nominal Turkish administration. In June 1905, Sultan, son of Hamud-bin-'Obaid, went into rebellion against his relative, the Shammar Amir, and apparently obtained independent possession of Jauf-al-'Amir in the extreme north, not without the countenance of the inhabitants and of the surrounding tribes; he also complained to the Sultan of Turkey against Ibn-Rashid, but without result.

Death of the
Amir 'Abdul
'Aziz-bin-
Mat'ab, 11th
April 1906.

After a short respite the Wahhabis, emboldened by the obvious powerlessness of the Turkish garrisons in Qasim, prepared to resume their attacks on Ibn-Rashid; and the Shammar Amir hung on the borders of Qasim, probably with the double object of preventing a northward movement against Hail and of inflicting damage upon the enemy, if an opportunity should occur. In December 1905 Ibn-Rashid was at Kahafah; in March 1906 he was at Thamami in Batin; and on the 11th of April 1906 he was surprised and killed by the Wahhabis at Ruwaidhah, probably not more than 30 miles from the nearest Turkish post. Shortly before his death 'Abdul 'Aziz had invoked the good offices of the Shaikh of Kuwait, whom he had asked to look upon him as a son, and to arrange a peace on his behalf with Ibn-Sa'ud.

Personality of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab.

Partly in consequence of the enmity between him and the Shaikh of Kuwait, by which authentic information regarding Jabal Shammar affairs was prevented from reaching the British political authorities in the Persian Gulf, considerable doubt prevailed, and still prevails, as to the real character of 'Abdul 'Aziz. The impression at first formed of the Amir by our officials was that he was of a harsh and impetuous disposition, without prudence or judgment, and that his administration, especially in his outlying dependencies, was excessively severe and provocative of disloyalty; but the result of later enquiries was to modify this opinion, and to show that he was in the end the victim rather of ill-fortune than of his own folly. His courage and skill as a military leader, despite his want of success in the field, have never apparently been called in question.

Relations of 'Abdul 'Aziz-bin-Mat'ab with British Government,
1897-1906.

In May 1901, after the invasion of Qasim by the Shaikh of Kuwait and Ibn-Sa'ud, 'Abdul 'Aziz, disappointed at the dilatory and ineffectual action of the Turks on his behalf and strongly impressed with the advantages which the Shaikh of Kuwait had derived from British protection, made overtures on his own account to the British Government. The occasion was a message sent him by the British political authorities, suggesting that he should settle his differences with Shaikh Mubarak, to which the Amir replied by a letter written in a somewhat haughty strain; but simultaneously he caused his agent at Basrah to inform Mr. Wratislaw, the British Consul there, that the written communication was a mere blind, and that he really desired to cultivate good relations with the British Government. He suggested that the British Government should undertake to supply him, at his own cost, with arms and ammunition, and that they should depose his enemy, the actual Shaikh of Kuwait, in favour of a nephew: the Amir on his part, would undertake not to interfere in Kuwait affairs, and would guarantee the safe construction by British enterprise of railways across Arabia.

Overtures
from the
Shammar
Amir to the
British Gov-
ernment,
1901.

The Government of India, while they considered that the Amir's requests were such as could not be granted, were anxious not to alienate his sympathy. They therefore proposed that a British officer should be sent from the side of 'Aqabah to interview the Amir and to ascertain more particularly his views and the nature of his personality, and they thought it might even be advisable that the British Government should undertake to restrain the Shaikh of Kuwait in future from hostilities against the Amir and to use their good offices to prevent Turkish aggressions on Najd; but His Majesty's Government, fearing that a mission might give rise to complications with Turkey and that anything in the nature of a protectorate might involve obligations which could not be discharged without resort to material force, withheld their approval. Accordingly no action was taken; and a few months later, as we have seen, the Shammar Amir fell more completely than before into the hands of the Turks and even joined with them in threatening an attack on Kuwait, after which no further communications passed between the Amir 'Abdul 'Aziz and the British Government.

Orders of His
Majesty's
Government
on the same
and result.

MAT'AB-BIN-'ABDUL 'AZIZ.

1906-07.

'Abdul 'Aziz was succeeded by his eldest son Mat'ab, a youth about 18 years of age, whose straightforwardness and generosity, aided by

Position of
Mat'ab at his

accession,
April 1903.

the remission of a year's taxes and the restoration of various personal allowances that had been reduced or abolished by his father, produced an immediate and favourable impression upon his subjects. The principality of Jabal Shammar was now, however, so impoverished that the young Amir could no longer find the annual tribute of 80 horses which his predecessors had been accustomed to pay to the Sultān of Turkey.

Relations
with Ibn-
Sa'ūd and the
Shaikh of
Kuwait.

After the death of 'Abdul 'Azīz the Wāhhābis continued to press their advantage against his successor, and in June 1906 the son of Ibn-Sa'ūd appeared at the very gates of Hāil demanding tribute, but he could not take the capital, and he was soon obliged by scarcity of supplies to withdraw from its vicinity. The Shaikh of Kuwait, who had apparently consented to negotiate with the Wāhhābi ruler on behalf of the late 'Abdul 'Azīz, agreed at the urgent request of the new Shammar Amīr, of his elderly relation Hamūd and of others of the family, to continue his efforts; and at length in July 1906, after discussions between the principals or their agents in Qasīm, a regular peace was arranged, apparently on the basis that each Amīr should keep what he then held.

Relations
with the
Porte.

The Turks showed much sympathy with the Amīr Mat'ab when he came to power, but their own position in Qasīm was so weak that they could afford him no real assistance; and the Sultān accordingly confined himself to condoling with the young chief on his father's death, to recognising him as his father's successor, and to promising the punishment of his father's murderers and the continuance to himself of his father's subsidy. In September 1906 Talib Pasha, an aide-de-camp of the Sultān, arrived at Hāil with a Turkish decoration for the Amīr; but in November 1906 the Turkish garrison, except a score or two of men, was withdrawn from Qasīm, and Turkish influence in Najd virtually ceased to exist.

Murder of
Mat'ab-bin-
Abdul 'Azīz,
January
1907.

In the first week of January 1907 a fresh crime was added to the blood-stained annals of the Al Rashīd. Sultān-bin-Hamūd, who had withdrawn to Jauf in 1905 and had subsequently returned to Hāil, induced the Amīr Mat'ab to join him on a hunting expedition in the country, in the course of which he treacherously shot him dead with his own hand; and simultaneously Sultān's brothers, Sa'ūd and Faisal and his cousin, Dhāri killed Mash'al and Muhammad, the brothers of the Amīr, and Talāl, the son of the Amīr's cousin Nāif. On their return to camp the murderers gave out that Talāl had killed the sons of 'Abdul 'Azīz and that they had taken immediate vengeance on him, but their story obtained no credence. An infant son of Talāl-bin-Nāif was also put to death. By these crimes not a single male descendant of 'Abdullah-bin-'Alī, the first Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar, was left alive except an infant son of 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Mat'ab, whom his mother had apparently taken with her on a pilgrimage to Madīnah. The females of 'Abdullah's branch were next expelled, or themselves voluntarily emigrated, to Madīnah, whither Hamūd-bin-'Obaid, the senior member of the Āl Rashīd family also betook himself, arriving there on the 7th of April. Hamūd had lived in retirement at Hāil during the lifetime of 'Abdul 'Azīz, of whose policy he did not approve, and who did not seek his advice; but one of his daughters had married 'Abdul 'Azīz and was the mother of the Amīr Mat'ab and his brothers; and it seemed that the old man's heart was broken by the murder of his grandsons by his sons.

SULTAN-BIN-HAMŪD, SINCE 1907.

The attitude of Sultān after his accession was subservient towards Ibn-Sa'ūd, with whom he appeared anxious to establish good relations; but the Turkish Government apparently did not recognise Sultān, for the allowances paid by the Porte to his two predecessors were not continued in his favour. Sultān twice made overtures through the Shaikh of Kuwait to the British Government; but they were not acknowledged (1907).

Position of
Sultān after
his accession.

ANNEXURE NO 2.—SEPARATE HISTORY OF THE QASĪM DISTRICT.

Early History of Qasim.

The detailed narrative of affairs in Central Arabia given in the preceding chapter and Annexure leaves little besides internal affairs to be noticed in the present-separate history of Qasim.

Qasim appears to have been among the first acquisitions of the rising Wahhābi power at the end of the 18th century; but no details have been preserved of the manner in which it was occupied or incorporated with the Wahhābi dominions.

Qasim entered by the Egyptians, 1815, and the Egyptian occupation of Qasim, 1817-24.

The invasion of Qasim by Tūsūn Pāsha in 1815, resulting in a peace between the Egyptians and the Wahhābis, and the occupation of the district by the Egyptians between 1817 and 1824 are fully dealt with elsewhere. From the encouragement given to Tūsūn Pāsha by some of the leading men in Qasim it would seem that in 1815 a considerable proportion of the inhabitants were discontented with Wahhābi rule; but Hijailān, the most influential of the local chiefs, was devoted to the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd and would hold no communication with the Egyptians. The principal operations of Ibrāhīm Pāsha's campaign in Qasim were an unsuccessful siege of Rass, the capture of Khabrah and 'Anaizah, and the occupation of Buraidah without resistance. The bulk of the Egyptian troops seem to have been withdrawn from Qasim about 1819, the year in which Captain Sadleir passed through 'Anaizah and Rass

on a political mission from the Government of India to Ibrāhīm Pāsha; but some apparently remained until 1824, when the Wāhhābi Amīr Faisal-bin-Turki, at his accession, drove the last of the Egyptian garrisons from Najd.

Wāhhābi reconquest of Qasīm through the Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar, about 1835.

Nothing is known of the position of Qasīm during the years that immediately followed the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops; but it is probable that the district enjoyed practical independence. When 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, the first of the Āl-Rashid to rule Jabal Shammar, was placed over that province in 1835 by the Wāhhābi Amīr Faisal, his principal opponents, the Bait 'Ali, whose influence had hitherto predominated in the northern principality, were supported by the people of Qasīm; and the final result of the struggle was the subjugation of Qasīm by 'Abdullah-bin-'Ali, who handed it over to his master, the Wāhhābi Amīr. It was perhaps during this period that an ill-conducted expedition started from 'Anaizah to attack the Amīr of Hāil and received short shrift at the hand of his brother 'Obaid.

Egyptian occupation of Qasīm, 1837-1842.

The second occupation of Qasīm by the Egyptians is described, like the first, in another place; it began apparently in 1837, when the Egyptians sent troops into Najd to assist Khālid-bin-Sa'ūd, whom they had put forward as a claimant of the Wāhhābi Amirship in opposition to Faisal-bin-Turki. It was from Qasīm that Khālid, after he in his turn, had been ousted from power by 'Abdullah-bin-Thana'iyan, made an ineffectual effort to recover Southern Najd in 1842; and it was in Qasīm that the ex-Amīr Faisal, returning from his captivity in Egypt, commenced his victorious march on Riyādh in 1843. The exact date of the withdrawal of the last Egyptian military post from Qasīm cannot be fixed; but it must have been later than the spring of 1842, when a few Egyptian soldiers attached to the Amīr Khālid still remained in Hasa.

Period from 1842 to 1862.

During the first few years after the withdrawal of the Egyptians the people of Qasīm appear to have co-operated with the Wāhhābi authorities for the restoration of order in Najd, and to have furnished military

contingents and paid annual tribute with regularity to the Wahhābi Government.

In 1848, however, true to the instinct which invariably bade them counteract a rising power, the Qusmān, after secret negotiations, transferred their direct allegiance from Riyādh to Hail. The Wahhābi Amīr for a time acquiesced in the change and accepted the explanations of his vassal at Hail; but before long he began to put in force against the people of Qasīm the levelling and incorporating policy which they themselves had assisted him to apply to Southern Najd. Buraidah, smaller and less important than 'Anaizah, was the first place singled out for reduction; and, its commerce having been cut off, the town quickly became desirous of peace. Thereupon the Wahhābi Amīr invited some members of the leading family, the Bani 'Alaiyān, to Riyādh to discuss terms; but on their arrival he caused them to be massacred and instantly despatched his son 'Abdullah with an army to Qasīm. Paralysed by the suddenness of these occurrences Buraidah submitted; and Mahanna, a rigid Wahhābi and a native of Riyādh, was installed there as governor.

Rebellion of Qasīm against the Wahhābis 1848, and its subjugation.

The exact date of these events and of the annexation of 'Anaizah, which in 1852 was governed by Jalui, a brother of the Wahhābi Amīr, cannot be determined; but it was in 1853 that the people of 'Anaizah, finding the Wahhābi yoke intolerable, rose under Yahya, whose son 'Abdullah was Shaikh at the time, and quietly and without bloodshed removed Jalui to Buraidah. The Wahhābi Amīr Faisal at once marched from Riyādh against 'Anaizah and was joined before the walls by his Mahfūdh of Jabal Shammar; but their united forces could make no impression on the stubborn town, which was partially self-supporting on account of the fields and date-plantations enclosed within the outer walls. According to one account the Wahhābis were at last induced to raise the siege by the Sharif of Makkah, who, from the point of view of his own interests, regarded the independence of 'Anaizah as a valuable check upon the Wahhābis, and whose mediation the Shaikh of 'Anaizah had sought.

Successful revolt of 'Anaizah against the Wahhābis, 1853.

For some years after the failure of this expedition, the Wahhābis occupied themselves with crushing the Harb and 'Ataibah Bedouins, who were partisans of 'Anaizah, and with extending the dependencies of Buraidah, their headquarters in Qasīm, in such a way as to isolate and harass 'Anaizah. Mahanna, the Wahhābi governor of Buraidah, was an oppressive and extortionate ruffian who did his best to break the spirit of the Qusmān under his rule by sending them on frequent military expeditions in the interest of the Wahhābis; in 1856 he fleeced a Persian pilgrim caravan so effectually that for two years the Persian Hajj across Arabia ceased altogether; and it was probably some characteristic act of his which occasioned the flight from Buraidah of a certain 'Abdullah-al-'Aziz, a member of the former ruling family. The fugitive was kindly received by the people of 'Anaizah, but soon afterwards he was murdered by Wahhābis in the desert.

Wahhābi administration in Qasīm, 1853-62.

Open hostilities which were now declared by Ibn-Sa'ūd against 'Anaizah may have been a consequence of this incident, for the people of 'Anaizah considered themselves at feud with the Wahhābi Amīr on account of the murder of their guest; but it has also been stated that the war was provoked by the refusal of the Shaikh of 'Anaizah to

Unsuccessful attempt of the Wahhābis to reduce 'Anaizah, 1862.

appear in person before the Wāhhābi Amīr and answer for tribute which was claimed of him. 'Anaizah was at this time ruled by Zāmil, who had seen fighting in his youth as leader of the 'Anaizah contingent in a Wāhhābi expedition against 'Omān, and whose name was honourably distinguished in the later history of Qasīm; he had succeeded his cousin 'Abdullah, who was Shaikh in 1853, but his father also had once held the Shaikhship. The Wāhhābis began their operations against 'Anaizah with a loose blockade organised by Mahanna from the neighbouring town of Buraidah, to which the people of 'Anaizah retorted vigorously by laying waste the lands and gardens of Buraidah. All Qasīm secretly sympathised with the 'Anaizans, and even Buraidah itself, between which town and 'Anaizah enmity usually prevailed, was on the verge of rising against the Wāhhābis. Ibn-Rashīd and the Sharif of Makkah would willingly have intervened, but they dreaded a personal rupture with Ibn-Sa'ūd; and 'Anaizah was left to stand alone.*

By degrees a large force was collected before 'Anaizah under a near relation of the Wāhhābi Amīr who brought with him Bedouin contingents from distant Hasa and still more distant 'Omān; Talāl, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, with his uncle 'Obaid joined the Wāhhābi camp; and Mahanna, governor of Buraidah, and the Wāhhābis of Qasīm were already present. A regular siege of 'Anaizah was then undertaken, but the Wāhhābi artillery produced no effect on the walls and the operations soon flagged, for the Qasīm levy at heart desired their failure and the Bedouins brought from a distance felt no interest in their success. On one occasion a part of the besieging force was routed by a sally of the besieged, a Wāhhābi standard was taken, and Zāmil, no less humane than courageous, was already exerting himself to prevent a massacre of the fugitives, when of a sudden a rain-storm broke and the matches of the 'Anaizah musketeers were extinguished: in a moment the mounted Wāhhābis had ridden them down and the half-won victory of the defenders of 'Anaizah was converted into the most serious defeat that they suffered during the whole siege. After this only two petty skirmishes took place, and finally the Wāhhābis retired leaving 'Anaizah as they found it, a free town.

Period from 1862 to 1891.

Qasīm
independent
and at rest
from war,
1862-80.

During the next 30 years Qasīm appears to have enjoyed immunity from disturbances, except those of a petty character resulting from raids by Bedouins upon Bedouins, and from punitive expeditions by the settled population against nomad breakers of the peace. In 1878 a notable defeat was inflicted on the Qahtān near the wells of Dukhnah by the Mutair, with whom they were at feud, assisted by the townsmen of 'Anaizah. By 1880 Buraidah had become a practically independent town

* At this juncture Palgrave, whose supposed mission from the Emperor of the French to the Wāhhābi Amīr is noticed in the history of Najd, passed through Qasīm on his way from Hail to Riyadh.

and no longer paid any deference to the Wahhābi ruler; but it showed considerable respect for the Amīr of Jabal Shammar, whose power was now increasing from day to day. This was the time of the wanderings in Qasim of the enterprising French cartographer Mr. C. Huber and of his greater contemporary, the private English traveller Mr. C. M. Doughty, whose name stands with that of Niebuhr above those of all other workers in the Arabian field.

A little after this Ibn-Rashīd possessed himself of Buraidah and its dependencies; but he was at first no more successful than the Wahhābis had been in his efforts to subjugate 'Anaizah. In 1885 Muhammad-bin-Sa'ūd, a Wahhābi commander, defeated the Shammar Amīr in Qasim and temporarily recovered Buraidah; this was, for the time the last decided success gained by the Wahhābis in Qasim. In 1890 a combination to resist the progress of Ibn-Rashīd was formed, embracing the whole of Qasim and Southern Najd besides the Bedouin tribes of the 'Ataibah and Mutair; but it was disastrously defeated, at the battle of Buraidah or Mulaidah, which was fought in March or April 1891. The veteran Zāmil of 'Anaizah, who seems to have been the leading spirit among the confederates, was himself among the slain; with him fell his second son 'Ali and his relatives Khālīd-bin-'Abdullah and 'Abdul 'Azīz-bin-Ibrāhīm; and a number of the ruling Salaimi family of Buraidah were carried into captivity at Hail.

Qasim con-
quered by
Ibn-Rashīd,
1880-91.

Qasim a district of Jabal Shammar, 1891-1904.

The Shammar Amīr at once placed Qasim under a governor of his own, and for ten years the political position of the district remained unchanged. In 1901 the invasion of Qasim by the Shaikh of Kuwait, acting in the Wahhābi interest, encouraged the Qusmān to hope for release from Shammar tyranny; but their expectations were disappointed by the defeat of the invaders at the battle of Sarif, and many of them suffered severely for having ventured to show premature sympathy with the cause of Ibn-Sa'ūd. Among those killed in the battle were Sālih-bin-'Ali, Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah, Muhammad-bin-Hasan, Sālih-bin-'Abdullah, 'Ali-bin-'Abdullah, and Muhammad-bin-Ibrāhīm, all belonging to the ruling Abul Khail family of Buraidah; and several other members of that family were either deported by Ibn-Rashīd to Hail or obliged to seek safety in exile. At length, in March 1904, the whole of Qasim was lost to Ibn-Rashīd in consequence of an encounter, near 'Anaizah, between his troops and those of the Wahhābis.

Turkish invasion of Qasim, 1904, and Turkish occupation of the district, 1905-06.

The subsequent course of events in Qasim is so fully described in the preceding chapter on the history of Najd that nothing can be added here.

In 1904 the **Turks**, in alliance with Ibn-Rashīd, invaded **Qasīm**; but they suffered two serious defeats at the hands of the **Qusmān** and **Ibn-Sa'ūd** and were obliged to retire to the village of **Kaháfah** in **Jabal Shammar**. In April 1905, under arrangements made with Ibn-Sa'ūd, they achieved a pacific occupation of **Qasīm** which continued until November 1906; but it was never effective, and they were unable to prevent the **Wahhābis** from attacking and killing their ally Ibn-Rashīd on the borders of the district, or to obtain any satisfaction from Ibn-Sa'ūd for the kidnapping by his son of **Sālih-bin-Hasan**, **Amīr** of **Buraidah**, whom they had appointed to be **Qāim-Maqām**. In 1907 the Turkish troops remaining in **Qasīm** numbered less than 50 men. After the death of Ibn-Rashīd a number of political prisoners belonging to the ruling families of **'Anaizah** and **Buraidah**, taken after the battles of **Buraidah** (1891) and **Sarīf** (1901), were released; and others who had been living abroad began to return home from exile.

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF TURKISH 'IRĀQ.

In 1600, the year from which we begin our survey of the modern history of Turkish 'Irāq, Muhammad III was Sultān of Turkey ; and war prevailed, as related in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, between him and Shah 'Abbās I, the Safavi monarch of Persia. In 1600 a considerable part of north-western Persia, conquered by the Turks some years previously, was still subject to the Porte and formed a Pashāliq of Tabrīz, which was reckoned the third in the Ottoman Empire as being next in dignity after those of Cairo and Baghdād ; but in 1603, that is shortly before the death of Muhammad III, Tabrīz was recovered by the Persians, and the Turks were partially expelled from Persia.

AHMAD I, 1603—17.*

Muhammad III died on the 22nd of December 1603 and was succeeded in the Sultanate by Ahmad I, the elder of his two surviving sons.

* The special authorities for the history of Turkish 'Irāq from 1600 to 1773 are an anonymous official *Précis of Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1905; besides which the *Voyage en Arabie*, 1776 of Niebuhr, who travelled in the country in 1765-1766, contains a large amount of relevant information. Facts relating to particular periods will also be found in the following works: *Travels of Pedro Teixeira*, 1902, relating to 1604; *Travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle*, 1665, relating to 1625; *Collections of Travels through Turkey into Persia and the East Indies*, 1684, by J. B. Tavernier, whose journey in Turkish 'Irāq was made in 1652; and a *New Account of the East Indies*, 1739, by Captain A. Hamilton, whose acquaintance with the country seems to have extended from 1688 to 1723. Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, may be consulted for general Turkish affairs during the period, and Sir J. Malcolm's *History of Persia*, 1815, in regard to Turko-Persian relations.

Relations with Persia, 1603—17.

The war with Persia continued, under the new sovereign, to the increasing disadvantage of Turkey. In 1604 'Ali Vardi Khān, a Persian general, advanced into the neighbourhood of Baghdād; but after a series of skirmishes, in which he captured about 300 prisoners, he suddenly and somewhat unaccountably withdrew. In 1605 a Persian force began an investment of Baghdād, but it was recalled by the Shāh, who had now resolved to crush the Ottomans in the field and who, by dint of immense preparations, was afterwards completely successful in so doing. The war, however, was carried on, without any very notable incident, during the whole reign of Ahmad I. About 1614 a fleet of 100 "frigates" and galleys was said to be maintained by the Persians at Rīshehr, in order to prevent communication between the Turkish port of Basrah and the Portuguese port of Hormūz, both of which the Persians regarded as hostile.

Internal history, 1603—17.

The Portuguese traveller Pedro Teixeira, who visited 'Irāq in 1604, has left an interesting description of the province as it was in that year; and his account is specially instructive in regard to the indirect results, in the country, of the disastrous war which the Turks were then waging in Persia.

Baghdād in
1604.

Baghdād, at this time the second government in the Turkish Empire and inferior in importance to Egypt only, was governed in 1604 by Yūsuf Pāsha, a Circassian eunuch, who had very recently been appointed to the Pashāliq. The power of this official was absolute in most matters, whether in peace or war; but, in dealing with merchants and foreigners, he had to reckon with an official protector of those classes who resided at Baghdād on the part of the Sultān of Turkey. As Baghdād had recently been threatened by the Persians, the extent of the military resources of the local government was one of the most important questions at the time of Teixeira's visit; and the traveller observed that the Pāsha had at command, in addition to a personal guard of 1,500 to 2,000 men, a force of 4,000 or 5,000 troops in Baghdād itself, of whom about 1,500

were Janissaries, and nearly 10,000 more in the vicinity. The wall enclosing the city on the side towards Persia was at this time of burnt brick; connected with it were many subsidiary works, including four strong bastions on which heavy bronze guns in good condition were mounted; and outside was a deep ditch. There was a mint at Baghdad in which gold, silver and copper coins were struck; and a school of archery and another of musketry were maintained by the government. Trade was carried on with India by way of the Tigris and Basrah, and with Aleppo across the desert; in ordinary times of peace there was also a direct trade with Persia.

Karbala and Najaf were ordinarily subject to Ottoman authority, Turkish garrisons were usually quartered in both those towns, and the nearest of the influential desert Shaikhs, Nāsir-bin-Mahanna, was accustomed to profess allegiance to the Porte; but in 1604, on account of the defeats lately sustained by the Turkish forces in Persia and of the withdrawal of the customary Turkish garrison, Karbala was in a state of revolt; and during Teixeira's stay there the horses, clothing and arms of some 30 or 40 Turkish soldiers, recently killed by Arabs of the place, were sold in the open market. Both at Karbala and at Najaf the Shīa'h prejudice against Jews and Christians was at this time very strong.

The Karbala-Najaf frontier in 1604.

The town of Basrah comprised in the same year about 10,000 houses, many large but of poor construction, and others merely reed huts. The fortifications were in ruins, but outside them ran a deep and wide ditch, filled with water from the creek. The town and its dependencies were governed by a Pāsha; the military garrison at headquarters amounted to 3,000 Turks, Kurds and Arabs; and a customs house existed, of which the receipts, after defraying all administrative expenses, yielded a large surplus. There was an arsenal containing some good artillery; but the armed vessels maintained by the Turks "for use in the river and thereabouts, to keep in order the rebellious Arabs, from whom they exact heavy tribute" were described as "few, of small scantling, and ill-built." The Shaikh of Arabistān, to whom Hawīzeh and Dōraq—the modern Fallāhiyeh—belonged, claimed Basrah, and in 1604 he was at war with the Turks; and the Ottoman authorities, to restrain amphibious Arab marauders, had built forts at numerous places on the bank of the river. Among these posts was one on the 'Arabistān side of the river opposite to Sarāji, three miles below Basrah, where was the anchorage for large vessels visiting the port. Dates were in those days, as now, the principal export of Basrah, and went to Baghdad, to various Persian ports and to Hormūz; trade generally was with Baghdad. Persia, Qatif, Hasa, Bahrain and Hormūz, all Indian goods being

Basrah in 1604.

received from the last named market, which was still in the possession of the Portuguese ; and some food-stuffs were imported from Dōraq in 'Arabistān and from Rīg and Rīshehr upon the Persian Coast.

English relations, 1603—17.

The East India Company had not, during this period, any establishments in Turkish 'Irāq ; but the despatch of Connock to Persia on their behalf in 1616, as related in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, led to the opening up of an English line of communication between Persia and Europe *via* Baghdād and Aleppo. In June 1617, Connock, who was then at Isfahān, requested the English Consul at Aleppo to arrange for a couple of trustworthy Arab messengers to convey his correspondence between Baghdād and that place ; the chief danger to be guarded against was, apparently, interception of the despatches by Portuguese emissaries at Baghdād. In August of the same year Connock transmitted by this route the news of his success in obtaining a Farmān for English trade from Shāh 'Abbās.

MUSTAFA I (FIRST REIGN) and 'OTHMĀN II, 1617—22.

On the death of the Sultān Ahmad I, on the 22nd of November 1617, his younger brother Mustafa was raised to the throne ; but, proving imbecile, he was deposed after a brief reign of three months. On the 26th of February 1618 the place of Mustafa was taken by 'Othmān II, a son of Ahmad I, whose age at the time was only 14 years ; and 'Othmān ruled until 1622, when he was murdered by Janissaries.

In the reign of 'Othmān II a peace was made with Persia, having for basis the surrender of all the Turkish conquests in Persia ; and during the period no event of importance occurred in 'Irāq. In 1619 the Court of the East India Company in London continued to receive news of Persian affairs through Aleppo.

MUSTAFA I (SECOND REIGN) and MURĀD IV, 1622—40.

On the death of 'Othmān II, Mustafa once more became Sultān of Turkey ; but insanity again necessitated his removal after the lapse

of about a year, and he was succeeded by Murād IV, a younger brother of 'Othmān II, whose age, at his accession on the 10th September 1623, was only 11 years. Murād occupied the throne until his death on the 9th of February 1640.

Relations with Persia, 1622--40.

The peace between Turkey and Persia was of short duration, for the Persians were not slow in turning to account the military superiority which at this period they indisputably possessed over the Turks, and they soon began to threaten Baghdād. Baghdād was in the possession of a local "tyrant," who had seized the government and was endeavouring to make himself independent of the Porte; but in 1623 his son, named Darwīsh Muhammad, betrayed the city into the hands of Shāh 'Abbās, who at once occupied it and put the usurping ruler publicly to death. Kirkūk, Mūsāl and 'Ānah were then taken and garrisoned by the Persians; but the invaders did not long retain possession of 'Ānah, whence their Qizilbāsh garrison was expelled soon after the return of Shāh 'Abbās to Persia by Mutlaq, surnamed Abu Rīsh, the greatest of all the Arab Shaikhs of the desert. Hillah, Karbala and Najaf appear to have come under the authority of the Shāh soon after the fall of Baghdād; and there were fears, though ill-founded, on the part of the Turks for the safety even of Aleppo. Imām Qulī Khān, governor of Shīrāz, whom the Shāh had ordered to join him in the operations against Baghdād, did not arrive until after the taking of the place; he had been delayed *en route* by difficulties with the Shaikh of Hawīzeh, who as a vassal of Persia should have accompanied his march.

Occupation
of Baghdād
by the Per-
sians, 1623.

After the fall of Hormūz in 1622 the Portuguese at first withdrew altogether from business in Persia and began to dispose of their goods chiefly at Basrah,—a system of trading which was highly disadvantageous to Persia, and one which the Shāh, on account of his naval weakness, could not hope to prevent except by capturing Basrah. He consequently required the Pāsha of Basrah, then Afrāsiyāb, a native of the country, to acknowledge the suzerainty of Persia by causing Persian coin to be struck, by substituting the name of the Shāh for that of the Sultān in public prayers, and by obliging the people of Basrah to wear their turbans in the Persian style; and he promised that, on these conditions, being fulfilled, the Pāsha and his heirs should be recognised as

Attacks by
the Persians
on Basrah or
its dependen-
cies, 1624-25.

the hereditary rulers of Basrah, should be exempted from payment of tribute, and should enjoy perfect independence in all local concerns.

1624.

This proposal the Pāsha of Basrah, relying on the naval aid of the Portuguese, whose interests in the matter were identical with his own, unhesitatingly rejected; and thereupon Shāh 'Abbās directed the Khān of Shirāz to proceed against him. A Persian army, descending into 'Arabistān by way of Shūshtar, attacked and very nearly captured Qubbān, which was then regarded as a dependency of Basrah; but Qubbān was saved by the efforts of the Portuguese, whose vessels, either from the Karūn river or from Khor Qanāqeh, bombarded the Persian camp; and the invaders retired. This attack on Qubbān took place in 1624. The Persian troops employed in it, as in most of the operations around Baghdād, were described as Qizilbāsh.

1625.

About the beginning of 1625 the Persians under Imām Qulī Khān made a fresh incursion into Basrah territory; but first they expelled from Hawīzeh the Shaikh of that place, who had neglected to comply with the Shāh's summons to Baghdād, and who now took refuge at Basrah with about 500 followers. In the meanwhile Afrāsiyāb had been succeeded in the Pashāliq of Basrah by his son 'Alī; and, as both Baghdād and Hillah, commanding the Tigris and the Euphrates respectively, were now held by the Persians, it was impossible for the Turks to send help to the new Pāsha. In March 1625, when the Italian traveller Pietro della Valle was at Basrah, panic prevailed, and the chief reliance of the Pāsha was on five Portuguese vessels, for the services of which the Portuguese received a liberal subsidy and which they kept anchored in the river to protect the town. On the 13th of March proclamation was made in the town that every house must send one armed man to the Pāsha's camp to be employed against the Persians, who were now said to be close at hand. On the 14th news was received that the Persian forces were in the neighbourhood of Qūrnah, their object being evidently to cross unopposed to the Arabian bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab; and the Pāsha set out with his whole land force and three of the Portuguese ships to encounter them. On the 16th of March the two armies were reported to be in contact; and on the same day Gonsalvo de Silveira, the Portuguese naval commander, sent his remaining two ships and a smaller vessel to intercept, if possible, seven pieces of artillery which the Persians, it was thought, were about to bring by sea to Dōraq for use against Basrah. On the 19th an eminent citizen of Basrah, Shaikh 'Abdus Salām, mustered a large body of armed men, with which he proposed to march to the assistance of the Pāsha; it included no less

than 200 Sabians, carrying arquebuses and other weapons like the rest, but unwarlike in their appearance. On the 23rd authentic intelligence reached Basrah that the Persians had hastily abandoned their camp and marched away towards their own country, leaving their supplies and even their cooked provisions behind, and the cause of the movement was conjectured to be an order of recall, for no loss had as yet been inflicted on them by the troops of the Pāsha of Basrah. On the 31st of March the two Portuguese ships despatched on the 16th returned to Basrah, having failed in their principal object. Three Persian Tarādahs, however, had been captured, all the Muhammadans on board of which, including children, the Portuguese according to their barbarous custom put to death, except one rich man whom they kept alive in hope of a large ransom. On the 7th of April, the Persians being now at a safe distance, the Pāsha re-entered Basrah in triumph with all his troops.

After these events matters remained *in statu quo* for a number of years. The Turks, it would appear, occasionally endeavoured, but without avail, to dislodge the Persians from Baghdād; two of their assaults were repulsed with success towards the end of the period by Safi Quli Khān, an Armenian by race, who then governed Baghdād in the name of the Shāh. In 1625 the influence of the Persians extended so far down the Euphrates as 'Arjah, a place on the left bank occupying approximately the position of the modern Nāsiriyyah; and the chief of 'Arjah, one Hasan Āgha, a refugee Kurd who had established a strong influence over the surrounding Arabs, was believed to be at heart devoted to the Persian interest, though openly he still professed obedience to the Porte.

Affairs from
1625 to 1638.

In 1638 the Turkish Sultān, Murād IV, who in 1635 had wrested Erivan from the Persians, marched in person with a large force to recover Baghdād; his host set forth from Scutari on the 8th of May; and on the 15th of November, after 110 days of actual marching interspersed with halts, it arrived before Baghdād. The city was found garrisoned by about 30,000 men, of whom 1,200 were trained musketeers. By the 22nd December 1638 the defences of Baghdād along a front of 800 yards had been so completely levelled with the ground that, in the words of an Ottoman Writer, "a blind man might have galloped over them with loose bridle without his horse stumbling." The attempts made by the Turks to storm the breach on that and the following day were repulsed, but on the 24th of December it was carried with the loss of Taiyār Muhammad Pāsha, the Sultān's Grand Vazīr, who was shot dead in leading the attack. Quarter was at first granted to the garrison; but later, whether treacherously

Recovery of
Baghdād by
the Turks,
1638.

or on account of some breach of conditions by the Persians, it was revoked, and over 20,000 of the defeated army were massacred. A few days later a general slaughter of the civil inhabitants of Baghdād took place under the orders of Murād, infuriated at the explosion of a powder magazine which had caused great loss among his troops. The Sultān remained in 'Irāq until February 1639, possibly visiting Najaf, where one of the * town gates is still called after him "Bāb Murād"; at his departure from Baghdād he is said to have passed through the Bāb-al-Tilism, which was then bricked up and has never since been opened. A strong Turkish garrison, commanded by a capable officer, was left at Baghdād; and from that time to the present the city has remained continuously under Turkish rule, but it has never again been visited by the Turkish sovereign.†

Peace with
Persia, 1639.

In 1639 a permanent peace was arranged between Turkey and Persia, the common frontier of the two empires being at the same ‡ time fixed in general terms by a Treaty drawn up after "much stormy discussion" between the Ottoman Prime Minister and a Persian Commissioner. The terms of this settlement, which was reaffirmed in 1746 and again in 1823, will call for notice hereafter.

Internal history, 1622—40.

The Pashāliq
of Basrah,
1622-40.

Probably about the beginning of the 17th century, the Pashāliq of Basrah came into the possession of Afrāsiyab Pāsha, already mentioned, a man of good position in the neighbourhood, who, according to one account, obtained the government by paying 40,000 piastres to Aiyud, the official nominee of the Porte. The Turks, having regard to the strength of Afrāsiyab's local influence, to the excellence of his administration, to his profes-

* Local tradition asserts that Murād, to show his respect for 'Ali, entered Najaf on foot, and that in passing through the gate in question his turban was thrown from his head by the jostling of the crowd. This story appears highly improbable, but it does not follow that Murād did not visit Najaf.

† The above account of the recovery of Baghdād is mainly from Professor Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, Volume 1, pages 408-11. Tavernier in his *Persian Travels*, Book II, Chapter VII, gives a different version of the affair, which, though obtained upon the spot and almost contemporaneous, seems improbable. Both accounts agree that over 20,000 of the garrison were massacred after having received quarter.

‡ The substance of the treaty of 1639 is given in Rawlinson's *Memorandum on the Turko-Persian Frontier*, 1844.

sion of loyalty to the Porte and, most of all perhaps, to the difficulty of expelling him by force, acquiesced ; and Basrah and its dependencies must, from this time until about 1669, be regarded as beyond their direct control. Afrāsiyāb treated foreigners in his dominions with consideration, and trade flourished under his rule ; he died apparently about the end of 1624 or the beginning of 1625 ; and he was succeeded by his son 'Ali Pāsha, who " had intruded into the Government by force before his Father expired."

One of the first tasks that devolved on 'Ali Pāsha was the defence of Basrah against the Persians when they threatened it in March 1625 ; and the news of his confirmation in the Pashāliq, accompanied by a robe of honour and a scimitar from the Sultān of Turkey, reached Basrah on the 13th of May 1625 during the sojourn there of the traveller Pietro della Valle. At some later period 'Ali Pāsha caused Qūrnah, formerly an open town, to be fortified.

In 1625 there was much unrest upon the western frontier of 'Irāq, due to the behaviour of Mutlaq, surnamed Abu Rīsh, and of Nāsir-bin-Mahanna, two principal Shaikhs of the desert who were at war with one another ; the former was the more powerful, being paramount chief of some very large tribe* in the north ; but the latter was the nearer to 'Irāq, and caravans ordinarily travelled from Basrah to Karbala and some distance beyond it under his protection, for which they paid a high price. At the taking of Baghdād by the Persians in 1623 Nāsir had declared for the Shāh, while Abu Rīsh continued to support the Turks ; but Nāsir soon broke with the Persians, and in June 1625 he attempted, after impressing into his service the members of a large caravan on its way from Basrah to Aleppo, to drive the Persians out of Karbala. The garrison, however, repelled his attack with loss. In the same month the traveller Pietro della Valle, while encamped at Qasr-al-Akhaidhir near Shifāthah, was subjected to extortion by Shaikh Abu Tālib, the son of Shaikh Nāsir, to whom his father, now old and retired from worldly affairs, had committed all executive functions in the tribe. A few marches further on Pietro della Valle entered the territories of Abu Rīsh, to whom also he was obliged to pay toll.

Affairs on
the Karbala-
Najaf fron-
tier, 1622—
40.

* The actual tribe to which either of these Shaikhs belonged cannot be determined. It may have been, in either case, the 'Anizab, the Bani Khālīd or the Northern Shammar. Probably both Shaikhs did not belong to the same tribe. From his geographical position 't seems not unlikely that Mutlaq was head of the 'Aniah.

English relations, 1622-40.

Beginning of
English trade
at Basrah,
1635.

English commercial relations with 'Irāq were first established during the period with which we are now dealing. Their institution seems to have been due to an idea that the East India Company's trade, which in Persia was then hampered by numerous obstacles, might find freer course under the Turkish flag. The first step, taken in 1635, consisted in the despatch by the Company to Basrah of a pinnace with a small "investment."

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1622—40.

The first Latin Bishop of Babylon, that is of Baghdād, was appointed in 1638 and was M. Bernard du Val, a French Carmelite.

IBRĀHĪM,

1640—48.

Murād, at his death on the 9th of February 1640, was succeeded by his brother Ibrāhīm, who ruled until August 1648 and was then murdered by Janissaries.

English relations, 1640—48.

Of the interna affairs of 'Irāq under the Sultanate of Ibrāhīm little is * known; but some facts relating to the affairs of the English East India Company have been preserved.

1640—48.

In 1640, under pressure of competition elsewhere by the Dutch and by Courten's Association, Messrs. Thurston and Pearce, two employés of the Company, were sent with an experimental cargo to Basrah. They

* The names and dates of the Pāshas of Baghdād during this period will be found in Niebuhr's *Voyage en Arabie*, Volume II, page 252.

arrived there on the 31st of May and obtained a license from the Pāsha to land their goods ; but the market had been recently glutted by the arrival of a Portuguese trading fleet from Masqat, and they only realised Rs. 30,000 by their sales. Political disturbances in 'Irāq in 1641 seem to have delayed further action ; but by 1643 an English Factory had come into existence at Basrah on a provisional footing, and the returns were so satisfactory that it was decided to make it permanent. Dutch competition had not as yet penetrated to Basrah ; and there it was found possible to exchange English luxuries, which were appreciated by the wealthier natives, for goods saleable in England.

In June 1645 the property of the East India Company at Bandar 'Abbās was temporarily transferred to Basrah during a crisis between the Persians and the Dutch, but the Dutch had now found their way into the Basrah market. In 1645-46 the representatives of the Company at Basrah were Thomas Cogan and William Weale. The trade of the English in 'Iraq was temporarily ruined in 1645 by the arrival of a Dutch fleet at Basrah ; and in 1647-48 the Company's business between India and Basrah continued unprofitable owing to the keen rivalry of the Dutch. 1645—48.

MUHAMMAD IV.

1648—87.

Ibrāhīm was followed in the Sultanate of Turkey by Muhammad IV, who reigned from 1648 to 1687.

Internal affairs, 1648—87.

Almost all that we know of the internal state of 'Irāq during the reign of Muhammad IV we owe to the traveller Tavernier, who visited Baghdad and journeyed down the Tigris to Basrah in the year 1642. Baghdad in 1652.

Tavernier found Baghdad under the government of a Pāsha ; and its importance was at this time still largely military. The city wall was of brick, and on the bastions were mounted about 60 guns, none of which, however, could throw a shot of more than five or six pounds weight ; the moat was wide and five or six fathoms deep ; and the citadel, mounting 150 guns, mostly without carriages, occupied the

same site as at the present day, near to the Mu'adhdam gate. The garrison as Baghdad amounted to about 5,000 men, including 300 Janissaries, some cavalry, and about 60 artillerists,—the last under the command of Signor Michael, a European who had taken part in the siege of 1638 on the side of the Turks. The trade of the city, though considerable, was less than it had been under the Persians; this was attributed to the slaughter by the Turks, at the capture of the place, of many of the richest merchants; and from Tavernier's remarks it may be inferred that Baghdād was in 1652 to a great extent depopulated. The majority of the inhabitants were Shi'āhs, but they were obliged to behave with civility towards Sunnis and the followers of other religions. On the Tigris below Baghdād taxes on buffaloes and other animals were collected by the Turkish officials as at the present time.

Basrah in
1652.

The ruler of Basrah in 1652 was Husain Pāsha, a son of 'Alī Pāsha and grandson of Afrāsiyāb Pāsha; this ruler, like his two predecessors, considered himself virtually independent of the Porte. Since his accession to power he had strengthened Qūrnah, of which his son was governor, with a second wall; his fort there was well provided with artillery, and at Qūrnah all vessels proceeding down the river were examined and supplied with passes showing the amount of customs duty to which they were liable and which they must pay at Basrah. At Basrah the police arrangements were admirable, and the port was frequented by many foreigners including the Dutch, who came annually bringing spices, the English, who dealt in pepper and to a less extent in cloves, and Indians who imported calico, indigo and miscellaneous goods; there were also many traders from other parts of the Turkish Empire. The principal source of the Pāsha's wealth was a tax upon date palms; but he also derived considerable profit from coining his own money; and customs duty was collected at Basrah at a rate nominally of five per cent., but in practice of four only. There were no longer any Portuguese friars at Basrah; but Carmelites, at this time Italians, still remained.

Events at
Basrah
after 1652.

The policy of Husain Pāsha was liberal, especially towards Christians, and brought him wealth; he extended the town wall of Basrah to the bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab and built a fortified residence in the suburb now known as Manāwi; and at last he so far presumed upon the prosperity of his affairs as to commit aggressions on the Baghdād Pashāliq and to annex some of its villages. He was successful in repelling a force which the Turks then despatched against him from Baghdād; but a young

relation, whom he sent to Constantinople to negotiate on his behalf, played him false and returned with troops and an authority from the Sultān to assume the Government of Basrah himself. A contest ensued of which the result was unfavourable to Husain Pāsha and obliged him to retire to Persia, and Basrah and its dependencies came under the power of his rival. This revolution, which seems to have had the effect of restoring direct Turkish control over Basrah and the surrounding districts, took place in or about the year 1669.*

English relations, 1648—87.

English relations with 'Irāq, during the period now under consideration, depended solely on the commercial connection of the East India Company with Basrah.

The experimental Factory established at Basrah about 1648, though it is not mentioned by Tavernier who visited the place in 1652, apparently continued to exist until 1657, in which year the Pāsha of Basrah, in consequence of a rumour propagated by the Merchant Adventurers that the East India Company was about to be dissolved, seized upon the premises and goods of the Company. A Mr. Bell had visited Basrah in that year with one of the Company's vessels, but he had only succeeded in obtaining freight to the amount of Rs. 900 for his return voyage.

East India Company's trade with Basrah, 1648—87. Seizure by the Pāsha of the Company's possessions at Basrah, 1657.

In April 1661 Messrs. George Cranmer and Robert Sainthill were sent from Sūrat to Basrah in the "Amerita" frigate with a cargo of Sūrat and other cloth, pepper, cassia lignum, rice, etc. They were instructed to remind the Pāsha of a promise given by him in the previous year that he would provide "a better house than that taken from the Hon'ble Company," and, if their representations on this point failed, they were to hire suitable premises on their own account. Freight goods were to be landed at once; but goods for sale were to be kept on board ship, with a view to avoiding payment of customs, until any doubts that might appear as to their profitable disposal had been removed. Mr. Sainthill was to return on the "Amerita," which was not to be detained beyond the 20th of September; but Mr. Cranmer was to remain until the amounts due for goods sold had been collected in full.

Voyage of Messrs. Cranmer and Sainthill to Basrah, 1661.

*A somewhat different and fuller account of Husain Pāsha's affairs is given by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, in his *Précis of the relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistān*, 1912, page 7.

Voyage of
Messrs.
Lambton and
Bromfield to
Basrah, 1662.

In 1662 the Presidency of Sūrāt ordered the ship "Seaflower" to be despatched to Basrah, with a cargo in charge of Messrs. Ralph Lambton and Henry Bromfield.

Voyage of
Mr. Adames
to Basrah,
1676.

In April 1676 the Sūrāt Presidency appointed Mr. James Adames to the second place on their establishment in Persia and sent him to the Gulf in the "Revenge," with orders first to deliver some freight goods shipped for Basrah and then to return to Bandar 'Abbās and assume his appointment.

The Capitula-
tions, 1661—
75.

The celebrated Capitulations* with Turkey, a set of articles defining generally the rights of English subjects in the Turkish Empire and restricting the customs duty exigible from the English to 3 per cent., were concluded by Heneage, Earl of Winchelsea, Ambassador Extraordinary from the King of England to the Porte, in 1661; and in 1675 they were amended and amplified through Sir John Finch, another English Ambassador.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1648—87.

In 1679 Louis XIV of France by a decree appointed the Superior of the Carmelites at Basrah to be, *ex-officio*, French Consul at that place, irrespective of his personal nationality.

SULAIMĀN II, AHMAD II, MUSTAFA II and AHMAD III, 1687—1730.

The reigns of the next four Sultāns of Turkey, *viz.*, Sulaimān II (1687—91), Ahmad II (1691—95), Mustafa II (1695—1703) and Ahmad III (1703—30), were not distinguished by any very remarkable events in the region of the Persian Gulf. The general course of Turco-Persian relations after the Afghān occupation of Persia in 1722 is described in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, from which it will be seen that the Turks obtained possession of a large part of north-western Persia and were at first inclined to enter on a partition of the country with the Russians and a representative of the late Safavi Persian dynasty, but that they afterwards came to an understanding with the Afghāns, and that they finally began to retire from Persia before Nādir Shāh.

* The text of the Capitulations, as finally confirmed (with alterations) by the Treaty of Peace concluded at the Dardanelles in 1809, will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*.

Internal affairs, 1687—1730.

The slightness of the English official relations with Basrah during the period and the general absence of accounts by private travellers leave us in almost complete ignorance of the state of 'Irāq between 1687 and 1730.*

During a series of years, ending in 1691, Basrah appears to have been occupied by the Persians; this occupation must apparently have begun during the period last described (1648—87), and it may have been a consequence of the retirement to Persia of Husain Pāsha, the rightful governor, on his expulsion from Basrah, as already related, by a younger relation. No facts concerning the Persian administration of Basrah are on record, but it is stated to have been favourable to trade. In 1691 the Persians withdrew from Basrah in consequence, it would seem, of a severe epidemic of plague; and thereafter the town remained in a politically derelict condition and partly deserted by the inhabitants until 1695, when the Ottoman Government resumed possession.

Persian occupation of Basrah, ending 1691.

In 1702, when a certain Hasan Pāsha was appointed for the second time governor of Baghdād, the province of 'Irāq and its dependencies was in a miserable state of disorganisation. The Janissaries were masters of the city of Baghdād, and the Arabs held the surrounding country; security of trade did not exist; and most of the local merchants had migrated to Isfahan. The neighbouring district of Kurdistan was ruled by an independent Pāsha of the first class; the governor of Mārdin was appointed direct from Constantinople; and even Basrah was a Pashāliq altogether separate from that of Baghdād. Hasan Pāsha, who must have been a man of strong character and who derived additional prestige from his ability to intervene with advantage to Turkey in the distracted affairs of Persia, succeeded in the course of his rule of 21 years in remedying these evils. In the Baghdād Pashāliq he broke the power of the Janissaries and the Arabs, re-establishing security of life and property; he obtained the addition of Mārdin to his own territories; and, by persistently creating difficulties for the Pāshas sent from Constantinople to take charge of Basrah, he in the end secured that government for his own son Ahmad. On his death, in 1723, he was succeeded by Ahmad, who so recommended himself to the Porte by his conduct in Persian

Administration of Baghdād and amalgamation of the Baghdād and Basrah governments, 1702—23.

* Hamilton (*vide* his *New Account*, Volume I, pages 75 to 88) appears to be the only contemporaneous authority having local knowledge. A list of the Pāshas of Baghdād is given, however, by Niebuhr in his *Voyage en Arabie*, Volume II, pages 352-3.

affairs that he was permitted to retain Baghdād, Basrah and Mārdīn as a single charge.

Maladminis-
tration at
Basrah about
1721.

It seems probable, from the maladministration which prevailed at the time of Captain Hamilton's acquaintance with Basrah, *viz.*, about 1721, that the place had then only recently come under the strong rule of Hasan Pāsha through his son Ahmad. Large Janissary forces were maintained at Qūrnah and at Basrah, the garrison of the former being much stronger than that of the latter place; and 8 or 10 armed galleys were maintained at Qūrnah, as against only 5 at Basrah. The officers of the galleys, under a "Captain Pāsha" or Commodore of their own, were at this time independent of the ordinary civil authorities; and in 1721, in a rebellion of the civil population against the governor of Basrah, by whose exactions they were being ruined, the Mufti of Basrah and the Turkish naval officers ranged themselves on the side of the rebels and formed a camp on the Shatt-al-'Arab, apparently at or near Manāwi; and eventually the civil governor, though no fighting took place, was obliged to come to terms with them and to put to death one of his own minions, a notorious blackmailer and extortioner. Official robbery was now the rule; the native merchants looked back with regret to the days of the Persian occupation; and even Europeans were not exempt from annoyance, for in 1721, Captain Hamilton himself was compelled by the Pāsha to part with a quantity of pepper, which he had brought for sale, at a price below that which had been offered him by merchants. Troubles between the Turks and the Arabs, due to the rigorous collection of taxes by the former, appear to have been not infrequent. Captain Hamilton gives minute details of a case in which a party of Janissaries, sent to exact revenue, were destroyed to the last man by the Arabs whom they had gone to coerce; he describes the affair as having occurred at Qubbān; but, from his account, 'Abbadān Island seems more likely to have been the scene of the tragedy.*

Muhammad
Pasha
appointed
to Basrah,
1727.

At the end of 1727 one Muhammad Pāsha was appointed, presumably by Ahmad Pāsha of Baghdād, to the Government of Basrah.

English relations, 1687—1730.

During the first part of the half century with which we are now concerned, the English trade with Basrah must have been carried on from

* Even this supposition is not free from difficulties, created perhaps by some change in the course of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Sûrat or Bandar 'Abbās, for the East India Company's records, though they contain numerous references to "Bassorah ships," do not mention any Basrah Factory. Captain Hamilton's dealings in pepper and the ill-treatment which he received at Basrah in 1721 have already been noticed above.

About 1723, or perhaps earlier, a permanent Factory was evidently established at Basrah. In April 1724, the President and Council at Bombay held a consultation on the state of the Company's affairs at Basrah, and it was remarked that "there is nothing yet done for "the advantage of our hon'ble employers, more than a promise obtained "from the Bashaw that we shall pay but three per cent. duties* on the "broadcloth, none of which being disposed of at the time Mr. Houssay "despatched those advices; the prospect he gives us of selling it seems "rather an amusement than any real application to serve his employers, "while he continues so much involved in private trade." As the said Mr. Houssay had carried with him to Basrah the greater part of the effects of a deceased Factor at Bandar 'Abbās and had given no account of the same, and as it was rumoured that he intended to depart thence direct to Europe without either being granted leave or returning to head-quarters as required by the Company's rules, it was decided to recall him to Bandar 'Abbās; but, in order that Basrah might not be left unoccupied, the Agent in Persia was directed to proceed thither himself, or, if he could not go, to send a Mr. E. Edlyne in his stead. At the same meeting a notification was drawn up, to be published at Basrah, "requir- "ing all the subjects of Great Britain trading under the Honourable Com- "pany's protection to be conformable to the rules of the factory, and "positively forbidding them to treat with the Government in any matters "relating to their trade but through the factory."

Establish-
ment of a
permanent
Factory at
Basrah,
about 1723.

In 1727-28, Mr. French being then the Company's representative at Basrah, several difficulties with the local government arose; but they were all, in the end, satisfactorily adjusted. In 1727 the Pasha suddenly demanded a poll tax of five Qurûsh per head on account of the Persian servants employed by Europeans at Basrah. The Dutch evaded the requisition by discharging their servants; but Mr. French positively

Difficulties
with the local
government
at Basrah
1727-28.

* This, as we have seen, was the maximum fixed by the Capitulations, but it is probable that at this time the Pasha of Basrah did not readily acquiesce in any limitations imposed on him by the Government at Constantinople; moreover, as will appear further on, neither the Pasha himself nor the Company's representative at Basrah had a copy of the Capitulations. In 1702, when Sir N. Waite of the English or New East India Company sent agents to Basrah to make enquiries, they reported that customs would be payable at the rate of eight per cent.

refused to comply, "pleading and insisting that, by the phirmaund "granted to the English,* they were exempted from such impositions, offering to deliver up the same again if it was not intended to be conformed to, which at last had the desired effect." Soon after this, having been badgered for a present by the Pasha's Kehiyah or deputy, Mr. French, on the arrival of the Company's ship "Britannia," purposely did not hoist the English flag as usual. The Pasha then gave him fresh assurances of friendship and protection, and, when this had been done, a reconciliation took place, after which relations continued on a better footing for a time. In 1728 the Company's representative at Basrah received from Constantinople, apparently through the British Embassy there, an order of the Sultān of Turkey directing the Pasha of Basrah to comply "with the terms stipulated with that Government on Mr. Houssay's first arrival," from which it would appear that the opening of the Factory at Basrah about 1723 had been preceded by some agreement with the local authorities; but this order was not immediately serviceable to its full extent, for it referred to the Capitulations, of which neither the Pasha nor Mr. French had a copy; and Mr. French was obliged again to refer to the Ambassador. In August 1728 another difficulty arose from the arrest by the Turks of Mr. French's Linguist, whom they put in irons for having presumed to administer the estate of a deceased Armenian without an order from the Qādhi. Mr. French, with the rest of the English at Basrah, immediately retired on board the "Britannia," and the affair ended much to his advantage; for the Pasha, or perhaps the Captain Pasha, † in the end "gave him assurances of all the favour and "protection he could desire, and a phirmaund, that in case any of our "servants for the future commit any crimes we shall have the liberty of "punishing them ourselves, and when any disputes shall arise about debts "or contracts with the country people the Cauzy shall examine the affair "in the presence of our Resident, and in case he (the Resident) shall think "the sentence not equitable it shall not bind till the Bashaw, upon a fair "hearing, confirms it." At the time when these difficulties were in course of settlement the Company had various claims against the Pasha on account of exactions, but it does not appear that they were ever successfully enforced. The attitude of the Pasha, however, was after this much more favourable to the Factory.

*The reference must be to some written guarantee of the local government. See last footnote

† This term is explained further on, see page 1214.

The Company's goods at Basrah seem to have consisted at this time chiefly of broadcloth, "perfects,"* "long ells" and other kinds of cloth; but iron also was imported, apparently for the markets of Hawīzeh and Shūshtar. From October to December was the best time to obtain freights for India, for the boats from Baghdād and the caravans from Aleppo ordinarily reached Basrah in those months.

The amount recovered at Basrah between the 31st of July 1727 and the 1st of January 1728 as "consulage" due to the Company amounted to 26,904 Mahmūdīs and 19 Qurūsh. This "consulage" was a duty recoverable by English Ambassadors and Consuls on goods carried in English ships, and was recognised by the 35th Article of the Capitulations; and, from its being collected at Basrah by the Company's representative, it appears that he must have been invested with consular status.† The rate of consula at this time is not stated.

The Company's trade and consulage at Basrah, 1727-28.

MAHMUD I.

1730-54.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1730-54.

As explained in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, war prevailed, at the accession of the Sultān Mahmūd I in 1730, between Turkey and Persia; and it continued, with varying fortune and an interval of peace after 1736, until 1744. The principal events of this contest were, in 'Irāq, the operations of Nādir Shāh against Baghdād in 1733 and two attempts by the Persians to capture Basrah, of which the second was made in 1743.

In 1733‡ Nādir Shāh, who had recently become regent of Persia on the deposition of Shāh 'Tahmāsb, invaded Turkish 'Irāq and laid siege to Baghdād, of which Ahmad Pāsha, the able and energetic son of Hasan

Nādir Shāh's operations against Baghdād, 1733.

* *Quære*, "perpets."

† It was apparently in the power of the English Ambassador at this time to appoint a Consul anywhere in the Turkish Empire—see Article 14 of the Capitulations in their original form, as given in the *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Honourable East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, Appendix A—but, from the circumstances in which a "Consulary Birat" for Basrah was obtained in 1764, (*vide* page 1223 post) it would seem that until that year the consular character of the Company's representative there had not been formally admitted by the Porte.

‡ According to Niebuhr, Nādir's siege of Baghdād lasted eight months, and in that case it must have begun in December 1732.

Pāsha, was still governor ; but his principal opponent was an ex-Vazir of the Turkish Empire, named Tōpāl 'Othmān or 'Othmān the lame, who had been specially sent from Constantinople to command the Sultān's forces against the Persians. This 'Othmān has been described as a man "justly celebrated by Christian as well as Mahomedan writers, ... and who "was not only skilful, sage, and valiant, but who gave proofs of a noble "spirit of generosity and gratitude, such as does honour to human "nature." Nādir Shāh, leaving a considerable force in the trenches before Baghdād, advanced with his main body against Tōpāl 'Othmān, who was encamped near Sāmarrah on the Tigris ; and in that vicinity, on or about the 18th of July 1733, was fought one of the bloodiest engagements that ever took place between Turks and Persians. It resulted after a furious combat lasting eight hours, in the complete overthrow and rout of Nādir Shāh's army, which was not rallied until it reached Hamadān ; and Ahmad Pāsha, on receiving news of the Turkish victory, sallied out against the Persian division investing Baghdād and drove them off with great slaughter, few of them, it was said, regaining Persia in safety, except a party commanded by Mahmūd Khān, Balūch. Within three months Nādir Shāh, whom this disaster had not dispirited, invaded Turkish territory with a fresh army ; a battle followed, in which the Persians were victorious ; and Tōpāl 'Othmān himself who was infirm and generally rode in a litter, was among the slain. His head was brought to Nādir Shāh, who caused it to be sent with all honour to the Turkish camp.

Persian
attacks on
Basrah, 1735
and 1740.

Great offence was given to Nādir Shāh by the action of the British at Basrah in helping, or preparing to help, the Turks in the defence of that place against a Persian force, apparently in 1735. What actually occurred is not known ; but the circumstances provoked a demand by Nādir Shāh that the British should expiate their fault by rendering him assistance against Basrah, and in connection therewith it is remarked in a Bombay Presidency Diary, under the date 22nd October 1735, that "the unlucky "affair at Basrah (of which the private traders only reaped the "advantage) first gave rise to these troubles." The authorities at Bombay, however, doubtful as to the manner in which a loan of vessels by themselves to the Persians might be regarded in Europe and fearing that it might excite the Turks to take extreme measures against the British at Basrah, strictly enjoined the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās not to place any of their ships temporarily at the disposal of the Persians ; but they authorised him, in case their interests in Persia could not be secured by any other means, to resort to the safer expedient of sale, and two ships were eventually

transferred in this manner. In 1736 a peace between the Persians and the Tarks removed for a time the prospect of further collisions.

In 1741 signs of renewed activity in the direction of Basrah were given by the Persians, who were said to be building boat-bridges at Hawīzeh; and on the 28th of August 1743 they laid siege to the town with a force estimated at 12,000 men. Mr. Dorrill, the British Resident, found himself in a difficult position: he had done what he could to avoid complications by preventing British vessels from remaining at the port, and he had even sent away a small brigantine of his own; but the crew of the latter, who were Arabs, had compelled the master to bring her back to Basrah. Mr. Dorrill, having firmly refused to lend his vessel to the local authorities, was arrested by their orders and kept as a prisoner for two days in a tent upon the town wall, when he submitted, fearing worse evils; but in the meanwhile he had caused the brigantine to be damaged and practically scuttled, and the Turks, on becoming aware of this, released him and dropped the matter. By Nādir Shāh's orders the siege was discontinued on the 27th of November, and the Persian troops marched away with their artillery on the 5th of December. The Persians, during the siege, destroyed the buildings over the tombs of Zubair and Talhah at Old Basrah, as having been erected in honour of rebels against 'Alī; but the shrines were rebuilt by the inhabitants soon after their departure.

1743.

No further hostilities between the Persians and the Turks took place in 'Irāq during the reign of Mahmūd I; and in 1746 the boundary of the two Empires was re-established by a Treaty, in accordance with the old arrangement between the Turkish Sultān Murād IV and his Persian contemporary in 1689, on a line which towards its southern extremity divided Khūzistān (or 'Arabistān) from 'Irāq-i-'Arabi; but this line itself was not defined. The Treaty also disposed of all other important questions pending between Turkey and Persia.

1746.

Internal affairs of Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

During the reign of Mahmūd I, Baghdād and Basrah with their dependencies continued to form one Pashāliq, and the Pāsha, who resided at Baghdād, was generally represented at Basrah by a Mutasallim or governor of his own appointment. At times, if not always, there was also a Captain Pāsha* at Basrah.

* See page 1214 *post*.

Government
of Ahmad
Pasha, till
1748.

Ahmad Pasha, as we have seen, still ruled Baghdād when it was attacked by the Persians in 1733. He was temporarily removed by the Sultān, accepting his dismissal with a good grace, about 1734; but his successors were unable to maintain order, and about 1736 he was reinstated. In 1741 the Porte proposed to take Basrah from Ahmad Pasha and give it to a certain Husain Pasha; but they were unable, apparently, to give effect to their intentions. The Persian attack on Basrah in 1743 was said to have been promoted by Ahmad Pasha for the purpose of enhancing his own importance, or of preventing his own removal from office for a second time; it became the means of procuring him money, guns, and other supplies from the Porte; and after its failure he remained in undisturbed enjoyment of power until his death, which occurred from natural causes in 1747 or 1748, in the course of a campaign against the Kurds. Ahmad Pasha was a skilful horseman, and his principal recreation was hunting lions, which he more than once killed single-handed, armed only with a spear.

In 1741 Ahmad Pasha severely chastised the Bedouins, who had rebelled, and it was anticipated that they would give no more trouble for some years; but in 1746 the Arabs near Basrah created disturbances, and a force was sent against them from Baghdād under the Pasha's Kehiyah or deputy. The Kehiyah was anxious to visit Basrah itself, but he was prevented by the Pasha and had to content himself with sending for some of the principal inhabitants, from whom he extorted large presents. In the spring of 1747 a new Mutasallim was sent by Ahmad Pasha to Basrah with orders for a reassessment of the date groves, "in order to oppress the Arabs in their tax, whereupon"—so wrote Mr. Grendon, the British Resident at Basrah—"thinking themselves already too highly imposed upon, the tribe called Monteficks are rebelled, and to secure themselves and to (cause) the Turks all the detriment in their power, they have opened the banks of the river which has laid the desert quite under water, to the very walls at Basrah; this accident has put the inhabitants into the greatest consternation, being now apprehensive lest the disagreeable stench arising from it should cause a pestilential fever." In June the inundation became so serious that three bastions of the Basrah town wall collapsed, and the whole of the inhabitants were placed on corvée for three days to repair the tottering ramparts. Shaikh Sa'dūn, the chief of the Muntafik was twice captured by the forces of Ahmad Pasha, and on the second occasion was put to death by Sulaimān, the Pasha's Kehiyah; and this measure, followed by the treacherous execution of 15 or 20 leading men among the Muntafik

who came one day to visit Sulaimān, reduced the tribe to a state of impotence from which it did not recover for many years. The Bani Lām also, upon the Tigris, were severely crippled by a sudden raid which Ahmad made upon them.

Ahmad Pāsha left no male heir ; but his Kehiyah Sulaimān Pāsha, to whom, though originally a Georgian slave, he had given his eldest daughter 'Ādilāh Khātūn, a haughty and ambitious lady, in marriage, was considered to represent the family after his death and to be the natural successor to the Pashāliq. The Porte, however, had other views, and while they made Basrah a separate Pashāliq and ultimately gave it as a solatium to Sulaimān Pāsha, they attempted to establish their own immediate authority at Baghdād by sending three or four Pāshas in succession from Constantinople ; but all of these were unsuccessful in coping with the unruly Arab tribes of the country. The first of the intruding Pāshas of Baghdād was "Cour Vazier," who, as he was bombarded in his Sarāi and expelled by the Janissaries before the 13th of March 1748, may have been merely some local official ; and his place was taken by Hāji Ahmad Pāsha, who had been originally destined for Basrah and who had already appointed the Captain Pāsha there to act for him until his arrival. Early in 1749 Sulaimān Pāsha, who had meanwhile been nominated Pāsha of Basrah, advanced up the Euphrates by Samāwah and Diwānīyah to the neighbourhood of Hillah. He was accompanied at the outset by his personal guard only ; but 'Ali Āgha, the governor of Diwānīyah, secretly espoused his cause and at once left for Baghdād to seduce the troops of the governing Pāsha—now apparently Tiryāki Hāji Muḥammad, an ex-Wazīr—from their allegiance. This he did with such success that, when the two Pāshas encountered near Hillah, the Baghdād Pāsha, though his force consisted of 14,000 men as against 800 with Sulaimān, was obliged to fly ; and before the end of the year Sulaimān Pāsha was recognised by the Porte as ruler of all the provinces that had been held by Ahmad Pāsha.

Government
of Sulaimān
Pāsha, from
1749.

On the 22nd of February 1750 Sulaimān Pāsha's Mutasallim arrived at Basrah and received charge of the place from a Captain Pāsha who had been acting as governor ; the latter was evidently expected to resist displacement, but instead he retired quietly to Manāwi. A visit from Sulaimān Pāsha in person was anticipated at this time, "when it is very certain numbers of worthless heads will be chopped off," but it appears that he did not come ; and the Captain Pāsha may even have escaped the fate that was predicted for him on account of his having insulted the family of Sulaimān during the latter's absence on his campaign against

Baghdād. In 1752 the effects of Sulaimān Pāsha's administration began to be perceptible in the greater security which prevailed around Basrah, and the British Resident was able to report: "For some time past this country has been in perfect tranquillity; the Arabs kept under due restraint; grain of all kinds been very cheap; the merchants of the city unmolested, and the place in general in a more quiet state than for many years before."

British political and general relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

British political relations with Turkish 'Irāq still consisted solely in the dealings of the East India Company's servants with the local government.

Difficulties at
Basrah,
1735.

Reference has already been made to the difficulties in which the British were involved at Basrah, about 1735, in consequence of hostilities there between the Persians and the Turks, and to the concessions which it was found necessary to make in the matter to Nādir Shāh; but the British Resident at Basrah was not withdrawn, as had at one time been intended, for the purpose of convincing the Persians that the British had no leaning towards the Turks; and the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, who had been invested at the end of 1735 with discretion to prevent ships under the Company's protection from visiting Basrah, found no occasion to exercise his powers.

Resident's
journey to
Baghdād,
1735-36.

In March 1736 Mr. French, the British Resident, had lately returned to Basrah from Baghdād; the object of his journey to the capital, which seems to have been undertaken on his own responsibility, was to obtain redress from the Pāsha for misbehaviour on the part of the Mutasallim of Basrah; and in this he was entirely successful.

Journeys of
the Assistant
to the Resi-
dent to Bagh-
dād, 1737-38.

In 1738 Mr. Dorrill, the Assistant to the Resident at Basrah, was sent by Mr. Whitwell, the Resident, to wait on Ahmad Pāsha at Baghdād with a present and solicit his aid in recovering debts due, especially from Bedouins, to the estate of Mr. French, who had died in the preceding year. Mr. Dorrill had visited Baghdād in 1737 also. After 20,000 "Telotas" * had been recovered in barley, dates and wheat, the Pāsha recalled the Āgha whom he had sent to Basrah to manage the business; and, as it was seen that nothing further could be expected without more payments, Mr. Dorrill was ordered to return to Basrah. The cost of Mr. Dorrill's mission was charged to Mr. French's estate, of which 30,000 Telotas remained unrecovered.

* The value of this coin is not stated.

The siege of Basrah by the Persians in 1743 led, as we had already seen, to a serious affront to Mr. Dorrill, the Resident; and the general behaviour of the Mutasallim and the other officials towards him, as also their demands for loans, had become so outrageous that in 1744 he proposed, if Ahmad Pasha neglected his complaints, to retire on board ship and, if his grievances still remained unredressed, to leave Basrah. The authorities at Bombay, however, advised him to remain, provided he could do so by "submitting only to a small expense," and matters seem to have been temporarily adjusted. In 1745 there was fresh trouble between the Resident and the Mutasallim, arising partly out of Mr. French's estate against which claims amounting to 166,005 Mahmūdis had been brought by native creditors, and Mr. Dorrill had prepared to retire to Būshehr; but the Turks seized goods belonging to some of the Company's Bombay servants and shipped them for Baghdād, obliging him instead to repair in haste to the capital, where the creditors resided. On this occasion the Resident was well received by Ahmad Pasha, who removed the Mutasallim of Basrah, replacing him by Yahya Āgha, a former satisfactory governor, and caused the property of some members of the Mutasallim's council to be sequestrated.

Ill-treatment
of the British
Resident and
various cases
1743—45.

In 1747, in consequence of the inundation deliberately caused in that year by Arab rebels against the Pasha's authority and of the pestilence by which he apprehended that it would be followed, Mr. Grendon, the Resident at Basrah, sought permission to withdraw for a time to Baghdād, Khārag, Rīg or Būshehr; but his request was refused by the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās.

Suggested
withdrawal
of the Resi-
dent from
Basrah,
1747.

In June 1748 Mr. Grendon, who appears not to have liked Basrah, suddenly made over charge of the Residency to Mr. Pompet, Writer, and left for Bombay on private affairs, without first obtaining permission from his superiors. The Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās animadverted severely on his conduct, and they considered it to be the more reprehensible because Husain Pasha, a new Mutasallim, who was one of the debtors to Mr. French's estate, had arrived at the time of his departure within a few days' march of Basrah.

Basrah Resi-
dency left in
charge of a
Writer, 1748.

In April 1749, Sulaimān Pasha having marched from Basrah to attack the Pasha of Baghdād, his Kehiyah, whom he had left behind, demanded a loan from the Resident in addition to one already given. The Resident, however, struck his flag and threatened to leave Basrah, whereupon the Kehiyah desisted and sent an influential deputation to beg him to stay.

Threatened
withdrawal
of the Resi-
dent from
Basrah, 1749.

In 1751 the Mutasallim of Basrah was again guilty of "violent measures and extraordinary behaviour" towards the Resident, who

Renewed
trouble with

the local
officials at
Basrah 1751.

complained to Sulaimān Pāsha; and the latter administered "so very effectual" a reprimand to his subordinate that the business of the British Factory was thereafter carried on without the least hindrance or molestation.

Collection of
documents
bearing on
British
grants and
privileges
1752-54.

In 1752 the Resident at Basrah was ordered to furnish translations, which had been called for by the Presidency of Bombay, of all the grants, etc., under which the British enjoyed privileges in 'Irāq. The required documents could not all be obtained at Basrah, and the Resident accordingly referred to the Ambassador at Constantinople; but up to February 1754 the necessary papers had not been received at Basrah.

Instructions
to the Resi-
dent at
Basrah,
1753.

In 1753 Mr. Shaw was appointed Resident at Basrah and received some general instructions from the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās in which they remarked: "We are likewise to acquaint you that the "Hon'ble Company will admit of no excuse for lending money to the "Government, or selling their goods to them, without first receiving the "amount; as by this means they are sure to sustain no loss from bad "debts."

Civility of
Sulaimān
Pāsha to the
Resident at
Basrah, 1754.

In July 1754 Sulaimān Pāsha of Baghdād, possibly influenced by the trouble he was experiencing from the Dutch at Khārag, made friendly advances to Mr. Shaw, the British Resident at Basrah, and sent him "a "fine Turkish sabre, with a very noble horse, richly caparisoned with "gilt furniture, with very extraordinary letters of compliments from the "Bashaw, his Kia (or First Minister), and Cuzenedar, or Master of the "Household, and Shahbunder, etc., expressing the particular satisfaction "they received from the regular decent conduct of our nation at all times "in the Bashaw's Government, and therein expressed their readiness, not "only to confirm all former grants and favours, but even to add to them, "if need were, as they found at all times made so proper a use thereof as "to render us daily deserving of additional instances of their particular "affection and esteem." The Resident, on receiving these presents and compliments at a large assembly in the Sarāi, "failed not to muster all the little rhetoric he was master of;" and subsequently he asked to be allowed to charge the cost of the return presents to the Company "as it is the custom at all other places on such public occasions."

Trade, consulage and other dues of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

Trade proper,
1730—54.

The official records contain few notices of the East India Company's trade at Basrah during this period. In 1733 the markets of Turkish

'Irāq were greatly disturbed by the Persian invasion of that year; but about 1737—39 the trade of Bandar 'Abbās, being seriously hampered by the Persian campaigns in 'Omān which were being conducted from that port, was largely diverted to Basrah, and the proportion of the Company's consulage collected at the two places was reversed. Copper in particular, imported into the Gulf in ships from Bengal, now went chiefly to Basrah. In 1741 the British woollen trade at Basrah benefited by a prohibition which the local authorities had imposed on the passage of caravans between Aleppo and that market. In 1752 and 1753 there was a great demand for perpets in Turkish 'Irāq.

The question of the consulage and other dues collected by the Company's representative at Basrah is frequently noticed in the correspondence of the day. In the sense of the Capitulations all the collections of the Company at Basrah were "consulage"; but the Company seem to have restricted that name to a portion which they allowed their officers to keep for themselves and to have styled the rest "customs."

Consulage
and other
dues.

In 1731 Mr. French, the British Resident, obtained a Farman from the Pasha restricting the Customs duty leviable on British goods at Basrah to *3 per cent.; and, as Mr. French had made the disbursements necessary to secure this concession from his own private means, while the concession was expected to be highly advantageous to trade in general, he was authorised to charge the outlay to the Company, together with an honorarium of 3,000 Qurūsh for himself. An additional duty, in the shape apparently of one per cent. imposed on the Company's own goods and an extra one per cent. on the goods of private traders, was at the same time laid on all British trade at Basrah; and it was ordered that this arrangement should remain in force until the whole amount, with the interest accruing thereon, should have been recovered.

In 1733 no consulage at all was obtained at Basrah, in consequence of a cessation of trade due to the nearness of the Persian armies.

In 1735, whether before or after the charge created in 1731 had been cleared off, an additional duty was again imposed by the Company at Basrah in recoupment of the expenses incurred by them in connection with the first Persian attempt upon the town. A separate account for the fund thus formed was opened under the heading "Basrah Troubles."

Mr. French, the British Resident at Basrah, was awarded 100 Tūmāns by the Bombay Presidency in partial repayment of the expenses of his journey to Baghdād in 1736; and he was "directed to charge it to

* This was the rate fixed by the Capitulations of 1661 but see footnote on page 1195, *ante*.

“the head of Basrah Customs, since the traders in general will find the benefit of this proceeding.”

1740.

In 1740 the debit balance under the “Basrah Troubles” heading of 1735 had been reduced to 212,167 Shāhis, and it was anticipated that it would be totally extinguished in the course of the season that had begun.

Establishments of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

The following interesting list is extant of the Company's staff at Basrah as it stood in 1751 :—

Person's names and employments.	Time of their arrival in India.	At what salary.	Present salary per annum.	Ages.	Title.
Brabazon Ellis, intended for Resident.	22nd February 1749.	£ 5	£ 30	28	Junr. Merchant.
Nathaniel Pompert, but ordered to move to the * Residency.	9th December 1746.	5	15	26	Writer.
John Holmes, Assistant to the Resident.	10th June 1750.	5	150	36	Fifth in Council.
Danvers Graves.	18th May 1719.	5	40	62	Senr. Merchant.
Francis Wood, Secretary.	17th August 1748.	5	15	22	Factor.

At an earlier period however, in 1741, it consisted of only two persons, viz., Mr. Thomas Dorrill, Provisional Resident, and Mr. Danvers Graves, Assistant to the Resident, whose annual salaries were £30 and £5 respectively.

The Company's allowance to the Resident for diet, house-rent and other charges, paid apparently in addition to salary, was in 1740 only Rs. 50 a month, which did not even cover the single item of house-rent, and the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās recommended that it should be increased; but it was not until 1747 that the Resident was authorised to charge his house-rent and the salary of his Linguist to the Company.

* Probably an error for “Presidency.”

At this time Basrah was, as a rule, a far healthier station than Bandar 'Abbās. In the year 1737, however, which was a very unhealthy one, sickness carried off "all the English gentlemen* except one Mr. Sterling," "Purser of the *Poultney*, who prudently sealed up the warehouses ;" and among the victims was Mr. French, the Resident, who died on the 7th of November. No other deaths during this period among the Company's servants at Basrah are recorded.

The Dutch in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

The Dutch, during the greater part of the period which we are now examining, had a Residency at Basrah ; and from it, at the end of 1747, a gentleman was sent to re-establish a Dutch settlement that had formerly existed at Būshehr. In or about 1752, however, calamity overtook the Dutch Residency at Basrah, of which the head was then the well-known Baron Kniphausen.† The Baron was arrested one day by the Turkish authorities on a charge of having had relations with a Muhammadan prostitute, and he was not released until he had paid, it was said, a bribe of Rs. 50,000 ; and large sums were extorted at the same time from other persons belonging to or connected with the Dutch Factory. On his release the Baron sailed for Batavia, where he arrived simultaneously with a letter containing complaints against him, sent by the Turkish governor of Basrah through the Dutch Factory at Bandar 'Abbās ; and, whether at or after his departure is uncertain, the Dutch Factory at Basrah was withdrawn. Having cleared his character to the satisfaction of the Dutch authorities in the East Indies, Baron Kniphausen, as we have seen elsewhere, returned to the Persian Gulf at the end of 1753 and proceeded to settle with a naval and military force on the island of Khārag ; and meanwhile the Dutch Ambassador at the Porte had procured a Farmān for the re-hoisting of the Dutch flag at Basrah. On arrival at Khārag the Baron sent to Sulaimān Pāsha a letter from the Dutch General in Batavia demanding repayment of the sums extorted from the Dutch Company's servants and the reception of Kniphausen himself at Basrah, and threatening that, in event of non-compliance, force would be used ; but the reply of the Pāsha seems to have been that he would refund nothing, and that he would only admit a Dutch Resident if he were somebody other than

* Number not stated.

† The chief authorities on this gentleman's character and proceedings are specified in a footnote on page 129 *ante*.

Baron Kniphausen and were not imposed by force. It was apparently the case that the principal inhabitants of Basrah had very strong objections to Baron Kniphausen, and that they threatened to emigrate if he were allowed to return. In July 1754, however, the Baron proceeded to blockade the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and a little later he detained two valuable ships belonging to Turkish subjects which happened to call at Khārag; these proceedings quickly brought the Pāsha to terms; and by the beginning of 1755 the money extorted had been reimbursed, and the Dutch had obtained leave to remove some goods which they had left at Basrah, and to collect debts which were due to them there. Subsequently the Dutch were invited—or at least gave out that they had been invited—by the Turks to return to Basrah; but they took no steps to avail themselves of the permission.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1730—54.

The system of French consular representation in Turkish 'Irāq appears to have been remodelled about 1740, when a French Consul at Baghdād was appointed for the first time in the person of M. Baillet, a French Carmelite, who soon afterwards became Latin Bishop of Baghdād. About the same time a layman assumed charge of the French Consulate at Basrah, which had been held by eleven ecclesiastics between 1679 and 1739; but this first lay incumbent, a M. de Martainville, died in 1741, not long after his appointment. In 1748 the French Consul at Basrah, now described as the Resident, having received no pay from Pondichéry for two years, embarked with the whole of the French Residency establishment and property on board a Portuguese trading vessel and departed. His difficulties may possibly have been occasioned by the war then in progress between Britain and France.

'OTHMĀN III.

1754—57.

The short reign of the Turkish Sultān 'Othmān III is not marked by any important event in Turkish 'Irāq.

French and British Relations.

In the summer of 1755 the French Residency at Basrah was re-opened by a M. Perdria, whose transactions the British Resident, Mr. Shaw, was directed to watch very carefully and report to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, for it was "imagined" that the Frenchman had been sent to Basrah "at this critical juncture" chiefly to forward intelligence to Europe. This order was sent from Bombay through the Agent and Council at Bandar 'Abbās, the Agent being described on this and on various later occasions as "Agent for all affairs of the British Nation," a style of address due perhaps to the approach of war, but one that continued in use for a number of years after.

Re-establishment of the French Residency at Basrah, 1755.

About the beginning of 1756 Mr. Shaw, having been insulted and threatened by a boatman on the Basrah river, applied for redress to the Mutasallim; but that officer, instead of complying, incited the populace against him, and a riot occurred by which his life was endangered. As the Pāsha at Baghdād accepted the Mutasallim's version of the affair, by which the whole blame was thrown upon the British Resident, Mr. Shaw undertook a journey to Baghdād, leaving his Assistant, Mr. Garden, in charge at Basrah; he was accompanied by M. Perdria, with whom he seems to have been on good terms. At Baghdād, by means of a personal interview with Sulaimān Pāsha, Mr. Shaw was able to secure the removal of the Mutasallim and the punishment of the less important offenders; and the Pāsha also granted a Farmān "in which he directed that all possible honour and regard should be paid to the interest and credit of the British nation, and declared that the least breach of that order would be attended with immediate loss of life and estate." The question of anchorage duties at Basrah, where it had been the custom to exact a present of 900 Qurūsh from every small and one of 1,500 from every large ship, visiting the port, was raised by the two Residents during their visit at Baghdād, and Farmāns were obtained by them from the Pāsha abolishing these duties. M. Perdria was imprudent enough to give the Pāsha a present of 6,000 Qurūsh on this occasion, and Mr. Shaw feared that he would be expected to pay a like amount; but he proposed to decline giving more than 4,000 Qurūsh and to recover that amount by temporarily charging British ships at Basrah the same anchorage dues on behalf of the Company as they had been accustomed to pay to the Turks. The Government of Bombay were somewhat concerned at the

Journey of the British and French Residents to Baghdād, 1756.

expense to which the Resident had thus committed himself without proper authority ; but they agreed that, provided the terms of the new Farman were respected by the Turks and no anchorage dues collected by them, the money spent might be recovered in the manner suggested ; and recoveries continued to be made until 1760, when, the whole amount having been made good, they ceased. It was hoped that by the removal of the anchorage dues ships which had hitherto been accustomed to turn back from Būshehr, Bandar 'Abbās or even Masqat would be induced to visit Basrah.

Misbehaviour
of Bengal
servants of
the Company
at Basrah,
1754—57.

Trouble appears to have been caused from time to time by gentlemen of the Company's Bengal establishment who carried on a trade at Basrah, and who sometimes tried to ignore the Resident ; one of the principal offenders was a Mr. Baldrick who had business there in 1754. Early in 1757 the Bombay Presidency, "being sensible of the ill-effects of the "Bengal gentlemen endeavouring to evade any dependency on the "Hon'ble Company's Resident," empowered that officer to prevent any application being made to the Turkish authorities, except through himself.

MUSTAFA III.

1757—73.

The history of Turkish 'Irāq during the reign of Mustafa III was little affected by events in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, except in so far as war with Russia prevented the Sultān of Turkey from enforcing his authority over the Pāsha of Baghdād. The peaceful relations at last established between Turkey and Persia were not disturbed. Mustafa died in the last days of 1773.

Pāshas of Baghdād from 1757 to 1773.

During this period the whole of Turkish 'Irāq continued to be governed by a Pāsha of Baghdād ; and that office was filled by a series of men possessing local influence, with whose services the Porte, however much they might wish to do so, found it impossible to dispense.

Sulaimān
Pāsha, till
1762.

Sulaimān Pāsha, who had seized the government of Baghdād in 1749 and was afterwards confirmed therein by the Porte, retained his position

until his death on the 14th of May 1762. More than one attempt was made, probably from Constantinople, to destroy him by foul means, but all were unsuccessful; and, so far from his paying any substantial tribute to the Sultān, he was in most years able and ready to prove that he had spent, on behalf of the Turkish Government, more than he had received. In the administration of his province he showed great energy, and he made himself the terror of the thievish Arab tribes, whom he reduced to tolerable order, and who surnamed him "Abu Lail" on account of his nocturnal raids upon them. At Baghdād he was known as "Sulaimān the Lion." In his time the journey between Baghdād and Basrah, whether by the Euphrates or by the Tigris, is said to have become safe even for travellers unaccompanied by a tribal protector; and the security that prevailed in his dominions, while disturbances were rife in Persia, had the effect of drawing a large proportion of the Indian trade, which had formerly sought Bandar 'Abbās and Isfahān, to Basrah and Baghdād. He was however influenced, to an undue extent, by his wife 'Adilah Khātūn, who gave audiences, interfered in public business, and even instituted an order of merit of her own, of which the badge was a silk ribbon worn round the head; and it was at her instigation that, in 1758, he invited Sālim, the Kurdish chief on a campaign against whom her father Ahmad had expired, to Baghdād and treacherously put him to death by strangling. In 1758, at the time of Dr. Ives' visit to Baghdād, Sulaimān Pāsha was a childless man over sixty years of age, but addicted to unnatural vices.

On the death of Sulaimān Pāsha without children, 'Ali Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, who had formerly been Governor of Diwāniyah and who in that capacity had given Sulaimān Pāsha invaluable aid in seizing the Pashāliq, contrived, by means of the recommendations of the local Baghdād officials supplemented by bribes at Constantinople to obtain the vacant post for himself. His appointment took place in July 1762, and the governments of Baghdād and Basrah remained, contrary to the general expectation, a combined charge. The first danger with which 'Ali Pāsha had to cope was a rising of the Janissaries at Baghdād, which obliged him temporarily to abandon the city; but very soon, with the help of the country Arabs and of the most influential citizens, who were all upon his side, he was able to suppress the revolt and even to punish the ringleaders with death. After this he reduced Kurdistan to obedience and undertook various expeditions, which are noticed further on, against Arab tribes of the province; but, of these last, one against the Khazā'il ended disastrously. His fall, however, which occurred in

'Ali Pāsha,
1762—64.

1764, is believed to have been due chiefly to the intrigues of 'Ādilāh Khātūn, in whose father's household he had been brought up, but whom he had rigorously excluded from power and whom he was suspected of a design to remove from Baghdād. 'Ali Pāsha, who was of humble parentage, happened to be a Persian by race; and this fact invested with some plausibility the assertions of his enemies that he was a Shī'ah in disguise, prepared to hand over the country to the Shāh of Persia,—a notion which to many minds was confirmed by his successes against the Sunni Janissaries and Kurds and his failure against the Shī'ah Khazā'il. 'Ādilāh Khātūn at last succeeded in persuading some of the principal officials, who had hitherto been among 'Ali's sincere supporters, to believe that he intended to put them to death, and to consult their own safety by raising an insurrection against him; and this they did so suddenly and so successfully that he was obliged to hide himself, as best he could, in the city of Baghdād. A few days later he was arrested in female attire while attempting to escape to the country, brought back to the Sarāi, and executed.

'Umr Pāsha,
after 1764.

'Ali was succeeded as Pāsha of Baghdād by 'Umr, the second husband of a younger sister of 'Ādilāh Khātūn, whose first husband that masterful woman had induced Sulaimān Pāsha, on false evidence, to put to death. 'Umr Pāsha was regarded as a man of mediocre ability, and his elevation to the Pashāliq cannot have been agreeable to 'Ādilāh Khātūn; but his name was proposed by a council of the chief officials at Baghdād and was accepted by the Porte.

Mutasallims of Basrah, from 1757 to 1773.

Basrah, with the districts dependent on it, was administered, as it had been since about 1720, by Mutasallims or Deputy-Governors whom the Pāshas of Baghdād appointed and removed at will.

'Ali Āgha,
1761.

'Ali Āgha, afterwards Pāsha of Baghdād, appears to have been Deputy-Governor of Basrah in 1761, in which year he commanded an expedition against the Ka'ab tribe.

Mahmūd,
1764.

In the summer of 1764 the Mutasallim of Basrah was one Mahmūd, who had the reputation of being a good soldier, and who, it was thought, might have become a candidate for the Pashāliq, had he been present at Baghdād at the time of 'Ali Pāsha's death.

Sulaimān
Āgha, 1765—
68.

Mahmūd appears to have been succeeded by Sulaimān Āgha, a Georgian, who was destined to play a long and important part in the

history of Turkish 'Irāq and to rise eventually to the governorship of the Pashāliq. Sulaimān, during his first term of office at Basrah, ruled with moderation and distinguished himself by his freedom from rapacity ; but he incurred the jealousy of Ismā'il, the Kehiyah of the Baghdād Pāsha ; and, notwithstanding a protest by the British Agent at Basrah, he was removed, early in 1768, for his negligence in not sending enough money to Baghdād, and for failing to meet some large bills drawn by his master the Pāsha against the public revenues of Basrah.

'Abdur Rahmān Baig, who, by paying a considerable bribe at Baghdād and promising to make Basrah a financially more productive province, had secured his own nomination to the Mutasallimate, did not retain his position long. In October 1768 the post was again vacant, the holder having died suddenly, not without suspicion of poison.

'Abdur
Rahmān
Baig, 1768.

Thereupon Sulaimān Āgha was immediately reinstated in the Deputy-Governorship ; but his conduct towards the British and Christians in general was unsatisfactory during this, his second period of rule ; and in 1769 he was actually removed by the Pāsha on the representations of the East India Company's Agent.

Sulaimān
Āgha, 1768-
69.

The attitude of Yūsuf Āgha, the new Mutasallim, towards the foreign community was friendly ; but in August 1771, to their great regret, he was displaced in favour of Sulaimān Āgha, whom the Pāsha had now re-appointed. This Yūsuf Āgha may have been identical with one Hāji Yūsuf who had charge of the town of Basrah in October 1768.

Yūsuf Āgha,
1769-71.

Sulaimān Āgha seems after this,—with a short interval, ending in 1773, during which he was again replaced by Yūsuf Āgha,—to have retained the Mutasallimate until the capture of Basrah by the Persians in 1776, after the close of the period with which we are now concerned. His creditable conduct in the defence of the town will be noticed in its proper place.

Sulaimān
Āgha, 1771
—76.

Administrative head-quarters in Turkish 'Irāq in 1758 and 1765.

Interesting and minute accounts of Baghdād and Basrah, then as now the two main seats of government in Turkish 'Irāq, have been left by the travellers Ives and Niebuhr, who visited them in 1758 and 1765-66 respectively.

The form of government at Baghdād was the same, in miniature, as that at Constantinople. Most official appointments within the limits of his

charge were in the personal gift of the Pāsha; but he was obliged to submit all matters of great importance to his Council or Diwān, of which not only the Āgha or commander of the Janissaries, the chief Qādhi, and the Naqib of the shrine of 'Abdul Qādir, but also every ex-official of high rank resident at Basrah and various ecclesiastical authorities were members. The chief Qādhiship, it may be mentioned, was held every year by a new incumbent, appointed from Constantinople. The executive functionary next in rank and power to the Pāsha himself was his Kehiyah or Minister, who had charge under him of all matters, whether civil or military; and other officials, some of whom possessed a public character while some belonged rather to the household of the Pāsha, were numerous. The troops under the direct orders of the Pāsha of Baghdād, including his personal guards, amounted to 6,000 or 7,000 men; and in addition to these there were at headquarters a strong force of artillery and various corps of Janissaries, the latter variously estimated at 10,000 to 40,000 men; but over the artillery in question and over the Janissaries, who were imperial troops and received their orders from Constantinople, the Pāsha had no control. A number of the Janissaries were civilians in different ranks of life, who enlisted merely for the sake of the protection and privileges to which they became entitled as members of the corps; and sometimes even the Pāsha of Baghdād found it expedient to enrol himself as a Janissary. To meet a demand for extra troops to serve against the Kurds or the Arab tribes, it was not uncommon at Baghdād to grant contracts to individuals, who themselves acted as officers of the untrained rabble which they collected.

The defences of the main town of Baghdād consisted at this time of a wall with a parapet, loopholed throughout its length, and of nine bastions, each mounting six to eight brass guns of miscellaneous calibres. Outside the wall there was a good ditch, and beyond the ditch an indifferent glacis; and the height from the bottom of the ditch to the top of the wall was about 40 feet. The number of guns at Baghdād was about 150 of all sizes, mounted and unmounted.

Basrah.

At Basrah, on the phenomenal filthiness of which both travellers comment, the principal official was the Mutasallim, who had his residence in an open square of the native town, on the south bank of the 'Ashār creek, far from the Shatt-al-'Arab. In the days preceding the abolition of the Basrah Pashāliq, before 1720, not only the Deputy-Governor but also a "Kapitān (Captain) Pāsha" or naval commandant was appointed by the Porte, and the Kapitān Pāsha was a personage of high dignity and independent powers; but, on the incorporation of Basrah in the

Baghdād Pāshāliq, he became a nominee of the Baghdād Pasha and his authority was greatly curtailed. The abode of the Kapitān Pasha in 1765 appears to have been almost precisely at the spot occupied by the Turkish Commodore at Basrah at the present day. At Basrah, as at Baghdād, there was a considerable body of officials, including a Qādhi sent annually from Constantinople; and the Mutasallim of Basrah, like the Pasha of Baghdād, was required in serious questions to consult his Council, on which the Kapitān Pasha, the Qādhi, the notables of the country and others had seats. The notables, among whom was the Naqib of Basrah, were collectively known as the Ajal-al-Balad; their privileges included exemption from the land-tax, and rights of private jurisdiction upon their own estates. The Janissaries at Basrah, being removed from under the eye of their own principal officers, who were stationed at Qūrnah, were even more troublesome than at Baghdād; and on the death of Sulaimān Pasha in 1762 the Mutasallim, with all his troops, was unable to prevent them from plundering in broad daylight the houses of Armenians, Jews and Hindus, and even those of such Muhammadans as had not enrolled themselves in a Janissary Corps. In the disorders which occurred, the Janissaries frequently came to blows among themselves, and as many as eight to twelve of them were often killed in a single day, besides an equal number of ordinary peaceful citizens. It might be supposed that a Mutasallim, surrounded by so many independent forces, must have been practically powerless; but such was not the case; and it was observed that an able man, skilled in playing off one faction against another, was able not merely to maintain his authority at Basrah, but even to amass considerable wealth by extortion.

Two other important official centres besides Baghdād and Basrah were Diwāniyah, generally known as Haskah, and Hillah, through both of which Dr. Ives and his party passed on their way up the Euphrates, finding in charge of the former 'Ali Āgha, afterwards Pasha of Baghdād, who struck them as a "generous, genteel, worthy man." The jurisdiction of the governor of Diwāniyah at that time extended to Qūrnah on the one side and Hillah on the other.

Diwāniyah
and Hillah.

Internal tribal affairs, 1757—73.

Notwithstanding the severe punishment which Ahmad Pasha and Sulaimān Pasha had from time to time meted out to the Arab clans,

*So Niebuhr; but in the English official records of the day they seem to be generally mentioned as the "Ions," by which, presumably, the term A'yān (أيان) is intended.

Dr. Ives and his party, in travelling up the Euphrates in 1758, found the tribesmen in places by no means respectful or submissive to Turkish authority.

Bani Lām
rebellion,
1763.

In October 1763 'Ali Pāsha, who had then ruled Turkish 'Irāq for more than a year, went in person to chastise the Bani Lām Arabs, who had been giving trouble, and apparently defeated them in the neighbourhood of Hawīzeh.

Khazā'il re-
bellion, 1763
—65.

He had less good fortune in his dealings with the Khazā'il, having their tribal capital at Lāmlūm, who had closed the Euphrates to all boats that did not pay them blackmail, and he even sustained a severe defeat at their hands; but 'Umr Pāsha soon after his accession invaded their country, burned Lāmlūm, expelled the reigning Shaikh Hamūd, and cut off the heads of six or seven of the principal men, which he sent to Constantinople. Hamūd, however, soon reappeared, ejecting a new Shaikh whom the Turks had installed, and 'Umr Pāsha, who had no desire to undertake a second campaign, thought it as well to recognise him; but the Khazā'il, though Turks passing through their country were still exposed to obloquy as Sunnis, did not venture after this to stop boats on the river.

Muntafik re-
bellion, 1769.

In 1769, the great Muntafik tribe, whose domains at this time embraced the western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab from Basrah to Qūrnah and both banks of the Euphrates from Qūrnah to the neighbourhood of the modern Nāsiriyyah, and who had now recovered from the punishment inflicted on them in the time of Ahmad Pāsha, rose against the Turks under the leadership of 'Abdullah, a brother of the deceased Sa'dūn. Communication between Basrah and Baghdād, both by the Euphrates and by the Tigris, was completely closed by this rising: at one time the rebels succeeded in capturing several villages near Basrah; and for some days they even confined the inhabitants of Basrah within the walls of the town. The cause of the trouble was the refusal of Shaikh 'Abdullah to make any payment to the Turks on account of his land-revenue, which was already in arrear by about nine years. In November the Pāsha of Baghdād reached the confines of the Muntafik country at Umm Labās, about midway between Samāwah and Qūrnah; and about the same time, the aid of the Ka'ab tribe having been invited, fourteen Ka'ab Gallivats arrived at Basrah, of which nine proceeded up the Shatt-al-'Arab in company with some Turkish vessels under the Kapitān Pāsha, the whole fleet carrying about 1,500 armed men, to operate against a tribe in alliance with the Muntafik whose settlements lay on the east bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab between Basrah and Qūrnah. In August 1769,

before this expedition against the Muntafik began, the Pāsha of Baghdād announced the deposition of 'Abdullah from the Shaikhship of the tribe in favour of one Fadhal ; but how matters actually ended is not clear.

Towards the end of 1773, communication between Basrah and Baghdād was again interrupted, trouble between the Turkish Government and the Arab tribes being, as before, the cause.

Renewed
troubles.
1773.

Difficulties of the Turks with the Ka'ab, 1757—73.

More serious troubles than these, however, were in store for the Turks—and also for the British, who rashly became their allies in the quarrel—with the Ka'ab tribe of Qubbān and Dōraq, whose power, under their Shaikh Salmān or Sulaimān, was day by day increasing. The Ka'ab were regarded at Basrah as being properly * Turkish subjects, and it was asserted that they had been wont in the past to pay revenue to the Turks for that portion, at least, of their territory which adjoined Qubbān ; but the chief of the tribe had now begun to play off Persia against Turkey, at the same time withholding tribute from both countries, and also to encroach on the government of Basrah by occupying villages and tracts upon the Shatt-al-'Arab, even upon its western side. Throughout his proceedings the Ka'ab Shaikh was careful to stand well with the Arab notables of the Basrah neighbourhood, some of whom he detached from the Turkish interest by bribery ; and, after the invasion of his country by Karīm Khān, Vakīl of Persia, in 1757, he set about creating a fleet of which the first vessel was launched in 1758.

In 1761, the Ka'ab Shaikh "having of late been guilty of many enormities," the Pāsha of Baghdād ordered 'Ali Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, to proceed against him. The Āgha obeyed, marching by land with his own troops, after they had been reinforced by others sent from Baghdād and by an Arab tribal contingent, to Qubbān ; and in June of that year, at the earnest request of the Turkish Deputy-Governor, Mr. Douglas, the British Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, then inspecting Basrah, sent the Company's vessel "Swallow" to co-operate with 14 Turkish Frankis in blockading Khor Mūsa, or one of its branches, in which some of the enemy's armed boats were lying. Shaikh Salmān took refuge

First Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1761. 62.

* This was the opinion of the Turks and also of the British Agent at Basrah in 1767, who may have been influenced by his Turkish surroundings ; but according to Niebuhr the original territory of the Ka'ab all lay in Persia, and only those of their lands were in Turkey which they had subsequently seized from the Turks.

from the Turkish expedition in his fortat Dōraq or Fallāhiyeh, which was found to be extremely difficult of access; but ultimately he was reduced to serious straits and purchased peace by sending presents to the Pāsha at Baghdād. The Turkish forces were then withdrawn from 'Arabistān, the "Swallow" at the same time returning to Basrah. In 1762, the Ka'ab blockaded Basrah by closing the Shatt-al-'Arab to all vessels, whether bound upwards or downwards.

Second Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1763.

In October 1763, a number of the Ka'ab Shaikh's people entered the Dawāsir district, upon the western side of the lower Shatt-al-'Arab, and drove away the inhabitants. As the East India Company had an interest in some dates in Dawāsir, Mr. Price, who had recently opened the new British Agency at Basrah and still held charge of it, was inclined to send a vessel to prevent their removal by the raiders; but the Mutasallim advised him against taking any such decided action and wrote a letter for him to send, instead, to Shaikh Salmān. Meanwhile 'Ali Pāsha of Baghdād, who as Mutasallim of Basrah had commanded the last expedition against the Ka'ab, himself arrived in the vicinity of Basrah; and the Ka'ab, hearing of his approach, withdrew from Dawāsir, whereupon the "Swallow," Captain Nesbitt, accompanied by boats carrying 100 troops detailed by the Deputy-Governor of Basrah, dropped down the river to secure the dates in dispute. 'Ali Pāsha, however, was anxious to destroy the power of the Ka'ab and wrote as follows to Mr. Price:

My desire is, as the well-being of my Government depends upon it, that, while I march with my army by land, you will send your ships to block up the mouth of the river, and you have full power to take, burn, and destroy whatever you may meet with belonging to the Chaab. In short, make yourselves masters of the Gallivats, as they will no doubt endeavour to escape to sea; and this my letter shall be a sufficient warrant for anything that may happen. The demolishing the Chaab will be a glory to your nation, and not to me, and you may be persuaded that this your ready assistance will be well known, and I doubt not recompensed, by the Sultan. It remains now with you, as soon as my letter arrives, to despatch away the ships, as besides the glory that will accrue, 'tis ever meritorious to demolish those who molest the least of our friends. The success, therefore, of this affair depends on your diligence, friendship, and sincerity.

In consequence of this request, the Company's ships "Tartar" and "Swallow" were sent to the Pāsha's assistance and had more than one encounter with the Ka'ab fleet, which now numbered several Gallivats; but again peace was made, and the expedition withdrawn, without any permanent settlement having been achieved.

Third Anglo-Turkish ex-

In 1765, when Karīm Khān, the ruler of Persia, marched for the second time against the Ka'ab with the object of subjugating them, he

had obtained a promise of co-operation from the Turks. The fighting fleet of Shaikh Salmān, Ka'ab, now consisted of as many as 10 or 12 Gallivats, besides which he owned about 70 smaller vessels; and no sooner did Karīm Khān enter his territory than he began to retire to the westwards, moving from one point to another by water, and eventually crossing the Shatt-al-'Arab into Turkish territory. The Turks, who really intended to assist the Persians according to their agreement, brought down an infantry regiment, known as the Barātaliis, from Baghdād; they collected a fleet of 11 Taknahs and a Gallivat,—the former a small kind of armed vessel, flat, and coated with bitumen,—under the Kapitān Pāsha at Basrah; they chartered a private British vessel, the snow "Fanny," Captain Parkinson, to join the expedition under a regular agreement as to risk, pay, and division of prizes; and they obtained the services of a couple of young Englishmen to command two of their own Taknahs. They had been dilatory, however, in completing these arrangements; and early in May, just as their force was about to start, a letter arrived from Karīm Khān in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with their conduct and informed them of his own retirement from the Ka'ab country. Upon this the Turkish expedition was countermanded; but eventually it received orders to proceed independently of the Persians. The Turkish land forces, amounting to about 5,000 men, then began their march down the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, the fleet in the river conforming to their movements; the Mutasallim, it was observed, invariably remained well in the rear with his best troops, while the inferior troops cleared the way. At length the head of the Turkish force arrived opposite the northern end of 'Abbādān Island, off which the Ka'ab fleet was anchored, and halted there for the night under the protection of the "Fanny," while the Mutasallim and Kapitān Pāsha encamped a couple of leagues nearer to Basrah. During the hours of darkness the Ka'ab fleet surprised the vessels under the command of the Kapitān Pāsha and captured three of his Taknahs without resistance; and on the next day they sailed quietly up the river in full view of the Turks, plundered several villages near Basrah, and took a number of small boats. Soon afterwards, however, Shaikh Salmān offered to make a single payment to the Turks; and a peace having been arranged on this basis, the Turkish forces returned to Basrah after an absence in the field of less than three weeks.

The participation of British subjects in this ineffectual expedition had been sanctioned, if not actually arranged, by Mr. Peter Elwin Wrench, the East India Company's Agent at Basrah, who, as remarked

pedition
against the
Ka'ab, 1765.

Renewed
trouble with
the Ka'ab,
August—
October 1765.

by the traveller Niebuhr, may have been a better merchant than he was a politician; and the Ka'ab Shaikh contended that, in making peace with the Turks, he had not abandoned his right of retaliation on the British, whose unfriendly action he had every reason to resent. An alarming attack by the Ka'ab upon British shipping, which is described at length in the history of 'Arabistān, followed in July 1765; and on the 24th of August eight Ka'ab Gallivats appeared at Basrah, whereupon the Muntafik tribe under Shaikh 'Abdullah, on pretence of repelling the invaders, migrated into the date plantations on the right bank of the river below Basrah and there joined the enemy in making away with the fruit. The Mutasallim, whose chief fear was that an open combination might suddenly replace the secret understanding between the Ka'ab and the Muntafik, remained inactive at Manāwi, where he had concentrated all his troops for the defence of the town; and the disagreeable situation continued until the 10th of October, when the Ka'ab took their departure. By this time little of the date crop remained to be collected by the proprietors.

Fourth
Anglo-
Turkish ex-
pedition
against the
Ka'ab, 1766-
68.

The unheard-of aggressions committed by the Ka'ab in 1765 upon vessels under the British flag obliged the East India Company to despatch a considerable mixed force in the following year for the punishment of the tribe. A campaign followed, of which the course is fully detailed in the history of 'Arabistān, and of which it is enough to say here that the Turks took part, as the nominal principals, on the same side as the British; that the heaviest action fought resulted in a deplorable defeat of the British; and that the operations were finally brought to an end by the intervention of Karīm Khān, Vakil of Persia. In March and April 1767, as described in the historical chapter relating to the Persian Coast, a genuine effort was made by an emissary from Karīm Khān to the Ka'ab to obtain satisfaction for the British and the Turks, but it failed; and a naval blockade of the Ka'ab country, which the British had established on their retirement, was rigorously maintained until 1768. In that year, in consequence of their failure to take the island of Khārag under an arrangement which they had formed with Karīm Khān, and of the premature abandonment of further negotiations at Shīrāz, the British forfeited the support of the Vakil in the Ka'ab case. The naval blockade of the Ka'ab was then, apparently, abandoned; and the Ka'ab, finding themselves once more at large, began to build forts upon both sides of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Assistance
lent by the

At the end of 1769, as noticed in an earlier section, the Ka'ab, who had now begun to tire of their Persian connection, actually proceeded

to the assistance of the Turkish Mutasallim of Basrah against the Muntafik with a fleet of 14 Gallivats. Ka'ab to the Turks, 1769.

In 1771, the Turks were still at peace with the Ka'ab, and the latter appeared to have dropped their animosity against the British; but neither the Turks, who had unsettled claims against them amounting to more than Rs. 20,000, nor the British, who had received no compensation for the outrages of 1765, appeared likely to obtain any satisfaction from the tribe. Before the end of 1773 a fresh rupture occurred between the Ka'ab and the Turks, and the former stopped the trade of Basrah by stationing three of their Gallivats so as to close the navigation of the river. Renewed friction between the Ka'ab and the Turks, 1771-73.

British political and general relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

In 1758, Mr. Garden, who was still Mr. Shaw's Assistant, visited Baghdād on important affairs, temporarily superseding Khōjah Raphael, an Armenian merchant from Persia, who was the Resident's ordinary agent or "attorney" at that place. Mr. Garden entertained there the English traveller Dr. Ives and his companions, on whom, as "an accomplished young gentleman" he made a favourable impression. Visit of Mr. Garden to Baghdād, 1758.

In the summer of 1759—partly to neutralise the effects of a visit which the French Resident had recently paid to Baghdād, partly to gratify Sulaimān Pāsha, who had sent him money and pressing invitations, and partly perhaps to attend to the interests of his own private trade—Mr. Shaw, the British Resident at Basrah, made a journey to Baghdād, where he remained as the Pāsha's guest from the end of June until the middle of August. He was treated during the whole of his stay with the utmost distinction, or, as he himself expressed it, "had such "public honours and favours conferred on me as has rejoiced the "friends, and confounded the enemies of our nation." The principal result of the Resident's visit, from the official point of view, was the grant to him by the Pāsha of a Farman in which the Mutasallim of Basrah was commanded to observe most carefully every article of the Capitulations; and, lest his labour in obtaining such a document should appear to his employers superfluous, Mr. Shaw was careful to explain that the effect of the new orders would be not only to confirm the abolition of the anchorage dues or "Ships' presents," regarding which an understanding Journey of the British Resident to Baghdād and grant of a Farman by the Pāsha, 1759.

had been reached in 1756, but also to abolish for the first time a number of other irregular charges on shipping and on the transit of goods to the interior. The exemption of the Company from inland transit dues, hitherto not enjoyed in practice, would enable them to supply the native merchants of Baghdād with goods on the same terms as those of Basrah, provided that the purchasers on their part undertook the risks of carriage; and the consequence would be a reduction of 13 per cent. in the price of woollens at Baghdād. Mr. Shaw, on his return to Basrah at the middle of September, met with a very hearty reception from the officials, merchants and citizens of the town,—a circumstance which he attributed to the favour shown him by the Pāsha at Baghdād, and to the redress of several Basrah grievances which he had by his representations been able to obtain.

Attempt by
the Pāsha to
levy customs
at 5 per cent.
on British
trade, 1760.

Sulaimān Pāsha's regard for the Capitulations and for Mr. Shaw must rapidly have grown cool after the return of that gentleman to Basrah; for in the following year, professing to act under orders from Constantinople, he required payment of import duty by European merchants on their goods at the rate of 5 per cent. instead of the 3 per cent. admissible under treaty. The Mutasallim of Basrah, who was well affected towards the British, informed the Resident privately of this demand and of interference which had already been practised under it with the goods of Europeans at Baghdād; his advice was that the Resident should protest against the innovation, at the same time detaining the "Swallow" at Basrah as if for the purpose of shipping off the Company's goods; and he promised that remonstrances on his own part should not be wanting. The withdrawal of the obnoxious order was at length obtained, though not without the solemn production of the Capitulations by the British, nor until a present had been demanded from Mr. Shaw's private representative at Baghdād and refused; and only then did it become known that the eccentric behaviour of the Pāsha had been due to the advice of a new Kehiyah, who was an enemy of all Christians, and to whom had been assigned the difficult task of replenishing an empty exchequer.

The assistance against the Ka'ab given by the British to the Turks in 1761 has already been noticed above.

Elevation of
the Basrah
Residency
to the status
of an Agency,
1763.

In accordance with orders passed by the Court of Directors in the previous year, the Government of Bombay in January 1763 prepared to transfer the Company's principal station in the Gulf from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah; and, as an important inquiry was to be held at Basrah into the conduct of the late Resident there, for which Mr. Douglas, the Agent

at Bandar 'Abbās, was held to be disqualified by his previous connection with the case, Mr. William Andrew Price was temporarily deputed from Bombay to carry out the delicate duty, and at the same time to establish the Agency. Before his arrival in the Gulf towards the end of March 1763, Mr. Douglas, as related in another place, had already withdrawn the Company's establishment at Bandar 'Abbās, sending most of the commercial stock to Basrah; consequently Mr. Price, apart from a halt which he made at Būshehr for the purpose of establishing a Residency there, as also directed by the Bombay Government, was able without delay to proceed on his mission to Basrah. He arrived there on the 13th of May, to find that a new Mutasallim, who bore "the character of an haughty, imperious man, and a mortal enemy to Christians," had arrived from Baghdād only three days previously to take charge of the Government; and he at first had some difficulty in arranging for his suitable reception on shore; but eventually, on the 18th of May, the Kapitān Pāsha, the Mufti and the Shah Bandar having been sent to meet him, he landed, and the new Agency was established.

It is unnecessary to refer again, in this place, to the intervention of Mr. Price in 1763, as described in an earlier paragraph, in the difficulties between the Basrah Government and the Ka'ab tribe.

In August 1764, a "Consulary Birat," or * order of the Porte recognising the East India Company's Agent at Basrah as British Consul there, was obtained by Mr. Grenville, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and was forwarded "together with the Grand Signior's commandment attending it, as likewise the Consulary patent or commission" from the British Ambassador himself, to Mr. Wrench, who at this time occupied the position of Agent at Basrah. Mr. Grenville, with whom the idea of applying for the Barāat probably originated, and who certainly over-estimated its practical value, encountered considerable opposition on the part of the Turkish Government before he carried his point, and he was proportionately elated by his success, in announcing which to the Agent he wrote:

The "Consulary Birat," 1761.

It is the surest and most efficacious means that we know of, in this part of the world, for protecting the Company's commerce, their property, and just rights: it secures to them for ever, and more firmly than anything else can, a permanent and

* The "Consulary Birat" of 1764, or rather a translation of the same supplied a number of years afterwards by the Resident at Basrah, will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*, Volume XIII, pages 7—9, 4th edition. A reference to that translation will show that the contents were substantially the same as those of the Barāat obtained for the Baghdād Residency in 1802 which is summarised at page 1301 *post*.

quiet residence at Basrah for their future Agents there: it silences for ever that new angled but dangerous doctrine of the Porte, the annual change of them. It is what has ever been practised by the Levant Company in almost all the considerable scales of the Levant for the sake of their commercial affairs; and by these means it is that their Consuls seldom or never meet with molestation in their respective establishments. The expediency and advantage of such a Birat is manifest and clear; the attainment of it was the doubtful point, and the more than doubtful, not only because of the extreme indisposition and aversion in the Porte to it, but because of its being in itself a new establishment, never practised byus before at Bassora, and an innovation in the eye of the Porte. In spite, however, I have succeeded; again I congratulate you upon it; and may the Company long enjoy the fruits of my success.

The Barāat ran in the name of Mr. Garden, who had been acting as Agent at Basrah while the negotiations at Constantinople were in progress; but the Ambassador assured Mr. Wrench that this was immaterial, and that after a little time had elapsed it would be easy for him to obtain the substitution, in a way that was customary elsewhere, of his own name for Mr. Garden's.

1765.

In 1765, some difficulty was experienced in inducing the local authorities in Turkish 'Irāq to respect and obey the recent commands of the Porte and the Sultan; but it was understood that their resistance was due to a bribe that some native merchants, who were opposed to the grant of Consular powers to the British Agent, had administered to the Pāsha of Baghdād; and Mr. Wrench and his council seem to have entertained no doubt that Mr. Garden, who was then at Baghdād, would be able to arrange matters with the Pāsha, especially if he were authorised to make him a present larger than the bribe. The Agent and Council understood that if the Consular powers of the Agency were recognised in practice, they would be able to land goods for native clients at the Company's premises and, on making themselves responsible to the Turkish Government for the duty payable by their customers, to hand them over direct to the importers, who would thus be spared the trouble and expense inseparable from the passage of goods through a Turkish custom house. The result of this procedure they expected to be that native merchants in general, and particularly the Armenians, whose import trade from India was the most considerable of all, would in future arrange to have all their goods consigned to them in British bottoms, by which means the receipts in consulage at Basrah would be increased and the Company re-imbursed for the heavy outlay that must have been incurred on their account at Constantinople. Whether, however, this interpretation of the scope of Consular powers proved to be correct, or whether the financial results were such as the Agent anticipated, does not, apart from one indication in the year 1769, on which we

shall have occasion to remark hereafter under another head, appear from the sequel.

The arrangement under which the East India Company's Resident or Agent in Turkish 'Irāq was located at the port of Basrah, while the Turkish Governor of the whole province had his residence at Baghdād, presented obvious inconveniences, to neutralise which various measures were taken at different times. In 1737, 1738 and 1758 an assistant to the Resident, and in 1736, 1745, 1756 and 1759 the Resident himself, visited Baghdād; Mr. Shaw, while he was in charge of Basrah, was ordinarily represented at the capital by Khōjah Raphael, an Armenian merchant from Persia; and, at the point which we have now reached, the Agent and Council seem to have become convinced of the necessity of maintaining a European representative at the Court of the Pāsha.

Temporary
establish-
ment of a
Residency
at Baghdād,
1765-66.

The immediate cause of their first deputing a gentleman to Baghdād 1765. was a difficulty which they experienced, from not having as yet formally congratulated Sulaimān Pāsha on his accession or made him the customary present, in recovering a large debt that was due to their employers from a certain Hāji Yūsuf at Basrah; and they thought that the opportunity was also a good one for securing recognition by the Pāsha of the consular powers conferred on the British Agent, which, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, he seemed inclined to ignore; but it was not originally intended that Mr. Robert Garden, on whom their choice fell—partly because he had already visited Baghdād in 1758, partly because he knew Turkish, and partly because he was next in standing to the Agent himself,—should remain permanently, and the expenses of his trip were estimated at only Rs. 1,200. Mr. Garden, however, who left Basrah for Baghdād on the 28th March 1765, seems to have stayed there for some time; and, on his being recalled to India, Mr. Lyster was sent to take his place.

In 1766, the establishment of a Residency at Baghdād having mean- 1766. while been sanctioned by the Government of Bombay on the recommendation of the Agent and Council at Basrah, Mr. James Morley was sent from India to take charge of the new appointment and arrived on the 2nd of May at Baghdād, where he relieved Mr. Lyster.

It should be noticed, however, that the succession of the gentlemen mentioned to one another cannot have been continuous, for in January and February of 1766, when Niebuhr was at Baghdād, there was no British representative at that place. The presence of a European servant at Baghdād in 1765 and 1766 was no doubt useful in connection with the joint action of the British and the Turks in those years against the Ka'ab

tribes ; but the Court of Directors, on coming to know of what had been done, disapproved of the action of the Bombay Government ; and on the 23rd of November 1766 Mr. Morley was recalled from Baghdād.

Financial relations of the Turkish Government with the East India Company, arising out of the fourth Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1766-71.

The course of the expedition against the Ka'ab tribe undertaken by the Turks in 1766 in alliance with the East India Company is fully described in the history of the 'Arabistān province, which was the scene of the active operations ; but the financial arrangements between the allies may be noticed, more appropriately, in the present place. The help of the Company was in the beginning gratuitous ; but so tardy were the preparations of the Turks for the joint campaign that the representatives of the Company, towards the end of May, found it necessary to insist that, if the British naval and military forces were detained beyond the end of June, their expenses should be defrayed by the Turkish authorities and, this condition having been accepted by the Pāsha of Baghdād, a subsidy of 1,000 Tūmāns a month during the continuance of the expedition was arranged. This allowance was evidently payable in advance, for the Pāsha's Kehiyah, Muhammad or Mahmūd, on arriving from Baghdād towards the end of June to take command of the Turkish troops, immediately gave the British Agent an order for 600 Tūmāns, on account, which was duly honoured at the Basrah custom house. The Turkish instalments, however, soon ceased to be paid with regularity. In August, 320 Tūmāns in cash and an assignment of dates due to the Turkish Government, for which a purchaser at 1,080 Tūmāns was found, were obtained from the Kehiyah, but only by strong pressure ; and on the 2nd of February 1768 the balance due to the Company was 11,718 Tūmāns, less the value of a quantity of dates made over to them by the Turks, of which they had been able to dispose at the rate of three Tūmāns per large Kāreh. Already the Mutasallim of Basrah had begun to hint that enough had been paid to the British for the services of their fleet, and the Agent in reply to threaten that he would send it away, leaving Basrah unprotected,—an argument which seems to have prevailed over the objections of the Mutasallim, inasmuch as, by October 1768, the liabilities of the Turkish Government had been reduced to 2,050 Tūmāns. Difficulties, as we shall see hereafter, arose in 1769 ; and no further reduction had been effected up to the end of August 1771. It appears that a portion of the sum recovered was derived from the Turkish customs of Basrah, of which half was at one time assigned to the British for the purpose by Sulaimān Āgha during his Deputy-Governorship.

Difficulties with Sulaimān Āgha

The conduct of Sulaimān Āgha, however, was not always satisfactory ; and in June 1769 Mr. Moore, the British Agent at Basrah

was driven to complain to the Pasha of Baghdād by letter of the injustice, oppression and rapacity of his representative, and in particular of his tyrannical treatment of the Armenians and other Christian merchants.* At the same time he mentioned, as illustrations of the Mutasallim's attitude towards the British, that within a week he had allowed two of his attendants to strike with clubs the horse of a gentleman who was at the time in the company of the Agent, and had caused the porter of the British Factory to be imprisoned and beaten, for no reason that could be ascertained unless that he was a Christian and a servant of the Factory. Before the Pasha's answer, which merely stated that the Mutasallim had been reprimanded and ordered to make reparation for his conduct, reached Basrah, Sulaimān Āgha himself had expressed a wish for a reconciliation and had promised to comply with the following conditions laid down by Mr. Moore, the two last of which throw an interesting side-light on the question of consulage and customs and on that of repayment of the debt due by the Turkish Government to the Company :—

and his
removal from
the Mutasal-
limate of
Basra¹, 1769.

First.—That the Mutasallim should send a deputation to the British Agent to apologise for the insults to which he had subjected him, especially in the imprisonment of the Factory porter, and to promise amendment of his conduct in future.

Second.—That the Mutasallim should give the British Agent an order for 20,000 Qurūsh on account of the duty on the goods landed by native merchants from certain specified British ships, and that he should agree to the Turkish customs on the goods landed by the British from the same ships being retained by the East India Company in part payment of the debt due to them by the Turkish Government.

Third.—That the customs on the cargoes of the other ships expected during the season should be divided in the following manner, *viz.*, “the 3 per cent. on all English property to be all paid to the Honourable Company,” and “the 7 per cent. on all country property whatever, whether sold by the English or country merchants, to be equally divided between the Mussaleem and the Honourable Company, or 3½ per cent. each.”

From these conditions it would appear that a number of the native merchants were still in the habit of landing the goods which they impor-

* In fairness to Sulaimān it should be recalled that Mr. Moore, as proved by his whole conduct at Basrah, was a peculiar and flighty character; and that Sulaimān, as we have seen already and shall see again hereafter, lived on excellent terms with other British officials. In the text we have only Mr. Moore's version of the case.

ted at the Turkish custom house, and not at the Company's premises as had been hoped by the Agent and Council in 1765.

The behaviour of Sulaimān Āgha, notwithstanding his acceptance of Mr. Moore's terms, must have continued unsatisfactory; for on the 31st of October 1769, on news being received that Sulaimān Pāsha had marched from Baghdād against the Muntafik tribe, Mr. Moore and Mr. Green embarked on the "Expedition" cruiser and proceeded up the Euphrates, accompanied by the bomb-vessel "Fancy," to Umm Labās on the south side of the river half way from Qūrnah to Samāwah, where they found the Pāsha encamped. They arrived there on the 6th of November, to discover that the Mutasallim had anticipated them by some days and obtained the Pāsha's ear; but on the 12th, after the Mutasallim's departure for Basrah, the Agent had a private interview with the Pāsha, which resulted a few days later in the despatch of the Kehiyah, who was also the Pāsha's brother, to remove Sulaimān Āgha from his Government and to install in his place Yūsuf Āgha, who was generally reported to be an honest and humane man.

Refusal of
the British
to assist the
Turks
against the
Muntafik,
1769.

In August 1769, the Pāsha of Baghdād earnestly begged the British Agent at Basrah to lend him the assistance of the Company's vessels for suppressing the revolt of the Muntafik under Shaikh 'Abdullah, already mentioned; but Mr. Moore, to whom the disastrous consequences of the Company's intervention in the war between the Turks and the Ka'ab were well known, whose relations with the rebellious Shaikh 'Abdullah had always been friendly, and who at the time—as we have already seen—had unredressed grievances against the Mutasallim of Basrah, evaded the request on the ground that large European ships would be unable to act in the Euphrates. In the opinion of the Agent there was even at one time a possibility of the town of Basrah being captured by the Muntafik, and this he regarded as a strong additional reason for observing neutrality.

Withdrawal
of the
Agency staff
from Basrah,
23rd April
1773.

In the spring of 1773 an outbreak of plague occurred at Basrah, resulting in heavy mortality and general panic. At the beginning of April, the Agent (Mr. Moore) and some of his establishment retired to "Belvoir," where also the Company's vessels "Drake" and "Tyger" were sent to lie, while the other members of the staff shut themselves up in the Factory building in the town of Basrah; and communication with the outer world was after that rigorously avoided. On the 7th of April the "Swallow," sloop-of-war, arrived at Basrah with 65 bales of piece-goods from Sūrat; and as Sir John Clerke, the commander, would not allow any boats from the shore to approach his vessel lest they should

bring contagion, the cargo was transhipped to the Company's cruiser "Drake" with a view to its being landed after the epidemic had ceased. The disease, however, so far from abating at the approach of the hot weather, as had been expected, continued day by day to increase; and the position of the Company's employés, whose servants had deserted them and whose provisions had begun to fail and could not, it was supposed, be replenished with safety, soon became extremely inconvenient.

At length, on the 23rd of April, having first sealed up the warehouses, recommended the Factory to the care of the local government, and appointed Khôjah Petrus and another Armenian merchant to represent the Company in their absence, they left Basrah for Bombay in the "Tyger" of eight, and the "Drake" of fourteen guns. In a resolution which they drew up immediately before starting, and which they left to be forwarded to the Court of Directors in London, they justified their conduct chiefly on the ground that there were not at Basrah any outstanding debts of consequence due to the Company, that the plague had caused a total suspension of business, and that it would be unsafe to hold communication with the natives for at least six months to come; and, in taking their departure, they were careful not to let it be suspected at Basrah that they meant to go so far as Bombay.

Three days later, while the two vessels were still descending the Shatt-al-'Arab, the "Tyger", then three or four miles ahead of the "Drake", was unexpectedly boarded by four piratical Gallivats from Rîg which her commander, Lieutenant Scott, had taken for Masqat vessels. Lieutenant Scott, finding that his lascars had all jumped over board and that he had only 11 Europeans left with whom to oppose the enemy, also threw himself into the water and was eventually picked up, along with two Europeans and two lascars, by the "Drake". Messrs. Beaumont and Green, Senior Merchants, who remained on board the vessel, were captured with her; but what became of the rest of the crew does not appear.

The "Drake" made every effort to overtake the "Tyger" and the pirate ships, which, assisted by a fifth Gallivat, quickly towed the unfortunate vessel away; but the pursuit, as the "Drake" on account of her draught of water was unable to cross the bar before the next morning's tide, was unsuccessful; and the Agent, considering it useless to proceed to Rîg with the "Drake" in her overloaded condition to demand the restoration of the "Tyger" and the release of the prisoners, resolved to prosecute his voyage "with the utmost expedition, lest from the lateness of the season the 'Drake' should lose her passage to

Capture of
the "Tyger"
in the Shatt-
al-'Arab,
26th April
1773.

Bombay." The subsequent experiences of Messrs. Beaumont and Green and the employment of the "Tyger" by the Persians are described in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast. The passengers who reached Bombay in the "Drake" were apparently Messrs. Moore, Lewis and Latouche; it is not clear whether Mr. Reilly, the Agency Surgeon, ever left Basrah, and he was certainly there again at the middle of October 1773, more than two months before the return of the Agent and other members of the staff.

No reference has been made in this section to a case which formed the subject of much correspondence between the Agency and the Turkish Government from 1765 to 1768, as it arose out of the conduct of two of the Company's servants (Messrs. Shaw and Garden) and is discussed, for that reason, in a later paragraph.

Trade of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

The trade of the East India Company at Basrah was considerable during this period; but their representatives seem to have obtained but little business at Baghdād, even during the existence of a Residency at that place.

Woollen
goods.

The chief article of import, here as in Persia, was woollen cloth of various sorts; and Mr. Shaw, on his visit to Baghdād in 1759, besides arranging—as he believed—for the future transit of the Company's goods to that place free of inland duties, actually disposed on the spot of 109 bales of coarse cloth at 7·4 Mahmūdis per gaz and of 30 bales of fine cloth at 17 Mahmūdis per gaz. He found that there was still a considerable importation of cloth from Aleppo to Baghdād; but this trade he hoped, by means of improved arrangements, entirely to "overset". In February 1768 there were "heavy remains" at Basrah; but 100 bales of broad cloth worth Rs. 30,569, consisting partly of coarse cloth and partly of coloured, had been consigned from Bombay and were expected to facilitate the disposal of the unsold stock. In 1771, there was a great accumulation of woollens, intended for sale in the Persian Gulf, both at Basrah and Bombay; and the Court of Directors, as a special measure, sanctioned their exchange for Gilān raw silk, and less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the price of the silk to be paid in woollens, after which the purchase of silk was to be discontinued. From 1763 to 1773, however, the average annual number of bales of Indian piece-goods imported at Basrah was 3,000 to 3,500. These were mostly the property of merchants settled in

Bengal, in Madras, and at Sūrāt; and they were chiefly carried in ships belonging to British subjects or to Muhammadan merchants of Sūrāt. The returns were largely in specie. During the same ten years the East India Company imported broad cloth and long ells at Basrah in considerable, and embossed cloth in small quantities.

Yaman coffee, brought annually by 'Omān vessels, was an important article of trade at Basrah during this period; but three times this traffic suffered serious interruption, *viz.*, in 1765 by the Ka'ab disturbances in the Shatt-al-'Arab, in 1767 by the rapacity of Mīr Mahanna at Khārag, and in 1769 by the war between the Vakil of Persia and the Imām of 'Omān. In 1761 an attempt was made to introduce Cornish tin at Basrah, but it does not appear to have been immediately successful; in 1764, however, there was a trade in tin there. Some iron, steel, lead, and carpets were imported also, but not in large quantities. Other im-
ports.

The export trade in dates had now grown to some importance, as shown by several indications. In October of 1763 the "Swallow" was sent to Dawāsir on the Lower Shatt-al-'Arab to prevent interference with some dates in which Mr. Shaw, the ex-Resident at Basrah, who was indebted to the Company, had an interest; in October 1767 Mr. Lyster of the Basrah Agency was reported to be at Maharzi, probably the part of 'Abbādān Island so named, "engaged ... in gathering in what dates he possibly can", but his operations were impeded by the behaviour of the Ka'ab tribe; and in 1768 the Agent and Council allowed part payment of the Turkish Government's debt to the East India Company to be made in dates. Dates.

In 1759, when silver rupees became scarce at Basrah, orders were requested by the Resident and by the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās as to the kind of gold in which remittances should be made, instead, from Basrah to India; and early in the following year, not having as yet received definite instructions and rupees being no longer procurable, the Resident sent "Venetians and Nadiris" to Bandar 'Abbās, whence they were forwarded to Bombay. Specie.

The following extract from a Bombay Castle "Consultation", dated 24th April 1769, is interesting, as it illustrates the practice of the Company in relation to freights, and also casts some light on matters of discipline falling properly under the next section: Freights.

The petition from the Armenian and other merchants at Basrah, complaining of their not being furnished with an annual freight ship from Surat and other hardships in respect to their trade from thence, being now taken into consideration, the President declares that part which relates to him is an absolute falsity, as he never gave orders

to, or ever wrote a syllable to, Mr. Price on the subject, as the merchants allege that gentleman informed their constituents; and in regard to what they allege against Mr. Price, he must be called upon to reply to it; when proper measures will be taken to prevent all complaints of this kind in future by making some necessary regulations in respect to freight ships in general. We cannot, however, close this subject without remarking our surprize at the Agent and Council having referred the above petition immediately to our Honourable Masters, as translations of this nature ought to be submitted to us as their immediate superiors and through us to the Honourable Company. Acting otherwise is directly contrary to their and our orders and the general rules prescribed for advices to Europe.

Establishments of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757--73.

Organisation
and appoint-
ments.

The interests of the Company in Turkish 'Irāq were represented, as we have seen, until 1763, by a Resident at Basrah, subordinate to the Company's Agent at Bandar 'Abbās; but in the year mentioned the Agency was transferred from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah, which thus became the principal British station in the Gulf, and it remained there until after the close of the period. In 1760, before this change occurred, Mr. Garden, on account of his special qualifications, seems to have been appointed Joint-Resident with Mr. Shaw, whose Assistant he had been; but in the next year, as will appear further on, both were removed, and the sole Residency was restored. In 1764 a qualified book-keeper in the person of Mr. G. Skipp, Writer, was added to the staff of the Agency and received an allowance of Rs. 20 per month for taking charge of the accounts. In 1764 the entertaining of a "Latty" Master, apparently a private customs officer, with a staff of assistants, was sanctioned for the prevention of frauds; but the Bombay Government did not approve of a suggestion by Mr. Price, that a "Latty" or private customs house should be erected and native merchants compelled to use it, as they feared that the building itself would be expensive to construct and that future Mutasallims of Basrah might raise objections to the system. In the following year the Agent and Council asked for another Assistant to enable them to cope with the ordinary work. In 1765-66, as already explained, a temporary Residency under Basrah existed at Baghdād.

The Basrah
Factory, and
life of
Europeans in
the country.

The Agency building at Basrah, generally styled the Factory, was situated in 1765 near the southern bank of the 'Ashār creek at a distance from the Shatt-al-'Arab, a little way below the residence of the

Mutasallim, which was about the middle of the native town ; but there was also a country-house or branch of the Factory at "Belvoir" on the Shatt-al-'Arab, 4 miles from Basrah, a place possibly identical with the modern Kût-al-Farangi.

It seems that the Company's employés at Basrah, when they were on good terms with one another, lived in a sort of mess ; for in 1763, on the occasion of Mr. Price's deputation to report on personal matters there, it was specially enjoined on him by the Bombay Government "that at Basrah everybody live in one house (if it can be done), eat at "one table, and in every respect keep up a perfect harmony."

Europeans residing in the country were obliged, out of consideration for their dignity, to maintain some state ; and Mr. Garden in 1758 would not allow English visitors at Baghdād to appear on foot in the streets and restricted them to riding magnificently caparisoned horses. European residents generally adopted Turkish costume, of which two complete suits, in good style, cost nearly £100.

Complaints of ill-health are not many during this period ; but in October 1770 Mr. Garden was obliged by illness to return to India, only a few months after he had arrived to take up the appointment of Second at Basrah ; in the summer of 1771 an "almost general sickness" prevailed among the staff ; and in 1773, as we have seen above, there was a severe outbreak of plague, to which, however, none of the staff fell victims.

We must now briefly notice a case, arising out of the conduct of two of the Company's servants in the Gulf, which caused a great official turmoil in its earlier stages, and which, in its later developments, was productive of much trouble with the Turkish Government.

Case of
Messrs. Shaw
and Garden,
1861—68.

Mr. Shaw, who held the office of Resident at Basrah from 1753 to 1761, was a liberal and hospitable gentleman, his name was well known and apparently respected throughout the country, and he maintained friendly relations with a number of Turkish officials in various places ; but his conduct, though he had at one time been designated for the Residency in Sind, as a mark of the Company's approbation, in case he preferred it to Basrah, had grown by degrees less and less satisfactory to his employers. The necessity for his journey to Baghdād in 1759 appears to have been called in question ; complaints were made in 1760, by the Court of Directors, as to the inefficient manner in which the overland mail service to Europe was being managed by him ; and, early in 1761, the Bombay Government found it necessary to call on the Agent at Bandar 'Abbās to insist that the expenses of the Basrah Residency should be kept within moderate bounds, particularly "the article of presents, which

1759—61.

"we observed was become very large." At length in February 1761, much inconvenience having been caused in India by Mr. Shaw's detention of the "Drake" and "Swallow" at Basrah contrary to express orders, the Bombay Government appointed a Committee to report on his conduct and decided, in accordance with its recommendations, to remove him and to send a Mr. Stuart to Basrah in his place; but, as a letter had also been received from the Court of Directors ordering the removal of Mr. Shaw in case he were unable to justify his conduct in the matter of the overland mails, they thought it well that Mr. Douglas, their Agent at Bandar 'Abbās, should visit Basrah and investigate that point for the satisfaction of the Court.

1761. Messrs. Douglas and Stuart arrived at Basrah on the 14th May 1761, and the case suddenly took another turn. It was now discovered that Messrs. Shaw and Garden, the Joint Residents, were responsible to the Company for a shortage of 12,317 Tūmāns (or about Rs. 61,585) in the cash of the Factory, which they were unable to make good; and Mr. Garden was accordingly suspended from his employment by Mr. Douglas, Mr. Shaw being, it would seem, already under suspension. Mr. Douglas remained at Basrah until the 17th October 1761, when he returned to Bandar 'Abbās, leaving Mr. Stuart in charge of the Residency. Mr. Shaw then complained to the Bombay Government of having been unfairly treated by Mr. Douglas, who had hopelessly compromised his credit with the Turkish officials, encouraged his native debtors to dispute their liabilities, and finally departed just when a few days' delay might have enabled him to adjust the whole account; and he begged that means might be devised for enabling him to wind up his affairs at Basrah and also to vindicate his character.

1762. On the 21st of July 1762 Mr. Stuart, the new Resident, died suddenly at Basrah; and Mr. Douglas, as a temporary measure, sent Mr. Lyster from Bandar 'Abbās to take charge of the Residency.

1863. The Bombay Government, whom Mr. Douglas's report seems to have left in doubt whether Mr. Shaw had embezzled the Company's funds or had merely been guilty—as admitted by himself—of a breach of standing orders in supplying woollen goods on credit to a native merchant named Hāji Yūsuf, decided, on learning of the vacancy, to send an impartial person to the spot to clear up and settle the case; and they selected for this duty Mr. W. A. Price, whom, at the beginning of 1763, they invested with the rank of "Provisional Agent of Persia". Orders had already been issued to Mr. Douglas for the transfer of the Persian Gulf Agency from Bandar 'Abbās to Basrah, and it was intended

that he should ultimately retain charge of it, if he pleased; but during Mr. Price's visit his powers as Agent were to be in abeyance, an opportunity, however, being afforded him at Basrah of disproving the charges brought against him by Mr. Shaw. Mr. Douglas, who was senior in standing to Mr. Price, preferred not to go to Basrah on these terms; and, after withdrawing the Bandar 'Abbās establishment and sending most of the stock to Basrah, he returned to India without meeting his successor. The result of Mr. Price's inquiry was to show that Messrs. Shaw and Garden, though they had disobeyed orders, had not been guilty of any dishonesty, and that Hāji Yūsuf was really indebted to Mr. Shaw to the extent of 11,674 Tūmāns; and for this amount Mr. Price succeeded in obtaining an "obligation" from the Hāji.

Hereupon the Bombay Government, in January 1764, held that Messrs. Shaw and Garden were still answerable to the Company for a balance of 11,807 Tūmāns, which had been struck on the 24th of March 1762; ordered Mr. Shaw to Bombay, where, with a seat in Council "conformable to his standing" he was to await the decision of the Court of Directors; and cancelled the suspension of Mr. Garden, but refused to appoint him to the post of Second at Basrah, for which he had apparently been recommended by Mr. Price. Mr. Shaw, however, did not see fit to comply with these lenient orders, and instead betook himself to Aleppo, where he remained for some time without even informing the Directors in London of his presence there; and the Court, in November 1764, on becoming aware of this further circumstance, ordered him to be dismissed from the Company's service, while at the same time they insisted on Mr. Garden's being immediately recalled from Basrah to India. Mr. Price, after discharging his commission, had left again for Bombay in January 1764.

1764.

This was the end of the case as among the servants of the Company but it still remained to recover from Hāji Yūsuf the value of the goods, belonging to the Company, which he had obtained from Mr. Shaw. Up to March 1765 little or no progress had been made in the matter, the Pasha of Baghdād apparently insisting on the production of proofs attested by a Qādhi, and the Agent and Council at Basrah, with the approval of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, refusing to comply; and in that month Mr. Garden, who had meanwhile returned to Turkish 'Irāq, was sent to Baghdād to interview the Pasha in regard to this and other matters. The Kehiyah soon after asked to be allowed to inspect securities to the value of 9,000 Tūmāns which had been

1765.

deposited by Hāji Yūsuf at Basrah, and in reply he was informed that they would be handed to the Mutasallim, if desired, but that the Agent and Council could not themselves undertake the responsibility of forwarding them to Baghdād. Eventually Mr. Garden obtained an order for the sale of Hāji Yūsuf's property; but the Mutasallim represented that on account of the demands of Janissaries and other creditors upon the estate, it would be impossible to find purchasers for the houses, lands, etc., of which it consisted in the ordinary way, and that it would be better if they were put up for sale as the property of the East India Company. The Agent agreed to this suggestion on condition that the Hujjats or title deeds should first be delivered over to him; and the Mutasallim then had recourse to fresh evasions, alleging that the title deeds were "old, and few or none remaining", and suggesting that the Agent should find the purchasers first, when certificates in the Sultān's name would be furnished, superior in validity to any Hujjats.

1766. In June 1766 the Kehiyah, on arriving from Baghdād to take command of the Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, promised that within 20 or 30 days of the final defeat of the enemy he would settle the entire debt by "separating the lands among the sons and obliging them to pay off the whole in proportion"; and though the condition on which the promise depended was not fulfilled, repayment had begun in earnest by April 1767.

1767-68. For some time afterwards instalments seem to have been regularly received, and after the beginning of 1768 the case ceased to be mentioned, presumably because the claim had been settled.

Mr. French's estate, 1768. From instructions given by the Bombay Government to the Agent at Basrah in 1768, it would seem that proceedings still continued in regard to the estate of Mr. French, the former Resident, who had died at Basrah so long before as 1737, and that persons having claims were now advised to make application to the East India Company in London.

Case of Mr. Skipp, 1768-69. In October 1768, on his return from a mission to Shīrāz, described in the history of the Persian Coast, Mr. Skipp, who had originally been sent to Basrah as book-keeper in 1764, was suspended by the Agent and Council there for breach of trust and breach of orders in his capacity of "Warehouse-keeper and Accomptant". It was apparently alleged that he had been guilty of dishonesty in the disposal of some "shalloons" at a low price jointly with Mr. Wrench, a former Agent, and also in the sale of some cloth but the Government of

Bombay, who were well aware of the animosity of Mr. Moore, the Agent, against Mr. Skipp on account of the divergence of their Persian policies, found Mr. Skipp guilty of an error of judgment only, removed his suspension, and restored him to his standing, at the same time, however, requiring him "to make good the difference on the price of the shaloons and the amount of Mr. Lyster's debt to the warehouse." The Bombay Government, while they thought Mr. Skipp's suspension not unwarranted in the circumstances, "highly condemned" the Agent and Council for having ordered it without allowing Mr. Skipp any opportunity of explaining his conduct.

Overland communication between Basrah and Europe, 1757—73.

We have already alluded, in connection with Mr. Shaw's case, to the interest shown by the Court of Directors of the East India Company in the efficient maintenance of overland communication between Europe and India by way of Basrah. Here we may add that on the same occasion they described the care of this "important channel" as an essential part of the Resident's duty and ordered the Bombay Government, in the following terms, to insist on his exact performance of the same: "whoever in future is appointed to Basrah (you) will keep "a watchful eye over his conduct; and if he ever fails in a punctual "correspondence with us or yourselves, or is ever found to delay advices "to or from India, call him immediately to Bombay; for early advices "may prove of the greatest consequence to our affairs, in time of war "especially."

Mails.

Travellers.

The Basrah overland route was frequented, to a limited extent, by European travellers, generally servants of the East India Company, between Europe and the East; but to those using it without proper arrangements it sometimes proved dangerous. A Captain Ivers was plundered in September 1757 on his way from Basrah to Aleppo; and at the beginning of 1758 Mr. Barton, a retired East India merchant, who after living for some time the life of a country gentleman at home, had determined to revisit India, was robbed and very nearly killed between Aleppo and Baghdād. Dr. Ives and his companions, who were in Turkish 'Irāq from April to June 1758, and the scientific traveller Niebuhr, who spent in the country the period from

August 1765 to March 1766, both arrived at Basrah from the Persian Gulf and returned to Europe by way of Baghdad, Diyarbakr and Aleppo. Sir Eyre Coote also passed through Basrah on a homeward journey *via* the desert in 1771.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

The French
war frigate
"Bristol"
at Basrah
1758.

At the beginning of the Seven Years' War a French vessel of 300 tons with twenty 3-pounder guns was lying in the river at Basrah; and there she remained, protected by the neutrality of the port, until 1758, when a French frigate of war, the "Bristol", Captain Rivage, was sent to bring her away. The "Bristol" carried 30 guns and a crew of 140 men, of whom 85 were Europeans, and the rest lascars. When Dr. Ives and his friends were at Basrah in April 1758, they found the two French ships still there; and on the neutral soil of Turkey, notwithstanding that war prevailed between their nations, numerous courtesies were exchanged between the British and the French communities, over which Mr. Shaw and M. Perdria at this time respectively presided. At a supper party given by the French Resident at his country house, the company, which included the whole staff of the British factory, the British visitors, and all the officers of the "Bristol," amounted to 26, —the greatest number of Europeans, it was believed, that had ever been assembled at Basrah.

Contest for
precedence
between the
British and
French Resi-
dents at
Basrah.
1759—65.

About the beginning of 1759, the Seven Years' War being still in progress, the French Resident at Basrah made a journey to Baghdad and obtained from Sulaimān Pāsha a Farmān in which it was enjoined that he should in future "be first received on the ceremonial visits and be respected as first of the European Residents." The Frenchman, on returning to Basrah, proceeded on the strength of this Farmān to treat the British Resident as inferior to himself in rank, and informed the great men and merchants of Basrah, especially the Christians, that they must on all public days visit the French before the British Resident. The persons to whom this order was addressed refused, however, to comply with it, and informed Mr. Shaw, the British Resident, that they preferred the British to the French. Mr. Shaw thereupon made a representation to the Pāsha of Baghdad, of which the result was that the Pāsha sent a command to the Mutasallim at Basrah "directing him and all his officers to regard the English as first in his esteem";

that he wrote to the French Resident at Basrah, condemning the order in regard to first visits which that officer had taken upon himself to issue; and that he "also addressed a letter to Mr. Shaw, expressing his concern at the Frenchman's impudence." Mr. Shaw's visit to Baghdād later in the year perhaps bore some reference to this affair: at least he reported that the ill-behaviour of the French Resident at Baghdād had been "in some respect the original cause" of the Pāsha's invitation to himself. The dispute lingered on, after the conclusion of the war, until 1765, when Sulaimān Āgha, on his appointment to the Mutasallimate of Basrah, finally decided it in favour of the British Resident by "giving him the preference to the French Resident" in regard to the first visit to the Serai, and gave orders to his guards "that, if he attempted to come there till after the English had had their audience, to stop him; so that point of contest is at last "determin'd in our favour."

In 1765-66, the year in which Niebuhr visited Turkish 'Irāq, the French were represented at Basrah by a Resident who did not engage in trade, and who made the most of an official salary by no means regularly paid; and the offices of French Consul at Baghdād and Latin Bishop of Babylon were still combined in the person of Mgr. Baillet, who eventually died of plague at Baghdād in 1773. The French Factory at Basrah was located in 1765 in the native town, on the south side of the 'Ashār creek, somewhat higher up than the residence of the Mutasallim.

The French
position in
1565—66.

Other European nations in Turkish 'Irāq, 1757—73.

The Portuguese seem by this time to have disappeared entirely from Turkish 'Irāq. Portuguese.

The Dutch, after their removal from Basrah in or about 1752, never again established themselves in the country; but from 1754 to 1765 they maintained a settlement on the neighbouring island of Khārag, from which all the spices and drugs in the Basrah market were imported by native merchants. Dutch.

There were now several Italian merchants at Basrah who carried on a considerable trade with Venice and Leghorn by way of Aleppo. One of the richest of these, in 1765, was a M. Leoni, who was very efficiently represented at Baghdād by a young Venetian agent. Italians.

ABDUL HAMĪD I.

1773—89.*

The reign of the Turkish Sultān Abdul Hamīd,† who succeeded Mustafa III at the end of 1773 and ruled until his death in the spring of 1789, was occupied by an incessant struggle with the Russians, in which two leading incidents were the treaty of Kainardji, imposed on Turkey in 1774, and the complete annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783. The difficulties with which the Porte had to contend in Europe occupied their attention to the exclusion of all other affairs, and incapacitated them equally from restraining and from assisting the Pāsha of Baghdād, from obliging him to respect their own authority, and from enabling him to repel invasion when his territories were entered by the armies of Karīm Khān, Vakil of Persia.

*For the period covered by the reigns of 'Abdul Hamīd I and Sālīm III (1773—89 and 1789—1807) in Turkish 'Irāq the official authorities are the anonymous *Précis containing Information in regard to the First Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, printed in 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800*, printed in 1905: both of these cover the entire period. Other valuable sources of information are *Travels in Asia and Africa*, 1808, by Mr. A. Parsons, who was present at Basrah in 1774-75 at the beginning of the siege by the Persians; *Observations on the Passage to India*, 1784, by Colonel J. Capper, who visited Basrah in 1778-79 towards the end of the Persian occupation; *Observations made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia*, 1790, by Ensign W. Fraucklin, and a *Journal of the Passage from India*, by Dr. T. Howel, both of whom were at Basrah at the beginning of 1787, shortly after the collapse of Shaikh Thuwaini's usurpation; a *Brief History of the Wahabys*, 1834, by Sir H. J. Brydges, who was a member of the Basrah Residency from 1787 to 1795 and himself Resident at Baghdād from 1798 to 1806; and, lastly, the *Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse*, 1801—07, of M. Olivier, who passed through Baghdād twice in 1796-97.

Professor E. S. Creasy's *History of the Ottoman Turks*, 1856, contains the general history of Turkey during the period.

†The Agent in Council at Basrah wrote on the 23rd of April 1774 to the Government of Bombay " . . . there is no hopes of a peace betwixt the Turks and " Russians being shortly concluded from a new Sultan Huleem having lately succeeded " to the Turkish throne on the death of his brother Mustapha." The present writer is not aware how the discrepancy in names here is to be explained.

Epidemic of plague in Turkish 'Irāq, 1773.

The epidemic of plague that occasioned the withdrawal of the British Agency from Turkish 'Irāq in April 1773, as before described, began in March at Baghdād, that place having received infection by a caravan from Erzeroum; but it extended almost immediately to Basrah. At Baghdād, where it had been unknown during more than 60 years, the fell disease continued until the middle of May, and at Basrah it did not cease until September. Mgr. Baillet, the Latin Bishop of Babylon, was among the more notable victims at Baghdād; while the Pāsha and his suite sought and found immunity by isolating themselves in a country palace, surrounded by gardens, at distance of about three miles from the city. The mortality from plague was heavy throughout the country, and there was stagnation of trade and general depression; but the total number of deaths, which there was no means of estimating, has probably been* exaggerated by contemporary writers.

Affairs in Turkish 'Irāq, from the epidemic of plague to the siege of Basrah, 1773—75.

Mr. Moore, the British Agent at Basrah, and a part of his staff, who arrived in Bombay harbour from Basrah on the 14th of May 1773, remained in quarantine on Butcher's Island until the 17th of June following, when they were allowed to land in Bombay. Under the orders of Government they left again for Basrah on the 28th October 1773, taking with them two new ketches of 14 guns each, the "Tigris" and "Euphrates," which had been built at Bombay expressly to the order of the Pāsha of Baghdād. The party remained at Masqat from

Return of
the British
Agency to
Basrah,
January
1774.

* Turkish officials in 1774 succeeded in persuading Mr. Parsons that at Baghdād, out of about 500,000 inhabitants, more than 300,000 had died of plague in a little over four months and had been properly interred by the survivors, every burial being registered by the authorities. At Basrah, Mr. Parsons was led to believe that more than 200,000 people had perished out of 300,000. Another estimate, officially reported by the British Agency, showed a mortality of 200,000 in Basrah and its environs, and one of 2,000,000 in the entire province: the latter number probably exceeds the whole population of the country at the present day. Recent experience in India has shown that in large places, even when plague is most severe, the process of depopulation is not so rapid as this.

the 17th of November to the 1st of December, chiefly to admit of repairs to the "Euphrates," which had lost her rudder and sustained other injuries by going ashore at the entrance of Masqat harbour. On the 5th of January 1774 they reached Basrah and re-occupied the British Factory, which was found, apparently, in good order. The Pasha of Baghdād seems to have been much pleased at the return of the Agency, and with the vessels supplied to him, and to have presented the Agent with a horse and trappings as a mark of his satisfaction.

Internal
administra-
tion, 1773—
75.

The ruler of the Baghdād province at this time was one* Hamad Pasha, of whom little is known beyond these facts: that in 1774 he had already held the government for a number of years; that latterly he had neglected public business for a life of ease and seclusion; and that in September 1774 he was guilty of an act of base ingratitude in allowing his adoptive father, whose influence had procured him the Pashāliq, to be assassinated along with his sons on a suspicion that he disapproved of the Pasha's administration and meant to subvert it.

The machinery of government continued, at the time of Mr. Parsons' visit to Turkish 'Irāq in 1774, to be much the same as it had been found a few years earlier by Ives and Niebuhr. There was still an Āgha of Janissaries at Baghdād representing the Turkish central government, but he had become—perhaps in consequence of the pre-occupation of the Porte with European affairs—a political cypher. A Kapitān Pasha existed at Basrah, under whose control were the Turkish coasts of the Gulf and the waterways of 'Irāq below Baghdād and Hillah, and whose duty it was to collect tonnage dues on all non-British vessels arriving at or clearing from Basrah, as also on trading craft plying upon the rivers, and a monthly tax on fishing boats.

The Arab tribes were at this time at least as powerful as ever. From a point on the Euphrates 30 miles below Hillah to Basrah, and even further down the Shatt-al-'Arab, they were practically independent; they paid some tribute to the Pasha of Baghdād for his protection, but they did not tolerate the presence of his officials; and they collected tolls upon river-borne traffic, at points such as 'Arjah and Samāwah, for the benefit of their own chiefs. The river-side capital of one of these chiefs, probably that of a Shaikh of the Muntafik, was visited by Mr. Parsons in 1774 between Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh and Qūrnah; it consisted entirely of tents, covered an enormous area, and sheltered a huge population; and the live stock of all kinds belonging to the camp were almost innumer-

*So Parsons; but was he not really 'Umr Pasha, who succeeded in 1764? See footnote on page 1245 *post*.

able. Among the animals possessed by the tribe or their chief were horses of the best breeds, greyhounds, hawks, and even such a curiosity as a score of tame ostriches with red cloth collars and brass bells about their necks.

Among the principal items of public revenue in 'Irāq at this time were the sea-customs, which were levied at Basrah at the rate of 3 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods imported by Europeans, and at 8 per cent. on those of Turkish subjects and other Asiatics; and equivalent duties were collected on goods re-exported from Basrah to Aleppo or imported at Baghdād from Basrah, the valuation in the latter case being made according to the rates of the Baghdād market. Another important fiscal resource was a *tax on date palms in the neighbourhood of Basrah.

Baghdād was at this period an important centre of trade, so much so that Mr. Parsons after visiting it wrote: "This is the grand mart "for the produce of India and Persia, Constantinople, Aleppo and "Damascus; in short it is the grand oriental depository."

Course of
trade,
1773—75.

Basrah was of consequence chiefly as the sea-port of Baghdād; but at times merchants of Aleppo carried on a direct trade with it across the desert by caravan. These Aleppo traders brought European goods to Basrah for sale, chiefly from Venice, also specie in the shape of Venetian Sequins; while from the Persian Gulf side, exclusive of European goods, the imports at Basrah were chiefly Indian piece-goods, Mokha coffee, and drugs from various parts of Arabia and Persia. The coffee, gums and Arabian drugs for the most part reached Basrah in 'Omāni vessels; but occasionally a British ship brought a cargo of coffee from Mokha; and goods from Persia invariably arrived in Persian bottoms. Of the piece-goods reaching Baghdād, large quantities were sent to Smyrna and Constantinople; but the drugs mostly found their way to Alexandretta, whence they were shipped to Venice, Leghorn, Marseilles, London and Amsterdam. Horses were exported from Basrah to India, where they fetched high prices. Besides Turkish and European merchants, there were many rich Armenian and Jewish traders at Basrah who lived by the continental transit trade, purchasing either on commission or, in advance of orders, at their own risk.

The question of direct caravans between Basrah and Aleppo deserves further mention, as it was occasionally a subject of correspondence

*In 1774 this tax on palms at Basrah was said to yield about 100,000 local Tumāns or £187,500 sterling a year, but this must have been an exaggerated estimate, the amount mentioned being approximately that of the revenue of the Basrah Wilāyat from *all* sources at the present day.

between the British Agent at Basrah and the Pasha at Baghdād, the latter of whom did not readily agree to a lucrative traffic being carried on across his territories otherwise than through the capital, where it could be closely supervised. In the spring of 1773, however, in consequence of the outbreak of plague at Baghdād, the Pasha authorised the despatch of a caravan direct from Basrah to Aleppo; but Mr. Moore, the British Agent, was unable in the haste of his departure to take advantage of the concession, and after his return he could not at once obtain its renewal. In April 1774 the necessary leave was at last given; and about the same time a caravan from Aleppo came in at Basrah.

British
Factory at
Basrah, and
customs and
consulage of
the East
Indian Com-
pany 1763—
1775.

The British Factory at Basrah still occupied the same site in the native town as in 1766; and vessels of 80 tons, lying in the creek, could load and unload cargo at its very gate. On the opposite side of the creek was a good garden belonging to the Factory; and the Company's Agent had, besides, a country house at Magil, the modern Kūt-al-Farangi, which, though it stood about half a mile inland from the water's edge, commanded an excellent view both up and down the Shatt-al-'Arab.

All goods brought in British ships, including the whole of the imports from India, paid "a duty and consulage" to the East India Company, amounting to 6 per cent., which was distinct from the customs levied by the Turkish administration; and the annual proceeds of the impost or imposts in question were, chiefly because of the Indian trade, not inconsiderable. In February 1774, the British Agent informed the Pasha that he feared much merchandise was being fraudulently passed through the Baghdād custom house in his name at the European, or lower, rate of duty; and he requested that in future no goods should be treated there as British unless certified by himself to be such.

Siege and reduction of Basrah by the Persians, 1775—1776.

The occupation of Basrah by the Persians, which was the principal event in the history of Turkish 'Irāq during the reign of the Sultān 'Abdul Hamīd, was neither unexpected nor sudden. On the contrary, an assault upon the town had been threatened for more than a year before any was actually made; and the event seems to have been in the end precipitated by successes which the Turks themselves gained, in Kurdistān, over the Persians. The further period of a year which

elapsed between the investment of Basrah and its surrender was ample to admit of succour being sent from Baghdād, or even from Constantino-ple; but it is probable that neither the Pāsha, * “a weak and needy ruler,” nor the Sultān was in a position to render effectual aid.

In the autumn of 1773, when the British Agent and his staff were on their return journey from Bombay, it was whispered for the first time that Karīm Khān had designs on Basrah. The Persian Governor of Kirmānshāh, 'Alī Qulī Khān, was known to have made preparations for invading Kurdistān, then a district of the Baghdād Pashāliq; and it was feared that a fleet and land force which were being assembled on the Persian coast under the orders of the Vakil, ostensibly for service against Masqat, were really intended to operate against Basrah the apprehension excited at Basrah at this time was so lively that Khōjah Petrus, in whose charge the goods of the East India Company had been left, thought of shipping them to Baghdād for greater security; and the Agent himself purposed, if on his arrival at Basrah he saw that an attack was imminent, to embark as much of the Company's goods as possible on the vessels “Revenge” and “Drake”, which he brought with him.

Events
leading up
to the siege
of Basrah,
1773—1775.

The actual position at Basrah was found less critical than had been feared; but in February 1774, some six weeks after the re-establishment of the British Agency, Karīm Khān was said to have requested, apparently through the Mutasallim of Basrah, the co-operation of the Turkish and British fleets against the Imām of 'Omān, with whom he was at war, and to have threatened in case of non-compliance to attack Basrah. This intelligence was fully confirmed by letters received from Messrs. Beaumont and Green, two of the East India Company's servants who were then confined by Karīm Khān at Shirāz. Mr. Moore at once apprised the Pāsha of Baghdād that, so far as British vessels were concerned, the Vakil's demand was inadmissible, adding: “In my “humble opinion, therefore, it behoves Your Excellency to order down “Your troops immediately for the defence of this place and give orders to “the different tribes of Arabs to march down to the banks of this river “to prevent the Persians from landing on this side of it—the sooner this “is done the better, as Bussora according to my notions is in no state of “defence whatever”; and at the same time he was careful to inform the Pāsha that the British ships then at Basrah could not be spared, partly

February to
March 1774.

* Whom Brydges and Olivier both call 'Umr Pāsha, but who cannot well have been the 'Umr that succeeded 'Alī Pāsha in 1764 unless he was also called Hamad. See note on page 1242 *ante*.

because of the danger of a revival of plague and partly because of the risk of a sudden onslaught by the Persians, to furnish trading vessels bound from Masqat to Basrah, as had been requested by the Turkish authorities, with a convoy to protect them against Persian attack. On the 20th February 1774, acting upon his own view of the situation, the Agent caused the "Revenge" and "Drake" to be provisioned for three months and prepared for receiving the stock of woollens then in the Factory; but the Mutasallim, Sulaimān Āgha, deprecated the removal of the goods, which would, he said, alarm the town, cause many of the inhabitants to take flight, bring trade to a stand-still, and play into the hands of Karīm Khān, whose object it was by destroying the commerce of Basrah to compel the British to re-open their settlement at Būshehr. Eventually, on the Mutasallim's assuring the Agent that he had made arrangements for obtaining prompt information of the movements of the Persian army and that there was a prospect of detaching from the Persian cause the Ka'ab tribe, without the aid of whose fleet nothing could be effected by the enemy, and on his further giving a guarantee on behalf of the Pāsha and the Sultān, in which the Daftardār and Shaikh Darwīsh—the latter probably the Basrah Naqīb of the day—associated themselves with him, that the East India Company should be indemnified for any loss which they might sustain through their goods remaining for the present on shore, Mr. Moore agreed to delay action for a few days longer. He also undertook that the Ka'ab of 'Arabistān, against whom the East India Company had claims, should not be attacked by the British squadron if they brought their vessels to Basrah to help in the defence of the town; but, to a suggestion that the British should themselves intervene on the side of the Turks, Mr. Moore replied with decision that his nation were only merchants at Basrah, and that they would observe strict neutrality, retiring on board ship with so much of the Company's property as they could remove on the approach of the Persian army, but not finally quitting the place so long as it remained in possession of the Turks. The Agent, probably in March, informed the Pāsha of Baghdād of what had passed between himself and the Mutasallim and again urged that Basrah should be placed in a state of defence; but before the end of April, authentic information was received from Shirāz that no preparations had as yet been made by the Persians for a campaign against Basrah,—a truth which had already been reported by the Ka'ab Shaikh to the Mutasallim,—and it began to be believed that Karīm Khān had, for the time at least, laid aside his original aggressive intentions. The Mutasallim, in the meanwhile, had done his best to pacify the Vakīl by promising to assist him with the

"Tigris" and "Euphrates" ketches against his enemy the Imām of 'Omān; but neither had the vessels yet been sent, nor was there any intention on his part of sending them.

The Ka'ab, in response to the Mutasallim's overtures, readily April 1774. promised in case of a war to desert the Persians and to remove with their own ships from Dōraq; but hardly had this assurance been given when, as related in the chapter on the history of 'Arabistān, its worthlessness was exposed by an attempt on the part of the Ka'ab to capture the "Faiz Islām," a Turkish ship, at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab: an attempt which was frustrated only by the despatch of the British cruiser "Revenge" from Basrah to the relief of the threatened vessel. The Mutasallim was so grateful for the assistance lent him on this occasion that, on the safe arrival of the "Faiz Islām" at Basrah on the 15th of April, he repaired in person to the Factory garden to tender his thanks to the British Agent. Two days later all the subjects of the Ka'ab Shaikh at Basrah suddenly withdrew from the place; and it was feared, from the circumstance of the Ka'ab fleet being at the same time assembled at the mouth of the Kārūn, that an attack upon Basrah or upon the British vessels lying there, instigated by the Persian Government, might be impending. No hostile act, however, was as yet committed by the Ka'ab.

During the summer and autumn of 1774, there was a lull in the January 1775. rumours of danger from Persia; but at the beginning of 1775 a series of nocturnal raids by the Ka'ab on Basrah, described in the history of 'Arabistān, excited fresh alarm by illustrating the defenceless condition of the town. The wrath of Karīm Khān had recently been excited by defeats inflicted on his troops in Kurdīstān by those of the Pāsha of Baghdād, and it was generally supposed that he would retaliate by moving against either Baghdād or Basrah,—in all probability against the latter, which was the more exposed to attack.

On the 13th of January 1775, the Mutasallim, the Daftardār, and Shaikh Darwīsh visited the British Factory to consult the British Agent regarding the situation and to sound him as to the attitude which he would himself assume in case of an invasion. Mr. Moore, in reply, simply commented on the weakness of the fortifications, artillery and garrison of Basrah; recommended that a reinforcement of 3,000 to 4,000 men should be obtained from Baghdād, that the Muntafik tribe should be called out to prevent the Persians from crossing to the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and that a system of military intelligence should be organised in Persia; and explained, as on a former occasion, that

the position of the British must necessarily be one of neutrality, and that the British cruisers had been kept at Basrah only for the sake of embarking the Company's goods in case of need.

Two days later, on the 15th of January 1775, news reached the British Agency at Basrah, *vid* Būshehr, that a Persian army of 50,000 men had actually left Shirāz under the command of Sādiq (popularly known as Sadu) Khān, a brother of the Vakīl, to attack Basrah. The ostensible ground on which Karīm Khān thus at length opened the campaign was the ill-treatment of Persian pilgrims in Turkish 'Irāq when visiting the sacred shrines of Shi'ahdom; and it appears that more than one demand for satisfaction * or amendment had, in fact, been addressed by him to the Turks, and neglected by them, before the final rupture. There is reason, however, as subsequent indications will show, for holding that the conduct of the East India Company's representatives at Basrah in diverting foreign trade from Persia to Turkish 'Irāq had at least contributed to bring matters to an extremity.

The annoyance caused at Basrah by prowling Ka'ab meanwhile continued, and even increased; and on the night between the 25th and the 26th of January 1775 a gang of 300 men of that tribe entered the town by scaling the walls, broke open a number of shops in the principal bazaar, and retired unpunished with a large booty of fine India cloth.

March 1775.

Nothing further happened until the 6th of March, when the unsettled state of the country was exemplified in an attack committed by a body of armed men on three British officers from the Company's cruisers, who had gone to shoot on the left bank of the river about four miles below Basrah; the officers were dangerously wounded, stripped, and left for dead; their boat's-crew were cruelly beaten and stripped; and the boat itself was taken away. After dark the victims of this outrage were able to follow the bank of the river to a point opposite their ships, which they hailed, and were taken on board; but the condition of one of the officers, whose lung had been penetrated by a spear, appeared to be desperate.

On the morning of the 16th of March, news reached Basrah of the appearance of the advance guard and main body of the Persian army, amounting to some 30,000 horse and foot, at the mouth of the Suwaib tributary of the Shatt-al-'Arab, upon the left bank of the main river about 35 miles above Basrah; the rear, with which were the artillery

* According to Olivier (*Voyage*, Volume II, page 399) Karīm Khān demanded the head of the Pāsha of Baghdād and the abolition of a tax on Persian pilgrims.

and the Commander-in-Chief, was expected to arrive in two days. The Persians at first found themselves confronted by a large Arab force which was encamped on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, having been posted there some days previously to hold the crossing; it consisted apparently of the fighting men of one tribe, possibly the Muntafik, under the command of one of their own Shaikhs whose name was 'Abdullah.

The same afternoon an envoy from Sâdiq Khân arrived at Basrah with separate letters for the Mutasallim, the British Agent, and the heads of the Arab, Armenian and Jewish communities, desiring that each should send a representative to treat with the Persian commander for the ransom of the town. He was dismissed, however, without receiving an answer from any of those to whom the communication was addressed.

A long-expected danger had thus finally overtaken the Turks, who, notwithstanding that they had received about eighteen months' notice of its approach, had made no dispositions, unless during the few days immediately preceding, for meeting it.

The defences of Basrah were carefully examined by the traveller Mr. Parsons, who happened to be at Basrah at this juncture; and the interest which the subject possesses, in view of later occurrences, seems to warrant a reproduction of his account *in extenso*. It runs as follows :—

Defences of
Basrah,
March 1775.

This city is walled and surrounded with a deep and broad ditch. It has four gates and a sally port. The walls are of mud, from twenty to twenty-five feet thick, with parapet walls, breast high, which have small embrasures for musquetry or arrows (the Arabs being good archers). The walls not only encircle the city on the side of the land, but likewise on those of the creek, the entrance of which is at a considerable distance, where the walls terminate on both sides; each extremity being defended by a fortification and a gate, which are three miles distant from the town. In the intermediate space are many thousands of dates and other trees, mixed with rice grounds. The walls are about twelve miles in circuit, and although not half the inclosed space, yet it is a large city, and before the plague, in 1773, was very populous. The two principal gates are large, and are situated on the land side, one is called the Baghdad, and the other the Zobeir gate; neither of them is defended by a ditch, which is wanting for a considerable distance on each side. The foundation of the walls, which is built of burnt brick, reaches so high as to be above the water when the ditch is full. The water is let into the ditch, at the flood tide, from the creek, and is retained by flood gates.

There are eight bastions, on each of which are mounted eight brass guns, twelve pounders, which besides upwards of fifty brass cannon, six and nine pounders, on ship carriages, are mounted round the walls. These were in such a state as to be unfit for use, until news arrived of the siege intended by the Persians, when the musolem was very vigilant in seeing them repaired: shot they had in plenty, as well as

gunpowder, which is made in the town, there being large quantities of salt-petre in the neighbourhood, so that they never import gunpowder, but supply other places with it. The fortifications on each side the creek's mouth are exclusive of the eight bastions.

* * * * *

At the entrance of the creek, on the right, is a castle with eight guns pointing down, and on the opposite side it has eight more, pointing up and across the river. On the left is a battery of four guns, which commands the entry of the creek, situated in such a manner as to act in conjunction with the castle, in defending the entrance of the creek. About one hundred yards lower is a double battery of twelve guns in two tiers, called the captain pāsha's battery; adjoining to which is his house, and those of his officers and men. Near this is a gate, which lets them out of the city when occasion offers. There is another such gate near the castle, on the right hand entrance of the creek, which admits into the city, the castle terminating the city walls on that side; yet both these gates are very small, and may rather be called postern gates.

British
vessels at
Basrah,
March 1775.

In November 1774, when Mr. Parsons arrived at Basrah, the following armed vessels belonging to the East India Company were lying in the river and apparently remained there, except the first-mentioned, until the commencement of the siege: the "Revenge" of 26 or 28 guns, of which 20 were 12 pounders, the largest fighting ship in the Company's whole fleet; the "Eagle," snow, of 16 guns; and the "Success," ketch, of 14 guns. The detention of the "Eagle" and "Success" at Basrah by the Agent, without their authority, was considered unnecessary and was much regretted by the Governor and Council at Bombay, who disapproved—as explained in the history of the Persian Coast—of Mr. Moore's provocative policy towards Karīm Khān, and who at this time, in consequence of a rupture with the Marāthas, themselves stood in urgent need of all the ships that they could collect; and in February 1775 they despatched peremptory orders by the "Drake," snow, which was proceeding to the Gulf, that both the vessels named should be released and sent back to them within ten days of receipt of their letter.

To the British ships enumerated above should be added, as being under the orders of the British Agent at Basrah in this crisis, the Pāsha's new 14 gun ketches, "Euphrates" and "Tigris," both of which still flew the British colours, were commanded by midshipmen in the Company's service, and had on board a few European sailors. Mr. Moore's retention of these ketches under his own control did not, as will appear later on, conduce to a steady observance of that policy of neutrality which he had twice professed.

Operations
until the
departure of
the British

No sooner had the Persians appeared in force at the mouth of the Suwaib than Shaikh 'Abdullah basely deserted his post, leaving the enemy to cross the river unopposed. This a part of the Persian forces at once

proceeded to do, mostly upon inflated goat-skins; but Sādiq Khān was as yet without the means of throwing his artillery and heavy stores over to the right bank. Sulaimān Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, had only about 1,500 regular troops at his disposal, and, as their loyalty was not much to be relied upon, he decided to remain at Basrah and await the attack of the Persians behind walls; but he set an admirable example to all by his courage and vigilance, and he showed great personal energy in pushing forward the preparations for defence.

Agency from
Basrah, 17th
March to
10th April
1775.

On the 19th of March, Mr. Moore sent one of the Pāsha's new ketches up the river to obtain information of the movements of the enemy; she was commanded for the occasion by a lieutenant from one of the cruisers and manned by European sailors; and Mr. Abraham, one of the Factory staff, went in her.

19th March.

At 3 A.M. on the morning of the 21st of March, the fleet of the treacherous Ka'ab Shaikh, who had formerly promised the Turks that he would not help the Persians but who had now changed his mind in view of a possible sack of Basrah, slipped up the river from below the town to join Sādiq Khān's force. The British cruisers, which had apparently received orders from the Agent to prevent such a junction, unfortunately did not perceive the Ka'ab Gallivats, 14 in number, until it was too late to intercept them; but they immediately gave chase. The "Success" and the "Eagle" having ultimately captured a Gallivat apiece, the prize of the former was burned in the river, while that of the latter was brought back to Basrah. The rest of the Ka'ab fleet reached the Persian camp, though in a more or less damaged condition; and land batteries which the Persians had thrown up on the banks of the river made it impossible for the British squadron to attack them, after arrival there, with any chance of success.

21st March.

On the morning of the 22nd of March, the British Agent, perhaps apprehending the consequences that his unsuccessful interference was well calculated to produce, went on board the "Eagle," to which the treasure and valuables of the Factory had already been transferred. The same afternoon the "Success" and one of the Pāsha's ketches returned from pursuing the enemy; and in the evening the Pāsha's other ketch -- the one that had been sent up the river to reconnoitre upon the 19th -- arrived, having met with some remarkable adventures.

22nd March.

On her way up stream, in passing the Persian camp, she had been hailed and enquiry made why she did not salute the Persian Commander-in-Chief, to which it was answered that she was going further up the river and would fire the salute on her return. On the 21st, the encounter

between the British squadron and the Ka'ab fleet having meanwhile taken place, the ketch had to pass the Persian batteries once more on her downward voyage; and, on the Persian authorities requiring her commander to land and pay them a visit, he sent a private soldier named Ryley, whom he dressed in his own clothes, on shore to personate him, while two Persian hostages were at the same time taken on board the ketch. Through some accident the Persians then opened fire upon the ketch, as did also the Ka'ab Gallivats, which were lying near the western bank of the river; the ketch returned the fire; and, after two men had been wounded on board, she proceeded on her way to Basrah. Ryley was thus left behind, but the imposture of which he was the instrument was not discovered; and on the 27th, having been well treated during his stay among the Persians, and having obtained valuable information with respect to their movements, he reached Basrah in safety, and the Persian hostages were discharged with presents.

23rd March.

On the 23rd of March two emissaries from Sâdiq Khân arrived at Basrah and interviewed first the Mutasallim and then the British Agent; they came to demand a sum of Rs. 20,00,000 as the ransom of Basrah; threatening that, if it were not paid, the town would presently be taken by storm; but they were dismissed, as on the former occasion, without any answer.

On the same day, at the suggestion of Mr. A. Parsons, the traveller already more than once quoted, who had been a sea captain and more recently Consul and Factor-Marine at Alexandretta under the Turkey Company, and who happened to be now at Basrah in a private capacity, the construction of a boom across the Shatt-al-'Arab immediately above the 'Ashâr creek was commenced: it was composed of boats moored in a line across the river and connected by chains and cables. The object of this work was to prevent other Persian fleets, which were expected, from joining that of the Ka'ab above Basrah.

By the incessant labour of the British marine officers and the Kapitân Pâsha's men, the boom was finished on the evening of the 25th, "to the satisfaction of everyone interested in the preservation of Basrah"; and hopes even began to be entertained "that the Persian army, without "further supply of cannon, ammunition and provisions, must soon "decamp." Two Gallivats of the Kapitân Pâsha's fleet, each carrying 8 guns and 80 to 100 men, had meanwhile been placed under British commanders, and the British flag hoisted on board of them.

26th March.

On the 26th of March the Ka'ab Gallivat taken by the "Eagle" was destroyed under the orders of the British Agent. In the course of

the operation an officer belonging to the "Success" was so severely burned in setting fire to a train of powder that it was feared he could not recover.

On the 27th it became known at Basrah, on the arrival of Ryley, 27th March. that the bulk of the Persian army were now on the right bank of the river, but that the commander still remained upon the eastern side; also that the invaders, though they had few heavy guns, were well supplied with ammunition and provisions

On the 2nd of April it was stated that Shaikh 'Abdullah, the same 2nd April. who fell back before the Persians on their first appearance, had arrived at Zubair with all his men and promised to assist the governor in defending the place; and on the same day Shaikh Thāmir of the Muntāfik tribe, who had been expected to embarrass the Persians during their march to Basrah by cutting the banks of the river and laying the country under water, arrived in Basrah without having done this, accompanied by 300 men.

On the 3rd of April about 200 Janissaries from Baghdād made their 3rd April. appearance; they had left their boats at 'Azair, had marched to Qūrnah, where they re-embarked, had crossed to the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and had then finished their journey by land without coming in contact with the enemy. They brought with them letters from the Pasha, containing promises of further help which there appeared little likelihood of his being able to fulfil.

Early in the morning of the 6th of April the advance guard of the 6th April. Persian army came in sight of Basrah and began to pitch their tents about three miles from the Baghdād gate of the town. By evening their camp extended to Kūt-al-Farangi, a mile further off; and it appeared to contain many thousands of men, both mounted and unmounted.

On the following day the rest of Sādiq Khān's forces came up and 7th April. located themselves in such a manner that the British Agent's country house at Kūt-al-Farangi became, as it were, the centre of the vast Persian encampment. About noon hostilities commenced in a curious manner by four mounted Persians approaching so close to the town wall that ten or twelve men of the garrison, by slipping down from the corner of a bastion were able to surprise them, kill them all, and capture three of their horses. The whole male population of Basrah were now under arms; they appeared to be in high spirits; and all night long they remained upon the walls in readiness to repel an assault, should one be attempted.

On the morning of the 8th of April a reconnoissance of the town

walls was made by a body of about 300 Persian horse, but they were careful to remain beyond range of the Turkish guns.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the "Eagle" and "Success" with the Pasha's two ketches, slipped their cables and set off down stream under full press of canvas to attack a Bûshehr fleet of 16 vessels which had been observed working up the river in the morning, and which had now arrived within about a league of the town; but the Persians turned back on seeing them and escaped, the possession of oars in addition to sails giving them an advantage in speed over their pursuers. The Bûshehr fleet included the East India Company's brig "Tyger" which had been taken by the Ka'ab in the Shatt-al-'Arab two years previously, and it consisted for the rest of five Gallivats of 10 guns each and ten Gallivats of 6 to 8 guns. The movement of the British squadron against it took place at the suggestion of Lieutenants Robinson and Thistleton, who were in command, and who received the permission of the Agent to act as they thought best for preventing a junction between it and the Ka'ab fleet.

At 4 o'clock Mr. Moore, accompanied by all the members of the British Factory and by Mr. Parsons, rode round the walls, going as far as the mouth of the 'Ashâr creek. On their way they met the Mutasallim upon his rounds, who promised to hold the town by land if the Agent would keep it by water; and they observed that the Turks and Arabs all appeared cheerful and confident, but that no townsman was any longer allowed to absent himself from his place at the wall, either by day or night.

9th April.

About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 9th of April, the sky being perfectly dark, without either moon or stars, the Persians tried to scale the walls at several places between the Baghdâd and Zubair gates; and a hand-to-hand struggle with the defenders ensued, which lasted for more than two hours. In the midst of the din and confusion of this conflict the British hastily quitted the Factory and made their way to the mouth of the 'Ashâr creek, which they reached in safety notwithstanding the thick darkness; Mr. Parsons and another gentleman, who were the last to leave, took an hour on the way and narrowly escaped being killed by stones and tiles which Arab women, imagining them to be Persians, flung down at them from the tops of houses. The entrance of the creek was found to be well defended by bodies of two to three hundred armed Arabs, under the Kapitân Pâsha, drawn up on either side of it; and the party from the Factory embarked safely on the "Eagle."

Daylight showed that the attack had been repulsed, and Mr. Parsons afterwards saw 21 Persian heads exposed at the Baghdad and Zubair gates; but he was obliged to listen to curses invoked on the British name, and to hear Mr. Moore abused as the cause of the Persian invasion. In the afternoon Mr. Parsons and four gentlemen belonging to the Factory were tempted by curiosity to make a circuit of about ten miles along the walls: they found 500 men quartered at each of the two principal gates and some 200 on each bastion; even the rich Jewish and Armenian merchants had now been obliged to take up their residence near the ramparts; and, to the general surprise, the Carmelite Fathers had voluntarily elected to do the same, apparently by way of showing a good example. The credit of repelling the Persian assault during the previous night appeared to rest chiefly with Shaikh Thāmir and his Muntafik warriors.

Meanwhile, however, on hearing that the Persians had attacked Basrah, the Arab Shaikh 'Abdullah had fled incontinently from Zubair. The whole of the livestock and supplies that he left behind, which according to one estimate might have provisioned the town of Basrah for a couple of months, fell into the hands of the Persians, to whom they must have been a fortunate windfall.

April the 10th passed quietly until the evening; but about 9 P.M. 10th April. the Pasha's Gallivats, which were moored on the further side of the river near to the boom, discovered men on shore and fired at them; and shortly afterwards the two boats in the boom closest to that bank were found to be on fire, as was also an adjoining village. The village, upon which the "Success" fired repeatedly, continued to burn for about six hours.

The Agent and his Council, the latter consisting of Messrs. Green and Latouche, had written to Būshehr on the 23rd of March, urging Mr. Beaumont, who was detained there by the Persians, to despatch to them without delay any of the Company's cruisers which might happen to arrive from Bombay. Their letter reached Mr. Beaumont at Būshehr on the 30th of the same month, but there was not then any British vessel at the port. Later, the Persian fleet from Būshehr having made its appearance in the river below Basrah with the evident intention of joining the Ka'ab fleet above, and there being no longer much prospect of a vessel being able to arrive from the Gulf to his assistance, Mr. Moore thought it prudent to retire from Basrah. He made no attempt to save the Company's goods by shipping them, but left everything behind except the Agency treasure, which had already been embarked, at the mercy of

Withdrawal
of the British
Agency from
Basrah to
Būshehr.
11th to 15th
April 1775.

the belligerents,—an omission which may have been due to want of time but which was more probably dictated by the attitude of the Turks, the agreement with whom he was about to violate by leaving while the town still held out.

The descent of the river began at noon on the 11th of April; and the officers of the fleet, which consisted of the "Eagle," the "Success," the Pāsha's two ketches, and the two Turkish Gallivats, were apparently allowed to suppose that only an attack on the Būshehr fleet was meditated, after which the ships would return to Basrah. About three in the afternoon 12 Gallivats and 13 armed Trankis, the latter carrying stores for the Persian army, were sighted at anchor about three miles below the first island; at 4 p.m., the Persians having weighed, their principal Gallivat fired a shot at the "Eagle," on which the Agent and the members of his Council were passengers; and immediately thereafter a cannonade, seemingly directed at the two British ships, was opened by the other Gallivats. At half past four the "Eagle," on arriving within suitable range, replied with a broadside; the "Success" followed her example; and soon afterwards the Persians began to retire down a narrow reach of the river, assisted by a strong ebb tide, firing as they went, and pursued by the "Eagle" and "Success," which kept them in play with such guns as could be brought to bear upon the alternate tacks. The Pāsha's ketches and Gallivats could not keep up with the British vessels, and the ketches twice went aground. About half past five the "Success," which had already been struck three times, sustained some additional damage by having a yard-arm shot away, two gun-ports broken in, and two shot lodged in her starboard side. A little later the Persians took to flight, the faster ships among them helping the slower to escape by towing them, and at 6 p.m. they anchored in shoal water close to the Persian bank of the river. The "Eagle" and "Success" then took up positions abreast of them, as near as their draught of water would allow, and an artillery fire began at no great range, supplemented on the side of the British by musketry; this continued until dark, when both combatants desisted simultaneously as if by mutual consent. Not one of the Pāsha's vessels got near enough to fire a single shot during this engagement at close quarters, nor did any of them anchor until it was over. It is a remarkable fact that, in the whole day's proceedings, no one was killed or even wounded on board the "Eagle" or the "Success," and it is believed that the Persians likewise escaped

without casualties, but the rigging of the "Success" suffered considerable damage.*

When day broke on the 12th of April it was found that the Persians had placed their fleet beyond reach of the British by retiring into a shallow place, apparently within the embouchure of the Kārūn river; and at 6 A.M. the "Eagle" weighed anchor and,—to the surprise, it would seem, of the crew of the "Success," who did not yet know that the Agent had decided to renounce his share in the defence of Basrah,—led the way down the Shatt-al-'Arab. At three in the afternoon three Persian Gallivats were sighted advancing up the river; but these, as the Anglo-Turkish vessels drew near, wisely took refuge in a creek. Two hours later three other Persian craft were met, approaching from the same direction, one of which fired a couple of shots at the British ships and then immediately put about and went down-stream with her consorts, clearly with the object of keeping at a safe distance so long as daylight lasted. 12th April.

The Anglo-Turkish squadron anchored for the night, but was under way again on the morning of the 13th at 4 A.M. By noon the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab had been crossed; and an hour later the ships lay to, while the Turks and Arabs on board the Pāsha's ketches, to the number of about 230, were being transferred to the Turkish Gallivats and the ketches manned instead by crews from the "Eagle" and "Success." The Gallivats then sailed for Kuwait, which was at this time a dependency of Basrah, and the British ships and the ketches shaped a course for Būshehr, where they arrived on the afternoon of the 15th of April. 13th April.

* It is difficult, on account of the strong personal interest of those by whom the affair has been described, to know exactly what happened between the British and the Persian squadrons on the 11th April 1775. Brief accounts by Mr. Moore, the British Agent, and by Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, the Commander on the Persian side, are extant (see pages 292 and 296—297 of Mr. Saldanha's *Summary of Events, 1600—1800*); but in the text the journal of Mr. Parsons has been followed, as being probably a more impartial authority than either. Mr. Parsons acted during the day as Lieutenant on board the "Success," supplying the place of the officer who had been injured by an explosion on the 26th of March and who was still dangerously ill; and he had at least an excellent opportunity of observing the incidents of the fight. Mr. Moore's account differs from that of Mr. Parsons chiefly in conveying the impression that the engagement was entirely at long ranges and that the British ships did not suffer any damage. According to Shaikh Nāsir's version, it was the British who began the battle; the vessels from Būshehr town, by his orders, took no part in the firing; and the only shots discharged on the Persian side were a few from Gallivats under the command of Mir 'Ali of Khārag. The Shaikh further asserts that the British remained at anchor where they were for a whole day after the encounter. The difficulty about Mr. Parson's account is the smallness of the damage done in an artillery contest at close quarters.

British proceedings at Būshehr in regard to the siege of Basrah, 7th to 23rd April 1775.

Meanwhile, as is fully explained in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast, Mr. R. Garden, formerly of the Basrah Agency and at this time a member of the Bombay Council, who was proceeding to Basrah on private business with the intention of continuing his journey to Europe, had been commissioned by the Government of Bombay to open negotiations with Karīm Khān for the release of Mr. Beaumont, then detained in Persia as a prisoner in connection with the grievances of the Vakīl against the East India Company. It was also intended by the Bombay Government that general good relations with the Persian ruler should be instituted, if possible, by a reversal of the hostile policy pursued towards him by Mr. Moore, under whose orders a virtual boycott of the ports of Persia by the Company's ships, and even by private British vessels, had been brought about.

Mr. Garden arrived at Būshehr on the 7th of April in the Company's cruiser "Drake," under convoy of which came also three merchant vessels, bound for Basrah, with valuable cargoes. He was made aware by Mr. Beaumont of the request for naval assistance preferred by the Agent at Basrah a few days previously, and he had at once to decide whether he would comply with it or not. On full consideration he resolved, for several reasons, to adhere to the instructions that he had received at Bombay, rather than to reinforce Mr. Moore, whose anti-Persian tendencies were well known: he expected that Karīm Khān would in the end prevail over the Turks, and he feared that, when once the Vakīl had established his supremacy in the Gulf, it might be difficult or impossible for the British to come to any understanding with him at all; he considered that there would be extreme risk in attempting to force his way to Basrah with the vessels at his disposal, three of which were so miserably equipped as to be incapable of defence; and he believed, moreover, that the awkward situation in which the Basrah Agency found themselves, and which in his opinion had been brought about by their own indiscreet behaviour, might be remedied at any time by their embarking with the Company's goods on the "Eagle" and "Success," which they had with them. Mr. Garden also foresaw that to enter immediately into negotiations with the Vakīl might be the best way of safeguarding the Company's property at Basrah, jeopardised by the Agent's having made himself a party to the war on the side of the Turks; and he had good hope of success, for, while he had reason to believe that Mr. Moore's action in suspending commercial intercourse with Persia was largely responsible for the Vakīl's treatment of Mr. Beaumont and even for his attack on Basrah, he was empowered by the Bombay Government to

promise that, in event of a settlement, a British Residency should be re-established at Būshehr and British trade with the country re-opened. Mr. Garden's first letter to the Vakil at Shīrāz was despatched on the 11th of April; and on the 15th, on the arrival of Mr Moore and his companions at Būshehr, he wrote again to Karīm Khān, begging him to arrange that British property at Basrah should be respected,—a request which he repeated direct to Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, then serving with the Persian army before Basrah. On the 23rd of April a favourable answer was received by Mr. Garden from Karīm Khān, which removed anxiety for the future, and which at the same time laid "the blame of the late disturbances between the English and the Persians entirely on Mr. Moore."

The Persians at first met with little success in their attempts to reduce Basrah; and it was reported in a letter written from that place on the 20th of April "that the Monteficks and Benechalid Arabs had assembled "for its protection, that the desert was overflowed, and the town was in "very little danger from the Persian army." On the 6th of June a 50-pounder gun which had belonged to the Portuguese was successfully shipped at Būshehr, amid general rejoicings, for employment against Basrah; and during the rest of that month there was a constant coming and going of small craft between the two places. But the Persian artillery, notwithstanding that it was directed by two European artilleryists, still failed to produce any serious effect on the Turkish defences; the astrologers advised delay whenever an assault was proposed; and the siege by degrees degenerated into a blockade. In August 1775, after dispersing a squadron of Persian Gallivats under the command of Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, a powerful fleet sent by the Imām of 'Omān to the aid of the Turks took up its position at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab and secured for a time the control of that river. Advantage was taken of the opportunity to bring an abundance of provisions into the town, which was thus put in a position to make a longer defence. It would seem, from the fact that in 1798 and again in 1826 a Turkish subsidy was claimed by the ruler of 'Omān on account of the services performed by his ancestor's navy at the siege of Basrah, that some sort of pecuniary inducement must have been held out by the Turks to the 'Omānis before obtaining their assistance. The Persians, on their part obtained valuable aid from the Khazā'il tribe of the Euphrates, who, though Arabs, were by religion Shi'ahs like themselves.

Progress of
the siege,
April to
August 1915.

In reply to a question by Mr. Garden, Mr. Moore had stated, on first arriving at Būshehr, that he intended to return to Basrah, should

Departure of
the British

Agent from
Būshehr for
Bombay,
15th July
1775.

the town escape capture by the Persians, and in the contrary case to make the best of his way to the Presidency; but the operations were protracted, and in the end he did not wait for their conclusion. On May the 12th* H.M.S. "Seahorse" of 20 guns, Captain Farmer, entered the roadstead at Būshehr, convoying a large Bengal ship destined for Basrah; and in this manner the number of vessels in port flying the British flag was increased to nine,—the "Success", it should be observed, had left for India on the 1st of May with despatches,—and some Persians professed uneasiness lest the British should attack the town by way of creating a diversion in favour of their friends the Turks. On the 24th of May, Captain Farmer, who had received orders from his Commodore, Sir Edward Hughes, to assist the representatives of the East India Company wherever he might meet with them, tendered his services for convoying to Basrah all or any of the ships at Būshehr intended for that place; but his offer was courteously declined by Mr. Moore. At length, on the evening of July 15th, all the British vessels then remaining at Būshehr except the "Drake" sailed for Bombay in company with H. M. S. "Seahorse", the commander of which had promised to afford them his protection against the Marāthas. With the fleet, in the "Eagle," went Mr. Moore, whose patience was worn out by confinement on board ship, for he would not land at Būshehr, and Mr. Parsons in the "Seahorse"; but Messrs. Latouche and Abraham were left behind at Būshehr in order that they might return to Basrah and take charge of the Company's effects there at the earliest available opportunity. In leaving for India Mr. Moore wrote to the Mutasallim of Basrah, stating that he was taking the two Turkish ketches with him to India for the same reason that he had brought them away from Basrah, *viz.*, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Persians; and at the same time he advised the Mutasallim, on account of the difficulty of returning the vessels to Basrah, to authorise him to sell them at Bombay on his behalf. In this farewell communication to Sulaimān Āgha the Agent remarked: "The honour that Your Excellency has acquired in the gallant defence of Basrah will be remembered to the latest times. I would that it had been in our power to have assisted you more than we did; but it was not, of which I doubt not but

* The great Nelson appears to have been a midshipman on the "Seahorse" at this time: he was in her from 1773 to 1776, and, in the "ordinary course of cruising in peace times, he visited every part of the station from Bengal to Bussorah" (Captain Mahon's *Life of Nelson*, page [4]). Of his service in the East Nelson himself said: Nothing less than such a distant voyage could in the least satisfy my desire of maritime knowledge; but he returned to England as an invalid.

"you will be perfectly convinced on maturely weighing the several circumstances both before and since our departure from Basrah."

The irresolute conduct of Mr. Moore himself was certainly less worthy of praise than that of the Mutasallim. That, after he had rashly abandoned his original policy of non-intervention and actively associated himself with the defence of Basrah, he ought to have remained there to assist the Turks was not doubted at any rate by Mr. Parsons who concludes the relevant portion of his narrative with the words:*

"The poor Bussorians are deserted by those whose duty and interest it was to assist them to the utmost of their power: had they been so assisted not the whole power of Persia would be able to take the city"; and Mr. Garden was evidently of opinion that Mr. Moore had been guilty of a distinct breach of faith towards the Mutasallim, and that it would be dangerous for him to return to Basrah even in the event of an accommodation taking place between the Persians and the Turks.

Basrah held out, largely on account of the determination which Sulaimān Āgha was able by his personality to infuse into the defence, for more than a year from the date of its first being invested,—a circumstance from which we may perhaps infer, in view of the large number of the inhabitants, that the blockade by the Persians cannot have been very stringent.

At last, on the evening of the 15th April 1776, by which time the defenders had been reduced to dire straits and no hope remained of relief from Baghdād,† the leading Arab notables of Basrah and its neighbourhood visited Sādiq Khān in his camp to arrange for the surrender of the town; and on the morning of the next day the transfer of Basrah to the Persians was duly accomplished. The terms of capitulation were merely "that the inhabitants of Basrah should not be molested with respect to their persons or families," and the Mutasallim and notables were treated as prisoners by the victor, who sent them to Shīrāz. Sādiq Khān, immediately upon the town being handed over to him, caused it to be occupied by about 6,000 Persian troops under

Surrender of
Basrah by the
Turks, 15th
April 1776.

* These words might be read as referring merely to the Pāsha of Baghdād and the Turkish Government, were it not so clear that in Mr. Parsons' opinion the British ought to have continued at Basrah (see page 180 of his book).

† According to Olivier (*Voyage*, II. 402), the Pāshas of Mūsāl, Vān, Diyārbakr, Aleppo and Damascus had meanwhile marched on Baghdād under orders from Constantinople and put the Pāsha to death as a sacrifice to propitiate the Persians. But Karīm Khān, though he professed to be satisfied, did not abandon the siege of Basrah.

the command of his son 'Ali Naqi Khān and of one 'Ali Muhammad Khān, with whose name we shall presently become familiar; and on the 21st of April he made his own public entry with additional troops, for whom accommodation was provided by requiring a number of citizens to vacate their houses. The townspeople were not otherwise troubled or despoiled in any way, and two Persians convicted of plundering were even beaten so severely that one of them died. There was, however, almost as great distress among the poorer inhabitants as during the siege, for they had before this sold most of their possessions, and now they could not find any employment.

It was stated that Karim Khān, on receiving news of the reduction of Basrah, "ordered Sadoo Caun to seal up all the effects in the place "belonging to deceased and absent persons, and forward him lists "thereof; to summons the Chaub Shaikh Barrakat thither, and "advise him of the result; and to examine and to send him a clear "account of the country leading from Basrah towards Muscat; from which instructions it would appear that the Vakīl not only intended to turn his new acquisition to the fullest fiscal advantage, but even to make it a stepping-stone to further conquests. In June 1775, however, the naval contingents forming the Persian fleet were dismissed to their home ports; and Shaikh Nāsir reached Būshehr, the most distant of them all, on the last day of that month.

Affairs during the Persian occupation of Basrah, 1776--79.

Return of the
British
Agency staff
to Basrah,
May 1776.

Before the capitulation Mr. Galley, a servant of the East India Company, was already present at Basrah to watch over the interests of his employers; he was afterwards "very politely received" by Sādiq Khān and assisted by Shaikh Nāsir; and, on the evening of the 20th April, he was placed in possession of the British factory, where he found everything in good condition. The representative of the French East India Company, some Italians under French protection, and the Carmelite Fathers had remained in Basrah during the whole of the siege. On the 3rd of May a letter from Mr. Galley reached Būshehr; and the gentlemen of the Agency staff there, presumably Messrs. Latouche and Abraham, prepared with the least possible delay to take advantage of the favourable position of affairs by returning to Basrah. After providing themselves with suitable presents for Sādiq Khān and

Shaikh Nasir, they went on board a native vessel in such haste that they delegated to the Resident at Būshehr the duty of reporting their movements to the Government of Bombay; but, after their embarkation, a contrary wind detained them in the harbour until the morning of the 5th of May. The records and papers of the Basrah Agency were left provisionally at Būshehr, where it was thought they would be safer, for the time being, than at Basrah. On reaching their destination the two gentlemen were able to report that "they found "the Hon'ble Company's factory in excellent order, that Sadoo Caun "expressed himself willing to show the English every indulgence, "that his people had shown particular respect to the Agent in Council, "and that the first appearance of things was so flattering that, if "they had not been acquainted with the Persian character, they would "have formed a most pleasing opinion of their future prospects under "the Persian rule at Basrah." This happy state of matters may perhaps be attributed, in part at least, to the favourable disposition of Mirza Muhammad Husain, the chief adviser of Sādiq Khān, who used his influence with his master for the protection of such individuals as were recommended to him by the Agency; and so desirous was Sādiq Khān at first of standing well with the British that on one occasion he assured Mr. Latouche, upon whom the duties of Agent had devolved, that, though the British Factory was the only edifice in Basrah fit for his own occupation, 'he would not reside in it, if the walls were made of gold."

Moderation, however, soon ceased to distinguish the new government of Basrah, and by the beginning of June a heavy sum had already been assessed upon the town by Sādiq Khān as a contribution. The duty of collecting the money was delegated by the Persian officials to the leading citizens,—an arrangement which caused the demand to fall oppressively upon many who were ill able to pay, for the principal object of the collectors was naturally to save their own pockets. The Persians after this had recourse to compulsion in carrying out various other measures; and the British Agency began to be regarded by the people of Basrah as the only vindicator of their liberties and the sole remaining check upon the rapacity of their new rulers.

Antagonism between the Agency and the local Persian authorities was the natural outcome of these conditions; and in September 1776, in consequence of the forcible arrest by Sādiq Khān's agents of some native merchants who had taken refuge in the Factory,—a proceeding which was regarded by the British as a grave violation of their im-

Administra-
tion of Bas-
rah by the
Persians and
their rela-
tions with the
British
Agency,
1776—79.

September
1776.

munities,—the tension became acute. The Persians were well aware that the presence of the British Factory was advantageous to them because it lent importance to Basrah, encouraged the inhabitants to remain there instead of emigrating, and gave ground for expecting a profitable foreign commerce in the future; and the Persian governor, on learning that the Agent in Council had resolved to withdraw with his establishment from Basrah to Būshehr,—a resolution which, by the way, he had little expectation of being allowed by the Persians to carry into effect,—made haste to assure him that there should be no further encroachment on his privileges, and so prevailed on him to stay. The Company's employés, however, found that they were now practically prisoners at Basrah; and that there was not much hope of their being able to do business successfully there so long as the Persians continued in possession is shown by a remark of the Agent that “to endeavour to convince them that force is incompatible with commerce, especially in regard to us, might have succeeded formerly, but would now be as difficult as to endeavour to convince them of the absurdity of their religion.”

January
1777.

On the 31st January 1777 matters came to a crisis with an outrage on Khōjah Ya'qūb, the principal Jewish banker at Basrah, who was also broker to the British Factory; he was seized by the Persians at his own house, along with the women and other members of his family, and was compelled by repeated beatings, at some of which 'Alī Muhammad Khān, the acting substitute or successor of Sādiq Khān, was present in person, to sign a bond for 6,000 Tūmāns. The Agency Linguist, who was sent to demand an explanation of these proceedings, was refused an audience; and the Agent and his staff, after a letter of complaint addressed to Karīm Khān had been despatched by way of Būshehr, shut themselves up in the Factory and discontinued their intercourse with the local officials. The closing of the British Factory caused such a commotion in the town that the Persians were obliged to double the guards upon the gates in order to prevent a general exodus of the people; the amount which they succeeded in extorting from Khōjah Ya'qūb fell far short, notwithstanding all their severities, of what they had expected; they began to be apprehensive of the displeasure of Karīm Khān; and in the end, after the Agent had ignored a number of hints that he should wait on 'Alī Muhammad Khān and seek a reconciliation with him, two of the latter's principal officers appeared at the Factory to suggest that Mr. Latouche should visit the Khān, when everything might be amicably arranged.

The Agent, however, declined to accede to this proposal; and on March 1777.
the 17th of March he was gratified by receiving a very friendly letter from Karīm Khān, accompanied by a Farmān in which 'Alī Muhammad Khān was peremptorily ordered to refrain from the conduct of which the British at Basrah complained, and to treat them with the utmost consideration. The letter itself, as translated at the time, was in these terms:—

I have received your petition; and everything that you wrote concerning the situation of Bussora I have understood. I have always had, and still have, the greatest regard for the English nation; and I know they have the same regard towards me. I have always experienced their friendship towards me. I have now wrote a Phirmaund to Ally Mahomet Caun, Governor of Bussora, and have ordered him to behave in such a manner towards you and your people that you may be entirely contented and carry on your business to your satisfaction, both you and the people that are under you. I have ordered that no person whatever shall molest them in any shape,—that everyone shall behave towards them so that they may be free to carry on their business to their satisfaction. I have also wrote a Phirmaund regarding the Jews and Armenians at Bussora, ordering that they shall be well treated; that, except the head-money, not a Fluce * shall be taken from them; and that, if any of the Jews or Armenians want to go to any part of the Gulph for the sake of trade, they shall have liberty to do so with the knowledge of Coja Yacoob or Coja Aratoon. These orders which I have given Ally Mahomet Caun must be obeyed by him; and I desire that you will always depend that my friendship towards you is very great.

In June 1777 a fresh Farmān issued by Karīm Khān at the request of June 1777.
Mr. Latouche was received at Basrah, by which 'Alī Muhammad Khān was required to collect the export and import duties on British goods there at precisely the same rates as had prevailed during the Mutasallimate of Sulaimān Āgha, and to allow the Jewish and Armenian merchants of Basrah to leave home for trade, when permission was requested on their behalf by the British Resident.

In November 1777 the Factory was broken into by thieves with the November 1777.
connivance of 'Alī Muhammad Khān; but the goods taken from it were afterwards restored from fear of the Vakīl's anger.

The foregoing are the facts derivable from official sources; but additional light is thrown by the journal of Colonel J. Capper, who visited Basrah at the end of 1778, on the relations of the Persians, during their occupation of Basrah, both with the inhabitants of the town itself and with the Arabs of the surrounding country.

* That is "Fulūs", plural of Fals, farthing.

The Persian garrison of Basrah seems to have consisted in the beginning of about 7,500 men; and the inhabitants were too few and too feeble, in consequence of the vicissitudes of plague, war, and scarcity through which the town had lately passed, to be dangerous to their conquerors. The Persian Governor or Deputy-Governor, 'Ali Muhammad Khān, who was a monster of vice and cruelty, at first affected moderation; but he soon gave rein to his natural instincts, and thenceforward neither the honour nor the lives of the most inoffensive citizens were safe from him. His outrages were not confined to individuals. One night, "in a fit of drunkenness," he made a sudden raid from Basrah upon Zubair, burned the place, and massacred a number of the inhabitants; then proceeding to the village of Kuwaibdah, which lay at a few miles distance from Zubair upon the caravan route to Aleppo, he treated it similarly, and returned to Basrah. After this, however, Thāmir, the Muntafik Shaikh, succeeded in drawing a Persian force from Basrah into ground enclosed by a water course on the north, the Shatt-al-'Arab on the east and a creek on the south, at a place about 17 miles from the town; and here they were overwhelmed and destroyed to the last man by a large gathering of Muntafik who were lying in wait for them near by, 'Ali Muhammad Khān himself being among the slain. From these incidents it may be deduced that the Persians held effective possession of little or nothing outside the walls of the town of Basrah.

Colonel Capper (who reached Basrah from Aleppo on the 18th of December 1778, saw Sādiq Khān enter the town with about 4,000 horse on the 24th, and left for Bombay on the 30th) found the place plunged in gloom; on the day of his arrival it did not appear to contain more than 6,000 inhabitants, Persian troops included; and "the principal streets were like a burying ground, with scarcely a space of 3 feet "between (*sic*) each grave."

The traveller observed that the British Agent, as he passed through the streets, was received with great respect by the few remaining Arab inhabitants; and this he discovered to be due to the kindness and generosity of Mr. Latouche, who after the reduction of the town had redeemed many Arabs from slavery and sent them to their friends in the country.

When the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London became aware of the straits to which their servants at Basrah had been reduced during the winter of 1776-77, they ordered the Government of Bombay to arrange for the abolition of the Agency. They recom-

mended, as a means of doing this without risk to the servants or property of the Company, that leave should first be obtained from Karim Khān for removing the Agency to Būshehr, and that thereafter the establishment at Būshehr should be reduced to a single European employé, the stock in whose charge was never to exceed Rs. 10,000 in value. Should the Turks recover Basrah, however, they would permit a Resident to be sent there, but not without previous sanction from themselves.

The Bombay Government must have hesitated to comply with these orders, which were dated 4th July 1777, but did not reach India till the 30th April 1778, for no steps were taken to execute them before August of the latter year. By that time a prospect of war with France had arisen; and the Government of Bombay, as they thought that in case of hostilities it would be necessary to have a representative of some kind at Basrah for forwarding despatches between Europe and India, decided to retain a Resident there. Another consideration by which they were influenced was that, if only one employé remained in the Gulf, there would be no one at hand, in case of an accident befalling him, to take charge of the Company's interests and effects. Accordingly they offered the appointment of Resident to Mr. Latouche, at the same time directing his assistants, Messrs. Abraham and Galley, as well as the Surgeon, Mr. Robinson, to return to India immediately in the "Eagle"; and the mercantile stock at Basrah was at the same time ordered to be removed to Būshehr, and thence to India.

Mr. Latouche, in his reply, thanked the Bombay Government for the honour that they had done him in appointing him Resident; but he was as slow to obey the orders of his superiors in regard to the reduction of his staff as those superiors had themselves been in giving effect, in a modified degree, to the intentions of the Court of Directors. On the 25th of April 1779, by which time the Persian occupation of Basrah had ceased, Mr. Abraham and the Surgeon were still with the Resident at Basrah.

When Basrah passed into the hands of the Persians, the private trade carried on there by Europeans declined almost to vanishing point; nor did it, with the lapse of time, show many signs of recovery. Almost the only kinds of merchandise that continued to be imported were coffee and other "gruff" or heavy goods from Masqat and Būshehr and a few piece-goods from Sūrat. This state of matters occasioned serious inconvenience to the Resident, who received, as a supplement to his pay, consulage at the rate of 1 per cent. on imports by Europeans: in 1777 his income from this source amounted to little more than Rs. 200, and

to a Resi-
dency, 1777-
78.

British trade
at Basrah
during the
Persian
occupation,
1776-79.

in 1778 it was expected even to fall short of that sum. Mr. Latouche, in view of the exceptional circumstances, requested the Government of Bombay at the end of 1778 to be so good as to remit the customs, at the rate of 3 per cent., which were levied by the Company at Basrah on goods privately imported by him. To strengthen his case, he reminded them that he had to pay an import duty at the rate* of 8 per cent. to the Persians on all goods brought to Basrah, as well as an export duty of 6 per cent. to the Company in the case of merchandise from Sūrat; and he added that, as native merchants were able by some means to land their goods at Basrah on payment of less than 8 per cent. as customs, they could afford to undersell him in the local market. The result of this application is not recorded. Towards the end of the Persian occupation some not unsatisfactory business is said to have been done at Basrah in imported cloth, but the continued absence of many of the merchants and scarcity of specie due to the proceedings of the Persians prevented large operations.

Accident to
the Desert
Mail, 1778.

During the Persian occupation of Basrah the British overland mail to Aleppo was for a time despatched from Kuwait instead of from Zubair as formerly. The new arrangement was not altogether satisfactory, as it was not possible to exercise so strict a control over the messengers as when they were Turkish subjects and began or ended their journeys at a Turkish town; and the difficulties of the Resident were increased by unrest which prevailed in the desert at the end of 1778. On one occasion, about December 1778 or January 1779, the messengers were attacked by Bedouins on their way and reported at Baghdād that they had been robbed of the mails, of their camels, and even of their clothes; but a duplicate set of the correspondence, which followed 19 days later, reached Aleppo in safety; and it was stated at Basrah that the lost packet of originals had meanwhile come into the hands of other Arabs, who had conveyed it to its destination.

Murder of
Mr. Hare.

It was probably at this same period, while the prestige of the Turkish Government with the Arabs was low, that Mr. Hare, an English gentleman from Bengal, was robbed and murdered near Lāmlūm upon the Euphrates.

The French
Consulate at
Basrah.

The French Consul at Basrah about this time was a M. Rousseau remembered chiefly on account of his negligence in not assisting a young French officer, M. Borel du Bourg, who in travelling to the East with

* Why he should have had to pay 8 per cent. is not clear, for Karīm Khān had, a year and a half previously, ordered the Governor not to take Customs from the British at a higher rate than that in force under the Turks, *viz.*, 3 per cent. See page 1265 *ante*.

despatches in 1778-79 was first attacked and wounded by Arabs in the desert and then captured by the British at Kuwait.

Recovery of Basrah by the Turks, 1779.

The occupation of Basrah was for the Persians a burdensome and unprofitable enterprise; and early in 1779 it came to an end. The Turkish Government had never regarded the loss of the place as final, and from time to time the invaders were made anxious by reports of warlike preparations on the part of the Turks. In September 1776, though trade between Baghdād and Shirāz remained open, it was stated that 'Abdullah, Pāsha of Baghdād, had received a large supply of money from the Porte and was about to attack the Persians; and about May 1777 an immediate movement by the Turks for the recovery of Basrah was anticipated with pleasure by the inhabitants of the unfortunate town, while a Turkish invasion of Persia by more than one route was also predicted; but neither of these expectations was realised. In January 1778 it was asserted at Basrah, and in the following month the news was confirmed, that negotiations for a peace between Persia and Turkey were in progress at Shirāz; but up to the time of Karīm Khān's death, on the 2nd of March 1779, the discussions had not in any way affected the situation at Basrah.

Rumours and negotiations,
1776—1778.

Private interest in the end brought about the change which considerations of public interest had failed to effect. On or about the 16th of March 1779 Sādiq Khān sent for Sheikh Darwish and Mulla Ahmad, the secretary of the former Turkish Mutasallim of Basrah, and informed them that, in consequence of the death of the Vakil, he was about to leave for Shirāz with the whole Persian garrison; that he proposed, pending the return of Sulaimān Āgha, whom he would cause to be released from captivity in Persia, to entrust the government of the town to themselves; but that, if they refused, he would make it over to the Ka'ab Shaikh. The persons in question, after consulting Messrs. Latouche and Abraham and obtaining from them a loan of 600 Tūmāns for administrative expenses, agreed to accept the charge; and on the 19th of March Sādiq Khān left the town with the last of his troops and crossed to the left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab. On the following day the ships of the Persian fleet at Basrah, which was composed of squadrons from Rīg, Ganāveh and Būshehr, left for their home ports; and, notwithstanding fears of an

Spontaneous evacuation of Basrah by Sādiq Khān, 19th March 1779.

attack being made on them by the Ka'ab while they were passing down the river, they reached the Persian Gulf in safety. On the 24th of March four Ka'ab Gallivats appeared off Basrah, and a demand was made for various articles said to have been left behind by the Persians; but some of the Muntafik tribe, whose help had been solicited by the temporary Government of Basrah, were already in the town; and on the following day one of their Shaikhs, Thāmir, arrived in person. The visitors accordingly "contented themselves with receiving one of the chains "which belonged to the Chaub, and with three or four guns which "they found at Goordilan, a fort on the other side of the river, and "opposite to the town, and which Sadoo Caun had been employed in repairing ever since his last arrival from Shyras, in order to secure "his retreat, as the Vackeel's life was at that time very uncertain."

Position of
the British
Residency
at the evacuation.

Sādiq Khān at his departure invested each member of the British Factory with a robe of honour, presenting the Resident in addition with "an horse and furniture"; he delivered over to the Residency between 400 and 500 Kārehs of dates in part payment of a debt of 1,700 Tūmāns for cloth, incurred by 'Ali Muhammad Khān during his government of Basrah; and he caused to be sent back to the Resident the sister-in-law of the Factory Linguist, whom an influential officer in his army had carried off by force from her parents' house and was preparing to abduct with him to Persia. The East India Company's representatives found themselves obliged in return to make a present of 300 Tūmāns to Sādiq Khān; but this, apart from a gift to Shaikh Thāmir and a loan, already mentioned, to the temporary administration, seems to have been the only unusual expense to which they were subjected by the change of government; and the situation, as a whole, was regarded by them with much complacency. They had been of service, during his imprisonment in Persia, to Sulaimān Āgha, whose restoration to the Mutasallimate was now expected; they stood well with the Arabs of Basrah and its neighbourhood, a number of whom had been redeemed from slavery by their instrumentality, and with the Muntafik Shaikh; they had cultivated friendly relations, during the Persian occupation, with the people of Rīg, Ganāveh and Būshehr; and even the Ka'ab Shaikh, at this juncture, renewed his assurances of friendship "and delivered up a boat which "the Resident of Būshehr had despatched . . . with news of the "Vackeel's death, as also five bales of coffee which he was sending in "her to Mr. Latouche."

Return of
Sulaimān
Āgha from
Persia.

Sulaimān Āgha, the former Turkish Mutasallim, presently returned from Shirāz having been released, according to one authority, at the instance

of the British Resident at Basrah. He was accompanied by the notables who had shared in his deportation and exile, among them Khōjah Ya'qūb, the important banker once before mentioned; and he brought back with him a servant named Ahmad, who had originally been a stable-boy, but who was destined to rise, by his master's favour and his own merit, to the highest post after that of Pāsha in the government of Baghdād.

Events from the recovery of Basrah by the Turks to the appointment of Sulaimān to the Pāshāliq of Baghdād, 1779.

On his return from Persia Sulaimān Āgha, who had deserved well of the Turkish Government by his stubborn defence of Basrah, received the rank of Pāsha and was reinvested with his former charge, possibly in direct subordination to the Porte and not as before in dependence on the Pāsha of Baghdād. He re-appointed Khōjah Ya'qūb, who had supplied him with funds during his captivity, to his former position as banker and financial adviser to the government of Basrah; and at the same time he promoted his servant Ahmad, who had served as negotiator between him and the Jew in their money transactions, and had ingratiated himself equally with both, to be a member of his household staff.

Appointment
of Sulaimān
to the
Government
of Basrah,
1779.

If, in consequence of Sulaimān's elevation to the dignity of Pāsha, the government of Basrah and Baghdād were for a time divided, it was not long before they were again combined, and that under his own administration. On the 27th October 1779* **Husain, Pāsha of Baghdād**, was deposed by Janissaries and obliged to quit the capital; and Sulaimān Pāsha became a candidate for the vacant Pāshāliq, which, largely in consequence of British support, he before long obtained, along with permission to reside at Basrah or at Baghdād as he found more convenient. Ahmad benefited by his master's promotion through being advanced to the responsible position of Muhrdār or custodian of the Pāsha's seal; but Sulaimān for some years deliberately abstained from appointing a Kehiyah or Minister,—an omission which drew many remonstrances from the Porte, as it was necessary that the Pāsha's nomination should

Appointment
of Sulaimān
to the
Pāshāliq of
Baghdād,
1779.

* According to Brydges, however, the Pāsha whom Sulaimān succeeded was named Ahmad, and he was put to death (*Brief History of the Wahawby*, page 187). The Ahmad in question may have been identical with the so-called Hamad who was Pāsha in 1774 (see footnote on page 1242). Olivier gives Sulaimān's predecessor in the Pāshāliq the name of Hasan and indicates that he was removed for incompetence—*Voyage* II, 403.

be approved by them, and their approval was not given except in consideration of valuable presents. The happiest results were anticipated by all from Sulaimān Pāsha's appointment to the province; and, though it was foreseen that the state of disorganisation prevailing in the northern districts would oblige him to visit Baghdād, and that he might be induced by the central position of that city with reference to his territories as a whole to take up his residence there, it was hoped that his former connection with Basrah and the dependence in some respects of Baghdād upon it, which had been clearly demonstrated during the Persian occupation, would ensure for that port a larger share of administrative attention than it had received under his predecessors. The favourable outlook, as it presented itself to Messrs. Latouche and Abraham in January 1780, was described by them in these words: "On the whole, "from the known prudence and spirit of Soliman Pacha, as well as from "the great opinion which is entertained of him by the people in general, "not only of Baghdād and Bussorah, but of the several adjacent provinces, "we flatter ourselves with seeing these countries in a very few years in a "more flourishing condition than before the late troubles. The communication with Baghdād, which has for a long time past been stopped by the "Ghesaal" (*i.e.*, Khazā'il) "Arabs, already begins to open, and not only "they, but the rest of the Arabs, profess the greatest respect for and obedience to, Soliman Pacha."

Internal affairs under Sulaimān Pāsha's earlier rule, 1779—89.

Suppression
of a rebellion,
1780.

About the beginning of August 1780, a rebellion against the authority of the new Pāsha was brought to an end by the decisive defeat of the insurgents in an engagement lasting several hours. Ibn Muhammad Qatil, who commanded the rebel army, was killed in the battle; and Muhammad Baig, who pretended to the Pashāliq, either fled the country or shared the same fate. It was hoped—though, as the sequel will show, in vain—that this success would render Sulaimān Pāsha's position unassailable for the future, and that its moral effect upon the Khazā'il, who were again interrupting communication between Basrah and Baghdād, would be such as to obviate the necessity for an expedition against them in their marshy retreats.

Turkish
campaign
against the
Ka'ab, 1784.

In 1784 the Turks were again at war with their old adversaries the Ka'ab of 'Arabistan; and the Muntalik tribe, governed at this time by Thuwaini, one of the most celebrated of their Shaikhs, took an important

share in the hostilities upon the side of the Turks. A curious incident of the campaign was witnessed by Messrs. Latouche and Harford Jones of the Basrah Residency, the former of whom, as he was returning to Europe by Baghdād and Aleppo, arranged to have a parting interview on the way with Thuwaini, whose camp was then on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab at some distance above Basrah. Immediately after the visit, which ended at sunset, was over, Thuwaini struck his camp; and his force, consisting of 1,000 to 1,200 mounted men, at once began to cross the great river by swimming. In the course of the night and the following morning the Muntafik travelled a distance of over 65 miles by land, besides swimming two large creeks; and at 9 A.M. the next day they surprised the enemy in their camp and completely routed them. The Ka'ab had been aware of Thuwaini's appointment with Mr. Latouche, and they had not thought it possible that he could be upon them within so short a time after it.

In 1786, the year after that in which Sulaimān Pāsha at last consented to appoint a Kehiyah in the person of his protégé Ahmad, then 36 years of age, a fresh rebellion broke out in the province; it was headed by Hāji Sulaimān Baig, the Shaikh of a powerful Arab* tribe in the vicinity of Baghdād. Hāji Sulaimān, who had resided for some years at the Pāsha's court, having been detected in a political intrigue, was ordered to quit the capital and obeyed; but he immediately took up arms against the Government, and he was supported in his resistance to the Pāsha by a strong party. Several engagements took place between the Pāsha's troops, which were commanded by the Kehiyah, and those of the rebel leader; and about the beginning of February 1787 the fortune of war appeared to favour the latter, who was said to have won a victory and to have taken prisoner the Pāsha of Kurdistān, one of Sulaimān Pāsha's generals. At one time it was even rumoured that the Porte had appointed Hāji Sulaimān Baig to the Pāshāliq of Baghdād in super-session of Sulaimān Pāsha; but the statement, though well vouched for, proved to be erroneous; and the rebellion was at length suppressed or otherwise came to an end.

Rebellion of
Hāji Sulai-
mān Baig,
1786-87.

In the early spring of 1787 the general outlook was far from reassuring, for not only was the rising just described at its height, but scarcity of provisions and high prices prevailed in the Basrah districts in consequence of the failure of the rivers to rise to their usual height during the previous season; and communication with Baghdād by the Euphrates

Various
troubles,
1787.

* Described as the "Tye" Arabs.

Occupation
of Basrah
by Shaikh
Thuwaini,
6th May to
25th October
1787.

had once more been cut by the Khazā'il tribe, obliging merchants to adapt the Tigris route, which was longer in time and more expensive.

An extraordinary episode in the history of Basrah was the seizure of the town and its occupation during some months in 1787 by Thuwaini, the chief of the Muntafik tribe: this Shaikh, whose exploit against the Ka'ab in 1784 we have already noticed, is described by a contemporary traveller as being "a middle-aged man, of great courage and enterprise; "which, joined to a vigorous understanding, and a just and moderate "exercise of the sovereign power, have rendered him dear to his tribe, and "respected by all men." Thuwaini took advantage of the opportunity afforded by a visit from the Mutasallim of Basrah, who came to Zubair to congratulate him on a victory over his enemies, to seize that well-meaning official and his suite; and, having accomplished this without bloodshed, he sent a large body of tribesmen to occupy Basrah, which they did without difficulty, as there were not more than 200 troops in the place and only a very few Turks. On the 6th of May he entered the town in person with a following of about 5,000 Arabs and assumed the government of Basrah, taking possession at the same time of the 'Turkish fleet. No violence was committed, and private property was everywhere scrupulously respected; but the existing civil officials were removed from their posts and replaced by others, Arabs were put in command of the vessels of the fleet, and the Mutasallim and his principal subordinates were either deported—or voluntarily retired—by sea to India. Shaikh Thuwaini then wrote letters to Constantinople in which he asserted his own hereditary title to the Government of Basrah, claimed merit for his moderation and for the orderliness of his proceedings, and promised allegiance to the Sultān of Turkey on condition of being invested with a combined Pashāliq of Basrah and Baghdād. After extorting a loan of 6,000 Tumāns from the Jewish, Armenian and other merchants of Basrah, Thuwaini marched to a spot on the Euphrates somewhere between Qūrnah and the modern Nāsiriyyah, and there cantoned his troops in readiness to meet the attack which he knew would shortly be made upon him by the Government of Baghdād. Sulaimān Pāsha had now with him an elder brother of Shaikh Thuwaini named Ahmad, who, having pretensions of his own to the Shaikhship of the Muntafik, had readily abandoned Thuwaini when he went into rebellion, and had met in consequence with a cordial reception at Baghdād. The Pāsha was careful to seek and obtain, before he moved, an alliance with the Ka'ab tribe, whom the Shaikh had already approached, but with whom he had concluded no arrangement; and in the beginning of October, the Porte having merely signified their pleasure that the head of the upstart should be sent to Constantinople, Sulaimān marched from

Baghdād. On the 23rd of the month the armies came in contact ; and on the 25th, after a long and doubtful conflict upon the bank of the Euphrates, the tribal army was scattered and Thuwaini fled the field, attended only by a few followers. The victor then appointed Mustafa Āgha to the Mutasalimate of Basrah, recognised Ahmad as principal Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe, and not only obliged the merchants of Basrah to propitiate him with gifts, but also ordered them to pay double duties on their goods during the current year, irrespective of what Thuwaini had already taken from them in customs and as a loan. After a time Thuwaini made overtures to the Pāsha for a pardon ; but these, at least in the first instance, were disregarded. Two English travellers, Ensign William Franckline, who was at Basrah from the 28th of December 1787 to the 12th of February 1788, and Dr. Thomas Howel, whose sojourn there lasted from the 23rd of February to the 1st of March 1788, have left an account of Shaikh Thuwaini's revolution ; and Dr. Howel personally examined the site of the battle of the 25th October, which "bore the marks of having been the scene of great slaughter ; for "it was abundantly strewed with the bones of men and horses."

Trade revived at Basrah, to some extent, between 1780 and 1787 ; but in the next year it again became languid in consequence of the rebellion of Thuwaini and the difficulties of the Turkish Government in Europe. After 1786 there was little or no profit on the sale of Indian piece-goods in Turkish 'Irāq. In 1789 the number of bales of Indian piece-goods imported at Basrah was only 800, and the whole treasure freight of the merchant vessels returning to India did not exceed Rs. 50,000. The broadcloth and long ells imported by the East India Company had now a slow and unprofitable sale, and they could only be disposed of at a very long credit. This was due to several causes—to their high price ; to the competition of similar goods of French origin ; to an unfavourable exchange, involving loss on all remittances of money or valuables to India ; and to a great and increasing dearth of specie, Turkish gold suitable for exportation abroad having practically ceased to be available. Some cheap kinds of locally manufactured cloth had taken the place of varieties formerly imported ; and part of the Indian muslins consigned to Europe now travelled to their destination by some sea route, instead of by Basrah and Baghdād as formerly. An important commercial advantage enjoyed by the British in Turkish 'Irāq was that, in case of a native merchant becoming bankrupt, the claims of his British creditors were, under Farmān, satisfied in full before anything was distributed among native creditors.

Course of
trade, especi-
ally British,
1779—89.

Imports and
exports.

Imports by sea were enumerated in 1790, with reference to the years immediately preceding, as "British woollens, Bengal piece-goods of "near fifty different kinds, chintz of different kinds from the Coromandel "coast, Madras long cloth, Port Nuovo blue goods, Malabar cloth, Surat "piece-goods of all kinds, cotton yarn; Guzerat piece-goods, chintz, and "Cuttanies; Cambay chauders, Broach and Scindy cotton shauls, bamboos, "chinaware, sugar, sugar candy, pepper, ginger, cardamums, cloves, "nutmegs, cinnamon, cassia flowers, musk, lump Lack, camphire, turmeric, "indigo, iron, lead, steel, tin, Tothenaque, red lead, coffee, tobacco, a variety "of drugs, and many less important mercantile articles; all which, except "the proportions thereof necessary for the consumption of Bussora and its "immediate vicinity are transported to Aleppo and Baghdād by Carravans "to Baghdād direct by the river Tygris, and by the river Euphrates *via* "Hilla, and to Shuster by boats." Imports from Aleppo and Baghdād were "copper, arsenic, galls, catgut, Persian saffron and raw silk, gold "and silver lace, Angora Shauls, Aleppo flowered piece-goods, Baghdad and "Aleppo cuttanies, Shamees, velvet, silks, sattins, English shalloons, "French broad-cloth, broad-cloth caps, Lamette, Ara, Contarino, Venetian "false coral and beads of different kinds, large and small looking-glasses, "stained glass, brass wire, coral, cochineal, tobacco, opium, a variety of "drugs, and many less important mercantile articles, all which, except "particular articles only intended for the Bussora market and the propor- "tions of the other articles necessary for the consumption of Bussora and "its immediate vicinity, are transported, by means of the before-mentioned "vessels which annually import at Basrah, from thence to the different ports "of the Persian Gulf, to Muscat and to India." Besides the re-exports just detailed there was a true local export of great importance, consisting of the dates grown in the Basrah district. The annual harvest of these was estimated to be worth, on the average, a million of Bombay rupees; and the major portion of it was sent abroad to various ports of the Persian Gulf, India and the Red Sea. There was a considerable trade from Basrah to Shūshtar, with which there was easy communication by the Kārūn River.

Duties on
goods.

Import and export duties were fairly heavy in Turkish 'Irāq. Merchandise was divided for purposes of assessment into two classes, *viz.*, into "fine" and "gruff" goods: to the former class belonged all kinds of cloth, and to the latter such "heavy" articles as metals, coffee, tobacco, pepper and sugar. In the case of European merchant the amount of import duty was limited by treaty to 3 per cent. *ad valorem*, but in practice it was more, for their goods landed at Basrah, after paying

3 per cent. at that port, paid the same again on reaching Baghdād, and even a third time on reaching Aleppo; and export duties at 3 per cent. were levied also. Native merchants on the other hand paid $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on "fine" goods received at Basrah from the sea or from Baghdād and $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on "gruff" similarly received; the rates on the goods exported from Basrah to Aleppo were similar; and $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. was charged on all native exportations by sea. To escape these dues, sometimes aggregating 17 per cent. on the same goods, native dealers frequently resorted to smuggling. They made use for this purpose of the town of Zubair, first bringing their goods there by stealth from landing places on the Shatt-al-'Arab, and afterwards introducing them secretly into Basrah or despatching them undetected, by a caravan from Basrah, across the desert to Aleppo. Kuwait also afforded opportunities, which were not neglected, for contraband trade.

The cost of caravan and water carriage at this time is noticed,* being a question of general importance, in the chapter on the history of the Persian Gulf as a whole.

The above details are mostly derived from a report on trade furnished by Messrs. Manesty and Jones, the East India Company's representatives at Basrah, in 1790.

Transport of goods.

British political relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1779—89.

The dealings of the representatives of the East India Company with Sulaimān Pāsha—then Sulaimān Āgha—during his Mutasallimate of Basrah are the subject of some remarks in an earlier paragraph of this chapter, and we have already observed that his release from detention in Persia seems to have been due in part to British influence; but some facts regarding his subsequent connection with British officials remain to be stated.

Relations of the British with Sulaimān Pāsha, 1779-89.

When Sulaimān in 1779 became an aspirant to the vacant Pāshāliq of Baghdād, it was resolved, inasmuch as he personally owed large sums to individual members of the Basrah Residency staff, while the Government of Baghdād itself was similarly indebted to the East India Company, that the Factory should support his candidature, the success of which would enable both sets of obligations to be discharged. Funds were accordingly remitted by Mr. Latouche, acting on the Pāsha's behalf, to the British Ambassador at Constantinople for distribution

1779.

* *Vide* page 167 *ante*.

among the most influential personages there, including the Sultān's mother, the Vazīr, and numerous high officials; and the desired result was attained. An item in the account afterwards furnished to the Pāsha, however, showing that about £2,000 had been paid "to a person" whose name it was not proper to mention," attracted his attention; and to the end of his life he was accustomed to insinuate, whenever anything had put him in ill-humour with the British, that this sum had been appropriated by their Ambassador.

1782-84.

During the years 1782 and 1783 Sulaimān Pāsha was supplied, on payment of the cost price and the expenses of carriage only, with 1,300 stand of arms and a quantity of gunpowder and cannon shot from Bombay; and about the same time, in compliance with a request from him which the Turkish Government at Constantinople subsequently supported, six armed Gallivats were built at Bombay and delivered to him at Basrah. One object of Mr. Latouche in travelling to Europe by way of Baghdād at the end of 1784, as already mentioned in another connection, was "to take leave of Sulaimān Pāsha, whom he had been "very instrumental in placing in that Pachalik, and with whom he "had large accounts to settle."

1787.

In 1787, when it was generally stated that the leader of the local rebellion which occurred in that year had been chosen by the Porte to supplant Sulaimān Pāsha in the Pāshāliq, the Pāsha, who himself believed the report, "sent for Coja Marcar, the Hon'ble Company's "Agent at Baghdād, and in his presence ordered a letter to be written "to His Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, in which he in the "warmest terms entreated his friendly support and good offices at the "Porte to set aside the appointment which he supposed had been given to "Hadjee Soliman Beg, and acknowledged his many serious obligations "to the English." In the same year Mr. Manesty, the British Agent at Basrah, stated it as his opinion that Sulaimān Pāsha, although his conduct had not been entirely such as might have been expected after the favours that he had received at the hands of the British, was "really partial" to them, and that by considerate treatment he had given the merchants more encouragement than any of his predecessors.

Relations of
the British
with influen-
tial natives of
the country,
1779-89.

The British Resident at Basrah and the members of his staff seem to have maintained, apart from their dealings with the Turkish officials, a friendly intercourse with the Arab chiefs and other notables of the country. The motive of Mr. Latouche's visit to Thuwaini in 1784 was to deliver a present to the Muntafik chief, apparently in recognition of his good conduct with reference to the British Desert Mail, the working

of which he had it in his power to facilitate or to obstruct; and a service which Mr. Manesty was able to render in 1785 to one Muhammad Baig was afterwards frequently acknowledged by the recipient's brother, the same Hāji Sulaimān Baig who rebelled in 1786, and whose appointment to the Pāshāliq was considered probable in the following year. In 1787 the Resident, in a report on the general situation, was able to refer with satisfaction to "the very extensive influence which the English now fortunately enjoy, and the very strict friendship which, without an exception, they are now in with every person of consequence in the country."

British establishments in Turkish 'Irāq, 1779—89.

It will be remembered that in consequence of the violent behaviour of the Persian governor of Basrah, or rather of the stringent orders by the Court of Directors which it occasioned, a reduction in the staff of the Basrah Agency had been ordered by the Government of Bombay in 1778, but that up to the beginning of 1779 it had not been carried into effect.

On the reversion of Basrah to Turkish jurisdiction Mr. Latouche, the Resident, represented to the Government of Bombay that the Court of Directors would now probably desire the Factory to be continued on more than a minimum scale, and he accordingly requested leave to keep Mr. Abraham with him as his Assistant and to retain the Surgeon formerly attached to the Agency. Permission was duly granted in both cases.

Staff of the
Basrah
Residency,
1779.

In the summer of 1780 "an epidemical fever" raged at Basrah and caused many deaths. Among the victims was Mr. Abraham, the Assistant Resident, who was sent to Būshehr in the "Eagle" for change of air, was taken ashore there at his own request on the 16th of June, and died the following day; but Mr. Petrie, another passenger who was dangerously ill of the same disease, escaped with his life. Captain Sheriff, who commanded the "Eagle," and most of his crew had also suffered; but during their stay at Būshehr, which lasted from the 16th to the 22nd of June, they all practically recovered.

Fever at
Basrah, 1780.

In November 1783 the Government of Bombay sanctioned a proposal made by the Resident at Basrah, that a permanent Native Agent should be appointed at Basrah on a salary of Rs. 1,100 a month to

Institution
of a Native
Agency at
Baghdad,
1783.

transact business with the Pāsha on behalf of the East India Company, to forward packets to Basrah, and to obtain information. The first Native Agent selected was Khōjah Marcar, who had been performing the duties of the new appointment gratuitously since July 1781; and he was authorised by Government, no doubt as a reward and as a token of their approbation, to draw his salary in arrear for the whole of that period.

New orders
in regard to
consulage,
1784.

In 1784, under new orders, half of the 2 per cent. consulage at Basrah, hitherto equally divided between the Resident at Basrah and the Governor of Bombay, began to be credited to the East India Company themselves.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1779—89.

From 1782 to 1794 the duties of Bishop of Babylon, and probably of French Consul at Baghdād as well, were discharged by the Abbé de Beauchamp, as deputy of his uncle M. Mirodot du Bourg. This Abbé was a *savant*, and in his capacity as such he afterwards accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt.

SALIM III.

1789—1807.

The successor of 'Abdul Hamīd I in the Sultanate of Turkey was his nephew Salīm III, a son of Mustafa III, who ascended the throne on the 7th April 1789 and was deposed on the 29th May 1807. The Ottoman Empire consisted in his day of 26 Ayālat or Governments; and among these was Baghdād, which included Basrah, but not Mūsāl. The period was an important and even critical one in western Turkey where the Sultan endeavoured to restore the authority of the central Government long fallen into abeyance, and perished in the attempt, resisted by the 'Ulama and the Janissaries; but the most remote of the Asiatic Ottoman provinces, that with which we are concerned, lay almost beyond the range of the international convulsions of the Napoleonic era, and perhaps entirely so beyond that of the reforms,

or attempted reforms, in Turkey by which the reign of Salīm III was distinguished. In fact, it may be said that, but for the financial effects of Austrian, Russian and French wars, to which it was required to contribute, and but for incursions by the Wahhābis of Central Arabia, against which the Porte were unable to afford it protection, the Baghdād Pāshāliq remained unaffected by movements external to itself.

But, though the native rulers and populations of Turkish 'Irāq lived in comparative indifference to the progress of events in Europe, it was otherwise with the representatives of the western powers there; and, in order to explain the policies and relative positions of these agents at various times, the following facts may be recalled. From the accession of the new Sultān in 1789 until the treaty of Jassey in 1792, Turkey was at war with Russia and at first with Austria also, while Britain and Prussia were exerting their influence on her behalf, and France, which was in a state of revolution, took no part in the strife. From 1798 to 1801 there was war between Turkey and France, due to the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte; and Turkey, after the beginning of 1799, was in receipt of active assistance from Britain and Russia. Finally, in 1806, the relations of Turkey and France having in the meanwhile become friendly and even intimate, a rupture between Turkey and Russia took place, and was followed by a breach between Turkey and Britain, in consequence of which the British Ambassador withdrew from Constantinople at the beginning of 1807, and a demonstration against the city was made by a British fleet under Admiral Duckworth. The most stirring days at Baghdād were doubtless those of 1798-99, when it was seriously expected that Bonaparte, either by the Euphrates or by some other route, would advance from Egypt against India.

The subject of the Wahhābi invasions of Turkish territory is dealt with further on in the present chapter and, more fully, in the chapter on the History of Najd; and it is not necessary here to describe the improvements in administration, both civil and military, to which Salīm III devoted much attention and which were one reason of his unpopularity and dethronement; for their influence on affairs in Turkish 'Irāq was of the slightest, if not altogether unfelt.

Internal affairs under Sulaimān Pāsha's later rule, 1789-1802.

Mention has already been made of Ahmad, originally a domestic servant of Sulaimān Pāsha, whom in 1785 he appointed to be his Kehiyah

Assassination
of Ahmad
Pasha,

Kehiyah,
1796.

or Minister, for whom he obtained at the same time the rank of a Pāsha of two horse-tails, and by whom for several years after that date the business of the Government, both foreign and domestic, was to a very large extent transacted. About 1790* Sulaimān Pāsha seems to have suggested to Ahmad Pāsha that he should become his son-in-law, and later to have promised that, if this took place, he would resign the Pāshāliq himself and recommend Ahmad to the Porte as his successor. Ahmad Pāsha, however, was averse to the proposed match, because it would involve, on account of the high rank of his master's daughter, the dismissal of his existing domestic establishment, including a Georgian lady to whom he was greatly attached; and he continued to evade the proposed honour. At length Sulaimān Pāsha's daughter, having come to know of the unwillingness of Ahmad, so unflattering to herself, to change his condition, induced 'Ali, a Georgian slave who was her father's Khaznahdār or treasurer, to undertake the removal of Ahmad, promising to marry him instead, if he were successful. 'Ali found means to enlist the support of a number of Sulaimān Pāsha's Georgian body-guard, by whom Ahmad Pāsha was already disliked; and one morning, as the Kehiyah entered the hall of public audience, where Sulaimān was already seated, he was struck down by 'Ali, who stabbed him in the breast with a dagger, and was then instantly despatched by some of 'Ali's confederates in the body-guard. Sulaimān Pāsha, though he had covered his face with a shawl instead of making a serious effort to save his favourite, appeared at first to be genuinely affected by his death and retired to an inner apartment; but Muhammad Baig, one of his Arab advisers, and 'Abdullah, a Jewish banker at his court, whom he immediately summoned, persuaded him to acquiesce in the accomplished fact. He accordingly issued a proclamation announcing that Ahmad Pāsha had been put to death by his own orders for intended treachery, and he actually caused the nuptials of his daughter with the chief conspirator Ali to be celebrated the same evening. This event occurred in April 1796, immediately after the recovery of the Pāsha from an illness which had made him almost incapable of managing his affairs.

Resources of
the Baghdād
Pāshāliq in
1796—1797.

The resources of the Baghdād Pāshāliq, both military and fiscal, were estimated by the French traveller M. Olivier, whose visit took place in 1796—97, to be considerable. The Pāsha's bodyguard then

*The account in the text is taken from Brydges (*Wahauzy*, pages 178—186). Olivier gives a different version of the circumstances leading to the assassination, which took place when he was himself at Baghdād (*Voyage*, Volume II, pages 411—414) and was practically witnessed by the French physician Outrey.

† She was the only daughter born in wedlock of Sulaimān Pāsha.

consisted of 4,000 mounted and 2,000 unmounted men; but of purely Turkish cavalry there were not more than 1,200 in the province. The number of effective Janissaries was not ascertainable. The garrison of Baghdād city comprised about 8,000, and it was believed that more than 15,000 could be assembled there and elsewhere, if required; but the Janissaries could not be employed by the Pāsha except for the defence of the stations at which they were posted, only the Porte having the power to order them on other service. Much reliance was placed on the military contingents provided by Kurdistān, then governed by three chiefs who were nominated by the Pāsha of Baghdād and graded as Pāshas of one horse-tail, and whose forces amounted in the aggregate to some 12,000 or 15,000 mounted men. From the Arabs of the province it was possible to raise a force of 10,000 to 12,000 mounted men, but this was an unreliable and expensive levy. Unorganised bodies of musketeers could also be collected, in an emergency, in numbers dependent on the prospect of booty and success. The military force of the Pāshāliq was estimated at 40,000 to 50,000 men, all told; and it was understood that this number could be maintained in the field without drawing on revenues external to the province.

The fiscal receipts of the local Government amounted in an ordinary year, according to M. Olivier, to about 4,000,000 francs, derived from taxes on land, assessments on Arabs and Kurds, contributions of non-Muhammadans, customs, etc. The income from customs had been of especial importance since the diversion in part of the Indian trade from Persia to Turkish 'Irāq—which took place in the time of Karīm Khān. The proportion of the local revenue remitted to the Porte did not exceed one-eighth, the remainder being absorbed in local expenditure; and in years of war with the Kurds or the Arabs the remittances to Constantinople were liable to serious diminution.

According to Mr. Jones, who went to Baghdād as British Resident in 1798, the revenue of the Pāshāliq for some years previous to 1797 was not less than * £1,000,000 per annum, out of which the Pāsha sent less than £100,000 to the Porte and laid by, on his own account, £100,000 to £150,000.

Early in April 1802, bubonic plague again made its appearance at Baghdād, and by the 9th of May it had carried off, it was estimated, about 2,000 souls; but from the absence of later references to the disease it may be assumed that the epidemic was not of long duration.

Plague at
Baghdād,
1802.

* The annual revenue of the modern Wilāyats of Baghdād and Basrah together is about £400,000.

The Pāsha forsook Baghdād as soon as the presence of plague in the city was reported, and no steps were taken, or even prescribed, by him for withstanding its progress; but he issued "unjust and inhuman orders" that none of the inhabitants should presume to follow his example of seeking safety in flight.

Political
state of the
Pāshāliq,
May 1802.

Sulaimān Pashā, distinguished in earlier days by energy and courage, had now sunk into his official * dotage. The general state of the Pāshāliq in May 1802 was one of inefficiency, confusion, and alarm. The city of Baghdād and the town of Basrah were both insufficiently defended against attack; and the garrison of the former, apart from some 500 ragamuffins described as Barātalīs, Tufangchīs, etc., consisted of 6,000 to 7,000 Janissaries, "undisciplined and unruly, who probably, when "distressed by the inconveniences of a siege, would turn like a wounded "elephant on their own party." The greater part of Kurdistan was still comprised in the Pāshāliq, but the leading Kurdish families were distracted by feuds and broils, and the district itself, apart from the military contingents which it furnished, was not a source of strength to the Baghdād Government. Of the Arab tribes of the country the Shammar Tōqah upon the Tigris near to Baghdād were disaffected towards the authorities, by whom they had often been cruelly treated; and the more distant Bani Lām were in partial revolt through the attack of a Shaikh, recently deposed by the Turks, upon the successor whom they had set up in his place. The whole district from Kūt-al-Amārah to Jassān and thence to Hawizeh was, owing to these causes, a prey to disorder. Besides these troubles at home there was also the constant danger, or at least the constant fear, of invasion from Central Arabia on the one side and from Persia on the other.

Death of
Sulaimān
Pashā, 17th
August 1802.

At the end of July 1802, though the condition of Sulaimān Pashā, who had then been ill for some time, was studiously concealed from the public, it was generally known to be critical; and plots and preparations for seizing the succession began. The ordinary medical attendant of the Pashā was M. Outrey, a French surgeon, long resident at Baghdād; but on the 6th of August Sulaimān was visited, at the request of his relations and a number of influential persons, by Dr. Short, the Surgeon of the British Residency, who at once perceived that he had not

* In 1796, when seen by M. Olivier, he had fallen into a state of drowsiness and melancholy, accompanied by a disinclination equally for work and for pleasure but from this attack he apparently recovered.

† Early in May 1802 the Resident at Baghdād reported that the Pashā was now paralysed from his waist downwards.

many hours to live. The end came on the 7th of August before the hour of mid-day prayer.

Sulaimān Pāsha's Government, once firm, had been qualified not long before his death by the British Resident at Baghdād as "imbecile in the extreme" while he himself was spoken of as having outlived his honour and his reputation; but he deserves to be remembered as he was in the days of his vigour, when his appearance and character answered to the following description by Sir H. J. Brydges, to whom he was well known :—

Suleiman was, perhaps, as fine a specimen of a Turkish Pasha as ever existed. Born a Georgian, he was possessed of great manly beauty—his stature and form were such as to give the greatest effect to the magnificence of the Turkish dress—his countenance had a strong expression of reflection and humanity—he was as expert in all military and field exercises and sports as those who made them their employment and profession—sincere and warm in the exercise and belief of his own religion, he was as tolerant as a Turk could be towards those whom an article of his own faith bound him to consider as infidels—exact and economical in his expenses, he was accused of avarice, but when he considered his country to be in danger, he freely and readily parted with that which he had amassed slowly and by degrees. I can vouch (for it passed through mine and the Jew Abdullah's hands) to his having sent, first and last, to the assistance of Eusoof Pacha, the Grand Vizier, during his campaign in Egypt against the French, half a million of pounds sterling in money. His court was splendid, and the establishment of his household was on the scale of that of a great sovereign. In the early part of his life he had received many favours and great assistance from the English, and to the very last moment he acknowledged these, and any favour asked for by an English gentleman travelling through his Pachalik was sure to be gracefully and cheerfully granted.

Sulaiman had, also, according to the same authority, a strong sense of humour.

The trade of the Pāshāliq during the period 1789—1802 continued to be of much the same character as between 1779 and 1789. In 1800 the average annual value of Indian imports at Basrah was estimated at 80 lakhs of rupees.

Trade from
1789 to
1802.

External relations of Turkish 'Irāq, 1789—1802.

Disquiet upon the western frontier, occasioned by the irreconcilable differences between the Turks and the Wāhhābis, was the most salient feature of the external history of Turkish 'Irāq under the later rule of Sulaimān Pāsha. The Wāhhābis were in general the active and aggressive party, and a detailed account of the struggle will be found in the chapter

Invasions
by and
expeditions
against the
Wāhhābis,
1789—1802.

on the history of Najd : in this place it will be enough to refer to some of its principal incidents.

First
Turkish
expedition,
1798.

Before 1798 various attacks had been made by the Wahhābis upon Turkish territory ; and in that year, even the town of Hillah having begun to suffer from their depredations, a Turkish expedition marched from Basrah, of which the objective was Dara'iyah, the Wahhābi capital and the purpose nothing less than the reduction of Najd. This force, which was under the command of 'Ali, Sulaimān Pāsha's second Kehiyah, the murderer and successor of Ahmad Pāsha, turned back from Hasa after a short and inglorious campaign ; and the result of the expedition was merely a truce for six years, arranged at Thāj during the Turkish retirement on Basrah and subsequently ratified at Baghdād.

Sack of
Karbala by
the
Wahhābis
and second
Turkish
expedition,
1801—1802.

This truce, even, was not long observed ; and on the 20th April 1801, a terrible disaster befell the Turks in the sudden seizure and complete sack by the Wahhābis of the town of Karbala, a place regarded as sacred by Shi'ahs and therefore by almost the whole Persian nation. Sulaimān Pāsha endeavoured to reply to the outrage by an expedition against Dara'iyah, conducted this time not by a Turkish official but by Thuwaini, the chief Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe ; but the result of this second attempt was even less favourable than that of the first, for not far beyond Kuwait the commander was assassinated, whether through political treachery or in consequence of some private grudge, and the leaderless force was dispersed and partly destroyed by the Wahhābis. These were the events that unnerved old Sulaimān Pāsha, who in middle age had defended Basrah bravely for a full year against the whole force of Persia, and who now, on learning of the calamity at Karbala, was said to have exclaimed : "It is not fit I should live longer."

Attitude of
the Arab
tribes to the
Wahhābis
and apathy of
the Turkish
authorities,
1802.

The attitude of a number of the Arab tribes of 'Irāq was, in May 1802, extremely doubtful with reference to the Wahhābis. It was considered not improbable that the Khazā'il and the Shammar Tōqah, who had both suffered much at the hands of the Turks, might join the Wahhābis, if the latter should attempt an invasion in force ; the loyalty of even the Muntafik tribe had become open to question ; and the Pāsha himself had enunciated it as a principle, that "enfin il ne faut pas compter sur les tribues arabes, qui ont toutes les yeux sur les Vahabes." The very extremeness of the danger begot a kind of apathy, which caused the town of Hillah, though unmistakeably threatened by the Wahhābis, to be left unwallled and undefended ; and Mr. Harford Jones, the British Resident at Baghdād, was constrained to remark, in addressing the Governor-General of India : "I fear Your Excellency

"will think I err if I tell you the Government here is so besotted as not to perceive the importance of the port (? post) of Hillah, but on my honor, my Lord, this is the case."

The only neighbours of consequence to the Pāshāliq besides the Wahhābis were at this time the Persians; and, after the establishment of Qājār rule in Persia, the Pāsha of Baghdād found it advisable to treat that country with consideration and respect. The founder of the Qājār dynasty, Āgha Muhammad Khān, was generally credited with designs upon Baghdād; and after his death in 1797 grave apprehensions were from time to time aroused by the conduct of his successor, Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, especially in 1801-02 when it was feared that he might require satisfaction of the Turks for their failure to protect the holy Shīah town of Karbala and its inhabitants against the fury of the Wahhābis.

Relations
with Persia,
1789—1802.

In the year 1791 a fresh rupture, which the Turks themselves had done nothing to provoke, occurred between their administration at Basrah and the semi-independent Ka'ab tribe in the Persian province of 'Arabistān. Earlier in the year the Ka'ab had ventured to attack the annual 'Omāni coffee fleet while on its way to Basrah, but had been repulsed with severe loss, most of their Gallivats being destroyed. To revenge this defeat, the Ka'ab constructed batteries upon both banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab and endeavoured, on the return of the 'Omāni vessels down the river between October and December, to prevent their passage; but the strangers were escorted by the Turkish fleet under the command of the Kapitān Pāsha, and, after an engagement between the ships and the batteries, they reached the Persian Gulf in safety. The Ka'ab then abandoned their batteries and withdrew to Dōraq, while the Turkish fleet returned to Basrah; but the Turks were extremely irritated against the Ka'ab on account of their insolence in having occupied positions on Turkish soil on the western bank of the river and in having demanded compensation from them, as they did, for the losses which they had sustained by their gratuitous attack upon the 'Omāni merchantmen. The matter, however, ended here.

Collision
with the
Ka'ab, 1791.

A slight disagreement, mentioned also in the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, occurred in 1798 between Saiyid Sultān, the ruler of Masqat, and the Turkish authorities in 'Irāq. By way of enforcing a claim to a sum of money which the Saiyid asserted to be due to him on account of the aid* rendered by his father to the Turks during the siege of Basrah in 1775-76,—a claim repudiated by the Pāsha, who as the defender of Basrah in that year must have been personally cognisant of the facts,

Difficulty
with the
Saiyid of
'Omān, 1798.

* Vide page 1259 ante.

—the 'Omāni ruler in July 1798 prepared to operate by sea against Basrah and, as a preliminary to doing so, opened negotiations with his enemy the Qāsīmī Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah for a peace, and even for an alliance. Sulaimān Pāsha, who was by this time aware of the French invasion of Egypt and who was now about to launch his first expedition against the Wāhhābis, feeling that any addition to his perplexities would be inconvenient, sent on the 20th August 1798 for Mr. Reinaud, an agent whom the British Resident at Basrah had deputed to Baghdad on business, and requested through him the good offices of the Resident in dissuading the Saiyid of 'Omān and the Qāsīmī Shaikh from violent action. To this proposal Mr. Manesty, the Resident, very readily assented, but he found on enquiry that the Mutasallim of Basrah was already in correspondence with both of the other parties. Direct negotiations followed between the Mutasallim and Mulla Ibrāhim 'Alī, the commander of the annual Masqat coffee fleet, then lying at Būshehr; and in the end the dispute was adjusted, for the time being, and the 'Omāni ships paid their accustomed friendly visit to Basrah.

British political relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802.

It remains to notice the relations of Britain, as represented by the East India Company and their agents, with Turkish 'Irāq during the later years of Sulaimān Pāsha's administration.

Difficulty
between the
British
Resident at
Basrah and
the Turkish
authorities,
arising from
a case
between Jews
and a
Christian,
1791-98.

In March or April 1791 Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, intervened in proceedings before the Mutasallim against a Christian inhabitant of Basrah named Risha, not apparently a British subject or even a European, who was taxed with the murder of a Jew. The ground of the Resident's interference seems to have been that *ex parte* evidence only had been taken in the case, and that the prisoner had not been allowed a fair trial; and, though he was unable to withhold the Mutasallim from finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to death, he succeeded in preventing the infliction of the extreme penalty. Meanwhile threats of resorting to personal violence against the British Resident and of cutting down the East India Company's flagstaff had been used by members of the Jewish community at Basrah, among whom the case had caused great excitement; but they were compelled to apologise to Mr. Manesty, in the presence of the Mutasallim and other Turkish officials, for what they had said; and Mr. Manesty at first accepted their apology. Subsequently, however, on learning from a private source that the head of the local Jewish colony had written of

him in disparaging terms to the Kehiyah Pasha at Baghdad, Mr. Manesty demanded that the whole case should be reopened, that "the principal Jew" should be expelled from Basrah, and that ten other Jews who had taken part in the agitation should be fined or otherwise punished; but the Mutasallim of Basrah, on the ground that the Jews had already expiated their offence by an apology, refused to take action; and the Resident then referred the question to the Pasha at Baghdad. The matter dragged on till about two years later, when the Pasha, wishing to end it, summoned "the principal Jew" to Baghdad and caused the others to be admonished, or offered to have them admonished. How the prisoner Risha was finally disposed of is not stated.

The settlement thus attempted by the Pasha was rejected, however, by Mr. Manesty; and on the 30th of April 1793, accompanied by Mr. Harford Jones, who had been "Joint Factor" with him at Basrah since November 1788, he withdrew by way of protest from Basrah to Kuwait, taking the Residency with him. The Pasha then wrote to the Governor of Bombay, complaining of Mr. Manesty's conduct and requesting that he might be recalled to India and another Resident sent in his place. The question raised by these events was referred by the Government of Bombay to the Governor-General of India, and by the Governor-General to the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London.

Removal of
the British
Residency
from Basrah
to Kuwait,
1793-1795.

The incidents of the sojourn of the Basrah Residency at Kuwait from 1793 to 1795 are described in the history of that principality. The Resident, while he was at Kuwait, received more than one invitation from the Pasha to return to Basrah; but he declined them all because a condition which he considered most essential,—the punishment, namely of ten of the Jews,—was not accepted; and finally he seems to have made an appeal to "His Majesty's Ministers," perhaps through the British Ambassador at Constantinople, for support.

The Court of Directors passed no orders in the case until April 1795. They then censured the conduct of Messrs. Manesty and Jones, whom they considered to have shown great want of judgment in reviving the dispute about the Jews after it had been practically settled; directed that those two gentlemen should be removed from their appointments in the Basrah Residency; and ordered that the officials sent to relieve them should, on arrival at Kuwait, intimate to the Pasha that the East India Company would not press for the punishment of the ten Jews, and that, if an honourable reception were guaranteed, the Factory would be retransferred to Basrah. On the 15th of September 1795, on receipt of these instructions, the Government of Bombay appointed Messrs. N. Crow

Orders of
the Court of
Directors,
April 1795.

and P. LeMessurier to the places of Messrs. Manesty and Jones, of whom the latter had recently left Kuwait for England on account of ill-health.

Return of
the Factory
to Basrah, 4th
September
1795.

The Pasha was not aware, however, of the disposition of the higher British authorities to view the case in the same light as he did himself; and, not long before the arrival in India of the despatch by which his triumph would have been secured, he agreed to Mr. Manesty's terms. On the * 9th of August 1795 Ismā'il Effendi, a Turkish officer of high rank, arrived at Kuwait to clinch matters by the delivery of a letter and to escort the Resident back with honour to Basrah. Mr. Manesty embarked at Kuwait on the 26th of August, and on the 4th of September he landed at Basrah, where he was well received and where, according to the agreement with the Pasha, the ten Jews were handed over to him "for personal chastisement or imprisonment"; but there is nothing to show what use he made of the power thus placed in his hands.

The subsequent arrival of Mr. Crow at Basrah with instructions for taking over charge of the Residency from Mr. Manesty gave rise to official difficulties which will be dealt with in a later paragraph.

Cordial rela-
tions between
the British
Resident and
the Turkish
authorities,
1797-98.

After the departure of Mr. Crow and the restoration of Mr. Manesty to the Residentsip, in which he had been temporarily superseded, harmonious relations were established and maintained between the British Factory and the officials and influential men of the country. Of these relations the following egotistic account was given by Mr. Manesty in May 1798 :—

I am really happy in communicating to Government information that the affairs of the Residency are at present in, a most prosperous state, and that I have not the smallest doubt of their long continuing so. The conduct of the Turkish Government in all its departments towards the factory and myself is friendly, handsome, and satisfactory on (*sic*) the highest degree. My influence with it is as extensive as I can myself desire. My influence and friendship with all the neighbouring Governors and Shaiks, and with the distant Shaiks in the desert, enable me to command their services on all occasions, and the general inhabitants of the country are devoted to my wishes. In short, Hon'ble Sir, I have now attained the desirable object of those politic and prudential measures which have invariably characterised my public conduct as British Resident at Bussorah. The honor, the credit, the respectability, and the influence are completely and firmly established, and the nation and the Hon'ble Company now in unequivocal enjoyment of all the advantages derivable from this valuable subordinate, advantages which I flatter myself I shall be enabled to preserve to them by the future countenance and support of Government.

* The decision of the Court was reached in April, and it is quite possible that Mr. Manesty may have had private advices of its tenor from some friend in June or July, and may have then renewed his efforts to bring the Pasha round. He could offer to let the Jews off lightly if they were made over to him for punishment, as they eventually were.

The departure of Bonaparte for the East, and designs upon India which he was supposed to entertain, brought the adequacy of British representation at Baghdād under review in 1798. A British Residency in charge of a European officer had been set up at Baghdād in 1765, but it was abolished again in 1766, and for fifteen years thereafter Britain remained unrepresented at the headquarters of the Pāshāliq. In 1781, as a middle course, a Native Agency was established. At length, in June 1798, Mr. Harford Jones, who had been at home on leave since 1795, was summoned to the India House in London, and various plans for counteracting the schemes attributed to Bonaparte were discussed with him, including one by which he would have been associated with Commodore Blankett in a mission to the Arab chiefs of the Red Sea coast; but the issue of the deliberations was that, at his own suggestion, he was appointed to Baghdād "by his Majesty, and the Secret Committee of the East India Company, to reside with Suleiman Pacha, in "quality of political Agent, but more particularly for the purpose of "prevailing on that almost independent chief to assist the Porte with "money, in disappointing the views on the East, whatever they might "be, with which Bonaparte, and the expedition fitted out from Toulon, had sailed.*" The appointment was made in London on the 5th July 1798, and the new "Resident at the Court of the Pacha of Baghdad" arrived at his destination on the 24th of August following and assumed charge of his duties, superseding Mr. Reinaud whom Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, had deputed to Baghdād a short time before as a temporary arrangement.

Establishment of a British Residency at Baghdād, 1798.

Joint action by the British and Turkish authorities in the East was regularised by a treaty of defensive alliance with the Sublime Porte, concluded by His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary at Constantinople on the 5th January 1799, of which the immediate object was the co-operation of British with Turkish troops against the French army in Egypt.

The existence of a new establishment of equal rank at the headquarters of the Pāshāliq of Baghdād must have detracted considerably from the importance of the older Residency at Basrah; and eventually,

Position of the Resident at Basrah, 1798-99.

**Vide* Sir H. J. Brydges's *Wahauby*, page 16. In a note on page 177 it is further explained that: "The intent of this appointment was, in the event of the French "influence prevailing at Constantinople, to endeavour to keep the Pasha staunch to "us; or if the Porte and ourselves drew together, to make him afford every assistance "in his power to his Sovereign." (Since the above was written some correspondence relating to the establishment of the Residency has been found by the present writer at Baghdād: it is printed as Annexure No. II to this chapter.)

friction * arose between Messrs. Manesty and Jones, of whom the former was the senior in rank, while the latter had now obtained the more conspicuous position. In December 1798 Mr. Manesty took advantage of the passage of the *Kehiyah*, 'Ali Pāsha, through Basrah on his expedition against the Wabhābis to establish friendly personal relations with him; but in February 1799, having enquired of the Government of Bombay whether he might proceed to Baghdād for an interview with Sulaimān Pāsha, he was told that he might do so only if the object which he had in view could not be equally well attained through Mr. Jones; and in consequence of this answer he gave up his intended visit.

British assistance in military matters to the Pāsha of Baghdād, 1798-99.

On several occasions in 1798 and 1799 the Government of Bombay supplied the Pāsha of Baghdād with mortars, muskets, shells, gunpowder and other munitions of war at cost prices; and, in response to a request for an experienced gunner and an "able bombardier of the "Muhammadam persuasion who had been trained in the military service "of the Honourable Company in India," a † conductor and two European gunners were sent to Basrah in August 1799.

Interception at Basrah of an embassy from Tipu Sultān to the Porte, October 1799.

In October 1799 Mr. Manesty became aware of the presence in Basrah of an embassy which Tipu Sultān of Mysore had despatched to the Sultān of Turkey, with presents and letters, to beseech his assistance against the British in India. It consisted of Saiyid 'Ali Muhammad, Kandri, and Saiyid Madār-ud-Din, with a secretary named Hasan 'Ali and some attendants. Mr. Manesty caused the Ambassadors to be informed through Āgha Muhammad Nabi, a Persian Merchant and afterwards Persian Envoy to India, of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of their master, of which events he had himself just received intelligence; but they did not consider themselves absolved from the duty of discharging their mission in the interests of Tipu's heirs. The Resident also had recourse to the Mutasallim, 'Abdullah Āgha, by whom he thought the Ambassadors might be restrained from proceeding further; but that official presently received instructions from the Pāsha of Baghdād,

* The quarrel gave rise to a truly remarkable exchange of invectives, during which each of the disputants plied Government with "true copies" of the abusive letters that he heaped upon his adversary.

† The conductor, whose name was Raymond, subsequently deserted to the French, alleging himself to be of French extraction. He was afterwards appointed by the French Government to their Consulate at Basrah; and his surrender by the Turks could not be obtained until 1826, when he was given up as a deserter and taken to Bombay, but there pardoned on account of the long time that had elapsed since his desertion.

which he dared not disobey, for forwarding them on their way. Mr. Manesty then sent Āgha Muhammad Nabi with the Factory Linguist and a Factory Janissary to the Ambassadors ; and this deputation enlarged with such effect on their position and obligations as servants of a conquered state, on the hardships to which they would probably be exposed at Constantinople, where the Sultān on account of his alliance with Britain would not be able to befriend them, and on his own positive determination not to let them pass, but on the contrary to compel them to return to Bombay in the " Antelope " then setting sail, that in the end—some hint of rewards having also been thrown out—they acknowledged themselves British subjects and promised to comply with the Resident's wishes. The presents and letters which they had brought for the Sultān, however, were taken from them by the Mutasallim, notwithstanding a protest by Mr. Manesty ; but this was probably an unavoidable concession by 'Abdullah Āgha to the opinion of his Council, who were strongly in favour of the Ambassadors being encouraged to proceed to Constantinople.

Captain J. Malcolm, in returning to India from his first mission to the Persian Court, paid a short visit to Turkish 'Irāq, to the Pāsha of which province also he was formally accredited. On the 15th March 1801, travelling from Hamadān, he reached the ill-defined boundary between Persia and Turkey ; and soon afterwards he arrived on the banks of the Tigris, where, in consequence of the alarm of the Pāsha of Baghdād at the large number of Persians accompanying the mission, he discharged all his Persian attendants with princely gratuities. Sulaimān Pāsha refused to let Captain Malcolm pay for the local supplies furnished to the mission, showing himself in this respect more hospitable than the authorities in Persia, where payment had been accepted ; but he was not free from strange suspicions, and on one occasion he sent specially to request that swords might not be drawn by the British Envoy's escort while in Turkish territory. The Pāsha was anxious for an alliance with the British, and he even expressed his regret that he had not been brought as a third party into the arrangement lately concluded between Britain and Persia by Captain Malcolm. Official dealings with him were confined, however, to one grand ceremonial visit, at which a letter from the Governor-General of India was delivered, accompanied by rich gifts. On the 31st March Captain Malcolm left Baghdād for Basrah in a river boat supplied by the Pāsha ; but on the 8th April he transhipped to a vessel belonging to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, which met him near Qūrnah, as did also a state barge belonging to the Pāsha. On the 14th of April, having resided for part of the time with Mr. Manesty

Visit of
Captain
Malcolm to
Turkish 'Irāq.
1801.

at his country house at Kût-al-Farangi, and having exchanged visits and presents with the local Turkish authorities, he embarked for Bombay on board the "Jonathan Duncan," which had been waiting for him at Basrah.

Disagree-
ment between
the British
Resident at
Baghdād and
the Pāsha of
Baghdād,
1801.

During the summer of 1801 the relations of Mr. Jones, the Resident at Baghdād, with Sulaimān Pāsha were disturbed by an unpleasant incident. On the 9th of June the Pāsha informed Mr. Jones that there was a dangerous feeling against him in Baghdād in consequence of a Turkish female having been seen—so it was alleged—to come out of his house; and he offered to assist Mr. Jones in making his escape from the city, adding that, if he decided to remain where he was, the local Government could not be responsible for his safety. Mr. Jones in reply refused to leave Baghdād, basing his refusal on his entire innocence of the misdemeanour with which he was charged, whereupon the Pāsha, whose motives for raising and pressing the case are not apparent, announced that he could no longer recognise Mr. Jones as representing the British Government, forbade the staff of the Pāshāliq to hold communication with him, and told him that he was no longer under Turkish official protection. Mr. Jones accordingly reported his circumstances to the Government of India and the Court of Directors in London; and, on his informing the Pāsha of this step and explaining to him the consequences which might be expected to follow, Sulaimān showed signs of trepidation; but, as he still refused to tender a written apology and a certificate to the effect that the accusation made against Mr. Jones was groundless, both of which Mr. Jones thought it necessary to obtain, the latter in his turn declined to exercise his functions as British Resident and retired to a place on the banks of the Euphrates to await the orders of his superiors. On the 20th October, however, the Pāsha at last declared himself, in writing, to be satisfied that the imputations against Mr. Jones were unfounded, and promised that he should be treated in future with the highest consideration and respect. The matter ended on the 20th of November with the return of the Resident to Baghdād, where he was received by the Pāsha with the accustomed honours and at once resumed the duties of his office.

Vaccination
introduced
into Turkish
Irāq, 1802.

Vaccination was introduced into Turkish 'Irāq by the Surgeon of the British Residency soon after the receipt, on the 30th March 1802, of some vaccine matter from Vienna. Work was begun at Baghdād during the commencement of a plague epidemic there in April, and at Basrah in May.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802.

The replacement of Mr. Manesty in the Basrah Residency by Mr. Crow, which, as already explained, had been arranged by the Government of Bombay in September 1795, led to a somewhat unseemly squabble. News of the reconciliation between Mr. Manesty and the Pasha of Baghdād did not reach Bombay until after Mr. Crow had sailed; and Mr. Crow, on arriving at Basrah with his Assistant Mr. LeMessurier on the 1st January 1796, took over charge of the Residency under the instructions which he brought with him. Meanwhile, however, the Court of Directors had been informed of the satisfactory ending of Mr. Manesty's difficulty with the Turkish administration; and on the very day of his relief by Mr. Crow, a letter addressed to him by name was despatched from London, saying that the Court had seen fit to revoke their former orders for his removal. This letter arrived at Basrah on the 3rd April 1796; but, though Mr. Manesty was still there for the purpose of settling up his private affairs, Messrs. Crow and Le Messurier, professing to consider the effect of the letter doubtful, took no action on it beyond protesting vigorously, both to the Court of Directors and to the Government of Bombay, against the possible re-instatement of Mr. Manesty. In writing to the former body they gave it as their opinion "that the influence and dignity of the Residency have suffered a severe shock, and that jealousy and distance seem to form the Turkish aspect, as near as we have been able to contemplate it;" and they advised their superiors in India that "such a restoration" as that of Mr. Manesty "would be attended with the most destructive consequences to the surviving portion of national credit we retain here and to the interests of the East India Company in this establishment, and that the Pacha would regard such an instability of our public measures with contempt and indignation." The Court of Directors, however, were so far from being moved by the representations of Mr. Crow, that in their reply they reprimanded him for not having made over charge to Mr. Manesty before, and ordered him to do so on receipt of their letter without further evasion or delay. These instructions reached Basrah on the 25th of September and were executed the same day. On the 14th of October Messrs. Crow and Le Messurier took their departure for Bombay; and on the 8th of November Mr. Manesty poured forth his feelings in the

Tenure of
the Basrah
Residency by
Mr. Crow,
January to
September
1796.

matter with characteristic exuberance, writing as follows to the Court of Directors :—

If in the hour of your severity, supported by conscious rectitude and actuated by a laudable resolution to assert my honor, I ventured with independent spirit to address you in manly, free and animated language, I now, rejoicing in your favor, solicit your favorable acceptance of those calm and harmonized assurances of uniform devotion to the service and interests of my Hon'ble employers, which a mind restored to happiness, and reinvigorated by the enjoyment of returning honor and credit, feels it a pleasant duty to offer. The Hon'ble Company know me well, and they shall find me, if my abilities equal my integrity, and my constitution enables me to prosecute my views and wishes, a servant worthy of their applause, attention and support.

The British
Desert Mail,
1793-1802.

British official correspondence continued to be forwarded regularly across the desert between the Basrah Residency and the Aleppo Consulate; and, during the wars with France, which began during the period, this overland route, owing to its directness and its security from the interference of European nations, possessed a higher value than at any time before or after. While the Residency was located at Kuwait there was tampering, * at times, with the mails by Wāhhābis or under Wāhhābi instigation; but the service was never seriously interrupted. In 1798 the Resident felt some anxiety in regard to the effect which the Turkish expedition against the Wāhhābis, then about to be undertaken, might produce; but his influence seems to have proved, as he himself anticipated that it might, a sufficient protection to the carriers whom he employed. The news of the battle of the Nile reached India by way of Basrah; and in 1801 the Resident at Basrah, Mr. Manesty, received the thanks of the Government of India for having maintained rapid communication between them and the British forces in Egypt.

Establish-
ment of the
Baghdād
Residency,
1798.

The establishment in 1798 of a Residency at Baghdād, independent of that at Basrah, has been mentioned already, with the considerations that led to it, as among the important facts of the British connection with Turkish 'Irāq at this time.

Provision of
a Surgeon
and military
guard for the
Resident,
1800.

In 1800 Mr. Jones, the Resident at Baghdād, fell ill; and as Mr. Manesty, the Resident at Basrah, declined to let the Basrah Surgeon go to his assistance, Mr. Jones was obliged to come all the way to Basrah for treatment. On Mr. Jones representing to

* There is some discrepancy, in regard to the immunity of the mails from interference, between the account given by Sir H. J. Brydges (Mr. Jones) in his *Wahaby* (pages 15—16) and that of Mr. Reinaud as reported in von Zach's *Monatliche Correspondenz* for July to December 1805 (pages 234—235). See also the footnote on page 1005 of this volume in the history of Kuwait,

Government the risk and inconvenience to which he had been exposed, a separate "Civil Surgeon" was appointed to the Baghdād Residency in September 1800 in the person of Dr. James Short of the Bombay establishment. The desire of Sulaimān Pasha to have a British medical man at hand had been brought forward by the Resident as an argument in favour of creating the new appointment; but the Pasha, after Dr. Short's first arrival, employed him very little, and the doctor, offended by his neglect, would have refused to attend him on his death-bed in 1802, if he had not been officially required by the Resident to do so.

In August 1800, on the application of Mr. Jones, the Baghdād Residency was furnished with a native military guard from India, consisting of a Subadar, a Havildar, a Naik, and 26 sepoys. About a month later two drummers were added.

The cost of maintaining the Basrah Residency was scrutinised in 1801, when it was found that the items of salaries, allowances and rent, which in 1788 had amounted to Rs. 13,800 per annum, had increased by 1798 to Rs. 15,342. Ordinary fluctuating contingencies stood, about 1798, at Rs. 9,276 on an average of years; but by 1801 a fixed annual contingent grant of only Rs. 5,520 had been substituted by Government. The cost of carriage of the overland mail was treated as a charge by itself, and so also was the expenditure in presents to Arab Chiefs, which was at the rate of about Rs. 16,000 a year.

Annual cost
of the Basrah
Residency,
1801.

The French in Turkish 'Irāq, 1789-1802.

In 1796-1797, after the French Revolution, France was represented at Baghdād by a "Commissioner for Commercial Relations," in other words no doubt a Consul; and this office was held by Citizen Rousseau, possibly the same individual who had been French Consul at Basrah nearly twenty years earlier. Baghdād was visited in 1796-97 by a French political mission, conducted by MM. Bruguière and Olivier, whose proceedings are fully described in the chapter on the general history of the Persian Gulf.

On the 8th of October 1798, less than two months after the establishment of the British Residency at Baghdād, orders were received by the Pasha from Constantinople "to imprison the French Consul, the persons in his service, and the French subjects residing at Basrah, and to send

“the French Consul and the several persons in his employment, together with all the papers belonging to the Consul, to Constantinople;” and the measures thus indicated were duly carried into effect.

In October 1799 the French Factory at Basrah was in the hands of the Turks, who used it to accommodate the embassy, already mentioned, from Tipu Sultān of Mysore to the Sultān of Turkey.

Interregnum at Baghdād, August 1802.

Ambition of
the Āgha of
Janissaries.

At the time of Sulaimān Pāsha's decease, the Āgha of Janissaries at Baghdād was a man of ability, enjoying the confidence of the Porte, but popular also at Baghdād, where he had distinguished himself by his excellent administration of the police. He was also ambitious. On the fact of Sulaimān Pāsha's serious illness first becoming known, he sought an interview with Mr. Jones, the British Resident, at which, after confessing that he had the succession to the Pāshāliq in view, he begged that a letter might be written on his behalf to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. Mr. Jones however declined, at the same time pointing out to the Āgha that what was expected of him, in accordance with the traditions of his office, was that he should take charge of the Pāsha's treasure at his death in the interests of the Porte and should carry on the administration of the Pāshāliq until a successor had been appointed from Constantinople; and he advised him to be satisfied, in the first instance, with performing these duties, and not in any case to put forward a personal claim to the Pāshāliq without having secured the treasure, which, if it came into the hands of his competitors, might be used against him with deadly effect.

Conflict
between
Āgha of
Janissaries
and 'Ali
Pāsha, the
Kehiyah,
and defeat of
the former.

On the morning of the day that Sulaimān Pāsha died, the Āgha, whose plans must have been laid beforehand, embarked boldly on an attempt to seize the Government by force. At an early hour he sent Janissaries to capture Muhammad Baig,* “the great Arab, who was the agent at the Pacha's court for the Shaiks of all the tribes tributary to the Pāchalik, and who resided in a large house in the suburbs on the western side of the Tigris;” but the Baig had remained at the palace over-

* This was no doubt the Muhammad Baig who advised Sulaimān Pāsha, to condone the murder of Ahmad Pāsha, and who afterwards accompanied 'Ali Pāsha's expedition against the Wabhbīs in 1798-1799. It is possible that he was also the Muhammad Baig whose brother Hāji Sulaimān Baig had rebelled in 1786; see page 1273 *ante*.

night, and this attempt on the Āgha's part to secure a valuable hostage consequently failed. A little after 10 o'clock the Āgha, on horseback, passed the British Residency at the head of a rabble of 1,000 to 1,500 men "all with naked sabres and using the most furious gesticulations;" he was then on his way to occupy the citadel as a preliminary to attacking the palace, in which was 'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah, with his supporters; but he assured Mr. Jones that he, the British Resident, had nothing to fear from any of the contending factions. At twelve noon, Sulaimān Pāsha being then probably dead, fire was opened from the citadel, first with an unmounted gun of enormous calibre throwing a stone ball, and then with mortars; but the practice was so poor that the palace hardly suffered at all from the bombardment. From the moment that the first shot was fired, all business in the city was suspended and the people shut themselves up in their houses.

During the next eight or nine days the Āgha persevered in his enterprise; but after that, in consequence of the bribes which 'Ali Pāsha's party, having possession of the treasure in the palace, were able to lavish, his supporters began to desert him. He then attempted to bring forward a Georgian slave of the late Pāsha as a rival to 'Ali Pāsha; but this manœuvre failed, and he had to retire from the citadel to his own house, in which he was immediately besieged. Ultimately, having been taken prisoner, he was cut to pieces in the presence of 'Ali Pāsha; and fourteen of his principal Janissary supporters were strangled in succession on one night, a cannon being fired as the fatal cord was adjusted upon the neck of each. Within a fortnight or three weeks from the death of Sulaimān Pāsha, order had been completely restored by 'Ali Pāsha; and, though an immense amount of firing had taken place during that time, the actual number of casualties was extremely small.

The chief anxiety of the British Resident during the disturbances arose from the presence in the river, only a few miles below Baghdād, of boats laden with muskets, bayonets and shells which had been ordered by Sulaimān Pāsha from Bombay; but, by causing the vessels to be anchored at a distance from the bank, by hoisting British colours on board, and by informing both the Kehiyah Pāsha and the Āgha that the consignments were still British property and must not be touched, Mr. Jones was able to prevent these additional arms and ammunition from falling into the hands of the combatants.*

Difficulties of the British Resident during the struggle.

* The whole crisis is well described by Sir H. J. Brydges (Mr. Jones) in a note to his *Wahaby*, pages 204-210.

Internal history of Turkish 'Irāq under 'Ali Pāsha, 1802-07.

Application
of 'Ali Pāsha
for the
Pāshāliq and
his appoint-
ment, 1802.

'Ali Pāsha, the Kehiyah, when he had gained the upper hand, caused a petition for his own appointment to the Pāshāliq to be signed by the principal inhabitants of Baghdād and sent to Constantinople. The petition was supported by a remittance of rather less than £60,000, "and this was all that the Porte got of Suleiman Pacha's treasure, "except some pieces of jewellery, shawls, furs, house-furniture, and rich "India goods;" for much had already been spent in fighting the Wahhābis, in contributing to the Turkish operations in Egypt, and in placating the indignant sovereigns of both Turkey and Persia after the disgraceful Karbala affair. Asad Baig, the thirteen-year-old son of the late Sulaimān Pāsha, did not figure in the transactions which followed his father's death; and, perhaps for this reason, a portion of his father's wealth was allowed to become his by inheritance. The *douceur* transmitted by 'Ali Pāsha, though small, was accepted by the Porte as sufficient; and formal intimation of his appointment to the Pāshāliq, accompanied by a mantle of investiture, arrived at Baghdād on the 6th of January 1803.

Condition of
affairs, 1805.

'Ali Pāsha, notwithstanding the resolution of character that he had shown in destroying his early rival Ahmad Pāsha and in asserting his claim to the succession on the death of Sulaimān Pāsha, did not prove a successful ruler.* In 1806 the whole country was in a turmoil. War had broken out between various Arab tribes in alliance and the Jarbah branch of the Shammar, and the Pāsha had ordered a military levy in Turkish Kurdistān for the purpose of attacking the confederacy and relieving the Jarbah, who were hard pressed. This led to a second misfortune. On their way from Baghdād to Kurdistān, whither both had been sent to collect troops, 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, the principal Kurdish chief under Turkish influence, decoyed Muhammad Pāsha, the second in importance, to his tent, where he murdered him; and subsequently he entered on a course of contumacy and rebellion against the Baghdād Government. At this inauspicious moment 'Ali Pāsha found it necessary to imprison his own Kehiyah, who was acting disloyally, and 'Abdullah Āgha, a relation of the Kehiyah, who had once been Muta-sallim of Basrah.

* His failure as a military commander against the Wahhābis in 1798 will be remembered.

The further course of these internal troubles need not be traced. 'Ali Pāsha continued unpopular among his subjects, and finally, to the great relief of the public mind, he was assassinated by a party of Georgians on the 18th of August 1807: this event occurred shortly after the deposition of the Sultan Salīm III, and so a little after the end of the period with which we are now dealing.

Assassination of 'Ali Pasha, 1807: his character.

Mr. H. Jones reported of 'Ali Pāsha in 1802, shortly before his accession to power, that "he was neither a man of business nor a "man of pleasure,—he had not parts for the one, and his fanaticising "prevented his being the other." The same authority represented him as detesting Jews and Christians, and his behaviour in public as being, at this time, "puerile and disgusting." The Pāsha's personal courage was also esteemed doubtful; but he was reputed steady in friendship, and he never willingly broke his word.

British relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1802-07.

One or two transactions affecting British interests in Turkish 'Irāq belong to the short reign of 'Ali Pāsha.

'Ali Pāsha showed, at first, a favourable disposition towards the East India Company; and, on receiving the news of his confirmation in the Pāshaliq, he addressed a long letter to the Court of Directors in London expressive of his friendship for the British nation and of his respect for Mr. Jones, the Resident at Baghdād; but this friendly attitude on his part was not, as we shall see, very long maintained towards the gentleman specially mentioned.

Friendly attitude of 'Ali Pasha at his accession, 1802-03.

Inconvenience had sometimes been felt at Baghdād in consequence of the British Residency at that place not having been formally recognised by the Government of Turkey as a Consulate under the Capitulations,* and His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople took advantage of the appointment of the new Pāsha in 1802 to remedy the defect by obtaining a Barāat or patent of recognition. By this document,† which was dated the 2nd of November 1802, Mr. Harford

Recognition of the British representative at Baghdād by the Sultan of Turkey, November 1802.

* Lord Elgin evidently attributed the persecution of Mr. Jones by the Baghdād authorities in 1801 to this cause; but it is possible that, like Mr. Grenville in 1764, he overestimated the value at Baghdād of recognition at Constantinople. As will be shown further on, the new safeguard did not prevent the virtual expulsion of Mr. Jones from Baghdād by the Pāsha in 1806.

† The text of the Barāat is given in Aitchison's *Treaties*, Vol. XIII, pages 10-11, fourth edition.

Jones was recognised as British Consul, according to the Capitulations, at Baghdād; his right to protect British merchants and travelers and to regulate the departure of British vessels was admitted; the public servants under his orders, his Assistants, and his "slaves" were declared exempt from various taxes and forms of contribution to the Turkish revenues, while he was made free in his personal capacity of liability to pay customs and excise; the immunity of the Consul himself from arrest, and of his house from closure, search and billeting of troops, was clearly established; complaints against him were ordered to be referred to the Sultan of Turkey and not to be disposed of by any other authority; the Consul was to be at liberty to travel about in the country without molestation; native vessels, on payment made, must carry his stores for him "according to the prevailing regulations," presumably those governing forced labour; in dangerous parts of the country he should be allowed to wear "a white turban, sabre, bow, or other warlike instruments;" and the officials of the Turkish Empire were ordered to assist and protect him everywhere and to deal with him, in all circumstances, according to the Capitulations. The British Residency at Baghdād, in its origin a temporary mission to the Pāsha, was thus placed upon the same regular footing that the Residency at Basrah occupied under the "Consulary Birat" of 1764.

Difficulty
between the
Resident at
Basrah and
the Turkish
authorities,
arising from
the case of
Captain
White, 1808.

A second serious collision, not unlike that of 1793, now occurred between Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah, and the authorities of the Pāshāliq. On the 4th of April 1803 a native mob at Basrah broke into the house of Captain White, the commander of Mr. Manesty's private trading vessel "Recovery," and carried off a woman, an Oriental Christian of Cairo, who was living there under his protection, and in regard to whom it was popularly asserted that she either was already a Muhammadan or had admitted in the presence of Muhammadans a desire to become one. The house, too, was plundered. Mr. Manesty at once applied for redress to the Mutasallim of Basrah, whom he suspected of being the instigator of the riot, but in vain; so on the next day he struck the British flag, caused the gate of the Factory to be bricked up, and prohibited intercourse between the town and British ships then lying in the river. At the same time he wrote to the Pāsha of Baghdād demanding the restoration of the woman to Captain White, the indemnification of Captain White for his other losses, and the punishment of the ring-leaders in the attack with transportation, imprisonment and other penalties; and he threatened, unless full satisfaction were afforded, to withdraw to Calcutta and there to lay a complaint before the Governor-General of India. The Pāsha, on receiving Mr. Manesty's communication, informed

Mr. Jones, the British Resident at Baghdād, that he would enquire carefully into the case ; and, after some time, he not only removed the Mutasallim for incapacity and summoned him to Baghdād to answer to the charge of having caused the *émeute*, but also directed that official's substitute to try, and on conviction to punish, all the persons who might be charged by Mr. Manesty with active participation in the outrage, and to make good to Captain White the material losses that he had sustained. He declined, however, to discuss the restoration of the woman, professing to consider that it would be contrary to the principles of his religion ; and, when Mr. Manesty in reply refused to treat with him upon any other basis, he broke off the correspondence altogether. Eventually in July 1803, Mr. Manesty still standing firm, the Pāsha caused the woman to be given up, and the Resident forwarded her after Captain White to Calcutta. All demands having thus been satisfied, the British flag was again hoisted and the Factory reopened upon the 23rd of the month. 'Ali Pāsha had no doubt been a witness of Mr. Manesty's successful bout with his old master, Sulaimān Pāsha, in 1793-95, and preferred to avoid a contest to the bitter end with a gentleman so tenacious in matters of personal importance.

About the end of 1803 'Ali Pāsha sent an Ambassador to the Governor-General of India in the person of one Sulaimān Āgha. This individual arrived in Bombay on the 16th February 1804, and was provided by the Government of Bombay with passages to Calcutta for himself and his suite on the ship "Upton Castle" which sailed on the 3rd of April. The object of the Embassy is not recorded, nor the result ; and it is therefore not improbable that the duties of the Ambassador were of a purely ornamental character, such as the offering of congratulations.

'Ali Pasha's
Embassy
to the
Governor-
General of
India.

The principle governing the customs tariff of the Ottoman Empire with reference to Great Britain continued to be that of the Capitulations, *viz.*, that the duty levied should not exceed 3 per cent. of the market value of the merchandise ; but it had been found convenient to assume fixed values for all classes of goods and to draw up a scale of authorised duties by weight and quantity, calculated from the fixed values on the 3 per cent. principle. Such a table had been framed in 1794 ; but by 1800, in consequence of a rise in the price of all commodities, the authorised duties had fallen below the 3 per cent. *ad valorem* level ; and in that year, with the consent of Great Britain, the table was revised in a manner favourable to the Porte. Subsequently it was found that the duties paid by British merchants under the revised table were higher in some cases than those paid by the merchants of other Christian nations ; and on the 13th

December 1805 a new table, free from this objection, was adopted for use under an agreement between Britain and Turkey.

Quarrel
between Mr.
Jones and
Ali Pasha,
1804-05, and
enforced
retirement of
the former
from
Baghdād,
January
1806.

In 1804 a dispute arose at Baghdād between Mr. Jones and 'Ali Pasha, the cause being the uncivil treatment by the Pasha of the Linguist of the British Residency. Mr. Jones demanded reparation, which the Pasha refused, and official relations between them ceased. In November 1805 the Pasha wrote to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and also to the Sultān of Turkey, asking that arrangements might be made for the removal of Mr. Jones from Baghdād; and, as the Porte strongly supported this request,—not because they were convinced of its justice, but because they were afraid to offend a far-off and semi-independent Governor,—and as they declined to be responsible for Mr. Jones's personal safety if he should remain any longer, Mr. Charles Arbuthnot, knowing well that His Majesty's Ministers at home would not press the case on account of the alliance then existing between Britain and Turkey, advised Mr. Jones to quit Baghdād. The latter accordingly made over charge of his duties to Dr. Hine, the Civil Surgeon, and left Baghdād early in January 1806; in February he was at Mūsāl; and on the 21st of May he reached Constantinople.

Visit of Mr.
Jones to
Constantino-
ple, May to
October 1806.

Mr. Jones was fortunate enough to win the good opinion of the British Ambassador there, who invited him to remain for a time and to lend his services, in the event of an expected Persian Embassy to France passing through the Turkish capital, in obtaining information with regard to its objects. On the 13th October 1806 the Sultān of Turkey made it clear, by investing him with the Order of the Crescent of the Second Class, that he entertained no personal objections against Mr. Jones; and six days later that gentleman left Constantinople for England, charged with important despatches from the Ambassador. In August 1807 Mr. Jones, either in recognition of his political work during eight years at Baghdād, which had been commended by the Ambassador, or in preparation for a Mission on which he was shortly afterwards sent to the Court of Persia, received a baronetcy*.

Political
position in
Irāq after
the rupture
in Europe
between
Britain and
Turkey,
1807.

If proof were needed of the practical independence of the Pasha of Baghdād at this time in his dealing with foreign powers, it would be sufficient to cite the conduct of 'Ali Pasha in 1807, when war broke out in Europe between Great Britain and Turkey. The Pasha at first informed the British Residents at Baghdād and Basrah that they must withdraw from their charges; but on second thoughts he pressed them to remain, promising them full protection in their public and private

* He at first called himself Sir Harford Jones; but later, perhaps after his retirement, assumed the surname of Brydges.

characters, as in time of peace. This was a very different sort of treatment from that to which the French in Turkish 'Irāq had been subjected in 1798, on the occurrence of war between the Directory and the Porte. Both Residents availed themselves of the Pāsha's permission to remain at their posts, and their conduct in doing so was approved by the Governor-General of India.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1802-07.

The difficulty, a hundred years ago, of maintaining discipline and a proper regard for higher authority among public servants at distant stations like Basrah is exemplified in the extraordinary proceedings of Mr. Manesty in the year 1805. In 1804, as explained in another chapter, Mr. Manesty had, without reference to Government, assumed, the rôle of a Special Ambassador to the Court of Persia; and on his return from Persia he had been held accountable by the Governor-General of India for the whole of the expenses incurred. In 1805 finding himself unable to meet his liabilities and being in fear of personal violence from his creditors at Basrah, he negotiated bills on the Government of Bombay to the amount of Rs. 93,000, "which he earnestly hoped Government would honour on presentation," and at once left for India to explain and justify his conduct, making over charge of the Residency at his departure to Lieutenant E. H. Bellasis of the Bombay Engineers. Arriving at Bombay, unannounced, on the 10th April 1805, he at once proceeded to represent his case, with a request that his emoluments as Resident at Basrah might be increased. The office which he held was, in his opinion, "one of the most arduous, unpleasant, and uncomfortable "ones held by any servant whatever of the Honourable Company, and "that it was unprofitable had, to his misfortune, been indisputably "proved." He continued :—

Embarrassments of Mr. Manesty and his unauthorised journey to Bombay, 1805-1806.

If, therefore, I cannot resume it on eligible terms, terms which I am ready respectfully to state and explain to Government, and on which only any gentleman can with prudence accept the situation, I shall most willingly resign it whenever you please, wisely preferring tranquillity, personal safety, and the most limited income in a British settlement to an extensive establishment, local rank, state, and authority subjecting me to unceasing care, laborious duty, serious dangers, and ultimate ruin in Arabia. If my past services remain unrewarded, if my just and reasonable claims are rejected, and if I cannot be Resident at Bussorah under equitable, handsome, and profitable arrangements, I will, in India, endeavour usefully and honourably to exert those talents which have some pretension to consideration, and which ought long ago to have given me affluence in my native country.

Government, however, declined to raise Mr. Manesty's salary; and it was only with difficulty, and on condition that he lodged with them securities sufficient to cover the debit that would be created in his account with the Company, that they were persuaded to undertake the payment of such of his bills on them as he could not himself meet.

Arrange-
ments in his
absence, 1805-
1806.

Mr. J. Law, who in April 1805 was on the point of proceeding to Basrah in the capacity of Assistant to Mr. Manesty, was authorised instead to take charge of the Residency there, on his arrival, from Lieutenant Bellasis. This he did on the 3rd of July 1805, but he died soon after; and Lieutenant Eatwell of the Bombay Marine carried on the duties of the appointment until the 13th of June 1806, when Mr. Manesty returned from India, and resumed his place.

The tolerance shown for Mr. Manesty's vagaries almost passes comprehension at the present day, when strict sobriety of conduct prevails, and is enforced, in the Indian services.

Orders re-
garding the
correspond-
ence with
India of the
Residents at
Baghdād and
Basrah,
1806.

In January 1806, it was decided by the Government of India, on a reference from the Government of Bombay, that the Residents at Basrah and Baghdad should be regarded as under the immediate orders of the latter Government, and that they should not correspond direct with any other authority in India. The object of this order was, probably, to ensure proper respect and obedience on the part of Residents towards their immediate superiors. There is some reason to think, however, that this order was treated as repealed after the Second Mission of General Malcolm to Persia in 1808, when, as Envoy of the Governor-General, he was invested with general authority over the British establishments in the Persian Gulf and Turkish 'Irāq.

Customs and
consulage at
Basrah,
1806.

The year 1806, was distinguished by a great and sudden increase in the amount of the customs and consulage obtained by the East India Company at Basrah; but whether this increase was due to greater stringency in assessment and collection, or to better trade, or to both of these causes, is not clear. The whole collections from 1st May 1791 to 1st May 1806, had only aggregated Rs. 27,512; whereas in July 1806 alone a sum of Rs. 41,663 accrued, and it was expected that an additional Rs. 20,000 would come in before the 30th April in the following year. Mr. Manesty, in reporting this, added: "As long as I may continue in office here, the annual amount must generally exceed, and possibly in a material degree, the large sum of Rs. 50,000," but the fact that the period of small collections also was included in his Residentship seems to preclude the supposition that the improvement was due to his vigilance or energy.

MUSTAFA IV, 1807-08,

AND

MAHMÜD II, 1808-39.*

On the deposition of Salīm III, the eldest son of the late Sultān 'Abdul Hamīd I was raised by the Janissaries to the throne of Turkey under the title of Mustafa IV. He ruled from the 29th May 1807 to the 28th July 1808, when he was displaced by partisans of the deposed Salīm. During the last few moments of Mustafa's authority Salīm perished by the bowstring, leaving the successful reactionaries no choice but to substitute for Mustafa his own brother Mahmūd, who was the sole other surviving male of the house of Othmān.

At home fresh attempts were made by the new Sultān, who ruled as Mahmūd II, to shake off the power of the Janissaries; but at first his efforts were unavailing. Abroad, during 1807 and 1808, Turkey continued to be on an unfriendly footing with Britain; but, after the Treaty of Tilsit on the 7th June 1807, when the French and the Russians combined and began to devise joint schemes for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, the relations between Britain and the Porte tended to improve; and on the 5th January 1809, notwithstanding strenuous endeavours by France to prevent it, their differences were healed, by the Treaty of the Dardanelles. War was then resumed between Turkey and Russia,—a war in which, as in the Perso-Russian war of 1826-28, Muhammadan feeling and enthusiasm at first played a considerable part,—and hostilities continued until the Treaty of Bucharest, which was signed on the 28th May 1812.

Meanwhile, between 1804 and 1811, the Turkish province of Egypt had been brought under thorough control by Muhammad 'Alī Pāsha, the Governor, who annihilated the turbulent Mamlūks; and the Wahhābis of Central Arabia, who had seized the sacred cities of Makkah and Madinah, and whose proceedings ever since the sack of Karbala in 1801 had been a cause of incessant alarm upon the Syrian and Mesopotamian frontiers, were crushed by the same strong hand, their country being finally

* Some additional details of the general history of Turkey during this period are given in two footnotes to Chapter Eighth, see pages 1061 and 1100. The principal sources of information in regard to local affairs in Turkish 'Irāq are the *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874 and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish Arabian Affairs, 1801-1905*, printed in 1905. Other authorities on particular points are cited in footnotes, and Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, 1836, is of some general value.

occupied by the Egyptian troops in 1818, as is fully related in the chapter on the history of Najd.

The year 1826 brought relief from the difficulty with the Janissaries, who on being required to undergo a modern military training, mutinied and were at last completely destroyed ; but it was also marked by the disadvantageous treaty of Akkerman, concluded with Russia. In 1828 another war with Russia began, which lasted until the Treaty of Adrianople on the 28th August 1829.

In the interim, from 1820 to 1827, Greece had been carrying on a struggle for independence of Turkey, and ultimately, at the battle of Navarino, the united fleets of Britain, France and Russia had taken action on her behalf and destroyed the navy of Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt, to whom the operations against the insurgent Greeks had been confided by the Porte.

Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had by this time himself become a danger to the Sultān ; and in 1831 he began to encroach upon his master's dominions. Syria was occupied and Asia Minor invaded by his troops. Britain, France and Russia then intervened, and a temporary settlement was effected in May 1833. It was followed a couple of months later by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which created a virtual offensive-defensive alliance between Turkey and Russia and made Russian influence supreme at the Porte. In 1834 an over-centralised system of Government was established for the whole Ottoman Empire, which eventually caused paralysis of the provincial administration and produced evils hardly less serious than those of provincial independence, but of a different kind. In 1839 the trouble between Muhammad 'Ali Pasha and the Porte was renewed, and the attitude of the former was so aggressive as to provoke the intervention of certain powers including Britain, upon the side of Turkey. Mahmūd, however, died on the 1st July 1839 before matters had reached their final stage, and even without knowing that a part of his army and the whole of his fleet had gone over to the Egyptians.

Internal history of Turkish 'Irāq, 1807-39.

Assassination
of 'Ali Pasha
of Bagdad
and succession
of Sulaimān,
1807.

On the 18th August 1807, not long after the accession of Sultān Mustafa IV, 'Ali Pasha, Governor of Baghdād and its dependencies, was assassinated by a confederacy of Georgian slaves. His death "diffused a general satisfaction throughout the Pachalic," and it was as little

regretted by the representatives of the East India Company in Turkish 'Irāq as it was by the native subjects of the Porte. Sulaimān, whom the Turkish Government appointed to succeed him, was a nephew of the Pāsha, similarly named, who governed Baghdād from 1779 to 1802. As Kehiyah of the late Pāsha he had commanded in a war against the Persians about the year 1806, in which he was taken prisoner; and in the same capacity he had assumed provisional charge of the administration upon 'Ali's death.

In 1810* Salim Āgha, Mutasallim of Basrah, rebelled against Sulaimān Pāsha whose place he hoped to obtain; but the Muntafik tribe, of whose support the Mutasallim had been assured, unexpectedly turned against him. On the 14th of July the Muntafik occupied the town of Basrah without violence, permitting Salim Āgha to retire with his family and all his property to Būshehr. He was followed in the Mutasallimate by one Ahmad Baig, regularly appointed by the Pāsha of Baghdād, whose entry into Basrah the Muntafik did not oppose.

Rebellion
and expulsion
from the
country of
Salim Āgha
Mutasallim
of Basrah,
1810.

In the same year, for reasons not ascertained, the Porte decided on the removal of Sulaimān Pāsha from the Government of Baghdād, and a special official was sent from Constantinople to carry out the fiat. The Pāsha was supported by the troops of the local garrison; but the Kurds of the districts under 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, a chief whose difficulties with Sulaimān Pāsha had before this led him to coquet with Persia, arrayed themselves on the side of the Ottoman Commissioner. The issue of the struggle remained doubtful for some days, but on the 5th October a decisive engagement took place in the immediate vicinity of Baghdād. The fighting began early in the afternoon, when a body of Kurds charged the Pāsha's army, but were driven off by artillery fire. The Pāsha's guns, however, the carriages being rickety, were soon all dismounted by their own recoil; and the Kurdish host, which was vastly superior in numbers, then resumed the offensive and pressed the Baghdād army hard so long as daylight lasted. A number of Kurds who had taken service with the Pāsha, and on whom he placed much reliance, deserted him at a critical moment; and on the morning of the 6th, finding himself all but forsaken by his followers, Sulaimān fled with a few faithful Georgians by the Basrah road. Reaching the Diyālāh river in safety, he crossed it and broke down the bridge behind him; but a strong party of the Shammar Tōqah Arabs, in whose country he was,

Removal of
Sulaimān
Pāsha by the
Porte, 1810.

* Probably an enfranchised Georgian slave of that name who had married an illegitimate daughter of the former Sulaimān Pāsha. He was a man of some intelligence and of affable manners, but not successful as a ruler.

overpowered his small escort and killed him. His head was cut off, stuck on a pole, and carried to the Turkish Commissioner, who at once caused it to be "carefully packed up, sealed, and sent as a trophy to Constantinople."

Sulaimān Pāsha showed undeniable courage in the closing scenes of his life; and his death was much regretted by Mr. Rich, the British Resident at Baghdād, who described him as "a man of warm affection and actual good principles," adding: "His faults were such as proceed from extreme youth, and would have been corrected by age and experience." His age at his death was only twenty-four years.

Appointment
of 'Abdullah
Pāsha to
Baghdād,
1810.

The choice of the people of Baghdād, in nominating Sulaimān Pāsha's successor, fell upon Asad Baig, the eighteen-year old son of the Sulaimān Pāsha who had ruled the province from 1779 to 1802. The youth at first agreed to accept the charge, if conferred upon him; but, on learning the miserable fate of his predecessor, he burst into tears and refused upon any consideration to enter public life. Apparently in the month of December 1810, one 'Abdullah was appointed by the Porte to the Baghdād Pashāliq. This may have been the same 'Abdullah, formerly Mutasallim * of Basrah, who was living in temporary exile at Būshehr in 1808 at the time of Sir Harford Jones's mission to the Persian Court; and in that case the new Pāsha was a man† of unusual intelligence and character, and particularly well disposed towards the British. One of his first acts was to substitute Ibrāhīm Agha for Ahmad Baig in the Mutasallimate of Basrah.

Campaign of
Abdullah
Pāsha in
Kurdistan,
1812.

The most important task imposed on 'Abdullah Pāsha by the Turkish Government was the reduction of 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, Kurd, who for his own ends had helped the Commissioner of the Porte to remove Sulaimān Pāsha from power, but who, having formed a close connection with Persia, was no longer inclined to admit his dependence on the Porte. In June 1812 'Abdullah Pāsha entered Kurdistān; and on the 18th of that month he achieved "a most signal and unexpected victory" over 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, giving hope of "the entire subjection of the Courdistan to the Pāsha of Bagdad, by which that Pachalic would acquire a strength and respectability it had not possessed for the last ten years, and would in reality become the most

* See page 1300 ante.

† See Mr. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish Arabian Affairs, 1801-1905*, page 32; also Brydges' *Mission*.

"powerful territory under the Porte." The affair seems to have ended, however, in some sort of compromise * with Persia.

The rule of 'Abdullah Pasha, however remarkable his good qualities† may have been, was not destined to last long. At the beginning of 1813 he took the field against the Shaikh of the Muntafik, who was threatening Basrah with a large force; but in the first week of February, on his arriving within striking distance, the greater part of his force suddenly threw down their arms and went over to the enemy. 'Abdullah Pasha then placed himself in the hands of the Muntafik under assurances of personal safety, but a few days later they teacherously put him to death. The power of the Muntafik, whose most distinguished Shaikh at this time was Hamid-bin-Thamir, increased greatly after their victory over the Pasha of Baghdad; and the country on the Euphrates almost as far as Samawah came under their sway.

The successor of 'Abdullah Pasha was Sa'id, a youth twenty-one years of age, who on the circumstances of 'Abdullah's death becoming

Death of
'Abdullah
Pasha, killed
by the Muntafik, 1813

Government
of Sa'id
Pasha,
1813-1816.

* See Chapter Eleventh, page 1870.

† The following portrait of 'Abdullah Agha (as he then was) was drawn by Mr. H. Jones, Resident at Bagdad, in 1802:—

"Abdullah Agha is native of Bagdad, born of one of the most respectable families in the city, and was appointed from the office of Hasnadar to the Pashaw to that of Mussalum of Bussora, which he filled for many years with superior credit to himself and the greatest advantage to the Pashaw, his master. He is about forty-two years of age, coarse in his person but most engaging and interesting in his manner and conversation, knowing and practising that great and invaluable secret of accommodating himself to his company without the smallest loss of his own dignity. He is a man of letters, a politician, a financier, and a merchant. He has procured himself, what people in these countries seldom think of, a tolerable distinct and correct notion of the state of Europe. He has been at uncommon pains to obtain some ideas of geography; and he is the only Turk that I ever conversed with that had a knowledge of the local situation and relation of the provinces of his own Empire. He is liberal in his religious opinions and would, if policy would warrant it, be still more so. He is liberal to his people without being profuse, and has the happy talent of combining great expense with the most exact economy. He is always happy to receive information in whatever shape, or by whomsoever it may be offered to him, and is seldom or ever contented with knowing a thing superficially or by halves. In his government at Bussora he was prompt, decisive and vigilant and contrived to procure himself a great character for good faith, humanity, and justice. He has been accused of being avaricious, but he certainly never gratified that passion by extortion and oppression, . . . He has been reproached with timidity, —he never showed it in any act of his government, . . . He is (very much to the credit of the Resident at Bussora) most firmly attached to the English and their interests, justly and on conviction of the truth of it, considering the latter as inseparably connected in these countries with those of the Porte."

known, was proclaimed interim Governor by the Qādhi of Baghdād. The selection must have been agreeable to the Saikh of the Muntafik, for he testified his approval by accompanying Sa'id on his public entry into the capital. That event took place on the 16th March 1813, but the news of Sa'id's confirmation as permanent Governor did not reach Baghdād from Constantinople until the 30th June following. The short administration of Sa'id Pāsha was disturbed by frequent troubles both at Baghdād and at Basrah. The most serious of these was a rising at Basrah, in the course of which a body of Arabs entered the town by surprise, plundered the Sarāi and beat the Mutasallim; in the end, however, they were expelled by the Mutasallim and tranquillity was restored. On the 4th November 1816 orders from Constantinople for the deposition of Sa'id Pāsha and his replacement by Dāwud Effendi arrived at Baghdād.

*Accession of
Dāwud Pāsha,
1816-17.

As Sa'id Pāsha refused to submit to the commands of the Porte, Dāwud was obliged to make good his right to the Pāshāliq by force of arms; and his success was not immediate or easy. On the 7th January 1817 he was attacked by the *de facto* Governor, and a large force which he had brought with him was scattered; but, not long afterwards, the desertion of Sa'id Pāsha by a number of his troops and an insurrection at Baghdād in which the Mamlūks took part gave him the advantage over his rival. On the 21st February he entered Baghdād in triumph, and the city submitted to his authority; on the 22nd he was proclaimed Pāsha; and on the 24th the ex-Pāsha Sa'id, who had endeavoured to hold out in the citadel, was put to death by beheading.

Outrages
committed at
Basrah by
Arabs of
Najd. 1820.

The new Governor, who was described as "Pāsha of Bagdad, Bussorah and Courdistan" was at first hardly more successful than his predecessor in maintaining the general peace; and by the middle of 1819 parts of the country had fallen under the terrorism of armed gangs, communications—especially to the northward—had been interrupted, and trade at Baghdād had come to a standstill. In 1820 a †series of grave outrages was com-

*For an account of Dāwud Pāsha's career, see Stocqueler's *Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage*, Volume I, pages 44-51.

†Lieut. A. T. Wilson seems to allude to these Basrah disturbances in his *Précis of the Relations, etc.*, page 14; but he refers them, though he mentions Hāji Yūsuf and not Hāji Jābir, to a year later than 1827. According to Lieut. Wilson, Basrah was actually captured by people of Zabair and Najd; Aziz Āgha, the Mutasallim, was extricated from danger and brought to Muhammareh by Ka'ab; and the Ka'ab afterwards helped the Turks to recover Basrah.

mitted at Basrah by Arabs of Najd,* in consequence, partly of a blood-feud which had arisen between them and the Mutasallim's body-guard, and partly of the instigation of some Najdi merchants in the town who considered themselves aggrieved by an order of the Baghdād Pāsha in regard to certain landed property and who wished to intimidate him. On the 16th July a party of Najdis entered Basrah and attempted, but in vain, to capture the Government Sarāi; they then plundered the place, murdered a number of the inhabitants and withdrew, killing in their retirement the commander of a small body of Balūchis who were advancing to assist the garrison of the Sarāi.

Kurdish and
Persian
relations,
1821.

In the summer of 1821 Dāwud Pāsha deputed his Kehiyah to Qizil-robāt to watch the Kurds and Persians, but the Kurds gained a victory over him. The Pāsha, on hearing of it, threw all the leading Persians at Baghdād into prison in order to extort money from them; and Georgians were marched from Baghdād to Karbala and Najaf to show "that, if they cannot fight, they can plunder." About the same time cholera carried off some thousands of persons at Basrah.

The
Muntafik.

In the case of the Muntafik, whose opposition had been the ruin of his predecessor 'Abdullah Pāsha, Dāwud Pāsha's general policy of dividing a troublesome tribe against itself was employed to good purpose. He raised up a rival to Hamīd-bin-Thāmir, the principal Shaikh, in the person of that chief's own nephew 'Ajl; and the result was an internecine war which paralysed the Muntafik as a tribe and incapacitated them for mischief during a number of years.

Deposition of
Dāwud Pāsha,
1831, and
character of
his administra-
tion.

In 1831 the Porte superseded Dāwud Pāsha, who had put to death at Baghdad an emissary of the Constantinople Government, and appointed in his place one Hāji 'Ali Riza Pāsha, otherwise known as Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha, or simply as 'Ali Pāsha. 'Ajl, the Shaikh whom Dāwud Pāsha had set over the Muntafik, made a feeble effort on his patron's behalf and called in the Ka'ab Arabs and those of Kuwait, whose fleets blockaded Basrah and caused some alarm; but this demonstration had no effect on the course of events at Baghdād. Dāwud Pāsha, had he been able, would have maintained himself in the Pāshāliq by force of arms, and he actually stood a siege of a few days in Baghdād; but eventually he sought shelter in the house of one Muhammad Āgha, by whom he was delivered up a prisoner to the enemy. His life was spared, but he was sent to Constantinople.

* They are described as "Najedah" Arabs, but no such tribe is known, and the reference to residence "Nagedah" merchants make it probable that natives of Najd are meant.

In the beginning of his rule Dāwud Pāsha gave no evidence of administrative ability. His only object then appeared to be the rapid accumulation of wealth, and it was thought that he was indifferent to all else, that he left too much to be decided by his advisers, and that he did not exercise any supervision or control over violent or corrupt subordinates; such at least was the unfavourable opinion formed by *Mr. Rich, a British Political Agent, towards whom at the outset of his administration he behaved in a very unreasonable manner. There were, however, fewer serious disturbances in his time than in that of either his predecessor or his successor; and after he had ceased to rule his administration was mentioned with respect. He maintained a regularly paid and fairly efficient force of about 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry and some artillery, which sufficed at least for the purpose of maintaining order.

Accession and
character of
Hāji 'Ali
Riza Pāsha,
1831.

The new Pāsha is said to have been the first of Turkish blood who governed at Baghdād, and his appointment was evidently intended to mark the beginning of a new system of administration. His mission was in the first place to destroy the power of the Georgian families in which the Baghdād Pāshāliq had become vested, and to bring the Arab tribes under direct control instead of dealing with them through their chiefs; but it was generally understood that he was also charged with the introduction of reforms which would benefit all peace-loving subjects of the Sultān. The experiment, whatever its nature, was made on a large scale, for Mūsāl, Diyārbakr and even Aleppo were now added to the territories normally attached to Baghdād; and the new Pāsha, who was already a Vazīr of the Turkish Empire, received in addition the high title of Khalīfah, recalling the days of the Baghdād Khalīfate.

The time of Hāji 'Ali Riza Pāsha's arrival was in one sense opportune, for the state of the country could hardly have been worse. Some districts were ruined by the treatment which they had suffered under the late administration, or by natural calamities such as †plague and floods;

* In 1821, after his own final departure from Baghdād, Mr. Rich wrote: "All is in confusion there, and a Persian war seems inevitable. The Turkish troops are plundering and insulting everyone, and the bazars are quite deserted. The Pāsha seizes everyone he can get hold of to extort money; and all who can possibly escape are running away in every direction. He has taken five thousands rupees from the Nuwaub."

See Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, Volume II, pages 225-226.

† The plague epidemic at Baghdād in 1831 is described by Wellsted (*Travels to the City of the Caliphs*, Volume I, pages 280-289). Loftus (*Travels and Researches*, pages 7-8) says that it destroyed 12,000 out of a population of 70,000; and that the river broke down the walls of the town in 1831 and swept away 7,000 houses in one night.

and Basrah in particular had lost almost all its inhabitants during the years 1831—32, while the neighbouring towns of Muhammareh and Kuwait had increased considerably at its expense. The first proceedings of the new Governor were distinguished by moderation and good sense. He spared the lives of a number of the Georgians whom he had been expected to destroy; he appointed as his chief adviser one Muhammad Effendi, Ibn-Nāib, who bore an excellent character and of whom he knew nothing except by reputation; he daily inspected parts of Baghdād city on foot, accompanied by a few attendants only; and his whole demeanour, as well as that of his officers, was distinguished by mildness and freedom from ostentation.

The new policy towards the tribes, however, early proved a failure; and in the course of a few years, as we shall see, the ordinary administration fell into a state which was by no means satisfactory; while the character of the Pāsha, as it finally declared itself, was summed up by the traveller Mr. J. B. Fraser in 1834 in the following sentences:—

Ali, the present Pacha, formerly Governor of Aleppo, and successor of Daood Pasha at Bagdad, is about 50 years of age, of weak mind and feeble judgment, and so irresolute of purpose that neither his promises nor his commands can safely be deemed binding for an hour together. He is selfish and indolent in the extreme, of gross appetites and low propensities, exceedingly avaricious, and quite regardless of the nature of the means by which money may be acquired. He is not naturally inclined either to cruelty or injustice, but so intolerant of trouble or the fatigue of business that he will sanction or overlook almost any crime committed by his servants rather than submit to have his ease disturbed by investigation, and thus justice is virtually denied to the injured party. In point of moral courage and decision he is equally deficient, so that he is quite unequal to act in the critical situations he is frequently placed in, and which require a firmness and vigour of mind of which he is utterly devoid. The principal redeeming points in his character appear to be a good natured and easy affability, and a degree of literary taste and acquirements which would have fitted him rather for the quiet seclusion of private life than for the bustling scene on which he has been thrown.

Unhappily the Pāsha's deficiencies are by no means compensated by the talents or integrity of his servants. There is not in fact a single person about him qualified to aid his master or benefit the public. * * * * The few of his former officers who might have laid claim to better report were carried off by the plague or by assassination; those of his predecessors, who might yet be useful, remain unemployed from motives of policy and caution; and the whole of his existing establishment, both public and private, is contemptible and mean in the extreme.

Some of the greatest difficulties with which Hāji 'Ali Riza Pasha had to deal proceeded from the larger Arab tribes in the districts adjoining

the capital, who were always anxious to obtain new and better lands for cultivation.

Trouble with
the Jarbah
Shammar near
Baghdād,
1832-1834.

In 1831 the Jarbah or Northern Shammar, who by a course of persistent annoyance, had already extorted a grant of the best estates upon the Dujail Canal and in Jazīrah, began to clamour for fresh concessions; and the Pāsha, in refusing their demands, thought it politic to divide them by substituting a young chief for Safūk, the principal Shaikh, and by assigning to him and his section alone the lands hitherto held by the whole body of tribesmen. Safūk and the greater part of the Jarbah then retired to the northward and made common cause with other rebels against the authority of the Pāsha in the district of Mūsāl.

In 1833 Safūk and his followers reappeared in the neighbourhood of Baghdād, where they plundered the country without opposition from either the new chief of the Jarbah or the Pāsha of Baghdād; and finally they blockaded the city itself. A two months' blockade, however, exhausted their patience; and Safūk returned to the north, threatening to come back in the following year.

Alarmed at the prospect of annual invasions thus opened up, Hāji 'Ali Riza Pāsha called in the assistance of the great 'Anizah tribe of the North Arabian desert, promising to give them the lands of which the Jarbah might be deprived by their co-operation; and the 'Anizah readily agreed and collected a large tribal army in the vicinity of Baghdād. At this juncture it became known that Safūk had given up the idea of returning to the Baghdād neighbourhood, and the Pāsha would then have receded from his bargain with the 'Anizah, but they insisted that he should hand over to them the promised lands, and suggested besides that all the country to the west of the Euphrates should be granted to them on lease. The Pāsha, who was unwilling to meet their wishes in either respect, next appealed to the friendly section of the Jarbah to help him in driving the 'Anizah out; and in October 1834 a joint attempt to do this was made and failed signally, the Jarbah suffering heavy loss. The 'Anizah then blocked Baghdād from the west, while parties of their marauders scoured the whole surrounding country and plundered travellers and caravans.

Difficulty
with the
'Aqail at
Baghdād,
1834.

Meanwhile a rupture had occurred with the 'Aqail, an Arab tribe or locally regarded as such, who about 1832 had established themselves in the part of Baghdād situated on the right bank of the Tigris: in that year, by threatening to plunder an important caravan that had arrived under their protection within a short distance of the city, they had obtained permission until then denied them, to settle within the walls.

The 'Aqail, it should be explained, were natives of Najd or Central Arabia ; their sole profession was to act as carriers and to guide and protect caravans travelling between Baghdād and Aleppo or Damascus ; and the number of them collected at Baghdād sometimes amounted to several thousands. Having obtained a footing in the south-western part of the city, they became its absolute masters, excluded the authority of the Pāsha, and harboured evil characters to such an extent that all the respectable inhabitants migrated elsewhere.

In 1834 the Pāsha decided that the presence of the 'Aqail within the walls could not be any longer tolerated ; and, a robbery committed on some of his own officers near Baghdād having been traced to members of their community, he required the 'Aqaili Shaikh, on pain of being attacked and expelled by force, to quit the place at once with all his dependents. The Shaikh endeavoured to obtain a guarantee that no attack would be made on him and his people after they had passed the city gates by the Pāsha's troops or by his Arab allies ; but the Pāsha, who had already summoned the Shaikh of the Zubaid tribe and Sulaimān Ghānim, a noted enemy of the 'Aqail, to his assistance, refused to give one, whereupon the Shaikh proceeded to the Sarāi to remonstrate. While he was there a false rumour became current that he had been put to death, and the 'Aqail then seized their arms, cut the bridge of boats, and commenced simultaneous attacks upon the part of the city on the left or opposite Bank of the Tigris, where the Sarāi was, and upon a detachment of the Pāsha's troops under the Kehiyah, who were encamped outside the walls upon the same side of the river as themselves. The Pāsha hastily dismissed the Shaikh with a present and orders to quiet the 'Aqail, but he also sent help to the Kehiyah, who had lost a gun in the first rush of the Arabs but had subsequently recovered it, and whose men had followed the retreating 'Aqail into their own quarter. Fighting ensued on the inner side of the Hillah gate, and the result of the day was still doubtful, when suddenly it was decided in favour of the Pāsha by the safe arrival of ammunition and reinforcements sent in a boat from the left to the right bank, and by the advance of a body of Albanians across the bridge of boats, the two parts of which they had succeeded in reuniting. The 'Aqail defended themselves in their own houses until the next day, when they were apparently allowed to march out of Baghdād with the honours of war. Part of them went to the rebellious 'Anizah, with whom, it was suspected, they had previously formed secret relations, and part to the Jarbah Shammar ; but neither tribe would give them any help in recovering their Baghdād location, which was what they chiefly desired.

The quarters of the town on the south-western bank of the Tigris were pillaged by the Pasha's excited soldiery, the loss falling chiefly on the non-'Aqaili inhabitants, a number of whom were even killed by the troops. It remained for the Pasha to settle as best he could with the Shaikh of the Zubaid and with Sulaimān Ghānim, whom he had invited to join him, and whose services he now no longer required.

How the 'Anizah and 'Aqail complications actually ended we do not know; but at the end of 1834 there were signs, such as dissensions among the 'Anizah, which portended an early break-up of the blockade of Baghdād.

Condition of
the Baghdād
Pāshāliq in
1834.

The administration of the Baghdād Pāshāliq as it was in the year 1834 has been depicted in highly unfavourable colours by Mr. J. B. Fraser. The industrious classes, especially the agriculturists, were so harried by official exactions and by Arab raids that they had reduced their operations within the narrowest possible limits, and their position compared unfavourably with what it had been under Sulaimān Pasha, from 1779 to 1802, or even under Dāwud Pasha. Of the revenue collected in the towns of Baghdād and Basrah, it was estimated that more than a half was lost to Government by the dishonesty of the collectors. Large tracts of country were held by officials as Tamlik, that is in lieu of salary, and the profits of such estates had ordinarily been underestimated for the purpose by at least two-thirds. The unsettled state of the country was as unfavourable to trade as it was to agriculture. The customs duties were not framed, but were collected and accounted for by Government officials with every circumstance of dishonesty. The dues payable for the privilege of engaging in various trades were leased to contractors who were guilty of scandalous abuses. In the mint fraud was prevalent to such an extent that ten piastre pieces, which were supposed to contain a third part of silver, contained in fact only a ninth. The desert routes had become practically impassable for small caravans on account of banditti, and the only tolerably safe line of communication with places abroad was the Shatt-al 'Arab below Basrah, upon which the river-bank chiefs exacted heavy dues from passing boats. The blame for this unfortunate condition of affairs was laid, however, by Mr. Fraser rather on the established system of government than on the ruling Pasha, whom he described as being "to a certain extent liberal and enlightened in his views," and in regard to whom he remarked: "His country is exhausted, his people impoverished and his power and course of improvement will probably terminate with himself, deepening the gloom of confusion that must follow, like a bright light

"suddenly extinguished." The actual revenue of the Baghdād Pāshāliq proper, *i.e.*, of the district dependent on the towns of Baghdād and Basrah, was estimated at £17,030 per annum by Mr. Fraser, who thought that under an efficient administration it might yield not less than £1,389,337 a year. The actual value of the European imports brought to Baghdād from Aleppo and Damascus, by such caravans as were able to make their way through, he placed at a quarter of a million pounds sterling annually.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1807-39.

Two wars with Persia which occurred upon the Kurdish frontier are described, from the Persian point of view, in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast. According to another authority, not followed in that place, the treatment of Persian pilgrims in Turkish territory was the cause of the war of 1821-1823, and it came to an end, in consequence of a cholera epidemic, without any decided success having been gained by the Persians. The Turko-Persian frontier was adjusted after this second war by the First Treaty of Erzeroum (28th July 1823) ; it re-established the boundary agreed on in 1639 and at the same time decided a number of contentious questions relating to pilgrims and trade.

Wars with
Persia, 1806
and 1821-23.

In 1837, incited by the loss which the rising free port of Muhmmareh was inflicting on Basrah and tempted, doubtless, by the opposition which existed between the Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh and his overlord the Ka'ab Shaikh of Fallahiyah, the Governor of Baghdād, then 'Ali Riza Pāsha launched an expedition against Muhammareh. It is * said that the town was taken by assault ; that the merchandise stored in its warehouses was plundered ; and that the walls were levelled and the guns of the place removed. It is added that 'Ali Riza Pāsha made a demonstration against Fallahiyah which resulted in the flight of the Ka'ab Shaikh to Kuwait ; that he placed two joint Shaikhs in charge of the Ka'ab as vassals of Turkey ; and that the former Shaikh of the Ka'ab himself, having returned and ejected these substitutes, signed "a convention with

Capture and
evacuation of
Muhammareh
by the Turks,
1837.

* The chief authority for these statements is Sir H. Rawlinson in his Memorandum on the Ka'ab tribe and Mohammerah, 1844 ; but from internal evidence it would appear that he relied, perhaps to an unwarranted extent, upon Turkish sources of information. There is, of course, no doubt that Muhammareh was in some sort taken by the Turks in 1837.

“ the Pasha of Baghdad, securing himself in occupation of the Shikh-ship and pledging the allegiance of his tribe to Bussorah.”

The Shaikh of the Muhaisin', however, instead of submitting to the Turks, had made his way to Bushehr, where he strongly urged upon the Persian Government of Shīrāz the necessity of recovering Muhammareh for Persia. Disappointed of official Persian assistance, he returned to Muhammareh after its evacuation by the Turks ; resumed possession of the town ; and defied the authority both of the Ka'ab Shaikhs, by whose convention with the Turks he refused to be bound, and of the Wāli of Baghdād.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with other countries in the Persian Gulf, 1807-39.

Blockade of
Basrah by
the Sultān of
'Oman, 1826.

As related in the history of the Omān Sultanate, the Sultān of 'Omān proceeded in 1826 to enforce a claim for arrears of a Turkish subsidy by means of a naval blockade of Basrah. The subsidy was the one, said to have been granted in return for help rendered by the Imām Ahmad during the Persian siege of Basrah in 1775-76, which had been a cause of dispute in the years 1798 and 1804 ; and the arrears claimed amounted to \$10,000. The blockade lasted from August to November 1826, and the result was apparently compliance by the Pāsha with the Sultān's demands. The blockade had been contemplated in 1825 ; but the threats of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt availed, in that year, to prevent its being carried into effect.

British relations with Turkish 'Irāq, 1807-39.

General good
relations, not-
withstanding
the Anglo-
Turkish War
of 1807-09.

At the opening of the period, and for two years after, Britain was at war with Turkey in Europe ; but in Turkish 'Irāq, on account of the favourable disposition of the Pāsha who had much to lose commercially by a breach with the British Indian Government, matters remained continuously upon a footing of peace and amity. Friendly letters were exchanged, upon special occasions, by the Governments of Bombay and Baghdād ; and we learn incidentally that the consular Barāat of

1764 had been renewed by the Porte in the name of Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah. From this last fact we may perhaps conclude that the desirability of obtaining recognition of the consular status of each new Resident at Baghdād or Basrah was steadily kept in view. Before 1808 the Bombay Government were not, it would appear, aware of the terms of the Barāat of 1764, though they knew of its existence. In 1808 Captain Pasley, whom General Malcolm at his withdrawal to India left in charge of the Government of India's Mission to Persia, retired to Basrah when it appeared that his personal safety was endangered at Būshehr.

In March 1808 an official letter from Mr. Manesty, Resident at Basrah, to Dr. Hine, Acting Resident at Baghdād, transmitted by the former through the usual medium of the Mutasallim of Basrah, was opened and read by the Pāsha at Baghdād,—an act which elicited a protest in strong terms from Mr. Manesty. The Government of Bombay ordered the case to be referred to General Malcolm,* who in proceeding on his Second Mission to the Persian Court had been placed by the Government of India in charge of all their officers and establishments in the Gulf region ; but, as the Pāsha had meanwhile promised Mr. Manesty that his packets should not be tampered with in future, at the same time expressing his surprise at the warmth of Mr. Manesty's language, no further action was taken in the matter.

Opening of a
British official
letter by
Sulaimān
Pā-sha, 1808.

In 1809 Mr. Rich, the British Resident at Baghdād, remarked a disposition on the part of the Pāsha to treat him with slight respect and even with positive rudeness. He accordingly reported the facts to the Government of Bombay ; and in the meanwhile, as relations grew still more strained, he withdrew to some distance from Baghdād. After receiving a firm but conciliatory letter from Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, on the subject of his treatment of the Resident, Sulaimān Pāsha informed Mr. Rich that he was desirous of being reconciled with him ; and his professions, which had hitherto been found empty, were this time proved by the event to be sincere. In a letter to Mr. Rich, dated 25th January 1810, the Pāsha renounced " all species of authority or command in any shape over the Resident ;" engaged not to interfere with Residency " states and ceremonies", such as the beating of drums, and especially the celebration of the King's birthday and undertook never to prohibit the interchange of visits, according to old custom, between his

Difficulties
between Sulai-
mān Pāsha and
the Resident
at Baghdād
and adjust-
ment of
the same,
1809-10.

* General Malcolm was accredited to the Pāsha of Baghdād, but found no opportunity, on this occasion, of visiting him.

own principal officers and the British Resident. Messages between the Pāsha and the Resident were to be conveyed by confidential agents of respectability; and if any doubt should hereafter arise in regard to the meaning of any of the conditions agreed on, especially that relating to ceremonials, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the Resident. The articles of agreement thus summarised sufficiently indicate the nature of the previous dispute. The formal letter embodying them was sent to Mr. Rich in his place of retirement by the hand of the second officer of the Pāsha's suite, who brought a guard of 200 Georgians and escorted the Resident back to Baghdād with every honour. On the 27th January 1810 Mr. Rich paid a "public ceremonial visit" to the Pāsha, at which he received a present of a horse with ornamental saddlery and was invested, along with Dr. Hine and others of the Residency staff, with a pelisse of honour. The settlement was regarded by the Resident as thoroughly satisfactory, and it was loyally observed by the Pāsha during the short remainder of his term of office.

Murder of
Captain Grant
and Lieuten-
ant Fothering-
ham, 1880.

In the spring of 1810 Captain Grant and Lieutenant Fotheringham, who had been detached by General Malcolm, on his third and last Mission from the Governor-General of India to the Shāh of Persia, to explore the country between Baghdād and Isfahān, were robbed and murdered by Kalb 'Ali Khān, a Fāili Lur chief, who was then in rebellion against the Shāh of Persia and had taken refuge in the country of the Bani Lām Arab tribe of Turkis 'Irāq. The Khān having heard that the two travellers had with them a large sum of money in gold,—a report almost certainly untrue,—caused them to be waylaid and attacked on the right bank of a hill stream called the Changūlak.* Captain Grant was killed on the spot; but Lieutenant Fotheringham and some Armenian servants were kept alive for several days, after which they also were put to death lest they should become instrumental in bringing about retribution. On account of the impotence of the Turkish and Persian authorities in the borderland where the crime was committed, it was impossible, evidently, to secure the punishment of the offenders.

Return of
General
Malcolm's
Third Mission
to Persia
through
Turkish
'Irāq, 1810.

General Malcolm, on the conclusion of his Third Mission to Persia, returned from Tabriz to the Persian Gulf by way of Kirmānshāh, Baghdād and Basrah. On the 20th September 1810 he reached Baghdād, where he and his party were hospitably received and enter-

* See Capt. D. L. R. Lorimer's *Report on Pusht-i-Kuh*, 1909, pages 8-9.

tained by Mr. Rich,* the British Resident, and Mrs. Rich. During the halt of the mission at Baghdād an employé of the Residency was attacked in the neighbourhood by a gang of Arab marauders and robbed of 500 Qurūsh belonging to Government; but General Malcolm, with his suite and escort, went in pursuit of the thieves and captured four or five of them, with their horses, firearms, and a part of the stolen property, after a hard gallop of about ten miles. General Malcolm remained at Baghdād for a few days to afford the protection of his escort to the British Residency during the conflict, then proceeding, which ended in the displacement and death of Sulaimān Pāsha. On the 5th October, while the final act in the struggle was taking place, the Mission camp was made secure with every military precaution; and the same evening it afforded refuge to the Dīwān Effendi, an adherent of the defeated Governor. Sulaimān Pāsha had urged Mr. Rich to obtain for him the support of the troops of General Malcolm's escort; but the request was one which it was not, of course, in the power of the Resident to entertain.

On the 25th October General Malcolm and his party reached Basrah. There he was entertained by Mr. Manesty, formerly Resident, but lately suspended from his functions; and on the 29th he embarked on the East India Company's cruiser "Ternate" for Būshehr and India.

The relations of the British with 'Abdullah Pāsha during his brief tenure of power at Baghdād seem to have been particularly cordial. The Pāsha himself, immediately on his appointment to the Pāshaliq, expressed a desire for the establishment of a close mutual friendship, and Mr. Governor Duncan of Bombay replied in fitting terms.

In May or June 1812 Mr. Rich, Resident at Baghdād, was successful in obtaining from the Pāsha two valuable decrees in the form of orders addressed to the Mutasallim of Basrah. The first required the Mutasallim to surrender to the agent at Basrah of the British Resident, Baghdād, all sailors and workmen who might desert from British vessels in the port and place, or attempt to place, themselves under the protection of

Amicable
relations
with 'Abdul-
lah Pāsha,
1810-13.

Decrees by
'Abdullah
Pāsha for the
surrender of
British
deserters and
against the
enslavement
of British
Indian sub-
jects, 1812.

* Mr. Claudius James Rich was a member of the Bombay Civil Service, of very scholarly tastes and extraordinary linguistic attainments. His wife was a daughter of Sir Jas. Mackintosh of Bombay. Mr. Rich's marriage and his appointment to Baghdād both took place in 1808, when his age was less than 24 years. He was a pioneer of archæology and an indefatigable traveller. He twice visited and studied the ruins of Babylon. He had travelled much in the Levant before his arrival in India; in 1813-14 he re-visited Constantinople and returned to Baghdād by land; and in 1820 he made a great journey into Kurdistān and Persia and visited the Niniveh site at Mūsāl.

the Mutasallim himself or of the Kapitān Pāsha. The second referred to kidnapped Indians, subjects of the British Government, whether male or female, who might be brought to Basrah for disposal as slaves by local or Masqat vessels, and ordered that they should be transferred to the Resident's agent. The abuses at which these two edicts were aimed no doubt prevailed at the time to some considerable extent.

Early
relations
with Dāwud
Pāsha,
1817-19.

Dāwud Pāsha, on being appointed to the Pashāliq of Baghdād, at once informed Mr. Rich, the British Political Agent, of the fact and invited his congratulations; but Mr. Rich, as the success of the Pāsha in enforcing his authority appeared problematical, at first abstained from answering his letter. When Dāwud Pāsha at length prevailed over his rival, however, the Political Agent wrote him a suitable letter, referring in it to a "private and sincere friendship" which had always subsisted between them; and an exchange of complimentary letters then took place between the Pāsha and Sir Evan Nepean, Governor of Bombay. By the middle of 1819 a cloud had come over the former good understanding between Dāwud Pāsha and Mr. Rich; and the latter had to complain of an attack, committed amidst the disorders which now began to prevail, upon a mounted messenger of the Political Agency, through which a number of despatches from the East India Company's Agent at Constantinople were lost.

Attitude of
the Assistant
Political
Agent at
Basrah with
reference to
the outrages
committed
there by
Najdis in
1820.

In 1820, when, as we have already seen, various outrages were committed by Arabs of Najd at Basrah at the instigation of some resident Najdi merchants, Captain Taylor, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, was ordered by the Government of Bombay to observe complete neutrality as between the Turkish authorities and the disturbers of the peace, and not to comply with a demand made by the Mutasallim for the surrender of some property belonging to Najdi merchants which was on board of British ships in the river. Captain Taylor was at the same time cautioned not to afford his official protection to any persons other than those strictly entitled to it as British subjects or as connected with the Factory; but he was directed to use his good offices with either party, should this be necessary in order "to prevent those who had a claim on British protection from suffering injustice"; and he was authorised, in case injury or insult to the Factory should become imminent in consequence of the disturbances, to withdraw from Basrah to Būshehr, or to the island of Qishm on which a British military station had lately been established. These orders, issued by the Government of Bombay, were confirmed by the Government of India.

The differences between Dāwud Pāsha and Mr. Rich, the Political Agent at Baghdād, had meanwhile become acute. The attempt to clear even a single bale of British goods from the custom house or an application for the recovery of the smallest debt owing to a British subject now invariably led to a violent quarrel; and matters culminated in an intimation by the Pāsha's ministers, of which the Pāsha himself was believed to approve, "that no European rights were recognised at Baghdād," and that in future the duties on European goods entering the Pāshāliq would be recovered at double the rates hitherto in force. In November 1820 Mr. Rich found himself obliged to direct his Assistant at Basrah, Captain Taylor, in case the goods of Mr. Scooboda,* a European merchant trading at Baghdād under British protection, were seized in the Turkish custom house, to strike the Factory flag; to suspend all communication with the Basrah Government, at the same time; informing them of the reason; and to prohibit commercial and other intercourse between vessels under British colours and the natives of the country. The goods of Mr. Scooboda having been seized, as anticipated, Captain Taylor withdrew with his staff from Basrah to Muhammareh, "a small town in a secure situation," of which this is perhaps the earliest mention. It may be mentioned that Mr. Rich had been absent from Baghdād on a tour in Kurdistān, Persia and the Mūsāl districts from 16th April 1820 to 12th March 1821, a circumstance which cannot have conduced to the adjustment of difficulties with the Baghdād Government. Especially as he had just before (in March-April 1820) made a journey to Qasr-i-Shirīn. In fact Dāwud Pāsha complained, and perhaps believed, that Mr. Rich had intrigued with the Kurds and Persians.

Disregard by Dāwud Pāsha of European treaty rights and his rupture with Mr. Rich, 1820.

Not only were the remonstrances which the Resident now made against the action of the Pāsha ineffectual, but they even provoked fresh insults; and double duties began to be levied upon all British goods passing through the Pāshāliq. Finally Mr. Rich announced his intention of withdrawing from Turkish 'Irāq and proceeding to India, while the Pāsha on his part declared that he would not allow him to leave Baghdād. On the 25th March 1821 private information reached the Political Agency that the Pāsha was about to send a body of troops to arrest Mr. Rich; and the building, with the assistance of some† gentlemen who happened to

Demonstration against the Baghdād Political Agency by the Pāsha's troops, March 1821.

*Perhaps "Svoboda." There is still a family named Svoboda at Baghdād, but they are now under Austrian protection.

†These were Captain J. Elliot, afterwards of H. M., 21st Dragoons, Mr. Taylor of the Madras Cavalry, and Mr. Hoste, Assistant Surgeon of H. M., 17th Infantry, besides whom Mr. Rich had an Assistant, by name Dr. Bell.

be passing through Baghdād at the time and were staying with Mr. Rich, was immediately put in a state of defence. The garrison of the Political Agency including the military guard and a number of local dependents of Turkish nationality who were personally devoted to Mr. Rich and refused to desert him, mustered nearly 100 muskets; and the management of the defence was undertaken by Captain J. Elliot, one of Mr. Rich's temporary guests. On the sides towards the main town the house was protected by the narrowness of the streets leading towards it, but it was open to artillery fire from the opposite side of the river. Among other precautions the Agency yacht was brought close under the walls of the building in order to prevent her being seized by the Turks. The British Political Agent was as popular with the inhabitants of the city as the Pāsha was at this time generally disliked; and there was good reason to think that, if a shot should be fired, risings would at once be commenced by sympathisers with the British in various parts of the city, which would seriously embarrass the Turks. It was also said that the Commandant of the Turkish Imperial Artillery at Baghdād refused to act against the British, unless the Pāsha could produce an order from Constantinople as a warrant for his proceedings.

The British dispositions for defence had hardly been completed when the Pāsha's troops were seen to be in motion: some occupied the river bank below the Agency, probably with a view to cutting off the Agent's retreat by water; others were posted in different quarters of the town to overawe the inhabitants; and a body of regular infantry took up a position in the immediate neighbourhood of the Agency. The bazaars of the city were at once closed, and all business was suspended. The Commandant of the Pāsha's infantry, an old friend of Mr. Rich, by whom his life had been saved on a former occasion, then visited the Agency accompanied by another Turkish officer; by the hand of the latter, who offered to become the bearer of any message that Mr. Rich might wish to send to the Pāsha, that gentleman despatched a hasty note in Turkish, complaining of the threatening movements of the troops; and, during the absence of the other officer, the Infantry Commandant remained with Mr. Rich and found opportunity to assure him of his determination to prevent, if he possibly could, any action by his own corps against the Agency. Other officials from the Pāsha then appeared and endeavoured to extort a promise from the Agent that he would not leave Baghdād until his difference with the local government had been settled; but Mr. Rich declined to say more, while so much as one Turkish soldier remained in the neighbourhood, than that he would not quit Baghdād during the

next night. The troops nearest to the Agency were at length withdrawn; but the little garrison, apprehensive of a surprise, remained under arms all night; and the Pāsha apparently thought it necessary to observe similar precautions at his own palace, and to keep detachment on duty in those quarters of the city where he distrusted the temper of the population.

On the 29th of March the Agent and his staff were still closely confined to the Agency. No objection had been made however, to the departure of his British visitors; and they apparently left Baghdād as soon as it was clear that direct violence was no longer likely to be employed by the Turks.

How much longer or under what conditions the Political Agent was detained at Baghdād does not appear; but the Pāsha, having been led to suppose that Mr. Rich was* required in India to fill the Governorship of Sūrat,—an idea of which it did not appear necessary to disabuse him,—at length consented before the summer heats had fully set in, to let him go. The Pāsha then even handed Mr. Rich a letter, in which he extolled his character and talents, for delivery to the Governor of Bombay; and on the 19th of May the Agent arrived in safety at Basrah with the whole of his establishment, having “left Baghdād with the greatest *éclat* and followed by the regrets and good wishes of almost the whole of the inhabitants,” and having brought away with him all those who from their connection with the Agency stood in the least danger of the Pāsha’s resentment. Mr. Rich was determined, however, to remain within reach of Baghdād until satisfaction should have been obtained from Dāwud Pāsha.

Withdrawal
of the
Agent, at
Baghdād to
Basrah, and
thence to
Būshehr,
May to Octo-
ber 1821.

About a month later Mr. Rich, still accompanied by some native members of the British Agency who had incurred the displeasure of Pāsha by their devotion to British interests, removed from Basrah to Būshehr; but the Assistant Political Agent, Captain Taylor, who must in the meantime have returned from Muhammareh to his usual post, seems to have remained behind at Basrah. On the 5th of October 1821 Mr. Rich was attacked by cholera at Shirāz whither he had gone in July in search of a cooler climate, Mrs. Rich having first been sent to India, and died after a few hours illness.

On the first information received from Mr. Rich regarding his critical situation at Baghdād, Mr. Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, wrote in strong terms to the Pāsha, informing him that Mr. Rich had

Proceedings
of the
Bombay
Government
in regard to
the detention
of the
Political

* He had in fact been offered a post at the Presidency and had accepted it. See his *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, Volume II, page 158.

Agent
at Baghdād,
temporary
removal of
the Agency
to Kuwait,
and final
settlement,
May 1821 to
September
1823.

now been positively ordered to leave Baghdād and desiring that the restraints imposed on him should at once be removed. The letter also stated that negotiations for the re-establishment of amicable relations could not be entered on until Mr. Rich should have reported his arrival at a place beyond the bounds of the Pāshāliq. On the same date, the 12th May, 1821, Mr. Elphinstone addressed the British Ambassador at Constantinople, suggesting that immediate steps should be taken to procure the release of Mr. Rich, as well as public reparation for the insult which had been offered through him to the national honour. The question, in so far as it related to the freedom of the Resident, had already been settled on the spot by the time that these communications were despatched ; but it remained to obtain satisfaction for the indignity inflicted and a guarantee for the discontinuance by the Pāsha of his late outrageous conduct in several respects. The Government of Bombay, with the sanction of the Government of India, accordingly called on Dāwud Pāsha to apologise to Mr. Rich both verbally through an officer and in writing, and to themselves in writing only ; to reduce the duties on British trade to the rates sanctioned by treaty ; to refund all sums which had been realised as duty in excess of the proper amounts ; to make good the value of some merchandise, injured or destroyed during the dispute, which belonged to Messrs. Scooboda and Sturmy, two merchants trading at Baghdād under British protection ; to engage to treat the representative of the British Government with becoming respect in future ; and to protect and countenance all British travellers in the Pāshāliq, extorting from them no illegal payments and redressing all their just complaints. It was added that, in event of the Pāsha's reply being unfavourable, the Government of Bombay would be compelled to prohibit commercial intercourse between British ports and those of Turkish 'Irāq and to enforce the prohibition by naval measures. Mr. Rich was instructed to remove the Basrah Factory, pending compliance by the Pāsha's Government with these demands, to some convenient place in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Rich was dead before the orders, dated 2nd October 1821, reached their destination ; but his substitute, Captain Taylor, carried them into effect by withdrawing, on the 15th December 1821, to the " island " of Kuwait, which term should possibly be understood to mean the island of Failakah. At Constantinople the case had been strongly taken up by the British Ambassador, Lord Strangford, who wrote in April 1821 : " I have not had an opportunity of fully inquiring into the grounds of the Pasha's representations ; but from the " information which I have already collected, it is quite evident to me,

“that Mr. Rich’s sole offence consists in the *manly* and *justifiable* “opposition which he has continually made to the exactions and impositions which the Pāsha has exercised towards British commerce at “Baghdād.”

The Pāsha, on receiving the letter of the Governor of Bombay, at once agreed to all the demands contained in it with the exception of that relating to an apology ; and Captain Taylor, considering it advisable to waive this last difficult condition, left Kuwait with his staff for Basrah on the 19th April 1822. On the 1st May he made a public entry into the town of Basrah, having been received with every honour and mark of attention by the Mutasallim, and was presented by that official, under orders from the Pāsha of Baghdād, with a horse richly caparisoned. His action was subsequently approved by the Government of India.

The settlement of the case was protracted however until 1823, in which year, on the 29th of March, a formal acceptance of the terms laid down by the Government of Bombay was at length transmitted by the Pāsha ; but a more detailed agreement was now considered necessary by the British authorities in India ; and at some time between April and August 1823 it was duly obtained by Captain Taylor in a written form. The twelve conditions to which the Pāsha therein gave his “ full and unreserved assent ” were as follow :—

1st.—A compliance with all stipulations contained in the Imperial Treaties and Royal Firmans, ancient or recent.

2nd.—The restitution of whatever was taken from Mr. Sturmy above the proper rate of customs, and of such property of Mr. Scooboda as was damaged or lost.

3rd.—Whatever may be deemed to constitute the complete safety in every respect of the life, property and honor of all Agents or Vakeels of the Government and of their protected dependents and subjects, together with an attentive regard for their views and wishes, a due estimation and honoring of them, and an admission of their rights to grant asylum and all other claims according to their ancient rights and customs, and that they may entertain as many servants as they see necessity for.

4th.—Should hereafter an Agent, not an Englishman, be established at Baghdād, he shall unquestionably meet with every proper honor and consideration, as it is due to his station.

5th.—Bills of exchange shall not be taken from their shroffs by force, nor money from their dependents or *protégés* by compulsion, nor shall temporary or arbitrary taxes of any kind ever be levied on their landed or other property contrary to their due right and custom.

6th.—No tax, except one previously well defined and arranged, shall be levied on boats, the property of British subjects and *protégés*, such for instance as pass between Bussorah and Baghdād ; nor shall their boats be seized for the public service ; nor shall the property of merchants, being British subjects or *protégés*, arriving at Baghdād,

otherwise than is usual on the arrival of the same at Bussorah, enter the Custom House contrary to stipulation and covenant.

7th.—Should British subjects and *protégés* lose any property in the town, or on public roads, and by theft or plunder, every exertion shall promptly be made to recover the same.

8th.—Should any dependent of Government suffer from any of our subjects offence or injury, the injured individual shall receive immediate satisfaction and reparation.

9th.—In commercial dealings, goods having been bought shall not be returned, except on legal and just plea, and commercial disputes shall be adjusted by an assembly of merchants according to mercantile usage.

10th.—Should British or Indian seamen desert, they shall not be forced to become converts to Islam, and in case of their willing conversion they shall be subsequently delivered up to their duty in order to prevent any detriment to the interest of the ship.

11th.—A spot shall be assigned on lease to the Resident for a house and garden, wherever he may point out.

12th.—The proven claims of British *protégés* to be enforced on whosoever of our subjects it may be, without the smallest loss or injury to the claimants.

Customs recovered in excess from Mr. Sturmy were at the same time refunded ; and compensation was made, in kind or otherwise, for goods lost by Mr. Scooboda. By this settlement, officially reported by Captain Taylor on the 5th September 1823, perfect amity was at last restored.

Dāwud Pāsha took advantage of the good understanding thus re-established to press various requests for assistance upon the British authorities in India. So early as February 1824 he applied for the services of a British medical officer and asked to be furnished with arms and accoutrements sufficient to equip a body of 1,000 infantry ; but the Government of Bombay feared that the embarrassments inseparable from the residence of a British physician at the Pāsha's court would more than counterbalance any political advantages to be derived from it, and they did not see their way to meet his wishes either in that respect or in the matter of military supplies. Again, towards the end of 1827, in congratulating Sir J. Malcolm upon his appointment to the Governorship of Bombay, the Pāsha made a large request for assistance in military personnel and *matériel*, basing his application upon orders that he had lately received from Constantinople to organise an army of regular troops. He asked for a subaltern, two non-commissioned officers and a conductor of stores of the European Horse Artillery, of whom the last should be competent to superintend the manufacture of gunpowder ; for a subaltern and two non-commissioned officers of European Infantry ; for a gunsmith able to direct the making and stocking of muskets ; for a planter and manufacturer of indigo ; for three vessels of three masts, the largest to

Refusal of
various
requests made
by Dāwud
Pāsha, 1824-
28.

be of 600 tons and carry 48 guns in two tiers ; and for 3,000 muskets and sets of infantry equipment and 400 barrels of gunpowder. At the same time he declared his readiness to defray the whole of the expense involved and to pay liberal allowances to the British officers and non-commissioned officers while employed in the Turkish service. The Pasha's application, which may have been prompted by the well known connection of Sir J. Malcolm with a former loan of British officers to the Persian army, as well as by the proximity of Russian forces to the northern frontier of the Pashaliq, was strongly supported by the Government of Bombay, Mr. F. Warden, a Member of Council, alone dissenting on the ground of the disputatious and unprofitable course in the past of the British relations with Turkish 'Irāq. In May 1828, however, the Government of India decided that a courteous negative should be returned to the Pasha's request, one reason for this decision being a mistaken impression on their part that war between Britain and Turkey was not improbable in the near future, while another was a notion that the Pasha might employ his new resources to rebel against his master the Sultān ; but they authorised the purchase by an agent whom the Pasha had deputed to Bombay of whatever military stores the Baghdād Government might require.

The action of the Government of India in this case was much regretted by the Court of Directors, who considered that a chance had been lost of establishing a valuable intelligence agency at an important point ; and they directed that, if such an opportunity were to recur, it should be immediately embraced. By way of enforcing their views they remarked : " There is nothing comparatively so cheap as information. It gives to " the Government which possesses it over that which has it not the advantage of a knowledge of futurity. We wish you to bear this constantly " in mind, not merely as regards the Pachalic of Baghdād, but as (regards) " all the countries to the west of Sutlege." The Pasha's idea of creating a naval force was, however, to be discouraged, as contributing neither to the internal pacification of Turkish 'Irāq nor to its defence against invasion by land. The ambitions of Russia had already at this time become an important consideration in connection with British policy in Asia ; and the Court of Directors of the East India Company seem to have been concerned lest Europeans of other than British nationality should acquire a footing in the Pashaliq as military instructors.

In 1825, when, as we have already seen, an expedition against Basrah was contemplated by the Sultān of 'Omān, the British Resident at Būshehr communicated with the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq

Attitude of
the British
authorities in
the dispute
between the

Sultān of
'Omān and
the Pāsha of
Baghdād,
1825.

Detention of
a British
official on a
voyage down
the Tigris,
1830.

Admonition
addressed by
Hāji 'Alī
Rīza Pāsha to
the Turkish
officials at
Basrah with
reference to
the respect to
be shown for
British rights,
1831.

Disapproval
by the Govern-
ment of India
of a proposal
by the Political
Agent in
Turkish 'Irāq,
involving
prolonged
absences on
his part from
Baghdād, 1833.

Report by
Mr. J. B.
Fraser on the
state of the
Pāshāliq,
1834.

suggesting British mediation. The Government of Bombay, however, instructed these officers to limit their intervention to the use of influence with the parties separately, and, as the Pāsha declined to listen to Captain Taylor's advice, the Sultān was informed that he was at liberty to take any action he pleased. The sequel has already been described above.

In 1830 Dr. Baikie, an Assistant Surgeon of the Madras establishment, was detained, on a voyage down the Tigris in a Political Agency boat flying the British flag, by an Arab Shaikh, who irregularly obliged him to pay a heavy duty on his baggage. He subsequently memorialised the Bombay Government, and his claim was referred to the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, but the result is not stated.

Shortly after his appointment to the Pāshāliq of Baghdād, Hāji 'Alī Rīza Pāsha addressed a formal order to the Qādhi, Mufti, Mutasallim and A'yān of Basrah by which they were enjoined to show the utmost respect for the rights and privileges of the British representative at Basrah, "his agent, interpreters, *protégés* and dependents, and the "subjects of the Government arriving from Hindoostan, and their ships "and merchants, and all others soever." This document, which was dated 2nd October 1831, was publicly read in the Mutasallim's Council at Basrah and was officially registered in the offices of the Qādhi and the Daftardār.

In July 1833 Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, proposed that he should be authorised, in view of the predominance of Russian influence and the prevalence of Russian intrigue in Turkey, to travel as much as he thought fit in the northern districts of the Pāshāliq, and even to reside occasionally at a point nearer than Baghdād to the supposed scene of Muscovite activity. The Government of India, however, concurring with the Government of Bombay, held that Baghdād itself was, as the seat of the Local Government, the very point at which vigilance against Russian designs was most required, and that the continuous presence of the Political Agent there was also necessary on account of the generally unsettled state of the Pāshāliq; and they therefore directed him, in December 1833, to remain at Baghdād unless he should receive orders of a different tenor from His Majesty's Government.

The attention of the British Government seems to have been now directed in a particular manner to the field of Turkish 'Irāq; and in November 1834 the traveller Mr. J. B. Fraser, already mentioned, who had been commissioned to visit that country and Persia, reported in great detail upon the administrative condition of the Baghdād Pāshāliq. A copy of his report was forwarded by the Political Agent, Colonel Taylor,

to the Government of Bombay; but no copy of it was transmitted by them, perhaps through an oversight, to the Government of India. Mr. Fraser's object was to indicate in what manner and to what extent, the resources of the province might be developed under better methods of government; and it should be remembered, in considering his recommendations, that the British Government at this time contemplated, as will presently be shown, the establishment of a steamer service on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq. In concluding his report Mr. Fraser remarked :—

It were superfluous to expatiate on the field which such a change of system would open to industry and skill and capital in Mesopotamia, a region assuredly the most favourable in all respects, in climate, in soil, and in comparative proximity to all the seats of civilization and improvement in the old world, for the employment of these to advantage. Even the rapid advance of Egypt in apparent prosperity affords no fair scale to calculate the extent of improvement that might be expected here, for Mohamed Allee Pacha, though to a certain extent liberal and enlightened in his views, looks ultimately to self. * * * If, therefore, the permanent improvement and tranquillity of this province be an object of importance to Great Britain, let what will be the form of government established, let the nature and extent of its future connection with the Court of Constantinople be what it may, she must and will find herself forced to maintain in the Government a permanent influence; in fact, she must herself have the managing and directing of all measures of policy and improvement, let whoever or whatsoever be the organ for carrying them into effect.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with European countries other than Britain, 1807—39.

During this period Turkish 'Irāq was practically unaffected by the influence of any European power except Great Britain.

In January 1819 Mr. Vigouroux, a French Consul at Baghdād, who had never before visited the Pāsha, requested an audience, at the same time claiming precedence over the British Resident on the ground that under treaty the French representative was entitled to be ranked before the British in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. These pretensions were of course rejected by the Pāsha of Baghdād, at the time Dāwud Pāsha, who remarked that, "Mr. Rich being a Resident "Minister and Monsieur Vigouroux only a Consul, there could not, under "any circumstances, be a competition between them."

Precedence
claimed by
the French
Consul at
Baghdād,
1819.

Attitude
of Russia
after 1833.

In consequence of the *rapprochement* between Russia and Turkey brought about by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, Russian movements in the Baghdād Pāshāliq began from that date to be apprehended by the British ; but, intrigues, if they existed, never took a tangible shape. Some suspicion of the motives of the British Government in establishing steam navigation upon the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq appears, however, to have been instilled into the mind of the Porte by Russian diplomacy.

British official matters in Turkish 'Irāq, 1807—39.

Amalgama-
tion of the
Baghdād and
Basrah
Residencies,
1809-10.

After the fear of French intrigue in the Middle East had died down, and before Russia's successful wars with Persia and Turkey in 1826-29 had enhanced Russian prestige in that region, the importance to Britain of her political position in Turkish 'Irāq was for a time sensibly diminished. Probably for this reason, at the recommendation of the Government of India, the Court of Directors of the East India Company decided in 1809 to abolish one of their Residencies in Turkish 'Irāq and to entrust the superintendence of their interests in the whole province, as before 1798, to a single Resident at Basrah, who might when necessary depute a European Assistant, to be allowed him, to visit the Pāsha at Baghdād. These steps were accordingly taken in 1810, when the Residency at Baghdād was amalgamated with that at Basrah ; but no steps were as yet taken to carry out the further change, which was also contemplated, of making the Company's representative at Basrah subordinate to the Resident at Būshehr. The amalgamation took place under *Mr. Rich, whom the Government of Bombay had appointed Resident at Baghdād in 1808.

Disciplinary
measure in
the case of
Mr. Manesty,
Resident at
Basrah, 1810.

On the occasion of this reform, the Court of Directors reviewed the conduct of Mr. Manesty, the actual Resident at Basrah, during his whole service there ; and, in view of the frequent indiscretions and acts of insubordination of which he had been guilty, they decided that he should be removed from his post, the amalgamation of the Residencies consequently taking place under *Mr. Rich, the Resident at Baghdād.

* Mr. Rich arrived at Baghdād on the 4th May 1808, relieving Dr. Hine whom Mr. Jones had left in charge of the Residency in 1806. Mr. Rich's European Assistants after 1810 were Dr. Colquhoun between 1810 and 1818 and Captain Taylor between 1818 and 1821. Both remained at Basrah.

At the same time they prohibited the employment of Mr. Manesty on any foreign or diplomatic mission whatever, without further orders from themselves. It will be remembered that Mr. Manesty had twice, in 1791-95 and again in 1803, come into serious collision with the Pasha, Governor of Baghdād, that in 1804 he had unwarrantably assumed the character of an Envoy to the Court of Persia, and that in 1805 he had drawn large bills upon the Government of Bombay in the absence both of authority and of funds, and had left his station to visit Bombay without the permission of Government. In these circumstances the action of the Court can hardly be regarded as too severe, nor can we do otherwise than share their surprise at the leniency with which the Bombay Government had treated * him. Mr. Manesty made over charge of the Basrah office to Dr. Colquhoun, the Residency Surgeon, on the 12th June 1810; but at the same time he announced his intention of remaining at Basrah on account of his private affairs until the 1st September, when he would proceed to England *via* Constantinople without resigning the service. He was informed in reply that he must conform with the regulations which required him to resign the service in the East before proceeding home, but that the Government of Bombay would recommend him for re-employment, should he so desire. Mr. Manesty, on receiving this intimation, formally and finally resigned the service, having "determined to accept the offer of an annuity which had been made to him by the Committee of Management of the Bombay Civil Fund," but permission for proceeding beyond Constantinople was withheld until he should have furnished Government with certain papers connected with his accounts, which had already been called for, and had satisfied all public demands against him. The conclusion of his case is not recorded.

On the 23rd September 1812, in accordance with a recommendation made by the Government of India, the Court of Directors of the East India Company ordered a change by which the nominal organisation in Turkish 'Irāq was brought into harmony with the actual. In fact the "Resident at Basrah" was made "Political Agent in Turkish Arabia," and was expressly empowered to reside at Basrah or Baghdād as circumstances might require, and to depute his Assistant from either place for duty at the other. As Mr. Rich, however, the holder of the appointment until 1821, continued to reside at Baghdād, he did not cease to be

Conversion of
the Residency
at Basrah
into a Political
Agency
in Turkish
'Irāq, 1812.

* Mr. Manesty had, no doubt, some redeeming qualities. He was patriotic and hospitable, and he lived at Basrah in the style of an English country gentleman. His wife was an Armenian lady, and they had a promising family.

generally known as the "Resident at Baghdād," and was styled so even in official correspondence.

Introduction of a system of passports for British subjects visiting Turkish 'Irāq, 1821.

In accordance with a suggestion made by Mr. Rich, the British Resident, the Government of India in 1821 prohibited British subjects from India from visiting the interior of the Baghdād Pāshāliq unless provided with a passport from the Political Secretary of one of the Indian Presidencies. The object of this restriction was to prevent an influx into the country of needy adventurers and others who might give trouble to the authorities and bring discredit on the British name. Notifications were issued by the Governments of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, that of the Bombay Government being dated 24th April 1821, promulgating the new order. The only penalty annexed to disregard of the regulation was liability to be prevented from proceeding up-country after arrival in Turkish 'Irāq.

Nominal or temporary abolition of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and inclusion of that province in the jurisdiction of the Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia, 1822.

At the time of the abolition of the Baghdād Residency in 1810 it had been intended, as we have seen, to bring the Company's affairs in Turkish 'Irāq under the management of their chief representative in the Persian Gulf; and in 1821 the change would probably have been carried into effect, had it not been for the serious disagreement which occurred in that year between Mr. Rich and Dāwud Pāsha. At length, on the 9th May 1822, on the restoration of amicable relations with the Pāsha some time after Mr. Rich's death, Captain W. Bruce of the East India Company's marine service, then Resident at Būshehr, was appointed "Political Agent in the Gulf of Persia," with jurisdiction extending to Turkish 'Irāq and headquarters at either Basrah or Qishm; and Captain Taylor, the British representative at Basrah, became his Assistant. It is doubtful, however, whether the new arrangement ever actually came into force, for its execution was to be delayed until Captain Bruce, under recent orders applying to all political officers, had wound up his transactions as a private merchant; and this he can hardly have done before the 1st November 1822, when, as explained in the history of the Persian Coast, he was removed from office.

Reinstitution of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and reduction of Basrah to a Native Agency, 1822.

In appointing Captain Bruce's successor at Būshehr the Governor of Bombay thought it advisable, inasmuch as the British detachment on Qishm Island was about to be withdrawn and the attention of the Resident at Būshehr would in all likelihood be fully occupied by the affairs of the maritime and piratical tribes of the Arabian Coast, to reinstitute the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and make it independent of the Residency in the Persian Gulf. The first holder of the revived appointment was Captain R. Taylor of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry,

formerly Assistant to the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, whose name has more than once appeared in our narrative. Basrah proper was reduced to a Native Agency, but the Political Agent continued for some years to reside there.

In 1824 another administrative change was made, whereby the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq became subordinate, but only partially so, to the authority of the British Resident at Būshehr. He was ordered, in all matters relating to the maritime Arabs or to the Persian Coast, to deal with the Resident at Būshehr and to comply with such instructions as he might receive from that officer; and he was also to supply the Resident with copies of his despatches; but in matters affecting the Baghdād Pāshāliq alone his responsibility and powers remained unaltered. Without the sanction of the Resident at Būshehr, however, no measures in regard to Turkish 'Irāq which might re-act upon other parts of the Persian Gulf were to be taken by the Political Agent; and the suspension of British trade with the Pāshāliq was specially cited as an example in point.

Partial subordination of the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq to the Residency at Būshehr, 1824.

During some years the headquarters of the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq continued to vary with circumstances, being sometimes at Baghdād, the administrative and political capital, and sometimes at the commercial port of Basrah. In 1828 the orders of 1812, issued at the time of the first institution of the Political Agency, were repeated by the Government of Bombay under instructions from the Court of Directors, authorising the Political Agent to reside at Baghdād or at Basrah as he found convenient; and it was suggested by the Court that, in case of the absence of the Political Agent at Baghdād, his duties at Basrah might be performed by a European Assistant. There appear, however, to have been objections on the part of the Indian authorities to the Agents' leaving Basrah; for in 1830, when he visited Baghdād at the express request of the Pāsha, he had first to obtain permission for his journey from the Government of Bombay. In the same year the Pāsha asked that Major Taylor, the Political Agent, might be permanently stationed at Baghdād instead of Basrah, but the Governor of Bombay replied that, in the interests of trade, he could not assent to His Highness's proposal. At the same time, however, an assurance was given to the Pāsha that Major Taylor would be allowed frequent opportunities of visiting the capital. On the 12th May 1831, plague having broken out at Baghdād, the Political Agent, who had then been at Baghdād for about a year and had witnessed at that place the displacement of Dāwud Pāsha by Hājī 'Alī Riza Pāsha, left again for Basrah; his brother-in-law,

Changes of headquarters of the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, 1828-32.

who accompanied him died of the disease by the way. In January 1832 plague appeared at Basrah, and Major Taylor, at the request of the new Pasha, then returned to Baghdād. Soon afterwards the Court of Directors of the East India Company expressed a wish that the Political Agent, for the sake of obtaining accurate information and the better to establish his interest with Haji 'Ali Riza Pasha, should "fix his residence chiefly at Baghdād," while his routine duties at Basrah should be discharged by a European Assistant, or, if there were none, by a Native Agent. In consequence of these orders the Political Agent thereafter resided mostly at Baghdād; and a suggestion that he made in 1833, under which, if accepted, he might have absented himself from the Pasha's Court for considerable periods to watch the proceedings of the Russians on the northern frontier of the Pashāliq, was, as we have already seen, negatived by the Government of Bombay.

Reserve
enjoined on
the Political
Agent in his
relations with
the Pasha of
Baghdād,
1831-32.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company laid down, in 1831 and 1832, some principles for the guidance of the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq. It is not clear whether their action in this respect was occasioned by an observed tendency on the part of the Agent to overact his part, or whether it was suggested by some general review of the relations subsisting between the British and the Ottoman power. The Political Agent was expressly cautioned against regarding the Pasha as an independent sovereign or himself as a plenipotentiary at a foreign court, and he was exhorted to bear in mind the dependence of the Pasha upon the Porte and his own subordination to the British Ambassador at Constantinople. With the latter he was to correspond freely in all matters which might influence the general relations of Britain with Turkey; he was to supply the Government of Bombay with copies of his correspondence with the Ambassador; and he was to await the instructions of that Government in all matters in which they had not themselves invested him with discretion. In the absence of special directions he was to confine his attention to business that might properly be undertaken by a Consul, in particular the protection of British subjects and interests and the collection of political information, and he was to avoid entangling himself in the affairs, external or internal, of the Pashāliq. In Persian business he was to be guided by the advice of the British Envoy at Tehrān.

Proposed
absorption of
the Political
Agency in
Turkish 'Irāq
into that in

Meanwhile the abolition of the separate Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq, contemplated in 1810 and actually ordered in 1822, had been kept in view as a desirable object by the British authorities in India. In 1827 Mr. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, considered that the

Agency might with advantage be suppressed, and his Council concurred in the opinion; but he left the decision to his successor, Sir J. Malcolm, who in 1823, while agreeing as to the advisability of a diminution of the political expenditure in the Gulf region, thought the time inopportune, in view of the critical relations of Russia with both Turkey and Persia, for any reduction of establishment in Turkish 'Irāq. In a report dated 26th April 1830 a Committee appointed in India to enquire into the state of the Government finances, recommended the retention of one Agency only, located at Būshehr, and the Government of India apparently adopted the suggestion; but the Court of Directors, before whom this and other questions of reorganisation came in 1834, decided* that no change should be made for the present in Turkish 'Irāq. This decision was due partly to the internal condition of the Pāshāliq, and partly to "the peculiar complication of circumstances in which the relations of "the various Powers connected with that part of the world are at this "moment involved."

In 1835 the orders of 1806, making the British political representative in Turkish 'Irāq entirely subordinate to the Government of Bombay, were cancelled; and it was ordered that he, as well as the Resident at Būshehr, should in future correspond with the Government of India and be under their direct orders.† The despatches of the Political Agent were to be sent, however, under flying seal through the Government of Bombay, by whom copies would be retained.

The Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq replaced under the direct authority of the Government of India, 1835.

During the earlier part of this period, from 1810 to 1822, a European Assistant Political Agent existed at Basrah; but occasionally, during his absence, his place was filled by the native broker of the Factory, for whom an allowance of Rs. 200 a month was sanctioned in 1819. Soon after the death of Mr. Rich in 1821 the European Assistantship was abolished; and the broker received, in addition to his allowance, the title of "Native Agent" as an indication of his political status. The first Native Agent was Khōjah Johannes, who died in 1821; he was succeeded by his son Khōjah Parseigh Johannes, who held the office for 30 years. In 1832, when the Political Agent finally removed from

The Political Assistantship at Basrah, 1807—39.

* They were influenced, probably, by a minute of the Governor of Bombay (Lord Clare) who observed that undoubtedly, if merely the protection of British commerce was required in Turkish Arabia, a Native Agent at Basrah would answer as well as a European Political Agent; but that he was of opinion that interests purely Indian were more deeply concerned, and that looking to the connection between European and Indian politics it appeared very doubtful to him whether it would be advisable, at all events for the present, to abolish the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia.

† See also pages 220 and 265.

Basrah to Baghdād, the station at the former place was left in full charge of the Native Agent there.

* Introduction of steam navigation on the Euphrates and Tigris by a British expedition under Colonel F. R. Chesney, 1834-37.

The question of accelerating communication with India had now for several years been under consideration at home, and between 1826 and 1832 valuable surveys of part of the Syrian coast and of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris were made by Lieutenant Ormsby of the Indian Navy, assisted during part of the time by Mr. W. Elliot. Especial attention was directed to the Lower Tigris, which Major Taylor, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, considered to be important.

Captain F. R. Chesney, R.A., had also commenced a study of the problem of overland communication in 1829, during a visit to Egypt, when some enquiries as to the relative advantages of the Egyptian and Syrian routes between Europe and India were addressed to him by the Examiner of the India House. In 1831-32 Captain Chesney travelled extensively in the region between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, making his outward journey down the Euphrates and by sea to Būshehr, and returning to Europe by the Kārūn river and a route through Persia and Asia Minor. In 1833 Captain Chesney, who had now worked out a scheme for establishing communication with India by way of Turkish 'Irāq, had the honour of an interview with His Majesty King William IV; and the King, who was much interested in his project, encouraged him to persevere and suggested the creation of a steam flotilla to form part of the Indian Navy and be stationed in Mesopotamian waters for the purpose of strengthening Turkey and Persia against the advance of Russia. Important evidence was given by Captain Chesney in 1834 before a "Steam Committee" of the House of Commons; and that body, in their report, recommended the grant of £20,000 for an experiment in communication by the Euphrates route. The sum in question having been duly allotted, and £5,000 having been added to it by the East India Company, an expedition was organised by Captain Chesney, who, under a royal commission dated 28th

*The principal authorities on the Euphrates and Tigris expedition are General F. R. Chesney's *Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris*, 1850; his *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition*, 1868; Mr. W. F. Ainsworth's *Personal Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition*; and the *Travels of Doctor and Madame Helfer*, 1878. Condensed accounts of the expedition are given in Lieutenant C. R. Low's *History of the India Navy*, 1877, Volume II, pages 31-43, and Mr. H. V. Hilprecht's *Explorations in Bible Lands during the 19th Century*, 1903. The earlier proceedings of Lieutenant Ormsby are noticed in Lieutenant J. R. Wellsted's *Travels to the City of the Caliphs*, 1840.

November 1834 was appointed, with the rank of Colonel, to the direction and command of the same.

On the 29th of December following, a Farmān, authorising two British steamers "to navigate the Euphrates by turns" "for the purpose of facilitating commerce," as long as their doing so should be advantageous to both Turkey and Britain, was issued by the Turkish Government. Colonel Chesney was required by the terms of his commission to cultivate good relations with all the representatives and subjects of the Porte with whom he might be brought in contact; and the local Turkish authorities, on their part, were instructed to afford every kind of assistance in their power to the members of the British expedition. It was expected that 'Ali Riza Pāsha, the ruler of Baghdād, would co-operate willingly with the enterprise, for he had himself in 1833 recommended to the Porte the introduction of steam navigation on the Euphrates. He did in fact issue stringent orders in February 1835 to his subordinates on the Euphrates, directing them to protect, defend, assist, and serve the members of the expedition.

Navigation
Farmān of
1834.

Colonel Chesney left England in February 1835, accompanied by the greater part of his staff except Lieutenant H. B. Lynch of the Indian Navy, his principal assistant, who had preceded the expedition in order to make necessary local arrangements. Syria was at this time in the possession of Muhammad 'Ali Pāsha of Egypt, and his son Ibrāhīm Pasha was at first inclined to deny the expedition access to the interior; but, this difficulty and others of a physical nature having been overcome, the "Euphrates" and "Tigris," two river steamers specially constructed at Liverpool, were conveyed * in pieces across the desert to "Port William," a point on the bank of the Upper Euphrates about 2½ miles below Birejik.

Preliminary
operations,
1835-36.

On the 26th September 1835 the "Euphrates," of 50 horse-power, was launched sidelong into the river from which she took her name, the height of the banks at the slip being no less than 25 feet; and in the course of the following spring the "Tigris," of 20, horse power, was successfully finished and floated. In April 1836 the two steamers commenced their passage down stream in company, the officers of the party being

*The transporting of the larger parts of the steamers from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates was a work of great labour. The boiler of the "Tigris" was hauled, on its journey, by 104 oxen under the charge of 52 native drivers.

distributed between the two vessels as below :—

<i>Euphrates."</i>	<i>"Tigris."</i>
Captain Eastcourt. 43rd Regiment of Light Infantry, in command.	Lieutenant H. B. Lynch, I. N., in command.
Lieutenant R. F. Cleaveland, R.N.	Mr. H. Eden, R.N.
Lieutenant H. F. Murphy, R.E.	Lieutenant R. Cockburn, R.A.
Mr. E. P. Charlewood, R.N.	Dr. Staunton, R.A.
Mr. J. Fitzjames, R. N.	Dr. A. Staunton.
Mr. W. Ainsworth.	Messrs. W. Elliot and J. Sader, interpreters.
Mr. T. Hurst, Engineer.	Mr. A. Clegg, Engineer.
Dr. and Mrs. Helfer, two Austrian travellers, passengers.	Lieutenant R. B. Lynch, 21st Bengal Native Infantry, brother of Lieutenant H. B. Lynch, passenger.

The European seamen and soldier artificers, as also the native employés, were equally divided between the two vessels.

Shortly after starting Colonel Chesney received orders from Sir J. Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control, recalling the expedition; but these he resolved to disregard.

Loss of the
"Tigris,"
May 1836.

All went well until the 21st May 1836, by which time over 500 miles of river had been successfully surveyed. On the afternoon of that fatal day, at a place not far from 'Ānah, the "Tigris" was swamped by a violent squall from the west-south-west and went down amidst darkness, caused by flying sand, almost as deep as that of night. Lieutenants Cockburn and R. B. Lynch, 13 other Europeans, and 5 natives perished in the catastrophe; and Colonel Chesney, who was on board, and the rest of the officers and crew only escaped by throwing themselves overboard. The "Euphrates", which succeeded in making fast to the bank and in keeping her berth there during the storm by means of two hawsers relieved by her engines working at full speed, suffered no injury. The whole of the cash carried by the expedition and a large part of the instruments and stores were lost with the "Tigris" and the position of the wreck could not immediately be located. From time to time afterwards efforts were made to raise the sunken vessel, but ten years later it still remained *in situ*.

Proceedings
of the expedi-
tion, 1836.

After the loss of the "Tigris" the surviving officers and men belonging to her were sent home to England, while the remainder of the expedition continued the survey of the Euphrates in the other vessel, and finished it to Qūnah on the 18th June 1836. On the following day Basrah was reached; and thence the "Euphrates" proceeded under her own steam to Būslehr to refit. There the places of her European

complement, who were now entitled to and claimed their discharge, were filled by volunteers from vessels of the East India Company. On the 25th July the "Euphrates" left Būshehr in tow of the "Elphinstone" for the Shatt-al-'Arab; and she steamed up that river to Kūt-al Farangi, at this time the site of the Basrah Political Agency, where Lieutenant Murphy, a member of the expedition, had recently died after a severe illness. With Colonel Chesney on board she then ascended the Tigris to Baghdād, arriving there on the 30th August 1836, and left again for Muhammareh on the 5th September. From Muhammareh she proceeded up the Shatt-al-'Arab and Euphrates as far as Lāmlūm, carrying an Indian overland mail for Europe. After this, a serious break-down having occurred in her machinery, she returned with the current to Muhammareh where the necessary repairs were executed with the help of the Indian Government vessel "Hugh Lindsay."

Notice was now received by Colonel Chesney that funds for continuing the expedition would cease to be available at the end of January 1837, and he accordingly made over the command to Major Estcourt and proceeded to Bombay, arriving there on the 1st December. During his absence in India Major Estcourt carried the "Euphrates" up the Kārūn River as far as Ahwāz, where further progress was barred by the rapids, and then revisited Baghdād and ascended the Tigris to a point 20 miles above it, but an accident to the vessel's rudder compelled him to return. It had now been arranged that the "Euphrates" should be transferred by His Majesty's Government to the East India Company, on payment by the latter of her value as assessed by a committee after a survey, and she was accordingly placed in charge of a British merchant at Baghdād. Most of her officers and men, the expedition under the orders of the British Government being now at an end, were dispersed and returned to their duties at home or in India. Colonel Chesney himself left Bombay, charged with important despatches for the Board of Control on the 28th April 1837; and on the 8th August he reached London, having travelled home from Basrah by way of Zubair and the desert. In March 1838 the "Euphrates," under Commander Hawkins, ascended the river of the same name as far as Hit, but had great difficulty in passing the marshes in its lower course.

Close of the expedition, 1837.

Although the experiment in overland communication by the Euphrates route was now discontinued, the idea of ultimately transmitting the Indo-European mails by way of Mesopotamia was still entertained. Lieutenant H. B. Lynch, whom the Secret Committee of the East India Company's Court in April 1837 appointed to the com-

Continuation of the river survey in Turkish 'Irāq by Commander H. B. Lynch, 1837-39.

mand of the "Euphrates" and of such other vessels as might subsequently be placed on the rivers of Turkish 'Irāq, was directed to "enter into friendly communications with the tribes frequenting the rivers of Mesopotamia and endeavour to establish with them such relations as may be serviceable to the interests of Great Britain, and may add to the facilities for a speedy and regular transmission of mails between the Persian Gulf and the coast of Syria," and he was also to complete the surveys of the "Euphrates" and the "Tigris," making in addition such astronomical, geographical and statistical observations as the more direct objects of his employment should permit. His political functions he was to fulfil in concert with, and under the guidance of, Colonel Taylor, the Resident. The above were his principal duties, but he was instructed besides to wind up the affairs of the late expedition in regard to depôts of stores and the wreck of the "Tigris," scrupulously observing any arrangements in respect of these which might have been already formed with the Arab tribes or the local authorities. In the two years following his appointment Lieutenant Lynch ascended the "Tigris" with his vessel to Kūt 'Abdullah above Baghdād, and also took her through the Saqlā-wiyah canal, then joining the "Tigris" and the "Euphrates" near Baghdād. He further completed a map of the course of the "Tigris" from Mūsāl down to Ctesiphon (Tāq Kisra) below Baghdād, and connected Niniveh, Baghdād, Babylon and Ctesiphon by triangulation.

The British
Desert Mail
and Dromedary Post,
1807—39.

The old British Desert Mail between Aleppo and Basrah, which had been found so valuable for official communication between Europe and India during the Napoleonic period, was abolished in 1833.

In 1836, however, in connection with the Chesney Expedition, a new Dromedary Post between Bairūt on the Syrian coast, and Hit on the Euphrates, passing *viā* Damascas, was organised under the superintendence of the British Consul-General in Syria. This line was continued to Basrah in the form of a Horse Post by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq under the orders from Government of Bombay; and in 1837 it was directed, though the Red Sea "Overland" route to Europe had just been officially adopted, that duplicates of all important despatches passing between England and India or *vice versa* should be sent by the Bairūt-Basrah line. Bairut, it may be mentioned, was already like Alexandria in regular steam communication with Europe. The cost of maintaining the Bairut-Basrah Post from February 1838 to April 1843 amounted to nearly Rs. 90,000.

Trade in Turkish Irāq, 1807-39.

The private trade of the East India Company's servants in Turkish 'Irāq as well as that of the Company themselves having ceased during this period, and there being at this time no very large or important trade carried on by ordinary British subjects, commercial topics no longer occupy a prominent place in official correspondence.

At the end of 1809 a table was compiled by Mr. Manesty, British Resident at Basrah, showing the duties levied by the Turkish authorities on the goods of "native merchants," by which terms probably Ottoman subjects and not Asiatic British subjects were meant, for the rates, as will be observed, were far in excess of those authorised by the Capitulations in the case of "the English merchants and all under their banner." The import duties collected at Basrah ranged from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and at Baghdād from 3 to $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*, and the export duties at Basrah were uniformly 14 per cent. In the case of goods taxed at Basrah, an additional charge per packet was made if they were afterwards forwarded to Baghdād. The most moderate duties were those on "Guzerat, Leree, Teffereck and Germasoot goods," the tariff on which had been lowered to discourage smuggling; but the best pieces of these were often appropriated by the Customs Masters at valuations of their own. Among the articles paying the heaviest duties were sandal-wood, black-wood, iron, tin, lead, sugar, sugarcandy, coffee, spices, sticklac and other "gruff" articles, also cotton yarn of a kind known as "Shagyree"; and the next most severely taxed were Bengal goods of all descriptions, Sūrat, Gujarat and Sind piece-goods of various kinds, and Cambay goods. Additional duties appear to have been levied on the arrival of merchandise at Aleppo, and again at Constantinople.

Duties levied
on the goods
of native
merchants,
1809,

'ABDUL MAJID, 1839—61.*

Mahmūd II, whose chief characteristics as a ruler were fortitude in adversity and perseverance, was succeeded by his son 'Abdul Majīd, a

* The principal authorities for local affairs during this period are the *Précis containing Information in regard to the first Connection of the Hon'ble East India Company with Turkish Arabia*, 1874, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish*

lad of sixteen, but of good natural ability and carefully educated for the throne. The Sultān 'Abdul Majīd grew up † “a kind-hearted, well-intentioned man, but constitutionally weak and feeble. His appearance agreed “with his character. He was small in stature, and pale, and sat with “downcast eyes.”

The first task which confronted the young ruler was that of reducing to obedience his rebellious governor of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha; but a combination of European powers, comprising Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, took this duty out of his hands and discharged it more effectually than he could have done. France secretly sympathised with Muhammad 'Ali, favoured by whom she hoped ultimately to establish her own predominance in the Mediterranean. She desired to maintain him in possession of Syria; and she resented as a “mortal affront” to herself the decision of the other concerted powers, reached in July 1840, to present Muhammad 'Ali with an ultimatum requiring his submission to the Porte.

The British, Russian and Austrian fleets appeared in August off the Syrian coast; Bairūt was bombarded; Acre surrendered; and the Egyptian army of occupation was dislodged from Syria by a rising of the inhabitants of the country. A naval demonstration against Alexandria followed and Muhammad 'Ali submitted, after which, by a Farman dated 13th February 1841, the Sultān, acting on the advice of the powers, conferred the Pāshāliq of Egypt on him and his descendants as a hereditary possession, to be held by them on conditions consistent with the dignity and suzerainty of the Turkey. On the 13th July of the same year a Convention was signed at London by representatives of the five powers, whereby it was settled that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be closed, so long as the Porte was at peace, to foreign men of war.

Arabian Affairs, 1801—1905, printed in 1905. To these may be added *Bombay Selection No. XLIII, Turkish Arabia, etc., 1857*, and several works by travellers (some of which will be quoted in footnotes) casting light upon particular points, such as Layard's *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia*, 1887, *Nineveh and its Remains*, and *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon*, 1853; Loftus's *Travels and Researches in Chaldaea and Susiana*, 1857; and Mitford's *Land March from India to Ceylon*, 1884. With reference to the question of the Turko-Persian frontier the most valuable source is *Extracts from Correspondence relative to the Turko-Persian Boundary Negotiations*, in three parts, printed for the Foreign Office in 1912; but the Hon'ble R. Curzon's *Armenia*, 1854, supplies some additional facts. Low's *History of the Indian Navy* is of service in connection with the Mesopotamian surveys, navigation of the Tigris, etc.

† Layard's *Early Adventures*, Vol. II, page 452.

Before these events, on the 15th November 1839, certain administrative regulations, known as the *Tanzimât*, had been promulgated in Turkey in the Sultân's name. They were of great significance in the internal history of the Turkish Empire, for, although in the dominant Muhammadan elements of the Turkish Empire they excited either ridicule or dismay, they placed the rights of the "subject nationalities," in other words of the different Christian races under the Sultân's rule, upon a recognised basis. The import of the *Tanzimât* was, however, general; they not only proclaimed the equality of Ottoman subjects without regard to creed or race, but they decreed the abolition of arbitrary executive power everywhere and the establishment of principle and method in the civil administration. The Government of the Empire had, it will be remembered, been centralised in a high degree at Constantinople since 1834.

The rupture with Russia which caused the Crimean War was the only serious breach with a foreign power that occurred during the reign of 'Abdul Majîd. By acting jointly with other powers in the Egyptian question in 1841 Russia forfeited the predominance in Turkish politics which she had enjoyed under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; and it was probably dissatisfaction with the situation at Constantinople, thus altered, which caused the Emperor Nicholas to revert to earlier schemes of his for a dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. In 1844, while on a visit in England, the Tsar proposed a partition of Turkey; but the only result of his overtures, which were declined by the British Government, was to inspire British statesmen with distrust of Russian intentions. At St. Petersburg, in January 1853, the Tsar renewed his proposals; and it was on this occasion that he made use, in conversation with the British Ambassador, of the term "Sick Man" which has since been so frequently applied to the Sultân and to Turkey. At this juncture Napoleon III demanded of the Porte, in the interests of the Latin Church, redress of certain encroachments said to have been made by the Orthodox Church on rights and privileges at the Holy Places in Palestine. The Emperor Nicholas, in opposition to this demand, required that the *status quo* at the Holy Places should be maintained unaltered, and insisted in addition that all Orthodox Christians in Turkey should be recognised as under Russian protection. The question of the Holy Places was capable of adjustment; but, in regard to the second demand of the Tsar, compromise was found impossible. A Russian ultimatum, presented on the 5th May 1853, having been rejected by Turkey with the approval of Britain and France Russian troops entered the Danubian Principalities. In October 1853 Turkey declared war against Russia; and on the 27th March 1854, after

further complications, Britain and France followed suit. The war in the Crimea resulted, which ended with the Treaty of Paris, signed on the 30th March 1856 by representatives of Britain, France, Turkey, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sardinia. The Treaty contained an article, directed against interference by the European signatories in the internal affairs of Turkey or between the Sultān and his subjects, which clearly signified the failure of the Russian claim to extend protection to all Orthodox Christians in Turkey. The Convention of London of 1841 was renewed with certain slight additions. By other important articles of the Treaty Turkey was made a member of the European concert and admitted to the benefits of European international law, and the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were guaranteed. The Black Sea was neutralised and thrown open to the merchant flag of all nations, while at the same time the possession of war vessels in its waters and even of arsenals on its shores by any power, even Russia or Turkey, was interdicted.

The effect of the *Tanzīmāt* was not, unfortunately, so immediate or so great as had been anticipated in the first flush of European satisfaction at the supposed regeneration of Turkey. Instances were not wanting, from time to time, of outrages against Christians in the Turkish Empire. In 1858 a fanatical outbreak occurred at Jiddah; and in 1860 there were massacres of Christians in Syria, leading in the first instance to a temporary French occupation of that province, and ultimately to the grant of that exceptional form of government which the Lebanon still enjoys.

Internal History of Turkish 'Irāq, 1839—61.

In Turkish 'Irāq the period was chiefly remarkable for the persevering efforts of the local Turkish authorities to enforce greater and more general respect for the Government on the part of the indigenous population, not excluding the Arab tribes, and to improve the provincial finances—or perhaps only to line their own pockets more handsomely—by a stricter collection of the revenue. This coercive policy was in part successful, for more than one sanctuary of violence and crime was brought under control; but it provoked incessant disorder everywhere, and it seems on the whole, accompanied as it was by a total neglect of economic and commercial considerations, to have tended rather to the ruin than to the betterment of the country.

The town of Karbala was in 1842, and had then been for some twenty years, a self-governing semi-alien republic, exempt, but for the payment of an uncertain tribute,¹ from the authority of the representatives of the Porte. Three-fourths of the inhabitants were Persians or of Persian extraction. The recent history of the place was not to its credit as a Turkish town. Two or three Governors appointed by the Pāshas of Baghdād had been murdered at their post. In 1831, or earlier, an attempt was made by Dāwud Pāsha to enforce his authority over Karbala; but it ended, after an eleven months' siege of the town, in a mere promise by the inhabitants to pay annual revenue. 'Ali Rīza Pāsha, the immediate successor of Dāwud Pāsha, was denied entrance into Karbala, even as a pilgrim; and, after obtaining a money payment and the acceptance as titular governor of his nominee Saiyid Wahhāb, a Karbalāi of good family, he seems to have acquiesced in its virtual independence.

Rebellion at Karbala, suppression of the same, and general massacre,* 1842—1843.

In the interior of the town an extraordinary state of affairs prevailed. The government was really in the hands of some two or three thousand †Yārāmāz or "good-for-nothings" as they were called, recruited from among the criminals and broken men of all Turkish 'Irāq and Persia, who subsisted upon the other inhabitants and upon pilgrims. The Yārāmāz, who always went armed, followed different self-constituted chiefs: much the most powerful of these in 1843 was Saiyid Ibrāhīm, Za'frānī, a Perso-Arab; and next to him were Mirza Salih and Muhammad 'Ali Khān, whose partisans were mostly Persians. Among the Yārāmāz themselves quarrels and bloodshed were rife; the respectable public lived in terror of them; and no resident or pilgrim was safe from violence until he had placed himself under the protection of one of their factions, — a protection which, needless to say, was not extended to him gratuitously. Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, described the situation as follows:—

The power of government was in the hands of a constantly renewed band of malefactors, ruined outlaws and dishonest runaways from every corner and tribe of the Pachalic; even the Turkish soldiers and lower employes flying from the fear of merited punishment, debtors from their creditors, public delinquents from the just severity of the law, were all welcomed, protected, employed in arms, and denied to all the reclamations of the Turks.

* This massacre is remembered at Karbala by Persians as the "Ghārātī" or "Plundering," by Arabs as the "Daggah" or "Stroke." The Muhammadan year was 1258, and the phrase "Ghadīr Dam" (—pool of blood), of which the letters yield that numerical value, is also used to denote it.

† Yārāmāz is a Turkish word meaning "it is worthless." Though a verbal form it is used also as an adjective meaning "evil" (man), "naughty" (child), etc.

The Mujtahids or most eminent theological doctors of the Shi'ahs, a class whose authority was at that day very great wherever they were found, were obliged at Karbala, though it was one of the two principal seats of Shi'ah learning, to play a part subordinate to the Yārāmāz in local politics. Of their number the two most distinguished were *Saiyid Kāzim, Rashti, and Saiyid Ibrāhim, Qazvīni, between whom there was bitter opposition and jealousy. Each of them enjoyed the support of a body of Yārāmāz, the Rashti relying on Saiyid Ibrāhim, Za'frāni, and the Qazvīni on Mīrza Sālih. The titular Governor, Saiyid Wahhāb, trimmed as best he could between his more distant master the Pāsha and his nearer masters the Yārāmāz, inclining to an alliance with Saiyid Ibrāhim, among the latter, against the Persian factions of Mīrza Sālih and Muhammad 'Alī Khān.

Such was the constitution of the Karbaline Alsatia when, in the summer of 1842, a new provincial ruler was appointed to Baghdād in the person of Najib Pāsha. The new Pāsha was of sterner stuff than his immediate predecessor; and, about two months after he had assumed the Government, the failure of the people of Karbala to furnish him with supplies and their refusal to allow him to enter the town, even in the character of a pilgrim, if accompanied by more than four or five attendants, provoked him to insist on the reception by them of a Turkish military garrison within their walls. This was about the end of October 1842. Najib Pāsha was at the time encamped at Musaiyib with Sa'dullah Pāsha, the Army Commandant, who was engaged with his troops upon drainage works intended to make more accessible the watery fastnesses of the rebellious Ma'dān tribes,—a fact which shows that Ottoman authority was in abeyance in the neighbouring districts as well as in the town of Karbala itself. Negotiations followed, and the Pāsha was visited in his camp by a deputation consisting of the Mujtahid Saiyid Kāzim, the titular Governor Saiyid Wahhāb, the Zill-us-Sultān (a son of the late Shāh of Persia, then living as a refugee at Karbala), and others. At their request the Pāsha sent a Baghdādi named Hāji 'Abdur Rahmān to Karbala to mediate between him and the rebels; and the chiefs of the latter as well as the principal inhabitants, at first undertook in writing to admit 500 soldiers into the town; but the agreement was torn up almost as soon as signed. Meanwhile the chiefs of the Yārāmāz, who were the most strenuous advocates of resistance, as the Mujtahid Saiyid Kāzim and the Zill-us-Sultān were of submission, made active preparations for

* This Saiyid Kāzim was the founder of the Shaikhi sect, which still exists. Muhammad 'Aī, the founder of Bābi-ism studied under him at Karbala. His grandson, Saiyid Qāsim, Rashti, lives at Karbala and owns much property there.

defending the town. Guns were mounted on the walls, and armed Arabs were brought in from the surrounding country.

Seeing that the rebels were not inclined to submit and that they were only utilising the delay to strengthen their position, Najib Pāsha obtained reinforcements from Baghdād and ordered the Army Commandant to advance to Karbala with one regiment of cavalry, twenty guns, and three regiments of infantry. Sa'dullah Pāsha, with these troops and some friendly Arabs, arrived before the place on the 19th December 1842. He pitched his camp on the south-east side of the town outside the date plantations by which it is surrounded, and was fired on from these, but did not reply. The Muġtahid Saiyid Kāzim and the Zill-us-Sultān then visited the Commandant in his camp and proposed that the families of the Yārāmāz chiefs Saiyid Ibrāhīm and Mīrza Sālīh should be delivered up to him as hostages; that the Commandant should then withdraw to Musaiyib with the bulk of his force, leaving 500 men behind outside Karbala; that this small force, on the arrival of the main body at Musaiyib, should be admitted into Karbala, while the Yārāmāz with their dependents were allowed to quit the town unmolested; and that, when the evacuation by the Yārāmāz was complete, the troops at Musaiyib should be at liberty to return to Karbala. Sa'dullah Pāsha seems to have accepted these conditions and to have sent to Najib Pāsha at Musaiyib informing him of what had been done, whereupon the people of Karbala ventured forth from the town and the imported Arabs proceeded to amuse themselves outside the walls in their usual fashion, with Hōsah dances and firing of guns. On the next day it would seem, being the 21st or 22nd of December, the Zill-us-Sultān went to the Turkish camp with the family of Saiyid Ibrāhīm, Za'frānī, and with Mīrza Sālīh in person. The party were well received by the Turkish Commandant; but presently Sulaimān Mīrza, another Persian refugee prince, arrived from Musaiyib with the news that Najib Pāsha refused to sanction the retirement of any part of the Turkish force from before Karbala. Next morning the Commandant found that Mīrza Sālīh had escaped to the town, that others of the required hostages were wanting, and that some of those delivered up to him were not the persons that they had been represented to be. He accordingly sent Ibrāhīm Āgha, an artillery officer, to Karbala to find out what was going on there. Crowds of townsmen and Arabs poured out of the date gardens as this emissary passed, asking him for news, and followed him to the town gate. While he was still at the gate an alarm was raised by watchers on the town wall, and it was said that the Turkish troops were advancing. In reality the Commandant was only improving the dispositions of his camp; but the rebels rushed out in large number

and attacked him. Ibrāhīm Āgha was hustled into the town, where he found safety with the Muġtahid Saiyid Kāzim. The engagement, unpremeditated on both sides, resulted in favour of the Arabs and townspeople. They captured the Turkish guns, but without the limbers, and carried some of them off in triumph, throwing the rest into a ditch from which the troops recovered them in the course of the following night. The fighting lasted till sunset, and there were a number of casualties on both sides. Sa'dullah Pāsha in consequence of this affair behaved with great rudeness to the Zill-us-Sultān, who was still in his camp, and sent him and the hostages to Najib Pāsha at Musaiyib, whence they were transferred to Baghdād.

After this the attack and the defence of Karbala were regularly organised; there was daily skirmishing in the date gardens, and both sides brought their artillery into action. The fire of the Turkish guns was high and did little damage to the town, being as yet intended, perhaps, only to intimidate and annoy. Negotiations were at no time suspended. On the 1st January 1843, the Persian Consul from Baghdād arrived at Musaiyib with the Muġtahid Saiyid Ibrāhīm, the rival of the Muġtahid Saiyid Kāzim; and Najib Pāsha was persuaded by them to promise not only that the town should be spared, if it were surrendered, but that the Yārāmāz even, should be allowed to leave it in safety by the gates on the side furthest from the Turkish camp. The rebels, however, emboldened by a false rumour that a Persian army was marching to their relief, made answer to these proposals that, at the most, they would let 200 men enter the town and a few more occupy one of the gates. This reply made Najib Pāsha furious; and, after a sojourn of four or five days only in the Pāsha's camp, the Persian Consul and the Qazvini Muġtahid returned to Baghdād. An unfortunate omission on the part of the former functionary was that he took no effectual measures to convince his nationals in the town of the firmness of Najib Pāsha's determination to make himself master of Karbala; but so great was the confidence of the defenders in themselves at this time, and so strong their disbelief in the seriousness of the Turks' intentions, that a message from the Persian Consul, if he had succeeded in sending one, would probably have been disregarded.

The Army Commandant had now begun to advance towards the town, --a movement which entailed on his men severe fighting in the date plantations as well as heavy labour in clearing an avenue of approach by cutting down palm trees. Possession of the tomb of Ibn Hamzah was wrested from the Yārāmāz, not without difficulty, and a battery of four

guns planted there at about 350 yards from the town wall. Inside the town anti-Sunni feeling ran high; the Mullas proclaimed the war to be one of religion; and gross abuse of the Sultān and his army was incessantly launched from the battlements at the besieging force. To meet a scarcity of shot and ball a brass railing was aken from the shrine of 'Abbās and melted down; and even holy men took their share, after the Turkish attack began in earnest, in repairing damage to the walls.

In the end the critical position in which his own force found itself obliged the Turkish Commandant to resolve, after holding a council of war, upon sharp and decisive action. Half rations and exposure to cold and damp had dispirited his troops, and desertion was rife. On the 11th January, the Turkish* guns began to play upon a portion of the town wall about 60 yards from the Najaf Gate, and by the next day a practicable breach had been effected. An Arab named 'Alwān was then despatched to the town, under a flag of truce, to summon it to surrender. Terms of capitulation had been all but arranged with him when the Yārāmāz chief Mīrza Salih, drawing his sword and dashing his turban on the ground, cried out that it was too late to recede. The general opinion veered round to the Mīrza's side; the messenger returned to the Turkish camp; and artillery fire was re-opened and continued until sunset, by which time the width of the breach was about 50 yards.

Even yet the Karbala rebels did not realise their danger, and, when on the morning of the 13th January before daylight the Turks reconnoitred the breach, the guard on it were found partly absent and partly asleep round a fire at the foot of the wall. Before the storming party reached the spot, however, a certain number of defenders had collected there and day had dawned. The breach was carried with the loss of about 50 men, and the Najaf Gate was then thrown open from within to admit the Turkish main body. The troops when mustered inside were divided into three columns, one of which was ordered to advance through the middle of the town, while the other two were to follow the inner side of the town wall in opposite directions until they met, seizing the various gates as they passed them. One of these two columns, on arriving at the Khaimahgāh Gate, found a crowd of Arabs, Yārāmāz, and ordinary citizens of every sort collected there, unable to escape because the gate was shut. Some of the Arabs in the crowd fired; the soldiers replied, with fatal effect; and a stampede followed in which numbers of men, women, and children were knocked down and trodden to death. The crowd then retreated,

* The damage done to the date plantations by artillery fire was still conspicuous in 1849. See Loftus's *Travels*, page 65.

followed by the troops, to the Hor Gate. As they reached it, the other wall column came up from the opposite direction ; shooting between the Arabs and the soldiers began again ; and, the Hor Gate being open to the extent of nine feet only, a frantic crush ensued in which women and children suffered terribly. At length the crowd broke up. Most of the people fled for refuge to the shrines or to the houses of distinguished citizens ; but some threw themselves over the town walls. In the meantime the column advancing through the middle of the town had arrived, in following up some Arabs, at the shrine of 'Abbās. The gate of the shrine was closed, and, as the troops halted before it, a fire was opened on them from a neighbouring house killing several ; they forced the gate and were again fired at by Arabs and Yārāmāz inside, and from the minarets. Exasperated beyond endurance the soldiers then fell without discrimination of sex or age, of combatant or non-combatant, upon a dense crowd of refugees which filled the courtyard. They pursued their victims even to the innermost part of the sanctuary, where a few were murdered clinging to the silver railings of the tomb of 'Abbās, and two—it was said—upon the actual tomb itself, so that its draperies were soaked with their blood. From this moment onwards discipline was at an end ; the officers, unable to control their men, repaired to the Commandant ; and the soldiers scattered themselves through the town, entering and robbing private houses and their occupants, often in the most inhuman manner, and slaying such few persons as were still abroad in the streets. The wife of a refugee Persian prince was wounded severely, and another member of the Persian royal family slightly ; but the victims mostly belonged to the poorer classes. At length the Commandant, mounting his horse, proceeded to the shrine of Husain. Here he was just in time to prevent a repetition of the horrors that had taken place at the shrine of 'Abbās ; and he emphasised his order to desist from slaughter by killing two or three soldiers with his own hand. An effort was also made to collect, for restoration to the owners, some of the booty that the soldiers had taken ; but it was ineffectual. It was not until nearly sunset that disorder ceased and that the troops, " worn out with fatigue and satiated with plunder, became obedient to their officers and returned to camp." The subsequent conduct of the Turkish military authorities " was very unbecoming, allowing the troops to turn the Court of the * Mosque into a barrack-yard ; horses and mules were picketed in various parts, the soldiers playing native music and singing loose songs to the horror of the Sheeahs."

* i.e., of the shrine of 'Abbās.

The general result of the operations was that the town of Karbala was brought thoroughly under Turkish control. The Yārāmāz chiefs Mīrza Sālīh and Muḥammad 'Alī Khān were captured, and the Yārāmāz leader Saiyid Ibrāhīm, Za'frānī, gave himself up, as did also the titular Governor Saiyid Wahhāb : all of these were pardoned.* A few days after the capture of the place Najib Pāsha was able to enter Karbala, where, in true Turkish fashion, he took from the inhabitants a sealed declaration to the effect that the loss of life had been trifling. From Karbala he moved on to Najaf, another religious, recalcitrant, and largely Persian town ; but there, naturally, no resistance was offered to him and his authority was established without any sort of difficulty.

Very exaggerated reports of the Karbala affair were current at first. It seems even to have been stated that 30,000 persons, most of them Persians, had perished, and that the whole town had been sacked and destroyed. In parts of Persia the population were excited to frenzy by these and similar rumours ; and a rupture of Turko-Persian frontier negotiations then going on at Erzeroum, or even a war between Turkey and Persia, appeared not impossible. In these circumstances the British Ambassador at Constantinople deputed Lieutenant-Colonel F. Farrant, attached to the British Mission in Persia, whose services had been placed at his disposal by the British Minister at Tehrān and whom it had previously been intended to employ at Erzeroum, to investigate the facts upon the spot. Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, had taken the extraordinary step of writing to congratulate the Pāsha on the success of his operations against Karbala and had omitted to inform the Ambassador of his having done so. Apparently for this reason Sir Stratford Canning considered the appointment of a Special Commissioner necessary ; and he directed Colonel Farrant "to remain at Baghdād "during the progress of the negotiations at Erzeroum and to retain in his "own hands the management of affairs relating to the frontier disputes "between the Governments of Persia and Turkey." The Russian Envoy at Constantinople, M. de Bouteneff, officially requested that Colonel Farrant should act on his behalf also ; and that officer consequently represented, in his proceedings, the Russian as well as the British Government. The Porte consented, somewhat reluctantly, to send an Ottoman Commissioner to hold an enquiry on the spot ; and their choice, which in the opinion of the British Ambassador could hardly have been more judicious, fell on †Nāmiq Pāsha.

Responsibility of the Turkish authorities and international enquiry, 1843.

* Some of them were pardoned at the intercession of Colonel Farrant, the British Special Commissioner, mentioned in the next paragraph.

† Probably the Nāmiq Pāsha mentioned by Layard in his *Early Adventures*, vol. II, pages 385—386.

Colonel Farrant's report, from which most of the detailed information given above is taken, was signed at Baghdād on the 15th May 1843. He believed that not more than 5,000 persons had been killed, of whom about 3,000 met their death inside the town, and that many of these last were Arabs. He seems to have had doubts whether even the reduced figures which he mentioned might not themselves be exaggerated, for he remarked that it was difficult to find a Persian in Karbala who could say that a relation or friend of his, or even a person whom he knew by sight, had been killed—yet the proportion of Persians among the slain was undoubtedly considerable. Thousands of Persians had fortunately escaped from danger by leaving the town before, perhaps even during, the operations against it; but the poor were unable to remove, and eventually carriage became unprocurable even by the rich. No British subjects lost their lives in the affair; but three Lucknowis from Oudh, then an independent Indian Kingdom, were killed at the shrine of 'Abbās. Some twenty or thirty natives of the Panjāb and Kashmīr, at that time not British possessions, were missing, and their fate remained unascertained. The deaths of Russian subjects, said to be numerous, could not be verified except in one single case.

Dr. Ross, the British Agency Surgeon at Baghdād, visited Karbala soon after the massacre, but unofficially, to attend to the injuries of some Persians with whom he was privately acquainted.

The Turkish Commissioner, Nāmiq Pāsha, estimated the casualties on the rebel and popular side at only 150 Persians and rather more than 200 others. The total losses of the Turks were about 400 killed and 200 wounded, from which it is evident that they must have met with strong resistance. Colonel Farrant was surprised to find the town and its shrines very little damaged, and he discredited the assertion that wholesale violation of women had taken place. The losses of property belonging to the shrines were insignificant, and the large claims raised by private individuals could not be verified.

In Colonel Farrant's opinion, it would seem, Najib Pāsha could hardly be held accountable for the disaster. From the first he had made no secret of his determination to reduce the place; on the 18th November 1842 he had informed the Persian Consul and the British and French Consuls-General at Baghdād in writing of his intentions; he had prevented some Persian pilgrims from proceeding to the threatened town; he had negotiated constantly with the rebels so long as there was any prospect of a peaceful settlement; he had continued the negotiations even

after a successful sortie by the garrison ; and, finally, he was not personally present at the spot. The conduct of Sa'dullah Pasha, the Turkish Army Commandant, was more open to criticism. Before the assault he proclaimed that 100 piastres should be given for every Yārāmāz head,—a thoughtless order which led to the cruel decapitation by soldiers of a number of innocent persons ; and he did not, apparently, stir from a position that he had taken up on the wall near the Najaf Gate until about two hours after the slaughter had begun. But the catastrophe was really due to the obstinacy and dissensions of the Yārāmāz chiefs and of the general population, which prevented the surrender of the town, and to the inability to control their men after they had entered the town of the Turkish officers, one of whom, Tāhir Bey, the leader of the storming party, seems actually to have told those under his command that once inside the breach they might do as they pleased. It is also possible that, if the Persian Consul from Baghdād had shown more energy, by going to Karbala himself and persuading Persian subjects to leave, there might have been less loss of life. The absence of any public communication from him and his return from Musaiyib to Baghdād seem to have imbued many Persians of Karbala with a false sense of security.

The final opinion of the British Ambassador at Constantinople on the Karbala affair, expressed by him in September 1843 after receiving Colonel Farrant's report, was as follows : “ Although the inhuman “ outrages perpetrated by the Turkish troops at the time of the assault are “ confirmed as to the leading points, (yet) the number of the slaughtered, “ the extent of the mischief, particularly as to the lives and properties of “ Persians, the conduct of Negib Pasha, and the degree of provocation “ are now presented in a light which varies considerably from our first “ impressions. The proceedings of the Pasha in particular appear to “ have been far less culpable than the reports of the Persian Agent and “ the French Consul had induced us to believe.” His Russian colleague concurred in Sir Stratford Canning's view ; and the terms of settlement subsequently arranged by the two Ambassadors at Constantinople, acting under instructions in the interests of the Persian Government, were these :

1. That the Porte should address a letter to the Prime Minister of Persia and communicate a copy of it to the representatives of the mediating powers ;
2. That a suitable sum of money should be applied by His Highness the Sultan to the relief of the sufferers at Kerbela ;
3. That the Porte should expressly declare its disapproval of the late expedition against Kerbela, its regret at the occurrence as unauthorised and unreasonable, and, more especially, its sorrow for the effusion of blood which ensued ;

4. That Negib Pasha should be ordered to repair the shrines at Kerbela, to administer his province with equity, to protect the Persian subjects there, and particularly the pilgrims from Persia, and, finally, to undertake nothing that can bring upon him the displeasure of the Sultan;

5. That Negib Pasha should be threatened with dismissal in case of any future misconduct; and

6. That all these points should be announced to the two Ambassadors in writing by means of an Instruction addressed by Rifaat Pasha to the Dragoman of the Porte and deposited in copy with the Ambassadors.

The removal of Najib Pasha from office, which had been demanded by Persia, was not required.

We have dwelt at somewhat disproportionate length upon the Karbala affair because it illustrates so well tendencies and feelings which exist even now, though much attenuated, in Turkish 'Irāq.

Reduction to
obedience of
the Shaikh
quarter of
Baghdād
City, 1847.

We may note, before turning to tribal and miscellaneous questions, that in 1847 Najib Pasha extended the principle of the universal currency of the Sultan's writ to the quarter, then turbulent, in Baghdād city which takes its name from the tomb of Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gilāni, and even to the shrine itself. It had been proverbial, before this, that every seditious riot in Baghdād had its origin in the Shaikh quarter, if not in the very precincts of the shrine. The transactions on which the Pasha founded his action seem to have been connected in some way with taxation, and they included a demonstration at the Pasha's country house by a crowd of 1,500 persons who presented him with an offensive memorial and threatened to resist his measures. On the return from Kurdistān of a military expedition, the despatch of which had evidently depleted the Baghdād garrison, guards were mounted on the shrine, and two of the principal officials connected with it were arrested—one of them in the sanctuary itself—and deported to Basrah.

Relations
with the
Bani Lām
and difficul-
ties with the
Shammar,
Khazā'il, and
'Anizah,
1843-44.

At the end of 1843 Persian intrigues among the Bani Lām, of which there had been complaints, were suspended; and a Turkish official with a small military escort was engaged in recovering taxes from the tribe. One expedition was in the field against the Northern Shammar, another had been despatched against the Khazā'il in their lagoons on the Euphrates. In 1844 an island fortress of the Khazā'il was taken and a Turkish garrison installed in it; but the 'Anizah to the west of the Euphrates, who had been showing themselves refractory, were considered to be beyond the reach of a Turkish expedition.

'Obaid,
'Anizah,
'Afaḥ, and
Muntafik

In carrying out his policy of internal administration, the main principle of which was to suppress every kind of influence that competed with the authority of the Ottoman Government, Najib Pasha seems,

after the reduction of Karbala, to have devoted his attention chiefly to the Pashaliq of Sulaimāniyah in the north, where the Kurdish family of the Bābānzādahs still held sway; but with his proceedings in that quarter we are not concerned. Affairs in Kurdistān appear to have engaged his personal attention in 1845, in which year, on his return with a military force from Kurdistān to Baghdād by the banks of the Tigris, the 'Obaid tribe, apprehending an attack upon themselves, came down in large numbers into the neighbourhood of Kadhimain, took up a position there, and interrupted the communications of Baghdād with Mūsāl and Aleppo. At the same time Arab tribes from the Euphrates side, including the 'Anizah, began to close in upon Baghdād from the west and south. How the danger passed, which it seems to have done harmlessly, is not apparent; but in May of the following year the 'Anizah were again in insurrection and busy intercepting caravans, while the Northern Shammar blocked the upper Tigris and the route to Mūsāl. The 'Afaḡ near Dīwānīyah were in revolt, and the chief of the Muntafik continued to postpone compliance with an invitation to visit Baghdād which had been sent him. The forts of the 'Afaḡ were reduced, but the situation continued disturbed.

disturbances,
1845-46

The dissatisfaction among the Arabs was due to efforts on the part of Najib Pāsha to more than double the revenues of the province,—a process which necessitated very rigorous collection of the poll tax. Incidental consequences were that the tribes generally, among whom the Zubaid, Dilaim, Khazā'il and Muntafik had lately shown a tendency to exchange the nomadic for a settled life, now seemed inclined to abandon such cultivation as they possessed for brigandage, and that agricultural labour had become difficult to procure.

Cholera prevailed at Baghdād in 1846 and 1847. In the second of these years the disease was less virulent, but the Pāsha and the French Consul-General left the town, and the British Political Agent went into camp at Qarārah. Business was partly suspended.

Cholera epidemic, 1846-47.

The following melancholy account of Najib Pāsha's administration was penned at the end of 1848 by Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, who had in the beginning formed a favourable estimate of His Excellency's policy and character:

Najib Pasha's administration in 1848.

Undoubtedly however of all the offences of which Najib Pasha is justly chargeable, the gravest, inasmuch as they compromise the character of the Sultan's Government, alienate the affections of His Majesty's subjects and threaten to convert into a desert one of the finest provinces of the Empire, are the intolerable rigor of his financial administration, and the reckless greediness and venality with which His Excellency's

officers throughout the Pashalic pursue the one sole object of raising money. I have in vain endeavoured to obtain materials for drawing up a return of what may be considered unjust and oppressive taxes. Such a task indeed is quite impracticable, for the rates and amounts are daily fluctuating according as the Collectors discover a more lucrative machinery of taxation, and any return moreover, however authentic and elaborate, would convey but a very imperfect idea of the real pressure upon the labouring classes and the consumers, as the realisation of every item of revenue is in the hands of contractors, who are permitted to put in practice all conceivable means of extortion, even to the infliction of personal torture, provided they fulfil their pecuniary obligations to the Government. The trade in corn since the last harvest has been a monopoly in the hands of the Government and the price to the consumer accordingly has been more than double that which was warranted by the abundant resources of the country. On animal food and fruit and vegetables, the duties under a variety of denominations amount to an average of about 50 per cent. *ad valorem*, and dates, which to the Arab population constitute the real necessary of life, are hardly less extravagantly taxed. All the internal trades to which the wants of the community give extension or importance, are reserved as monopolies, and farmed out to the highest bidder, among those monopolies I may instance the manufacture of soap, of spirits and of leather, the dyeing and painting of cloths, the cleaning of cotton, the storing and weighing of rice and grain, portorage, brokerage, etc. The transit duties also are enormous on hides, wool, sheep skins, gall nuts, etc., the charges amount sometimes to 30 per cent. *ad valorem* before the goods reach the gates of Baghdad, and a further duty of 12 per cent. is levied on entrance into the town. New taxes too are being constantly added. Stamps are required for all public papers, whether bonds, acquaintances, agreements or even petitions. The passport fees press heavily on the poorer classes and the exorbitant charges on conveyance of property, on the realisation of money, on the mere passing of contracts, deter the rich from making any use of their capital. According to the data which I have collected from various quarters and which furnish at any rate the means of approximately estimating the result of Nejib Pasha's financial operations during the last year, I find that His Excellency, who was granted a farm of the Baghdad Pashalic at the assumed gross annual valuation of 60,000 purses (300,000£), has raised by ostensible means alone, above 120,000 purses (600,000 £); and at the most moderate calculation for his extraordinary profits, those I mean which have accrued from his grain monopoly, from his Kazihs on the Arabs, from confiscations, fines, presents, and above all from direct bribes, I should be disposed to assess the entire proceeds of his Government at not less than one million sterling, and when Your Excellency considers that during the interval in question no single fresh source of legitimate revenue has been opened, that there has been no territorial acquisition; no barren lands reclaimed from the desert; no increased trade, or improved cultivation; no discovery of metallic treasure; no invention in manufactures or extension of produce; but that on the contrary every branch of agriculture, commerce, enterprise and industry has very essentially declined, you will understand that this immense sum, so entirely disproportioned to the present capabilities of the province, could not have been raised without entailing a terrible amount of individual suffering, and without calling forth a general execration of the ruling power which sanctions, if it does not encourage, such grinding tyranny.

A few months later the British Political Agent had to report that the great Bani Lām tribe had risen in rebellion in consequence of the Pāsha's having farmed the collection of the taxes for which they were liable to the Shaikh of the Muntafik, their hereditary foe; that they had ravaged the districts of Mandali, Jasān and Badrah and approached within 30 miles of Baghdād; and that the Pāsha seemed disposed to cancel the arrangement he had made with the Muntafik Chief,—a step by which the latter would probably be alienated, in his turn, with dangerous results. The *Northern Shammar, too, among whose chiefs Najib Pāsha had cultivated dissension, succeeded for once in combining and in forming a coalition that seemed capable of sweeping the whole country down to the gates of Baghdād. Nightly robberies and other atrocities disgraced the streets of the city itself; these were believed to be the work of gangs of armed Arabs sent in from outside to distract the attention of the Government. Major Rawlinson observed that some allowance must always be made for natural turbulence of the Kurds and Arabs, but that in the present case the disorders were undoubtedly due to the character of the fiscal administration.

Bani Lām
and Shammar
revolts, 1849.

At length, in the summer of 1849, a very serious crisis arose upon the Shatt-al-Hindiyah in consequence of the extortionate demands made upon the cultivating Arabs there by the Pāsha. The lands irrigated by the Hindiyah and other canals from the right bank of the Euphrates were legally assessed at an amount equivalent to £17,800 sterling; but Shaikh Wādī, the Chief of the Zubaid, an outsider to whom the Pāsha had given them in farm, raised from them in one year no less a sum than £105,000. The tribes of the district, which were in general law-abiding, then rose, expelled the farmer and his myrmidons, and plundered the public granaries and store-houses in which their contributions in kind had been deposited after collection. Najib Pāsha called upon 'Abdi Pāsha, the Army Commandant, to put down the insurrection and reinstate Shaikh Wādī by force of arms; but that officer, convinced that the tribesmen had a just grievance, declined to do more than despatch a column, with specific instructions for the restoration of order only. A furious altercation between the Pāsha and the Commandant followed, and eventually it was arranged to send a joint civil and military Commission to the spot to investigate the causes of the outbreak. The Commissioners did not agree; each supported the view of his own superior; and the feud between the civil and military heads of the administration became a public scandal.

Dangerous
rebellion of
the Hindiyah
Arabs and
friction be-
tween the
Turkish civil
and military
authorities,
May-June
1849.

*Safūk, the chief of the Northern Shammar, after assassinating his principal rival in the tribe, Nijris, was himself treacherously made away with in 1847 by an emissary of the Wali of Baghdād. See Layard's *Nineveh and its Remains*, pages 61-78, for an account of Safūk and his affairs in 1846.

Simultaneous
trouble with
the Northern
Shammar,
Bani Lām
and Shammar
Tōqah, June
1849.

At this juncture the Northern Shammar tribe again broke out and pillaged the whole district lying between Sāmarrā, Tikrīt and Kirkūk. Fresh complications arose with the Bani Lām, also, after the failure of an attempt to induce their chief, Shaikh Madhkūr, to trust himself in the hands of the Turks. The Turkish officer sent to invite him was one by whose instrumentality Najib Pāsha had recently procured the murder of Safūk, the great chief of the Northern Shammar, while on safe conduct; and the wily greybeard of the Bani Lām evidently did not regard the fact as a propitious omen. The attitude of the Bani Lām shortly became a serious menace to all shipping on the Tigris: so much so that some Baghdād merchants trading with Basrah sent orders that a fleet of boats which was bringing merchandise for them up the river should wait at 'Azair. The Shammar Tōqah too, a tribe settled on the left bank of the Tigris a short way below Baghdād, embarked on hostilities against the Government.

End of the
Hindiyyah
rebellion,
June 1849.

It was now ascertained that the Shaikh of the distant but very powerful Muntafik tribe was implicated in the Hindiyyah revolt, and that the rebels had been aided by armed contingents of the Dilaim, Dhafir, 'Afaj, and Khazā'il tribes, which were in sympathy with them. The Army Commandant presently became alarmed at the extent of the financial responsibilities which the Porte, according to Najib Pāsha, would consider him to have assumed. His fears led 'Abdi Pāsha to proceed in person to the Hindiyyah districts, where he issued a manifesto of a nature to appease the tribes and held meetings with the chiefs of the Hindiyyah Arabs, of the 'Afaj, and of the Khazā'il. All of the Shaikhs professed their loyalty to the Sultān, and eventually the Commandant obtained from the Hindiyyah chiefs a written agreement in which they bound themselves to pay the full legal assessment of their districts and £10,000 in addition. 'Abdi Pāsha's settlement was however repudiated by Najib Pāsha, who had meanwhile been busily engaged in falsifying his accounts so as to prove that his public expenditure equalled his receipts; an attempt at reconciling the two officials made by Dervish Pāsha, an Ottoman Commissioner for the delimitation of the Turko-Persian frontier, ended in failure and in the accession of the mediator to the party of the Army Commandant; and not long afterwards, probably in consequence of the representations of Major Rawlinson as well as of his own flagrant misconduct, Najib Pāsha was removed from Baghdād.

Danger at
Karbala,
June 1849.

The Turkish military garrison at Karbala had got somewhat out of hand during the continuance of the Hindiyyah rebellion; outrages were committed by them upon the people of the town; and citizens and soldiers

began to eye one another with mutual suspicion, both fearing violence. To complaints made by Persians of insults offered to their religion at Karbala Najib Pāsha actually replied that he had no control over the army and that the Persians must look to their own defence. This mischievous speech, made by the Pāsha during the height of his controversy with the Commandant, was undoubtedly intended by him to embarrass his opponent; and he followed it up by recalling the civil governor of Karbala to Baghdād,—an extreme measure which he justified by saying that he could not be responsible for the administration of places where he had no longer the means, in the shape of an obedient army, of enforcing his orders. The British Political Agent at Baghdād, concerned because of the disastrous effect which another Karbala incident might have on Turko-Persian relations, caused the recklessness and impropriety of his conduct to be pointed out to Najib Pāsha; but the Pāsha, determined as it appeared to ruin either the Commandant or himself, could not be brought to reconsider his orders. 'Abdi Pāsha, however, sent a trustworthy officer of his own to Karbala to supply the place of governor, and the public peace there was not disturbed.

The unrest in Hindiyah subsided after 'Abdi Pāsha's settlement; but the indirect effects of the rebellion continued to show themselves for a time in other parts of the country. The 'Afaj soon afterwards attacked a fort held in the name of Shaikh Wādi of the Zubaid and put the whole garrison to the sword; Shaikh Madhkūr of the Bani Lām closed the Tigris stopping all communication between Baghdād and Basrah; and the 'Obaid to the north, and the Shammar Tōqah to the south of Baghdād harried the districts within their reach.

Continued misbehaviour of the 'Afaj, Bani Lām, and Shammar Tōqah, July 1849.

The character of Najib Pāsha, which has already appeared to some extent from his actions as recorded above, was thus summed up in 1848 by the British Political Agent at Baghdād:

Character of Najib Pāsha, 1842-49.

He possesses, or at any rate has possessed, a very remarkable natural energy, and his inflexible spirit, although too often degenerating into obstinacy, has on more occasions than one dissipated dangers that would have been fatal, if encountered with a less degree of firmness and serenity. That thorough knowledge also must be conceded to him, of the craft of Eastern Government, which can be alone acquired by fifty years' experience of public life. Herein however are, I think, comprised his full catalogue of virtues, and unfortunately there is a terrible amount of evil in the frailties, prejudices and passions which make up the residuum of his personal character. Proud, superstitious and corrupt, he is alone accessible to the influence of flattery, of saintly hypocrisy, or of bribes. His bigotry increases with his years and his rapacity with his wealth. Hating equally Christians and Sheeahs, whom he classes together as infidels and strangers, his conduct to the two communities at Baghdād is merely in so far distinguished as the relative weight of the Persian and European Government

may be supposed to admit a greater or less latitude for the indulgence of his rancor. The Christians, to whom in public he invariably attaches the opprobrious epithet of "Giour," have chiefly to complain of an indifference to their wrongs, of a disposition to enforce against them civil disabilities which in other parts of the Empire have either fallen into disuse or have been formally annulled, of systematised endeavours to confirm, if not to aggravate, their social depression.

It is interesting to compare* this opinion, the fruit of experience, with that which Major Rawlinson had enunciated five years earlier :

In his internal administration Nejib Pasha evinces the same energy and firmness which have ever been his distinguishing characteristic. The repression of robbery and disorder, the establishment of the authority of the Porte over the tribes subordinate to the Pashalic, the severe, but not extortionate, exaction of the dues of Government, and the introduction of system and arrangement into the various branches of administration appear to be the chief objects of his care, and it is only reasonable to suppose that, if these objects are carried out with the same vigour and constancy that have marked their first adoption, the increased prosperity of the province must be a necessary consequence.

Government
of 'Abdi
Pasha and
difficulties
with the
Northern
Shammar,
1849-50.

Najib Pasha, though he left debts at Baghdād unpaid, did not fail to carry a large sum of money away with him on quitting the province.

He was followed in office by two incompetent successors, the earlier of them being 'Abdi Pasha, the former Army Commandant, to whom a liberal salary was allotted by the Porte in order to place him above the necessity of committing extortion. 'Abdi Pasha, as a civil governor, disappointed such expectations as might have been founded on his successful handling of the Hindiyah rebellion; he resigned himself absolutely to the guidance of Mulla 'Ali, a favourite eunuch and buffoon; and the state of the country went from bad to worse. The post of Kifl, not far from Hillah, was captured by Arabs and the whole Turkish garrison of about 60 men put to the sword. Baghdād itself was virtually besieged by the tribes, and travellers could hardly venture to leave it in any direction on account of the Bedouins, whose camps beset it to the very walls. 'Abdi Pasha's main idea was to reduce to obedience the so-called Ma'dān tribes of the western marshes, including the 'Afaj whose yearly assessment of £900 he was anxious to double. For this purpose he endeavoured, with a force of 2,000 men, not counting irregulars, to close the head of the Shatt-al-Hindiyah, down which nearly one-half of the water of the Euphrates was now pouring; but the current washed away his dam nearly as fast as it was constructed. He succeeded in completing it, however,

* It is an almost invariable rule at Baghdād that each new Pasha or Wāli makes a favourable impression on the British representative at first arrival, and that this impression is gradually replaced, as the Turkish official's character reveals itself, by a depreciatory and even hostile estimate on the part of the Resident.

and was able to arrest and imprison Wadi Bey, Najib Pasha's favourite Shaikh and revenue farmer; but his officers were treated with contempt by Fahad, the Shaikh of the Muntafik, who had lately succeeded to the headship of that tribe on the death of his brother Bandar. The Pasha next established himself at Diwāniyah with 3,000 men and began to re-organise the tribal arrangements and to recover arrears of taxes; but presently the Hindiyah dam gave way again, and with it disappeared such remnants of prestige as he still possessed. These events occurred during the winter of 1849-50.

Early in 1850, the regular forces of the province having mostly been sent against a rebel Kurdish chief, the Shammar north of Baghdad were called in by 'Abdi Pasha to supply their place. This tribe were not infrequently made use of by the Turkish authorities to chastise smaller Arab tribes, a task which they were accustomed to perform with hearty good-will, but without much discrimination between the friends and the foes of the Government. On the present occasion the Shammar seem to have raided the banks of the Tigris so energetically that the country down to Kūt-al-Amārah was turned into a desert, road and river became equally unsafe, and trade was interrupted. Safūk, *Shaikh of the Shammar, prominent in the events of 1833, had been treacherously murdered by an agent of Najib Pasha, as already mentioned, and the chief of the tribe in 1850 was his son Farhān.†

In 1850, Shaikh Fahad having somehow disappeared, the headship of the Muntafik tribe was disputed between Fāris-bin-'Ajil and his cousin Mansūr-bin-Rashid, with dire results to trade and the country at large. The Turks officially recognised Mansūr as chief; but hardly had they done so when his rival attacked him, driving him out and obliging him to seek refuge in the Ka'ab country. The Turkish authorities then accepted Fāris.

Muntafik
troubles,
1850.

In 1852, the Baghdad Pāshaliq, after nine years of continuous misgovernment, was reduced almost to a wilderness. A new ruler had arrived in the person of Nāmiq Pasha‡; but his headstrong violence and his

Government
of Nāmiq
Pasha, 1852.

* Safūk was in friendly relations with the British Political Agency; and in 1841 he recovered at the request of Dr. Ross, the Agency Surgeon, some articles of which the traveller Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.) Layard had been robbed on a journey.

† On Farhān, by 1855, the Turks had conferred a monthly subsidy; but it was not large enough, as that Shaikh himself once remarked, to meet his expenditure on coffee for guests, and he always treated it as of no account.

‡ This may have been the Nāmiq Pasha who was deputed from Constantinople in 1848 to report on the Karbala massacre. There is reason to think that that once promising official became in his later days a thorough-going reactionary.

obstinacy in striving with insufficient means to establish absolute power were as fatal to the peace of the country as the incompetence of his immediate predecessors. To quote the words of Major Rawlinson the British Political Agent, in 1852 :

Nāmiq Pāsha inaugurated his government by acts of severity which were totally uncalled for, he then goaded the tribal chiefs one by one into a hostile confederation against the Government; and he has since, by exhibiting sometimes military weakness, by countenancing at other times measures of perfidy and scenes of cruelty, which it would be shocking to relate, and by maintaining throughout a violence of language and haughtiness of demeanour which to the Bedouins of the desert are of all things the most insupportable, so completely excited and exasperated the Arab population of the province that it would require perhaps a force of 50,000 men to put down opposition and restore general tranquillity.

If Nāmiq Pāsha had exhibited but ordinary prudence, when on a recent occasion as reported in my last despatch disunion broke out in the ranks of the insurgents, there would have been a fair chance of an honourable termination of his difficulties. Several indeed of the most influential of the Arab chiefs withdrew from the field and sent into Baghdād for terms, and if these parties had been conciliated, the submission of the others would in all probability have followed. To one and all, however, the same imperious answer was returned, that it was beneath the dignity of the Sultān's representative to treat with rebels; they were required to surrender unconditionally to appear in person at Baghdād and to sue for pardon; their cases would be then considered. This of course was considered by the chiefs as equivalent to condemning them to imprisonment or transportation, and, accordingly, as their power was in reality undiminished, they laid aside their differences and met once more to resist the common enemy. Since then matters have been daily growing worse. The outlying detachments of the Turkish troops have been cut up or driven in, the larger bodies of troops are beleaguered in their camps. Caravans have been plundered almost within sight of the walls of Baghdād, and as large bodies of horse, ten or twelve thousand strong, are now moving up from various quarters, there is an imminent prospect of the city being invested in so far at least as such an operation can be carried out by mere parties of irregular cavalry.

Rebellion of
the Euphra-
tes tribes,
July 1852.

A little later Wādī Bey, the great Shaikh of the Zubaid to whom Najib Pāsha had granted the farm of the Hindiyah district and whom 'Abdi Pāsha had cast into prison, finding Nāmiq Pāsha inexorable in certain demands which he had made upon him, declared war on the Pāsha and established himself at Musaiyib on the Euphrates, an important strategic point commanding the routes from Baghdād to Karbala, Najaf, Hillah, and Diwāniyah. His horsemen and those of the Dilaim and 'Anizah, who also had differences with the Government, were soon "scouring the country up to the gates of Baghdād, driving off camels, "plundering caravans, clearing out and burning the villages in the

"suburbs, and committing every species of havoc and disorder." Simultaneously a mixed force of Khazā'il, Ma'dān and 'Anizah Arabs were beleaguering the Turkish garrison of Diwānīyah and cutting off its supplies. As in the time of Najib Pāsha, the Turkish troops had begun to murmur at the privations and fatigue imposed on them by an apparently insensate policy; and Shākir Pāsha, the Army Commandant, had been suspended by Nāmiq Pāsha for too freely expressing his opinion of the inadequacy of the military resources of the province to the coercion of all the Arab tribes at one and the same time. In these circumstances, hampered also by a revolt at Najaf which we shall presently describe, Nāmiq Pāsha condescended to negotiate, though not in the first instance with the arch-rebel Wādī Bey; but the final settlement between him and the Euphrates tribes is not recorded.

There were at this epoch, as at the present day, two Arab factions in Najaf known as the Shumurd and the Zugurd. In general they occupied the town jointly, but a few years before 1852 the Shumurd altogether expelled the Zugurd; and in 1852, under a local Arab chief of some notoriety who had been badly treated by Nāmiq Pāsha, the Shumurd seem to have set the Government of Baghdād itself at defiance. If the Pāsha had deigned to make use of the Zugurd against the Shumurd, Najaf would probably have been recovered without difficulty; but he despised the assistance of such allies and instead caused Turkish troops from Hillah, Diwānīyah and Dagharah to be concentrated before Najaf under an officer named Salim Pāsha. The task confronting this commander is thus described in a British despatch of the day :

First revolt
at Najaf,
August 1852.

They (*i.e.*, the Shumurd) look with contempt upon the Turkish troops and are well aware that, while Wādī Bey and the Anizah hold the open country, no military impression can be made on their position. It appears indeed that the plan of defence adopted systematically by this tribe is one which would try the metal of the best soldiers in the world. They place no reliance on the walls of the town, but intrench themselves within the strongest and most populous quarter, throwing up barricades across all the streets, connecting the houses by mines and galleries, loopholing the walls, and occupying every commanding point with their matchlock men, who are admirably armed and are the most expert marksmen in this part of Asia. Salim Pāsha's difficulties, if he thus attempted to expel the Shamerta by force, would be of the same nature as those which met Cavaignac in the Faubourg St. Antoine, while his chance of success would be infinitely less, inasmuch as the narrow streets and high-walled courts of an Oriental city afford greater shelter to the defenders, and the Turkish soldier, brave even to daring in the open field, quails before a hidden enemy.

In these circumstances Salim Pāsha proceeded to negotiate with the Shumurd through the Shī'ah Mujtahids of the town; and those inter-

mediaries, to whose minds the recollection of the Karbala massacre in 1843 must have been present, exerted their influence with the chief of the insurgents so effectually that he agreed to evacuate the town and remove to Hillah, provided that his personal safety was guaranteed and that he and his followers were allowed to carry their arms and property with them. This arrangement was apparently carried out, but not without an unfortunate incident of which Nāmiq Pāsha gave the following account to Major Rawlinson at Baghdād : "that . . . the Turkish officer who had conducted the previous negotiations had judged it necessary to arrest other parties in Nejef who had not withdrawn ; that the followers of these parties attempted a rescue ; that the townspeople then rose ; that street fighting was maintained for 24 hours with considerable loss on either side ; that there was of course a good deal of pillage and destruction of property ; but that ultimately the Arab combatants were driven out of the place, and that the authorities were now employed in restoring order and returning to their proper owners the effects which had been plundered." Major Rawlinson was disposed to think, however, that the whole matter was pre-arranged, that the chiefs were first enticed away, and that the townspeople, when off their guard and relying on the capitulation, were surprised by the Turkish troops. He believed, nevertheless, that no great damage had occurred.

Second
revolt at
Najaf, 1854.

At the beginning of 1854, Rashid Pāsha having in the meantime succeeded Nāmiq Pāsha as Governor-General of Baghdād, there was a second outbreak at Najaf against the authority of the Turkish Government. The cause seems to have been the withdrawal of a garrison that had been stationed in Najaf, which emboldened the Shumurd and Zugurd, acting on this occasion in concert, to assemble about 2,000 men and forcibly repossess themselves of the town. After an interval, during which he sent troops from Baghdād to Hillah and ordered the Commandant of Diwānīyah to be ready to co-operate, Rashid Pāsha himself proceeded to Hillah ; and at the end of March a Turkish force recaptured Najaf, having expelled the rebels with little loss to themselves and small incidental injury to the general public. The Arabs, however, were said to have suffered severely.

State of the
Baghdād
Pāshāliq,
1854.

An interesting account of the internal condition of the Baghdād Pāshāliq was given by Commander Felix Jones, I. N., writing in 1854. With regard to the management of the Arab tribes, he said :

To sum up generally on this head, owing to the nomade habits, I must add, they are one and all but little under the control of the Turkish Government. It is true that a sort of tacit understanding exists between them and the authorities, that, so long as the revenue at which the tribe is assessed is paid, they are to suffer no molestation. This

assessment takes place annually, but much difficulty is experienced before the sum is fully paid up, the object of the Arab being to show he is really too poor, and that of the Government to obtain, if well paid in one year, an increase of tribute in the next. Thus both parties fall out, (and) are for the most part always at odds, if not at open war. Too weak to coerce them efficiently, the Government employs the usual weapons of the feeble, those of exciting party against party. Factions are thus raised in the tribes, the much-coveted Shaikhships are sold, as it were, to the highest bidders, and a constant rivalry exists, fomented by the Government as an element to neutralize the combinations and rebellions so frequent in all ages among these singularly constituted people. It is this system, however, which has impoverished both the country and people.

Commander Jone's remarks on the Government of the town of Baghdād, etc., which follow, are obviously accurate as well as extremely interesting, and to a large extent they still hold good of the province at the present day.

On the Government of the province, and the *imperium in imperio* system pursued to weaken those who, when united, were able to set up in antagonism to authority, I have already touched. Generally speaking, the form of administration in Baghdād and in the minor towns is based on that of Constantinople, varied only to suit local usages and requirements, when these do not operate badly upon the general law, which, of course is that of the Koran, and the interpretations which learned legislators have awarded to its less intelligible doctrines. The old despotic rule has been closed for some years; and now a council, at which the Pacha usually presides, hears and determines upon all cases. It is a mixed one of Mahomedans and Christians; but the latter in Turkey are not as yet sufficiently independent to do justice to their position when the Mahomedan portion may be biased by their creed, or by corruption, to pronounce an unjust award. To speak candidly, these nefarious practices in perversion of law and right are less complained of in Baghdād than in most parts of the Turkish empire, and under the more enlightened and honest administration of the present Pacha, Mahomed Reshid, they are less flagrant. He discountenances them, indeed, in his desire to benefit the State and to raise his fellow Turk in the scale of humanity; a Herculean task certainly, but the attempt is still worthy of commendation. Trained by education in Europe, the present Governor-General of Irāq has the tact, and perhaps the energy, to work a change in this neglected province. Unfortunately he has no seconds. All his subordinates are as ignorant as Turks usually are, and his effort are, moreover, often paralysed by the dogged obstinacy of their characters. The terrible pressure upon the resources of Turkey by the present war is another drawback to him, for he is called upon to furnish funds to aid in maintaining the struggle, and with an exhausted exchequer, he must resort to an extra tax upon his people. Complaints are therefore as rife as public improvement is at a stand-still. Too poor to maintain an efficient staff in the various departments, the fiscal arrangements of the province, as well as the police of the towns, are on the most slender and inadequate scale. Frequent and daring robberies, as well as loss of revenue, result from the want of force to levy the one, and the absence of efficient means to check the commission of the other. There is, in fact, no system; and so long as Governorships, public lands, custom dues, and the wholesale vending of many staple articles of commerce and food, are held as monopolies by the highest bidders in the State auction, improvement cannot be expected. Every one, of course, works these with the greatest gain and least loss to himself, regardless of the effect upon individuals, and the hideous consequences to the State. The regular army, too, in the province is far too small for its extent in the most peace-

able times ; indeed, should a serious *émeute* arise in Baghḍād itself, the whole force would barely suffice to put it down ; and when the lawless character of the tribes around is considered, it is a wonder, indeed, that such a patchwork and threadbare form of government can hold together at all. The secret lies, however, in the opposite elements of the governed body, and the character of the general mind being too slow to work extended mischief ; a love of repose and a singular apathy in the people to past, present or future events, adds to the security, while it acts in an inverse ratio when we think of the energy necessary to effect improvement. On the whole, it may be said that the population is a quiet one. There is little appearance of fanaticism in it. The Jew and the Christian are tolerated, and enjoy immunities which they do not elsewhere possess. The only tax upon them is the Kharaj, or capitation tax, levied annually on males only above the age of fifteen, in the proportion of about ten, five, and two and a half shillings per head. This exempts them from all other demands ; and while the poor Mahomedan is often dragged from his wife and children, and made to serve as a soldier, these classes pursue their occupation in quiet in the midst of their families, and yet are not contented. But was the oriental ever so ? No ! and moreover, the Christians and Jews of Turkey, while they are insidiously robbing all classes of their neighbours, are ever ready to whine about oppressions, and, unfortunately they receive attention from those who are ignorant of their characters and real position in Turkey. I venture to assert, indeed, there is more real ill-will felt towards Jews in Europe than at the present time in Turkey, and the concealed hatred of Roman Catholics and Protestant manifests itself more in those civilised states than it now does in the dominions of the Sultan. We have nothing to compare among Mahomedans with the Spanish denial of sepulture to their fellow Christians. Here every sect of Christian has its churches and cemeteries ; and the intercourse between individuals of totally different creeds in the common concerns of life is less restricted and infinitely more courteous than among those professing Christianity under different denominations in Europe. Massacre in this country, solely on account of antagonistic belief, is a rare thing, and, when it does occur, it arises more from its being the first political weapon at hand on the part of the rebellious townspeople against the Government than from any inherent desire to shed Christian blood, and in some cases it has been brought about by the Christians themselves being urged to set at defiance the restrictions they had lived under in peace, if not in absolute freedom. * * *

* * * *

The law of Tanzimat, or Tansimat, suspending the infliction of capital punishment in the provinces governed by Pachas, has been productive of both good and evil. It was certainly wise and humane to place restrictions on the despotic will of local Governors, particularly in the provinces near Constantinople, but we may question if it was politic to set aside the punishment which held in check the lawless tribes of marauders that wander over a great part of the Turkish empire, at a distance from the capital. In 'Irāq and its towns, the promulgation of this edict was looked upon by the evil as an amnesty for crime, and by the well-disposed with alarm. Revolt, robbery, and murder increased ; whereas the amputation of a hand or a foot, the timely impalement or public decapitation of a blood-stained villain (I must speak the truth while deploring the necessity) operated for a long time in these provinces on the public mind, though doubtless there were occasions when the absolute power of the Pacha might be exercised in ridding himself of people less obnoxious to the public than to himself. The law, indeed, has been too sweeping to be attended with entire good ; for we observe offenders, after being convicted of parricide and other hateful mesurders, cape the death they have fully merited, and when immediate example was

required, by long confinement in prison awaiting a decision from Constantinople. For the more distant provinces this law should be modified, so that retributive justice should immediately follow the commission of crime. I will not deny but that long incarceration may be worse than death to the offender, but such a mode of punishment is lost in these countries, where example and precept are understood only through the channel of the eye. Here we might as well imprison a mule to deter others from kicking. The public mind is not yet enlightened enough to understand the motives of the penal refinements of our European codes.

The rapid enhancement of fiscal demands at this period, together with the frequent changes in the Shaikhship of tribes which they involved, are well illustrated by the case of the Muntafik. Previous to Najib Pasha's arrival in 1842 the Shaikh of this tribe had been liable for an annual payment of 100,000* Shāmis only. By 1851, when Fāris was Shaikh, the assessment had risen to 200,000 Shāmis. In the autumn of 1851 Shaikh Mansūr undertook to pay 240,000 Shāmis a year; but in the spring of 1852 he was outbidden by Shaikh Sālīh, who offered 300,000. In October 1853, the Samāwah district assessed at 100,000 Shāmis per annum having in the meanwhile been removed from the Muntafik Chief's jurisdiction, Shaikh Mansūr undertook to pay 310,000 Shāmis a year for the remainder; and in 1855 Shaikh Bandar assumed an annual liability, notwithstanding further reductions of territory, of at least 310,000 Shāmis.

Taxation of
the Muntafik,
1851-55.

In 1855 the Āl Bū Muhammed tribe, occupying the banks of the Tigris below 'Amārah, revolted for financial reasons and began to plunder villages and to attack boats plying on the river. It was found impossible to coerce them, because no sooner did Turkish troops appear on the scene than the amphibious tribesmen vanished into their lagoons; so, after the navigation of the Tigris had been completely suspended for six months, the Turkish Government agreed to accept as their revenue that which the tribe themselves were willing to pay.

Insurrection
of the Āl Bū
Muhammad,
1855.

Turkish administrative arrangements, 1839—61.

A few facts interesting to students of Turkish administration emerge from the records of the time. Some of them, implying changes, must no

* The Shāmi at this time was worth about one shilling and six pence English.

doubt be attributed to the reforming and centralising zeal of the Constantinople bureaucracy under 'Abdul Majid, the first Sultān under whom the influence of the capital on provincial administration is clearly traceable at Baghdād. Others may have been connected with Turkish designs on Muḥammareh.

Military
recruiting at
Baghdād,
1844.

So early as 1844 an attempt was made to raise a local regiment at Baghdād by voluntary enlistment. About 200 recruits were obtained; but fears of conscription or some other evil to follow created a panic in the city, from which 3,000 or 4,000 people actually took flight. The experiment was probably a failure.

Institution of
Daftardārs,
1845.

In 1845 the first regular Daftardār or Accountant-General, an official ever since well known at Baghdād, appears to have been posted to Turkish 'Irāq. He seems to have worked at first under the direct orders of the central Government; and his authority superseded, in certain revenue matters, that of the executive ruler of the Pāshāliq. That this centralising innovation cannot long have remained in full vigour seems clear from the arbitrary and ruinous fiscal policy pursued by Najib Pāsha and his successors after 1845, unless indeed it was dictated by the new official, which does not seem probable.

Octroi duties,
1847.

Orders from Constantinople were received at Baghdād in 1847 for the abolition of Ihtisāb or octroi duty in the towns. This may have been a fashionable reform, or proposed reform in Western Turkey at the time; but in Turkish 'Irāq octroi was destined to survive for many a year to come. The Daftardār of Baghdād made a journey to Basrah, however, to discover whether any compensating tax could be realised at that port in lieu of octroi.

Commission
of Rāghib
Pāsha, 1847.

Administrative Commissions of Enquiry now come into vogue. In March 1847 one Rāghib Pāsha was sent from Constantinople with a Farmān and sword of honour for Najib Pāsha, which he presented at Baghdād with much *éclat*; but he had also instructions to inspect Basrah and the Shatt-al-'Arab districts generally, and to report how the town could best be improved, the local revenues enhanced, and the naval strength of Turkey upon the river increased. The British Political Agent at Baghdād considered the proceedings of this Commissioner likely to appear suspicious not only to the Persians, with whom the frontier line was in dispute, but also to the Muntafik tribe for other reasons. The institution of a separate Pāshāliq of Basrah three years later may have been a result of Rāghib Pāsha's deputation.

Existence of
a Kahiyah at

In 1849 the ancient office of Kahiyah still existed at Baghdād. The Kahiyah was originally a very confidential officer of the Pāsha's house-

hold, sometimes described as his chamberlain, and a member of his personal rather than of his official staff ; but it seems probable that by 1849 he had become a public officer corresponding to the Assistant Wāli (Adjoint du Vali or Mu'āwin) of the present day.

Baghdād,
1849.

As late as 1845 the Turkish Governor of Basrah still bore the old-fashioned title of Mutasallim, and his position was that of a modern "Qāim-Maqām" under the Pāsha, now "Wāli", of Baghdad. In 1850 the Basrah districts were suddenly divided from those of Baghdad and made a separate charge under an almost independent Pāsha. The new Basrah Pāshāliq embraced all the Turkish districts upon the Shatt-al-'Arab ; those upon the Euphrates up to and including Samāwah ; and those upon the Tigris up to and including 'Amārah upon its eastern bank, and, on its western bank, up to the point where the Hai or Shatt-al-Ghāraf leaves it. Basrah thus comprised the whole territory of the Muntafik tribe, whose influence then greatly predominated in the internal politics of lower Turkish 'Irāq, and whose connections with Baghdad were slender. The Pāsha of Basrah was empowered to correspond direct with the Porte, but in military and financial matters he was made subordinate to the Government of Baghdad.

Separation of
Basrah from
Baghdād and
its erection
into a Pāshā-
liq, 1850.

The first holder of the new Pāshāliq was Ma'shūq Pāsha, who arrived at Baghdad on the 3rd April 1850 and left again the very next day for the seat of his government, accompanied by a staff of naval officers and artificers whom he had brought with him from Constantinople.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1839—61.

During the period with which we are now concerned the relations of Turkey and Persia were more than once strained almost to breaking point ; but war was averted by the intervention of Britain and Russia in one case, and by isolated British action in another. The frontier province of Turkish 'Irāq, as it was the place of origin of some of the gravest questions between the two Oriental States, was also the scene of the hostile, mediatory, and preventive measures to which those questions gave rise.

The first treaty of Erzeroum, that of 1823, contained numerous excellent clauses for the improvement of Turko-Persian relations ; but in practice it

Frontier
questions

and proceed-
ings result-
ing in the
Second
Treaty
of Erzeroum,
1839—47.

failed to establish a peaceful border. In 1842 friction between the two limitrophe powers became so intense that war seemed imminent. Mutual difficulties arose largely from the conduct of marauding chiefs and restless tribes upon the frontier to the north of Baghdād; but there were also larger questions at issue. The destruction of the disputed town of Muhammareh by the Turks in 1837 was a principal grievance of the Persian Government, and they demanded as compensation for the same the payment of about a million pounds sterling. Various pretenders to the throne of Persia were harboured at Baghdād, of whom two received pensions from the Turkish Government and others, who had visited England, from the British. In 1840 a Persian force occupied Sulaimānīyah generally a dependency of Baghdād; and in July of that year the Shāh of Persia himself, having collected 13,000 men, a number of field guns and many camel-swivels, appeared to be meditating an attack on Baghdād, but was persuaded* to retrace his steps from Kangovār. A military expedition by the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān in 1841 to Fallāhiyeh and Muhammareh was regarded by the Turks in much the same light as their own action at Muhammareh in 1837 had been by the Persians. The climax was reached when, in 1842, a force organised by the Turkish authorities at Sulaimānīyah, which they had recovered, made a surprise attack on the summer quarters of the Persian Vāli of Ardilān. The Persians, on this last occasion, were the real aggressors; but the fact did not transpire until later, nor did it prevent the Persian Government from invoking, with success, the good offices of the British † and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople. Troops began to be massed on both sides of the frontier; but eventually, on the advice of the mediating Ambassadors and under the superintendence of British and Russian agents who proceeded to the spot, but not without some reluctance on the part of the Turks, warlike preparations were discontinued.

It was eventually agreed that a Joint Commission of Turkish and Persian Plenipotentiaries, to be assisted by delegates representing Britain and Russia, the mediating powers, should meet at Erzeroum to investigate—and, if possible, settle—the territorial and other questions in

* According to Layard his return was due to Russian influence, the Russians fearing that Britain might, in case of a conflict, espouse the Turkish side (Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume I, page 248). See also Mitford's *Land March*, Volume I, page 360.

† Despatches relating to the situation, so far as it had then developed, were carried by Sir A. H. (then Mr.) Layard for Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, to the British Embassy at Constantinople in May-July 1842. See Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume II, pages 366 *et seq.*

dispute. The British Commissioner was Colonel Williams,* R. A., afterwards Sir W. Fenwick Williams "of Kars," and with him was associated in the beginning the Hon'ble R. Curzon, afterwards Lord Zouche, from the British Embassy at Constantinople.

The first conference of the Commissioners at Erzeroum was held on the 15th May 1843. The difficulties inherent in the task of the commission were greatly aggravated by the recent Turkish massacre of Persians and other Shī'ahs at Karbala, and by various questions regarding the position of Persians in Turkey which had arisen; but examination of evidence and discussions continued at Erzeroum until March 1844, when they were interrupted by the insolence of the Turkish plenipotentiary, Enveri Bey,† in replying to his Persian Colleague,‡ Mirza Taqi Khan, on the question of whether Shī'ahs should be allowed to possess separate mosques of their own in Turkey. The principal negotiations were then transferred to Europe, the members of the commission awaiting the result at Erzeroum. Not uneventfully, however, for in 1846 the house of the Persian plenipotentiary was besieged and pillaged by a Sunni mob, the Turkish authorities not stirring to his assistance, though Colonel Williams risked his life in the affray. Two dependents of the Persian representative were murdered also; and eventually he received £8,000 as compensation from the Turkish Government.

At length, on the 31st May 1847, the Second Treaty of Erzeroum was signed at that place by the Turkish and Persian plenipotentiaries, Enveri Effendi and Mirza Taqi Khan, in the presence of Colonel Williams

* Colonel Williams was the original nominee, but he fell ill; and Mr. Curzon, who was at the time Sir Stratford Canning's Private Secretary at Constantinople, was appointed in his place. Colonel Williams presently recovered, however, and he and Mr. Curzon then proceeded to Erzeroum as Joint Commissioners. In October 1843, Mr. Curzon had an attack of brain fever at Erzeroum and was obliged, after his recovery, to go home. Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, had originally advocated the appointment as British Commissioner of Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.) Layard, a private traveller possessed of local knowledge; but his recommendations were not accepted by Lord Aberdeen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen's successor, offered Mr. Layard a Joint Commissionership at a later stage of the proceedings, but Mr. Layard had by that time found other employment.

† The original Turkish Commissioner was Nūri Effendi, who had been Ambassador at London and Vienna, but he died before the proceedings at Erzeroum began. It was only after some delay that Enveri Effendi, who had been his Secretary, arrived in his place.

‡ The first nominee of Persia was Mirza Ja'far, who had been Persian Ambassador at the Porte, but illness prevented his proceeding further than Tabriz in the direction of Erzeroum.

and Colonel Dainèse, the British and Russian Commissioners. The ratifications were exchanged at Constantinople on the 21st March 1848.

The principal provisions of the Treaty affecting the Persian Gulf region were as follows.

Second
Treaty
of Erzeroum,
1847.

As regarded pecuniary matters, Turkey and Persia were to abandon all their claims and counter-claims; but the question of certain pasturage dues and of losses sustained since 1845 was excepted from this provision, with a view to its being investigated and equitably settled by a Joint Commission. The general stipulation, it will be seen, barred the recovery by Persia of compensation for the damage done by the Turks at Muhammareh in 1837 and at Karbala in 1843.

With reference to the territorial question, the Turkish Government formally undertook that Persia should hold possession, in full sovereignty, of the town and port of Muhammareh, of the island of Khidhar (*i.e.*, 'Abbādān), of the anchorage, and also of the islands on the eastern bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, occupied by tribes recognised as dependent on Persia. Persian vessels should enjoy the right of navigating the Shatt-al-'Arab, with perfect freedom, from its mouth to the point where Turkish and Persian territory met upon the eastern bank. The frontier from Muhammareh in the south as far as Zohāe in the north was not mentioned in the Treaty at all and was thus left, under a final article, to be regulated by earlier treaties. A Joint Commission, including engineers, was to be appointed immediately for the actual delimitation of the frontier in accordance with the terms of the Treaty.

In respect of frontier administration, it was laid down that each border tribe should be compelled to inhabit one side of the frontier only; that raids and crimes committed across the frontier should be punished by the authorities of the territory from which they were committed; and that each power should station troops at suitable points for restraining the marauding tribes.

Further provisions were that Persian pilgrims were to be free to carry out their pilgrimages in Turkey without molestation; that Persian merchants and other Persian subjects in Turkey were to be protected and treated with consideration; and that Consuls appointed by the Persian Government to any places in Turkey where they might be required (except Makkah and Madinah) were to be recognised by the Turkish Government and enjoy the same *ex-officio* privileges as the Consuls of other powers. These last arrangements were reciprocal, Persia being equally bound by the Treaty to protect Turkish subjects and recognise Turkish Consuls in her dominions.

The Treaty was ratified subject to certain explanations of its meaning furnished by the Ambassadors of the mediating powers at Constantinople, Lord Cowley and M. de Titow, at the request of the Porte, which were accepted both by the Turkish Government and by a Persian plenipotentiary. These explanations were embodied in a joint note of the mediating representatives to the Porte and were not without significance. The most important were to the effect : that by the " anchorage of Muhammareh " was meant the place opposite to that town and within the Haffār Canal (*i.e.*, the Kārūn River) ; that in leaving to Persia, in the region in question, the town, port, and anchorage at Muhammareh, as also the island of Khidhar (*i.e.*, 'Abbādān), the Porte did not give up, in the said region, any other lands or ports which might exist there ; that Persia could not, under any pretext, lay claim to the countries situated on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, nor to land belonging to Turkey on the left bank, even in the event of Persian tribes being settled, wholly or partially, on the bank or lands mentioned ; and that all claims for indemnification by State against State were at an end, the claims of private individuals only being cognisable by the Joint Commission which was to deal with recent losses and pasturage dues. By means of the Ambassadors' explanatory note a more detailed assurance regarding the reciprocal treatment of Turkish Consuls and subjects in Persia was conveyed to the Porte as having been accepted by Persia ; and the Porte were at the same time informed of the Shāh's having agreed that, so long as Turkey did not build fortifications on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Persian territory, Persia on her part would refrain from constructing any on the portion of the left bank assigned to her by the Treaty.

We may now examine the state of affairs which existed locally, on certain parts of the frontier, during the period which intervened between the accession of the Sultān 'Abdul Majīd and the conclusion of the Second Treaty of Erzeroum.

We have seen that the Turks, on withdrawing their troops from Muhammareh after the expedition of 1837, left Thāmir, the Shaikh of the Ka'ab, in possession of his domains, but as a dependent of Turkey.

As is more fully related in the history of 'Arabistān, however, the Ka'ab Shaikh Thāmir was obliged in 1841, by a Persian demand for arrears of revenue coupled with the movement of Persian troops against him, to withdraw from Fallāhiyeh to Muhammareh, whence he proceeded to invoke Turkish support. The Persian Governor of 'Arabistān then notified the Turkish Governor of Basrah of his intention to follow the absconding Shaikh to Muhammareh and invited the co-operation of the

Affairs on
the Basrah-
Muham-
mareh fron-
tier, 1839-46.
1841.

Turkish fleet in preventing his escape by water. The Turks hesitated whether to assist or to disown their new vassal ; and Shaikh Thāmir took refuge, for a second time, at Kuwait. The Persian Governor then occupied Muhammareh and threatened to advance to Di'aiji ; but the attitude of the local Arabs prevented the execution of any further designs on his part. A tardy protest and demonstration were made by the Turks against the action of the Persians, but they were ignored, and the Persian Governor confirmed a double appointment which he had made to the vacant Shaikhship of the Ka'ab.

1842.

In 1842, on the flight of the new joint Shaikhs and the retirement of the Persian Governor northward to deal with difficulties which had arisen in another part of his charge, the Turkish Governor of Basrah was instructed by the Pāsha of Baghdād to reinstate Shaikh Thāmir and to call upon the Persians to leave Muhammareh ; but Shaikh Thāmir's influence over his own tribe was now clearly lost, even his patrons the Turks had begun to slight him, and no material action was taken on his behalf. To the demand for the evacuation of Muhammareh the Persians seem to have replied by claiming the whole left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab up to Qūrnah, where the Shatt-al-'Arab was at that time formed by the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates.

1843.

In the following year Shaikh Jābir, the chief of the Muhaisin and the real ruler of Muhammareh, having heard rumours that the Erzeroum Commission, which had lately assembled, were likely in the end to assign the Muhammareh district to Turkey, seems to have approached the Turkish authorities with proposals as to the terms on which he might be allowed to hold it under them. His action seems to have been prompted, also, by difficulties in which he found himself involved with the Persian revenue authorities ; but it had no definite result.

1844.

Meanwhile Thāmir, the ex-Shaikh of the Ka'ab, had migrated from Kuwait, his first asylum, to Basrah, and there had settled down as a wealthy private owner of houses, lands, and gardens. In 1884, at the suggestion of the Pāsha of Baghdād and helped on his way by the British authorities, most of whom at this time favoured the claim of Turkey to Muhammareh, he appeared before the Commission at Erzeroum and gave evidence before it, on the Turkish side, regarding the international position of the Ka'ab tribe. On his return journey, however, in April 1844, the ex-Shaikh, at the instance of the British Political Agent at Baghdād, was detained there lest, in the still unsettled state of the frontier question, his reappearance at Basrah should be the signal for trouble

in the neighbourhood of Muhammareh. Eventually, after three months' detention at Baghdād, he was allowed to proceed homewards on giving suitable assurances.

At this juncture, probably as a precaution against a sudden *coup de main* by the ex-Shaikh Thāmir and the Turks, but ostensibly for the purpose of recovering revenue from Shaikh Jābir, who was still in possession of the district, the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān threw a Persian infantry regiment, with one gun, into Muhammareh as a garrison. One result was the flight of the Muhaisin Shaikh across the Shatt-al-'Arab into Turkish territory, where the ex-Shaikh of the Ka'ab was already settled; another was a protest by the Porte against the military re-occupation by the Persians, *pendente lite*, of the disputed district. The Persians, however, set about enlarging and improving the fortifications of Muhammareh; while large numbers of the Ka'ab tribe, probably disliking the vicinity of a garrison, migrated from the Persian to the Turkish bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab and could not be induced to return. Towards the end of 1845 an attempt was made by the Persian authorities to bring Shaikh Jābir back to Muhammareh by the offer of favourable terms, but he feared treachery and would not adventure himself in their power. Meanwhile Musallim-bin-Barkat, another member of the Ka'ab ruling family and an aspirant to the Shaikhship, had taken refuge on the Turkish side of the river from the *de facto* Shaikh and was plotting against him there. The Turkish authorities, however, observed a correct attitude towards the refugees and abstained from seeking to benefit by their intrigues. That they did so seems to have been chiefly due to the influence of the British Political Agent at Baghdād, whose position as the representative of one of the powers mediating at Erzeroum no doubt gave weight to his advice.

The continuance of a Persian garrison at Muhammareh, though it was a small one, seems to have caused uneasiness at Basrah, to allay which and to maintain the Turkish claim to Muhammareh a Turkish guardship was, in 1846, stationed at the mouth of the Kārūn. The Persian Government objected strongly to the presence of this vessel, and the Porte, on representations being made, consented to remove it; but it continued to hover in the neighbourhood. To a protest made at Baghdād, probably by the British Political Agent, the Pāsha merely replied that the ship did not affect, in any way, the trade of Muhammareh. This does not appear to have been altogether the case, for at least one complaint was received at Baghdād, in 1847, of a boat bound for Muhammareh having been forced by the guardship to go to Basrah first and pay duty there

on all her cargo. Eventually, at the instance of the British Political Agent at Baghdād, acting on a request from the British Minister at Tehrān, the Pāsha consented to withdraw the vessel to Basrah and issued peremptory orders on the subject.

In the end, Muhammareh having been awarded to Persia by the Second Treaty of Erzeroum, Shaikh Jābir made his peace with the Persian Government, returned to Muhammareh, and obtained official recognition as ruler of that place; but the ex-Shaikh Thāmīr never regained his position as chief of the Ka'ab.

Affairs on
the Baghdād-
Kirmānshāh
frontier.
1839-47.

Of the state of matters on the frontier more to the northward, at this time, only fitful glimpses are obtainable. In May 1843 the Pāsha of Baghdād informed Colonel Farrant, then temporarily representing the British Government as a Special Commissioner for frontier affairs at Baghdād, that, in spite of precautions taken to prevent such occurrences, a section of the great Jāf tribe dependent on Sulaimānīyah had made a foray into Persia and plundered tribes there. The Pāsha wrote to the Governor of Sulaimānīyah to take immediate punitive and remedial action, and Colonel Farrant also sent letters through the Persian Consul at Baghdād to the same local Governor and to the Persian Vālī of Sinnah, desiring them to keep their Kurds in order; but the result is not recorded. In December of the same year the British Political Agent at Baghdād, having resumed the supervision of frontier relations after the departure of the Special Commissioner, reported that a portion of the Jāf who had emigrated to Persia had voluntarily returned to Turkey, so removing a grave inconvenience; for the Turkish Government had demanded their extradition, which the Persian Government were not prepared to concede. Petty acts of depredation continued to be committed by the Kurdish tribes on the frontier, but they did not necessarily involve serious consequences, as the local authorities on both sides of the border were able, if they pleased, to afford mutual redress without any sacrifice of dignity, or injury to the interests of their respective Governments.

In March 1847, however, the Second Treaty of Erzeroum being as yet unsigned, the situation had grown much worse. The British Political Agent at Baghdād reported that the tribes on the Persian side, "despairing of any accommodation, have now fairly thrown aside all "respect for authority and are doing themselves justice in their own "barbarous way, as opportunity offers. Outrages and wholesale plunder, "accompanied by loss of life, are matters of every-day occurrence, and "order I think can hardly be restored without extensive military

"combinations." Major Rawlinson succeeded, through the British Legation at Tehrān, in obtaining the despatch by the Governor of Kirmānshāh of a special Persian officer to the frontier; but the Pāsha of Baghdād, when approached on the subject, declined to send anyone to co-operate with the Persian Commissioner, alleging that previous experience forbade him to put any faith in the Persians, and that he could only take such a step if the British Political Agent would guarantee a satisfactory result. He wrote to Major Rawlinson on the subject and asked that translations of his letter might be forwarded to Constantinople and Tehrān, but the letter was worded so offensively to the Persian Government that transmission was refused.

The lot of Persian subjects in Turkish territory appears, during this interval of suspense, to have been no enviable one. In 1846 it was complained by the Persians that irregular internal duties were levied on their trade; that the fees for interment in sacred soil at Karbala and Najaf had been enhanced; that a harmful monopoly for the washing of the dead had been granted at the Holy Cities; that a double toll was exacted from Persians crossing the Kūfah ferry near Najaf; that duties were now levied on burials even in the Khaimahgāh at Karbala, where they had hitherto been free; that a tax was imposed on Persian pilgrims to Makkah; that Persians, like Europeans, were required to be in possession of passports; and that Persian pilgrims were not properly protected, nor even compensated for their losses when the actual offenders against them were caught. Some of these complaints were not substantiated, and others were frivolous; but the fact remains that Persian subjects were regarded and treated with consistent hostility by the local Turkish officials. The fault lay, in part at least, with the Persian Government itself; and in March 1843, the British Political Agent at Baghdād wrote: "Although upwards of three months have now elapsed since the death of the Persian Consul no measures have been taken to replace him, and not only have my efforts to protect Persian interests at Baghdād during the interval been unacknowledged and unsupported at Tehran, but in some instances they have been actually thwarted for no motive that I can conceive but that of jealousy; at the same time every case in which I advocate Persian claims injures my position with Nejib Pasha, hampers one in asserting British rights, and risks collision with the Consul-General of France, so that I have been constrained of late to remain almost passive."

Treatment
of Persian
subjects in
Turkish
'Irāq, 1839-
47.

In 1848 a Commission was formed for the delimitation of the frontier in accordance with the Second Treaty of Erzeroum: it consisted of

Attempted
delimitation
of the

Turko-
Persian
frontier
under the
Second
Treaty of
Erzeroum,
1848-52.

Dervish Pasha, representing Turkey, and Mirza Ja'far Khān, representing Persia, as principals, with Colonel Williams and Colonel Tcherikoff, British and Russian Commissioners, as auxiliaries. The British surveyor was Captain Glascott, R.N., the Russian, M. Agranowitch. Mr. W. K. Loftus * was appointed geologist to the British Commission, but was employed largely on detached archæological duties.

1849.

The Commission assembled at Baghdād in 1849, but the commencement of proceedings was delayed by the late arrival of the Turkish Commissioner, who after indulging in unilateral and high-handed action on the northern frontier, loitered at Mūsāl until the season was too far advanced for field work. The summer of 1849 was passed at Baghdād, and in the autumn the British, Russian, and Turkish parties made a tour to Hillah, Najaf and Karbala, entering the courtyard of the shrine at Najaf to the great indignation of the Shī'ah population, but not venturing within the actual tomb of 'Alī.

1850.

Operations only began in January 1850 at Muhammareh, where, during the early summer, the four camps composing the Commission suffered intense discomfort from heat, mosquitoes, and a curious endemic sickness. To escape these inconveniences the British party undertook a tour in the Persian hills, but there they lost one of their number, Mr. A. Wood, by death. The Turkish Commissioner, whose attitude had from the first been unpromising, now gave clear proof of the unconciliatoriness of his spirit by claiming for Turkey a large tract of country to the east and north of Muhammareh, including Qubbān, between which and the Turkish possessions to the west of the Shatt-al-'Arab the town, port and anchorage of Muhammareh together with the island of 'Abbādān should, he contended, form a small enclave. He also undertook separate surveys and statistical enquiries among the Persian tribes surrounding Muhammareh, intrigued with their chiefs, and issued inflammatory proclamations. The Persian Commissioner, not to be outdone by his colleague in the boldness of his pretensions, asserted that the rights of Persia on the left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab extended so far up that river as the confluence with it of the Suwaib—a point many miles above Basrah. The argument on which the claims of the two plenipotentiaries were founded may be epitomised in the words : ancient suzerainty over the occupying tribes. A boundary intermediate between those claimed by the Turkish and Persian representatives was eventually suggested by the British and Russian Commissioners. It was approved by the mediating Govern-

* Mr. Loftus was afterwards appointed to the Geological Survey of India and died in 1858 while returning home from that country.

ments; but the Porte rejected it, and the Persian Government's acceptance of it was conditional.

The Turkish Commissioner had gone so far as to propose, in February 1850, that the collection of taxes by the Persian authorities at Muhammareh should cease, and that the Persian employés and troops there should be withdrawn, the place not having yet been formally *ceded to Persia; and later he pressed for the removal of Shaikh Jābir, whom the Persians had recognised as Governor, and made other irritating demands. In reply, moreover, to the admittedly "vain and impolitic substitution of the Royal Persian flag for the local colours which had marked the Shah's government of that town † for upwards of sixty years," Turkish war vessels appeared on the scene and maintained for a time what was virtually a naval blockade of the Kārūn River.

Towards the end of 1851, however, on its being rumoured that Persian troops were on their way to re-inforce Muhammareh, the Turkish Commissioner agreed in writing, being then at Zohāb with the rest of the Commission, that pending a final settlement no innovation should be made by either claimant in the Muhammareh district—in other words, that the *status quo*, which favoured the Persians, should be maintained. A special point was the possession of the island of Muhalleh (*i.e.*, Hāji Salbūq), on which the Persian authorities had installed an agent; and it was agreed, as the Turkish representative denied the island to be a part of 'Abbādān, that the Persian functionary should be provisionally withdrawn.

1851.

It was not the pleasure, however, of the Turkish Commissioner or of his Government that the temporary arrangement reached should continue. This was clear from the conduct of Ma'shūq Pāsha, the ruler of the new Basrah Pāshāliq, who now took two refugees from Muhammareh territory under his protection and patronage. They were Sulaimān-al-Ghadhbān and Mūsa-al-Jandīl, of whom the former was provided with a place of abode on the Turkish side of the Shatt-al-'Arab opposite to Hāji Salbūq Island in disregard of the protests of Shaikh Jābir, while the latter was settled in a confiscated house at Basrah, formerly the property of Hāji Jābir, and made havoc as a pirate of native shipping on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab

1852.

* It had been relinquished to Persia by the Treaty of Erzeroum, under which the Commission were working, but Dervish Pāsha probably hoped to find means of stultifying the Treaty.

† *Sc. Muhammareh.*

An attempt to delimit the frontier in the district of Zohāb between Baghdād and Kirmānshāh, where a preliminary survey had already been made by Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, and Commander Felix Jones of the Indian Navy in 1844, led to an acute difference between Dervish Pāsha and his colleagues; and at Mandali, on the 19th January 1852, acting professedly under instructions from his Government, he demanded the restoration of what he affected to consider the *status quo* at Muhammareh and in Zohāb,—including in the case of Muhammareh the hauling down of the Persian flag there, the dismissal of Hāji Jābir, etc.,—and announced that in default of compliance he would no longer act with the rest of the Commission. On his persisting in this determination the other Commissioners decided to march southwards along the border and make a survey of the frontier region from Mandali to Hawizeh,—a resolve which they did not fail to carry out in spite of the strenuous opposition of Dervish Pāsha, who himself retired to Baghdād.

An attempt was then made at Constantinople to obtain the substitution of arbitration by Britain and Russia for their mediation, but it failed owing to the non-acceptance of the proposal by the Porte; and the task of the mediating Commissioners was confined, after the withdrawal of the Turkish representative, to survey operations and the collection of useful information. By the end of April 1852, about which time Lieutenant Jackson, I.N., was attached to the British Commission, the whole frontier had been mapped from the northern extremity of Zohāb to the Persian Gulf; and in May the Turkish Commissioner rejoined his colleagues, but only to hamper their work by secret intrigues with Persian tribes during the completion of the survey northwards to Mount Ararat.

Further
proceedings,
1853-57.

Early in 1853 Colonel Williams proceeded to England on leave; and the outbreak of the Crimean War shortly afterwards put an end, for the time being, to co-operation between Britain and Russia in the Turko-Persian frontier question. In November 1857 the seat of the British Commission was transferred from Constantinople to St. Petersburg, where work on the maps of the frontier continued for some time longer.

It had been the intention of Colonel Williams to draw up a comprehensive report embodying the views of himself and his Russian colleague in regard to the position of the frontier at every point; but, by an unfortunate accident, his materials were lost while in transit to Woolwich. The report would have explained the *status quo* of tribal occupation as existing in 1849-52, which is not now discoverable.

The stipulations for the good treatment of Persian subjects in Turkish 'Irāq which were contained in the Second Treaty of Erzeroum seem to have remained, to all intents and purposes, a dead letter. Under Najib Pasha's rule Persians were exposed to cruel harassment at the hands of the Turkish officials: witness the following extract from a despatch of the British Political Agent at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople in 1848:—

Treatment of Persian subjects in Turkish 'Irāq after the Second Treaty of Erzeroum, 1848-52.

The Persians, to whom His Excellency commonly applies the equally dishonourable title of "Rafizi," are the objects of an undisguised and indiscriminating persecution. To enumerate the multitudinous grievances under which the latter parties suffer would be too great a trespass upon Your Excellency's time and patience. Those grievances have been catalogued for the most part in my previous despatches, and they extend over every portion of the body politic and every question of individual right, whether affecting religion, conscience, nationality, property, commerce or personal security. The last refinement of severity to which my attention has been drawn (and which has been superadded to the prohibition of all charitable bequests or benefactory outlay upon the holy shrines and to a compulsory substitution of Sunni for Sheeah law in the towns of Karbala and Nejef, not only in regard to civil contracts, conveyance of property, testamentary dispositions, etc., but in such personal matters as marriage and divorce) is a formal interdict that His Excellency has lately placed upon those traditional mourning ceremonies which, within certain bounds, the Persians have always hitherto been permitted to exhibit at the present season in memory of their martyred Imams. This interdict is regarded as almost equivalent to proscription of the Sheeah faith, and has called for the most violent resentment generally amongst the Persian population.

When a new appointment was made by the Persian Government to the office of Persian Consul at Baghdād, apparently in 1849, it was stated that the *exequatur* of the new officer denied his right to exercise the extra-territorial jurisdiction over nationals vested in the Consuls of European powers under Capitulations, and that the Turks insisted upon all suits in which Persians were concerned being tried by the Sunni courts of the province. In 1852 the Persian Government forbade their subjects to cross the frontier into the Baghdād Pāshāliq; but this prohibition seems to have been due to the disturbed state of Turkish 'Irāq at the time, rather than to difficulties of a diplomatic order.

At the beginning of the Crimean war there appeared a probability that Persia might make common cause with Russia against Turkey and her allies, and in 1854 the Persian Governor of Dizfūl collected troops near the Basrah frontier with the purpose of attacking Basrah in case a rupture should take place. The Pasha of Baghdād, on his part, called the Arab tribes to arms and embarked on intrigues with Shaikh Jābir, the Persian

Crisis on the Basrah-Muham-mareh frontier and British naval demonstration, 1854.

Governor of Muhammareh. The despatch by the Government of India of the British steam frigates "Auckland" and "Akbar" in succession to Basrah at the beginning of 1854, as part of a general demonstration in the Persian Gulf, had a tranquillising effect, however; and Persia ultimately decided to remain neutral. The "Akbar," in the course of her visit to Turkish waters, proceeded with the Turkish Governor of Basrah on board as far up the river as Qūrnāh, where she was apparently met by the "Comet" from above, carrying Sir H. Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdād. This manoeuvre seems to have convinced certain rebellious Arab tribes in Turkish territory of the folly of calculating any longer on the embarrassments to which they had expected that hostilities with Persia would expose the local Turkish authorities.

Turkish 'Irāq
and the
Anglo-Persian
war,
1856-57.

The Ottoman Government of Turkish 'Irāq took a close interest in the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-57, especially in the operations at Muhammareh, and their attitude is described in the chapter on the history of 'Arabistān. At Basrah, where "fortifications existed only in detached pieces, and were ridiculous as Military works," the fall of Muhammareh to the British expedition made a *profound impression. The transport purchased for the British Field Force, both camels and mules, was obtained largely in Turkish 'Irāq.

General British interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1839-61.

The period under consideration is characterised by a great expansion of British interests in Turkish 'Irāq together with an increased difficulty in protecting them. This difficulty arose, it may be conjectured, partly from the inevitable multiplication of points of contact and friction; partly from the bureaucratic influence of Constantinople in Baghdād affairs; and partly from the overweening and chauvinistically Turkish spirit of the Pāshas now posted to Baghdād by the central authorities.

* "The recent events at Muhammerah procured for the British visitors in the "bazaar considerable respect as well as attention; the conquerors of works before which "their own arms in their last attempt failed (Muhammerah having always been a "bone of contention in their quarrels with the Shāh), could not be treated with Moslem "insolence; and consequently salaams and obeisances were as plentifully bestowed "now as the epithets 'kafir,' 'infidel,' 'unclean dog,' 'son of a burnt father,' would have "been, but a short time previously, in the same place and by the very same people." (Hunt's *Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign*, page 296.)

From now onwards it is necessary to distinguish between the commercial interests of private British subjects and the political interests of the British Government, especially as the two were not always in accord.

Already in 1840 two British commercial firms existed at Baghdād and carried on a trade with Basrah in native boats, some of which were owned by the firms and sailed under the British flag. These boats, at favourable seasons of the year, carried country produce to Basrah for exportation and returned with cargoes of imported British goods; at other times they were employed in bringing salt, firewood, and other commodities yielded by the neighbouring riverain districts to Baghdād city.

In 1841 the port of Basrah was still comparatively inactive. Almost the only articles of export were Arab horses for Bombay and some wool and cotton for England which went *via* the Cape of Good Hope. An occasional British merchantman with Manchester goods and other British manufactures for the Arab tribes and Baghdād visited Basrah; but such ships had difficulty in finding any return cargo. Signs of better days to come were now, however, apparent.

About 1840, or not long after, the idea of placing steamers on the Tigris for trade seems to have been suggested to British merchants at Baghdād by the formation, which will be noticed further on, of an armed flotilla of British Government vessels. The merchants consequently regarded with extreme disfavour steps which were taken in 1843 by the Pāshā of Baghdād, assisted by the British Political Agent, Colonel Taylor, to obtain an iron river steamer from Bombay and to secure the services of Commander Lynch, I.N., in connection therewith; and some of them even went so far as to complain of Colonel Taylor's attitude in matters of trade, and to insinuate that he had an interest in a local commercial undertaking. The Pāshā's application was rejected by the Government of India, who also censured Colonel Taylor for having transmitted and recommended it; but the Pāshā was in a position to thwart the rival schemes of the British merchants, and he did not fail to do so.

British firms
at Baghdād
and projects
of steam
navigation,
1840-45.

By 1845 the British houses of business at Baghdād numbered at least three, *viz.*, Messrs. Mills & Co., Messrs. A. Hector * & Co., and Messrs.

Question of
British
commercial
navigation of

* Mr. Alexander Hector was an enterprising man of business and maintained extensive relations, on his own account, with the Arab Shaikhs. In 1836 the Government of Bombay had proposed to appoint him "Agent for Dromedaries and Superintendent of the Mails through Syria between Muhammareh and Damascus" on a salary of Rs. 300 a month; but the Secret Committee of the East India Company vetoed the scheme on which this appointment depended. Layard seems to have had negotiations with Mr. Hector's firm in connection with his excavations at Nineveh; see his *Early Adventures*, volume II, page 368.

the Tigris
and its settle-
ment, 1845-
1846.

Lynch & Co. The whole question of British rights of commercial navigation on the Tigris was at length formally raised in 1845. The discussions which took place were occasioned chiefly by the case of the "Karbalaï," a British schooner; but they quickly assumed a general form, and the terms of the final settlement were general also. The "Karbalaï" was built at Bombay by a merchant of that place, and her construction was so ingenious as to admit of her making the whole voyage from Bombay to Basrah by sea and thence by river to Baghdād without discharging any of her cargo.

The points which arose with reference to British vessels were four in number, *viz.* :—

- 1st, whether they might navigate the river from Basrah to Baghdād at all;
- 2nd, whether, if they might, they might also hoist the British flag on that part of their voyage;
- 3rd, whether they were liable to pay the dues claimed by the riverain Arab Chiefs through whose territories they passed; and
- 4th, whether a Turkish tax, known as *Tālibīyah*, levied on native boats at Baghdād, was recoverable from them.

With regard to *Tālibīyah*, it may be explained that this tax had been instituted at Baghdād about 1821; it was levied, according to tonnage and length of voyage, for every trip made by the vessels subject to it, being thus of the nature of a duty upon cargo; and it had not hitherto been realised from British boat owners. It was originally an arbitrary local impost, and its proceeds were supposed to be devoted to the maintenance of the bridge of boats at Baghdād; but, being found productive, it had been transferred to the schedule of Imperial taxes; in view of its irregular origin, however, no attempt was even then made to recover it from British subjects. Levied virtually upon cargo, it did not appear to be a demand of which British boat owners could fairly complain, as long as its application was restricted to boats engaged in district trade at Baghdād; but its extension to vessels employed in foreign trade through Basrah was considered to be unwarrantable, as involving an unauthorised addition to export duties. This tax, therefore, stood on a different footing from the dues claimed by the river-side Arab Shaikhs, which had formed the subject of a correspondence between the British Ambassador at Constantinople and His Britannic Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1843. The Shaikhs' dues, amounting on the Tigris to about 1,500 piastres for each voyage to Basrah, had been

held by the last-mentioned authority "to be in a certain degree legitimised "by long usage, by their application to the vessel rather than to the cargo, "and by their forming a perquisite of the Arab Chiefs, for which, in event "of their suppression, the Turkish Government would be bound to afford "indemnification."

Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, held that the possibility of a British sea-going vessel reaching Baghdād proved that place to be a "port"; and he argued very strongly in favour of the right of British vessels to fly their own flag above Basrah, not only on the ground that for 40 years Turkish boats possessed by British owners or owners under British protection had been permitted to navigate the river under British colours, but also because he feared that to concede the point of flying the flag might be to concede the right of British commercial navigation on the rivers of Mesopotamia altogether. The attitude of the Pāsha of Baghdād was uncompromising: he questioned the right of the "Karbalaï" to enter the Tigris at all, and said he would refer it to Constantinople; he insisted, apparently under instructions from the capital, that in any case she should not hoist the British flag above Basrah; and he professed, with truth, his inability to prevent the Arabs from attacking her if the usual dues of the riverain Shaikhs should be refused.

The above threatened impediments to British navigation of the rivers of Mesopotamia were discussed by Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, with the Porte; and in April 1846 a Vizirial Letter to the Pāsha at Baghdād was obtained through his exertions, of which the concluding paragraph in the French text (or translation) ran as follows:—

Vizirial
Letter of
1846.

"En conséquence, je vous écris et vous envoie cette dépêche afin que Votre Excellence mette ses soins à ce que l'on prenne des barques de commerce Anglaises qui, comme il a été dit plus haut, seraient désormais occupées à faire le commerce intérieur sur les deux fleuves susdits, des droits conformes à ceux que l'on prend des barques des sujets Ottomans: et à ce que l'on ne prenne sur les chargements des bâtiments Anglais qui viennent de dehors, et qui vont dans un pays étranger, que les droits de douane établis, et qu'un droit d'ancrage consistant en cinq piastres. Votre Excellence aura soin de ne rien faire prendre de plus."

The sense in which the British Ambassador understood the settlement thus reached in the light of the discussions preceding it, was explained by him in the following terms:—

British-owned vessels will continue to navigate the waters of Mesopotamia under their national colours equally whether they are engaged in the foreign or in the internal trade, and they will pay upon the merchandise which they convey the amount of duties respectively applied in each case by the Convention of Balklia-Liman.

In the event of their being employed above the usual ports of entry in the internal traffic of the country, they will be liable to the anchorage duty which is always paid

here and which is sanctioned by the capitulations, but instead of paying 12 piastres as levied upon each vessel in the harbour of Constantinople, they will only pay 5 piastres.

There is no question of any difference between steam boats and sailing vessels.

With respect to vessels built in the country and owned by subjects of Great Britain, which cannot by our own regulations legally carry the national flag without registration under British authority, they will not pay higher duties than those required of the most favoured class of natives engaged in the internal trade, but they must be content to navigate like other vessels of the country. Though it is not impossible that such vessels as have hitherto abusively enjoyed the privilege of carrying their national colours may be tacitly allowed through favour to continue the same practice, it would not, I conceive, be proper for any British authority to support a claim which, be the state of Turkish law what it will, is manifestly at variance with the enactments of our own legislature.

State of
trade, 1850.

In 1850 the trade of Basrah was still inconsiderable, the only vessels visiting the port being some which belonged to British merchants at Baghdād and an occasional cruiser of the East India Company. The only cause that could be assigned for this state of matters was Turkish misgovernment.

Protest
by British
merchants
against the
prevalence of
disorder in
the Baghdād
Pashaliq,
1852.

In 1852 the British merchants at Baghdād complained in writing to the British Political Agent there of the losses and risks to which they were exposed by the insecurity prevailing on the Tigris, communication by which between Baghdād and Basrah was at the time almost suspended in consequence of tribal disturbances, and requested him "kindly to take such steps as he might consider likely to have a tendency to bring this state of things to a termination ;" and later they raised "the question of their right to require the intervention of the Hon'ble East India Company's armed steamer upon the Tigris for the protection of their mercantile interests, now suffering much from the disorganisation of the country and the inability of the Turkish Government to afford redress."

Major Rawlinson was most unwilling to employ the Government steamer upon a duty that might bring her into collision with the tribes, to good relations with whom—for reasons which we shall examine later—he attached the greatest importance; and he thought that the difficulties experienced by the British merchants were largely of their own creation because "they are continually protesting against the river dues, on which the Arab Chiefs depend for their support, they pursue their Arab debtors with relentless severity (and) they exact compensation for losses through the instrumentality of Turkish officials, which is of all things the most distasteful to the independent Arabs."

The "Nitocris" was in any case unfit, at the moment, to perform the services desired of her. Major Rawlinson accordingly suggested to Colonel Rose, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, and also direct to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a remonstrance with the Porte on the subject of Nāmiq Pāsha's sustained misgovernment might be authorised. Whether this proposal was adopted does not appear; but by 1854, if not earlier, Nāmiq Pāsha had ceased to govern at Baghdād.

The beginnings of an Indian colony already existed in Mesopotamia, though Indians were not, of course, so prominent in the province as they have since become. So early as 1821 there * was a "Nuwaub" at Baghdād, from whom Dāwud Pāsha extorted Rs. 5,000 and in 1850 a "Nawab of Oude" † resided there.

Protection of
British
Indian
subjects at
Najaf, 1852.

On the occasion of the first revolt at Najaf, in August 1852, the safety of the British Indian subjects there was a matter which caused not a little anxiety to the British Political Agent at Baghdād. As the town was crowded with Persian refugees and Indian pensioners, the Turkish authorities pretended to look with some suspicion on the outbreak, but Major Rawlinson was satisfied that it was in reality quite independent of foreign influence or money. Under the Oudh Bequest, which will be described further on, a sum of £5,000 a year was now disbursed by the Government of India at Najaf; and this payment had attracted many immigrants from India. A confidential agent was accordingly sent to Najaf from the Baghdād Political Agency to watch over the interests of the Indians there and to advise them, in case of serious danger, to retire to Karbala. On the day before the unfortunate incident with which the revolt closed, this agent left for Baghdād as the bearer of re-assuring letters for Major Rawlinson from the Chief Mujtahid of Najaf; but it does not appear that, in the fracas that occurred after his departure, any harm befell the British Indian residents of Najaf, who had at least been placed sufficiently on their guard.

In 1859 Messrs. Lynch & Co. of Baghdād, relying apparently on the Vizirial Letter of 1846, proposed to place a trading steamer on the Tigris and run it between Baghdād and Basrah. Sir H. Bulwer, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, doubted whether the Company would be warranted in venturing their capital on the strength of a mere Vizirial Letter, which might be cancelled at any moment by another similar document; but he expressed his expectation of being able to obtain from

Commence-
ment of
British
commercial
steam
navigation
on the
Tigris,
1859-61.

* See Rich's *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, volume II, page 226.

† See Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, page 576.

the Porte a Farmān or concession for establishing a line of steamers, if an application in due form were made. Messrs. Lynch accordingly applied for a Farmān "granting them the requisite sanction to navigate the rivers of the country with British registered steam vessels."

Vizirial
Letter of
1861.

The outcome, however, was only another Vizirial Letter, addressed to the Pāsha of Baghdād and dated 15th January 1861. In this letter, perhaps by design, different matters were hopelessly jumbled together; and considered as a response to Messrs. Lynch's application, it was altogether inapposite. In fact it merely cited Farmāns of 1834 and 1841 relating to British *Government* steamers in Turkish 'Irāq, together with the Vizirial Letter of 1846, and directed that the instructions contained in these should be observed in practice. It did not even mention Messrs. Lynch. Under it, nevertheless, the firm seem to have succeeded in putting their first steamer, the "City of London," on the Tigris.

British official establishments, enterprises and policy, 1839-61.

The two middle decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a great increase of British official activity in Turkish 'Irāq. This increase has been partially illustrated already in the foregoing sections on Persian relations and British interests. Its principal causes were, on the international side, the Turko-Persian boundary dispute, Turkish misgovernment, apprehensions of a dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and British distrust of Russia. On the purely British side the chief factors were the growth of local British trade, a consequence perhaps of public attention at home having been attracted to the country by the Chesney Expedition, and a growing influx of Indians into the Holy Cities; but much was due also to the enthusiasm and energy of the British officers employed in the country, particularly Major Rawlinson and Commander Felix Jones, who were themselves impressed with the great potentialities of the Mesopotamian province, and who neglected no opportunity of enforcing their ideas on Government.

Proposal of
the
Government
of Bombay to
abolish the
British
Political
Agency in
Turkish

The great developments which were imminent in the country do not appear to have been anticipated by the Government of Bombay, which in 1843 informed the Government of India of their opinion that the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq, constituted in 1812, had for a long time past been maintained on a scale much more expensive than was necessary, and that all the objects which either His Majesty's Government or the

Hon'ble East India Company could desire in that quarter might be attained either by an Assistant to the Resident in the Persian Gulf being stationed at Basrah, or by the appointment of a Consul to Her Majesty on something of the same footing as Her Majesty's Consul at Masqat, by which arrangement a saving would be effected of about two-thirds of the expenditure actually being incurred.

This reversion on the part of the Government of Bombay to the principle found impossible of application in 1809-10 and 1822 seems to have been prompted partly by their dissatisfaction with the Political Agent of the day, Colonel Robert Taylor. This gentleman's obnoxious recommendations that the Pasha of Baghdād should be helped to create a Turkish commercial flotilla on the Mesopotamian rivers, accompanied, it may be observed, by another that the Pasha should be allowed to purchase 20,000 cannon shot of different sizes at Bombay, have already been mentioned; and it is true* that in connection with the Karbala tragedy of 1843 Colonel Taylor had shown himself remiss and supine, if not actually a partisan of the local Turkish authorities.

Unsatisfactory conduct of the incumbent (Colonel Taylor).

The Government of India, however, while admitting that the arrangements suggested by the Government of Bombay might not be unworthy of adoption at some future time, considered that at the moment, it being of paramount importance to preserve the peace between Turkey and Persia which many events had tended to exasperate against each other, an urgent necessity existed for the despatch of an officer possessed of the confidence of Government to represent British interests at Baghdād. Major Rawlinson, C.B.,† a young officer who had attracted the favourable notice of the Governor-General and who was at the time at Calcutta, was accordingly selected, at his own request, to be Political Agent in Turkish 'Iraq in succession to Colonel Taylor. He was given a passage from

Maintenance of the Political Agency, and appointment thereto by the Government of India of Major Rawlinson with special instructions and powers, 1843.

* Colonel Taylor is perhaps unfortunate in the connections in which his name has been preserved in official documents. We learn from Layard that "he was a man of much learning and an excellent scholar, acquainted with various Eastern languages amongst which was that of the Sabaeans, whose books he had studied under one of their priests" also that he possessed "a valuable library rich in manuscripts and rare works relating to Oriental geography and history" (Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume II, pages 171 and 213). His hospitality also was great (Mitford's *Land March*, Volume I, page 325).

† Major (afterwards Sir H. C.) Rawlinson (Bart.), was born in 1810 and died in 1895. He belonged to the Indian Army, and was one of the 1834 batch of British military instructors lent to Persia. In the Afghan War he was Political Agent in charge of Qandahār during its occupation by the British. In 1859, after leaving Baghdād and retiring from the service, he was British Minister at Tehran. His fame as a scholar especially in connection with the decipherment of cuneiform writing, is hardly inferior to his reputation as a political officer.

Bombay to Basrah in Her Majesty's brig of war "Clio" and arrived at Baghdād on the 16th December 1843.

The orders which he carried with him were such as to enhance, instead of reducing, the dignity of the office to which he was appointed: he was directed to make the preservation of peace between Turkey and Persia his principal care; he was enjoined to keep himself in constant communication with the British Ambassador at Constantinople and the British Minister at Tehrān, and to endeavour to give effect to their views; and he was "vested with discretionary authority to issue directions "and to address requisitions to all the Political and Naval Officers in the "Persian Gulf as occasion may require." This last clause of his instructions gave rise, in 1848-49, to official difficulties, which are noticed in the history of 'Arabistān. From correspondence in those years it may be gathered that the dealings of the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq were now exclusively with the Government of India, and that the Government of Bombay had no authority over him.

Colonel
Farrant,
British
Special
Commissioner at
Baghdād,
1843.

On arrival at his destination Major Rawlinson found that Colonel Farrant, whom the British Ambassador at Constantinople had deputed to Turkish 'Irāq to enquire into the Karbala affair, was still at Baghdād and that he had been ordered by the same authority to remain there during the progress of the negotiations at Erzeroum, and to retain in his own hands the management of affairs relating to the frontier disputes between the Governments of Turkey and Persia. Major Rawlinson carefully avoided bringing his powers into collision with those of the special Commissioner; and he did not intervene in frontier matters, except by way of co-operation at Colonel Farrant's own request, until the departure of that officer from Baghdād.

Frontier tour
of Major
Rawlinson,
1844.

In 1844, after entering on his special frontier duties, Major Rawlinson made a tour, in connection with border disputes, to Zohāb, Kirmānshāh and Sulaimāniyah. He was accompanied by Commander Felix Jones, I.N., who made a survey of the districts traversed.

Political and
consular
status of the
British
representative at
Baghdād,
1839-61.

The political or Indian status of the British representative at Baghdād was now technically that of Agent, to which it had been reduced from that of Resident in 1812; and Major Rawlinson and his successors for many years seem never to have described themselves in their correspondence with the Government of India otherwise than as "Political Agent."

It appears probable that from 1802, when a consular *exequatur* was obtained from the Porte in the name of Mr. Harford Jones, until 1841, when Colonel Taylor was appointed His Britannic Majesty's Consul at

Baghdād and recognition of him as such was applied for at Constantinople, the British representative in Turkish 'Irāq was destitute of consular status ; but no practical difficulty had arisen from this irregularity, if it existed. In March 1844, Major Rawlinson was appointed His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Baghdād in succession to Colonel Taylor, and the effect of the appointment was explained to him by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in these words : " I think it right to observe to you that Consular rank was given to the East India Company's Agent at Baghdād, not with a view of making the Agent especially a servant of the Crown, but solely in order that he might be able, if circumstances called for Consular interference, to act as Consul, and it was expressly stated in the instructions to Colonel Taylor of the 10th August 1841, which you will find amongst the Consular archives at Baghdād, that Her Majesty's Commission was not intended to interfere with or alter his position as the East India Company's Resident at Baghdād further than to place under his superintendence the British Vice-Consul at Mosul."

This passage shows that the dual nature of the Baghdād charge was recognised by His Majesty's Government, and the use by the Secretary of State of the term " Resident " to describe, in his non-consular capacity the officer occupying it, is worthy of note.

On the 22nd November 1851 Colonel Rawlinson, who had been absent* on leave for two years, Lieutenant Kemball acting in his place, was appointed His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdād ; and the consular status of the British Political Agency or Residency remained thereafter that of a Consulate-General.

The consolidated salary of the British Political Agent about this time (1836-44) was Rs. 2,500 a month, while that of the Residency Surgeon varied from Rs. 515 to Rs. 715 per mensem.

From its institution in 1800 until the year 1843 the strength and composition of the British military guard at Baghdād varied but little, the number of sepoy's fluctuating between 25 and 32, while a fifer was occasionally substituted for drummers. In 1843, when Major Rawlinson became Political Agent, the guard consisted of one Native Officer, five non-commissioned officers, 24 sepoy's, and two drummers. As there were difficulties connected with the relief of the detachment, Major Rawlinson at first proposed to dispense with an Indian military guard altogether and to substitute for it a mounted escort of 15 or 20 sabres recruited on the spot ; it is possible that he was influenced by the further consideration

British
military
guard at
Baghdād,
1839-61.

* He passed through Mūsā, meeting Layard there, in October 1849 on his way to England *via* Constantinople (Layard's *Ninēveh and Babylon*, page 100).

that a mounted guard would be more useful to him on tour.* But subsequently, being unable, as he wrote, to find people of the country in whom he could place implicit confidence, and it being necessary also to provide for the safety of the Treasury, he modified his original proposals, and asked leave to retain a non-commissioned officer and nine sepoy of the Indian military detachment for employment as a treasury guard, and to engage a local mounted escort consisting of a Dafadar, 8 horsemen, a farrier and 3 grooms. This was granted, and in 1859 another horseman was substituted for the farrier; but otherwise no change was made in the sepoy guard or in the mounted escort until 1861-62, when, on grounds of economy, the strength of the escort was reduced from 13 men (including 3 grooms) to 10 men (including 3 grooms).

British
representa-
tion at
Basrah,
1851.

On the death of Khōjah † Parseigh Johannes, the British Native Agent at Basrah, in June 1851, a joint recommendation by Major Rawlinson and Lieutenant Kemball was accepted by Government under which Mr. J. Taylor, a son of the former Political Agent Colonel R. Taylor, was appointed to be British representative at Basrah in subordination to the British Political Agent at Baghdād. This step was no doubt connected with the erection of Basrah by the Turkish Government into a separate Pāshāliq, a change which had been made just a year earlier. Mr. Taylor's position, by whatever name his appointment may have been described, did not apparently enable him to exert much influence over the new Pāsha of Basrah; and Colonel Williams, the British Frontier Commissioner, found himself constrained to write as follows in November 1851, with reference to the proceedings of Ma'shūq Pāsha, already noticed elsewhere: "I have had my doubts of the working of the new Pashalick of Bussorah, even under ordinary circumstances, but here we have a man like the present governor acting without the high control and supervision of the consulate of Baghdād, embroiling his country, thwarting the benevolent views of her allies, and, I fear, enriching himself by a system of wide corruption and bribery, and I beg to submit to Your Excellency ‡ the question of the propriety of his removal ere he can arouse the Persian Court to acts of reprisal and (*sic*) their evil consequences to the trade of Bussorah as well as that of Mohammareh.

* Mr. Rich's escort on a journey to Babylon in 1811 consisted of his "own troop of Hussars, with a galloper gun, a havildar and twelve sepoy"; and in 1820, when he visited Kurdistan, he took with him "the guard of twenty-five sepoy and their Subadar, allowed the Resident as a body-guard by the Government of Bombay." What would be the feelings of the Turks at the present day if the British Resident were to undertake a military progress through the country with the Residency guard?

† Layard calls him Mr. "Barsac" and describes him as an Armenian gentleman (Layard's *Early Adventures*, Volume II, pages 177 and 179).

‡ The British Ambassador at Constantinople.

"I beg to embrace this opportunity to bring this prompt notice of Mr. Taylor's to Your Excellency's notice, and to suggest that, if the separate Pashalick of Bussorah be rendered a permanent measure, Mr. Taylor may receive such a commission as will enable him to communicate directly with Your Excellency."

In April 1854 a reference occurs, in official correspondence, to "the individual who officiates as British Agent at Nejef." This may have been an unofficial native correspondent only, though it was open to Major Rawlinson as Consul-General to appoint a Vice-Consul, for no mention is made of recognition by the Turks of any British representative at Najaf. His appointment was probably due, in any case, to the influx of Indian settlers into the Holy Cities, to which reference has been already made, and to the dangers to which the Indian immigrants were exposed in the course of the local revolts of 1852 and 1854.

British
representa-
tion at
Najaf,
1854.

In 1839 the East India Company despatched from England in frame work, *vid* the Cape of Good Hope, three additional iron steamers, the "Assyria," "Nimrod" and "Nitocris," which, with the "Euphrates" already maintained by the Company in Mesopotamia, were to form a flotilla of four armed vessels for service on the Euphrates and Tigris. The component parts, which were shipped on the "Urania" in June, arrived at Basrah on the 22nd December 1839; and by the end of April 1840 the steamers had been successfully put together. Each new steamer was divided into three compartments internally, and carried six swivels guns, besides two large guns fore and aft. The fuel used by them was tamarisk wood supplied by Arabs, on contract, at fixed stations.

Formation
and work of
a British
armed flotilla
in Mesopota-
mian waters,
1839-40

Lieutenant* H. B. Lynch was appointed to command the flotilla, in which capacity he was to act under the advice of the Political Agent; and it was laid down that the Superintendent of the Indian Navy, to which the vessels were attached, should not "originate any orders as to the particular duties" on which they were to be employed.

It is not stated that the East India Company had other objects in view besides the promotion of trade by opening up and civilising the country; but it must be supposed† that the carriage of mails between India and Europe at first formed part of their plan.

* An account of Lieutenant H. B. Lynch's career will be found in *Law's History of the Indian Navy*, Vol. II, pages 33-34, and page 289. He lost one brother in the accident to the "Tigris" on the Chesney Expedition and another by an illness contracted while commanding one of the vessels of the Mesopotamian flotilla.

The traveller Mitford, however, remarks: "I imagine this flotilla is here more with a political object than for any service it may render either in forwarding mails or merchandise; for the latter it is useless, and, for despatches to India, it is much too dilatory: should the Suez line ever be interfered with there is a land route across the desert to Beyrout: and another by courier, through Trukey in Asia to Constantinople,

One of the steamers was fired at by Arabs, and struck, on her first voyage to Baghdād ; she replied with discharges of grape-shot among the Arabs' herds of buffaloes, killing many.

The chief performance of the flotilla was an ascent of the Euphrates by the "Nitocris" and "Nimrod" in 1841 under the command of Lieutenant C. D. Campbell, I.N., assisted by Lieutenant Felix Jones, I.N., Commander Lynch being then on leave. After carefully examining the Euphrates from 'Ānah to Hilla in a boat, besides surveying the Tigris from Baghdād to Qūrnah and exploring the Shatt-al-Gharāf and Jahaglah, Lieutenant Campbell left Basrah on the 1st April 1841, passed 'Ānah on the 7th May, and reached Maskanah on the 31st May. Lieutenants Campbell and Jones visited the Mediterranean from Maskanah and connected that sea chronometrically with the upper Euphrates. Commander Lynch having rejoined at Maskanah in August, the descent began, on which a survey down the Euphrates was made and the "Nimrod" was sunk by a snag, but was raised again. 'Ānah was reached on the 29th April 1842. The result of this remarkable voyage was, unfortunately, to demonstrate the practical unnavigability of the Euphrates by the steamers of the flotilla.

Navigation
Farmān or
Viziriāl
Letter of
1841.

It is not stated that the existence or movements of the flotilla aroused any distrust or opposition on the part of the Turkish authorities ; and in 1841 a navigation Farmān or Viziriāl Letter, supplementary to that of 1834, was obtained at Constantinople. The object was stated to be the protection* of "the Commandant† of the two steamers" in the execution of his duties. The document referred to the Chesney Expedition ; it cited the Farmān of 1834 ; and it concluded with this direction, addressed doubtless to the Pāsha of Baghdād, or perhaps to Turkish officials in general : "Vous aurez soin que les susdits bateaux fassent comme par le passé le service de la rivière, à condition qu'il n'y ait point un inconvenient quelconque et l'entreprise soit favorable aux deux parties."

by which the letters would travel with greater despatch." (*Land March*, Volume 1, pages 309-310.)

* In 1841, as we have seen, two of the steamers of the flotilla were detained for the season at Maskanah in the bounds of the Aleppo Pāshāliq ; and special arrangements had to be made to prevent the local Arabs from annoying them.

† The substantive Commander of the flotilla was at this time Lieutenant Lynch, and if his *name* was mentioned in the Farmān, the circumstance may account for the confusion that subsequently arose, or was wilfully created, between the title of the British Government to navigate the rivers and that of Messrs. Lynch & Co. It should be mentioned, however, that Commander Lynch was absent on sick leave from July 1840 to August 1841. Unfortunately no copy of the Farmān is forthcoming among the archives of the Government of India or the Government of Bombay.

The "Euphrates," "Nimrod," and "Assyria" were withdrawn in the summer of 1842, under the orders of the Government of India, for service on the Indus. The total cost of maintenance of the flotilla from 1837, when the "Euphrates" was transferred to the East India Company, up to 1842, when the flotilla was broken up, was approximately Rs. 3,50,000. It is possible that the advantages expected from the flotilla, whatever they were, had not been obtained, or that they were found to be incommensurate with the expense. Disappointment in regard to the navigability of the Euphrates probably contributed to the result, all hope of a good mail route to Europe by that line having been extinguished.

Reduction of the flotilla and retention of the "Nitocris" only, 1841-1843.

In 1843 the "Nitocris" alone remained in the waters of Mesopotamia, and Lieutenant Felix Jones succeeded Lieutenant Lynch in command of her. The annual cost of the "Nitocris" was about Rs. 55,000.

In 1844 the utility of the "Nitocris" in Turkish 'Irāq seems to have been called in question by the Government of India, and a proposal was made to remove her as the other vessels of the flotilla had been removed. It was opposed by Major Rawlinson in two perspicuous despatches, from which the passages that follow are taken :

Question of the retention of any British armed steamer, 1844-45.

It is impossible, it appears to me, to reduce this question to a mere pecuniary calculation, for, although the outlay upon the one side be direct and tangible, yet the return which that outlay brings is, for the most part, incidental and a matter of opinions rather than of proof. The only immediate advantages that we desire from the presence of a steamer on the rivers of Mesopotamia refer to the protection of our merchants and to the security and extension which are thereby given to our commerce. Within the last few years three independent British houses of agency have been established at Baghdad, and other parties encouraged by the prosperous condition of the trade are about to enter on the same field of enterprise. The insecurity of the river and the rapacity of the Arabs who live on the banks presented in former times serious obstacles to the introduction of our manufactures into the Pashalik of Baghdad, but those evils have now almost disappeared and it is matter of notoriety that we owe the change to our exhibition of strength upon the Tigris and Euphrates and to the friendly relations which we have established with the Montefik, the Beni Lam, the Zobeid and the other great Arab tribes upon the banks rather than to any increased efficiency on the part of the Turkish Government or to any real improvement in the character of the Arabs.

Whilst a single steamer continues to ply upon the river, the Arabs are reminded of our strength, and they respect not only British boats, but those also of our Turkish allies, but were that steamer to be withdrawn, they would assuredly revert to their old habits of plunder, and the river trade would be entirely at their mercy.

But the chief benefits which attend the presence of a steamer upon the Tigris are as I have mentioned incidental and their importance or otherwise depends upon a general view of Eastern policy which I am neither competent nor would it be becoming in me to discuss. It strengthens the hands of the British Agent in the most effectual, and at the same time in the least ostentatious, manner possible; it enables him to vindicate

the rights of those under his protection ; it assists his' mediation between the Turkish and Persian authorities ; it places him in the most favourable position for maintaining the dignity of the British Government and it acquires for him local influence to an extent which, without such a means of support, would be altogether unattainable. The French Government has been unceasing in its endeavours for many years to supersede British influence in Asiatic Turkey, and that it has not more successfully availed itself of the vantage ground which it enjoys, as the declared protector of the Catholics of the East, is owing, I think as much to our continued exhibition of strength in this quarter and in the Persian Gulf, as to the late success of our arms in Syria, and to the presence of our fleet in the Mediterranean. The right of navigating the rivers of Mesopotamia with armed steamers, it may also be observed, was obtained with some difficulty by special firman from the Sultan ; and so long as the right continues in active exercise, no attempt is likely to be made at its abrogation ; but should the privilege be once voluntarily abandoned, should we resign the navigation of the rivers into the hands of another power, it would be necessary, in the event of a possible desire for the resumption of our right, to make a second application to the Porte ; and I cannot doubt that in the spirit of isolation which has for some time governed the Ottoman Council, and which leads the Turkish Government to exhibit day by day more determined resistance to measures of European intervention, such an application would be received with much distrust, and would occasion serious embarrassment at Constantinople.

* * * * *

By the establishment of wood stations along the course of the river, the Commander* is brought into regular and most friendly communication with the Arab tribes who reside upon the banks. He is visited by several of the Chiefs on every occasion of his ascent or descent of the river, and by a judicious distribution of trifling presents he is enabled to maintain a connection which, if it answered no other purpose than that of pre-occupying the ground, would still not be without its value. The rapidity also with which by the monthly visit of the steamer to Bussorah intelligence reaches Baghdād of the state of affairs in the Chaab country has frequently been found of the greatest use in supplying timely and correct information to Her Majesty's Ministers at Constantinople and Tehrān and to the Commissioner employed at Erzroom, whilst the occasional transport of Turkish officers of rank between Baghdād and Bussorah lays the Local Government under obligations to us, which materially assist my official intercourse with the Pasha. I attribute it, indeed, in a great measure to the presence of a steamer at Baghdād, that, where as in all the other provinces of the Turkish Empire occasions of dispute between the Local Government and the resident British functionary are of most frequent and embarrassing occurrence, I have not been called upon in a single instance since my appointment to this Agency to claim the interference of the Ambassador at Constantinople in the support of our interests, or the vindication of our national right.

The true point of view, at the same time, in which, I think, the maintenance of an armed steamer on the Tigris should be regarded, is as a part, however fractional and remote, of our great system of universal maritime ascendancy. Our flag is at present supreme (by sufferance be it allowed yet it is still supreme) on the waters of Mesopotamia. If it be once lowered, another flag will replace it, and we shall then be excluded from the navigation of the Tigris and the Euphrates, as we have been shut out of the Danube, and as we are threatened with exclusion from the Nile.

In April 1846 an attempt was made by Commander Felix Jones under instructions from Major Rawlinson, who attached great importance to its success, to take the "Nitocris" up the Tigris upon the spring floods as far as Mūsāl. The river had already been ascended to some distance above Baghdād in 1843. The experiment was a failure, however, owing to the inability of the steamer to make head against the current at the spot where the river passes through a gap in the Hamrīn hills not far above Dūr. Major Rawlinson had intended that advantage should be taken of the voyage to establish friendly relations with the 'Obaid, 'Azzah Tāi and Shammar tribes, and he authorised* special disbursements in this connection ; but his chief object was to retain the right of navigation "in active exercise, wherever there may be sufficient water for the steam vessel that bears our flag."

Attempt to reach Mūsāl with the "Nitocris," 1846.

The "Nitocris" was found particularly useful in 1849, when in consequence of tribal disturbances, all native navigation was stopped, while British-owned boats continued to pass freely up and down the Tigris. In 1850, however, she was reported unserviceable, and her replacement was urged by the Acting Resident, Lieutenant Kemball. In 1852 she was so crippled by defective boilers that she could not, even had the Resident approved of such a use being made of her, "be prudently sent on any service where she might be required to come into action with the Arabs."

Absence of the "Nitocris" at Bombay, 1849-52.

At length in 1852, after a delay caused by the Burmese War, the "Comet,"† a by no means new but otherwise suitable steamer, was refitted and sent to Basrah to take the place of the "Nitocris." She performed the same duties as her predecessor ; chiefly the carrying of the British mails, the maintenance of friendly relations with the tribes, and the surveillance and protection of British trade and shipping, also survey and observation work.

Substitution of the "Comet" for the "Nitocris," 1852.

In 1839 a site was required for putting together the British Government steamers sent in parts from Europe, and as a dépôt for the coal and other stores of the British flotilla that was to be, and Kūt-al-Farangi or "Magil," on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab 4 miles above Basrah, was provisionally occupied. This was an estate bought by Mr. Manesty, when he was British Resident at Basrah, from the native proprietors ; on

British steamer depôts at Basrah (Kūt-al-Farangi or "Magil") and Baghdād, 1839-58.

* From 1844 onwards the Commander of the "Nitocris" had a grant of Rs. 100 a month from Government for the purpose of making small presents to the Arab Shaikhs with whom he was thrown in contact.

† It does not appear that she derived her name from Bell's first steamer on the Clyde. The Indian Navy at this time possessed a whole galaxy of astronomical bodies, including a "Planet," a "Satellite" and a "Meteor," as well as a "Comet." The "Comet" seem to have been built in 1838, and she took part in the operations in Sind in 1843.

it he had built a house and resided ; and from him it was purchased by Colonel Taylor, who subsequently became British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq.

1840. In 1840 Commander Lynch, the officer in charge of the flotilla, suggested that Magil should be acquired by Government from Colonel Taylor, who was still Political Agent at Baghdād, as a marine dépôt. A board of military officers from Khārag Island, then under British occupation, visited the place in the same year and reported the ground and buildings to be suitable for the purpose for which they were required. There was also a question of renting a house and garden at Baghdād, similarly the property of Colonel Taylor, which had been occupied as a dépôt for the flotilla.

1842. Correspondence on the subject was prolonged until 1842, when Colonel Taylor finally offered to sell the Basrah and Baghdād dépôts for Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 10,000 respectively, which he represented to be the amounts that they had cost him, or to lease both to Government for a monthly sum of Rs. 250. Meanwhile, however, the flotilla was broken up ; only the "Nitocris" remained ; and it seemed to be expected that a dépôt could be dispensed with.

1844. But the necessities of the situation obliged Major Rawlinson and Commander Felix Jones to raise the question again in 1844, when, Colonel Taylor having left the country, the Magil property was being managed by Messrs. Lynch & Co. on his behalf. It appears that the Magil dépôt had, in fact, never been evacuated ; and the Superintendent of the Indian Navy considered that one was required, and that Magil was the most suitable place. At length, in May 1844, the Government of Bombay authorised the payment, as recommended by Major Rawlinson, of a monthly rent of Rs. 100. Messrs. Lynch had demanded double that amount on Colonel Taylor's behalf. Colonel Taylor then brought a back claim for rent of Magil from 1st November 1839 to 1st May 1844 at Rs. 200 a month, and for rent of the Baghdād dépôt from 1st May 1840 to 1st August 1843 at Rs. 100 a month, or in all for Rs. 14,700.

1847. In 1847 this claim was compounded on the payment by Government of Rs. 100 (instead of Rs. 300) a month for the two dépôts for the period during which they had been occupied, making altogether Rs. 5,400. Thereafter the lease of Magil was renewed from time to time.

1851-52. In 1851-52 the Government of India were prepared to purchase the Magil property for £1,000 ; but the transaction could not be carried out, because Messrs. Lynch, the managers, had only certain specified powers under their power of attorney, and Colonel Taylor was at the time too ill to be consulted.

In the end Messrs. Lynch & Co. themselves became the owners of 1858. Magil, and in 1858 they received Rs. 2,000 from the Government of India as compensation for damage done to the quays in the Persian War, when horses, mules and stores for the British forces were embarked there.

These were days of great activity in the exploration and survey of Turkish 'Irāq; the principal workers were the officers of the Indian Navy employed with the flotilla and, later on, with the "Nitocris" and "Comet." British explorations and surveys, 1839-61.

In 1841 a regular survey of the Euphrates valley was begun, the upper portion of which was eventually connected by chronometric observations with the basin of the Mediterranean. Commander Lynch and Lieutenants Felix Jones, Campbell, Selby, and Grounds, with the steamers "Nitocris" and "Nimrod," took part in the work. Commander H. B. Lynch.

Commander Felix Jones, after succeeding to the command of the "Nitocris" in 1843, engaged with remarkable energy, and for the most part single-handed, in the pursuit of topographical and general information. The result of his labours from 1843 to 1855, in which latter year he was appointed Political Resident at Būshehr, forms an enduring monument of intelligence, enterprise and industry; and the extent to which later * European workers in Mesopotamia are indebted to him is not, perhaps, generally realised. Commander Felix Jones.

In August and September 1844 he accompanied Major Rawlinson, the Political Agent, on his journey to Zohāb, Kirmānshah and Sulaimāniyah and made a valuable survey of the country traversed for the information of the Frontier Commission at Erzeroum. In April 1846, in the "Nitocris," he ascended the Tigris to a point above Dūr and recorded useful observations, but failed, as mentioned before, to reach Mūsāl. In April 1848 he made a survey and wrote an elaborate account of the remains of the ancient Nahrwān Canal. Between April and September 1850 he examined and surveyed the country on the west side of the Tigris between Baghdad and the head of the Dujail. In 1852, under the orders of the Government of India, who now granted him a special allowance of Rs. 150 a month as "Surveyor" together with an allowance for an "Assistant," he made a trigonometrical survey of the country between the Tigris and the Persian hills, from Baghdad as far north as Mūsāl, embracing the districts of Kifri (Salāhiyah), Kirkūk, Āltūn Köprü, Arbīl and Mūsāl. In 1853 was

* Sir W. Willcocks, whose schemes for irrigation of Mesopotamia have now (1912) been taken in hand, drew his earliest inspirations on the subject from Jones' monograph on the old Nahrwān Canal. Jones' principal memorandam on Mesopotamia are printed in Bombay Selections, No. XLIII, 1857.

completed by his Assistant, Midshipman Collingwood, a large scale plan* of Baghdad city ; it was accompanied by a memoir on the province, full of statistical information, from the pen of Commander Jones himself. In 1854 he sent to England, along with a memoir, three sheets of a "Babylonian" survey which he had completed, and which extended from Musaiyib on the Euphrates to the north-west corner of the Bahr-an-Najaf ; but the maps were lost in the India House. After this, returning prematurely from leave, he acted as Political Agent at Baghdad from March to October 1855.

Commander
W. B. Selby.

In 1855 Commander Selby succeeded Commander F. Jones in charge of the Mesopotamian surveys ; and the districts of Babylon, Karbala, Kūfah and Najaf, already covered by Commander Jones, were trigonometrically resurveyed by him with the assistance of Lieutenants Collingwood and Bewsher, besides which a considerable tract of country to the eastward was taken in.

This survey was finished in 1861 ; but the clean sheets were again lost, together with an elaborate paper by Commander Selby. The field books and original sheets having been procured from Baghdad, however, an admirable map was produced from them by Lieutenant Collingwood ; it now requires some correction in consequence of natural changes, but it seems unlikely to be superseded. Other minor surveys were carried out by Lieutenant Collingwood.

The general outcome of the Chesney Expedition, and of 22 years' labour on the part of the Indian Navy officers mentioned who continued its work, was that Turkish 'Irāq had been converted from a *terra incognita* into a country perfectly well understood in its main features, while certain important districts in it had been carefully delineated in great detail.

British
archæological
enterprises,
1839-61.

Of less value politically, but nevertheless of great importance in the domain of archæological research, were the excavations undertaken and the discoveries made by British travellers and officials during this period at the ancient sites of Assyria and Babylonia. The subject † lies beyond

* This plan of Baghdad is still the best in existence. It was borrowed by the Wālī of Baghdad from the British Resident in 1912 for practical purposes and was used in 1913 by the representatives of a British firm of electrical engineers charged with the installation under a concession, of electric tramways and lighting at Baghdad. Collingwood had to work by stealth on account of the suspiciousness of the Turkish authorities, noting bearings and paces with a pencil upon his white shirt. While the plan was being made Commander Jones absented himself from Baghdad on other work.

† The following authorities may be consulted: Layard's *Early Adventures*, 1887, *Nineveh, and its Remains*, 1848, and *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon*, 1853 ; Loftus' *Travels and Researches*, 1857, besides his articles in the

the scope of our history, and here it will be sufficient merely to mention the two expeditions of Mr. (afterwards Sir A. H.) Layard to Assyria and Babylon in 1845-47 and 1849-50, which proved so rich in results ; to the work of Mr. W. K. Loftus at Nifar, Warkah and Muqaiyar in 1849-50 ; and to the operations of Major (afterwards Sir H. C.) Rawlinson at various places during his tenure of the Baghdad Political Agency from 1843 to 1855. These excavators gave an immense extension to the work so well initiated by the precocious but unfortunate Rich during his term of office as Resident at Baghdād from 1808 to 1821.

After the introduction of regular British steam navigation on the Tigris the British Horse Post between Baghdād and Basrah was abolished. It existed, however, until September 1841, and seems to have been both efficient and safe. Letters were frequently conveyed between Basrah and Baghdād in five days, or about the same time as is now taken by the British mail steamers ; and the British mail was so much respected by the Arabs as to confer a certain degree of protection on persons who travelled with it. A British Dromedary Mail *viâ* Damascus continued to exist ; and in 1844, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq was authorised to levy informal "postage" on articles sent by it by private individuals. At the same time, to meet a deficit in the revenue from "postage," the Government of India made a grant of Rs. 200 a month for the maintenance of the service.

The British
Dromedary
Mail, 1839-
61.

If some of the British officers at this time employed in Mesopotamia secretly looked forward to a day when that province should have become a British possession, the fact need cause no astonishment. Turko-Persian frontier relations were supervised by the British representative at Baghdād ; British local interests were daily increasing ; and nearly everything that was done for the improvement of the country, whether in steam navigation, land and river surveys, postal communication or trade, was due to British foresight and hard work.

Policy of the
local British
officers in
Turkish
'Irāq, 1839-
61.

The Turkish provincial administration, on the other hand, as oppressive and corrupt as it was inefficient, seemed likely ere long to achieve its own ruin ; and its hostility to all foreigners, vented in obstruction and annoyance, must have disposed such foreign representatives as had to deal with it to desire its downfall. Of his later relations with Najib Pasha Major Rawlinson wrote in 1848 to the British Ambassador at Constantinople :

Journal of the Royal Geographical Society ; and a number of articles by Rawlinson in the Journals of the Royal Asiatic Society, Royal Geographical Society, and Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. An excellent general résumé will be found in H. V. Hilprecht's *Explorations in Bible Lands during the Nineteenth Century*, 1903.

Your Excellency must be aware, from my last six months' series of despatches, of the general spirit by which the Pāsha is actuated. His hostility must be ascribed in its origin to his innate hatred of all Europeans, while it was no doubt called into more open activity by finding that British privileges interfered with his pecuniary gains and that my assertion of those privileges impeded the exercise of what he would fain have considered an irresponsible power. Tardily wakening to a sense of the impolicy of having incurred so formidable a danger as might arise out of the exertion of your Excellency's influence against him at the Porte, he is far from exhibiting at present the same disposition to invade our rights and to forget that which may be due to our honour and our interests which he displayed during his former happy state of confidence in the complete immunity of his contract,—but at the same time there is nothing like cordiality, or even conciliation, in his demeanour. He has been frightened into a truce, which is only broken by an occasional sortie, but he is by no means inclined to lay aside his arms, and I can only preserve the position of comparative security in which I have been placed through your Excellency's valuable support, by constant alertness and by showing that I am prepared to repel attack in whatever quarter it may be offered.

Colonel Rawlinson's* own views with reference to the future of Mesopotamia may be inferred from the following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Government of India in 1852 :

The British Government has undoubtedly at present, owing to the efficient establishment which she has kept up for the last sixty years in Turkish Arabia, a paramount local influence, and there are two European eventualities, not perhaps imminent, but certainly to be looked for in due course of time, which may render that influence of great importance to India. One of these eventualities is the resumption of those schemes of ambition and aggrandisement which would probably inaugurate the reign of a new Russian Emperor; the other is the dismemberment of Turkey, which in the present sinking condition of the Empire would be the almost certain consequence of a European war.

I have thus considered it my duty, since my nomination to the Political Agency of Turkish Arabia, to adopt a general conciliatory conduct, and to strengthen and extend our local influence, as far as that end may be attainable without giving umbrage to the Turkish authorities.

It seems no far-fetched supposition that the enthusiasm and activity of the officers associated with the Political Agent in navigation and survey work may have had their source in great aspirations inconsistent with Turkish sovereignty over Mesopotamia and that some inkling of the forward policy which they entertained may have reached the Turks and the Arabs. The conviction that Britain entertains designs on Mesopotamia and the jealousy with which the Turkish authorities regard direct dealings between the British representative and Shaikhs of the Arab tribes, two notable features of the situation in Turkish 'Irāq at the present day, would in that case date from this period of rapid political and commercial movement.

*Writing on the 13th June 1853 to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Rawlinson submitted a lengthy memorandum in regard to the possible contingency of the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and advocated strongly the occupation by troops from India of the whole strip of territory from the Lower Zab and Annah to the sea.

Special British Indian interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1839-61.

The scheme of establishing rapid communication between Europe and India by means of British steamers on the Euphrates having been abandoned, its place was taken by a project for a railway to be constructed under British auspices from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. This* project was first propounded in March 1856 by Mr. W. P. Andrew, formerly an official in the Indian Post Office, who had made a special study of railway questions in India and the Middle East; and his proposals were supported by the Court of Directors of the Hon'ble East India Company. A company was formed, with Mr. Andrew as Chairman, for the execution of his scheme; a concession was, by the diplomatic good offices of Her Majesty's Government, obtained on their behalf from the Porte; General F. R. Chesney, the leader of the Euphrates and Tigris expedition of 1834-36, was appointed the Company's Commissioner at Constantinople; Sir John Macneill, an eminent railway expert of the day, became their Engineer-in-Chief; His Majesty's Ship, "Stromboli" was placed at the disposal of General Chesney and Sir J. Macneill; the harbours of Aleppo and Suwaidiyah were examined; and a survey was made of the route from Suwaidiyah to Aleppo, besides a reconnaissance of that from Aleppo to Maskanah on the Euphrates. The scheme was favourably regarded by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and by Lord Clarendon, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Proposed
British Eu-
phrates
Valley Rail-
way from
the Medi-
terranean
to the Per-
sian Gulf,
1856-57.

On the 22nd June 1857 "a deputation in favour of the British Government granting pecuniary support to the Euphrates Valley Railway" had an interview with Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister; it was headed by Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Andrew; and it included many distinguished members of both Houses of Parliament as well as specialists such as General Chesney and his former assistant Mr. W. Ainsworth, General Sir Fenwick Williams, the defender of Qārs, Sir Justin Sheil, formerly His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran,

* Mr. Andrew's project was preceded by another and more ambitious one which owed its existence to Sir Macdonald Stephenson and came into being, originally, about 1840. It contemplated, in its earlier form, continuous railway communication between the West and India *via* Constantinople, Asia Minor, Aleppo, the Euphrates Valley, Basrah, Bandar 'Abbās and Karachi; in its later form the line was intended to run, beyond Kharput, by Tabriz, Tehrān, Mashhad, Herāt and Qandahār into Sind. No guarantee was sought on behalf of this scheme, which continued in existence until 1879 at least; but it does not seem to have advanced much beyond the academic stage.

Mr. T. K. Lynch, and others. Lord Palmerston assured the deputation that the Government were fully alive to the importance of the Euphrates route, and that they had supported, and would continue to support, the project of a Euphrates Valley Railway, without consulting his colleagues, however, he was unable to say anything on the subject of a financial guarantee by the British Government; and he therefore requested that the proposals of the Company might be submitted to him in writing, promising that they should receive full consideration, and that the Government would assist the scheme in so far as they were able.

Evidently Her Majesty's Government arrived at the conclusion that a financial guarantee could not properly be given; and without a reliable guarantee, the undertaking no doubt appeared unattractive to capitalists. The concession granted by the Porte was in the end allowed to lapse without having been utilised by the Company.

From the period with which we are now concerned Indian interests begin to bulk more and more largely in the work of the British Political Agency at Baghdād.

Grant by His Highness Mir Nāsir Khān of Sind for the clearance of the Husainiyah Canal, 1836-42.

The clearing from silt of the Husainiyah Canal, the 20 mile long channel by which Karbala derives its water supply from the Euphrates, is a periodically recurring difficulty which continues even at the present day to exercise the Turkish local authorities. In 1836 His Highness Mīr Nāsir Khān of Sind resolved to undertake the work of clearance as a pious duty and requested the good offices of the Governor of Bombay, to whom he remitted Rs. 20,000 as a first instalment towards the cost. As his agents for carrying out the operation he deputed to Karbala two individuals named Saiyid Mehdi Shāh and Hāji Sālīh; and it was his desire that the funds which they required should be advanced to them, from time to time, by the British representative at Baghdād. The arrangements which he desired were authorised; and in 1838 the Mīr, having been informed by his agents that the work would cost a lakh of rupees, remitted a supplementary amount of Rs. 50,000 to the British Political Agent at Baghdād, through the Agent, the Governor-General in Sind, and the Government of Bombay. In 1839 Mīr Nāsir Khān asked for a credit of an additional Rs. 50,000 at Baghdād, which was granted. In 1842 Colonel Taylor, after repeated references to him by the British authorities in India, reported that he had advanced Rs. 1,09,999 in all to His Highness's agents, *viz.*, in October 1837, April and November 1840, and June 1842; and the accounts were closed. A balance which remained due by the Mīr, in consequence of his procrastination in making good the credit of Rs. 50,000 that had been allowed him, was in the end duly recovered.

The Oudh Bequest, 1849-61.

We come now to the subject of the "Oudh Bequest", a valuable trust of an unusual nature, the administration of which, since it came into operation in 1849, has been a cause of grave and incessant difficulty to the British representative at Baghdād.

The Oudh
Bequest,
1849-61.

In 1825, during a period of financial stringency occasioned by a war in Burma, Lord Amherst, then Governor-General of India, accepted a loan, generally known as the third Oudh Loan, from Ghāzi-ud-Dīn Haidar, King of Oudh. The terms of the loan were defined in an Agreement made at Lucknow through Mr. Mordaunt Ricketts, the British Resident in Oudh. The amount of the loan was ten million rupees, and its character was perpetual. The principal was never to be repaid; and the interest, fixed at 5 per cent. per annum, was to be applied by the Government of India in perpetuity to particular specified purposes.

The Agreement mentioned was concluded at Lucknow, in counterpart, on the 17th August 1825. One part, written in Persian and bearing the King of Oudh's seal, was delivered to Mr. Ricketts. The other part, written in Persian and signed by Mr. Ricketts as the representative of the Governor-General, was handed to the King under a stipulation, expressed in both parts, that it should be returned on being replaced by a document in accordance with it bearing the seal and signature of the Governor-General. The Agreement was ratified by Lord Amherst on the 30th September 1825. Unfortunately, though the contents of the two original parts and of the document signed and sealed by the Governor-General, which last contained an English translation in a column parallel to the Persian text, were very similar, the wording of all three was different.

Agreement
concluded
between the
King of
Oudh and the
Governor-
General of
India, 17th
August 1825.

The Agreement, among other things, made monthly allowances of Rs. 10,000, Rs. 2,500, Rs. 1,100 and Rs. 1,000, respectively, payable to Nawāb Mubārak Mahall, Sultān Maryam Begam, Mumtāz Mahall and Sarfarāz Mahall for life, the first two being wives of the King; and each of the said ladies was empowered to bequeath by will one-third of her allowance, after her death, to whatsoever person or object she desired; but the remaining two-thirds of each allowance, together with any portion not bequeathed by will of the one-third, were to be appropriated to benefactions at Karbala and Najaf. Other allowances, amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 929 a month, were assigned to servants and dependents of Sarfarāz Mahall, with a proviso that, if any of the assignees died without heirs, their allowances should be added to the sums devoted to the Karbala and

Najaf benefactions. It is the fund thus provided for disbursement at the Holy Cities which has since come to be known as the Oudh Bequest.

Discrepancies
in the differ-
ent parts of
the Agree-
ment.

The clause of the Agreement relating to the Oudh Bequest was, in the part sealed by the King of Oudh, fully, explicitly, and unambiguously worded. There the passage ran :

..... miqdār-i-bāqi-i-mazbūr-rā dū hissah kardah nisf ba-Najaf-i-Ashraf va nisf ba-Karbālā-i-Mu'alla nizd-i-Mujtahidān i-mujāvir-i-Ān-Āstān-i-malāik-pāshān mī-rasānidah bāshand ki mushār-ilaihim az taraf-i-Īn-Janib binābar-i-kasb-i-sawāb ba-arbāb-i-istihqāq taqsim mī-kardah bāshand.

This may be translated : ... they (i.e., the Honourable East India Company), having divided the aforesaid remaining sum into two parts, shall continue to transmit half to Najaf the Noble and half to Karbala the Sublime, to the Mujtahids resident at the angel-guarded Threshold, so that the said Mujahids may continue to distribute it to deserving persons on our behalf, for the acquirement of religious merit.

In the part of the Agreement signed by Mr. Ricketts the corresponding clause was worded thus :

..... va hamah mushāharah baqimānd nisf ba-Najaf-i-Ashraf va nisf ba-Karbālā-i-Mu'alla nizd-i-Mujtahidān-i-mujāvir-i-Ān-Āstān abad in muabbadan az taraf-i-Bādshāh-i-z-jāh-i-mu'azzam-ilāhi rasānidah khāhad shud ki masūbat-i-ān'aid-i-hāl-i-farkhundah-fāl-i-Janāb-i-Bādshāh gardad.

This version may be rendered in English thus :

.... and the whole remaining monthly allowance shall be transmitted, half to Najaf the Noble and half to Karbala Sublime, to the Mujtahids residing at the Threshold, eternally, on behalf of the glorious King aforesaid, in order that the religious benefits thereof may accrue to the auspicious condition of His Majesty the King.

In the bilingual document by means of which the Governor-General ratified the Agreement, the Persian text was exactly as in the part of the Agreement signed by Mr. Ricketts except that the omission of a stroke over a Persian letter made the wording ungrammatical and left room for a doubt whether the proper payees were the "Mujtahidān-i-mujāvir-i-Ān-Āstān", that is "the Mujtahids residing at the Threshold" or the "Mujtahidān (va) Mujavirān-i-Āstān", that is "the Mujtahids (and) Mujavirs of the Threshold".

The term "Mujtahid", it may be explained, includes only Shī'ah doctors of theology of the highest class; while the word "Mujāvir" would mean persons officially connected with the holy shrines, perhaps even persons who had settled at or near them for religious reasons.

The second of the alternative readings was adopted in the somewhat slipshod English version of the Agreement as ratified, which proceeded :

...the remaining two-thirds.....is to be divided into two equal parts; one half to be given to the Nujuf Ushruf, and the other half for Kerbulla to the* High Priest and Mujawurs (or persons who have it's charge), on the part of the said King, that His Majesty might thereby derive it's benefits.

It cannot be doubted that the part of the Agreement sealed by the King of Oudh was that in which his intentions were most † correctly, as well as most elaborately, expressed; that part, it will be noticed, stated that the funds transmitted to the payees were to be distributed by them to "deserving persons",—a point on which the other documents were silent. It is equally clear that there was no intention on the King's part of including Mujāvirs among the original payees, and that Mujāvirs would never have been mentioned at all in connection with the Oudh Bequest, had it not been for a clerical error by a Persian scribe which gave rise to an incorrect English version of the Agreement.

Sultān Maryam Begam and Nawāb Mubārak Mahall both died in the year 1849, King Ghāzi-ud-Din Haidar having predeceased them in 1827, and the clauses of the Agreement of 1825 constituting the Oudh Bequest became operative. The question of how practical effect should be given to them was considered by Lieutenant Kemball, the Acting Political Agent at Baghdād, in the absence on leave of the Political Agent, Colonel Rawlinson.

The magnitude of the Bequest and the political difficulties in which it threatened to involve the British Political Agency at Baghdād seem to have daunted, somewhat, the officiating British representative. Rupees 1,668 a month from the allowance of Sultān Maryam Begam and Rs. 6,666 a month from that of Nawāb Mubārak Mahall had fallen in with effect from the 6th April and the 30th June 1849, and large sums were rapidly accumulating. Lieutenant Kemball accordingly addressed the Government of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,

True meaning of the Agreement.

Coming into operation of the Oudh Bequest 1849.

Orders of Government in regard to the administration of the 1849-52.

*The arbitrary substitution of the singular for the plural will be observed. Moreover "High Priest" or even "Priest" is a misleading translation of the word "Mujtahid," the duties of Mujtahids being professorial, judicial and notarial, but not sacrificial.

†The King of Oudh's part of the Agreement seems to have been lost sight of for a long time; but in 1911, having been rediscovered by Khān Bahādur Maula Bakhsh, Attaché in the Foreign Office, Simla, it was referred by the Government of India to the Government of the United Provinces for examination and opinion. That Government held that it was superior in authority to the other Agreement papers, and the Government of India apparently concurred.

making reference to the Karbala massacre of 1843 and to the inveterate antipathy always existing between the Sunni and Shī'ah sects of Islām, to the latter of whom the Oudh Bequest belonged, while the Government of Turkish 'Irāq was in the hands of the former. He feared that the Bequest funds were already sufficiently large, "apart from the loan which with "probable facility might be raised upon the forthcoming monthly payments, to corrupt, if need be, the Turkish garrisons on the spot; or at all "events to secure the aid and co-operation of a formidable body of Sheah "fanatics, who would scarcely require the spur of pecuniary gain to devote "their lives to a cause by them esteemed so holy",—namely the freeing of Karbala and Najaf from Turkish domination. He added "I have endeavored to show that the supply of such considerable funds by monthly "payments to the Mujtahids of Karbala and Nejef may possibly, in their "uncontrolled expenditure, contain the elements of future disorder in this "Pashalic; and that their unconditional disbursement by me may hereafter "furnish grounds of umbrage to the Turkish Government". He also drew attention to the difficulties which might be experienced in keeping the Agency Treasury supplied with funds for making the required payments. In effect he only asked to "be invested with discretionary power to make "or suspend the payments in question without reference to the dates on which they fall due"; but it was clear from the tone of his letter that he disapproved of the execution of the Bequest being undertaken by the British Government, or at least by their representative at Baghdād.

Sir Stratford Canning, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, replied that the circumstances hardly seemed to warrant a violation of the terms of the King of Oudh's bequest, and that "the "most desirable arrangement would obviously be to pay the annuities as "willed, but to make the receivers effectually accountable for their proper "application". He considered the question to be one of such delicacy, however, as to necessitate a reference to Her Majesty's Government. In his instructions to Lieutenant Kemball he remarked: "You have at all "events to guard against any misunderstanding which might arise in some "period of trouble in consequence of the payments being made by means "of (the) British Agency, and I conceive that in spite of other consideration(s) everything of a clandestine or mysterious character should on "that account be carefully avoided in the course of the transaction".

1850. It was meanwhile decided, however, by the Government of India that the money should not be paid at Baghdād, and that instead the chief priests of Karbala and Najaf should, through private agents of their own, draw on the Bombay Treasury for the amount. A guarded concurrence in

these orders was expressed by Lord Palmerston, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and the system so instituted remained in force until 1852.

1852.

In that year the question was re-opened by Colonel Rawlinson, on his return from leave. He pointed out that the circuitous method of payment at Bombay had, in fact, a clandestine and mysterious appearance, and was more likely to cause trouble with the Turkish authorities than direct and open payment through Baghdād. He also thought that there was a real danger of the money being misapplied by the Mujtahids for want of proper control and remarked :

I may further mention that the evils which I have depicted as attendant on the present system of payment are not altogether hypothetical. I have reason to believe that there has been already an irregular, if not a treasonable, application of the funds; that considerable funds in fact have been diverted from charitable purposes to objects of personal ambition; and I have also learnt that the attention of the present Governor of the Pashalic has been drawn to the sudden influx of wealth into Kerbela and Nejef, and that he has expressed uneasiness at what he calls "the secret subsidising of the holy shrines by the British Indian authorities."

The remedy, in Colonel Rawlinson's opinion, was—

to place the disbursement unreservedly in the hands of the Political Agent accredited to the Court of Bagdad, who is at the same time Consul-General on the part of Her Britannic Majesty; to authorise him to see, according to the principle observed at Lucknow in all cases of guaranteed pensions, that the money in question is expended agreeably to the intention of the Royal donor, that is in eleemosynary grants and religious attendance, and not in political excitement or military corruption; and to give the Political Agent a discretionary power in emergent cases to suspend payment altogether.

These suggestions were not at all in accordance with the views of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India; and under his orders Colonel Rawlinson was instructed "that neither the Government of India nor the Political Agent have any right to exercise any control over the stipends which have been left by will to the priests". A despatch was, however, addressed to the Court of Directors of the East India Company suggesting that the opinion of the British Ambassador at the Porte should be taken; and the result was that Colonel Rose (afterwards Lord Strathnairn), then British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, supported the proposals of Colonel Rawlinson, remarking that it was necessary to the maintenance of good relations with the Turkish Government that the means of revolt and intrigue should be taken out of the hands of its sectarian opponents, the Shi'ah fanatics.

Accordingly, in October 1852, the Government of India cancelled their original orders ; the Oudh Bequest was made payable from the Baghdād Treasury ; and the Political Agent was authorised to exercise “ a judicious supervision over the expenditure of the money ”.

It seems probable that during the whole of this period discussions regarding the Oudh Bequest were conducted upon the basis of the misleading English translation of the Agreement of 1825. Various passages in the correspondence of Colonel Rawlinson and Lieutenant Kemball indicate this.

Results of
the Oudh
Bequest at
Najaf, 1852.

In 1852, in a despatch about the Najaf revolt addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Rawlinson remarked : “ Your Lordship will remember that the Indian Government .. . pays a “ sum of £5,000 annually, in virtue of its agreement with the late King of “ Oudh, for the maintenance of the Shrine of Nejjef, and the charities “ connected therewith ; and you will understand that this payment has “ drawn a vast concourse of devotees from India to reside in the town. “ Their presence furnishes me with an additional motive for wishing to “ prevent a recurrence of that scene of carnage which took place at the “ sack of Kerbela ten years ago... .. ”

Local ma-
nagement of
the Bequest
1852-54.

The manner in which Major Rawlinson, the Political Agent at Baghdad, “ consequent upon the instructions of Government to exercise a “ general supervision over the disbursements of the Lucknow benefactions “ to Karbala and Najaf, with a view to preventing the misappropriation “ of the funds to political or personal ends,” proceeded in the local administration of the Oudh Bequest was described by himself in a letter to the British Resident at Lucknow, in May 1854, as follows :

I entered last year into communication with the Chief Priests of *those places, Mirza Ali Naki and Shekh Murtaza, and concerted with them a scheme of distribution which would, I conceived, reconcile the greatest practicable amount of public benefit with a due regard to the terms of the original bequest, in this scheme, while providing completely for the individual claims of the Mujtahids and all the various religious establishments connected with the shrines, I secured at the same time a liberal allowance for purely charitable purposes, and even for objects of general interest and utility, such as repairing the mosques and colleges, and keeping open the canal from the Euphrates upon which Karbala is dependent for its supply of water. It is only fair to the Chief Priests to state that they responded most cordially to every suggestion which I offered and sought to secularize the distribution rather than to tie it up for exclusively religious purposes.

Having obtained from Mirza 'Ali Naqi an exact account of the application of the Karbala funds under this system during the year 1852-1853, Major Rawlinson forwarded it to the British Resident at Lucknow with these remarks.

* Karbala and Najaf.

My object, moreover, in forwarding these documents is not only to satisfy His Majesty the King of Oudh that the benefactions which came originally from the Lucknow Treasury have been duly administered, but to obtain also his Majesty's approval of the general scheme of distribution ; for there is a certain fanatical party at Karbala, headed by some of the junior Mujtahids, which repudiates all appropriation of the funds in question to charitable or secular purposes.

Colonel Sleeman, the Resident at Lucknow, replied expressing his entire concurrence in the arrangements made which seemed to him " most benevolent and judicious " and his willingness to submit the accounts to the King of Oudh, but pointing out that His Majesty's approval of the proceedings through it could readily be obtained, was not in any sense requisite.

Relations of other European powers with Turkish 'Irāq, 1839-61.

Besides Britain the only European power which at this time maintained a representative in Turkish 'Irāq seems to have been France.

There are frequent references in correspondence in the years following 1841 to a French Consul-General at Baghdād, whose attitude to the British representative, perhaps in consequence of the divergence of British and French policy in regard to Syria and the failure of a recent French mission to Persia, seems to have been unfriendly.

Representa-
tion of
French
interests at
Baghdād.

This official, though his country had no local interests except such as were connected with the Catholic religious orders, seems to have concerned himself a good deal in internal affairs. We have seen that Najib Pāsha, before proceeding to the reduction of Karbala in 1842, thought it necessary to inform the French as well as the British representative at Baghdād of his intentions ; and during the Karbala operations the French Consul-General was visited by some Persians who " requested his advice to know if they should proceed to Kerbella to help the Sheeahs, as it was a religious war ".

In 1843, as has been mentioned under the head of relations with Persia, the British Political Agent at Baghdād found that attempts on his part to interpose between the Turkish authorities and Persian subjects were regarded with jealousy by his French colleague ; and in 1845, in the debate regarding the necessity of retaining a British armed vessel in Mesopotamia, Major Rawlinson, as we have already seen, made reference to the ambitions of France in Asiatic Turkey.

'ABDUL 'AZĪZ, 1861-1876, AND MURĀD V, 1876.*

'Abdul Majīd died on the 25th June 1861 and was followed in the Sultanate by his brother 'Abdul 'Azīz, who ruled the Ottoman Empire for fifteen years. Under his rule the over-centralisation of the administration, dating from 1834, became intolerable, especially in the absence almost everywhere of means of communication; and in 1864 there was a partial return to the system of provincial devolution of authority. A† scheme of civil organisation prepared by 'Ali Pāsha was, after having been applied experimentally to the Danubian provinces through Mid-hat Pāsha afterwards Wālī of Baghdād, brought into force in 1867 throughout the Empire generally.

During the reign of 'Abdul 'Azīz the course of events in Turkish 'Irāq was little influenced, to outward appearance, by political events in Western Turkey: these last, therefore, need not be more than slightly noticed here. Trouble constantly prevailed in the Balkans, culminating in the "Bulgarian atrocities" of 1875-1876; and Muhammadan fanaticism was displayed in homicidal form at Salonica, where two foreign consuls were killed. But incompetent administration and wasteful finance were the most patent causes of a deterioration that now occurred in the general position of Turkey. Public extravagance had been rendered possible by the admission of the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War to the circle of the European powers, which facilitated the raising by Turkey of foreign loans; and it was bankruptcy, precipitated it is true by military expenditure in the Balkans, that reduced her to the miserable position in which at the fall of 'Abdul 'Azīz she was found. The Sultān, whose personal profligacy in money matters

* The sources of information regarding the history of Turkish 'Irāq during the reigns of 'Abdul 'Azīz and Murād V are almost exclusively official: they have been condensed by Mr. J. A. Saldanha in his *Précis of Turkish Arabia Affairs, 1801-1905*, printed in 1905. Notable exceptions exist in Mr. J. C. McCoan's *Our New Protectorate, 1879*, relating chiefly to general administration, and the writings of Lady Anne Blunt, whose *Bedouins of the Euphrates, 1879*, though referring to 1877-1878, and *Pilgrimage to Nejd, 1881*, though referring to 1878-1879, contain information relating to the period. Mr. G. Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey, 1878*, should also be mentioned. Sir F. J. Goldsmid's *Telegraph, Travel, 1874*, contains some facts in regard to the construction of the Baghdād-Persian Gulf line of telegraph.

† An admirable account of the Turkish executive system as remodelled in 1867 will be found in McCoan's *Our New Protectorate*, vol. I, pages 232-39, followed by remarks on the judicial system.

was among the causes of the catastrophe, was deposed in May 1876, by a political coalition including the Grand Vazir, the Minister of War, and Mid-hat Pāsha, ex-Wālī of Baghdād, under a Fatwa obtained from the Shaikh-ul-Islām. He died soon afterwards, not without indications of foul play, and was succeeded by a nephew bearing the title of Murād V. The new Sultān proved a nonentity and was removed for incompetence in August 1876, having reigned only three months.

As the situation of Turkey grew worse, from internal causes, Russian influence at Constantinople increased. In 1870, at the instance of Russia, the Bulgarian Exarchate was created by the Porte: this removed the Bulgarian Church from the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople and stimulated the growth of a Bulgarian national spirit. In 1871, after the overthrow of France by Germany, Russia succeeded in obtaining a partial abrogation of the Treaty of Paris, thus further enhancing her prestige on the Bosphorus. The modification of the Treaty restored to Russia and Turkey their freedom in regard to the maintenance of armaments in the Black Sea,—a change beneficial to the former country; but the Straits remained closed to all but Turkish men of war.

A law important to all foreign nations possessing subjects in Turkey was promulgated in June 1867, whereby foreigners were allowed for the future to own immoveable property throughout the Ottoman Empire, except in the sacred province of Hijāz, on condition of submitting to Turkish jurisdiction in respect of the same.

Relations of Turkey with Persia, 1861-76.

The most striking incident in the history of Turko-Persian relations during the reign of the Sultān 'Abdul 'Azīz, was a pilgrimage made by Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, the ruler of Persia, to the Shī'ah shrines of Turkish 'Irāq. The question of the visit was mooted in May 1870, or earlier; the visit itself took place in the following winter; and it must have caused acute anxiety to the Turkish Government in view of the mutual hatred of Sunnis and Shī'ahs, of the traditional enmity between Arabs and Persians, and of the incessant friction and strained relations between the Turkish and Persian Governments arising out of frontier relations, which appeared at this time to be again approaching a crisis. That it was not accomplished without the greatest inconvenience to Turkish

Visit of
H. M. Nāsir-
ud-Dīn
Shāh of
Persia, to
Turkish
'Irāq, 1870-
71.

officials of all grades is plain from the following passage in a private letter written by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Persia from Kirmānshāh to Mr. Alison, British Minister at Tehrān, on the 27th October 1870.

Vous ne pouvez vous faire une idée des embarras sans nombre que nous cause ce malheureux voyage et des peines infinies que nous devons endurer.

J'ai été malade de fatigue et de privations, actuellement je me porte bien ; mais n'allez pas croire que je sois à mon aise.

Le Roi vient d'arriver à Kirmanshah où il s'arrêtera dit-on une dizaine de jours.

Si ça va de ce pas nous arriverons à Bagdad, Dieu soit guard (*sic*.)

The proceedings in connection with the Shāh's arrival and stay at Baghdād are well described in two despatches from Colonel Herbert, British Political Agent there, to his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople which we reproduce at full length below :

(24th October 1870.)

I have the honour to report that, on the 20th instant, news having reached Bagdad of the near approach of S. Es * Musheer-ood-dowlah, Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, and Kamil Pasha, Imperial Commissioner for the reception of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, His Excellency Midhat Pasha, accompanied by the chief officers of his Government proceeded to the shrine and village of Ma'azin, about 3 miles to the north of the city, in order to meet them.

Troops were sent out as a guard of honour, and every honour done to their arrival.

The party entered Bagdad on the afternoon of the 22nd instant, and the visitors took up their residence at the serai, where the principal apartments were placed at their disposal.

I had the honour of paying them a ceremonial visit yesterday, the 23rd, when Musheer-ood-dowlah informed me it was his intention to proceed the same evening, or this morning, towards Kirmanshah, there to join the Shah.

Kamil Pasha remains here to accompany the Governor General to the frontier.

*

*

*

*

(7th December 1870.)

In continuation of my despatch No. 19, dated 24th October last, I have the honour to report :—

On the 5th ultimo, intelligence having been previously received by telegram from Musheer-ood-dowlah, who had reached the Shah's camp, that His Majesty would on that day leave Kirmanshah for the frontier, His Excellency Midhat Pasha, accompanied by Kamil Pasha Imperial Commissioner, Raoof Pasha, Commander of the forces, and several officers of importance, and escorted by 800 infantry and a regiment of cavalry, left Bagdad for the purpose of meeting His Majesty at Khanikeen.

* This was Mirza Husain Khan, who in 1871 became Prime Minister of Persia and in 1872 induced the Shāh to grant the Reuter Concession. See page 2034.

The Shah reached Baghdad early in the afternoon of the 22nd ultimo, and at once proceeded to take up his residence in a new* kiosk, which had been built in a large garden outside the city walls and furnished in a sumptuous manner for his reception.

His Majesty arrived in state, escorted by the above mentioned officers and his own attendant Ministers and others, and from a distance of, I suppose, upwards of two miles from the city passed with his cortége along a road specially marked out and cleared for his use, which was thronged by the inhabitants of the city and lined by the troops of the garrison, and by what was a new† feature in this country, the boys of the different schools, all neatly dressed, some in a regular uniform.

He was preceeded by two detachments of Persian Infantry, each about 200 strong, and then by his Casveen Regiment, 1,100 strong, headed by a large and excellent band of music.

The most perfect order prevailed during His Majesty's passage, every precaution having been taken by the Governor General of the province to preserve the peace.

A cloud of dust almost completely hid the Shah and his cortege from the view of spectators at a distance, and immediately on his passing, the crowd of nearly all the inhabitants of the city broke up and returned quietly and orderly to their homes.

I annex a list of the persons who have accompanied His Majesty, and which formed the enclosure of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran to Earl Granville of which the former has favoured me with a copy.

On the Shāh's passing the camp of the Ottoman troops, who have been for sometime past living under canvas about a mile from the town, a salute of 21 guns was fired from the field artillery, and, on his alighting at Garden House, 101 guns were fired from the citadel.

It has been remarked, and with a feeling of disappointment among a people who regard courtesy as an essential sign of dignity, that the Shāh returned the salute of none, great or small.

Even on receiving the Governor General and high officers of Khanikeen, he failed to return their salute by the smallest notice.

This is said to be the custom of the Persian Court.

He appears to be entirely occupied with himself, and is described by those who accompanied him from the frontier as travelling covered with gems and barbaric ornaments, and as looking over himself and stroking his ornaments complacently, and scarcely taking any notice of those around him, and then only addressing them abrupt questions.

On the forenoon after his arrival he proceeded to visit the Sheeah ‡Shrine, common to all sects of Muslims, of Ma'azim.

Late in the afternoon he returned, and proceeded to the Turkish camp, where the troops had been under arms for some hours, awaiting his arrival.

The lateness of the hour of his coming obliged a curtailment of the review intended for his honour, but after a few movements and the march past, His Majesty caused

*The building still (1912) exists and is used as a hospital. It is on the left bank of the Tigris immediately above the town.

† It is an invariable feature of public occasions at Baghdad at the present day (1912) and appears to be a minor symptom of the militarism which threatens to destroy Turkey.

‡The place probably meant, the tomb of Abu Hanifah, is Sunni not Shi'ah. See Volume II of this Gazetteer, page 1243, article "Mu'adhdam."

numerous decorations of the Lion and the Sun to be distributed ; to Midhut Pasha he gave the 1st class ; to Raof Pasha and Kamil Pasha the 2nd ; and to many others inferior grades.

The distribution, however, does not appear to have been carefully considered, or to have given satisfaction, decorations having been given to officers of rank and standing such as are not unfrequently conferred on menial servants of the Court at Tehran.

On the morning of the 24th His Majesty, accompanied, as usual, by Midhut Pasha and many others, proceeded in the Ottoman Steamer *Moosul* to visit the great ruin of the ancient Persian Palace at Ctesiphon.

On this occasion, at a very late hour, indeed, in less than an hour before the *Moosul* left, I was personally requested by Shakir Beg, the Muteserif, on behalf of Midhut Pasha, to permit Her Majesty's steam vessel *Comet* to accompany them in case of difficulties arising from the want of water in the river.

She accordingly followed so soon as steam could be got up, but the voyage of the *Moosul* being made without accident, her services were not called for.

The *Moosul* returned about 10 p.m.

The night was dark, but the principal houses on the river, which had been illuminated each night since His Majesty's arrival, were again lighted up ; the bridge across the river was also illuminated, and as the boat, which was herself brilliantly lighted, moved slowly up the perfectly tranquil river, large blue lights, which had been previously arranged along the banks were burnt as she passed, casting a beautiful and clear light around and producing a strikingly picturesque effect.

On the two previous evenings a display of fireworks had been exhibited on the further side of the river from that on which His Majesty's camp was pitched.

On the 25th, at noon, the Shah received the Consular Corps of this city, including the establishment of this Consulate General,* the French Consulate, and the Italian Vice-Consulate.

* And
Political
Agency.

Mr. Ongley, *Attaché* to His Majesty's Mission at Tehran, who came down with the camp, accompanied our party.

We were all received in the tent of Yehya Khan, Mootamad-ood-Mulk, the Lord Chamberlain of the Court, where we were met by His Excellency Midhut Pasha, and at the appointed hour were introduced to the presence of the Shah by His Excellency, accompanied by Musheer-ood-Dowlah and Ali Reza Beg.

Midhut Pasha led us into the large room in the centre of the kiosk, where we found His Majesty sitting on a settee, wearing a suit of dark cloth clothes with frogs of diamonds across the chest, but without shoes or boots and wearing white stockings.

He took no notice, according to the custom of his Court, of our salutes, but on our being presented to him, he addressed to each a few commonplace remarks, after which we retired.

On our leaving, the whole party, including the Governor General of the province, were begged to form a group under the shade of the tent walls which were set up to screen His Majesty's residence from vulgar gaze, and these were photographed at the request of the Shah, who appears to have a fancy to retain the photographic likenesses of all admitted to his presence.

On the afternoon of the next day His Majesty visited the shrine, respected alike by all sects of Muslims, of Sheikh Abdool Kader, after which he attended another review of the Turkish troops.

On Sunday, the 27th, His Majesty proceeded by steamer to Kazimeen, to which place his camp had been removed, and on the following morning continued his route towards Kerbela.

Midhut Pasha accompanied His Majesty, and will continue in attendance on his person while he remains within Ottoman dominions.

The greatest credit is due to His Excellency and to the officers who have energetically carried out his orders for the perfect preservation of order that has existed during the Shah's visit to this city, and for the magnificence of the reception accorded to His Majesty, which has far exceeded what could have been expected in this locality ; and it is said that His Majesty has expressed very great satisfaction with all the arrangements made.

His Majesty is expected at Baghdad in about a fortnight on his way back to his own dominions.

List of those who compose the Shah's Camp.

The King's mother, all his wives, six of his daughters and their attendants.

His Royal Highness the Hessam-es-Sultaneh and servants (in charge of the camp).

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and servants.

His Excellency the Mooayer-ul-Memalek, with his son and wife, and his own Harem.

His Excellency the Zaheer-ud-Dowlah, chief master of ceremonies and servants.

His Excellency Yahia Khan, his wife and servants.

Pasha Khan Ameer-ool-Moolk, with servants.

Agha Ali, Ameen-oo-Hoozore, with servants.

Ali Reza Khan, Keeper of the Royal seals.

Hajee Hoossein Khan, Ameer-i-Toman, with 150 of his horsemen.

Kambar Ali Khan, with 100 horsemen.

The Casveen Regiment, 1,100 strong.

From the Noosret Regiment, 250 soldiers.

From the Deemavend Regiments, 250 soldiers.

12 Guns.

All the Peishkhdmts and the private and personal attendants of the Shah.

The Body-Guard.

Mahomed Mehdi Khan, Chief of the Body-Guard, and his wife.

The Ameen-i-Khelvet.

Sixty Artillerymen and one gun.

The whole are estimated at 20,000, 6,000 of whom are the King's own suite.

Having visited the shrines at Kādhimain, Karbala and Najaf, the Shāh returned to Baghdād on the evening of the 20th December. Colonel Herbert, on the 17th January 1871, related his further movements as follows

After a stay of three days, during which he again visited Ctesiphon, for a day's sport with his hawks and guns, His Majesty left on the morning of the 24th December for* Samarrah where are the tombs of the Imams Ali-un-Nuki, otherwise known as Ali-ul-hadi, and Hussan Askeri, and thence proceeded direct to Khannikeen on the frontier, leaving Ottoman territory on the 9th instant.

Owing to the presence in His Majesty's camp of His Excellency Midhut Pasha and his constant care and exertion, no serious disturbances have taken place, but the march

* After this visit the Shāh caused the principal dome at Samarrah to be regilded.

of the camp has been marked by mutual recriminations by Persians and Arabs of plunder and robbery.

I believe there is no doubt that some thefts were committed by Arabs, but that the followers of His Majesty plundered the people of the country and committed serious barbarities, and the impression left by them on the minds of all classes of persons is very unfavourable.

His Excellency Midhut Pasha returned from the frontier, whither he had attended the Shah on the 13th instant, and I had yesterday the honour of paying him a visit.

He gave me a long account of the trouble caused by the misconduct of the persons in the Persian camp, of their plundering the country people, to whom he had found it necessary to give indemnity, of the disgraceful manner in which the servants, grooms, and others of the Court openly sold in the camp portions of the supplies collected by His Excellency under instructions from the Porte for the use of His Majesty and suite, their horses and numerous animals, and the want of co-operation on the part of His Excellency Musheer-ood-dowlah and Mirza Saeed Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in attendance on His Majesty, who seemed to look upon these matters as every day and natural events.

The Shāh arrived at Kirmānshāh in his own dominions, without accident, on the 24th January 1871.

Turkish
demand for
the extradi-
tion of
Hamawand
refugees in
Persia, 1871.

In the course of the Shāh's visit to Turkish 'Irāq the Wāli of Baghdād brought to his notice an important frontier question, that of outlaws from Turkish territory belonging to the Hamawand tribe, and forming nearly the whole of it, who had migrated to Persia, apparently about 1865. They appeared to enjoy the countenance of Malik Niyāz Khān, the Persian Governor of Zohāb; and they incessantly raided, from their safe retreat, the Turkish districts of Kirkūk and Sulaimāniyah. Mid-hat Pāsha added a request that the outlaws might be arrested as criminals and handed over to the Turkish authorities.

The Shāh at first appeared to concur and issued strict orders on the subject to Malik Niyāz Khān, who presently reported the arrest of no less than 280 men,—by which perhaps he only meant that most of the Hamawand tribe were then in his jurisdiction. When matters came to a point, the Shāh's staff of Persian Ministers and officials, among whom the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Persian Ambassador at Constantinople, seemed to take the lead, demurred to handing over the prisoners to Turkey on the plea that to do so would be degrading to Persia. A Turko-Persian Joint Commission on the subject was formed at Khānaqīn, including amongst others Mid-hat Pāsha and Kāmil Pāsha on the Turkish side and the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh on the part of Persia; and eventually it was agreed, or was said by the Turks to have been agreed, that the Hamawand chief and twenty of his principal followers should be extradited on the understanding that their lives would be spared and that they would be deported.

to Rumelia. The Persians, however, neglected to give effect to the agreement, if agreement it was, and even seemed prepared to repudiate it; and at Baghdād there were allegations that the Shāh, on the offenders being sent to him by the Governor of Zohāb, had received them with favour and presented a jewelled sword to their chief.

Colonel Herbert, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, suggested to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān that British influence might be used with the Persian Government to bring about the extradition of the Hamawand, as the Turkish demand seemed reasonable and compliance with it would avert threatened complications on the frontier; but, the Shāh being clearly determined not to concede the point, Mr. Alison deemed it inexpedient to intervene, more especially as pourparlers were on foot between Turkey and Persia for a direct settlement of all their frontier differences without recourse to the good offices of the British and Russian Governments.

This Hamawand dispute leads back to the question of the Turko-Persian boundary, the surveys connected with which had been finished in 1852. The maps prepared on the basis of the British and Russian surveys were ready in 1865; but on examination they were found to contain inaccuracies, obliging the Ambassadors of Britain and Russia at Constantinople to withhold their signatures. The maps were accordingly revised, and were not finally passed till 1869.

Question of
the Turko-
Persian
frontier,
1861.—1876.

In August 1869 a* Convention was entered into by Turkey and Persia, under which both powers undertook, pending a definitive settlement, to maintain the *status quo* and not to erect any new buildings in disputed territory. As the *status quo*, however, was differently understood by the parties, and as the materials bearing on it collected by Sir F. Williams were lost, the Convention was productive of no good results. On the contrary many annoying frontier questions cropped up, of which the Hamawand affair may serve as an example; the trouble extended to the Pusht-i-Kūh† section of the border, of which little had previously been heard; and from 1869 to 1873, notwithstanding a mutual agreement to remove refugees from across the frontier to a dis-

* The Protocol is given in Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. XII, pages lxii and lxiii.

†The principal dispute in the Pusht-i-Kūh section related to the ownership of certain lands, known as the Saifi Malkhatai, to the east and north-east of Badrah; and with special reference to some of these, known to the Turks as Saiyid Hasan and to the Persians as Baksai and Ghuraibeh, the Turko-Persian Convention of 1869 was formally renewed in 1873. See Captain D. L. R. Lorimer's *Report on Pusht-i-Kūh*, 1909, page 32, and Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistān*, 1912, page 54.

tance from the border line and to refer the frontier question to a joint Commission at Constantinople, it seemed to grow progressively more dangerous.

Copies of the identic British-Russian map were communicated to the Porte in October 1869 and to the Persian Government in February 1870; and, in accordance with an agreement reached by Britain and Russia in 1865, an expectation was at the same time expressed on the part of the mediating powers that the line of boundary between the respective dominions of the Sultān and the Shāh would be found within limits traced on the map, and that the Ottoman and Persian Governments would themselves mark out that line, but that, in the event of any difficulty arising between them in regard to any particular locality, the points in dispute should be referred to the Governments of Britain and Russia.

It was not until December 1874 that a Turkish and a Persian Commissioner met at Constantinople to trace the frontier on the map, and in January 1875 their proceedings came to a deadlock. A new Commission was then formed, comprising representatives of the mediating powers; the British Commissioner was Sir Arnold Kemball, formerly British Political Agent at Baghdād, the Russian was Colonel Zelenoi. As Ottoman Commissioner the Porte chose Dervish Pāsha, whose attitude on the Delimitation Commission of 1848—52 will not have been forgotten. The new Commission assembled at Constantinople in June 1875, when the Turkish and Persian representatives were each invited to trace, on the identic map, the line of frontier claimed by his Government.*

Dervish Pasha expressed his inability to do this, since the line he intended to trace lay altogether to the east of the so-called frontier zone, and was based upon the solitary surveys he had made while separated from his colleagues on the former Commission.

As a result of this attitude, the Ambassadors made energetic representations to the Porte, and stated that any line passing outside the frontier zone on the identic map would not even be taken into consideration by the mediating Delegates.

The Porte hereupon formally recognised the zone as embodying the limits within which the frontier line should be traced; but this admission, it was added, would *ipso facto* lapse if the Commission then sitting did not arrive at a definite settlement of the frontier question.

About this time the Persian Government intimated that they would agree to the arbitration of Great Britain and Russia, and accept any line within the zone laid down by the mediating Delegates.

**Memorandum on the Turko-Persian Boundary Question, 1833-1906*, by Mr. Alwyn Parker, 8th December 1906.

The last sitting of his Commission was held in January 1876. The Turkish memorandum and the tracing of the frontier as claimed by the Porte were duly presented; but, owing to a misapprehension on the part of the Persian Commissioner, the Persian memorandum and tracing were not ready. Much delay ensued in consequence, and in July 1876 the outbreak of the Servian war put a stop to all further proceedings. The Persian documents were only communicated on the eve of this war.

The vexed question of the powers of Persian Consular officers and the immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey, which had given much trouble in the past, was finally regulated by a* Convention between Persian and Turkey, dated 20th December 1875. There had been a wide divergence between the Turkish and Persian Governments' views on these subjects, the former virtually claiming to treat Persians in Turkey as Ottoman subjects while the latter insisted on rights similar to those possessed by the great European powers under capitulation only. The Convention recognised the title of Persian Consuls and consular Dragomans in Turkey to the same privileges as those enjoyed by the Consuls and Dragomans of other powers; and the exclusive authority of the Persian Consuls over Persian subjects in questions confined to Persian subjects whether civil or criminal, and in matters of succession were affirmed; but Persian subjects were declared amenable to the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts in cases of breach by them of the law of the country and in mixed civil and commercial cases, certain powers of assistance and protection in the proceedings being reserved however to the Persian consular representatives. Among other matters, the immunity of Persian subjects from "taxes" to which only Ottoman subjects were liable was established. The Convention also laid down that all the provisions relating to Persian subjects in Turkey should apply equally to Turkish subjects in Persia, and that both should receive treatment due to subjects of the most favoured nation.

Convention regarding the powers of Persian Consular officers and immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey, 1875.

Internal history of Turkish 'Irāq, 1861—1876.

The early years of the reign of 'Abdul 'Aziz were characterised in Turkish 'Irāq by difficulties between the Turkish administration

*The text of this Convention will be found in Aitchison's *Treaties*, vol. XII, pages lxiv—lxvi.

and the Arab tribes, hardly less grave than those which had prevailed in the province from 1845 to 1855. The exciting cause was similar; it was a determined effort made by the Local Government, with insufficient resources and in disregard of the experience of Najib Pāsha and Nāmiq Pāsha, to bring the tribesmen under strict control, and extend Turkish executive authority to new and by the Turks almost untrodden districts. These difficulties interfered seriously with the construction of a line of telegraph from Baghdād to the Persian Gulf which had been undertaken by the Porte under British advice, and with British official aid; and the British Political Agent at Baghdād was consequently obliged to intervene, to a much greater extent than had been usual in internal affairs of the country.

Muntafik
troubles,
Nov. 1863—
Aug. 1864.

It will be remembered that in 1855 Shaikh Bandar had been recognised as head of the Muntafik tribe on undertaking to pay a large annual sum for the farm of a group of districts from which some, formerly pertaining to the Muntafik Shaikhship, had been removed. In 1863, Shaikh Bandar having constantly made default in his payments,* Nāmiq Pāsha sent orders to Basrah under which Munib Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of that place, arrested Bandar when that chief came in a Turkish steamer to pay him a visit. The Shaikh was soon set at liberty, however; and Nāmiq Pāsha, suspecting that his release was due to bribery, caused Munib Pasha himself to be brought under arrest to Baghdād, where it was proved that he had in fact been guilty of corruption. Shaikh Bandar was subsequently induced, in hope of a renewal of the farm of the Muntafik districts in his favour, to come to Baghdād and pay up 150,000 Shāmis on account of the arrears due by him; but while still at Baghdād he died, on the 13th November 1863, owing about £25,000 to the Turkish Treasury.

Nāmiq Pāsha thought the opportunity favourable for extending direct Turkish rule to new portions of the Muntafik territory. He resolved, without seeking the approval of the Government at Constantinople, to detach the lands on the Shatt-al-'Arab below Qūrnah and those on the right bank of the Tigris above Qūrnah, including the Hai or Shatt-al-Gharaf tracts from the Muntafik Shaikhdom, and to annex the former to the Turkish Qāim-Maquāmlīq of Basrah, and the latter to that of Azīyah. At the same time the Muntafik Shaikh was to be deprived of the powers of life and death, mutilation, and corporal punishment generally, which he had exercised from time immemorial; he was to be debarred from exacting blood money in tribal disputes and other unau-

*It is uncertain whether this is the same Nāmiq Pāsha who was Pāsha of Baghdād in 1852—64: probably it was not.

thorised dues ; and the local system of taxation was to be assimilated to that of the Ottoman Empire at large. All suits, criminal and civil, were to be decided in future by a Majlis or court composed of landowners, merchants, and other notables upon the spot, whose appointment as judges must be confirmed by the Pāsha of Baghdād. As the instrument for carrying out this policy, which they foresaw would be unpopular, Nāmiq Pāsha appointed Mansūr, one of the Muntafik Shaikhs, to be the first Turkish Qāim-Maqām of the Muntafik country, with headquarters at Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh. He associated with him, as Muhāsibahji or Accountant, one Sulaimān Bey, a Turkish officer who had been Mudir of Khānaqīn, and to whom he gave instructions to show produce and leniency, at the outset, in his dealings with men of local influence.

Shaikh Mansūr, who was secretly determined to thwart the Pāsha's intended subversion of Muntafik autonomy, no sooner reached home from Baghdād than he suppressed the notifications curtailing his executive authority, virtually imprisoned his colleague Sulaimān Bey by surrounding him with guards on the pretext that his life was in danger, and sent emissaries out in every direction to misrepresent the intentions of the Government and to invite the headmen of clans to join with him in making a stand for Arab rights, so that at least their semi-independence as mere tributaries might be preserved. The small tribes dependent on Shaikh Mansūr complied to the extent of stopping the navigation of the Euphrates and, apparently, of attacking Turkish steamers besides plundering grain destined by the Government for exportation to Jiddah ; but they showed at this time no very decided preference for the rule of their own Shaikhs over that of the Turks, and their attitude seemed to be on the whole one of expectancy. The large Bani Lām, Al Bū Muhammad, and Khazā'il tribes did not respond at all to overtures which were made to them. Shaikh Mansūr in the meantime also wrote to Nāmiq Pāsha, professing his own loyalty but declaring that the chiefs under his authority were opposed to the new kind of government, that his brother* Nāsir was stirring up the tribes against him, and that he and Sulaimān Bey were in personal danger and powerless to vindicate their authority unless aided by troops from Baghdād.

Nāmiq Pāsha, on receiving this missive, recalled Shaikh Mansūr and Sulaimān Beg to Baghdād, pretending sympathy with the former in his difficult position ; but at the same time, in January 1864, he sent troops from Baghdād to Dīwāniyah and Kūt and despatched a steamer to

*Can this have been the Nāsir, Muntafik Shaikh, who afterwards became Wālī of Basrah ? See page 1447.

'Amārah to fetch Shaikh Fahad-al-'Ali, a rival of Shaikh Mansūr, who was encamped on the bank of the Tigris near that place. Colonel Kembball, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, at this time favoured the Pāsha's plan in regard to the Muntafik country, for he expected that it would facilitate, if realised, the construction of the telegraph line.

But the opposition of the Muntafik to Nāmiq Pāsha's schemes was stronger and more genuine than had at first appeared. Shaikh Fahad declined the post of Turkish Qāim-Maqām at Sūq-ash-Suhyūkh on its being offered to him; and the smaller Muntafik Shaikhs avowed a resolve to defend their *quasi*-independence, if need be, by force of arms. In the circumstances the Pāsha, who had meanwhile summoned additional troops to Baghdād from Mūsāl and Kirkūk and made other military dispositions for coercing the Muntafik, appeared to renounce the idea of changing the arrangements for the government of their territory and signified his willingness to appoint Shaikh Nāsir, the brother of Shaikh Mansūr, to be head of the tribe and farmer of the revenue of the districts for a period of one year on the same terms as the late Shaikh Bandar. Colonel Kembball was at this stage of the case brought into the proceedings in a manner which he has described as follows :—

Shortly after my return from Bussorah I received a communication, signed by that* Chief and other elders of the Muntafik, deprecating the plan formed by the Pāsha and soliciting my intervention to dissuade him from its further prosecution, which communication I immediately submitted to the perusal of His Excellency with the draft of my proposed reply. This reply was, of course, superseded by His Excellency's change of intention, but I subjoin it in copy for† Your Excellency's information, as indicating the course that, with His Excellency's approval, I had determined to adopt on the occasion; when, however, Shaikh Nassir's Agent was quitting Baghdad, charged with the summons to his Chief, he waited upon me to state that no hope existed of its being complied with, unless I would pledge my word as a guarantee for the Sheikh's personal security. I declined, of course, to take upon myself such a responsibility, unless so solicited in writing by Namik Pāsha, to whom I accordingly referred him; but his fears, it seems, not permitting him to broach this condition to His Excellency, I thought it my duty to advise Namik Pāsha of what had passed between us. His Excellency replied that the solemn pledges he had already given, together with the prospect of investiture, would suffice, in his opinion, to re-assure Sheikh Nāsir and for the present he would not avail himself of my intervention.

After this, on the 11th February 1864, Shaikh Nāsir entered Baghdād, having first insisted on and obtained an unusual guarantee for his immunity from arrest. But nothing was settled between him and the Local Government. The Pāsha demanded that the Shaikh should pay

* *viz.*, Shaikh Nāsir.

† H. B. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

up, before his formal investiture, the sum of £15,000 offered by him as earnest money at an earlier time when he was competing with his brother for appointment to the Shaikhship ; the Shaikh, in reply, persisted that he could not raise so large an amount without first returning home ; and the result was deadlock. Colonel Kemball protested against the delay thus occasioned, but in vain. He says :

To my appeal on this head His Excellency has remarked that the interests of the telegraph must give way to those of the Government, and although he still looks for a speedy decision of the question, did it even issue in the postponement of the work till next autumn, he would not consent to a sacrifice of authority which must eventuate in confirming the *quasi*-independence of the Muntafik Chiefs by assuring them of the means on all future occasions of evading their just obligations.

The Pasha then summoned Shaikh Fahad again to Baghdād, as also another Shaikh named Mashāri, in the hope that by playing them off against Shaikh Mansūr and against each other he might be able, if not to institute a Qāim-Maqāmlīq of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, at least to bring under direct Turkish government districts below and above Qūrnah which he had in the beginning decided to separate from the Muntafik Shaikhdom. Colonel Kemball, though he still regarded the reduction of the Muntafik country to the status of ordinary Turkish territory as desirable, at this point began to have doubts of the ability of the Local Government, in a military sense, to effect the change within any reasonable time. He left Baghdād for Hillah, however, prepared to push on the extension of the telegraph southwards as soon as an opportunity should occur.

On the 13th of March 1864, at the request of Nāmiq Pasha, who had received a telegram from Constantinople demanding an explanation of the long continuance of the Muntafik difficulty, the British Political Agent returned to Baghdād. The Pasha informed him that Shaikh Nāsir and Shaikh Fahad both declined to undertake the farm of the Muntafik districts, while Shaikh Mashāri was too weak and uninfluential to assert himself, if nominated ; he acknowledged that the Muntafik were now unanimous in their determination to resist his projects, and that the season of the spring floods was too near at hand to allow of military operations—which would, moreover, alarm the Porte—being undertaken ; and finally he requested Colonel Kemball's opinion. That officer recommended that the general question of the form of Government of the Muntafik country should be referred to Constantinople ; that in the meanwhile Shaikh Fahad should be installed as chief, to avoid any appearance of surrender to the implied menaces of Shaikh Mansūr and

Shaikh Nāsir; and that, if Shaikh Fahad demanded the removal of the two brothers from his jurisdiction, they should be compelled or induced to reside at Baghdād on a guarantee, confirmed if necessary by the Porte, for the safety of their persons and the security of their property, including large estates which they owned on the Shatt-al-'Arab. This advice appears to have commended itself, at least in part, to Nāmiq Pāsha. On the 19th of March he despatched a steamer with a Buyuruldi (or patent) and flag of investiture for Shaikh Fahad-al-'Ali. A letter accompanying the Buyuruldi merely stated that the Shaikhship of the Muntafik had been conferred on Fahad upon the same conditions as those on which Shaikh Bandar had formerly held it. No more precise mention was made in the letter of the limits of the new Shaikh's jurisdiction, of the amount of his financial obligations, or to the period for which the arrangement was to remain in force,—a vagueness which Colonel Kemball thought likely to be productive of distrust in the recipient's mind. Returning from Baghdād to Hillah the British Political Agent, with the previous approval of Nāmiq Pāsha, addressed letters, probably of warning or remonstrance, to Shaikh Mansūr and Shaikh Nāsir.

At the beginning of April, partly because of the detention of Shaikh Nāsir at Baghdād against his will—an evident breach of faith against which Colonel Kemball did not fail to protest, as the Shaikh had come in on a safe conduct—and partly perhaps in consequence of the appointment of Shaikh Fahad, Sulaimān, a son of Shaikh Mansūr, suddenly appeared on the Baghdād-Hillah road with a body of armed tribesmen, and telegraphic and all other communication between the two places was temporarily interrupted. Nāmiq Pāsha, who expected that Shaikh Fahad would be able to restore order immediately, declined an offer by Colonel Kemball to place himself in communication with Shaikh Mansūr or even, if necessary, proceed in person to his camp; but Shaikh Fahad continued to haggle over the terms of his appointment, and matters remained in suspense. No general amnesty such as might have served to conciliate the adherents of Shaikh Mansūr was published; but the Pāsha was eventually persuaded to send letters of assurance, through Shaikh Fahad, to the principal men whose attitude was doubtful.

Early in May 1864, Shaikh Fahad, who had not yet accepted full responsibility for the Muntafik, was encamped on the right bank of the Tigris at 'Ali-ash-Sharqi. Assisted by a detachment of 300 Turkish infantry with one gun, 200 'Aqaili matchlock men and 100 Bashi Bazouks from 'Amārah, he had repelled a half-hearted attack made on

him by the partisans of Shaikh Mansūr; but he was, or seemed, unable to advance. Meanwhile, infuriated by the insolence of Shaikh Mansūr and his family, Nāmiq Pāsha had determined on military operations "in spite of the difficulties arising out of the marshy character of the country, the lateness of the season, and his own state of unpreparedness." A force of 1,000 regular infantry and 2 guns under Hāfiz Pāsha, Army Commandant, left Baghdād on the 2nd May for Kūt, where it was to receive a reinforcement of 500 regular infantry and whence it was to advance, if practicable, to Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh. The help of the Bani Lām and Bani Rabī'ah tribes was invited; and Shibli Pāsha, commanding at Diwāniyah, was ordered to co-operate with a regiment of cavalry, 400 irregular horse, and 4 guns. It appeared to be the intention of Nāmiq Pāsha to force the hand of the Porte by making the restoration of Shaikh Mansūr impossible.

By the middle of June 1864 the authority of Shaikh Fahad was sufficiently established to admit of the return of the Turkish troops to their garrisons, except a detachment of 300 men and 1 gun which, at the Shaikh's request, was left at Rās-al-Jazīrah, a place on the Shatt-al-Gharāf not far from Kūt. Fahad himself was then in the neighbourhood of Shatrah, engaged, on his way to Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, in receiving the submission of the smaller tribal authorities and in sub-letting the revenues of the districts. He had been guilty of gross treachery in putting to death Sulaiman-al-Khalaif, Shaikh of the Ajwad, one of the principal divisions of the Muntafik, and in seizing two other Shaikhs, all of whom had approached him on safe-conduct. Nāmiq Pāsha "disavowed the act, which he declared to be *disapprovable*, though he "added that, as these Shaikhs had been foremost in resisting the substitution of Turkish for Arab rule in the Montific Territory, he could not "regret that they should have been the first to experience the effects of "the despotism they had themselves mainly contributed to set up." Before the end of the month, however, it was reported that Shaikh Mansūr had again collected a force, with which he was threatening Samāwah, and that the Bani Mālik, a large division of the Muntafik, had at his instigation renewed their claim to certain lands south of Basrah from which they had been ejected by Munīb Pāsha during his governorship of Basrah. Conspicuous among Shaikh Mansūr's supporters was 'Osmān Bey, the son of a former Governor of Mūsāl, who had fled to the Arabs, being a Treasury defaulter, on his removal from the Mudirship of Samāwah. To counteract these demonstrations Shibli Pāsha was

ordered to proceed to Samāwah with the whole garrison of Diwānīyah, while a detachment of rifles commanded by Muhammad Pāsha was embarked on steamer at Baghdād for service at Basrah.

In July 1864 a serious disaster befell the force advancing to the relief of Samāwah. The unmounted portion, consisting of 350 riflemen with 3 guns, were proceeding to their destination by water when they were unexpectedly attacked by the Bari Hachaim, Āl Bū Husain, and Dhawālim, of whom the first two had been supposed to be mutually unfriendly. The next day Shibli Pāsha arrived by land at the same place, accompanied by his cavalry and by mounted contingents of the Jabūr and Zubaid tribes ; but the enemy, having a great superiority in numbers, obliged him to retire. He then applied to Baghdād for reinforcements. Of the infantry more than half had been killed, besides the officer in command ; and a week after the occurrence only 90 of their number, of whom 30 were wounded, had succeeded in straggling back to Dīwānīyah. All three guns were lost, but two of them were brought back, later, by the inhabitants of a small Saiyid colony near the scene of the fight.

Nāmiq Pāsha lost no time in despatching additional troops, under Hāfiz Pāsha, to punish the rebels and, if still possible, save Samāwah. The chief of the Bani Hachaim was known to be in correspondence with Shaikh Mansūr and with Shaikh Mutlaq, the head of the Khazā'il, under whose influence the Āl Bū Husain were ; and there was therefore some reason to fear that the attack on the Turkish troops might have been the outcome of a widespread Arab conspiracy. On the 21st of July Hāfiz Pāsha's force, consisting of 2,000 regular troops, 350 irregular cavalry, and large Arab contingents, marched from Dīwānīyah. Shaikh Fahad was still in the Hai district, but was preparing to advance to Durrāji with the Turkish garrison of 300 men and one gun that had been stationed originally at Rās-al-Jazīrah, and later at Shatrah. An incursion attempted by Sulaimān, the son of Shaikh Mansūr, was successfully repelled, the invaders being driven back across the Euphrates ; and the Bani Zaraij, incited by the Turks, began a series of attacks on the Āl Bū Husain and Dhawālim, who were their tribal foes. On the Government troops arriving to the support of the Bani Zaraij, a fight was reported to have taken place in which 60 or 70 of the enemy were killed and the missing gun was recovered. A final engagement occurred on the banks of a canal known as the Abu Chilib, in which the Arabs were said to have lost 600 in killed and wounded, including women and children,

while the troops at the same time captured some cattle, a huge number of sheep, and other booty. According to information from non-Turkish sources, however, the people thus severely punished were not the enemy at all, but quiet pastoral tribes who had brought peace offerings to the Turkish commander and had been assured by him that they would not be molested. The smallness of the Turkish losses, which were quite insignificant, as also the presence of the Arabs' women and children, gave a colour of truth to this version of the affair and made it necessary to discount the importance of the "victory" claimed by the Turks. In any case, however, Hāfiz Pāsha reached Samāwah with his force at the beginning of August, and was joined there by Shaikh Fahad. Meanwhile 'Osmān Bey gave himself up to the Turkish authorities at Dīwāniyah, in consequence of a price having been set upon his head; Shaikh Mansūr was reported to be retiring to Najd by way of Kuwait; and attempts on the part of the Bani Mālik to give trouble near Basrah were frustrated by the arrival of the troops under Muhammad Pāsha.

These operations on the north-western border of the Muntafik country may in one sense be described as successful; but their result, after all, was practically] to restore the position which existed when Nāmiq Pāsha first began to meddle with the tribe. No garrison seems to have been left at Samāwah, and almost the only real change was the substitution of Shaikh Fahad for Shaikh Mansūr. Moreover, the attitude of Shaikh Fahad himself was equivocal. Up to the 7th of September he had paid only £5,000 into the treasury on account of the revenue of the financial year of which the closing date was the 11th; he declined to come to Baghdād to be formally invested with the Shaikhship; he refused even to accept office unless under a guarantee that the Turks would forego for three years all encroachment on the established privileges and jurisdiction of the Muntafik Shaikh; though now all-powerful in the Muntafik country, he professed to be unable to protect boats on the Euphrates and obviously did not exert his authority to restore order; he showed great reluctance to meet Hāfiz Pāsha at Samāwah; and he absolutely declined to take part with the Turks in an expedition against the Khazā'il which was now impending.

In March 1865 Shaikh Mansūr was still at large in the desert to the south of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh; but Shaikh Fahad was at last persuaded to visit Baghdād, where he undertook to pay off the balance due to the Treasury by his predecessor Shaikh Bandar and was then confirmed in the Shaikhship of the tribe for three years with effect from September 1863.

1865.

1866.

In May 1866 it was reported that Shaikh Mansūr, who was living among the Dhafir, would not come to Baghdād, the reason being that he distrusted promises of pardon and good treatment that were held out to him by the Turks, while Nāmiq Pāsha on his part would "tolerate no guarantee beyond his own words." Shaikh Nāsir, who had escaped outlawry by timely submission, was then absent on a pilgrimage to Makkah but was expected to return in time to compete for the farm of the Muntafik districts on the expiry of its tenure by Shaikh Fahad in September 1866. October came, but no new appointment was made to the Shaikhship, and it was expected that Shaikh Fahad would be re-invested with it for another three years, though probably on less advantageous financial terms than before.

Contumacy
and reduction
of the
Khazā'il,
1864—66.

No sooner were the Muntafik disturbances at an end in 1864 than trouble arose with the Khazā'il of the Shāmiyah district, whose Shaikh was Mutlaq, and whose territory extended from Shināfiyah to Najaf on the one side and to Abu Jawārir on the other. It was not alleged against Shaikh Mutlaq that he had ever made default as farmer of the revenue assessed on the lands of his tribe, which in fact he was accustomed to pay with punctuality, adding to it presents for the Turkish officials, or that he had shown active sympathy with the Muntafik in their late revolt; but he was virtually independent, he would not appear and do homage in person to the Pāsha of Baghdād, and he was suspected of having harboured the guilty Āl Bū Hasan and Dhawālim after their attack on Shibli Pāsha's column.

Before resorting to military operations Nāmiq Pāsha once more consulted the British Political Agent and received from him a sound opinion, the whole of which is perfectly applicable to the situation in Turkish 'Irāq at the present day.

I said that however patriotic His Excellency's desire to reduce the larger tribes of Turkish Arabia under complete control, I was of opinion that the force at his disposal was unequal to the purpose, not, perhaps, to beat the Arabs wherever they should encounter the main body of the troops, but to maintain the positions which might be successively occupied; and that in consequence, and for a period probably very protracted, not only would the highways of communication be rendered impassable, but the settled districts would be exposed to incursions, leading, of course to the usual results, a desolated country, stoppage of trade, and loss of revenue, which, sooner or later, must oblige the Government to compromise its aims and to restore matters to their normal condition. I readily admitted that the dominancy of the Arabs over the most fertile portions of this province was a great evil; but it was an evil which could not be overcome by isolated and convulsive efforts at coercion, and was assuredly the lesser evil compared with the state of anarchy accruing upon failure. On my instancing the more recent case of the Montefiq tribe, His Excellency did not deny that the attempt to establish Turkish rule at Sukesh Shiookh had had this issue.

Swayed by his own partiality for the use of force, urged on also by flatterers whose real object was to involve him in difficulties that should lead to his recall, Nāmiq Pāsha after some days hesitation launched an expedition against the Khazā'il. On the 4th September 1864 a force of 3,000 regular troops and 1,000 irregulars marched from Dīwāniyah; but Shaikh Mutlaq and his followers retired to the desert beyond the Euphrates without showing fight. It was apprehended, however, that their withdrawal would prove "the forerunner of serious and extended disturbances."

In the course of the following six months Shaikh Mutlaq wrote 1865. more than once to the British Political Agent, asking him to intercede on his behalf with Nāmiq Pāsha; but Colonel Kemball did not, apparently, do so. In the spring of 1865 the Pāsha informed the Khazā'il Shaikh that, if he would make submission in person and without conditions, he would be allowed to reside at Baghdād without molestation. In August of the same year Shibli Pāsha took action, as an interlude in the Khazā'il campaign, against the Bahāhithah, one of the 'Afaḡ clans, and against the Āl Budair of the Dagḡarah tract. The mud forts of these tribes on land were destroyed by the troops; but the tribesmen with their families, after a short conflict, withdrew to the then existing 'Afaḡ and Dagḡarah lagoons, where their assailants could not follow them. 'Abdul Muhsin, a Shaikh of the 'Anizah with whom Shaikh Mutlaq had taken refuge, obliged the latter, at the instance of Nāmiq Pāsha, to quit his camp; but the desert chief at the same time professed inability to restrain Shaikh Sumair, possibly not one of the Khazā'il, but a Shammar chief, who with the help of Dagḡaiyin, a relative of 'Abdul Muhsin himself, had lately carried off 100 Baghdād camels from a grazing ground close to the city.

At length in May 1866 Shaikh Mutlaq, weary of the vagrant life 1866. of the Bedouins with whom he had thrown in his lot, and of their greed and venality, accepted the pardon offered him and came to Baghdād to pay homage to Nāmiq Pāsha. It was arranged to settle him, with his immediate dependents, upon lands lying to the east of the Tigris; and in his former district, or rather kingdom, of Shāmīyah a new system of direct dealing between the Government and the lesser tribal Shaikhs, which had been introduced, was maintained.

In 1865 general insecurity prevailed in Shehrizūr, as the division of Kirkūk was then styled, owing to the depredations of the Hamawand, a tribe living in the neighbourhood, and renowned for their lawlessness even

Depredations and impunity of the Hamawand, 1865.

at the present day. In March it was reported at Baghdād that a considerable success over them had been achieved by a Turkish expedition from Kirkūk and Sulaimānīyah; but before long their increased vigour in infesting the roads, burning villages, levying blackmail, and ultimately in threatening Sulaimānīyah during the absence of the garrison, showed that the loss which they had suffered, chiefly in the capture of some of their women, had only served to exasperate them. Military reinforcements were sent from Baghdād to Kirkūk; but at the same time Nāmiq Pāsha, seeing that coercion was impracticable, ordered Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha, Governor of Kirkūk, to revert to a system of subsidies which had previously existed and had been abandoned.

Movements
of the
'Anizah and
Shammar
and law-
lessness of
the 'Anizah,
Aug.—Dec.,
1865.

The immigration of the 'Anizah and Shammar Bedouins into the northern districts dependent on Baghdād, which takes place every year on a large scale, was attended in 1865 by more than the usual amount of friction and excitement. Anxiety first began to be felt in August, when it was reported that 'Anizah to the number of 4,000 horsemen and camel riders had crossed to the east of the Euphrates, and that the Shammar, who are their hereditary enemies, were retiring before them across the Tigris. Far-reaching disorders were feared by the Pashā of Baghdād, for, as the British Political Agent remarked in a despatch: "The presence of Bedouins in the cultivated districts, whether as invaders or refugees, is almost equally to be dreaded, and however gladly His Excellency would restrict the conflicts between these large nomad tribes to the waste lands west of Mosul, he is unhappily powerless alike to prevent the encroachment of the one, or the retreat of the other." By the middle of October, however, the two great hostile tribes were settled in their usual autumn seats, the Shammar occupying the right bank of the Tigris down to within 10 or 12 miles of Baghdād, the 'Anizah both sides of the Euphrates down to Musaiyib and in the neighbourhood of Karbala and Najaf; and their chiefs, subsidised by the Turkish authorities, were restraining them, as in ordinary years, from highway robbery and from the invasion of cultivated districts. Shaikh Farhān, who ruled the Shammar, was anxious in this year to carry his tribe some distance to the southward of Baghdād; but permission was denied him by Nāmiq Pāsha, and he acquiesced in the prohibition. It was remarked by Colonel Kembell: "Owing to the converging course of the two rivers at this point, his position there would expose his retreat to be cut off, did he defy the Government and drive it to coalesce with the Anazeh against him.

"This resource is, of course, the chief instrument of control which the provincial authorities possess over the rival Bedouin tribes, but, owing to the full appreciation by the latter of their common interests, apart from the mere acquisition of plunder, and to the difficulty of leading such allies to discriminate the property of friends and foes, one of dangerous and doubtful efficacy, and only to be employed in extremity."

Meanwhile a robbery of more than usual importance was committed by 'Anizah belonging to the Fida'an and Sabā'ah sub-divisions of the tribe. A caravan from Aleppo having arrived at 'Ānah on the Euphrates, a portion of it, comprising 75 camels with their loads, crossed the river there and made straight across country for Baghdād. The loads consisted of British manufactures to the value of £6,000 and were the property of leading merchants, Turkish subjects, at Baghdād. The conductor of this portion of the caravan was connected by marriage with an 'Anizah family; and it was surmised that either he had presumed too much upon the fact in adopting an unprotected route, or that he was in league with the robbers into whose hands the animals and goods fell: all were taken by foraging parties of the 'Anizah whom they encountered. Demands for restitution were addressed by the Turkish authorities to the chiefs of the guilty sub-divisions; but on the 17th October the British Political Agent was obliged to report: "To the remonstrances of Nāmik Pasha the one Shaikh has returned no reply; the other, pleading the contumacy of his followers, has boldly referred His Excellency to the sword as the only means of vindicating the authority of the Government: and His Excellency's threats of reprisals and of stopping the Musableh (permission to traffic with the towns) are, as usual, invalidated by the dread of provoking general disturbance and by the impossibility of distinguishing the real offenders. For the rest a sudden fall in the price of longcloths, etc., is a sure indication that the plunderers have already bartered their booty to pedlars and petty traders." Of the camels 40 had been immediately returned to the owners, who may themselves have been tribal Arabs like the 'Anizah, and it was not expected that the recovery of the other 35 would present any difficulty; but the merchandise stood on a different footing.

An accident made the recovery of partial compensation possible. Dissensions having occurred among the offending sections, which resulted in the secession of several families, the great 'Anizah Shaikh fell upon and plundered their camps, not, however, on behoof of the Turkish

Government, for he and his followers claimed all their booty for themselves; but, out of 2,000 camels captured, 142 were secured by some Turkish irregulars who had been sent to co-operate with the Shaikh, and of these 82—very inferior animals—actually reached Baghdād. In the end compensation to the extent of about one-fourth of the value of the goods lost was obtained, whereupon Colonel Kemball remarked: "This issue, though, indeed, reflecting credit upon the management of Nāmiq Pāsha as productive of a result more substantial than that which usually attends the ostensible efforts of the Turkish executive to save appearances, is an additional instance only of their powerlessness in such cases. Nor does that result represent an unmixed gain, for the Sabaa and Fidaan offenders, angered at the co-operation of Shaikh Abdool Muhsen against them, have resorted, or pretended to resort, to retaliation, and, while seeking to surprise his outlying adherents, have intercepted a caravan with money to the amount of 35,000 G. S. P., passing from Nejjeff to Kerbela, which they have carried off."

In December the 'Anizah and Shammar began to return, according to custom, to their more western and northern pastures in the Arabian desert.

Cholera and
plague,
1866-67.

In the autumn of 1866, as frequently occurs, there was a slight epidemic of cholera at Baghdād, lasting about two months; but the number of deaths from the disease registered *per diem* at no time exceeded fifteen. In the summer of 1867 plague appeared, but not in a severe form, in some of the Euphrates districts of the province, and it lingered there for some time.

Burglaries
at Baghdād,
1866.

Towards the end of 1866, as from time to time happens, serious burglaries, accompanied in some cases by murder, became common in Baghdād City; and grave suspicion fell, as has been the case in very recent times also, upon the soldiers of the military garrison. The British Political Agent, in reporting three quite recent cases in which life had been taken, remarked:

In no case, however, can I recall the conviction of the burglars; the official opinion being that the institution of the Tanzimat when not supplemented by the machinery of police as organized in Europe forms an effectual bar to the detection of malefactors. In one of the three instances above mentioned the office of a British Indian merchant was forced and his watchman* killed; but as on a former occasion when the same office was robbed of £1,500 the perpetrators were discovered and lodged in jail, yet effected their escape under circumstances which implied the connivance of the Zabtieh, I may on the present occasion anticipate no better result when the burglars succeeded in putting out of the way the only witness of their act. Lest murder should follow, people, conscious of the inefficiency of the police, though aware of the presence of thieves in their houses, abstain from giving the alarm.

* This man
was laid
down and his
throat deli-
berately cut.

Nāmiq Pāsha, under whose government all the events related above occurred, though his policy towards the Arab tribes was aggressive and on the whole unsuccessful, seems not to have been insensible to the claims of public works. As happens in the case of most Turkish rulers at Baghdād, however, the pacific and useful part of his administrative programme was early laid aside to make way for *actions d'éclat*, and was never executed. When first he arrived at Baghdād it was one of his chief ambitions to place "the* dyke of the Jezair" on a permanently satisfactory footing without "recourse to the former vicious system of contract through the instrumentality of the Arab Shaikhs, with its attendant evils of forced labor and arbitrary exactions." He seems to have set apart £40,000 or £50,000 for the proposed work, in case it should be sanctioned by the Porte; and having been unable to obtain a competent engineer from Egypt, he moved the Turkish Government "to engage the services an experienced† Dutch officer for this purpose, who should be conversant with the execution of similar works." Nothing is heard of the project afterwards, however, during the rule of Nāmiq Pāsha.

Administra-
tion of
Nāmiq
Pasha, 1863
—1868.

Nāmiq Pāsha seems to have been succeeded by Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha, probably the former Governor of Kirkūk, who was in power at Baghdād in 1868.

Mid-hat Pāsha, the most energetic and best known ruler of Baghdād in modern times, the first also to bear the hierarchic title of Wālī or Governor-General‡ instead of the more indefinite one of Pāsha, assumed charge of the province of Turkish 'Irāq in April 1869. His advent is noteworthy as inaugurating in Mesopotamia the § present system of Turkish civil administration; and his subsequent doings are interesting on account of the personality of the man himself, whose force of character, whatever may be thought of his judgment and intelligence, enabled him a few years later to play a leading part in affairs at Constantinople and to determine in a great measure, as the event has

Appointment
of Mid-hat
Pasha to
Baghdād,
1869.

*It is not clear what dyke is meant, but it must have been a large and important work. Some say that it was the dam at the head of the Saqlāwīyat canal, and this is probably correct: see page 1542 *post*. Mid-hat Pāsha, as we shall see, was in the beginning—and only in the beginning—attracted by the same scheme.

†A slight acquaintance with Turkey enables one to infer that somebody had told him Holland was a country of dykes

‡ So the Turks translate the word Wālī, though the importance of a Wilāyat often hardly exceeds that of a Collectorship or Deputy Commissionership in India.

§ With regard to the civil reorganisation of the Turkish Empire in 1867, see page 1416 *ante*, text and footnote.

proved, the later destinies of Turkey. The despatch of Colonel C. Herbert, Acting British Political Agent and Consul-General at Baghdād, in which Mid-hat Pāsha's earliest actions at Baghdād are described, is given below *in extenso*: it was dated 26th May 1869 and was addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have the honour to report the arrival, on the 30th ultimo, of His Excellency Mid-hut Pasha, Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, accompanied by Shaker Beg, Lieutenant-Governor (Muteserif) of Baghdad, Raef Beg, Secretary (Máaoun), Hamdy Beg, Attaché (Mudeer) for Foreign Affairs, together with several subordinate officers of different grades.

His Excellency entered the city in state at an early hour, being met by all the principal *employés* of the Government and representatives from the Consulates of England and France.

On the third day after his arrival, the firman of his appointment was publicly read at the Government House (Serai), when His Excellency addressed the assembly, telling his audience that he had come hither with an earnest desire to benefit the country and enrich the people; that he proposed to introduce many changes and reforms which, he hoped, would be beneficial, changes which, perhaps, they might not at first altogether approve, but which they would appreciate when they had experienced the advantages that would accrue to them therefrom.

He commenced his career by the abolition of the following taxes, which are said to have been peculiarly local, and have proved obstructive and oppressive:—

- 1st.—*Ihtisab*, or octroi duty levied on all produce brought into the city gates for sale in the market.
- 2nd.—*Talibiyeh*, a tax on the native craft on the rivers.
- 3rd.—*Khums Hateb*, a tax of 20 per cent. on fuel brought to the city on rafts and in boats.
- 4th.—*Roosbukâr*, the tax on irrigation wheels of the Arab cultivators.

In lieu of these taxes, he has established one of 10 per cent. on the produce of gardens and fields.

His Excellency is organising several new Councils (*Mejlises*), of which the members are to be paid, instead of, as heretofore, working gratuitously, with the opportunity of making what they could—a source of corruption and trouble.

He has introduced the Wilayet system and I have the honour to forward a copy (with translation) of a communication which has been addressed to the Foreign Consulates on this subject.

His Excellency has deputed an officer, Serri Effendi, to re-open an old canal called "Kenanieh" from the Euphrates into the "Seglawieh" canal, which falls into the Tigris, with the view to forming a channel of communication between the two great rivers, to be conducted by means of small steam vessels which it is proposed to bring from Europe for the service.

He has also deputed a steamer to proceed up the Euphrates to endeavour to arrange for the ultimate * opening of the navigation of that river, with which object he proposes

* In May 1872 Midāhat Pasha himself ascended the Euphrates, from the head of the Saqlāwiyah, canal to Maskanah, in the Turkish steamer "Furat." He was accompanied, as a guest, by Captain Powell of the late Indian Navy, the commander of the Residency steamer "Comet." An account of the voyage by the latter exists; it shows that the difficulties of navigation encountered were extreme, notwithstanding a high river.

to remake the embankments of the Jezair territory and so confine the water of the river to its own bed, and prevent the inundations which yearly immerse a large tract of country to the south, and reach even to the town of Bussorah.

These inundations convert the whole of that country into a tract of unhealthy and unproductive marsh, while the loss of the water from the bed of the river renders the latter unnavigable.

His Excellency's mind seems earnestly bent on various schemes for the improvement of the country.

He at once recognizes the two great wants, *viz.*, security of property and means of communication with the world (from which the country is at present excluded), and of the transport of produce.

He contemplates the construction of a railway hence to Kerbella as a step in this direction in connection with the navigation of the Euphrates, the importation of several steamers for river and sea navigation, so as to connect the province with Suez, of machinery for cleaning the river channels and also for various manufactures, as well as for irrigation.

I waited on His Excellency, accompanied by officers attached to this Political Agency and Consulate-General and the members of the British community, on the day after his arrival and have since paid a private visit.

Official information regarding the actual achievements of Mid-hāt Pāsha at Baghdād is scanty, but the blank is supplied by the almost contemporaneous writings of a very intelligent and reliable English lady traveller, from which the following* extracts are taken.

Administration of Mid-hāt Pāsha in Turkish 'Iraq, 1869—72.

It would appear that, besides and beyond its other misfortunes, Bagdad had the ill luck a few years since to pass through the hands of an improving Pasha, Midhat, author of the famous constitution of 1877, which is now regenerating Turkey.

That singularly unhappy statesman (unhappy, I mean, in his plans) was sent by the Sultan Abdul Aziz to try his prentice hand upon Bagdad, before being allowed his way with Constantinople and the Empire. He was an honest man, by all accounts, and sincerely anxious for his country's good, but half educated and belonging to that school of Turkish politicians, which thinks to Europeanise the Empire by adopting the dress and external forms of Europe. He seems to have been allowed almost unlimited credit for improvement and full liberty in all his schemes, nor can it be denied that some of them were, in their design, excellent. Only he was incapable of working out the detail of what he planned, or of at all counting the cost of each adventure. They have consequently, one and all, led only to the most impotent if not the most disastrous conclusions. His first scheme was a good one. He wished to establish communication with Aleppo by the Euphrates, and in that view built the forts we saw at Ana, Rumady and elsewhere, to protect the road, while he ordered steamers from England to navigate the river. The forts, though unnecessarily large, answered their purpose and still exist; the boats, with one exception, have disappeared, either left to rot at Bussora or never fitted out with their engines. The sole representative of the Euphrates fleet draws too much water to ascend the river except at flood, and her regular trips were abandoned almost as soon as begun. Midhat also established, with some success, a tramway between Bagdad and its suburb Kasmeyn, which still runs. So far so good. But his next venture was not equally

*Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, vol. I, pages 194—97, and her *Pilgrimage to Najd*, vol. I, pages 15—17 and 18.

reasonable ; indeed, it shows the unreality of his claim to be considered a serious statesman. He had heard, or perhaps seen, that the fortifications of Vienna and other towns in Europe had been pulled down, to make room for the cities they enclosed and which were outgrowing them ; and, arguing from this fact that all walls were out of date, he proceeded to level those of Bagdad. I dare say he thought them unsightly and feared lest they should remind strangers of the dark age of the world, before gunpowder and the Ottoman Empire were invented, the age of Haroun al Rashid. He seems, too, to have had a curious idea of occupying his soldiers in this work and of paying them their arrears in bricks, a rather unsaleable article, one would think, in a country where little is built and nothing at all mended. Be that as it may, the walls of the Caliphate were "removed" and the city left open to all who chose to enter, thieves wolves and Bedouins, for it is but a few years since Bagdad was threatened with sack by the Shammar. The townsmen protested, but the thing was done. Bagdad is now as defenceless as any of the villages near it.*

Not content with this, Midhat conceived the unfortunate thought of benefiting the whole country by a huge canal, in imitation of the irrigating works once fertilising Southern Mesopotamia. Engineers were engaged, labour impressed, a special tax for the cost levied, and Midhat himself, before his term of office came to an end, had the satisfaction of opening the new canal in person, after the fashion of dignitaries in Europe. But, oh cruel fate, at the first flooding of the river, instead of a beneficent stream to fertilise the thirsty earth, behold it was a deluge that entered. Midhat Pasha with his spade let in the flood and converted Bagdad into an island, standing in a pestilential marsh and obliged at certain seasons to communicate with the outer world by means of boats. This was enough. The Porte saw the necessity of his recall and entrusted him instead with the reorganization of the Empire. Yet, such is the power of virtue, Midhat has left behind him not altogether an evil name even in Bagdad. They narrate of him still that he went away without a shilling in his pocket and left his watch in pawn for the sum necessary to hire his horses for the journey. An honest man, in a land of dishonesty ; an enthusiast, in fact, not a knave.

* * * *

A man of a very different sort, but one whom we were also interested to see, was Midhat Pasha, just arrived at Damascus as Governor-General of Syria. He had come with a considerable flourish of trumpets, for he was supposed to represent the doctrine of administrative reform, which was at that time seriously believed in by Europeans for the Turkish Empire. Midhat was the protégé of our own Foreign Office, and great things were expected of him. For ourselves, though quite sceptical on these matters and knowing the history of Midhat's doings at Bagdad too well to have any faith in him as a serious reformer, we called to pay our respects, partly as a matter of duty, and partly, it must be owned, out of curiosity. It seemed impossible that a man who had devised anything so fanciful as parliamentary government for Turkey should be otherwise than strange and original. But in this we were grievously disappointed, for a more essentially commonplace, even silly talker, or one more naively pleased with himself, we had never met out of Europe. It is possible that he may have adopted this tone with us as the sort of thing which would suit English people, but I don't think so.

* The old palace of Otesiphon, one of the wonders of the world, had almost shared the fate of the city walls when the foreign consuls interfered. Mid-hat's soldiers were already at work. Yet this is the representative of progress in Turkey, a man of letters, who writes French and English well and contributed his paper lately to the *Fortnightly Review*. (Lady Anne Blunt).

We kept our own counsel of course about our plans, mentioning only that we hoped to see Bagdad and Bussora and to go on thence to India, for such was to be ultimately our route. On the mention of these two towns he at once began a panegyric of his own administration there, of the steamers he had established on the rivers, the walls he had pulled down and tramways built. "Ah, that tramway," he exclaimed affectionately. "It was I that devised it, and it is running still. Tramways are the first steps in civilisation. I shall make a tramway round Damascus. Everybody will ride in the trucks. It will pay five per cent. You will go to Bussora. You will see my steamers there. Bussora, through me, has become an important place. Steamers and tramways are what we want for these poor countries. The rivers of Damascus are too small for steamers, or I should soon have some afloat. But I will make a tramway. If we could have steamers and tramways everywhere Turkey would become rich." "And canals," we suggested, maliciously remembering how he had flooded Bagdad with his experiments in this way. "Yes, and canal, too. Canals, steamers and tramways are what we want." "And railways." "Yes, railways. I hope to have a railway soon running alongside of the carriage road from Beyrout. Railways are important for the guaranteeing of order in the country. If there was a railway across the desert we should have no more trouble with the Bedouins. Ah, those poor, Bedouins, how I trounced them at Bagdad. I warrant my name is not forgotten there." We assured him it was not.

* * * *

On the whole, we went away much impressed with Midhat, though not as we had hoped. He had astonished us, but not as a wise man. To speak seriously, one such reforming Pasha as this does more to ruin Turkey than twenty of the old dishonest sort. Midhat, though he fails to line his own purse, may be counted on to empty the public one at Damascus, as he did at Bagdad, where he spent a million sterling on unproductive works within a single year.

At the present day Mid-hat Pasha is remembered in Turkish 'Irāq chiefly as the leveller of the walls of Baghdād, as the promoter of the Baghdād-Kāzimain tramway, and as the creator of the "new town," or more correctly southern suburb, of Karbala. The demolition of the Baghdād city wall, an undoubted offence against the antique and the picturesque, was even from the practical point of view a measure of questionable expediency, not so much on military grounds as from considerations of octroi; but the Kādhimain tramway, though a small undertaking, has proved extremely useful. The extension given to Karbala, though marring the old-world aspect of the town, especially in comparison with Najaf, must have greatly improved it as a place of human habitation. The intended railway to Karbala was not built.

Outside the towns, apart from certain reforms relating to the land tax, the greatest performance of Mid-hat Pasha was his completion of measures which had been begun from the Aleppo end, some years previously, for the protection of the direct caravan route between Aleppo and Baghdād. "It was he who continued the line of "guard houses as far as Rumādy, and made of Ana for Bagdad what Deyr

"has become for Aleppo,—the head-quarters of a detached military force in possession of the Euphrates route. Caravans have since that time passed in more or less security down the valley. At the same time possession was taken of the few towns existing on the Tigris." *

Mid-hat Pāsha called into existence the small town of Rumādi on the Aleppo route endowing it besides with a fine caravanserai and military barracks ; and the extension of the telegraph to the same place may also, not improbably, have been due to his initiative. The fort which he built opposite to 'Ānah for the reception of a garrison that was to dominate a section of the Euphrates valley and Aleppo road is still, though now unoccupied, a striking feature of the landscape. In spite of all his efforts, however, a round-about way to Constantinople by Mūsāl and Diyārbakr continued, for some years after his departure, to be preferred to the short route by Aleppo as being more safe. Time has justified his work, however, and the Aleppo or Euphrates route is now almost universally followed by travellers between Baghdād and Constantinople and is as safe as any in the country.

Mid-hat Pāsha founded an Industrial School at Baghdād in conjunction with an orphanage ; it still exists and, though it has produced no striking results, must supply a real need. Two Turkish Government schools were also opened at Baghdād in his time. The improvement of the main bazaar of Baghdād, and the lighting of the bazaars, some of the adjoining streets and the bridge of boats there at night with kerosine lamps are reforms attributed to Mid-hat Pāsha. He instituted a Municipality at Basrah and endeavoured by erecting new Government buildings to draw the native town from the site which it still occupies down to the banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Mid-hat Pāsha's reception of the Shāh of Persia on a pilgrimage to the Holy Cities in 1870-71 has been mentioned already, and his annexation of Hasa in 1871 will be noticed further on.

Upon the whole Mid-hat Pāsha and his administration appear to have been rather too severely summed up by one of his successors in office, who † observed : "Three things are necessary in a governor, who would

* Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 1879, Vol. II, page 182.

† Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Vol. II, page 7.

There are numerous points of resemblance between Mid-hat Pāsha and a later Wālī of Baghdād, Nāzīm Pāsha, afterwards Turkish Minister of War and generalissimo of the Turkish forces in the war of 1912-13 with the Balkan States and Greece, who was sent by the "Union and Progress" Government of Turkey to 'Irāq in 1910, with extensive powers, to regenerate the province. Both revelled in municipal improvements which involved the destruction of existing buildings ; both made abortive attempts to establish navigation on the Euphrates, the earlier by means of steamers, the later by means of motor boats ; and both seriously endangered Baghdād city, the one by cutting a canal, the other by attempting to construct a gigantic dyke to control floods. For neither, apparently, had undertakings which were devoid of the sensational element and merely useful very much attraction ; in each of them patience and true insight were equally lacking ; but both were honest men and both were called subsequently to high office in Europe.

"effect real good in the department he administers—' *vouloir, savoir, et pouvoir* ! 'Mid-hat had the first and last qualifications, but not the second. "He was a half-educated man." Mid-hat Pasha was at least scrupulously honest, and the story which represents him as obliged to sell his watch and chain at the end of his government in order to obtain the means of returning to Constantinople seems well authenticated.

In the early summer of 1872 a state of lawlessness existed in Basrah town more discreditable to the local authorities than even the insecurity which had prevailed in Baghdad city in 1866. It was described as follows by Mr. Robertson, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Basrah, writing on the 26th May 1872 to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad :

Lawlessness
at Basrah,
1872.

I have in my late demi-official letters informed you of the almost daily and nightly occurrence of robberies in and about Basrah during the past two months. On the night of the 17th instant some 40 or 50 men surrounded and tried to enter Messrs. Lynch and Company's office. A person next door saw a man trying to break open a window, and fired a pistol at him. The report brought up a guard of twelve men stationed near the North gate. The robbers attacked the soldiers, killed two of them, and went away apparently scatheless.

I wrote to the Acting Muteserif mentioning this occurrence and stating that, in the event of a house occupied by any person under the protection of this Vice-Consulate being robbed, I should call on the local authorities to make good the property stolen. In his reply he promises to take all the measures in his power to protect the property of British subjects, but denies the Government's liability to refund the value of property stolen.

Were the thieves who infest Basrah ordinary thieves, committing occasional robbery by stealth and by eluding the vigilance of a fairly effective police, the Acting Muteserif would doubtless be quite right in declining to accept extraordinary responsibility ; but the existing state of affairs being notoriously the result of feebleness and indifference on the part of the authorities and of collusion between their subordinates and the thieves, I trust that, should occasion occur, you will support me in the position I have taken up.

The robbers are an organised body of about one hundred men. Their Chiefs — Alwan, Sahein, Mahomed, and Ibrahim Agha—a Turk from Constantinople, formerly an employé in the sarai,—are well known to the police. Yet these men accompanied by a few of their followers, with arms concealed under their abbas, walk about Basrah and sit in the coffee houses within the town daily. The police either fraternize with or affect not to see them, and private persons, being liable to arrest if found carrying arms, are entirely at their mercy. Of late they have adopted the custom of sending messages to persons of known means demanding sums of money, varying from 100 to 500 Shamis, and threatening assassination if their demands be not complied with. Such is the fear which the feebleness of the authorities has allowed them to inspire that the sums so demanded are invariably paid. Khoja Ibrahim Mukdassi Eysa, the procurator to the French church, called on me this morning to say that he had received a demand for 100 Shamis and to ask my advice as to whether he should pay it or not. I told him not to ; but his fears will, I fancy, outweigh my advice.

Some of the most influential men at Busrah,—Sheikh Suliman Zeheyr, Kassim Chelebi, the Nukeeb and his brother, Syed Mahomed Syed,—who are on bad terms with the Muteserif, Saeed Effendi, are accused of encouraging and protecting the robbers, with a view to obtaining the Muteserif's removal. This I do not suppose to be the case; but it is at the same time certain that were Sheikh Suliman and the Nukeeb so inclined, they could easily put a stop to the robberies. I believe, indeed, that they have offered to do so, if allowed to bring two hundred armed men from Zobeyr; but the Muteserif, being more afraid of them than of the robbers, has declined their services.

Internal administrative arrangements in Turkish 'Irāq, 1861—76.

Government
of Basrah,
1863—72.

The semi-independent Pāshaliq of Basrah, of which the creation in 1850 was obviously connected with the Turko-Persian frontier delimitation proceedings of 1849—52, seems not to have survived very long the cause which brought it into existence. The date of its abolition is uncertain; but by 1863 Basrah had been reduced to the status of a Qāim-Maqāmlīq, that is, to a district forming the charge of a Qāim-Maqām or civil official of the same grade as that of Mutasallim under the older system of nomenclature, which had now passed away. Munīb Pāsha, the Qāim-Maqām of Basrah in 1863, was, as we have already seen, subject to the orders of the Pāsha of Baghdād. In the years immediately following 1863, as has been related above, Nāmiq Pāsha endeavoured to extend the limits of Basrah at the expense of the Muntafik Shaikhdōm, but failed. One of his designs in the same connection must have been realised, however, not long after his departure; for by 1872 the Muntafik Shaikh of the day, Nāsir Pāsha, had become Mutasarrif of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh and to be discharging the duties of a Turkish official.

Annexation
of Hasa
and forma-
tion of a
Wilāyat of
Basrah,
1871—75.

In 1871, as described in the chapter on the history of Hasa, that distant and detached region in Eastern Arabia was occupied and annexed to Turkish 'Irāq by Mid-hat Pāsha and became a Mutasarriflik or civil division.

In 1874, a rebellion broke out in Hasa, in the suppression of which valuable services were rendered to the Porte by Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik Shaikh and Turkish Mutasarrif of Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, who seems to have been, for an Arab chief, a man of unusual capacity and enlightenment. Nāsir Pāsha's local influence being considered sufficient to make the incorporation of the Muntafik districts with Basrah a safe proceeding, if only the conditions were acceptable to the Shaikh himself, advantage was

taken of his loyalty to combine them in 1875, together with the existing districts of Basrah and the new Hasa division, into a Basrah Wilāyat of which Nāsir Pāsha was appointed the first Wālī. It is said that he paid £70,000 as the price of his nomination. Nāsiriyyah town, now the capital of the Muntafik Mutasarriflik, was founded by Nāsir Pāsha, after whom it was named; and under his rule the town of 'Amārah on the Tigris, which was included in his jurisdiction, began to rise into notice.

As might have been foreseen, the combination in one person of full official powers and supreme local influence was found inconvenient; Nāsir Pāsha fell under suspicion of the Porte; and after a short tenure of the Basrah Wilāyat, he was summoned to Constantinople and detained there, nominally as a trusted adviser of Government, but really as a political prisoner. He was succeeded as Wālī of Basrah by 'Abdullah Pāsha, a Kurd, who retained office until 1879.

In mentioning the appointment of Mid-hat Pāsha as first "Wālī" of Baghdād, it has been indicated that part of his mission was to introduce a new system of civil government: this was the *symmetrical "Wilāyat" system which then already existed in other parts of Turkey and which now covers the greater part of the Ottoman dominions.

The following translation of a letter addressed by Mid-hat Pāsha, soon after his arrival, to the foreign Consulates at Baghdād, explains how the system was intended to work in relation to foreign representatives:

Translation of a letter from His Excellency Midhut Pasha, Governor-General of Turkish Arabia, to Her Britannic Majesty's Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, dated Baghdad, 5th Safer 1286, 5th Mais 1285, 17th May 1869.

As the Walayet system has been founded and enforced in all other provinces in the Turkish dominions, the Baghdad Province is likewise now reformed on the same system; consequently, the mode of administration has been altered in order to facilitate affairs that may occur. I deem it necessary to explain the mode of such administration. Baghdad Walayet is divided into nine different subordinate Governments (Muteseriflik). The Baghdad Province (Sinjak) is counted as one of the Subordinate Governments (Muteseriflik). This place being assigned at head-quarters of the Walayet, therefore the * separate Offices of Secretariat (Māaoonlik) and Agency

Regularisation of the civil administration of Turkish 'Irāq. 1869.

*See page 1416 *ante* text and footnote. An account of the system, in its application to Mesopotamia, will be found in Volume II of this Gazetteer, page 834, article "Turkish 'Irāq." There have been some modifications of detail in the system since its first introduction: *e.g.*, there is now no longer a Mutasarrif of Baghdād distinct from the Wālī.

† The translation here is not very happy. The offices of Mu'awin and Mudir-al-Umūr-al-Ajnabiyah still exist. The former officer is what his title denotes, "Adjoint du Wālī" or Assistant Wālī; the latter, the "Director of Foreign Affairs," is the Wālī's Foreign Secretary. The Mu'awin is an executive officer occupying himself, under the Wālī, with internal affairs; the Mudir is the medium of communication with Foreign Consuls and is (or ought to be) the expert of the Wilāyat in questions of treaty rights; privileges of aliens, etc.

(Mudeerlik) for Foreign Affairs have been established for conducting the business of Government.

In transacting the important affairs of the subjects of your Government in other provinces (Sinjak), whenever anything may occur requiring settlement, it must be conducted in the same manner as is carried on here. In order to facilitate the business, it is necessary that the same should be communicated for settlement to the Lieutenant-Governor (Muteserif) on the spot; and in case of the affair not being arranged on the spot, it may be referred to the head-quarters of the Walayet. In conducting business of your subjects with the Government, the affairs, or the claim, shall be represented by an official communication, as the case may require, either to the Sub-Government (Muteseriflik) or Agency (Mudeerlik) for Foreign Affairs, and, if necessary, it may be communicated directly to myself, and, in my absence, to the Secretariat (Maaoonlik).

Turkish
Government
steamers,
1863—76.

Several matters of local administration in Turkish 'Irāq, mostly belonging to the earlier years of the Sultanate of 'Abdul 'Aziz, call for notice in passing.

References in official correspondence show that as early as 1863 the Turkish Government possessed steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia and made use of them for administrative purposes; but no details are ascertainable of their number, size or kind, or of the manner in which they were obtained. They seem to have been occasionally attacked, or at least threatened, by the Arab tribes. In 1867 a line of river steamers under the Turkish flag, run as a commercial concern but under official direction, was constituted under the name of the Oman-Ottoman Administration. The former Government steamers of which perhaps there were only two the * "Baghdādi" and the "Basrah" were evidently transferred to the new Administration; but the concern is frequently described as a "Company", and the capital may have belonged in part to private individuals. In 1869 the "Musal," "Furāt," and "Rusāfah," built at Antwerp to the order of Nāmiq Pāsha about 1866, were added to the Oman-Ottoman fleet. Two more steamers, one of which was named the † "Maskarah" were subsequently added, bringing the number up to seven. After the commencement of Midhat Pāsha's rule at Baghdad the steamers of the Administration were used almost exclusively for commercial purposes.

Official
exportation
of grain to
Jiddah,
1864—66.

Nāmiq Pāsha, during his administration of Turkish 'Irāq, seems to have been required by his Government to arrange for the regular exportation of a certain quantity of grain to Jiddah in the Red Sea with the

* The "Baghdādi" was built in 1859.

† The "Maskarah" was built at Trieste in 1871; by 1883 she was useless and dismantled. The other new steamer was the "Tilafa:" she was destroyed by fire at Basrah in 1884.

object of preventing scarcity at that great pilgrim port. In the Muntafik troubles of 1864 large amounts of grain collected for this purpose by the Turkish authorities were plundered ; and two years later, the orders for export being still in force, there were serious complaints at Baghdād of inconveniences and abuses to which they gave rise. In this connection Colonel Kemball, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, reported as follows at the end of November 1866 :

Owing to the operations of the Local Government to effect the promised supply of grain to Jeddah, the prices of wheat and barley have risen to double the ordinary rates, and considerable discontent has been engendered in consequence amongst the town populations. This feeling is justified by the well-founded conviction that the distress which is experienced is not the result of any real scarcity, but has been occasioned by the competition of the Government and the monopoly to which it has had recourse of the means of transport in order to secure the consignments required. Appeals made to His Excellency by deputations of the people, including a mob of women, have been productive of little relief, and His Excellency observed to the French Consular Dragoman that high prices ruling temporarily were in the present case no evil, seeing that, owing to a famine in India, grain might otherwise be drained out of the country. It may be inferred that His Excellency's measures have been taken with a design, the more especially that the shipments to Jeddah for the current year have been completed, and that the grain now somewhat prematurely stored is destined for exportation next autumn. I need hardly inform your Lordship that Namik Pasha's fears, real or pretended, with respect to the famine in the distant districts of Bengal, are wholly groundless. No vessels have come this year to Bussorah to carry away grain to India, though the charterers of one or two vessels seeking their annual cargoes for the Mauritius have been this year disappointed. I have before expressed an opinion that the supply of grain to Jeddah, regarded as a mercantile speculation and freed from Government action, could, under proper management, be turned to excellent account in developing the resources of this country, but in the sense of encouraging extended cultivation, and not by hampering trade and agriculture, as under the existing system.

In the summer of 1864 Nāmiq Pasha established a service of Arab messengers to run twice a week between Basrah and Dīwāniyah, and it may safely be assumed that the latter place was at the time connected in some similar or superior fashion with Baghdād. It is probable that this post was instituted for official purposes only, and it may have been only a temporary expedient for the rapid transmission of news during the military operations of that year, when Dīwāniyah was an important garrison and troops had been sent to Basrah also.

Turkish post
between
Basrah and
Baghdād,
1864.

At the present day, when money is required in Turkey for public expenditure which cannot be met from the ordinary resources of the State, subscriptions are commonly invited ; and these are sometimes collected from public servants, after their consent has been obtained by official pressure, in the form of deductions from their pay. Fifty years ago the

Confiscation
by the
Turkish
Government
of the pay
of their
employés for
August 1866.

procedure was more drastic, witness the following extract from a despatch written by Colonel Kemball at the end of 1866: "The salaries of "all Government servants (from the highest to the lowest employé, including the private soldier), which were sequestered by the Porte for the "month of August, have aggregated for the whole province * 4,436 purses, "which amount has already been forwarded to the capital in specie. The "forced contribution demanded from the population, and aggregating "7,000 purses, is in course of collection."

Provincial indications were thus not wanting of the progress of the central exchequer towards bankruptcy.

The Baghdad-Basrah Wilayat Budget, 1874.

The revenue of the Baghdad-Basrah Wilayat for the year 1291 (corresponding roughly to 1874 A. D.) was £T. 648,435, while expenditure amounted to £T. 285,880, the former exclusive of customs house receipts and the latter inclusive of military, marine and telegraph expenditure. If these † figures are correct, there would seem to have been in the 30 years that have since elapsed a serious diminution of revenue and a very large increase in expenditure.

General British interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1861—76.

British commercial navigation of the Tigris, 1861—75.

The navigation of the Tigris by the British steamer "City of London," which Messrs. Lynch & Co. sent out from England in 1861 or 1862, was at first opposed or even prevented by the Turkish authorities at Baghdad. This necessitated a fresh application to the Porte by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which the outcome was another Vizirial letter, obtained in July 1862. Its purport was identical with that of the letter of 1861, and it sufficed to put an end, for the moment, to the obstruction offered by the Baghdad local authorities to the running of the "City of London."

In 1864, however, on its becoming known that Messrs. Lynch proposed to place a second steamer, the "Dejleh," upon the Tigris, a serious controversy arose. Colonel Kemball, the British Political Agent at Baghdad, learning that the Turks intended to oppose the employment of the "Dejleh," wrote to Nāmiq Pasha, referring to the freedom of

* The "purse" was worth about £5.

† See Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, vol. I, page 339, and compare vol. II of this Gazetteer, article "Turkish 'Irāq," page 857. Customs receipts were apparently about the same in 1874 and 1903.

navigation enjoyed by British commercial vessels in Mesopotamia and asking him to specify any objections that he entertained. Nāmiq Pāsha, in reply, argued that the number of steamers under the British flag authorised to ply on the rivers was restricted to two, and that, as there were already the "Comet" and the "City of London" upon the Tigris, another could not be added. Evidently the British Political Agent referred to the settlement of 1846, which covered all British commercial vessels; and in accordance with which alone the question of the "Dejleh" ought to have been settled, while the Pāsha had in his mind the Farman of 1834, which related exclusively to British Government vessels and so had no bearing at this time except on the "Comet," which belonged to the Indian Navy. The discussion was soon transferred to Europe, where the British authorities, under some misconception of the facts of the case, at first inclined to accept the Turkish view of the case and to withdraw the "Comet" from Mesopotamia to make way for the "Dejleh." On Colonel Kembball's pointing out, however, that the "Dejleh," owned by Messrs. Lynch, had not and could not have been sent—as was assumed by the Porte in an official note to the British Embassy—to replace the "Comet," which belonged to the Government of India, the course of the argument was changed; and in the end the "Dejleh" was allowed to run, irrespective of the presence of the "Comet."

In 1867 the practical monopoly of steam navigation on the Tigris enjoyed by Messrs. Lynch was challenged by the Oman-Ottoman line, of which the formation has already been mentioned; but the competition of the new Company or Turkish Department, whichever it may have been, was ineffectual.

In 1874, on Messrs. Lynch & Co.'s proposing to turn the "City of London" into a store ship and to replace her by a new steamer and a steam launch, the Porte revived their old objections and arguments. They contended that there was no distinction between the British Government and Messrs. Lynch; that only two steamers under the British flag might be on the Tigris at the same time; and that, as this number was already exceeded by the presence simultaneously of the "Comet," the "City of London" and the "Dejleh," Messrs. Lynch could not claim the right of making an addition to their fleet. The Turkish note was referred to Colonel Herbert, who explained once more the character of the "Comet," besides exposing various misstatements; and his views were adopted by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. At length, on the 31st March 1875, orders were obtained from the Porte

authorising Messrs. Lynch to replace one of their old steamers by a new one, and also to employ a steam launch in exceptional cases and when the river was low.

Messrs. Lynch & Co. appear as early as 1870 to have assumed, perhaps on *taking other capitalists into partnership, the style of the "Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company"; but this designation has never been recognised by the Turks, who to the present time insist on describing the Company as "Lynch's."

Donation by
an Indian
Nawāb for
clearing the
Husainiyāh
Canal, 1863.

By 1863 or probably earlier, the Husainiyāh Canal, on the clearance of which large sums were spent by His Highness the Mīr of Sind between 1836 and 1842, had again become choked with silt. A sum of about £10,000 having been devoted to the purpose of clearing it by "an Indian Nawāb, since dead,"—not otherwise described but in all probability a British subject, — Nāmiq Pāsha, on whom the duty of expending the money had somehow devolved, deputed the "Egyptian trained engineers on his staff to make an estimate of the work and report upon the best mode of carrying it into effect."

Injuries to
and claims
of British
subjects,
1866.

In 1866, as has been shown in the section on the internal history of the province, British subjects or dependants were among the sufferers by various burglaries which occurred in Baghdād city; and it does not appear that they obtained any substantial redress.

In August 1866 a somewhat amusing correspondence took place between the British Political Agent at Baghdād and the local authorities with reference to a bale of 65 pieces of calico, the property of a British subject and worth 423½ Qrāns, which had been plundered more than a year before on the road between Ba'qūbah and Shahrabān. Some of the robbers were captured, in his own jurisdiction, by Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha, Governor of Kirkūk, who recovered from them the sum of 148 Qrāns and remitted it to Baghdād, remarking that the balance was due by their associates, who were still at large. Colonel Kemball, however, demurred to a settlement on these lines and in writing to Nāmiq Pāsha observed: "I beg, however, to submit to Your Excellency that the "practice of holding each robber responsible for his share of property "plundered in company is scarcely just. In commercial transactions the "liability of a partner may very properly be limited to the amount of "capital he may have contributed to the concern; but such a principle "could hardly be extended to malefactors, and I venture to hope that

*The "Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company" was incorporated, however, in April 1861.

"Your Excellency will be pleased to compel the individuals actually in custody to make good the balance still due to Agha Mahomed Hussain."

Mr. Andrew, the sanguine and energetic originator of the Euphrates Valley Railway scheme, did not abandon hope when in 1857, as already mentioned, the Company formed at his instance failed to secure a financial guarantee for its enterprise from the British Government. Though the concession obtained from the Porte had expired, Mr. Andrew remained in communication with British and Turkish Ministers and other influential persons on the subject of the scheme, and from 1866 to 1870 he pressed it with great earnestness. The Indian Mutiny and the completion of the Suez Canal furnished fresh arguments in the case, and much stress was now laid on the facilities which the line would afford for* relieving or reinforcing the British garrison in India by a route alternative to, and more rapid than, that *viâ* the Red Sea.

Proposed
British
Euphrates
Valley
Railway
from the
Mediterranean to the
Persian Gulf
1871-72.

In 1867 the advantages of a Euphrates Valley Railway were summarised by Mr. Andrew as follows:—

It would connect the Mediterranean with Bussorah, at the head of the Persian Gulf, between which place and Kurrachee and Bombay regular communication is now maintained by a line of steamers subsidised by the Indian Government.

Making Kurrachee the European port of India in place of Bombay, it would save about 1,000 miles in the distance between England and India, and would reduce the time occupied in the journey almost by one half.

It would save the Government large sums in sudden emergencies, by the facilities it would afford for the transport of troops and stores.

It would enable troops from England to be landed at Kurrachee in about 14 days, and in two or three days more, at Lahore, Peshawar, or Delhi, when the Indus Valley railway system is complete.

It would render the invasion of India all but impossible.

It would subject an enemy advancing towards the North-Western Frontier of India to easy attack in the flank and rear.

It would render the resources of England so promptly available in the East, that Chatham and Portsmouth might be made the bases of operations as easily as Kurrachee

* It argues extreme optimism on the part of the promoters of the Railway that they should have expected Turkey willingly to consent, at least for long, to the frequent passage of considerable bodies of foreign troops through remote districts where her own military power was of the slightest. And insufficient thought seems to have been given to the false situation in which Turkey would have been placed, during a war between Britain and Russia, through the use by Britain for military purposes of a railway running through Turkish territory, the idea of moving foreign troops across Turkey from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was not a new one; see Dr. J. W. Winchester's *Note on the Practicability of advancing an Army from Europe into Asia by the Provinces of the Euphrates and Tigris* in the transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, Volume VI, September 1841 to May 1844.

and Bombay; and any hostile movement directed against us, whether from without or within our Indian frontier, might thus be effectually checked before it could assume formidable proportions.

It would put an end to the present dangerous isolation of Persia, and would relieve that country from the undue pressure to which she is subjected by Russia; and it would afford her a short, cheap, easy and safe outlet on the Mediterranean for her trade with Europe, in place of the existing long, expensive, and difficult route by the Black Sea, which is entirely at the mercy of Russia.

It would be easily defensible, both termini of the railway being on the open sea.

The length of the Railway, from Sea to Sea, would be about 850 miles.

The country does not present any serious engineering difficulties; the cost of the entire line being estimated at from £8,000 to £10,000 per mile.

The capital which would be required would not exceed 8½ millions.

In 1870 Mr. Andrew sought further to strengthen the case for the Railway by insisting on the advantages in relation to British postal communications, trade, and political prestige which it would confer, and of the services which it might tender to the cause of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The Porte were believed to be favourable to the construction of some railway connecting Mesopotamia with the rest of Turkey; but there was reason to think that they would prefer a line leading from Baghdād through Asia Minor to Constantinople to one ending on the Mediterranean.

At length, on the 23rd June 1871, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed "to examine and report upon the whole "subject of railway communication between the Mediterranean, the Black "Sea, and the Persian Gulf." This Committee, which was presided over by Sir Stafford Northcote, sat at different times in 1871 and 1872. It examined a large number of important witnesses, besides taking into consideration reports specially obtained from many British consular officers in Turkey. Among those who gave evidence before the Committee were Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Lords Sandhurst, and Strathnairn, ex-Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Bartle Frere, ex-Governor of Bombay; Sir H. C. Rawlinson, Sir A. B. Kemball, Captain Felix Jones, I.N., and Captain Selby, I.N., political and topographical experts; Mr. Thomas K. Lynch (who had accompanied his brother Commander Lynch to Turkish 'Irāq in 1841 and had afterwards engaged in trade at Baghdād), Mr. R. Paul, and Mr. E. Dawes, merchants of local knowledge and experience; and Mr. W. Mackinnon, Chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Co. Among the consular officers consulted were Colonel Herbert, the British Political Agent at Baghdād,

who recommended a line from Aleppo to Baghdaḍ *via* Birijik, Nisibin and Mūsāl; and Mr. W. Gifford Palgrave, the Central Arabian explorer, who had become British Consul at Trebizond.

The following extracts from the Select Committee's report will serve to show the scope of their investigations and the nature of their conclusions.

The evidence which your Committee have taken, and to which much more might have been added, has satisfied them that there is no insuperable obstacle in the way of the construction of a railway from some suitable port in the Mediterranean to some other suitable port at or near the head of the Persian Gulf; that there is more than one port which might be selected at either end of the line; that there are several practicable routes; that there would be no difficulty in procuring the necessary supply of labour and of materials for constructing a railway; and that their need be no apprehension of its being exposed to injury by natives, either during the process of its construction or after it shall have been completed. They find, too, that there is reason to expect the sanction, if not the active concurrence, of the Turkish Government in any well conceived project that they may be presented to them.

* * * *

Several witnesses have discussed the relative advantages of the various termini, both on the Mediterranean and on the Persian Gulf; the principal question with regard to the former being whether Alexandretta or Suedia should be preferred; while with regard to the latter, there have not only been questions between different ports, such as Bussorah, Mohammerah, Core Abdullah, Grane, and Bushire, but the further question, whether the line should not be carried along the whole northern shore of the Gulf, so as to establish direct communication with the Indian railway system at Kurrachee.

* * * *

As regards the terminus on the Persian Gulf, your Committee are decidedly of opinion that it would be better to carry the line to some point where it might be brought into communication with the steam-vessels which are now under Government subvention to carry the mails, and which ply from the Indian ports to Bussorah, than to continue it along the coast to Kurrachee by a very expensive and probably unremunerative route. Of the particular ports which have been mentioned, they are inclined to prefer the port of * Grane, but upon this point, as well as upon the selection of a port on the Mediterranean, they think that a local inquiry, conducted by competent scientific authorities, with a special reference to the purpose in view, would be desirable.

Passing from the question of the termini to that of the route itself, your Committee find that the arguments in favour of, and against, the Euphrates and the Tigris routes respectively may be thus stated:—

The Euphrates route is considerably the shorter, would be the cheaper to make; and, assuming an equal rate of speed, would afford the quicker passage for persons, troops, or mails passing between England and India. The Tigris route might attract the larger amount of traffic, and would connect itself better with the projected Turkish system.

Upon the whole, your Committee are of opinion, that, if the enterprise were to be regarded simply as one affecting British interests, it would be the wisest course to

* *i.e.*, Kuwait.

adopt the shortest and most direct line not open to very obvious objections, and that one of the two routes by the way of the Euphrates should be preferred, leaving it for those who are interested in the improvement of the communications with the towns on the Tigris, or further east, to connect those towns with the main line by one or more branch railways, and by the use of the water communication which exists between the two rivers. But if other considerations are to be taken into account, and if the co-operation of the Turkish Government is to be sought in the construction of a railway, it may well happen that that Government may see reason to prefer the route by way of the Tigris, and any such preference ought to be a material element in the determination of the question.

Your Committee, therefore, having arrived at the conclusion that there is no probability of any line being constructed by unassisted private enterprise, have now to consider the following question :—

Is it worth the while of England to undertake the making of a line in conjunction with Turkey ; and is there, in that case, a probability that a practical arrangement can be made ?

There can be no doubt that if the Government of England were to give its support, in the form of an adequate guarantee, the Turkish Government would give its general countenance to the undertaking, whatever might be the route that was chosen. It is the opinion of many very competent witnesses that it would be worth the while of this country to give such a guarantee, even though it should involve a considerable pecuniary sacrifice. Others are of a different opinion ; and, though admitting that England would derive certain advantages from the opening of a railway through Mesopotamia, do not consider that those advantages would be of sufficient importance to justify a serious national expenditure.

Among the witnesses whose evidence tends most strongly to support the policy of incurring the cost or risk of a national guarantee, your Committee may mention Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord Strathnairn, Sir H. Bartle Frere, Sir Donald Macleod, Mr. Laing, Colonel Sir H. Green, Colonel Malcolm Green, Captain Tyler, R.E., Mr. W. Gifford Palgrave, etc.

Among those who suggest considerations tending to throw doubt on the propriety of such an expenditure, your Committee would call attention to the evidence of Lord Sandhurst, Sir H. Rawlinson, Major Champain, etc.

Your Committee have had laid before them a Despatch from the Government of India, expressing an earnest desire that it may be found practicable to carry out the project, which, it is observed, would be of considerable, but not of paramount, importance to the interest of that country. They infer from it that the Indian Government while it would be prepared to avail itself of the railway if made, and of course to pay for the services it might require, would object to join in any direct or indirect expenditure for the purpose of obtaining its construction.

*

*

*

*

*

Your Committee are decidedly of opinion that, if any steps are to be taken towards the construction of a line, the best course will be for Her Majesty's Government to place themselves in communication with the Government of Turkey, with a view to some arrangement of the nature above described ; and that the two Governments should jointly undertake a survey for the purpose of deciding upon the precise route to be adopted.

Your Committee have not obtained full information as to the cost of any of the lines which have been proposed, but they think it probable that the sum of £10,000,000 would be amply sufficient to cover the expense of the shortest route at all events.

What then are the advantages which the country might expect to gain from this possible expenditure? They are principally those to be derived from the more rapid transmission of mails, and from the possession of an alternative and more rapid route for the conveyance of troops, and from the great commercial advantages, both to India and England, which the opening up of the route would confer.

The amount of time that might be saved in the transmission of mails from England to Bombay is variously estimated by different witnesses, some placing it at four days, others as high as seven or eight days, but it must of course materially depend upon, first, the length of the railway, and secondly, the rate of speed at which the trains can travel, which again depends partly upon the gauge to be adopted, and thus the question is resolved into one of cost. Captain Tyler, R.E., who has gone carefully into the question, states the saving of distance by the Euphrates route from London *viâ* Brindisi and Scanderoon to Bombay, as compared with that *viâ* Brindisi, Alexandria, and Suez at 723 miles, and estimates the saving of time at 92 hours. The adoption of Kurrachee as the point of debarkation, instead of Bombay, would of course materially enhance the saving, and during the season of the monsoon the gain would be increased by avoiding the Indian Ocean.

With regard to the conveyance of troops, your Committee have taken the opinions of several highly competent witnesses, Lords Strathnairn and Sandhurst, successively Commanders-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Bartle Frere, and others. As respects the comparative advantages of the proposed railway route and the route by the Suez Canal for the purpose of the ordinary reliefs, some difference of opinion prevails. The advantage of gaining some days in point of time is counterbalanced, in the opinion of some witnesses, by that of being able to send the men from the point of departure to that of destination without transshipment. Lord Sandhurst and Sir Henry Rawlinson prefer the Suez route on this ground. On the other hand, Lord Strathnairn and Colonel Sir Henry Green consider that in the winter the shorter route would be the preferable one. But nearly all the witnesses concur as to the importance of having a second or alternative route available in case of the first being impeded or in case of an emergency arising, which might call for the rapid dispatch of troops, especially if they were wanted in the north-west of India.

* * * * *

Speaking generally, your Committee are of opinion that the two routes, by the Red Sea and by the Persian Gulf, might be maintained and used simultaneously; that at certain seasons and for certain purposes the advantage would lie with the one and at other seasons and for other purposes it would lie with the other; that it may fairly be expected that in process of time traffic enough for the support of both would develop itself, but that this result must not be expected too soon; that the political and commercial advantages of establishing a second route would at any time be considerable and might, under possible circumstances, be exceedingly great; and that it would be worth the while of the English Government to make an effort to secure them, considering the moderate pecuniary risk which they would incur. They believe that this may best be done by opening communications with the Government of Turkey in the sense indicated by the semi-official correspondence to which they have already drawn attention.

It does not appear whether any action was taken at Constantinople by Her Majesty's Government on this report, nor, if so, what difficulties in the way of an understanding with Turkey or of raising capital for the enterprise were encountered. But with the presentation of the Select

Committee's report the scheme for a British railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf disappeared finally from the public view.

The general lawlessness which prevailed at Basrah in 1872, as already described, culminated in an outrage of a very unusual and daring character against the mail steamer "Cashmere," the property of the British India Steam Navigation Company, while lying at anchor in the port under the protection of the Turkish Government.

Piracy
committed
on the
British mail
steamer
"Cashmere"
at Basrah,
1872.

In the small hours of the morning of the 13th June 1872 the vessel was suddenly boarded, from three boats, by a gang of 28 pirates, the foremost of whom obtained access to the deck by pretending to be passengers. The "Cashmere's" rifles and ammunition were in different parts of the ship and could not be got at once the pirates were in possession of her, consequently there was no resistance. The robbers, after inflicting enough personal injuries with cold steel to terrorise the crew, rifled the vessel and disappeared with remarkable celerity. A native fireman, Ismā'il Khān, was killed in the attack, his head being almost severed from his body by a sword-cut as he emerged from the stoke-hole, and a dozen other persons on board were wounded, including five Europeans, among whom were the ship's Clerk (Mr. Bradford), dangerously stabbed with a dagger, and the Chief Engineer (Mr. Mackenzie), whose hand was crippled. Specie to the amount of Rs. 42,050 and property belonging to the officers and crew to the value of Rs. 5,552 were carried off, making a total loss of Rs. 47,602.

It was subsequently ascertained that the gang which committed this piracy was a composite one, comprising Hasāwis from Hasa, Ka'ab from 'Arabistān, Muntafik from the Euphrates, inhabitants of the Maqām quarter of Basrah town, negroes, and others. The leader of the enterprise was Jāsim-bin-Khalaf, a native of Hasa; among his lieutenants was Muhammad-al-Hāij, probably a Muntafik; and 'Alwān, another Hasāwi bad character well known at Basrah, became an accessory after the fact. The presence of people from Maqām among the raiders explained the excellence of the information possessed by the gang and their quickness in getting at the treasure on board, for Maqāmis were employed to a considerable extent about British steamers visiting the port.

The plunder was divided by the pirates at Sarāji; and on the night following, a boat from the Turkish corvette at Basrah fell in with a suspicious craft off Hamdān and endeavoured to stop her, but was beaten off with the loss of one man killed and five wounded.

Raūf Pāsha, the Turkish ruler of Baghdād, took energetic action; and before long the Turkish authorities had arrested a large number

of persons at Basrah. Muhammad-al-Hāij was captured at Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh; and an active search for Jāsim-bin-Khalaf was set on foot by Nāsir Pasha, Shaikh and Mutasarif of the Muntafik country. Some of the pirates sought refuge in 'Arabistān, in the chapter on the history of which province an account of the proceedings taken to obtain their surrender will be found. About the beginning of 1873 between 30 and 40 prisoners were brought to trial before a Turkish Court at Basrah, with the result that 16 were convicted, of whom 9 were condemned to death and 4 to imprisonment for life. Seven of the capital sentences, after confirmation from Constantinople, were carried out at Basrah on the 26th June 1873, the criminals—among them Muhammad-al-Hāij—being publicly hanged at different places in the town. Eight more of the offenders were reported to have met, in the meantime, with violent deaths of various kinds; 6 were in prison; and only 7 remained to be accounted for. 'Alwān had been captured at an early stage of the proceedings in the Bahrain islands, to which he at first escaped; his arrest was effected by the Shaikh of Bahrain at the request of the British Political Resident at Būshehr; and he was sent to Basrah in His Britannic Majesty's gunboat "Hugh Rose" and handed over to the Turkish authorities. Jāsim-al-Khalaf, the ringleader and supposed murderer of the fireman, was found by the Turks in Hasa and brought to Basrah in August 1873. The result of the trials of Jāsim and 'Alwān is not on record; but, whatever it was, enough had been done to ensure respect for the British mercantile flag. The "Cashmere" case is remembered in Turkish 'Irāq to the present day as an impressive example of British retribution.

Part of the specie plundered had been traced by the Turkish authorities with very little delay; and eventually the specie recoveries reached a total value of Rs. 31,347, those made in Turkey amounting to Rs. 17,917 and those in Persia to Rs. 13,430, which left a balance of Rs. 10,703 unrecovered under this head. The shippers and consignees of the specie were all native merchants.

Messrs. Grey, Paul and Company, the Agents at Būshehr of the British India Steam Navigation Company, from the first urged that the Turkish Government should be held responsible for making good the entire losses occasioned by the piracy. This view was endorsed by the Government of India, who held that the peculiar circumstances of the attack, taking place as it did in a large Turkish port and under the guns of a Turkish man-of-war, warranted exceptional treatment of the case. But Her Majesty's Government, advised by the Law Officers of the Crown,

considered that to demand compensation from a Government on account of the misdeeds of criminals within its jurisdiction would be to create an inconvenient and even dangerous precedent. Accordingly, though Ra'ûf Pâsha had verbally admitted the responsibility of the Porte for affording compensation in full, and though Colonel Herbert, the British Political Agent, had already lodged with *Radîf Pâsha, Ra'ûf Pâsha's successor, a claim for Rs. 10,703 on account of the specie and Rs. 5,552 on account of the other property unrecovered, as also for Rs. 1,000 as compensation to the family of the murdered fireman and £200 and £25 as compensation to the Clerk and Chief Engineer respectively, no representations were made at the Porte on the subject, and nothing was obtained.

The settlement of the "Cashmere" case entailed heavy work, extending over many months, on the British representatives in Turkish 'Irâq; on Colonel Herbert, the Political Agent at Baghdâd, to whose energy and determination the satisfactory result obtained was mostly due; and on Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Basrah, by whom the proceedings at that place and in 'Arabistân were watched, and in part conducted, under Colonel Herbert's supervision. Good assistance was rendered, in Turkish 'Irâq, by Ra'ûf Pâshâ, the Wâli of Baghdâd; by Nâsir Pâsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, who had presented himself at Basrah only four days after the piracy; by Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmân Effendi, Naqîb of Basrah; and by Qâsim-az-Zuhair, Chalabi, President of the Mercantile Court at Basrah. Colonel Herbert received the thanks of the Government of India, and was commended by Her Majesty's Government, for his successful handling of matters; and the recommendations which he made on behalf of his principal coadjutors were accepted. Mr. Robertson's official position was improved by the change of his title from "British Agent" to "Assistant Political Agent" at Basrah; the acknowledgments of the Government of India were conveyed to Ra'ûf Pâsha; and in 1874 suitable presents were given to the others, the Muntafik Shaikh receiving a double-poled tent, and the Naqîb and the Chalabi a gold watch and chain each. His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was directed to thank the Turkish Government for their satisfactory treatment of the case.

* Radîf Pâsha was well spoken of after his departure: he "had a way of hanging "malefactors who were condemned to death, and doing other unpleasant things with "promptitude and thoroughness, which gave Mesopotamia a new start in civilization," (Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, vol. I, page 138.)

**British official enterprises and establishments in Turkish 'Irāq,
1861-76.**

The institution of a British mail service between Baghdād and Basrah in 1862-63, its improvement in 1866 and 1876, and the establishment of regular British Indian post offices at Baghdād and Basrah in 1868 are described in the Appendix on Mail Communications, which may be consulted. Annexure No. 2 to that Appendix contains a description of the contracts for the carriage of the British mail between Baghdād and Basrah granted by the British Government from 1863 onwards, to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. (Messrs. Lynch). No Turkish post offices as yet existed in the province; and there was not even any public mail service, except the British Dromedary Post, connecting Mesopotamia with the outer world. The British Indian Post Office had thus a large share in inaugurating, by its enterprise, a new economic, social, and even political era in Turkish 'Irāq.

Institution of a British mail service between Turkish 'Irāq and India, 1862-63.

The British Dromedary Post between Baghdād and Bairūt was still maintained; but the contribution of Rs. 200 a month towards its cost, granted by the Government of India in 1844, was withdrawn in 1871. Formerly letters from Baghdād to India had been sent by this line, but the establishment of a direct British mail service between Turkish 'Irāq and India deprived it of that part of its custom, besides providing an alternative line of communication between Baghdād and Europe longer, but not very much slower, than that by Damascus. From 1871, accordingly, its usefulness being diminished and its revenue impaired, this old institution began to decline; but it was not finally abolished during the reign of 'Abdul 'Azīz.

Maintenance of the British Dromedary Post.

Great as was the effect of the institution of postal services, that of the establishment, almost simultaneously, of telegraphic communication between Baghdād and Constantinople, Baghdād and Persia, and Baghdād and India was probably even greater. The lines were constructed by British agency, but, within the limits of the Ottoman Empire, on behalf of the Turkish Government, to whom on completion they were handed over. A full history of the work will be found in the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf; and here it will be sufficient to mention, by way of chronology, that communication was opened between Baghdād and Constantinople in June 1861, between Baghdād and Khānaqīn on

Construction, by British agency, of the Constantinople-Baghdād, Baghdād-Tehrān, and Baghdād-Persian Gulf lines of telegraph, 1861-65.

the Persian frontier in October 1864, and between Baghdād and Fāo below Basrah, the point of union with the Persian Gulf telegraph system, in January 1865.

Part played
in the enter-
prise, in
Turkish
'Irāq, by
British
officials.

British officials with local experience of Turkish 'Irāq played, from the first, an important part in the arrangements for the Mesopotamian sections of the work. Sir H. Rawlinson, formerly British Political Agent at Baghdād and at this time Envoy to the Court of Persia, participated in the preliminary discussions at Constantinople in 1859, contributing an unrivalled store of knowledge and information. On the 15th December 1860 Colonel Kemball, British Political Agent at Baghdād, arrived at Constantinople, having been deputed by Her Majesty's Government, with the assent of the Porte, to examine and report on the partially completed line from Constantinople to Baghdād, a duty which he performed most thoroughly, making a tour along the whole line from Scutari to Baghdād between the 9th January and the end of April 1861.

From 1863 to 1865 Colonel Kemball was associated in the further measures for extending the telegraph from Baghdād to the Persian Gulf; and in March-April 1863, accompanied by Mr. Greener, a professional electrical engineer, he made a reconnaissance lasting a month along the approximate line to be followed as far as Basrah and supplied a sketch map and itinerary, in consequence of which a route *viâ* Hillah, Dīwānīyah, Hammār and Qūrnah was adopted. A further more minute survey of the country between Dīwānīyah and Hammār was made a little later by Lieutenant Bewsher, I.N.,* and Mr. Johnston, British Vice-Consul at Basrah, on a downward journey from Baghdād to Basrah.

In the subsequent actual construction of the line Colonel Kemball was necessarily dependent on the co-operation of Nāmiq Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of Baghdād; and, in carrying it through the territory of the then semi-independent Muntafik tribe, he often chafed considerably at the difficulties and delays occasioned by the policy of his Turkish colleague. Sir F. J. Goldsmid observes: † “ . . . the Political Agent, in undertaking to look after the work, so far as British interests “ were concerned, had heaped upon himself a not inconsiderable amount of

* Sir F. J. Goldsmid, writing in 1874, remarks: “ These two zealous and intelligent officers are now no more. Lieutenant Bewsher, worn out in body, came home, and died at Mentone in 1869, Mr. Johnston took leave in failing health in 1868, and when about to return to his duty in the following year, was wrecked in the *Carnatic* in September. He reached Basrah to die there in November.”

† *Telegraph and Travel*, pages 103-4.

"labour. Fortunately for the success of the cause, he was able and willing "to take in hand all difficulties of minor detail, as those of sheer political "character; and while infusing a spirit of earnestness into the local "executive, and luring a loth Administration to conciliate instead of "irritate the proud and turbulent Arabs, he did not neglect the smaller "but very essential facts"

At the end of 1863 some telegraph operatives on the Hillah section were robbed by a gang of mounted Dhafir Bedouins and Muntafik matchlockmen led by a slave of Shaikh Mansūr of the Muntafik tribe, who was then in rebellion against the local Government; but the Turkish authorities undertook to indemnify the sufferers. In the beginning of 1864 boats with telegraph materials required at Diwāniyah were detained at Basrah by the troubles between the Muntafik and the Turkish administration; and the mission by the Pāsha of an officer named Muhammad Bey, who was supposed to have special experience in dealing with Arabs, seems to have yielded no result. At length, in June of that year, Shaikh Fahad, the new Shaikh of the Muntafik, sent a relative of his own to pass the boats up the Euphrates; but whether the passage was safely effected may, in the light of a despatch written by Colonel Kemball on the 13th July, be doubted.

As regards the telegraph, despairing now, after nearly a year's trial of the ability of Namik Pāsha to open the way for its construction, I believe that one of the only courses left to the Porte to effect this object is either that I should be permitted at length to act independently and to negotiate directly with the Arabs for a safe conduct, or that a campaign should be undertaken and vigorously prosecuted with a sufficient force to subdue the districts on either banks of the Euphrates from Diwanieh to the sea. I adhere to the conviction I have uniformly expressed that, with the good will of the Turkish officials, British Agents dealing directly with the Arabs would experience no difficulty in carrying out the undertaking. But under Namik Pāsha's rule the proposed policy would be certainly impracticable. The occurrences at Fao on the occasion of the landing of the cable have served to illustrate the extreme jealousy of His Excellency at anything like independent action on our part, and *Your Excellency is aware that every offer from me to place myself in communication with the revolted Chiefs personally or by letter, with the view of furthering our telegraphic purposes to (*sic*) induce their submission to Turkish authority, has been systematically rejected on the ground of His Excellency's aversion to every form of foreign intervention; nor, in a patriotic point of view, perhaps could His Excellency be blamed for preferring the second course to which I have referred, but its adoption would occupy time, and would probably entail a greater sacrifice of revenue and a greater substantive outlay than the Porte would be willing to incur.

Before concluding this despatch, I beg Your Excellency to pardon me for alluding to a matter of a personal nature. Great disappointment is naturally felt in England

* His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

at the non-completion of the Mesopotamian telegraph, and, success being taken as the test of efficiency, the discredit of failure is to a certain extent, I understand, reflected upon myself. How far my efforts have been rightly directed Your Excellency can alone judge, but if they could have been so fortunate as to gain your approval, I respectfully hope that in the measures under contemplation I may be honoured with Your Excellency's support and permitted at least to accomplish a task of which, having been once entrusted with its execution, I could not but feel it a disparagement to be relieved at the last stage.

In August 1864, without thought of the expedition which he was then sending against the Sheikh of the Khazā'il, Nāmiq Pāsha instructed Sāmi Effendi, a Turkish officer who acted jointly with Colonel Kemball in telegraph matters, to inform Colonel Kemball by letter that the Pāsha "had determined to resume operations for the construction of the telegraph" and to invite him to depute English engineers and form working parties for the purpose; but it was now the turn of the British Political Agent, though materials sufficient to finish the line had lately been received at Basrah, to insist on delay. He justified his action to the Under-Secretary of State for India in the following terms:

Already Namiq Pāsha has proposed to me to resume operations for this purpose; but as His Excellency is preparing a military expedition to coerce Sheik Mootluk, the powerful Chief of the Khuzail tribe, located not far from Samaweh, and as the rebel Montefiq Chief, Munsoor, who is still at large, may probably join the Khuzail, drawing with him the disaffected portion of his own tribe, I do not feel equally sanguine with His Excellency of tranquillity being restored; nor should I be justified, I believe, in exposing my European employes under canvas, to the malaria of the marshes, until materials shall have been distributed along the banks of the Euphrates and until the weather shall have become cooler, conditions both of which will need a full month to be realized. A brief delay at this season, with the view of certifying our objects, must be comparatively immaterial; but did any considerable portion of stores fall into the hands of revolted Arabs, or become swamped in the river, the work must necessarily be postponed for another year, and the risks of such a contingency would, of course, be imminent pending the issue of the plans now under prosecution by His Excellency.

All difficulties, however, were in the end surmounted; and in October 1865 Colonel Kemball was able to report: "The Mesopotamian sections of the telegraph from Baghdād to Fāo have, I believe, uniformly worked well as double lines since the date of their construction. The inspector in charge of those sections, Mr. Carthew,* is an efficient officer. The mode of maintenance, as in the first instance established, differs only from the system generally prevailing in Turkey by the reduplication of the Chaooshes in the persons of native 'Musseyers,' or escorts, at those

* Mr. Carthew was a retired non-commissioned officer of Artillery. See Sir F. J. Goldsmid's *Telegraph and Travel*, page 68.

"points where the administration of the country is vested in Arab 'Sheikhs."

We had formerly occasion to remark the hostility which British political intervention and general enterprise excited in the rulers of Turkish 'Irāq under the Sultanate of 'Abdul Majid; and it must be confessed that the prestige acquired by the British Government through the successful establishment of mail and telegraph services in the reign of 'Abdul 'Aziz was not, any more than the virtual monopolisation of commercial steam navigation on the Tigris, calculated to assuage the dislike with which the Turkish authorities were accustomed to regard manifestations of British activity in the province. The continual intervention of the British Political Agent in tribal and other internal affairs, though made inevitable by his responsibility in regard to telegraph construction, must have been extremely irritating to the local authorities; and the state of matters revealed in the following extract from a despatch of Colonel Kemball, dated 4th May 1864, need cause, therefore, no surprise.

Attitude of
Nāmiq
Pāsha to-
wards British
interests,
1863-68.

From the known sentiments of Namik Pasha, I believe his real aim to be to force on this issue. His dread of the extension of British influence among the Arabs amounts to mania, of which the exhibition is no longer disguised. Thus, when advised from the best sources that the elders of the Muntefik only needed my assurance of the sincerity of Nāmiq Pasha's concessions as regarded both the resumption of their lands and the treatment of themselves in order to make their submission, I tendered my mediation in that sense, and submitted to His Excellency drafts of the letters I proposed to write to them (of which I enclose copies). His Excellency, while admitting their probable efficacy, replied that the example of the Lebanon, after the occupation of Syria by Ibrahim Pasha, had determined him to decline foreign intervention on all occasions and in any form whatever, nor could he be persuaded of the want of parallelism or analogy in the two cases.

Again, when more recently informed by a telegraphic despatch from Shebli Pāsha at Dewanieh that the heads of the Muntefik families proposed to address me collectively in order to ask my mediation, His Excellency immediately sent to desire that I would reject their application and refuse to answer it.

This course I have declined to adopt as needlessly discourteous to my correspondents, but I have assured His Excellency that their letter when received should be immediately laid before His Excellency and that His Excellency's decision, provided it were not coupled with any matter of a nature to commit or compromise myself, should be faithfully communicated to them. I deemed it right to specify this condition, because, on the last occasion, when, with His Excellency's sanction, I addressed Sheikh Nasser and Munsoor (*vide* despatch No. 16, dated 26th March, 1864), His Excellency privately urged the former Chief, then, as now, his guest at Baghdad, not only to repudiate my interference, but even to adduce the telegraph as the cause of the existing disturbances. To this suggestion, of course, Sheikh Nasser, perceiving the trap that was laid for him, declined to accede, but,

without betraying my knowledge of His Excellency's procedure, I ventured to profit by a hint to myself in the same sense in the course of conversation, in order to point out the futility of His Excellency's argument. Not only, I observed, was an after-thought of this nature inconsistent with the hostility displayed by the Arabs in plundering a large quantity of Government grain destined for Jeddah (an act which could hardly have been prompted by their aversion to the telegraph), but, on the contrary, the appeal made to myself by the rebellious Chiefs and their kindly and cordial demeanour towards Mr. Johnston and the officers * of the *Comet* on a late occasion, the trip having been undertaken in concert with Samee Effendi, sufficiently refuted the motives attributed to them; while, on the other hand, His Excellency could not be ignorant of the universal belief that His Excellency had purposely compassed the existing embroglio in order to bar a work from which he was supposed to be averse. His Excellency then assured me that I had misapprehended his meaning, but I mention the circumstance, lest, in order to justify his policy and to excuse the delays it has occasioned, Namik Pasha should have had recourse to such an argument in his communications with the Porte. I need hardly, I believe, assure Your Excellency that the insinuation it conveys is wholly unfounded; nothing could be more friendly than the present disposition of the Arab tribes towards the English, or more willing, I am satisfied, than would prove their co-operation in a measure known to have emanated from the authority of His Majesty the Sultan, were it not their aim by every means in their power, including, of course, the stoppage of the boats laden with materials, to discredit Namik Pasha with the Central Government.

Removal of
the British
Government
steamer dépôt
from Magil
(Kūt-al-
Farangi) to
Basrah,
1869-73.

Being called on by the Government of India in 1869 to suggest economies in the expenditure of the British Political Agency at Baghdad, Colonel Herbert, the Acting Political Agent, proposed that the coal store and dépôt of the British Government steamer "Comet" at Magil or Kūt-al-Farangi should be removed to Basrah: this would make possible the substitution of a single door-keeper for a Balūch guard of one Jamadar and seven men which was maintained at Magil on account of its isolated situation, and there would also be a saving in lighter hire. Moreover, under the new arrangement, the Commander of the "Comet" would have a dépôt and jetty of his own instead of sharing the accommodation at Magil, where only one steamer could be alongside at a time, with Messrs. Lynch & Co. That firm, who were now the proprietors of Magil, who received a rent of Rs. 100 a month from Government on account of the space there occupied by the "Comet's" stores, and who feared that on the cessation of the British Government's connection with the place their own title to it might be assailed by the Turkish authorities, remonstrated early in 1873 against the proposed change. They represented it as regrettable, because the estate had for 100 years been regarded as British ground and as closely associated with the British name and prestige; and their contentions were supported by

* *Vide* enclosure to despatch No. 19, dated the 5th April 1864.

Sir H. Rawlinson, and to some extent by the Secretary of State for India. But it was too late; Colonel Herbert had already agreed with one Hāji Ibrāhim for a suitable site and building at Basrah, connected with the town and new Turkish Government buildings by good roads, on an annual rent of Rs. 1,200; and on the 30th June 1873 the new dépôt was occupied. No attempt was made by the Turks, apparently, to oust Messrs. Lynch from Magil, which the firm were entitled to own under the recent law of 1867 legalising the possession by foreigners of immoveable property in Turkey.

It has been shown that the British Government steamer "Comet" was dragged by the Turkish Government into the discussions which took place in 1862-64 regarding the right of the British commercial firm of Messrs. Lynch & Co. to place a second steamer on the Tigris; and that in 1864 it was all but decided, in consequence of some misconception, to admit certain Turkish claims by withdrawing the "Comet" from Mesopotamia altogether.

The British
Government
steamer
"Comet."

In 1868 the substitution of a new vessel for the "Comet," which had been condemned as unsafe so far back as 1862, was reported by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq to have become a matter of great urgency; and the Government of India suggested to Her Majesty's Government that the consent of the Porte to the proposed step might be sought. This was done; and the Porte, in a note dated 13th July 1869, agreed to "the replacement by another ship of the 'Comet,' a vessel of the Royal Navy stationed on the rivers of Mesopotamia."

The question of ways and means then arose; and it was found that a new vessel, similar in size to the "Comet," would cost Rs. 61,200 to purchase and Rs. 3,039 a month to maintain. In February 1870 a Resolution was recorded by the Governor-General of India in Council recommending that, as a substitute for the "Comet," a small steam launch worth Rs. 10,000 or 12,000, with an establishment costing Rs. 6,000 a year at the utmost, would suffice; and copies of this Resolution were sent to the Marine Department and to the Acting Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq. The latter authority earnestly solicited a reconsideration of the question, urging that the increased number of Turkish steamers on the Tigris was a strong reason for replacing the "Comet" by a vessel of equal importance. Colonel Herbert added that the Turkish authorities were doing their best to drive the vessels of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company off the river, and pointed out that, if they succeeded in this, the Government vessel attached

to the Political Agency would become the sole means available of keeping up postal communication with Basrah, and so with India. He also submitted that another point deserving serious consideration was the moral support afforded by the presence of a British Government vessel at Baghdād to British commercial enterprise, and mentioned that so lately as 1869, when a portion of the country was in a state of revolt and an attempt at insurrection was made in the city of Baghdād, the "*Comet*" was regarded as a means of escape in case of need. These arguments did not prevail with the Governor-General of India in Council, by whom a fresh Resolution to the following effect was adopted on the 13th June 1870 :

The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, on a reconsideration of this question, is of opinion that it is not necessary at the present time to replace the *Comet* even with a steam launch. There is ample facility for carrying the mails in the English and Turkish steamers which are now plying on the *Euphrates; and there is little likelihood, with the increase of civilization in Asiatic Turkey, that a British vessel of war should be required, as the Political Agent considers that it possibly might be (as) a place of refuge for British subjects at Baghdād. His Excellency in Council in this Department is accordingly of opinion that the *Comet* should be at once put out of commission, her crew discharged, with the exception of such men as may be wanted to look after the vessel, and that the recommendation of substituting a steam-launch for the *Comet* be cancelled.

Another reason given for the decision so reached regarding the "*Comet*" was that "her presence was avowedly distasteful to the feelings of a faithful ally"; but it would have been difficult to point out any substantial advantage that had accrued to the British in Turkish 'Irāq from the intimate relations and friendly sentiments thus assumed to exist.

Colonel Herbert's contentions were approved and enforced, however, by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who pointed out that the opportunity offered "for replacing the rotten vessel by a sound one" was not likely, if let slip, to recur—a point already raised by the Government of Bombay, who had remarked that "it would be difficult in the face of the opposition of the Turkish Government, and possibly of other Powers, to restore to England her privileges once surrendered on account of considerations of economy." At length it was decided by the Government of India, "solely from deference to the views of the Secretary of State," not only to replace the "*Comet*" but to replace

* *Sic.* The confusion of the Euphrates with the Tigris would seem to indicate that the local situation in Mesopotamia had on this occasion been somewhat superficially studied.

her by a vessel of similar size. No practical steps to this end were taken, however, till some years later.

Meanwhile, as has already been mentioned in connection with the question of an addition to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's fleet, the status of the "*Comet*" was once more called in question by the Turkish Government, who affected—as in 1864—to confound her with Messrs. Lynch's vessels. At last, on the 31st March 1875, a note was obtained from the Porte in which the "*Comet*" was clearly distinguished from Messrs. Lynch's steamers, and it was stated with reference to her :

Pour ce qui est du bâtiment de la Marine Royale la *Comet*, il continuera, comme par le passé, à rester sur les rivières de la Mesopotamie suivant l'entente précédemment établie.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de *Votre Excellence cette décision de la Sublime Porte qui a été déjà communiquée télégraphiquement au Gouverneur-Général de Bagdad.

The "*Comet*," after the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1863, became a vessel of the Bombay Marine. In 1873 she was commanded by Mr. Powell, a retired Lieutenant of the late Indian Navy without any commission; her armament consisted of two 9-pounders only, mounted fore and aft, and her crew was composed almost entirely of Oriental Christians, Turkish subjects.

Prior to 1863, that is, during the existence of the Indian Navy, the "*Comet*," according to the testimony of Commander Felix Jones and Sir A. Kemball, constantly fired salutes, and no exception was ever taken by the Turkish authorities to her doing so; but later, one of her two guns having been dismantled to give more room on deck, the practice was discontinued. It was revived by Colonel Herbert, Acting Political Agent, about 1871, in which year the "*Comet*," being at Basrah on the anniversary of the Sultān's accession, honoured the day with a salute,—a courtesy that seemed to be appreciated by the Turkish Naval Commadore of the station. In 1873, however, in consequence of the "*Comet*" having fired a salute of 13 guns on the return of the Political Agent from a tour, objections were raised by Radif Pasha, Wāli of Baghdād, and the question was reported to Constantinople. Colonel Herbert alleged that the salute was fired in strict accordance with old usage; but His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople inclined to the view that, Baghdād being not an open sea-port but a large town situated on a river far in the

Prohibition of the firing of salutes by the "*Comet*," 1873.

* His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

interior of the country, the wishes of the Turkish authorities in the matter must be respected. On further examination of the question it was found that the practice of firing salutes from the "Comet," which carried less than 10 guns, was not in accordance with the Admiralty Regulations; and the Foreign Office pronounced Colonel Herbert to have acted injudiciously in reviving it after it had become obsolete,—an opinion in which the Government of India concurred.

Visit of
H. M. S.
"Philomel"
to Qūrnāh
and question
of the
freedom of
the Shatt-al-
'Arab, 1874.

In 1874 the question of the right of foreign warships to navigate the Shatt-al-'Arab above Basrah arose from a visit paid by H. M. S. "Philomel" to Qūrnāh at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates.

To a complaint made by the Wālī of Baghdād on the subject the British Political Agent replied: "It has always been supposed that the Shat-el-Arab is a free river, and practically it certainly is so, and can scarcely be otherwise. Kurna being a chief depôt for the exportation of dates, sea-going craft under foreign flags are in the habit of there taking in their cargoes, etc."

The Wālī rejoined: "It needs no comment that the part from Basrah to Kurna is not a free river, but the Turkish side with its dependencies to the point below Basrah on the Shat-el-Arab and, specially, both banks above Basrah being the real possession of the Ottoman Government, the entry of foreign merchant vessels, and specially vessels of war into such a river as this, of which the fountain-head and outlet are situated within the dominions of the Ottoman Government, unless it be with the consent and acquiescence of the Government, is according to rules inadmissible."

It seems that the matter went no further, and that no conclusion was reached.

Reconversion
of the
British Poli-
tical Agency
in Turkish
'Irāq into a
Residency,
1873.

Under a notification, dated the 22nd August 1873, by the Government of India in the Foreign Department, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq regained the rank of Resident of which he had been deprived in 1812. In the notification it was declared that "the officers holding the highest political appointments will be graded as Residents in three classes, and the salaries to be drawn by them will be local, and attached to the appointments they hold." Under the new scheme the "Political Agent, Turkish Arabia" was placed at the head of the second grade of Residents, the other Residencies in that class being the Persian Gulf, Nepal, and Gwalior; but though the status of Resident was then conferred on him he still continued to be officially addressed as Political Agent.

A list of the Political Agents and Residents at Baghdād during the period will be found in the Appendix on Diplomatic and Consular Representation.

In the same year a demand by the Wālī for a list of the employés of the British Consulate-General at Baghdād brought on a discussion regarding the status of the local British representative himself. The Wālī's demand was connected with a Turkish regulation whereby, in the absence of exceptional arrangements, the number of privileged * Dragomans and Qawwāses to be employed by foreign Consulates-General in the Ottoman Empire is limited to four of each. Colonel Herbert, who had perhaps been accustomed to regard all the members of his staff as under his protection, whether Turkish subjects or not, twice declined to furnish the Wālī with the desired statement, assigning as a reason that the employés in question were not consular subordinates but belonged to the establishment of a "Political Agent under Her Majesty's Government of India." He then reported the dispute to higher authority. In addressing His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople he contended "that the office of the Resident preceded that of Consul at Baghdād, and that, the post being recognised by the Foreign Office and consequently at Constantinople only in its consular capacity, loses, in the eyes of those with whom it is of much importance the Political Agent, should possess much influence, its diplomatic and political character;" he quoted the instructions given to Major Rawlinson in 1844 with reference to the dual character of his appointment; and finally he suggested that the nature of his post under the Indian authorities might be expressly recognised by the London Foreign Office, the British Embassy at Constantinople, and the Sublime Porte.

Status of the
British
official
representative
at Baghdād,
1874.

The Government of India expressed themselves on the subject as follows:

With reference to this question, we would remark that since the year 1798 the Government of India has been represented by a Diplomatic Agent at Baghdad, whose denomination has been sometimes Resident and sometimes Political Agent, and that although the Sublime Porte has never formally recognised any other officer than a Consul or Consul-General, and although the treaties between Great Britain and Turkey contain no stipulations on this subject, the position of the Political Agent of the Government of India has been formally and officially recognised by the Local Government at Baghdad. From this fact, and from the continuance of the office for three-quarters of a century without any objection on the part of the Turkish Government, we consider that the

* They are "privileged" in the sense of being, though Turkish subjects, entitled to the protection, within certain limits, of the power to which the Consulate employing them belongs. There is no limit to the number of "unprivileged" employés.

acquiescence and consent of the Sublime Porte may be fairly presumed to have been accorded to the arrangement.

The distinction of the Consular from the diplomatic functions is valuable, and should not, in our opinion, be obliterated in the manner suggested by Colonel Herbert. We would express a hope that the position hitherto enjoyed for so long a period by the Political Agent may not be disturbed.

The opinion of the Foreign and India Offices, however, as communicated to Colonel Herbert, was that it would be inexpedient to raise any question of his status as Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, and that "the requirements of the case in reference to his public establishment would be met by the excess over the number fixed by the Consular Regulations * being sanctioned by the Porte in the manner provided for in them."

In connection with the question of salutes by the "Comet" already discussed, the Government of India made the following remarks bearing on the position of their Political Agent at Baghdād in the Indian official hierarchy: "Colonel Herbert's right to be saluted on proper occasions is quite a different question. As a Political Agent with the status of a Resident he is entitled under Her Majesty's Order in Council of 23rd January 1860 to a salute of 13 guns."

Removal of
Colonel
Herbert
from the
Baghdād
Political
Agency,
1874.

Apart from his assertion of a right to be saluted by the "Comet" at Baghdād and his claims to a status higher than that of Consul-General, Colonel Herbert had come into conflict with Radif Pasha, Wālī of Baghdād, over various matters. Among these were the freedom of navigation of the "Comet" in Mesopotamian waters and the protection by the British authorities of natives of Bahrain residing or domiciled in Turkey. It was considered that Colonel Herbert, notwithstanding his success in the "Cashmere" case, had on the whole displayed want of tact and inability to cope with the difficulties of his position, and that his attitude towards the Turkish authorities had been unnecessarily irritating. Her Majesty's Government accordingly signified a wish that, in the interests of the public service, he might be transferred to some other appointment for which he was better fitted. The Government of India concurred and made arrangements for his transfer; but at the same time they urged the desirability of obtaining the removal of Radif Pasha also from Baghdād, as his tone to the British representative had been extremely discourteous and was unlikely to improve in consequence of Colonel Herbert's removal.

The post of British political representative and Vice-Consul at Basrah was held until 1862 by Mr. R. Rogers, ex-purser of the "Comet," who had

British
representa-
tion at
Basrah,
1861-73.

* By "Consular Regulations" is meant, of course, the Turkish Regulations in regard to Foreign Consulates.

succeeded Mr. J. Taylor in 1858, on the transfer of the latter as Consul to Diyārbakr. Mr. Taylor's salary, originally Rs. 200 per mensem, had been increased in 1856, with retrospective effect from 1854, to Rs. 400 ; and the pay of his successors was at the increased rate.

Mr. Rogers died in 1862, and, on the recommendation of Colonel Kemball, Mr. W. Johnston, a junior partner in the firm of Messrs. Lynch & Co., was appointed in his place. In April 1868, Mr. Johnston proceeded on sick leave from which he returned only to die at Basrah at the end of 1869.

Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, an assistant in the same firm, who had been nominated by Colonel Kemball to act for Mr. Johnston, was confirmed in the appointment on the latter's death and held it on the same condition until 1873, when, as already mentioned, his designation was changed from that of "British Agent" at Basrah to that of "Assistant Political Agent."

This alteration, effected by a notification of the Government of India on the 17th July 1873, was suggested by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq as a reward to Mr. Robertson for his excellent work in the "Cashmere" case. Its primary object was to improve Mr. Robertson's position in the estimation of travellers, especially of travellers from India, in whose minds the title of "British Agent" was likely to be associated with posts held by non-Europeans ; but, though it carried with it no immediate increase of pay, the change had also the effect of making Mr. Robertson a member of the Indian political service.

Assistant
Political
Agency at
Basrah,
1873.

In February 1868 Nāmiq Pāsha, the Turkish Governor of Baghdād, complained of the general behaviour of Mr. Michael Minas, who had been appointed British Vice-Consul at Baghdād in 1859, as rude and disrespectful, and requested that some other person might be chosen as a medium of communication between the British Consul-General and himself. Sir A. Kemball declined to remove Mr. Minas on a general and unproved charge and asked Nāmiq Pāsha to specify instances of misconduct on his part ; but the Governor merely ignored this reply and refused to transact business with Mr. Minas. Mr. Minas had been a paid employé of the Political Agency for 24 years ; the complaint was the first ever preferred against him by a Turkish authority ; and the grounds of it were a mere matter of conjecture. They appeared to be connected with a case of the robbery of a British Indian, in which Mr. Minas had been obliged to remonstrate with Nāmiq Pāsha on the laxness of the Turkish executive, and had possibly been betrayed into

Position of
the Native
Agent of the
Baghdād
Political
Agency,
1868.

undue warmth of language. Nāmiq Pāsha, after two months, withdrew his complaint; but at this juncture he was transferred from Baghdād; and his successor, Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha, declined to recognise Mr. Minas as Vice-Consul, or as possessing any other quality than that of Dragoman.

Sir A. Kemball referred the matter to the British Embassy at Constantinople, but their reply was: "No Berat can be asked for (for) a Vice-Consul in a place where there is a Superintending Consular Officer. If the Vice-Consul is recognised as the medium of communication between you and the Turkish authorities, we have no right to claim more. The Vice-Consul at Constantinople is not officially recognised as such by the Turkish Government, though he holds his office by Foreign Office appointment."

Thenceforth Mr. Minas was described only as "Native Agent."

Official residence of the British representative at Basrah, 1861—75.

We have seen that negotiations were at one time entered into by the Government of India for the purchase from Colonel Taylor, the proprietor, of the estate of Magil or Kūt-al-Farangi, where the depôt of the British Government steamers in Mesopotamia existed from 1839 to 1873, but that they were abortive. A portion of the estate was rented by the Government of India, however, for occupation by the British representative at Basrah until 1870, in which year Mr. Robertson, the British Agent, left Magil and settled in a house on the site of the present British Consulate at Basrah, on the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, a short way below the mouth of the 'Ashār creek. In 1872 the property occupied by Mr. Robertson was bought by an individual, who was described in the deed of transfer as "Hāji Ibrāhīm-bin-'Osmān-bin-'Abdul Wāhid, Maimani, residing in Mahallat-al-Pāsha, Basrah," but whose name in India, where he was born, was Hāji 'Umr-bin-'Osmān-bin-'Abdul Maula. He was the local agent of an Indian firm principally owned by certain 'Osmān Vydyā; and the name which he assumed at Basrah was identical with that of an infant son of the head partner in the firm, for whose benefit, it seems probable, the property had really been purchased. This complication, or possibly fraud, is not without importance in connection with the later history of the estate.

By an agreement executed in August 1872 between Mr. Robertson and "Hāji Ibrāhīm," the latter undertook to build a new house on the property and to let it to Government during such time as the said Government might choose to retain them, in consideration of a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200 to be paid in quarterly instalments. In 1875 the Hāji repented of the bargain and asked that either the rent might be raised or

the house restored to him ; but, after legal advice had been taken, his request was refused.

We now pass to matters having especial reference to British Indian subjects and interests in Turkish 'Irāq.

The Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was the third son of the Nawāb Shams-ud-Daulah, who was the second son of Sa'adat 'Alī Khān, Nawāb Wazīr of Oudh. In 1835 the Government of India instructed their Resident at Lucknow to use his influence to obtain for the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, his two brothers, and his two sisters, from the King of Oudh pensions to replace one of Rs. 2,400 a month offered to their mother, who had recently died. One reason assigned for this act of intervention was that the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's branch of the Oudh royal family had exceptional claims on the good offices of the British Government. The King of Oudh, then Nasir-ud-Dīn Haider, readily acceded to the suggestion and granted a pension of Rs. 2,500 a month to the descendants of the Shams-ud-Daulah, payable to them through the British authorities, in which the personal share of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was Rs. 625 a month. About 1843, or perhaps so early as 1839, the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah removed from India to Turkish 'Irāq and took up his residence at Baghdād, where after 1844 he drew his pension from the Treasury of the Political Agency.

*Pension of
the Nawāb
Iqbāl-ud-
Daulah,
1865-66.*

The annexation of Oudh to British India occurred in 1856. It was followed in the same year by the British war with Persia, in which the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was held to have rendered valuable services, though not of a personal nature, to Government and to have displayed a hearty goodwill towards their cause ; and in 1857-58, during the Indian Mutiny and insurrection in Oudh, in which many of his relatives were compromised, the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah showed conspicuous loyalty. In 1859, in recognition particularly of the aid given by him during the Persian War—the real importance of which, however, was somewhat questionable—the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's personal pension was doubled, being raised to Rs. 1,250 a month.

The Nawāb seems, nevertheless, to have felt himself straitened in his circumstances ; and in 1865, during a visit to England in which he found favour in high quarters and was made a G.C.S.I., he submitted a memorial requesting that his pension might be further increased. At length in October 1866, when he had been more than a year in Europe, the Secretary of State in Council directed that his allowances should be enhanced to Rs. 2,500 a month for life from the 21st October 1865.

The Nawāb was at this time the only surviving son of the Shams-ud-Daulah, of whose family he had, even in the lifetime of his elder brothers, been regarded as the head; and he was now an old man without any children.

Disposal of
the pension
and property
of Nawāb
Tāj Mahall,
1875-76.

An important legal case, known from the name of the successful claimant as "Kulsum Nisa's," arose in Turkish 'Irāq on the death in 1875 of Nawāb Tāj Mahall, a relict of King Nasir-ud-Din Haidar of Oudh, who had predeceased her in 1837. Under an Agreement entered into with the King of Oudh in 1829, somewhat similar to that of 1825 by which the Oudh Bequest was constituted, the Government of India had bound themselves to pay Tāj Mahall a pension of Rs. 72,000 a year for life, and, after her death either to continue the pension to her heirs or to pay to them the capital sum the interest on which it represented.

Tāj Mahall, after the decease of her royal husband without issue by her, married a certain Kalb-i-Husain, to whom she bore one daughter, Mazharah Begam. Mazharah Begam became the wife, first, of one Ja'fār Husain, by whom she had one daughter, Kulsum Nisa Begam, the future claimant; and afterwards, Ja'fār Husain having died, she married his brother Mehdi Husain. It may be noted that Kalb-i-Husain himself contributed not a little to the estate of Tāj Mahall's descendants for he left her a house at Cawnpore, various houses and gardens at Lucknow, and promissory notes to the value of Rs. 1,56,000 deposited in the Bank of Bombay.

In 1859 Tāj Mahall left Lucknow on a pilgrimage to Karbala, whence she did not return to India, but where on the contrary she settled, acquired some immoveable property, and lived until her death in 1875. During the whole of her residence in Turkish 'Irāq her pension was paid to her there through the Treasury of the British Political Agency. At the time of her decease she possessed, in addition to her hereditary pension the property left her by her husband Kalb-i-Husain, the immoveable property acquired by her at Karbala, certain immoveable property in Oudh, and certain moveable property in Turkish 'Irāq. Her estate, the capitalised value of her pension alone being approximately £150,000, was thus a very valuable one.

Exclusive succession to it was claimed on behalf of her grand-daughter Kulsum Nisa Begam, who was still a minor, as also by Ramzān 'Alī Khān, a surviving brother or half-brother of Tāj Mahall herself, who conceived that he had a better right. The claims of Kulsum Nisa Begam rested on the Shī'ah law of inheritance, supplemented by a

deed of gift purporting to be executed in her favour by Tāj Mahall, but declared by the opposite party to be spurious; those of Ramzān 'Ali Khān, on a denial of the legitimacy of Kulsum Nisa Begam, in which he was apparently countenanced by the Nāwab Iqbāl-ud-Daulah.

It is unnecessary to enter on the history of the case much further than to remark that it gave rise to great legal and practical difficulties both at Baghdād and in India, and that it was ultimately decided at Lucknow in favour of Kulsum Nisa Begam, who was held to be the true grand-daughter, and as such the heir under Shi'ah law, of Tāj Mahall.

The suit was of no political importance, but the great value of the subject-matter, the minority of Kulsum Begam, and the protracted nature of the proceedings occasioned misrepresentations and intrigues among the Indian community in Turkish 'Irāq by which the British Political Agent was at times seriously embarrassed. One of the most difficult points falling to be settled at Baghdād was that of the guardianship of the minor; it was conferred by Colonel Nixon on Ramzān 'Ali Khān, the rival claimant of Tāj Mahall's estate, in preference to Mehdi Husain, Kulsum Nisa Begam's uncle and step-father, who was then in India,—an arrangement at variance with the view taken of the affairs of the family by the Court of first instance in India. Colonel Nixon also held Ramzān 'Ali Khān to be the heir entitled to Tāj Mahall's estate in Turkish 'Irāq, a decision which was afterwards indirectly invalidated by the action of the Indian judicial authorities.

A final settlement was not reached until 1879, or even later.

The Oudh Bequest, 1861—76.

Against certain political difficulties of an international character to which it was feared that the existence of the Oudh Bequest might give rise, precautions were taken, as we have seen, in 1852; but neither then, nor at any later period, did those difficulties assume a material shape. Before long, however, the place of apprehended political complications was taken by real difficulties of a practical and administrative order, to the origin and perpetration of which the unfortunate loss from view of the true terms of the Bequest contributed not a little; and premonition of those difficulties occurred, as we have seen, as early as 1854.

Difficulties
in the admin-
istration of
the Oudh
Bequest.

1860-67.

About 1860, during the Political Agentship of Colonel Kemball at Baghdād and under the influence, it would appear, of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, who resided at Baghdād and who was himself a nephew of King Ghāzi-ud-Dīn Haidar, the founder of the Oudh Bequest, certain changes were introduced into the local administration of the Bequest as formed by Major Rawlinson. A "kind of Sub-Bequest" was constituted by the combination of one-third of the Karbala and one-third of the Najaf allotment into a fund, amounting to about Rs. 3,300 per mensem, of which one-third was distributed to Indians at Karbala, one-third to Indians at Najaf, and one-third to Indians at Kādhimain. An Indian gentleman was appointed at Karbala to distribute the Indian money there and at Najaf, and another Indian gentleman at Kādhimain to conduct the Indian distribution at that place: the former received an allowance of Rs. 255 a month, the latter one of Rs. 280, from the Indian fund. These Indian distributors were empowered to superintend the general affairs of the Indian communities with which they were in relation, and were granted the titles of "Honorary Agent at Karbala" and "Honorary Agent at Kādhimain," apparently by the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq on his own authority. Supervision of the Indian distributions seems to have been exercised by the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, with the approval of the Political Agent; but it is not certain that this supervision began before 1867, in November of which year instructions were issued for the Nawab's guidance by Colonel Sir A. Kemball, who soon afterwards relinquished charge of the Baghdād Political Agency. The extent of the confidence reposed by Colonel Kemball in the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah is illustrated in the closing words of the instructions: "Do what you think advisable and expedient, because "trust is placed in you, and you are at liberty to use your discretion. "Should any complaint be made against you through enmity, falsehood, "ill-will, prejudice and self (? selfish) hatred, it will neither be listened "nor credit given to."

In the uncertainty that prevailed, under the corrupt version of the Agreement of 1825, as to the proper destination of the funds, the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah felt impelled, during his visit to London, to submit to the Secretary of State for India a written representation on the subject, of which the following is a translation:

I now come to mention the bequests of two ladies of the seraglio of the former King of Oudh, Ghazee-ood-deen Hyder. These ladies during life received a monthly allowance of Rs. 5,000 each, and died without children or heirs. They left wills

bequeathing their allowances to Mujtehed^s at Kerbella and Nejeff, to be distributed by them to poor and indigent persons. This testamentary disposition was after their deaths carried into effect, and every month Rs. 10 000 is paid through the Residency at Baghdad into the hands of the Arabian and Persian Doctors of the Faich at Kerbella and Nejeff, who are not more honest than they need be. Herein the following particulars are to be noted :—In the first place, it is impossible to know and distinguish who are *bonâ fide* Mujtehed^s, seeing that there is no list by which to recognize them. They are not like Bishops and Archbishops in England, who are possessed of credentials from the Government or the public showing their authority. So far from that, any beggar or destitute wretch belonging to Arabia or Persia who may chance to set himself up and twist several yards of black cloth or white cloth round his head, and take a long staff in his hand and wear a flowing beard, and collect a parcel of dissolute bullies about him, may call himself a Mujtehed, and there is nothing outwardly nor inwardly to prove it except his beard, his staff, and his turban.

Secondly.—All this money goes in misplaced and meaningless expenditure, and for most unholy purposes. Every penny of it goes into the hands of rich people who don't want it, or *canaille*, or bullies, or rogues, or Arabian and Persian merchants who possess landed estates and wealth and all that agriculture and commerce can give them—legitimate incomes and gains of all kinds. Meantime the natives of India, who, poor creatures, are a most numerous body, many of them of good and noble families, the descendants of Princes and Noblemen, and have taken up their residence at Kerbella and Nejeff and become residents there, and pass their lives in starving poverty, are shut out from participating in this money. A miserable trifle only, so small that it is not worth mentioning, is given to them, just to keep up the pretence of relieving them; and now this is wrung from the Mujtehed^s of the country only by force and threats.

Now the Arabs and Persians are neither friends nor subjects of the English Government, whereas the natives of India are, as is evident; and it little accords with good sense and justice to fatten one's enemies and starve one's friends. Further, what claim or right have the Arabs and Persians to the money of India? What says the proverb? "The earth from a well must be used for that well." The people of India reap no good nor advantage from the Arabs and Persians; then why should benefits and advantages flow from the natives of India to the Arabs and Persians? The proverb says, "Give to those that give to you." Besides all this, the Arabs and Persians, even while enjoying benefits from the people of India, are not grateful for them, but, on the contrary, return ingratitude, as I with my own ears have heard again and again. Meantime all this money is expended in debauchery and unlawful things and folly, and leads to thousands of quarrels and disturbances, as I know well and have seen with my own eyes. The Residents at Baghdad, both past and present, are well acquainted with the facts, and I request that a corroboration of my statement may be obtained from them, so that all doubt in the matter may be cleared up. In this way the curtain will be withdrawn, and the good and bad of the question will be clearly known. Sir Henry Rawlinson is well acquainted with the circumstances, but Sir Arnold Kemball is even more so, for he has gone thoroughly into the matter and sifted it; and I desire that enquiry may be made of these officers, for knowledge of a thing is better than ignorance of it. It

is a duty to make a searching enquiry into the circumstances, for the money is drawn from India and is knowingly directed to unlawful purposes.

I would suggest, then, that either this alms should altogether be withheld from Arabia and be expended in India, especially in the province of Oudh, as being originally Oudh money, for which reason it ought to be disbursed there; nay, it should be restricted to the poor persons of the Royal Family of Oudh, in which case the target of right would be hit in the centre. It would then be as with the gates of Somnath, which after ages were brought back to their own places.

If, however, it should be thought proper to carry out the testaments of the deceased persons, and, right or wrong, disburse the charity in Arabia, then a suitable plan must be devised, so as at the same time to perform the bequests of the parties who left the charity, and to take care that the money should be expended on worthy objects; and the unique plan is that the disposal of the charity should be placed in the hands of the Resident at Baghdad, so that he should carry out whatever might appear to him right and proper after he had made due investigation. Let him appoint as distributor of the charity whomsoever he may consider a trustworthy and respectable person, and let him have the absolute discretion as to the division of the charity, and as to who are to be the recipients and the shares they are to get. Let him show no favor to Arab or Persian, or the natives of India, and have no respect to the length or breadth of their beards or their turbans. Righteousness depends upon the inward qualities, and not upon their being born of this or that nation. Let the money be all given to the natives of India, with a special distinction in favour of those of Oudh, or let it be divided into two portions, and let one be given to natives of India and the other to Arabs and Persians, on condition that they be respectable persons in their conduct and acts.

In case the charity is wholly confided to the charge of the Resident at Baghdad, many excellent works for the public good might be done with it, as colleges and rest-houses for travellers, and hospitals for all the visitors to the mosques and travellers from India; and the name and memorial of these good works would endure in those districts for ever, and the names of the founders of the charity would be commemorated and the English Government would be blessed, and the people of India would, as it were, find a house in these remote parts and pass their time in repose; for as long as those shrines remain in the world, the resort of the natives of India to them will never cease, and the shrines are and will be co-existent with the world.

It must be added that the small * sum which the English Government take year by year from the natives of India, *viz.*, five shillings a head, might be deducted from the amount of this charity, it being so large that the Government should lose nothing, and the collections should be made without scandal and the people too be spared, and so this charity would be the means of repose and contentment to all, and no brawling would take place about it. Another disbursement might be fitly made from this charity for the interment of persons deceasing without heirs.

* The reference seems to be to the fees for consular registration of British subjects.

The undeniably important suggestions contained in the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's memorandum were referred at the beginning of 1867 to Sir A. Kemball, British Political Agent at Iaghdād, for report. That officer, after correcting an error into which the Nawāb had fallen regarding the origin of the Bequest, and mentioning that the monthly amount for distribution had been increased (by the falling in of new items) from Rs. 8,333 to Rs. 8,451 a month, explained that the money was now disbursed at each of the Holy Cities through a Chief Mujtahid—Mirza 'Ali Naqi at Karbala and Saiḥid 'Ali, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, at Najaf—assisted by a number of sub-distributors of the Political Agent's selection, of whom there were 19 at the former and 6 at the latter place; and that receipts were obtained from the sub-distributors, as well as from the Chief Mujtahids, "to anticipate, as far as might be practicable, the misappropriation of the monies by the primary recipients." Sir A. Kemball, who had probably consulted the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah on his return to Baghdād in regard to the details of his scheme, continued :

The selection of the Mujtehed depends solely upon popular preference, necessarily very much divided in its exhibition, and guided or misguided as often by the intrigues and ambitious pretensions of the individual as by his assumed pre-eminence in the knowledge of the law, or austerity in devotional exercises. I should add, however, that the Mujtehed preferred for Nejeff and Kerbella respectively by my predecessor were those being Turkish subjects, but of Persian extraction, who at the time enjoyed the highest repute, the latter being still the almoner of these endowments, and the former, deceased, having been succeeded by a Mujtehed who was chosen by my *locum tenens* during my absence in England in 1860.

As regards the appropriation of the monies in question, there is every ground to believe in the accuracy of the information communicated by the Nawab. Nothing is assigned to the support, strictly speaking, of the shrines. The Mujtehed is virtually irresponsible; their own friends, relatives, and adherents are, of course, favoured, and in any case the recipients are for the most part in the enjoyment of independent means of subsistence, while Indian noblemen and a crowd of Indian devotees and pilgrims of all ranks exist on charity and in a state of absolute destitution.

Did, then, the terms of the Agreement referred to justify, as I suppose, the assignment of these charitable grants for the benefit of Indian Mujtehed and Mujawurs, I should be disposed certainly to recommend the adoption of this measure, if not exclusively, to an extent at least more in proportion to the needs of the latter. In doing so I am sensible of the increased labour and responsibility which such an arrangement would entail upon this Agency: the Nawab Ikbal-ood-dowlah proposes that the funds thus rendered available should be assigned in various proportions: *1stly*, to provide subsistence to indigent resident Mujawurs, to relieve the immediate wants of poor pilgrims, widows, and orphans, being Indians (among whom under emergency the preference should be given to natives of Oudh), and to defray, in the case of such persons deceased, the ordinary charges of interment. etc.; *2ndly*, to construct rest-houses and hospitals at the principal places of resort and finally, should the means

be found adequate, to establish schools and orphanages for Indian children. The machinery he suggests for giving effect to these plans consists in a Committee composed of the most respectable resident Indians, who should supervise the distribution of the monies now to be entrusted to the agency of Indian Mujteheds, the whole being placed absolutely and unreservedly under the control of the British Resident. The last condition would, however, entail additional and very onerous duties on this officer ; and, efficient as may be the machinery proposed in other respects, I would even suggest the advisability of an Assistant (Covenanted or Uncovenanted) being specially appointed to administer the endowments in question, whose salary, wholly or in part, should properly and legitimately, as, indeed, admitted by the Nawab, constitute a first charge thereon.

The only objection which occurs to myself is the risk of provoking the susceptibilities of the Turkish Provincial Authorities, and more especially of a functionary of the stamp of Namik Pasha ; but as the experience of 15 years has not justified my former apprehensions of inconvenience and embarrassment, so in the future, under the direct management of a responsible British Officer, must there exist even less ground to anticipate such a result ; while in the event of interpellation, it may be presumed that no difficulty would be experienced in satisfying the Porte of the charitable and harmless character of the new arrangement.

The Government of India concurred with the Political Agent at Baghdād in regarding a transference of the benefits of the Bequest from Turkish 'Irāq to India as entirely out of the question ; but they were unable to approve of his recommendations that the system of distribution should be modified, and their letter to the Secretary of State for India on the subject, which was dated 7th August 1867, proceeded as follows :—

If the money is misapplied by the priests, the fault lies on them and on the deficient foresight of the deceased Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder ; the British Government can have no responsibility at all in the matter. Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder, looking solely to his own spiritual welfare and not to the temporal welfare either of pilgrims or of any one else, contracted with the British Government for the investment in perpetuity of certain funds as an endowment for the Sheeah Shrines at Kurbullah and Nujjuff, and he indicated “ the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of those places ” as the persons to whom the endowment should be payable. Therefore, so long as there may exist a class of persons recognizable as the Moojtahids and Moojawurs of Kurbullah and of Nujjuff, the Government of India, we consider, is bound to make payment to that class at either place, and could not modify or limit such mode of payment without betrayal of its trust.

The only considerations which could, in our opinion, be admissible to an equal bearing with the specific terms of the trust, would be the general welfare of humanity and the preservation of peace among nations. By Sir Henry Rawlinson's arrangement now in force, the Government of India not only fulfils the particular engagement it entered into with King Ghazee-ood-Din Hyder, but also satisfies its general political obligations towards allied nations by so checking the distribution of the fund as to prevent the Sheeah fanatics from embroiling Persia with Turkey. It therefore seems to us that the present arrangement, on grounds alike of justice and of expediency, ought to be strictly maintained ; and that it is most undesirable to allow any opening to further

discussion on a subject to which, for several reasons, it is not desirable to attract unnecessary attention.

There are some minor arguments which might be used in favour of letting things lie as they are. Were the Nawab Ikbāl-ud-Dowla's proposals and Sir A. Kemball's recommendations to be carried out, the British Government would undoubtedly be lending itself to the promotion of the interests of the Mahomedan religion among the natives of India—a course directly opposed to all its recent policy; and it would be encouraging the emigration of its subjects to Turkish Arabia—an object which politically cannot be regarded as expedient.

The Government of India recognised that, as Sir A. Kemball pointed out, the words "or persons who have its charge" in the English translation of the Agreement of 1825 as ratified by Lord Amherst were at least an* interpolation; but their enquiry into this point unfortunately did not lead, as it might have done, to the discovery of the part of the Agreement authenticated by the King of Oudh's own seal. Instead, arguing from the defective version of the Agreement then relied upon, which, besides wrongly introducing "Mujāvirs" into the question, omitted the clause that required the Mujtahid recipients to distribute the money to "deserving persons," the Government of India arrived at the conclusions detailed above. They also quoted, as an analogy supporting their view of the case, the terms of a particular endowment founded at Lucknow by King Ghāzi-ud-Dīn Haidar,—that of the "Imāmbārah-i-Najaf-i-Ashraf."

The Secretary of State for India, in November 1867, agreed with the more general conclusions of the Government of India, observing :

that, with reference to the terms of the deed of 1825, it is not incumbent on the British Government to do more than pay the money regularly to the recipients specified in that deed, namely, the high † priests in charge of the shrines; that such payment is a good and sufficient payment; and that the Government has not undertaken, and cannot now undertake, to control the ultimate distribution of the money by the chief priest among the devotees who may frequent, or reside at, the places of pilgrimage in question.

* The Government of India thought, at this time, that the insertion was not without significance; but such a view has ceased to be tenable since it became known that the Persian word, of which the English phrase was given as a parenthetical explanation, was itself only an erroneous transcription of two Persian words having different sense.

† The facts of the Oudh Bequest case being now better known, it is perhaps unnecessary to remark here that the Mujtahids are not, and never were, in charge of the shrines.

Complaints
concerning
the adminis-
tration of the
Bequest,
1875-76.

In 1875 dissatisfaction with Saiyid 'Ali's distributions at Najaf was voiced by a number of the residents of that town, belonging chiefly to religious and ecclesiastical professions, who alleged that the Mujtahid treated the charity of which he was the channel as if the money were destined solely for himself and his relations, and demanded his dismissal in favour of some new nominee. The complaint was not the first of its kind to be received; indeed, for twenty years protests of a similar character had been incessant. The British Political Agent summoned Saiyid 'Ali to Baghdād, where he was confronted with his principal accusers; but Colonel Nixon, while he admonished the Mujtahid and advised him to make his distributions publicly in future, considered that the Government orders of 1867 in regard to the Oudh Bequest did not warrant his further intervention in the matter. On the aggrieved parties petitioning the Government of Bombay through His Highness the Āgha Khān, Colonel Nixon informed that Government of the facts and of his views in regard to the impossibility of interference.

Interests of European powers other than Britain in Turkish 'Irāq, 1861—76.

French
scheme of
commercial
navigation on
the Tigris,
1864.

The only discoverable reference to European activity, other than British, in Turkish 'Irāq during the period appears to be the following, which occurs in a despatch of 1864 from the British Political Agent at Baghdād to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, relating to the obstacles raised by the Turkish authorities to an increase in the number of the British commercial steamers on the Tigris.

I take this opportunity to mention to Your Excellency that for some time past a French Company has proposed also to navigate the Tigris with steamers carrying the national flag. While Namik Pasha supposed that no limit would be assigned to the number of English vessels His Excellency seemed disposed to encourage such a speculation, but latterly, to the disappointment of the parties concerned, His Excellency has stated that the privilege conceded to Her Majesty's Government, being both in its origin and in its nature exceptional, it could not be arrogated by any other nation. The reply of the French party to this argument is, that, however valid the exception in the case of the public vessels of a foreign State, it could not be extended to the merchant vessels of the State without conferring a general right under "the most favoured nation" clause; and, acting upon this view of the case, they have now referred the question for decision to Constantinople.

Nothing more was heard, however, of the projected French enterprise in question.

'ABDUL HAMĪD II.

From 1876.*

A succinct account of the general history of Turkey during the reign of 'Abdul Hamīd II, who was a brother of the ex-Sultān Murād, and who was proclaimed Sultān in succession to that prince on the 31st August 1876, will make the affairs of Turkish 'Irāq during the period now to be dealt with more intelligible.

When 'Abdul Hamīd ascended the throne there was unrest in the Balkan provinces; reforms and the grant of local autonomy were proposed as remedies, but were rejected by the new ruler; and meanwhile Russia was preparing for decisive action on behalf of the Christian nationalities in Turkey. At the end of 1876 it was suddenly announced that the Sultān had conferred on Turkey a liberal constitution, extending to the whole Empire; and the Porte declined to give effect to the suggestions made by an International Conference, then assembled at Constantinople, for the better government of the European provinces of Turkey. Russia, unsatisfied by the vague prospects of an improved general administration held out by the new Turkish constitution, declared war against Turkey on the 24th April 1877 on the question of the European provinces; and Britain, scandalised by recent Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria and by the failure of Turkey since 1875 to meet her financial obligations, observed a strict neutrality.

The invasion of Turkey by Russian forces followed; Plevna, where alone the Turkish army offered an effective resistance, fell in December 1877; an armistice was arranged at Adrianople on the 31st January

* The principal authorities for this period in Turkish 'Irāq are official; among them may be mentioned Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Précis of Turkish Arabia Affairs, 1801—1905*, printed in 1905, and Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistan*, 1912. Unofficial sources of information are: Mr. G. Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, 1878; Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, 1879, and *Pilgrimage to Nejd*, 1881; Mr. J. C. McCoan's *Our New Protectorate—Turkey in Asia*, 1879; Commander V. L. Cameron's *Our Future Highway to India*, 1880; and Madame Jane Dieulafoy's *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, 1887. With reference to irrigation and hydraulic questions generally Sir W. Willcocks' *Re-creation of Chaldea*, 1903, and *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, 1911, may be consulted.

1878; and on the 3rd March a Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey was signed at San Stefano. The chief terms of the settlement were the complete severance of Roumania, Servia and Montenegro from the Ottoman Empire; the creation of an autonomous Bulgaria, still tributary to Turkey, but reaching from the Euxine to the Ægean; and the payment of a war indemnity.

A critical period followed, during which a Russian army remained encamped outside Constantinople, while certain of the powers manifested their dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty as being too favourable to Russia. A British fleet was sent to the Bosphorus, and in the United Kingdom the military reserves were called out. At length Russia, influenced partly by a fear that Austria might fall upon her line of communications in flank, agreed to a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano; and the result was an International Congress which assembled at Berlin on the 13th July 1878. Meanwhile on the 4th June an agreement had been concluded between Britain and Turkey, whereby the former power undertook—subject to conditions—to defend the Asiatic dominions of the latter, and received in return—also on conditions—possession of the island of Cyprus. The Treaty of Berlin signed on the 13th July 1878, which was the outcome of the Congress, modified the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano in favour of Turkey. Roumania, Servia and Montenegro received their independence, and a war indemnity of 300,000,000 roubles was assigned to Russia; but the new autonomous and tributary Bulgaria was confined to the north of the Balkans, some more southern districts which by the Treaty of San Stefano would have been included in Bulgaria being constituted instead a separate autonomous and tributary principality under the name of Eastern Roumelia.

Some interchange of communications seems to have taken place in 1877 between the Sultān of Turkey and the Amīr of Afghanistan. The former sovereign seems to have appealed to the latter for help against the Russians, advising him incidentally to disregard the occupation of Quetta by the Government of India and to cultivate good relations with the British. The Amīr is stated to have replied that he could afford no aid, and somewhat ironically to have referred the Sultān to the British Government for the assistance of which he stood in need.

The Turkish constitution of 1876 ended abortively. It was soon suspended; a Parliament convened under it was dissolved; and its principal author—Mid-hat Pāsha, ex-Wāli of Baghdād—was exiled from the capital. The provisions of the Treaty of Berlin relating to improvement of the Turkish administration also remained, to a great extent

unfruitful. German military and financial advisers were engaged, and British officers were obtained for the reorganisation of the Gendarmerie; but no real amelioration of the prevailing conditions was observable.

Egyptian affairs, though prominent from 1879 to 1882, including the deposition of the Khedive Ismā'il, the establishment of a temporary Anglo-French condominium in Egypt, the revolt of 'Arabi Pāsha, and the British occupation of Egypt, did not greatly affect the political life of the Ottoman Empire. More important to Turkey were the establishment in 1881 of a Public Debt Department, under international control, which placed her relations with her external creditors on a sound basis, and "the bloodless revolution of Philippopolis," which resulted in the fusion of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria.

From 1890 onwards Turkey became a prey to troubles which were mostly of a semi-external, semi-internal character. Crete was disturbed; and Cretan affairs led in 1897 to a war between Turkey and Greece, in which Turkey was easily victorious and obtained a modification of the common frontier besides an indemnity of £1,000,000, while Greek subjects were deprived of extra-territorial privileges which they had till then enjoyed in Turkey. In 1898 four of the powers with which Crete had been placed *en dépôt* appointed Prince George of Greece to govern the island as Chief Commissioner.

An Armenian* revolt in the autumn of 1894 was quelled with extreme rigour; and a scheme for an Armenian settlement proposed by Britain, France and Russia was checkmated by widespread massacres of Armenians throughout Asia Minor in 1895, in which it was estimated that 200,000 persons perished. A massacre of 3,000 Armenians, not entirely unprovoked, occurred at Constantinople in 1896.

The relations of the Turkish Government with their Muhammadan subjects were also, in places, unhappy: after 1892 there were frequent insurrections in Yaman and constant troubles in Albania.

By 1903 the state of Macedonia had become such as to necessitate the adoption by Austria and Russia of a joint programme of reforms for that province but in its application, this programme was ineffectual.

There was also occasional friction between Turkey and foreign powers. In 1901 a brief occupation by France of Mitylene was required in order to

*Already in 1878 the Armenian question had begun to make its appearance. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin bound the Porte to carry out reforms in the Armenian districts, to protect the Armenians against the Circassians and the Kurds, and to report progress periodically to the Powers

obtain a settlement of the claims of some French subjects ; and difficulties occurred with Britain in 1901-02 in regard to the hinterland of Aden, and in 1906 in regard to the Egyptian frontier. The only foreign country maintaining constant good relations with Turkey was Germany, who directed Turkish military policy, acquired a predominant influence at Constantinople, and did not interest herself adversely to Turkey in the Armenian question.

Towards the end of the period a "Young Turkish" party was in course of formation which aimed at subverting, and at a later period did actually subvert, the power of 'Abdul Hamīd.

The character of 'Abdul Hamīd as ruler was * described as follows in 1878.

His habits are simple in the extreme and he commits no excesses. His attention to the affairs of Government is unremitting ; he is even nervously anxious to know everything, even details which would be much better left to competent subordinates. He gives his ministers no rest ; after being in council with him for the greater part of the day, he sends for them again at night, and reconsiders the matters already fully discussed. He is, in truth, fairly chargeable with fidgetiness and over-anxiety, but, assuredly, not with neglect or disregard of the interests of the State. His intentions are good ; his desire is to do what is right and best for the Empire in its great extremity, but his inexperience in public affairs tells woefully against him. This is the real source of the vacillation which is at times painfully evident ; he is never sure that a measure which has been resolved upon was not, after all, a mistake ; and it is just as likely to be abandoned as carried through.

The same assiduous attention to official business continued to characterise 'Abdul Hamīd throughout his reign ; but his ignorance was soon replaced by knowledge ; and he came to be distinguished, as he grew in experience, by the astuteness of his diplomacy and the relentlessness of his methods, which were based on espionage and secrecy.

A feature of the beginning of 'Abdul Hamīd's reign was the emergence in public life of a new non-hereditary class of civil and military Turkish administrators. To this class belonged General 'Osmān Pāsha, the defender of Plevna ; Ghāzi Mukhtār Pāsha, the most successful Turkish leader after 'Osmān Pāsha in the Russian war ; and a number of the civil ministers of State of the epoch. These *novi homines* displaced, to a great extent, a select order of high-born Pāshas who had enjoyed, under previous Sultāns, a virtual monopoly of power. A trait remarked

* Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. II, page 310.

in the new class of public men was greater impatience of foreign guidance and control, as distinguished from foreign information and advice.

Perhaps the most conspicuous defect in the administration of the country was the inefficiency of its civil employés of all grades and in all branches. This was especially the case at the beginning of the period, but it cannot be said that any appreciable improvement took place up to the end of it. The civil services, if they may be dignified by the name of services, were more neglected than the military; appointments in them were determined by favouritism and bribery; merit and experience obtained no recognition; there was no fixity in the tenure of posts; and venality in office was the rule rather than the exception.

Features of the period in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905.

Under 'Abdul Hamīd the local Majlis or Council, in part elective, by which every executive officer from the Wālī down to the Mudīr was assisted, grew to be a factor of more than nominal importance in the government of the country. In some of these bodies the Jewish and Christian communities were represented, and a certain amount of good resulted from the association of these with the predominant Muhammadan element in the discussion and despatch of business. But it was found that the Councils, while they afforded little protection against the misdeeds of evil officials, were apt to obstruct the action of those of the better sort; and it was alleged that their existence even increased the area of active bribery and corruption. They required in fact, to render them really useful institutions, more public spirit and a higher civic morality than were to be found in the people; but they were not without their uses as a means of education in self-government.

Considerable freedom of speech and opinion in public questions seems to have existed in Turkish 'Irāq in 1878, there being as yet no organised system of espionage in the province; and official personages and measures were criticised openly and without hesitation. The Deputy who represented Baghdād in the first Turkish Parliament was one of the most advanced politicians of the day and was distrusted by the Court party at Constantinople. In the respects just mentioned there was probably retrogression, rather than advance, as the reactionary

principles and severe methods of 'Abdul Hamīd's Government gradually declared themselves.

Effects of the Russian war of 1877-78 in Turkish 'Irāq.

The chief effect of the Russo-Turkish war in Turkish 'Irāq was to denude the province almost entirely of its military garrisons, and in a great degree of its Gendarmerie, the only real police. Much energy was shown by the Turkish authorities in dragging conscripts to the colours; and even on country roads gangs of men collected for military service were to be seen, marching in fetters and under guards to the nearest recruiting centres. The result of the removal of the troops was not, as might have been expected, universal anarchy and license, though tribal fighting and highway robbery possibly flourished on a greater scale than usual; but a sense of the weakness and instability of the Turkish Empire became widely diffused and gave rise, for a time, to exaggerated fears of general disorder.

The net result of the war on foreign trade in Turkish 'Irāq was difficult to estimate. On the one hand the credit and purchasing power of Turkish subjects undoubtedly declined; on the other, in consequence of a check to commerce between Russia and Persia, the transit trade through Turkish 'Irāq to the latter country was stimulated.

Foreign travellers seem to have found the people of the province, both Arab tribesmen and Turkish officials, rather more communicative than at ordinary times; and in 1878, notwithstanding a locally prevalent impression that Turkey had been forced into an offensive-defensive alliance with Russia and might be obliged shortly to enter into hostilities with Britain, British travellers in the country were everywhere well received and well treated.

General state of Turkish 'Irāq about 1878.

Rural
conditions.

Turkish 'Irāq in the early years of 'Abdul Hamīd was still a wild and uncivilised province, much more so than at the present day. As an

illustration of this it may be mentioned that the Mesopotamian lion, now apparently extinct, then still existed.

So lately as 1874 a lion and two or three lionesses had been* shot from the deck of one of the British river steamers on the Tigris.

The Turkish authorities had made some progress, however, in pacifying and settling the country; and the situation in this respect was summed up, in 1878, in the following well-considered words :—

I have no sympathy with the Turks in Arabia, and still less with their administration. It is utterly corrupt; but I do not think their theory of government there is a bad one. The protection of the peaceable tribes and the repression of the warlike ones; encouragement to all who will cultivate the soil; security for the high roads and military occupation of the villages; alliances entered into with the Bedouin chiefs, and inducements offered them to act as the police of the desert;—nothing, in idea, could be better or more European. It is only in practice that the Turks fail, and that, I fear, from incurable causes. Yet they have not wholly failed. From a military point of view, the Pashas can boast with some truth that, compared with twenty years ago, no country has made more rapid steps towards civilisation. The power of the Bedouin tribes has within that period been seriously checked, if not broken; and it is quite conceivable that in another 20 years, at the same rate of progress, the Anazeh will have disappeared from the upper Syrian desert, and the Shammar have been reclaimed to settled life in Mesopotamia. On the day when the alluvial valley of the Euphrates shall be completely cultivated, and their access to the river cut off in summer, the true Bedouins must retire to the Nejd, whence they came, or abandon their independent life. Turkish optimists are excusable if they count on this. But for my part, I do not believe in the regeneration of Turkey, or even in the maintenance of its military power for any length of time.

In the towns perhaps the most remarkable feature of the time was a sudden movement in the direction of modern education among the large indigenous Jewish community of Baghdād, whose mother tongue is Arabic. When a Jewish school was founded there in 1864 by the Alliance Israélite Universelle of Paris, it was at first regarded with some suspicion by the more old-fashioned Jewish families; but its later progress was rapid. By 1878, under the management of M. Garat, himself a native of Baghdād educated at Paris, it had attracted 172 pupils; the instruction given was excellent; and the curriculum included the English

Urban conditions.

* Captain Clements, who afterwards commanded the *Blosse Lynch* took part in this adventure. The animals were found on a piece of land cut off by floods at a part of the river where there was no jungle. One of the lionesses sprang into the water and was killed in attempting to board the steamer. A lion and a lioness were killed near Dair-az-Zor on the Euphrates at the end of 1877. Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Vol. II, pages 280-281.

language as well as French. After 1878 its popularity still continued to increase.

Administrative organization of Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905.

Territorial divisions in 1878.

The territorial divisions of the province of Turkish Arabia in 1878 were, * perhaps, as follow. There were two Wilāyats: one of Baghdād, one of Basrah. The former included Mutasarrifliks of Mūsāl, Kirkūk (then known as Shehrizūr), and Sulaimānīyah, besides Qāim-Maqāmliqs of Kādhimain, Dilaim, 'Ānah, Sāmarrah, Khurāsān, Khānaqin, Mandali, and 'Azizīyah. The latter consisted of a headquarters division including Fāo (a Mudirlik), Qūrnah (a Qāim-Maqāmliq), etc., and of Mutasarrifliks of Hillah (embracing Karbala, Najaf, and even 'Amārah), Muntafik, and Hasa. The Shaikh of the Muntafik was Mutasarrif of the division named after his tribe.

Formation of a Wilāyat of Mūsāl, 1879.

At the beginning of 1879 the northern districts of the Baghdād Wilāyat were separated from the rest and erected into a separate Wilāyat of Mūsāl. The result was a great reduction of the Baghdād Wilāyat in size and importance.

Combination and separation of the Baghdād and Basrah Wilāyats, 1880-1886.

In the spring of 1880 the Baghdād and Basrah Wilāyats were fused into one, with headquarters at Baghdād: in other words there was a reversion to the system prevailing before 1875. But it was of short continuance, and in the spring of 1884 two separate Wilāyats of Baghdād and Basrah were reconstituted. As we shall see further on, British influence was employed in 1881 to discourage the retention of the whole province in the form of one huge unwieldy Wilāyat. On the re-institution of Basrah as a Wilāyat in 1884 Karbala and Najaf (if ever included) were excluded from it, and 'Amārah figured in it as a Mutasarriflik, instead of a Qāim-Maqāmliq as formerly. At the end of 1886 a fresh separation of the Baghdād and Basrah Wilāyats took place, which must have been preceded by another recombination.

Corruption and other faults of the Turkish administration.

Corruption was very prevalent in the Turkish administration, as the † extracts which follow, referring to the year 1878, will show; but

* See Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I, pages 333-334. But his account seems open to doubt on account of the very peculiar inclusion of Karbala and Najaf in the Basrah Wilāyat.

† Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I, pages 247-228 and 245.

there were honourable exceptions to the rule among the higher Turkish officials.

Of the many instances illustrative of the prevailing habits of the official class, which were given to me whilst I was in Baghdad, I may mention one. A certain Governor of a District within the Pashalik, kept up a large establishment, his harem being on an extensive scale, seven horses standing in his stable, and his staff of servants being considerable. As his official salary was but fifteen pounds Turkish a month, and he had no private fortune, his friends marvelled much how he could do all this, entertain Arab Sheiks in a profuse, hospitable fashion, and make presents to influential people at Baghdad, without ever appearing to be straitened for want of money. But the Philosopher's stone which he worked was not at all mysterious to those who were admitted within his immediate circle. He hardly attempted any disguise

I have been told of three directors of the Baghdad Custom House who retired on their means after a short term of office. As their pay was very small, and as they received it very irregularly, it was creditable to their frugality that they could lay by a competency in the course of a couple of years of office. They lived well, and kept up a certain state as became important public functionaries while serving their country. They entertained, I was informed, great pashas in a friendly way, and even at times administered to their personal necessities. How all this could be done out of a salary of some eight or ten pounds a month, which was seldom paid as it fell due, it is not easy to say.

Another* traveller, writing two years later, observed :—

Ce n'est pas au Caire d'ailleurs, ce n'est pas à Constantinople ou dans les villes du littoral de la Méditerranée, caravan-sérails cosmopolites où affluent les Levantins et les Européens, que l'on peut apprécier la valeur de la régénération de la Turquie sous l'influence des idées occidentales.

La crainte de la France et de l'Angleterre, un certain vernis que l'Oriental prend facilement au contact des Occidentaux, donnent au monde officiel, en partie composé de fils d'Arméniens, de Grecs ou de Syriens converties à l'islamisme, une souplesse féline qui trompe les plus habiles. Si l'on veut étudier l'administration turque dans toute sa beauté il faut aller loin de l'Europe, loin des regards chrétiens, il faut venir à Bagdad par exemple, cette deuxième capitale de l'empire, et suivre dans ses rapports avec la population cette armée de concussionnaires_éhontés qui constitue le corps des fonctionnaires turcs.

As after the promulgation of the Tanzimāt in 1839, so after the proclamation of the Turkish constitution in 1876, increased antipathy to European foreigners seemed to take possession of the Turkish official

Anti-foreign
spirit in
Turkish
official
circles.

* Madame J. Dieulafoy's *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, page 584.

class. In 1880 it was * observed, with special reference to Baghdad :—

Tels sont les Turcs de la nouvelle école ; ils ont tous les défauts de leurs prédécesseurs et n'en ont pas la franchise ; en revêtant l'habit et le pantalon de la réforme, ils sont devenus faux et hypocrites. Gardez-vous de vous fier à ces aimables convives qui partagent avec vous les meilleurs vins de France, et dégustent, en raillant Mahomet et le Koran, la viande de porc ou la cuisine impure des Francs, ils seraient les premiers à massacrer les Européens s'ils se croyaient sûrs de l'impunité, car, s'il est un sentiment vivace chez les musulmans, et chez les Turcs en particulier, c'est le fanatisme religieux quise réduit aujourd' hui à la haine du chrétien. Le Turc nous hait de toute la force de son âme ; il nous hait parce que nous sommes les représentants de ces infidèles dont on lui apprend à redouter jusqu'au contact ; il nous hait parce que nous reprenons possession des terres d'où ses ancêtres nous ont autrefois chassés ; il nous hait parce que, malgré les préjugés et l'éducation, il reconnaît dans ce chrétien méprisable, dans ce chien fils de chien, son supérieur et son maître.

*

*

*

*

La situation des Européens, à quelque nationalité qu'ils appartiennent, est en ce moment-ci très précaire dans la Turquie d'Asie. Un chrétien est-il molesté, maltraité, assassiné : les plaintes de son consul restent sans effet, et l'on n'arrête jamais le coupable ; si le prévenu est livré à la justice par la victime ou par sa famille, les juges l'acquittent, le code Napoléon à la main. Les Anglais eux-mêmes, toujours si fiers et si respectés en Orient, sont insultés tous les jours et ne peuvent avoir raison de l'inertie de l'administration ottomane.

Various instances of the xenophobic spirit here referred to will be found in the remaining sections of this chapter.

Official ex-
portation of
grain to
Jiddah, 1878.

The practice of exporting grain from Turkish 'Irâq to Jiddah under official arrangements still continued in 1878. The revenue derived by the Government from the cultivated lands of the province was paid for the most part in kind, and the disposal of the Government grain, which tended to accumulate in large quantities, being often locally unsaleable, was no trifling administrative problem. In the more remote districts the wheat and barley collected in the Government granaries simply rotted there, or was consumed by rats, or used as fuel, from year to year. The grain paid in at less inaccessible centres was partly issued as rations to troops and partly sent in chartered steamers to Jiddah, where and at Makkah it found a market owing to the constant demand for provisions created by the going and coming of huge numbers of pilgrims in a poor country.

* Madame Dieulafoy's *La Persia, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, pages 584-85 and 588. A third illustration of an outbreak of xenophobia after internal reforms or *quasi* reforms in Turkey was supplied by the events following the re-establishment of the Turkish constitution in 1908. The connection between liberalism in internal politics and dislike of foreigners is not easy to explain. It seems to show itself only in the Turkish, as distinguished from the other Muhammadan elements of the Ottoman Empire.

Government of the Baghdād Wilayāt, 1876-1905.

Some information regarding the Wālis of Baghdād during the period is derivable from the writings of travellers and from other sources. 'Akif Pasha, about 1878.

'Akif Pasha—apparently the next Wāli after Radīf Pasha, who ruled the Wilāyat in 1874 and bore a good reputation,—was a man of a different stamp from his predecessor. He was a Turk of the old school ; polite, and on the surface amiable, but in his last post, in Europe, he had gained an undesirable notoriety in connection with massacres of Bulgarians. It was * written of him in 1878 :—

Akif has the reputation of being the most corrupt Pasha that ever ruled in Baghdād, but this is saying a great deal. He has been only eight months in office, yet, according to common report, he has already amassed £50,000 in money, besides jewelry, horses and much other wealth in kind. Let us hope that the sum is exaggerated. It is difficult all the same to believe that the sixty or seventy Arabians, which compose his stud, have been bought and paid for out of the income of the Vali's office.

He was removed from Baghdād in the spring of 1878, on account of riots there which will be mentioned further on.

'Akif Pasha was followed by Qadri Pasha, a self-educated man, who talked French fluently, had a passable knowledge of English, and was a regular reader of the London "Times." He belonged to the school of Mid-hat Pasha, whom however he affected to despise ; and he was a special protégé of Vafīq Effendi, another leader of the liberal party, who procured for him his appointment to Baghdād. Qadri Pasha made a favourable impression on the European travellers who were brought into contact with him ; he seemed to be endowed with capacity, energy, and probity ; and great hopes of an improvement in the administration of the Wilāyat were entertained at the commencement of his rule. It does not appear whether Qadri Pasha succeeded in satisfying the expectations that he had raised ; but it was noted in the beginning that European politics seemed to interest him more than the affairs of his province. It was one of his maxims that religious toleration in Turkey was not enough and that real religious equality must be introduced.

Qadri Pasha,
1878.

* Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Vol. I, page 203.

†Later Wālis,
1880-1905.

Subsequent Wālis of Baghdād, of whom less is known than of the two just mentioned, were :—

'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha	1879.
Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha	1880-1886.
Mustafa 'Azīm Pāsha	1887-1890.
Sirri Pāsha	1890-1892.
Hasan Pāsha	1892-1896.
Āta Ullah Pāsha	1896-1898.
Nāmiq Pāsha	1898-1902.
Faizi Pāsha	1902-1904.
'Abdul Wahhāb Pāsha	1904-1905.
Majid Pāsha	1905.

Of these Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha was said to have been officially implicated, at a previous time, in a massacre of Christians at Aleppo; and at Baghdād his relations with the representatives of the European nations were most unfriendly, even the ordinary exchange of ceremonial courtesies being to some extent suspended in his time. It was remarked of him in 1881 by Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, that he was enfeebled by age and that his principal characteristic was a fanatical dislike of all Europeans; and about the end of 1886, according to Colonel Tweedie, he was "permitted to retire, laden with years and riches, to his native Aleppo." Basrah was included, during his whole term of office, in the Baghdād Wilāyat.

Faizi Pāsha was a military officer of advanced age, but energetic disposition; he commanded the Baghdād Army Corps as well as governing the Wilāyat.

'Abdul Wahhāb Pāsha, an Albanian, was a highly incompetent governor; his policy was anti-foreign; and his conduct elicited, on various occasions, strong protests from the British, French, and Russian representatives at Baghdād.

Internal affairs of the Baghdād Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Plague at
Baghdād,
1876-77.

Baghdād city, as well as other towns and places in the Wilāyat, suffered from a serious visitation of bubonic plague in 1876 and 1877. The events connected therewith are discussed in the Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation.

In the summer of 1877 there were serious risings against the authority of the Turkish Government at Karbala and Najaf, attributable to the denudation of the Wilāyat of troops in consequence of the Russo-Turkish war. Insurrections
at Karbala
and Najaf,
1877.

At Karbala, it seems, the townspeople refused to furnish conscripts for the army, and even to pay taxes; and the Radif there, being locally recruited, broke into open mutiny. In the town itself, as in the days of the Yārāmāz supremacy before 1843, anarchy reigned; Arab factions fought out their feuds in the public street; and foreign settlers, Persian and Indian, were exposed to considerable danger. Resistance to the Government was prepared, and even travellers and traders approaching the town were fired on from the surrounding date plantations. A column of about 400 regular infantry from Baghdād, with two or three guns, eventually fought its way into the town, suffering some loss but inflicting greater. Months later houses ruined by artillery fire and tree-felled to facilitate the operations were to be seen outside Karbala. In the second half of August the Turkish force was in occupation of the town, where the bazaars were at one time closed as a protest against their tyrannical behaviour; but the Radif mutineers still held out in some of the adjoining date groves, made raids upon passing caravans, and supplied their wants by seizing specie and provisions. On the 24th August the Turkish troops attacked the mutineers, and had two men killed, but returned with five rebel heads which were set up in various public places. Another Turkish assault on the 25th resulted only in the loss of an officer killed and several men wounded. On the 26th, about 600 Bani Hasan from Hindiyah and some 'Auizah having arrived to the assistance of the Turks, it was found that the mutineers had evacuated their position; and on the next day the rebel entrenchments were demolished.

During the crisis the Wālī of Baghdād, 'Akif Pāsha, asked Colonel Nixon, the British Political Agent, that British subjects at Karbala might be warned against joining the rebels; this was an entirely superfluous request, but a caution was duly conveyed to the British Indian community through Haidar 'Ali Khān, the Honorary British Agent on the spot.

About the same time disorders occurred at Najaf, from which place, after a rupture with the Turkish garrison, the turbulent local faction of the Zugurd, the sworn enemies of the Shumurd, retired to Kūfah. Here they made ready to defend themselves by force; but they were in

the end induced by a deputation consisting of 'Ulama of Najaf and Shaikhs of the Arab tribes of Hindiyah, sent by Colonel Hāji Bey, the Turkish Commandant of the Najaf garrison, to make their submission. In suppliant guise, uncovered, and with the fillets of their head-dresses unbound and lowered to their necks, they returned to Najaf and threw themselves at the feet of the Commandant, who thereupon wisely granted them a free pardon. A prominent part in the mediation which had this happy issue was played by Saiyid 'Ali, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, the Mujtahid Distributor of the Oudh Bequest, whose intervention was solicited by the military Commandant, and with whom Colonel Nixon was also in correspondence; his nephew, Saiyid 'Ali Naqi, was one of those who took part in the deputation to Kūfah.

This trouble lasted only two or three days; but there seems to have been also at Najaf an insurrection, similar to that at Karbala, in connection with conscription and taxation. It collapsed, however, on the arrival of a detachment from the Turkish column at Karbala and the arrest of some 30 persons implicated, who were imprisoned.

In 1879 a garrison of four companies of infantry was maintained at Najaf, and a larger force at Karbala.

Grain riots
at Baghdād,
1877-78.

In 1877 there were large shipments of grain from Baghdād to Bombay and England, and local prices doubled, to the consternation of the populace. The spring harvest was thought to be precarious, and the impressment of transport and carriers for the Russian war prevented the importation of food stuffs from a distance. In these circumstances the Wālī of Baghdād was ordered by the Government at Constantinople to prohibit the exportation of grain and did so; but the embargo was violated by merchants, and nine native vessels proceeding down the river with grain were seized and plundered by the people. The whole garrison of Baghdād at the moment consisted of a single infantry battalion and a few artillery; but peace was restored without difficulty, and an order by the British Political Agent enjoining strict observance of the embargo by British subjects produced a sedative effect. This was in 1877.

Exporters, finding that prices had again fallen and expecting that the embargo would presently be removed, then began to purchase and stock large quantities of grain,—proceedings which greatly exasperated popular feeling.

In February 1878 a European trader, alleging that he had obtained special permission from the Wālī, loaded grain on the British river steamer *Blosse Lynch* for despatch to Basrah, and removal of grain in native

boats was rumoured to be taking place. A party of rioters left Baghdād for Ctestiphon to intercept the native boats supposed to be engaged in removing grain, but they failed to discover any having grain as cargo. A crowd also besieged the custom house, off which the *Blosse Lynch* was lying, threatening to destroy the vessel unless the grain on board her were relanded. With the assent of the British Political Agent the *Blosse Lynch's* cargo was discharged; and the result was to avert a general outbreak and pillage, which, in the absence of a sufficient military force, had at one time appeared imminent. By April 1878 all danger of scarcity was past, and matters had resumed their ordinary course.

These disturbances led, as already mentioned, to the removal from Baghdād of the Wālī, 'Akif Pasha, who seems to have been held accountable by the Turkish Government for their occurrence.

The general condition of Baghdād city in the spring, 1878, was backward and depressing. Trade appeared to be stagnant; there was an absence of life and activity of all kinds; and violence was prevalent in the immediate environs. There was no passable hotel or even inn. A traveller was unable to obtain bills on Musal, Diyārbakr, or Alexandretta; and though a small joint-stock bank, the "Baghdad Banking Company" existed, there were no banking facilities except such as wealthy Jewish merchants and British commercial firms between them could supply. Within two days, just outside the town, a Turkish official was knocked off his horse and dangerously wounded, his assailants taking the horse, and a Turk was set upon and received injuries that were expected to prove fatal. In the country tribal fighting and highway robbery were rife.

State of
Baghdād
in 1878.

The Niqābat of Baghdād was held from 1873 to 1898 by Saiyid Salmān, whose predecessor was Saiyid 'Alī. On the death of Saiyid Salmān in 1898 his brother Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān succeeded to the office.

Naqibs
Baghdād. of

Tribal affairs in the Baghdād Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Little information is available regarding tribal affairs in the Baghdād Wilāyat after the accession of 'Abdul Hamīd, the reason probably being that the Arab tribes had declined in political importance, and that their concerns had ceased to interest the British representative. Whereas they had formerly levied war against the Turkish Government, ravaged

whole districts, and even threatened Baghdād itself, they were now unable to do more than commit raids and robberies in the desert and on the outskirts of the settled tracts.

Misbehaviour
of the Hama-
wand, about
1886.

A partial exception to this general change existed in the Kurdish Hamawand tribe near the Persian border. In 1886 Colonel Tweedie, the British Resident at Baghdād, reported of them as follows :

At the time of writing, indeed, as periodically during many years past, the frontier of the Baghdād and Mosul Pashaliks is dangerous from the raids of the Hamāwand or Ahmedāwand Kurds. Within the present year, this great postal line has once or twice been closed because of them, to other than the largest Kāfilas ; and Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Mosul, when passing over it lately, reported that his "escort ranged from one hundred and thirty mounted infantry to twenties and fifteens besides Dhābitias (*gens d'armes*), according to the state of the road." "The Hamāwands," he added, "have created a regular scare all along the line ; and although there are large numbers of troops moving about, they never seem to come up with them." And yet, this thorn in the side of two great Governments is represented by a horde of barely five hundred fighting men. Armed with Martinis, and mounted on mares "lifted" from the Shammar, they are as ubiquitous, as mischievous, and as difficult to touch as swarms of wasps. Only the other day an officer was wounded, and a soldier killed, by them near Sulimānfah.

The Northern
Shammar,
to 1889.

The Northern Shammar continued for long to be ruled by Shaikh Farhān-bin-Safūk ; and the history of that Shaikh and his near relations illustrates the degeneracy and disintegration which had now set in among the Arab tribes of Turkish 'Irāq. Shaikh Farhān, who had succeeded to the Shaikhship on or soon after the murder of his father in 1847, appears at a later time to have spent some years, probably as a political *détenu*, at Constantinople, where he learned Turkish and became imbued with Turkish ideas. After his return to Mesopotamia he was again recognised as Shaikh ; and he eventually received an allowance of £3,000 a year from the Turkish Government on condition of maintaining order in the tribal area and inducing his people to adopt a more settled life. To promote the latter object he himself took up a fixed residence at Sharqāt on the Tigris, where he was found established in 1878 ; but no progress had then been made in inuring the Shammar to agriculture, as was hoped might be done. The Shaikh had by that time obtained the title of Pasha, and his younger sons were being instructed in the Turkish language.

A large proportion of the Northern Shammar seem to have been always dissatisfied with Shaikh Farhān, partly because his mother was a Baghdād woman, and partly on account of his Turkish proclivities and of

the manner in which he lent himself to Turkish designs of reducing the tribe to civilisation. The result was that, from time to time, he lost the support of his most useful dependents,—those, namely, who were most firmly attached to their Bedouin independence. A younger brother of Shaikh Farhān, 'Abdul Karīm, whose mother was of a noble family of desert Arabs, once seriously disputed the chiefship with him; studiously insulted, flouted, and harassed the Turkish authorities; and for a time successfully evaded capture. In the end, however, about 1873, 'Abdul Karīm was surrendered to the Government by Shaikh Nāsir of the Muntafik, then an aspirant to the Wāliship of Basrah, with whom he had taken refuge, and was hanged at Mūsāl. Another younger brother, 'Abdur Razzāq, whose political sentiments resembled those of 'Abdul Karīm, met his death about the same time at the hands of the Turks. In 1875 'Abdul Karīm's full brother Fāris, then about 24 years of age, returned from Najd, where he had found a temporary asylum, and quickly secured the allegiance of a part of the tribe in opposition to Shaikh Farhān. In 1877 Fāris entered into negotiations with the Turkish authorities at Dair-az-Zor with the object of obtaining a Government subsidy in return for his aid in tribal matters, and of securing official support against Shaikh Farhān and his elder sons, 'Īsa and Mijwal. Fāris received a visit in 1878 from Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt, who were then travelling in the country, and on whom his open, frank character and high spirit made a very favourable impression; and oaths of Bedouin brotherhood were even exchanged between him and Mr. Blunt.

About 1886 a desperate raid was made on the Shammar by the Dilaim and proved much more sanguinary than such affairs generally are. The Dilaim, though the assailants were defeated; and, as living under the law, were called heavily to account by the Turkish authorities.

The later course of Shammar affairs is obscure; but it appears that in 1889 there was trouble between the Northern Shammar and the Turkish Government, and that Farhān, who was still Shaikh, adopted a policy of submission.

On one later occasion, in October 1902, the peace of the Wilāyat was seriously disturbed, the country between Karbala and Musaiyib being given up for two or three days to warfare between 'Anizah nomads and the settled Mas'ūd tribe. The latter were assisted by Bedouins of the Northern Shammar who were at the time encamped in their territory. Captain Cox, the Surgeon of the British Residency at Baghdād, had a

Tribal
disturbances
near Karbala,
1902.

narrow escape at Musaiyib from being robbed by a body of the combatants; but order was presently restored by the despatch of a Turkish cavalry detachment to the spot from Hillah.

Government of the Basrah Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Wālis of
Basrah.

The following is a list, possibly incomplete, of the Wālis who governed Basrah during its existence as a Wilāyat: the dates given are, in some cases, only approximate.

'Abdullah Pasha	1875-1879
Zābit Pasha	1879-1880
(Walāyat in abeyance)	(1880-84 and in 1886)
Salih Pasha	1884
Commodore 'Ali Riza Pasha (acting)	1884
Shaban Pasha
Hidāyat Pasha	1891-92
Hāfiz Muhammad Pasha	1893
Hamdi Pasha	1894-1896
Emni Pasha	1897
Hamdi Pasha (2nd time)	1898
'Arif Pasha	1898
Muhsin Pasha (acting)
Hamdi Pasha (3rd time)	1899—January 1900
Muhsin Pasha	1900-01
Mustafa Nūri Pasha	1901—September 1904
Fakhri Pasha (acting)	1904
Mukhlis Pasha	from December 1904

Of the earlier of these Wālis little except their names is known.

'Abdullah Pasha, who was a Kurd, tried to introduce sugar cultivation from Egypt with the help of the Khedive; but he evidently did not succeed.

It was the failure of a coercive policy put in force against the Muntafik by Zābit Pasha which led to the temporary abolition of the Basrah Wilāyat in 1880.

Hamdi
Pasha, 1894-
1900.

Hamdi Pasha, who held charge at Basrah almost continuously from 1894 to 1900, was an honest man and on the whole a satisfactory administrator, but neither brilliant nor popular. He belonged properly to the naval service. A hot temper and an arbitrary disposition made him many enemies; and his efforts to check speculation and bribery rendered him unpopular with his subordinates. His ultimate removal seems to have been chiefly due to the intrigues of the Naqīb of Basrah,

who was his personal enemy, and whose brother, Saiyid Talib, was sent to Constantinople to undermine the Wālī's position. The Shaikh of Kuwait, too, was induced to represent that the difficulties between himself and the Turkish Government arose from the employment of Hamdi Pasha as a medium; and charges connected with the proceedings of a German Railway Commission at Basrah seem to have been brought against the unfortunate official by Muhsin Pasha, the Military Commandant at Basrah, who coveted the Wāliship for himself.

Emni Pasha and 'Arif Pasha, who governed the Wilāyat in the intervals of Hamdi Pasha's administration, appear both to have fallen quickly into disgrace. Complaints against them were investigated by Muhsin Pasha, afterwards Wālī but then holding a military appointment at Baghdād, who was sent from Baghdād for the purpose, and who thereafter acted for a short time as Wālī, pending the return of Hamdi Pasha.

Muhsin Pasha was a soldier of some intellectual attainments; he had risen in the Turkish military service by merit; and he had held the position of Chief of the Staff in the 7th (Yaman) Army Corps. His plausible policy in regard to Kuwait, however, which may be learned from the chapter on the history of that Arab principality, though consistently pursued during two years with the support of the Naqib of Basrah, and crowned at one moment with seeming success, ended in total failure. A favourite scheme of Muhsin Pasha was the construction of a road from Basrah to Fāo through the date plantations on the right bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab; but heavy expenditure in acquiring land and building bridges was involved, and it was not carried out. The idea of the road was military rather than administrative, but its execution would have given the Turkish authorities a strong hold on the riverain villages and might have contributed to the suppression of piracy on the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Muhsin
Pasha, 1900-
1901.

Mustafa Nūri Pasha, who succeeded Muhsin Pasha, was Military Commandant as well as Wālī of Basrah. He showed considerable firmness and energy in grappling with internal difficulties that prevailed in his time, as will be described hereafter.

Nūri Pasha,
1901-1904.

Fakhri Pasha, the temporary successor of Nūri Pasha both as Wālī and Commandant, was a military officer of good education. He used great severity in dealing with violent crime at Basrah, where he is still remembered by the name of Abu Gawāni or "the Man of Sacks," it having been alleged that he caused criminals to be tied up in sacks and

Fakhri
Pasha,
1904.

secretly drowned in the river. He also opened the pacific negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd by which the Turkish campaign in Central Arabia, as described elsewhere, was eventually brought to an end.

Mukhlis
Pasha,
1904-05.

One of the candidates for the Wāliship of Basrah on the departure of Nūri Pāsha was Tālib Pāsha, brother of the Naqīb of Basrah. At Constantinople he had indited a long memorandum on the proper policy of Turkey in Arabia; but his claims, though supported by a palace clique under Abul Huda, did not prevail; and the choice of the Government fell upon Mukhlis Pāsha, a former Commandant of the Gendarmerie of Salonika. Mukhlis Pāsha brought to a successful conclusion the negotiations with Ibn Sa'ūd begun by Fakhri Pāsha.

Internal affairs of the Basrah Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

Naqibs of
Basrah;
Saiyid
Muhammad
Sa'id, 1874-
1896, and
Saiyid
Rajab, from
1896.

Saiyid Muhammad Sa'id was Naqīb of Basrah from 1874 to 1896. He succeeded a brother named Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān, whose coadjutor he had been; and a considerable part was played by him in the foreign politics of the Wilāyat. In 1886 he was nominated Vice-President of the Administration of Civil List Properties at Basrah, but declined the salary of £40 a month attached to it, saying that the honour of serving his master the Sultān was in itself a sufficient reward. He was not a man of high moral principle, and his relations with Hamdi Pāsha, one of the most honest of the Wālis of Basrah, were bad in consequence. In 1890 he was permitted by the Porte, on the plea of advanced age, to nominate his eldest son, Saiyid Rajab, to act for him in the duties of the Niqābat. In that year he held the rank of Istāmbūl Pāyasi, and had obtained as decorations the Osmanieh and the Mejidieh of the first class,—the former in recognition of political services performed by him in Qatar. Besides Saiyid Rajab he left two sons, Saiyid Ahmad and Saiyid Tālib, of whom the former—considered the ablest member of the family—was officially employed by the Turkish authorities at different times in matters relating to Najd and Kuwait, while the latter once held the Mutasarriflik of Hasa and after his dismissal from that post enjoyed a measure of Court favour at Constantinople.

Saiyid Rajab succeeded to the Niqābat of Basrah on the death of his father in August 1896,

In 1892 great insecurity prevailed in the town of Basrah. In April the prisoners in the Turkish Jail overpowered their guards and 18 Arab criminals, including a notorious assassin, succeeded in making their escape. On the night of the 3rd of May a gang of marauding Arabs broke into a shop, killed two men, wounded another, and carried off bodily a safe containing cash and other valuables.

Disorder in
Basrah town,
1892.

In 1901 there was a general outbreak of lawlessness in the Basrah Wilāyat, which was intensified— if not caused—by failure of crops and agricultural distress. Three burglaries on a large scale, committed in Basrah town by gangs of 20 to 25 armed Arabs, were unmistakable signs of faulty administration and probably contributed, as such, to the removal of Muhsin Pāsha from the Wāliship. Under Nūri Pāsha, the next Wāli, order was promptly restored in the town and the immediate neighbourhood.

Lawlessness
in the Basrah
Wilāyat,
1901.

Tribal affairs in the Basrah Wilāyat, 1876-1905.

While the behaviour of the Arab tribes in the Baghdad Wilāyat showed, as we have seen, a marked improvement during the period, tribal affairs in Basrah seemed to remain on as unsatisfactory a footing as ever. It should be remembered that under Taqi-ud-Dīn Pāsha as Wāli, that is, from 1880 to 1886, Basrah formed part of the Baghdad Wilayāt.

In 1878-79 the Bani Lām were divided among themselves owing to a feud between Mizbān, the principal chief of the tribe, and his half-brothers Mūsa, 'Āqil and Humaidi: a son of Mūsa had been slain by Mizbān. In March 1878 a battle took place on the *Tigris between the contending factions, who apparently held opposite sides of the river, for, the British Political Agency Steamer "Comet" happening to pass, they utilized her as cover against each other, and maintained a running fight across her as she proceeded upstream against the current. In March 1879 fighting still continued; but Shaikh Mizbān and Mūsa had gone to 'Amārah, in obedience to a summons from the Mutasarrif, to have their differences arranged. Raids and counter-raids were carried on by their partisans in their absence, and little hope was entertained that the Turkish official would be able to effect a reconciliation.

Bani Lām
troubles,
1878-79.

*Geary, the authority for this seems to place the scene of this incident too far down the river, viz., between the Āl Bū Muhammad country and Qūrnah. See his *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I, page 110.

At this juncture Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt made an adventurous journey through the Bani Lām country from the Tigris to 'Arabistān. They encountered great incivility on the part of Banaiyah, a son of Shaikh Mizbān, whose manners were those of a barbarian and a robber; and their property, if not their lives, were at one time in some danger before they finally quitted the domains of the Bani Lām.

Al Bū
Muhammad
disturbances,
1878-80.

While the Bani Lām were thus at war among themselves, the adjoining Āl Bū Muhammad addicted themselves to robbery on the Tigris. In their case the trouble began with the retirement into the marshes of the Shaikh of the tribe, taking with him a year and a half's revenue which he had collected from his fellow tribesmen but had no intention of paying to the Government. The rupture between him and the Turkish officials was the signal for a crop of outrages upon river-borne traffic, which he probably did not instigate, but which the perpetrators cunningly calculated would be set down to his account. In March 1878 nine persons were murdered on board a boat which the Āl Bū Muhammad plundered; and it became necessary to organise the native sailing vessels on the river into larger fleets, which were convoyed through the dangerous zone by Turkish steam vessels. The Turkish, but not the British, river steamers were themselves threatened with attack; and, as the country was denuded of troops owing to the war, no operations against the Āl Bū Muhammad could be undertaken at the time.

In 1880, the Shaikh of the Āl Bū Muhammad being then Saihūd, robbers of that tribe attacked the British river steamer "Khalifah" on the Tigris; but this incident and the proceedings to which it gave rise will be related more fitly in another place.

Muntafik
rebellion,
1881.

In 1881, Nāsir Pāsha, Shaikh of the Muntafik, being then in honourable detention at Constantinople, the Muntafik tribe rose in open rebellion against the Turkish Government. They had been giving trouble to the authorities for a year or more, and the ill-success of strong measures taken by the Wālī of Basrah against them had led to the suppression of that Wilāyat. Consequently it now rested with the Wālī of Baghdād to restore order.

At the middle of June the situation was serious. Telegraphic communication between Basrah and Baghdād had been interrupted by the rebels. There were only 1,500 Turkish troops at Nāsiriyyah, the principal place in the Muntafik country, and the difficulty of reinforcing them was extreme, for the garrison of Baghdād, the military headquarters of the whole province, was already reduced to 850 men, *viz.*,

300 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 250 artillery. On the 10th of June a body of 1,000 Arabs endeavoured to cut an embankment about three miles north of Nāsiriyyah with the design of flooding the town, but they were repulsed with loss after a two hours' engagement. The next day the rebels attacked Nāsiriyyah itself, but were beaten off, a large number of them being killed and wounded.

It seemed doubtful whether the best policy of the Turkish Government in this emergency might not be to appoint one of the tribal Shaikhs of the Muntafik to be Mutassarif of Nāsiriyyah. Two seem to have been available: Mansūr Pāsha, who for some reason had taken flight, and Falah Pāsha, a son of the absent chief of the tribe. It was believed that such an appointment would secure an immediate collapse of the revolt, and resumption of payment of revenue; but it might on the other hand restore the Muntafik and their Shaikhs to the position of virtual independence which they had occupied in the reign of the Sultān 'Abdul 'Azīz. The local Turkish officials seem to have been in favour of strenuous action against the rebels; while the Porte, possibly under the advice of Nāsir Pāsha at Constantinople, were in favour of conciliation. What policy was in the end adopted is not clear; but the Muntafik question for a time again dropped out of notice.

It will be apparent from the preceding that between the years 1878 and 1881 the Bani Lām, the Āl Bū Muhammad, and the Muntafik, the only important tribes in their part of the country, were more or less simultaneously in a state of excitement or insubordination very detrimental to the general peace. Though concerted action among them was not in question, there was reason to think that the attitude of the one was to some extent influenced by that of the other; and the trouble among the Muntafik, in particular, tended to create disorder beyond the limits of their tribal territory.

In the spring of 1883 there were disturbances on the left bank of the Tigris near 'Amārah, and exceptional measures became necessary on the part of the Turkish authorities for the protection of navigation.

Disturbances near 'Amārah, 1883.

In 1892, for causes which are not ascertainable, the Āl Bū Muhammad tribe under Shaikh Saihūd again rose against the Turkish Government. Telegraphic communication between Bāghdad and Basrah was interrupted; several native boats were plundered between Qal'at Sālih and Qūrnah; the Turkish steamer "Mūsāl" was fired on, and could not pass through the disturbed zone; and 'Azair (Ezra's Tomb) was placed in a state of defence. On this occasion no British steamer was molested.

Āl Bū Muhammad rebellion under Shaikh Saihūd, 1892.

The Mutasarrif of 'A nārah would have detained the "Blosse Lynch" there, being unable to furnish her with a guard, but she proceeded on her way to Basrah without accident; and the "Khalifeh", which had been supplied with a Turkish guard at Basrah, made the ascent to Baghdad without interference on the part of the tribesmen. On the Wāli of Baghdad proceeding to the spot with troops, either the rebellion collapsed or its manifestations were transferred to a distance from the river.

Rebellion of
Shaikh
Hasan-al-
Khaiyūn
of the Bani
Asad, 1899-
1900.

In April 1899 trouble broke out in a new place on the lower Tigris in the form of depredations committed by Shaikh Hasan-al-Khaiyūn of the Bani Asad tribe, whose followers numbered about 600 men, on the river between 'Amārah and Qūrnah. This chief had formerly received an allowance from the Turkish Government for the protection of the river and telegraph from Qal'at Salih to Qūrnah; but intrigues by some of the Muntafik Shaikhs and insubordination on his own part had led to its forfeiture some years before 1899; and, early in the Wāliship of Hamdi Pāsha at Basrah, he had become a rebel and an outlaw. No settlement with him could be effected under Hamdi Pāsha; but in May 1900, after the appointment of Muhsin Pāsha to Basrah, he offered his submission, which appears to have been accepted.

Turkish raid
on the Āl Bū
Muhammad,
1903.

In November 1903 a serious affair resulted, below 'Amārah, from a new allotment of state lands on lease by the Turkish revenue authorities. Rice lands had been transferred from the Āl Bū Muhammad tribe, whose payments were in arrears, to the 'Azairij, friends of the Bani Lām, and to the Sulakh; and the enforcement of the transfer had been entrusted by the Mutasarrif of 'Amārah to a military officer, the troops under whose command, it was said, proceeded to massacre a number of the Āl Bū Mūhammad, men, women, and children. The Wāli of Basrah visited 'Amarah on learning of this affair, suspended the Mutasarrif, and restored the transferred lands to the Āl Bū Muhammad; and the Bimbāshi alleged to be responsible for the massacre was ordered to be tried by court martial.

Rebellion of
Sa'dūn Pāsha
of the Munta-
fik, 1900-05.

In 1900 Sa'dūn Pāsha, one of the chiefs of the Muntafik tribe and nephew of Nāsir Pāsha, erstwhile Wāli of Basrah, became seriously embroiled with the Turkish authorities in consequence of events external to Turkish 'Irāq. Sa'dūn Pāsha was at this time a mere professional marauder rather than a politician.

By a successful foray on adherents of the Shammar Amīr of Northern Najd, as described in the chapter on the history of Kuwait, Sa'dūn Pāsha nearly brought about, in the summer of 1900, a serious collision

on the western border of Turkish 'Irāq between the Shaikh of Kuwait, to whose interest he was attached, and Ibn Rashīd ; and one of the conditions on which the latter chief was persuaded by the Turkish authorities to retire to his own country was that satisfaction should be obtained for him from Sa'dūn Pāsha by the Ottoman Government.

The Turkish commander sent against Sa'dūn Pāsha in fulfilment of this pledge was Muhammad Fāzil Pāsha, Dāghistāni, who was a relative of the celebrated Caucasian leader Shāmil, and who had during the war of 1877-78 transferred his allegiance from the Tsar to the Sultān. He was accounted one of the best officers in the Baghdād Army Corps, the cavalry of which were under his command ; but in his operations against Sa'dūn Pāsha he failed to justify his reputation. The Muntafik freebooter, who had a stronghold at Sakhariyah in the desert to the west of the Euphrates, but who sometimes, when hard pressed, took refuge in the marshes of Mesopotamia, was not caught ; and in December 1900 he disappeared in the direction of the Dhafir country, or of Kuwait. 1900.

Two months later Sa'dūn Pāsha again emerged from obscurity as a leader in the invasion of Central Arabia by the Shaikh of Kuwait ; and, after the defeat of the invaders and their return home, Muhammad Pāsha was sent once more from Baghdād to hunt him down. 1901.

No actual military movement seems to have taken place, however ; and nothing more was heard of Sa'dūn Pāsha until 1903, towards the end of Nūri Pāsha's Government of Basrah. In that year the restless Muntafik leader crossed into Mesopotamia and began to harass the settled tribes there with claims for payment of blood-money in cases more than forty years old, and with other unreasonable demands. A written remonstrance by the Wāli of Basrah having failed to deter him from his objectionable proceedings, a military detachment was sent to Shatrah to intervene between Sa'dūn Pāsha and the tribes ; but, owing to mismanagement on the part of the officer commanding the party, a brawl arose at a meeting ; and 50 Turkish soldiers were massacred together with several officers, including the commandant. Muhammad Pāsha was then despatched against Sa'dūn Pāsha for the third time, and arrived at Nāsiriya in the beginning of November. His operations were no more effective, however, than on former occasions,—a circumstance which was now attributed to his having married a relative of Sa'dūn Pāsha, but which was probably due rather to the deficiency of cavalry in his force. In December the outlaw escaped to Kuwait territory ; but this time he received no countenance from the Shaikh of Kuwait. 1903.

1905. In January 1905 Sa'dūn Pāsha was understood to be suing for a pardon from the Porte ; but before long he was again guilty of causing disturbances on Turkish soil. Mukhlis Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, then confiscated his landed property and endeavoured to arrest him. His capture, however, could not be effected.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Kuwait and Najd, 1876—1905.

The relations of Turkish 'Irāq during this period with Kuwait and Najd are described fully in the chapters on the history of those territorial divisions. The outstanding features of the time were firstly persistent efforts by the Turkish authorities, between 1899 and 1902, to incorporate Kuwait with the Basrah Wilāyat, and secondly a Turkish campaign in Qasīm in 1904, followed by a Turkish pacific occupation of that district which ended pitifully in 1906.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with Persia, 1876—1905.

Question of
Shalbah
Island,
1877—84.

The indeterminate state of the Turko-Persian boundary, which the united efforts of Britain and Russia, exerted over a period of thirty years, had failed to remedy, continued under 'Abdul Hamīd to give rise to occasional difficulties.

1877. The chief controversy that arose during the period was one relating to Shalbah. This island first made its appearance, as a mud-bank, about the year 1870 ; and its aspect in 1877, when it came under dispute, and its history up that time were described by Surgeon-Major Colvill of the Baghdad Political Agency in the following terms :

The Shallah Island is about thirty-two miles below Mohammerah, and six miles above and within sight of the Turkish Custom House at Dawasir. Shallah appears to be no name but in Arabic a generic term meaning out-growth, and it is well it should have been applied in this case, for this is really no island but a bank, which had it been left alone would even now have been covered by every tide.

The bed of the Shat-el-Arab at this point is broader than usual, being about three thousand yards wide on account of the bank on the Persian side forming a sort of bay, and the island is about one thousand yards from the Persian and two thousand from the Turkish shore, and situated as it were in the mouth of this Persian bay. The

result is that, whatever it might have been originally, the whole force of the current now is between the island and the Turkish bank, while the bay is fast filling up; even now a man can wade at low tide from the island to the Persian bank, and there is no question but that in a few years more the island will become a portion of the Persian mainland. To describe the island would be to take a piece of swampy alluvial soil two, three or say even four acres in extent, for I could not well measure it; form this into a parallelogram twice as long up and down the river as broad, and surround it with an embankment of clay and reeds sufficient to keep out the ripple of the high tides but with slits to allow of irrigation; surround this with a fringe of bulrushes in extent three times the area of the parallelogram, but at high tide under water sufficient to float a boat; and we have a very fair idea of Shallah I-land. The Persian bank of the Shat-el-Arab opposite this island is low and apparently uninhabited, while the Turkish side is abrupt and covered with a forest of date trees, and is the private property of His Excellency Nasir Pasha. Thus Nasir Pasha as private proprietor of the opposite bank built the embankment of clay and reeds on the island and in 1876 planted some offshoots of date trees, while two or three cultivators sowed melons and gourds, but never permanently lived there. That Nasir Pasha had some ulterior object in view in making this embankment is certain, for the place is so wretched that not a family of cultivators, however poor, would accept the island as a gift on condition of having to live there permanently.

Turkey, embarrassed at the time by war with Russia, eventually agreed to evacuate Shalhah, provided that no buildings should be erected on it by Persian subjects until the question of the country to which it belonged had been settled by an international Frontier Commission. The Persians on their part renounced a design which they had formed of occupying the island in force. Nāsir Pāsha was directed to arrange for the evacuation of the place; Surgeon-Major Colvill was sent down from Baghdād to see that the evacuation was properly carried out; and it was apparently understood that the island should not, pending a final settlement, be cultivated by subjects of either side.

The question of Shalhah was raised again in 1884, there being then no 1884. Basrah Wilāyat, by the Mutasarrif of Basrah, who claimed that the island belonged neither to any Persian subject nor to Nāsir Pāsha personally, but that it was the property of the Turkish Government, who now wished to turn it to account. It was found on investigation at this time that Shalhah, since its evacuation in 1877, had been in the possession of cultivators from the Persian side owing allegiance to the Shaikh of Muhammareh. In 1884 it carried date trees bearing fruit, but the only buildings on it were mud huts. The Shaikh of Muhammareh tried to avoid the discussion which the Mutasarrif of Basrah wished to force on him by asking to be addressed through the Persian Consul at Basrah, and not directly; but, on the failure of this ruse, and on an announcement by the Mutasarrif that he intended to take the island by force, Shaikh Miz'al caused some thousands of his Arabs to be collected on the Persian mainland opposite

Shalhah, where they awaited the arrival of the Turks. A Turkish gunboat, full of troops and carrying the Mutasarrif, appeared in due course ; but when the Mutasarrif saw the number of the Arabs assembled, he thought better of his threats and passed on down the river to Fão. Next day the gunboat returned to Shalhah, but the Arabs on the Persian shore were still there and engaged, as before, in noisy war-dances ; so he pursued his way upstream to Failyeh, and there landed and interviewed the Shaikh. On the Mutasarrif's demanding the reason of the concourse of Arabs near Shalhah, Shaikh Miz'al at first pretended that they had been sent there to catch partridges alive for His Royal Highness the Zill-us-Sultân, the Persian Governor-General of 'Arabistân ; but, as the Mutasarrif would not accept this explanation, he in the end "declared roundly that the island was Persian and should remain so as long as he had breath in his body." The Mutasarrif, who had no effective reply to make to this, then withdrew ; and Shalhah was left in *de facto* possession of Persia.

Presence
of Persian
subjects on
the right
bank of the
Shatt-el-
'Arab.

A peculiar circumstance with an important bearing on Turko-Persian frontier relations is the residence on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-'Arab of numerous Arab tribesmen who regard themselves "and are commonly regarded" as subjects of the Shaikh of Muhammareh and therefore of the Persian Government, and as foreigners in Turkey. The facts have been well * described as follows :—

The position of the Shaikh *vis à vis* the Arab tribes dependent on Persia but resident in Turkey presents many anomalies, but has the sanction of usage and ancient custom. The members of such tribes are liable to military service and the Shaikh has not infrequently called them up for operations against the Bani Turuf and other recalcitrant tribes : the obligation is doubtless distasteful to the tribesmen, but the right of the Shaikh to demand it has never been disputed by them, and important landowners, Turkish subjects, such as the Naqib's family, Ahmad Effendi, Saiyid Talib, and others have, in virtue of engagements dating from the time of Shaikh Haji Jabir, personally made themselves responsible for the collection and despatch of levies, a proceeding naturally very distasteful to the Turks.

In tribal matters, the jurisdiction of the Shaikh is unquestioned by such tribesmen and in cases of blood feuds, as in other questions in which tribal law prevails, his intervention is necessary to effect a settlement, the idea of taking such cases to a Turkish Court of Law being wholly foreign to Arab ideas. This, again, is galling to Turkish susceptibilities.

In return, the Shaikh grants to such tribesmen as live in his lands in Turkey, and such men are very numerous, the customary tribal exemptions from grazing taxes, "Vergi" or "Miri" taxation, and from other imposts of a minor character, but

* See Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations, etc.*, pages 57-58.

important in the aggregate. Many of them, too, even though actually in possession of Turkish certificates of nationality (which documents are considered by Arabs as purely administrative documents having no bearing on tribal questions) have the right, handed down from father to son, to cultivate wheat lands in the Ahwaz district and Arabs of the Ka'ab and Muhaisin tribes living in Abul Khasib and Zain will be found in December and January ploughing their lands as far north as Wais.

We thus have the quaint anomaly of Arab tribesmen, in possession of certificates of Turkish nationality and liable to Turkish military service, training for which they may have actually undergone, acknowledging simultaneously liability to service under the Persian flag, and proceeding annually 100 miles and more from their homes in Turkey to cultivate lands in Persia which they and their forefathers have tilled for generations.

Questions of reciprocity seldom arise between Persia and Turkey, in regard to this frontier at all events, in connection with the treatment of Arab tribes, since no Arab tribes subject to Turkey reside in Persian territory, though, as has been shown, the reverse is very extensively the case.

A number of questions of a general nature were agitated from time to time between Turkey and Persia, and were all simultaneously pending in 1877, when war broke out between Turkey and Russia.

Persian
subjects,
refugees,
pilgrimages
and trade,
1877—78

One of these was the interpretation to be placed on the Convention of 1875 between Turkey and Persia in regard to the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the consular representatives of either country in the other. It seems to have been claimed by Persia that the rights of jurisdiction conferred on her consular officers in Turkey was precisely similar to those enjoyed by the Consuls of various European powers under Capitulations; but the contention was apparently denied by the Porte, it was not supported by the British Government, and it failed to be established.

A Persian grievance was the continued residence at Baghdād of Mirzā 'Abbās, a fugitive brother of His Majesty the Shāh, whom the Turkish Government had, it was alleged, given a written promise to remove to some other place. The matter being strongly pressed in 1877, when the Persian Prince had already been *many years at Baghdād, an assurance was given that he would be obliged to make Constantinople his place of residence; but he preferred to make his peace with the Shāh and returned to Tehrān.

Not long after the Shāh's own pilgrimage to Turkish 'Irāq in 1870-71, there was much indignation in Persia on account of annoyances inflicted, and extortions practised, by officials of the Turkish Government

*According to one authority he had been there since the accession of Nāsir-ud-Din Shāh to the Persian throne in 1848.

and of the Constantinople Board of Health on Shī'ah pilgrims to the shrines of 'Ali and Husain in Turkish 'Irāq. The Persian Government took advantage of popular feeling to prohibit such pilgrimages by Persian subjects altogether, and an effort was made to divert the stream of religious devotion (with its accompanying profits) to Mashhad in the Persian province of Khurāsān. This prohibition of pilgrimages in Turkey was either soon withdrawn or not long respected, and the attempt to substitute Mashhad for Najaf and Karbala was a failure; but for several years there was a marked falling-off in the number of Persian pilgrims to Turkish 'Irāq, and the effect on the internal trade of the province was unfavourable in an appreciable degree. At length, in 1878, the main grievances of the Persian pilgrims were removed by an agreement between Turkey and Persia regulating quarantines and the admission of corpses for burial from Persia, and dealing with the subjects of passports and fees; and the pilgrimages quickly recovered their former attraction for Persians.

The importation of salt from Persia into Turkey was prohibited, and the importation of tobacco subjected to special conditions, by Agreements executed between the two countries in 1875 and 1878. The restrictions were arranged in the interest of the public revenues of Turkey, in which the receipts from salt and tobacco monopolies are important items.

Turkish
fort at Fāo,
1885—1905.

In December 1885 the Wālī of Basrah informed the British Assistant Political Agent at that place that it was the intention of the Turkish Government to construct a large fort at Fāo; and in May 1886 a Turkish military detachment of 160 men (probably a nominal battalion) was stationed there, and building materials were collected.

1887.

When Colonel Murdoch Smith, Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph, visited Fāo in 1887, he found the construction of the fort in active progress. The work promised to be a strong one, and it was evident that it would completely command the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, from the channel of which it was only 500 yards distant.

It will be remembered that the British and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople informed the Porte, before the Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) was ratified, that Persia had undertaken to abstain from constructing fortifications on the Persian bank of the Shatt-el-'Arab so long as Turkey did not erect any on the Turkish shore opposite to Persian territory: this assurance was obtained by the mediating Govern-

ments from Persia at the special instance of the Porte. The construction of a Turkish fort at Fāo being regarded as a menace to British interests, a remonstrance on the subject was addressed to the Turkish Government in August 1887; but it was not well received by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The British contentions, in view of the history of the engagement annexed to the Treaty of Erzeroum, were as below :

It follows from the above facts, that the Turkish and Persian Governments stand mutually pledged to one another to abstain from fortifying on either side the banks of the Shat-el-Arab, and that Great Britain and Russia, who were the means of obtaining for the Porte this engagement from the Persian Government, have a direct interest and right to watch over its faithful observance by the contracting parties on whose behalf they intervened at the time.

It is possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs may be unaware of these facts. Or he may perhaps argue that the engagement being a reciprocal one, the Turkish Government have the option of departing from it with no other consequence than that of leaving the other party free to do the same. Her Majesty's Government cannot admit, in view of the history of the negotiations, that such a connection (? construction) is valid in international law, or that the Porte can free itself from the engagement which it took to the British and Russian mediators as well as to the Persian Government without previous arrangements with them.

And, setting the legal question aside, Her Majesty's Government, being interested in the integrity both of Persia and the Ottoman Empire and having regard to the fact that British subjects are largely interested both in the trade of Basrah and Mohammerah, would greatly regret the construction of opposing fortifications on either bank of the river, which must constitute a menace to its peaceful navigation and under certain circumstances become a source of danger to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, or between either of them and Great Britain.

Discussions continued until the 31st July 1888, when the Turkish Government delivered their final reply in the following terms :—

We have perused your note of reply stating that the construction of fortifications at Fāo is contrary to the decision arrived at when the treaty of Erzeroum was concluded, *viz.*, that no fortifications should be made on the banks of the Shatt-el-Arab, and declaring that any modification of this decision must be subject to the concert of the mediating powers. It is needless to explain that the agreement arrived at on this subject was not a reciprocal understanding, but Turkey at that time, in her own interests reserved to her own institution the right of constructing fortifications on those banks and brought about the engagement that so long as Turkey should not fortify the right bank of the river, Persia should abstain from building forts on her left bank. Now that Turkey has had forts made, Persia is released from her engagement and is also free to construct forts on her own ground and has no right to object. And this agreement being between the two Governments, there is no kind of engagement *vis à vis* the mediating powers, and the two Governments aforesaid are not dependent on their consent, and the construction of these works is no violation of any treaty between the two countries.

As it was evident from the tenor of this communication that the Turkish Government meant to persist in their design of fortifying Fão, Sir H. D. Wolff, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrân, suggested that a British naval squadron of some strength should visit the Persian Gulf ; and the demonstration which he recommended was decided on in principle, but was deferred (and eventually not carried out), lest umbrage should be given to Russia, already irritated by the opening of the Kârûn River to navigation under British auspices.

1889. In February 1889, at the instance of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the Persian Ambassador at the Porte addressed a note in the following sense to the Turkish Government :

It is clear that the construction of fortifications on the Shatt-el-'Arab is contrary to the Convention concluded through the mediation of Russia and England at the time of the exchange at Constantinople of the ratifications of the treaty of Erzeroum, dated the 21st March 1848.

No action contrary to the provisions of the Convention can be legitimate without the consent of the two signatory powers of the above mentioned treaty, as well as that of the mediating powers, having been obtained.

Now this action, in opposition to the said Convention, whose provisions are at present in force, has given rise to strong remonstrances on the part of England and Persia, and it is submitted that the fact that no attention is yet being paid to these remonstrances cannot naturally serve to maintain the friendly sentiments which exist between the two countries.

No result, however, followed from this communication, or from further remonstrances by the British Ambassador ; and work on the Fão fort continued, with occasional interruptions due to extraneous causes, during 1889. Drawings and plans of the work were made about this time by a clerk of the British telegraph station at Fão, who succeeded in obtaining access to it.

1890. In 1890, under orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the East India Squadron, His Majesty's ships "Sphinx", "Griffon", and "Redpole" visited Fão. On the 11th March Commander Boldero of the "Sphinx", accompanied by Commander Blaxland, proceeded on shore to visit the Turkish Officer in command of the fort ; but, immediately that his boat touched land, the ramparts of the fort were manned by riflemen who, under the orders of an officer, opened fire on the British party. No one, fortunately, having been hit, Commander Boldero decided not to reply to the fire but to return to his ship. Under orders from the Admiral he demanded an explanation from the Commandant of the fort, who answered, without making any reference to the firing by his men, that

he had received no official information of the intention of the British officers to visit the fort; that he had orders from his military superiors at Basrah not to allow any one to enter or approach the fort; and that there was a quarantine cordon. The matter was also reported by the British Consul at Basrah to Constantinople with the result that Commander Boldero was admitted to the fort on the 22nd March, and that an assurance was subsequently given that the Turkish officer responsible for the firing had been removed from his command and sentenced to six month's imprisonment.

At the time of Commander Boldero's visit the Fāo fort, though it was not a large work and had been under construction for nearly four years, was still incomplete; the embrasures were unfinished, no shields were in position, and there were no mountings for guns. In 1892 and 1893 work on the fort was resumed in a desultory fashion, with the consequence that in August of the latter year the British Ambassador at Constantinople expressed to the Porte a hope that they would "give orders for the prompt discontinuance of the work in question, for, should the fort be completed and steps taken towards arming it, Her Majesty's Government would regard such action as one of hostile preparation which they would be entitled to resent, and which would justify them in taking necessary measures for counteracting it". In November 1893 the British objections were renewed, and an assurance was received that orders for stopping the work would be issued; but it was not actually discontinued until May 1894.

1890-94.

The fort remained unarmed with artillery, and in 1905 the strength of the garrison was only about 45 rifles.

1905.

It may be mentioned that the Persian Government, throughout the controversy, showed entire indifference on the subject of the fort, and that the whole burden of opposing its construction was consequently borne by the British Government.

Between 1890 and 1894 small military guard-houses were built by the Turks on Shamshamiyah Island; at Kūt-az-Zain, on the Turkish bank, nearly opposite to the mouth of the Kārūn; and at another place on the Turkish side, apparently Gat'ah, between Kūt-az-Zain and Dawāsir. These erections were of burnt brick, one storey high, with a loopholed parapet surrounding the roof. There was talk in 1890 of the construction of a Turkish fort, similar to that at Fāo, at or near Kūt-az-Zain; but this scheme was not carried into effect.

Other
Turkish
posts on the
Shatt-el-
'Arab,
1890-94.

In 1891 the Turkish Government proposed to transfer the Basrah quarantine station to Fāo. The ostensible object was to prevent evasion

Projected
transfer
of the Basrah

quarantine
station to
Fão,
1891-97.

of the payment of quarantine fees at Basrah by travellers who might disembark at Muhammareh and proceed thence—as many undoubtedly did—by land or by small boat to Basrah; but in reality the Turkish authorities aimed at establishing their ascendancy over the waterway of the Shatt-el-'Arab, a purpose which the construction of a Turkish fort at Fão had not sufficed to effect; and it was also hoped, apparently, to strike a telling blow at the commercial prosperity of Muhammareh. The scheme, which was inimical to British commercial as well as political interests, was opposed by Her Majesty's Government, was resisted by the British and Russian delegates on the Constantinople Board of Health, and failed to be carried into execution. It was brought forward again in 1894 and continued to be cherished by its originators for some time longer, being revived in 1897; but in vain. Practical and scientific considerations were in no wise in its favour, for vessels declared to be bound for Muhammareh, a Persian port, could not legally be stopped at Fão.

Collection of
Turkish
customs at
Fão from
vessels bound
for Muham-
march,
1893-94.

In 1893 the Turkish authorities at Fão made an audacious attempt to treat the Shatt-el-'Arab below Muhammareh as a Turkish river and began to interfere with its navigation in a manner contrary to the treaty of Erzeroum (1817). One of the first cases which arose was that of a British Indian sailing vessel which, having arrived in the Shatt-el-'Arab with a cargo of charcoal for Muhammareh, was stopped at Fão and placed in quarantine there for 24 hours. The master was obliged to sign a paper, to him incomprehensible, for production at the Turkish custom house at Dawāsir further up the river, and was required to deposit one of his sails as a pledge of compliance. At Dawāsir no attention was paid to the Fão paper, and the vessel was allowed to proceed to Muhammareh. On her return seaward from Muhammareh with a cargo of dates she ran direct to Fão, where exception was taken to her not having called at Dawāsir, and a certificate (presumably of payment of export duty in Persia) obtained from the Shaikh of Muhammarch was rejected as insufficient. The vessel returned to Dawāsir; but the Turkish customs authorities there refused to grant the certificate demanded by those at Fão; and the master accordingly sailed to Basrah and lodged a complaint at the Assistant Political Agency. The British Assistant Political Agent, thinking that there had been some mistake, referred to the Turkish Mudir of customs at Basrah, from whom he received the unexpected reply that “as Muhammareh was a Turkish port, he had received orders to take customs duty on all cargo

landed there." The Wāli of Basrah was then addressed, but he merely echoed the assertions of the Mudīr ; and the effect of a communication made by him to the Persian Consul at Basrah was similar. The Turkish claims should not have come entirely as a surprise, for as early as 1891 there had been whispers at Basrah of renewed Turkish pretensions to Muhammareh, and so far back as that year tonnage and quarantine dues had been claimed, and blackmail extorted, at Fāo from native vessels bound for Muhammareh.

Turkish customs were paid at Fāo, under protest, by two British Indian sailing vessels of which the destination was Muhammareh, one of them being probably that of which the case has been described above.

At the instance of the Shāh of Persia an energetic protest was at once made by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, apparently in consultation with the Russian Embassy there, on the subject of the Turkish claim to Muhammareh. Meanwhile a curious statement was made by M. de Butzow, the Russian Minister at Tehrān, to the effect that shortly after the conclusion of the treaty of Erzeroum an explanatory note had been extorted by the British and Russian Chargés d'Affaires at Constantinople from a Persian Commissioner, in which it was admitted that the treaty did not confer possession of Muhammareh upon Persia. The Turkish Ambassador at Tehrān affirmed that such a document existed and had never been rejected by Turkey, while the Shāh's Government asserted that it must in any case be disallowed as not authorised by proper Persian authority. The Porte, however, promptly admitted that they had no claim to Muhammareh, and the fact or fiction of the Persian Commissioner's admission was thus rendered of no importance. In explanation of the conduct of their local officials on the Shatt-el-'Arab, the Turkish Government seem to have given prominence to a distinction between duty on cargoes consigned directly to Muhammareh and others imported there from a Turkish port or through Turkish territory, but the question was not further pursued. The Turkish demands on vessels bound to or from Muhammareh ceased ; and it was found unnecessary to send a British gunboat to Fāo for the protection of British Indian shipping there, as had been proposed.

The personal extravagance of Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh, ruler of Persia, the acceptance of large loans by Persia from the Russian Government, the re-organisation of the Persian customs on a European basis by means of European agents, and the levying of duties on wines and spirits in

The Muj-
tahids of
Turkish
'Irāq and

Persian
affairs,
1903-05.

place of an absolute interdict on the sale of liquor excited in 1903 acute dissatisfaction among the Persian Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala,—the chief of whom, though residing on Turkish soil, are the real leaders in all Persian religious movements, and exercise an ascendancy over the Persian mind which is not possessed by any authority in Persia itself.

Early in 1903 some of the Mujtahids in Turkish 'Irāq addressed a remonstrance to the Shāh, desiring him to modify his policy ; but it passed almost unheeded, the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād being merely directed to visit Karbala and Najaf and to convey His Persian Majesty's salutations to certain of the Mujtahids, together with an assurance that matters had been misrepresented to them. Muhammad-al-Garāwi (Sharabiyāni), Hāji Muhammad Husain, Mirza Khalīl (Māmaghāni) and Mulla Muhammad Kāzim (Khurāsāni) were the Mujtahids who took the most active part in the agitation against the policy of the Persian Government. In the month of June 1903 riots broke out at Tabriz against the Armenian liquor-sellers and the Belgian customs officials of that place ; and tumultuary risings at Isfahān and Yazd ensued, in which numerous Bābis were cruelly murdered. These disturbances were attributed by the Government of Persia to incitement by the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala ; and subsequent inquiry by British officials in Turkish 'Irāq showed that the Persian Mujtahids, among whom the Sharabiyāni was the most prominent figure, though disavowing anti-Christian and anti-European sentiments, did at least approve of the wholesale " execution " of Bābis. The Shāh, on the occurrence of the outbreaks, telegraphed to the Mujtahids through the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād, assuring them that all the measures taken by his Government were in the interests of the Persian realm. To this communication the Mujtahids promptly replied by condemning, though in measured terms, all imitation of European methods, as well as the latitude allowed in Persia to heretics and unbelievers ; they intimated not obscurely, that the adoption of certain other measures then believed to be contemplated—probably the collection of the land-revenue by European machinery—would cause a religious revolution in Persia ; and they besought the Shāh to repay the Russian loans, and not to depreciate the currency by unlimited coinage of silver. The Persian authorities distrusted the loyal professions of the Mujtahids, for they had, it was said, been shown a document signed by the Sharabiyāni and others which conveyed approval of the lawless proceedings at Tabriz ; nevertheless a courteous though evasive reply was returned by the Shāh to the Mujtahids, in which he professed readiness

to be guided by them in religious matters, but deprecated their interference in affairs of state. Eventually a manifesto signed by some of the Mujtahids and dated the 3rd of August 1903 reached Persia, in which the molestation of foreign subjects was prohibited as unlawful, and the Bābi and liquor questions were described as matters within the province of the civil authorities, about to be satisfactorily regulated, but on the 14th September a document of a different character was issued by certain of the fraternity, in the form of a bull of excommunication directed against the Grand Vazīr, the Atabaig-i-A'zam, who was identified with the policy to which they objected. Facsimiles of this paper, produced at Calcutta by a photographic process, were shortly in circulation over the length and breadth of Persia ; and, if they were not a direct cause of the Atabaig's downfall, they at least made his return to power impossible. It was even stated that, if the obnoxious minister had not been dismissed, a similar sentence would shortly have been pronounced against his royal master. In these proceedings the Mujtahids seem to have allowed themselves to be made the tools of the political enemies of the Atabaig ; but their motives were probably patriotic.

At an earlier stage of the controversy the Mujtahids had attempted to bring pressure to bear on the Shāh through the Sultān of Turkey ; but the Persian Government quickly borrowed this weapon from the armoury of their critics, and, with the hope of bringing about their expulsion from the Holy Cities, denounced the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala to the Porte as friends of the British. The expedient was skilfully chosen, and its effect was enhanced by a prohibition which the Mujtahids had rashly enacted, at the end of 1903, against the use of the Hāil route to Makkah by Shī'ah Muhammadans during the continuance of hostilities between Ibn Rashīd and Ibn Sa'ūd ; this order of theirs was represented by the Persian Government to the Porte as having been issued in the interests of the Shaikh of Kuwait and of " his friends," the British Government. A few months later the Russian representative at Constantinople seems to have complained of the dangerous activity of the Mujtahids' agents in Persia and Central Asia. Accordingly, in June 1904, some of the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf were threatened by the Turkish authorities with deportation to Madīnah ; and a secret inquiry was instituted by the Turkish authorities into their relations with foreign powers.

Alarmed by these proceedings, and weakened by the death in December 1904 of their leader the Sharabiyāni, whose funeral all but

caused a riot against the Turkish authorities at Najaf in consequence of interference with it by the Turkish sanitary staff, the Mujtahids appear from this point onwards to have modified their tone. They had already been persuaded to issue a fulmination against the "Habl-ul-Matin," a Persian newspaper published at Calcutta, of which the political views corresponded with their own, and in which what purported to be a correspondence between certain of them and the Sultān of Turkey had appeared; and they now virtually rescinded their interdict on pilgrimages by the Hail route. Subsequently, in March 1905, on the occasion of fresh anti-foreign outbreaks at Mashhad and Kūchān, they despatched loyal telegrams, enjoining the priesthood and people of Persia to support the throne,—a step which seemed to produce some sedative effect, and which removed, for the time being, the friction that had arisen between them and the Persian Government.

Piracies on the Shatt-el-'Arab, 1888-1905.

Other matters of common interest to Turkey and Persia were piracies which, for a number of years during the period now under consideration, were frequent on the Shatt-el-'Arab

Cases of
piracy,
1880-1895.

On the 3rd January 1880 the Superintendent of the British Telegraph Station at Fāo, when proceeding to Basrah in a boat with two of his clerks, was attacked by a gang of eight Arabs at a place about twelve miles below Basrah. The members of the party, surprised while asleep, were beaten and wounded, besides being deprived of property valued at Rs. 1,070. One of the Superintendent's boatmen stated that he had recognised in the leader of the pirates an Arab named Bakhākh-hin-Sabbhān of the Muhaisin tribe, a well-known bad character under the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Muhammareh. Zābit Pāsha, Wāli of Basrah, and Hāji Jābir, Shaikh of Muhammareh, were immediately apprised of the occurrence by the British authorities and requested to take action. The guilt of Bakhākh was denied by Shaikh Jābir; but, the Government of India holding it to be clearly proved, a fine of \$150 was realised from his family through the Shaikh. In the meantime the whole of the stolen property, except some cash, had been recovered by Shaikh Miz'al, a son of Hāji Jābir. Efforts were made also to obtain the surrender of Bakhākh for punishment, which

Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, had demanded ; but they seem to have been fruitless, the man having fled to the marshes.

In October 1888 two British Indian sailing vessels were attacked by pirates at Ziyādiyah on the Turkish side of the river ; three persons were killed, two were wounded, and property to the value of Rs. 3,000 was carried off. Certain Turkish subjects were prosecuted in this case, but were not convicted, the influence of the manager of certain Civil List estates having been exerted in their favour. 1888.

The British Indian vessel " Chaturpasa," a Batil from Kach, was plundered on the 6th November 1889 near the island of Hāji Salbūq, all moveable property, including the cash and even the sails of the boat, being taken ; one person was killed on board, and four were wounded. In this case the pirates, about twenty in number, were stated to be from the Persian bank ; but, though the Shaikh of Muhammareh took steps to trace them, they were not discovered. 1889.

On the 12th December the " Daulatpasa," another British Indian sailing vessel, was stripped of all portable effects, including \$700 in specie ; but in this case there was no loss of life or personal injury. The scene of the piracy was Khast ; but none of the robbers, whose number was about thirty, could be traced.

On the next day an unsuccessful attempt was made at the same place on the British Indian Batil " Fly," and the offenders this time seemed to belong to Turkish territory, but the Wāli of Basrah maintained that they were from Persia.

On the 13th September 1890 the " Harsingha " and " Sukarpasa," owned by British subjects resident at Gwādar, were plundered near Baraim, a village on the Persian island of 'Abbādān by a gang of about forty pirates, apparently from the Persian side. Two persons were killed and three wounded ; and all movables, among them cash to the value of Rs. 860, were taken. There were two or three Turkish soldiers and clerks on board, passengers from Fāo to Basrah, but they gave the crew no assistance against the robbers. In this instance the Wāli of Basrah and the Shaikh of Muhammareh each asserted that the pirates belonged to the other's jurisdiction. 1890.

In 1895, within the Shatt-el-'Arab and in the vicinity of its mouth, Persian and Arab as well as Indian vessels suffered at the hands of pirates ; and some of the attacks made were of a most savage and murderous character. One derelict was picked up containing only corpses. 1895.

Among the victims of this year was the "Haripasa" of Jāmnagar, an Indian State, which was attacked near Fāo on the 19th September, had four men killed and three wounded and was plundered of property worth Rs. 3,400. The robbers in this instance appeared to be Nassār Ka'ab of the Persian bank; and after some enquiries had been made by the Mudir of Fāo, the Turkish authorities repudiated all responsibility. The Shaikh of Muhammareh, on his part, showed a strong disinclination to take action, and only one arrest was made under his orders.

In none of the above cases was any satisfaction obtained, the Turkish and Persian authorities invariably trying to cast upon each other the responsibility for each fresh outrage.

Preventive
measures and
repression of
piracy, 1896.

This unsatisfactory state of matters obliged the British representatives at Basrah and Muhammareh to insist that the local authorities at those places should take effectual measures for policing the river. The result was the establishment, during 1896, of posts at which native vessels could anchor for the night in safety, and the introduction by the Turkish and Persian authorities of nocturnal patrolling by armed boats. The posts instituted on the Turkish side were at Sangar, Shamshamiyah Island, Kūt-az-Zain, Ziyādīyah, Fāo, and a place between Ziyādīyah and Fāo; and half a company of Turkish regulars, under two officers, were distributed over them. On the Persian bank posts were located at Hārtheh, Juruf, Baraim, Shatait, Manyūhi and Qasbeh, as well as other places; and strenuous injunctions were issued by the Shaikh of Mahammareh to the inhabitants of his river-bank villages to protect British Indian sailing craft. In the autumn H. M. S. "Lapwing" was stationed in the Shatt-el-'Arab. These precautions, together with the semblance of concerted action between the authorities on the opposite banks which they produced, had an excellent effect; and after their institution only a few unimportant cases of piracy were reported. One serious crime occurred off the bar of the river, in which the master of a vessel was killed, two traders were wounded, and goods and cash to the amount of Rs. 3,000 were plundered; but this was apparently before the measures described above were taken. In December 1896 a Persian boat from Dilam which went aground near Baraim was attacked, two or three persons on board being more or less wounded and the cargo looted; but the only other complaint during the latter part of the year referred to a Kuwait vessel which was threatened or annoyed near Qasbeh, but which apparently suffered no loss.

No reparation was obtained in the two last mentioned cases, both of which belonged to the Persian side,

In 1897, the vigilance of authorities having apparently been relaxed, there was a recrudescence of piracy.

Recrudescence
of piracy,
1897.

In May of that year three piracies were committed on Kuwait vessels at the mouth of the river, and in one of these a member of the crew was killed and property worth Rs. 5,500 carried off.

On the 6th September one Persian sailing vessel was looted by another outside the river; but H. M. S. "Pigeon" and the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence," which happened to be near the spot, at once set off in pursuit; and the "Lawrence," on the second day, succeeded in capturing the offenders. Four of the pirates, who were Persian subjects, were handed over to the Persian authorities and were sentenced to six months imprisonment each; and the guilty vessel and its contents were sold, the proceeds being handed over as compensation to the injured party, some of whom had been severely wounded.

The next case was a graver one: it was that of the "Kaliyanpasa," a British Indian sailing vessel, which was attacked on the river at Saihān on the night of the 1st December. In this affair one British Indian and one 'Omāni subject lost their lives, and a quantity of valuable property was carried off. Saihān is in Turkish territory, but the pirates seemed to belong to the Persian side. The only person arrested was a Persian subject who was not really implicated, and whom the Turkish police seized for reasons of their own. The case remained under enquiry for some time, but it was never settled.

These events necessitated more stringent preventive measures, in which the lead was taken by the British authorities. H.M. S. "Redbreast" was stationed in the river in September 1898 and remained until January 1899. The Turkish and Persian authorities were also induced to exert themselves. In September 1898 the number of river-side posts occupied by military in Turkish territory was increased to 13, and the Turkish armed steamers "Ālūs" and "Zuhāf" were equipped for service; but this by no means spontaneous display of energy was not considered a sufficient reason for acceding to a request made by the Porte in November 1898 for the withdrawal of the British gunboat. On the Persian side the Shaikh of Muhammareh raised the number of his posts to 12, at each of which a Ballam was stationed and the Persian flag hoisted; and all movement of private Ballams at night in the waters adjoining the Persian bank was prohibited. It was suggested by the British authorities that the headmen of villages should be warned that they would be held responsible for piracies committed

Increased
precautions
against
piracy, 1898-
99.

by those under their authority, and that in doubtful cases reparation would be exacted from the inhabitants of both banks ; but, though representations in this sense were made to the Wāli of Basrah by Mr. Wratislaw, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, it is uncertain whether the desired steps were taken by the Wilāyat.

Cessation of
piracy, 1897-
1900.

For three years, from the end of 1897 to the end of 1900, there was a complete cessation of piracy in the Shatt-el-'Arab. In each year at least one British gunboat remained more or less continuously in the river during the season of date exportation ; and her presence was no doubt the chief cause, directly and indirectly, of the improved state of affairs.

Revival of
piracy, 1901-
1904.

When piracy began again in 1901, the methods of the pirates had changed. From that year onwards outrages were mostly confined to the slack season, when no British gunboat was at hand ; and they occurred chiefly on the bar outside the river, over which the Turkish and Persian authorities maintained little or no surveillance.

The first piracy on the Shatt-el-'Arab after 1897 was committed on the 27th January 1901 on the "Husaini," a Bahrain boat, while she was lying aground off Ma'amir upon the Turkish side of the river ; the loss in property on this occasion was considerable, but there were no fatalities. The next case happened on the bar of the Shatt-el-'Arab on the 4th November 1901, when the "Yāsmin", a sailing-vessel owned by a Khōjah British subject of Bandar 'Abbās, was attacked by a Ballam containing 20 pirates ; after the boat had been plundered she was abandoned by the crew from fear of a second attack, but she was recovered again in the neighbourhood of Khārag Island. The third victim in 1901 was the British Indian Ghunchah "Padarath," which was pillaged on the bar on the 27th of December. The offenders in these three cases were stated to be Ka'ab Arabs under the leadership of one Khalaif of Faddāghiyah in Turkish territory ; but, though a correspondence took place between the Wāli of Basrah and the Shaikh of Muhammareh, none of them were brought to justice.

On the 8th April 1902 the "Fath-al-Khair" of Bahrain was attacked, also on the bar, and looted ; one of her people was wounded ; and the crew were kept prisoners for two days and compelled to give up their cash, which they had secreted. Immediately after, a Būshehr Mashwa was plundered, probably by the same gang, who were said to be residents of Dorah and Faddāghiyah on the Turkish bank of the Shatt-el-'Arab. On the 27th May the "Hussaini" of Kuwait, which

had shipped specie to the amount of Rs. 15,000 at Muhammareh, was held up and robbed off Būbiyān Island by a boat which had followed her from the Shatt-el-'Arab, one man being killed ; and the pirates, in this instance also, were said to be men of Dorah and Faddāghiyah. Possibly for this reason a visit paid by the Shaikh of Kuwait to the Shaikh of Muhammareh, in connection with the case, was productive of no result. On the 29th May one of the Shaikh of Muhammareh's water patrols gave chase to two Ballams which had approached a Būshehr boat in a suspicious manner ; but the men in the Ballams fired on the patrol boat and ultimately took refuge in the Hājiyah creek near Faddāghiyah, the inhabitants of which village turned out to their assistance.

At the time of these events the Shaikh of Muhammareh had only one armed boat between Qasbeh and the mouth of the Bahmanshīr ; and the Turks had discontinued the use of armed boats altogether. The Shaikh, however, now sent his steamer " Īrān " to Qasbeh and stationed two armed Ballams between the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab and the mouth of the Bahmanshīr, besides a Būm at the entrance of the Shatt-el-'Arab. The Turkish steamer " Ālūs " was put on duty on the river, but was of little service, as her engines almost immediately broke down. H. M. S. " Sphinx " was ordered to co-operate with the local authorities. A temporary cessation of piracy ensued, but the perpetrators of the recent attacks remained undiscovered and unpunished.

Before the end of the date season outrages recommenced. On the night of the 25th November, 1902, H. M. S. " Assaye " being then engaged in investigations at the bar outside river, the " Fath-al-Khair " of Masqat, registered at that port as a British vessel and flying the British flag, was boarded by pirates on the Turkish side of the Shatt-el-'Arab near Ma'āmīr and plundered ; the mate was killed ; and the master was stabbed in several places. The pirates in this case were 10 or 12 Arabs and negroes, who were said to belong to the Persian side.

On the 3rd of February 1903 a Kuwait vessel, carrying a master, 5 sailors, and a merchant as a passenger, was attacked in Khor Mūsa and captured after a fight lasting 4 hours. The occupants were killed, with the exception of one of the crew, and the boat was looted. This piracy was attributed to natives of Dorah on the Shatt-el-'Arab, four or five of whom were believed to have been killed or wounded in the engagement. No satisfaction was obtained by the sufferers in any of the piracies of 1902 or 1903.

At the beginning of 1904, the trouble was renewed. On the 30th of January a Karachi sailing vessel, the "Sogarparsa," while moored at the quarantine station within sight of Basrah was boarded by a gang of 20 men who arrived in a Ballam : they wounded the master with knives and carried away the effects and money of the crew. At this time the Turks were again without any system of water patrols, even at Basrah, and their land police was inefficient ; protection of property on the river at Basrah consequently depended on private watchmen, who at night frequently exchanged shots with prowling thieves. A very serious case occurred on the 3rd February in the early morning. The vessel attacked in this instance was the "Fath-as-Salāmat" of Karachi, of 153 tons register, and the scene of the outrage was the outer side of the Shatt-el-'Arab bar, about 10 miles from Fāo. The "Fath-as-Salāmat" had sailed from Ma'āmir, up the river, on the 1st of February with a cargo of dates, and had been followed by her assailant, a Būm carrying 20 men, from Qasbeh, where it had been lying at anchor for three days previously. The pirates made free use of their fire-arms, killing 2 and wounding 2 of the "Fath-as-Salāmat's" crew of 15 : after plundering the vessel they scuttled her and damaged her small boat and left the occupants to drown. The survivors of the crew succeeded however, in plugging the bottom of the small boat : and they were picked up by the British steamer "Dwina," which conveyed them to Basrah. The material damage in this case, including the loss of the "Fath-as-Salāmat," was estimated at Rs. 25,000. According to information received, three of the pirates belonged to Qasbeh and ten of them to a place at the mouth of the Hindiyān River, and the stolen property had been secreted at the latter of these. H.M.S. "Lapwing" accordingly proceeded to the mouth of the Hindiyān and searched the houses of a settlement there, but without success, heavy weather which caused delay in landing having given the inhabitants ample time to remove the evidences of their guilt after the "Lapwing" was sighted. A reward of Rs. 1,000 was offered by the British authorities for information leading to the conviction of any of the offenders, but no evidence was forthcoming ; and eventually His British Majesty's Consul at Basrah reported that nothing more could be done in this or in the "Sogarparsa" case. The Persian Government complained of the proceedings of the "Lapwing" at the mouth of the Hindiyān and were informed in reply that the sovereign rights of Persia would be scrupulously respected, but that the action of His Britannic Majesty's ships in the repression of piracy could not be subjected to restrictions.

In August 1904, H. M. S. "Merlin" was sent to patrol the Shatt-el-'Arab, and about the same time an effort was made by the British Government to induce the Turkish and Persian authorities to co-operate in a serious manner for the purpose of tracing and arresting local pirates. The Shaikh of Muhammareh, whose posts and patrols were on the whole more effectively maintained than those of the Wāli of Basrah, was willing to act with the Turks, and suggested that he should be authorised to arrest bad characters on either bank of the river. The Porte also showed a disposition to enter into some arrangement. But the Persian Government declined to commit themselves to anything in the nature of an extradition treaty with Turkey, and the British proposals fell to the ground.

Failure of a British attempt to promote co-operation between the Turkish and Persian authorities, 1904.

The natural sequel of deficient co-operation was the renewal of trouble immediately on the departure of H. M. S. "Sphinx" from the river at the beginning of January 1905. On the 11th of that month an ordinary piracy was committed on a Kuwait boat in the Shatt-el-'Arab; and at the beginning of March a more serious attack took place on a Bahrain boat not far from Basrah, accompanied by the murder of the captain, who was a subject of the Shaikh of Kuwait. There were also one or two minor cases. A lull followed, which appeared to be partly due to the settlement by the Shaikh of Muhammareh of some 1,500 'Idān tribesmen on waste lands in the neighbourhood of Qasbeh.

After 1898, the year in which the British Government first took a share in policing the Shatt-el-'Arab during the date season, the river and its approaches were fairly safe during the busy months; but piracies continued to occur at uncertain intervals, some of them attended by loss of life, without a single one of the perpetrators being brought to justice or any compensation obtained for material losses. Indian vessels under the British flag were particularly exposed to violence by small gangs, as their crews, besides being timorous, were generally unarmed. Nevertheless there was an increase in the number of Indian craft calling at Basrah, which was attributable in part, to the increased security of the river during the date season.

Relations of Turkish 'Irāq with European foreign powers other than Britain, 1876-1905.

The only European power besides Britain represented at Baghdād at the beginning of the period was the French Republic. Very import-

ant 'archæological excavations were carried on at Tallo from 1877 to 1900 by Mr. E. de Sarzec, who was during part of that time French Vice-Consul at Basrah, and during part of it French Consul at Baghdad. Russia at first showed no signs of interest in the province; but the Armenian community, though outwardly loyal to the Turkish Government, were supposed to have Russian proclivities; and it was believed that the Russian Government kept themselves informed of affairs in Turkish 'Irāq through Armenian agents.

Later in the reign of 'Abdul Hamīd the attention of various European powers was turned to Turkish 'Irāq, and a Russian Consulate-General and several Foreign Consulates were established, as shown in the Appendix on Diplomatic and Consular Representation.

United States
of America,
1885-1900.

In 1885 an American Archæological Mission visited Turkish 'Irāq; and thereafter, from 1888 to 1900, excavations were carried on at Nifār by American archæologists working under the auspices of the University of Pennsylvania.

Russia, from
1883.

The power next to Britain having most connection with the province was, before the inception of the Baghdād Railway scheme, Russia; and Russian instigation was suspected in the case of an attempt by the Turkish authorities in 1883 to prevent the navigation of the Tigris by British vessels.

Germany,
from 1903.

Afterwards Germany, in consequence of the Baghdād Railway arrangements occupied the second place; but during the period with which we are concerned neither German nor Russian interests materialised locally to an appreciable extent. Archæological excavations on a large scale were, however, carried on at Babylon from January 1898 by a German Mission under the direction of Dr. Koldewey.

Russian war
vessel's visit
to Basrah,
March 1900.

It may be mentioned that the stay of the Russian war vessel "Gilyak" at Basrah from the 5th to the 13th March 1900 was made the occasion of a somewhat ostentatious display by the Russian Consul from Baghdād, and that the regulation period of quarantine was reduced in her favour by the Turkish authorities from 10 to 5 days. The Board of Health at Constantinople, however, on the representations of the British delegate, soon afterwards agreed to extend the relaxation to all foreign warships calling at Basrah; and the permanent benefit of the concession thus reverted chiefly to the British navy.

Questions of navigation in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905.

It will be convenient to treat all navigation questions of the period in Turkish 'Irāq together, though the interests involved were partly Turkish and partly foreign.

In 1876 the "Dejleh," belonging to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch), was sunk in the Tigris by striking the wreck of a native vessel which she had herself sent to the bottom two years earlier. All efforts to refloat her failed, though divers and apparatus were sent out from England for the purpose; and after some delay her owners replaced her by the "Blosse Lynch," a two-funnelled steel vessel, 225 feet in length and 29 feet in beam, with a tonnage of 383. The new steamer, built by Messrs. Rennie & Company of London, cost £22,000 before she was put together at Messrs. Lynch's Magil workshops near Basrah, and several thousand pounds more were spent on her erection there. She was of more ambitious design than any of her predecessors, but her greater size was not without attendant disadvantages.

Lynch and
Company's
fleet, 1876—
78.

In 1878 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company had two steamers running on the Tigris and the net profit of their operations was said to be about 25 per cent. per annum.

Turkish river
steamers in
1878.

The Turkish Government steamers on the Tigris in 1878 numbered seven; and in 1879 they were under the management of the Turkish Naval Commadore at Basrah; but their administration frequently changed hands, and in all circumstances it was haphazard and inefficient. It was the custom of the Turkish administration to send one vessel up the Euphrates each year upon the spring floods; but the date of her starting from Basrah was always uncertain, and the voyage, which generally extended to Birijik was unremunerative. The officers of most of the Turkish vessels were at this time British, and the annual net earnings of the Turkish flotilla were believed to be at the rate of 8 per cent., notwithstanding the unbusiness-like manner in which its affairs were conducted.

The snow-fall in the mountains of Armenia in the winter of 1778-79 was very deficient, with the result that the level of the Tigris in the following summer was unprecedentedly low. To prevent injury to rice cultivation on the lower reaches of the river the Wālī of Baghdād formed the extraordinary resolution of throwing a temporary dam across the main channel at 'Azair (Ezra's Tomb), by which navigation between Baghdād and Basrah would have been made impossible without transshipment. The scheme drew vehement protests from the merchants of all nationalities at Baghdad, who represented that the loss to the Turkish Government in customs revenue would be greater than the gain in (or rather saving of) agricultural receipts, and that the navigation

Proposed
Turkish dam
across the
Tigris, 1879.

of the Tigris might be permanently affected. These arguments did not prevail with the Wilāyat; but, when the project was on the eve of execution, it was suddenly prohibited by orders from Constantinople.

Attack by
Arabs on the
"Khalifah,"
1880.

On the morning of the 8th July 1880 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co.'s steamer "Khalifah," while passing up the Tigris with the British mails, a light general cargo, and about 80 passengers, was attacked by Arab marauders a few miles from 'Azair. The Arabs suddenly appeared in some long grass on the bank and opened a brisk fire on the steamer, which they maintained for about 40 minutes, following by land and attempting to board her, but without success. The commander, Captain Clements, and the chief engineer, Mr. Cole, clung manfully to their posts, and the Arabs at last abandoned the pursuit. On board a native quartermaster and one passenger were killed and Captain Clements was wounded, being shot through the lungs. The perpetrators of the outrage were Āl Bū Muhammad tribesmen, subject to the authority of Shaikh Saihūd. No motive could be assigned for this wholly unprecedented attack, except the usual Arab fondness for plunder, coupled in this instance perhaps with a desire on the part of the Āl Bū Muhammad to draw attention to their grievances against the Turkish Government, which at the time had proscribed them as rebels. The "Blosse Lynch", which passed down the river shortly afterwards was not molested. The "Khalifah" on her next journey from Baghdād to Basrah was provided with a Turkish guard of 30 soldiers, and a Turkish gunboat was ordered to Basrah.

Representations were immediately made at Constantinople, and the Porte promised that an expedition would be sent against the offending tribe, and that the river would be patrolled by an armed Turkish steamer. In August 1880 it was reported that Shaikh Saihūd, who had retired to an island named Abu Shadar in the marshes between the Tigris and the Euphrates above their junction at Qūrnah, had succeeded in repulsing an attack made on him at the instance of the Turkish authorities by his elder brother, Shaikh Wādi, and another relation. His followers suffered little loss, but of the attacking force seven were killed and twenty were wounded. The ends of the only creek giving access to the Shaikh's retreat were guarded by the Turkish steamers "Basrah" on the Tigris and "Rusāfah" on the Euphrates. Later Sālīh Bey, the Mutasarrif of Āmārah, proceeded against Shaikh Saihūd with regular troops; but the Shaikh fled without encountering them, and it soon became evident that the prospects of his being captured were small. His stronghold at Abu Shadar, however, such as it was, was destroyed.

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. gave notice that they would claim compensation for the outrage; and Colonel Miles, the British Resident at Baghdād, continued to press, both locally and through Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, for effectual punitive measures; but the Wālī of Baghdād seemed timid and disinclined to authorise coercive proceedings; and he even proposed to withdraw the Turkish military guards which had been furnished to the British steamers. Eventually one Haji Mutair, said to have been concerned in the attack on the "Khalifah," was captured, and in February 1881 he was condemned to death by the Turkish Courts; but the sentence long remained unexecuted, pending an appeal by him to Constantinople, the final result of which is not known. The case continued to be pressed by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and by the British Resident at Baghdād, but without further success. The local Turkish authorities seemed more anxious to conciliate Shaikh Saihūd than to punish him; they represented him as having emigrated to Persia, though in reality he was still hiding in the Tigris marshes; and it was reported that they had offered him the lease of certain state lands on condition of his appearing in person, but he did not take advantage of the proposal, which perhaps covered a design to seize him by treachery. The Porte insisted that subsequent reports by the British Resident at Baghdād, who described the situation as insecure and asked that British war vessels might be sent to Basrah, were incorrect; and they asserted on the authority of the Wālī of Baghdād that "the safety of the river left nothing to be desired." A few years latter, as we have seen, Shaikh Saihūd gave more trouble to the Turkish authorities.

Meanwhile a controversy had arisen in regard to the right of British river steamers to tow barges on the Tigris. About the beginning of 1880 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co., after giving six months' notice of their intention to do so, began to employ barges; but in March of that year, after one barge had been in use for three months and another had made several trips, the Wālī of Baghdād objected to the practice and intimated that barges might not be towed until special permission had been received from Constantinople.

Question of
the right of
British
steamers to
tow barges,
1880-81.

The Wālī's argument, which the Turkish Government at once adopted, was that that Messrs. Lynch's concession (or rather what the Porte regarded as such) admitted of the British Company's running two steamers only, and that, as barges were not mentioned in the Farmān considered (by the Porte) to be Messrs. Lynch's, none could be employed

without express sanction from the Turkish authorities. On the part of the Company it was contended that no exception had been taken in the past to the towing of native boats by British steamers, when required, and that there was no difference in principle between the towing of native boats and the towing of barges; that the right to run steamers implied the right to use steamers in any way that steamers could be employed, which included the towing of barges; and, finally, that barges were towed by the steamers of the Turkish flotilla. The upshot of the discussion seems to have been that in 1831 the use of barges by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. was permitted, but only for so long as a scarcity then existing in Mesopotamia should continue.

During the negotiations the historical and legal basis of the British navigation rights in Mesopotamia was thoroughly examined by Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, who placed his conclusions on record in a lucid and able despatch. It was pointed out by Mr. Plowden that, in addition to local permissions and grants of various sorts, there existed in Article 22 of the Capitulations of 1661 between Britain and Turkey, confirmed by the Commercial Treaty of 1861, a general warrant for free British navigation in all Turkish waters.

Protection
of British
steamers on
the Tigris,
1883.

In April 1883, in consequence of disorders which then prevailed on the Tigris near 'Amārah, Turkish military guards were again supplied to the British river steamers, on which they travelled as deck passengers.

Attempt by
the Turkish
Government
to prevent
British
navigation
on the
Tigris, 1883.

In May 1883 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. wished to add a new vessel, the "Mejīdīeh," to their fleet; but the Wālī of Baghdād asserted, in correspondence with the British Resident, that the Company were entitled to possess two vessels only, and that, when they found it necessary to replace one of their ships, it must be by a ship of the same size. The "Mejīdīeh," it may be observed, was supposed to be a larger steamer than any yet employed by the Company; but, though her beam exceeded that of the "Blosse Lynch" by 6 feet in order to give a shallower draught, her length was less by 10 feet and her tonnage by 10 tons. The objection as to size being thus disposed of, fundamentally unjustified and unreasonable as it appeared, the Wālī under orders from Constantinople resorted to the argument that, under the terms of their (supposed) concession, the Company had not the right to navigate the Tigris at all, but only the Euphrates; and on the 14th June 1883 he officially requested Colonel Tweedie, the British Resident, to prevent Messrs. Lynch's steamers from entering the Tigris. The Resident

accordingly made a telegraphic reference on the subject to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

On the 28th June a British* steamer was prevented from loading cargo at Baghdād, and the Resident was informed by the Wālī on the same day that he had received orders by telegram from Constantinople to prohibit the entry of British steamers into the Tigris. Colonel Tweedie asked that execution of the orders might be deferred as the matter was then under discussion at Constantinople, but the Wālī replied: "I have the honour to repeat the intimation already made to you that, as Messrs. Lynch and Company's privilege applies to the Euphrates only, the Ottoman Government have finally prohibited their keeping steamers on the Tigris." As the "Mejidieh," however, then at Baghdād, had arrived before receipt of the Turkish Government's instructions, she was allowed to discharge her cargo. The Wālī added: "Final orders have been given to the Captain of our steamer at Qūrnah and others that henceforward it is requisite that no cargo should be given to Lynch's steamers; also that should they desire to run on the Tigris and come up again to Baghdād, it will be necessary to obstruct them and give them no way to enter the Tigris."

The British Resident remonstrated, referring to the serious consequences to which the steps threatened might give rise, and protesting against the interference with the British mail service involved; but the Wālī answered that he was merely acting under instructions, and that the British mails could be sent by Turkish steamer.

On the 5th July, in accordance with the Turkish pretensions, gendarmes were sent on board the "Mejidieh," which was preparing for her downward voyage; cargo and passengers were prevented from approaching the vessel; and various means of insulting and annoying the officers and crew were employed. Native merchandise intended for shipment by the "Mejidieh" was conveyed instead, at the dictate of the Turkish customs officials, to the Turkish steamer "Furāt." On the 6th July the "Mejidieh" left Baghdād for Basrah with the British mails, but otherwise quite empty and so light as to be dangerous for navigation. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, who had at all times carried Turkish official despatches and specie gratis, and who were under contract for delivery of goods and had chartered tonnage at Basrah for their onward transit, were naturally much aggrieved by

* This steamer is called in the correspondence the "Mosoul," but the "Mejidieh" may be meant. There was a Turkish steamer "Mūsāl."

this unceremonious treatment, and hinted at claims for damages, which they hoped would be supported by Her Majesty's Government. The British Resident accordingly sent a further short official protest to the Wāli, but it passed unheeded. Perceiving signs of excitement in the town, which he feared might lead to disturbances endangering the life and property of all Europeans at Baghdād, Colonel Tweedie conferred with his French and Russian Colleagues on the subject of his difficulties with the Wilāyat; and the former promised to aid him by addressing the Wāli officially, but the latter gave it as his opinion that there was no danger and declined to take any action.

In the 14th July a British mail steamer, apparently the "Khalifah," arrived at Baghdād from Basrah. A Turkish guard was immediately placed on board her, and neither crew nor passengers were allowed to land. The landing of the British parcels mail was also prevented. The same evening Colonel Tweedie sent a Dragoman to remonstrate with the Wāli in a friendly and unofficial manner on his proceedings; but on all points the Wāli "was firm and determined, though courteous, "and what he said about the parcels mail merely was that he would "compel them (*sic*) to go down to Basrah and be brought up here again on board a Turkish steamer." On the 15th July the "Khalifah" left Baghdād for Basrah, the Turkish authorities being apparently afraid to prevent her departure by force, as they had threatened to do; she seems to have carried a letter mail, but no cargo or passengers.

The effects of the proceedings of the Turkish authorities was described by the British Resident as a "blow now daily being inflicted on "our visible (and invisible) power in the presence of all Her Majesty's "native Indian subjects here, and others." He further observed, generally :

In the eyes of these practical and untutored people, it simply looks as if war had broken out between England and the Porte, and the hostilities had for three weeks been all confined to one side. Of course this is a wrong view, but nowhere do appearances go for more than here.

* * * * *

Already, as I am credibly informed, the Ottoman Navigational Bureau has, on the strength of our trade having been stopped and all traffic diverted for a short time into its hands, greatly raised its rates for freight, much to the disgust of some of the very capitalists and traders who have been conspiring to bring about the present *coup*. The truth is, if the navigation of the Tigris between Basrah and Baghdād were, by any possibility, to fall within the power of Turkish maladministration and rapacity, it would gradually collapse. No capitalists having large ventures would hold themselves

very long at the mercy of so uncertain a Government as this. And the trade of the country would subside to its pristine channels, namely small native crafts run by people too poor and obscure to think of anything better than getting on as best they could, now submitting to extortion, now evading it through bribery or cunning, and leading, generally, the precarious lives to which Asiatics are as a rule habituated.

Meanwhile active measures had been taken by the British Government, at Constantinople and in London, for the removal of the embargo on British navigation. On the 4th August the Turkish Ambassador in London, Musurus Pāsha, informed Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that "the Porte had decided on revoking for the present the measures taken by the authorities at Baghdād with regard to the navigation of the Tigris by Messrs. Lynch and Co.'s vessels," but he explained that this decision was subject to three conditions :—

1. That it was not to be considered as in any way prejudicing or derogating from the rights claimed by the Porte in regard to the navigation of the Tigris.
2. That the question of those rights and of the extent and nature of the privileges conceded to the Company should be examined and discussed between the two Governments.
3. That there should be no question of claims for compensation on account of what had taken place.

To the last of these conditions Lord Granville informed the Turkish Ambassador that he was unable to assent.

On the 4th August opposition to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co.'s operations in Turkish 'Irāq was suspended ; and on the 20th August it was finally withdrawn. From observations made by the Turkish Ambassador in London to Sir J. Pauncefote on the 15th August, it appeared that the documents relating to British navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates, and especially those constituting the arrangement of 1846, were differently construed by British and Turkish authorities ; but it does not seem that the discussion of their proper effect was carried to a conclusion, or that any common agreement as to their meaning was reached.

The interference of the Turkish Government with British navigation in 1883 appeared to be partly due to the intrigues of local* aspirants to a monopoly of navigation on the Tigris, as mentioned by Colonel Tweedie ; but the discovery by the Porte, apparently in 1881, that the Farman of 1834 referred to the Euphrates and not to the Tigris, may

* A Jewish firm at Baghdad were stated to have applied for and obtained a concession for navigation.

have had something to do with it; and it was also remarked that it synchronised with the first appearance of a Russian Consul at Baghdād, where there were few if any European Russian subjects and where Russian trade did not exist.

Formation
of an
Ottoman
Navigation
Company,
1892.

In 1892 the formation of an Ottoman Company for the Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates was authorised by Imperial Edict. This scheme, which had been incubating since 1883, and which had appeared to be on the point of *realisation in 1888, appeared to be connected with another for irrigating lands on both sides of the Tigris which had been purchased by the Dāirat-as-Saniyāh or Administration of the Sultān's Civil List. It was understood that the new Company, of which the capital was expected to be about £100,000, would enjoy the full support of the Turkish Government and would employ four steamers. Two steamers were in fact ordered in London by the Turkish Ministry of Marine, a circumstance which sufficiently attested official patronage; but one of them was lost with all hands on the voyage out, and the other was diverted to Constantinople.

Impaired
navigation
of the Tigris
and attempt-
ed or
suggested
remedies,
1898-99.

About 1898 more than usual difficulty began to be experienced, in the low season in navigating the Tigris between Qūrnah and 'Amārah, and also between Kūt-al-'Amārah and Baghdād. On the lower of the two sections mentioned, that generally known as "the Marshes," the deterioration was caused by the irrigation canals of the Arabs, which—having their head-openings directed upstream and being, as regards their management, under no scientific supervision—showed a constant tendency to enlarge and to draw off more and more water from the river, so diminishing its depth and flooding the country on both sides.

The Turkish authorities made some efforts to combat the evil; but the funds allotted by the Turkish Government were insufficient, and the Arab owners of the canals resented official interference with their property. In the winter of 1898-99 some Turkish officials employed on the work were attacked and stripped by tribesmen, and had to fly for their lives with gunny-bags as their only clothing.

In 1899 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co., who saw their interests seriously threatened, proposed that the Porte should be moved to give immediate attention to the state of the river, especially between Qūrnah and 'Amārah, to take measures for closing the more injurious of the canals, and to insist that the heads of all irrigation cuts should be altered so as to face downstream. They also suggested that an engineer from

* The promoters in 1888 demanded the suppression of the British steamers, but this could not be obtained.

the Indian establishment, whose salary should be paid by the Indian and Home Governments jointly in equal shares, should be attached to the British Residency at Baghdād to advise as to the works required and to superintend their execution. This scheme was referred to the Government of India and to the Resident at Baghdād for opinion, but was disapproved on its being pointed out by the latter authority that an expenditure was involved which the Turkish Government would probably be unable to meet, that the irrigation of the Sultān's private domains would be affected, and that there would certainly be opposition on the part of the Arab tribes.

The question of the employment of barges as adjuncts to the Euphrates and Tigris S. N. Co.'s steamers meanwhile remained undecided. Barges were employed by them, but on sufferance only ; and in 1892, on the formation of the new Ottoman Navigation Company already mentioned, the local representative of Messrs. Lynch, who were never backward in pressing for increased facilities, suggested that the removal of all restrictions on the use by them of barges might be sought ; but the time was considered by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to be inopportune for making such a request.

Question of
the towing
of barges by
British
steamers,
1892-99.

In 1899, on the ground of the impaired navigability of the river, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. again moved for distinct permission to use barges in the low season or, preferably, to be allowed to employ a third steamer. In June of that year Sir N. O'Connor, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, was successful in obtaining, on the plea of a deterioration in the navigability of the Tigris which the Turkish Government were unable to remedy, the issue of a Vizirial letter to the Wāli of Baghdād allowing the towing of barges by the British steamers. In August the permission granted was again withdrawn under orders from H. M. the Sultan ; but, as no directions were given to prevent the use of barges by the British Company, the latter were authorised by Her Majesty's Government to continue the practice when there was an accumulation of cargo, unless prohibited officially and in writing.

The question thus remained, though His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople claimed that the permission given could not be revoked, virtually *in statu quo ante*.

At the end of 1902 there was a considerable accumulation of cargo at Basrah due to the inability of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co., with restricted means of transport, to forward the goods consigned to them for conveyance to Baghdad as quickly as they were received.

Congestion
of cargo at
Basrah,
1902-03.

On the 1st December 1902 the quantity of unforwarded goods lying in their warehouses at Basrah was 2,526 tons. The difficulty was aggravated by insecurity on the river, which had led the Turkish Government to forbid, temporarily, the carriage of valuable goods in native sailing craft. In these circumstances Colonel Newmarch, the British Resident at Baghdād, suggested that application should be made to the Porte on behalf of the Company for authority to make use of a third steamer; but it does not appear from the records of the Government of India whether action in this sense was taken at Constantinople. By September 1903 the accumulation had been worked off and the arguments founded on it had lost their validity.

Institution
of the
(Turkish)
Hamīdiyah
Navigation
Office, 1904-
05.

For many years the Turkish commercial steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia had been worked by the Oman-Ottoman Administration, which was a branch of the Turkish Ministry of Marine; but early in 1904 the existing vessels, engineering plant, offices, and other property of the Administration were transferred to the * Dāirat-us-Saniyah, or Administration of the Sultān's Civil List, in consideration of a payment of £T. 9,500. The new department of the Civil List Administration thus formed was styled the Hamīdiyah Navigation Office; and it benefited, necessarily, by the personal interest which the Sultān had in its successful working. The steamers taken over by the office at its formation were four,—the "Baghdādi," "Furāt," "Rusāfah," and "Mūsāl,"—with two barges; and two new steamers, the "Hamīdiyah" and "Burhāniyah," built in Scotland, were added in the first year, together with four new barges. The two new steamers, though not up to contract specifications, were first class modern boats, fitted with electric light and search lights, and in all respects superior to anything possessed by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. Official influence was exerted, not without success, to divert custom from the British Company to the Sultān's line; and it was anticipated that competition would result in a lowering of freights by which trade generally, including the trade of British merchants, would benefit.

Application
by Messrs.
Lynch for
permission
to run a
third
steamer,
1905.

In September 1905 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. applied, through the British Resident at Baghdād, for the assistance of His Majesty's Government in obtaining permission to run a third steamer on the Tigris; but the British Ambassador at Constantinople considered that the request could not, at the time, be preferred with any hope of success.

* A full account of the Dāirat-as-Saniyah in Turkish 'Irāq will be found in Vol. II of this Gazetteer, article "Turkish 'Irāq", pages 861—68.

In October 1905 there was a project on foot for a lease of the management of the Turkish Hamidiyah Navigation office for 30 years to Mr. C. Theodoridi of Constantinople, steamship agent, and Sir George Mackenzie, capitalist, of the British firm of Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co. of Basrah, in return for a loan of £T.100,000. The annual net earnings—after provision had been made for insurance, for interest at 5 per cent. per annum on the loan, for payment of 3 per cent. per annum to a sinking fund, and for all out-of-pocket expenses — were to be divided between the Civil List Administration and the lessees in the proportion of nine-tenths and one-tenth. This scheme, including as it did a monopoly of navigation rights on the Tigris, Shatt-el-'Arab and Euphrates except as against Messrs. Lynch, would have brought all river transport in Turkish 'Irāq under British control and would have introduced, at the same time, the salutary element of effective competition which had till then been wanting. The negotiations, however, seem to have ended in failure.

Lease of the Turkish steamers sought by Sir G. Mackenzie, 1905.

Questions of irrigation and river control in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905.

Irrigation and the controlling of the Euphrates and Tigris so as to prevent floods are questions of vital, if not supreme, importance in Turkish 'Irāq; but it was only in the reign of 'Abdul Hamid that they first began to receive the attention they deserved.

The principal problems connected with the Euphrates related, firstly, to a movement of the river westwards, out of its proper channel running through Hillah, into another, known as the Shatt-el-Hindiyah, passing by Tawairij and Kūfah; and secondly, to a tendency on the part of the river to break through its left bank above Musaiyib and deluge the country between there and Baghdād.

The Euphrates.

In 1878 rather more than half the water of the Euphrates still, as in 1849, followed the Hillah channel; but by 1886 the main stream had* set down the Hindiyah, with the result that agriculture on the former channel was threatened with extinction, while

* Sir W. Willcocks attributes this change in part to the closing of the Saqlāwiyah canal by Mid-bat Pāsha; see next paragraph in the text and page 12 of Sir W. Willcocks' *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*.

the country on the new course of the river had become exposed to destructive floods. The services of M. Schœnderfer, a French engineer, having been obtained by the Turkish Government, a small barrage was thrown across the Hindiyah near its head in 1890 or 1891, and the deviation of the river from its old course was partially and temporarily checked. In July 1903, however, the central portion of this barrage * gave way ; and by the following year practically the whole water of the Euphrates was flowing down the Hindiyah.

In former times the Saqlāwiyah canal, leaving the left bank of the Euphrates a short way above Fallūjah and entering the Tigris a few miles below Baghdād, provided an escape for the surplus waters of the former river, and in 1838 its depth was sufficient to allow of the passage of a British steamer. At a later period this canal was closed at its head by Mid-hat Pāsha, Wālī of Baghdād, to prevent the floods which in the season of high river it brought down into the neighbourhood of Baghdād, and this object was in a considerable degree attained ; but breaches thereafter occurred at various places on the left bank of the Euphrates, inundations from which from time to time reached the walls of the provincial capital. In 1877 £12,008 was said to have been spent in strengthening the Euphrates embankments at different points ; nevertheless, in the spring of 1878, the country to the north-west of Baghdād was flooded by water escaping from that river, most of which eventually found its way into the Tigris.

The Tigris.

Certain difficulties connected with the control of the Tigris have already been mentioned in connection with navigation. It may now be added that in 1836 much alarm was caused to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company by a project for the construction of a new canal from the right bank of the Tigris at Dujailah, a few miles below Kūt-al-'Amārah, of which the purpose was to water lands recently acquired for the Sultān by the Administration of the Civil List. Messrs. Lynch seem to have apprehended a diversion of the river on a large scale, similar to that of the Euphrates into the Shatt-at-Hindiyah, to which they made reference ; and, in consequence of their representations, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to communicate with the Porte. Whether the projected canal was subsequently made, with or without modification, by the Dāirat-as-Saniyah does not appear from the Government of India's archives. The importance of the question had probably been exaggerated.

* Possibly the passage had never been closed in the centre ; see Sir W. Willcocks' *Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, page 12.

At length the question of Mesopotamian irrigation and river-control was taken in hand, at first in a private manner, by the eminent English engineer Sir W. Willcocks, by whom the Assuan barrage on the Nile was designed, and who had been Director-General of Reservoirs in Egypt. On the 25th March 1903 he delivered, at a meeting of the Khedivial Geographical Society at Cairo, a *lecture on the "Re-creation of Chaldea" in which he stated the conclusions at which he had arrived in regard to the irrigation of Turkish 'Irāq. His information in regard to the country was at that time chiefly drawn from the writings of Commander Felix Jones, I. N. In the winter of 1904-05 Sir W. Willcocks visited Baghdād and spent several weeks in investigating the physical and agricultural conditions of the province. Returning to Egypt he drew up a report in which he discussed the question of bringing the whole country from Hit and Sāmarrāh to the Persian Gulf under perennial irrigation, and advanced for immediate consideration two preliminary projects, depending one upon the Tigris and the other upon the Euphrates. These initial schemes contemplated the fertilisation of a million acres of land at a cost of seven and a half million pounds sterling; and Sir W. Willcocks anticipated a handsome return on the outlay. The Euphrates project was brought to the notice of the Sultān by the British Ambassador at Constantinople in June 1905, and was received not unfavourably, but with the remark that the magnitude of the undertaking would necessitate the formation of a Company, and that until the terms required by the Company were known no opinion could be pronounced as to the permissibility of the scheme. His Majesty, however, desired to be supplied with a summary in Turkish of Sir W. Willcocks' proposals.

Sir W. Willcocks' projects for the irrigation of Mesopotamia, 1903-05.

Question of land communications in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1904.

In 1878, notwithstanding the measures taken by Mid-hat Pāsha a few years previously to assure the safety of the direct route by the Baghdād Aleppo route.

*The present writer may be pardoned for mentioning a series of coincidences personal to himself. He was present at Sir W. Willcocks' original lecture at Cairo in 1903; he enjoyed with Sir W. Willcocks the hospitality of the British Residency, then under Colonel Newmarch, at Baghdād in 1905; and at a later period, in 1909-11, when Sir W. Willcocks had been appointed Adviser to the Turkish Ministry of Public Works in Turkish 'Irāq, he was brought as Resident at Baghdād into official relations with him.

Euphrates valley between Baghdād and Aleppo, it was still insecure. In July 1878 a caravan travelling by that line was plundered near Mi'aidīn to the extent, it was said, of £3,000. A circuitous route by Mūsāl and Diyārbakr was still, in 1878, that most frequented by travellers between Baghdād and Aleppo; and on it post horses for hire were maintained by the Turkish Government. From Baghdād to Mūsāl the way lay by Kifri (Salāhiyah), Kirkūk and Arbīl, and there were 13 changing stations. The charge for horses was $3\frac{1}{2}$ piastres (about 7d.) per "hour," and the number of post "hours" between Baghdād and Mūsāl was 100. By degrees, however, the greater directness and convenience of the Euphrates valley route prevailed; its safety was gradually established; and, by the end of the period now under consideration, it had completely superseded its rival, and travelling carriages had begun to ply upon it.

The Baghdād
Kādhimain
tramway,
1878—1880.

The tramway inaugurated under Mid-hat Pāsha between Baghdād and Kādhimain continued to flourish, throughout the period, as a commercial enterprise; and in 1878 it was stated that, though the fare for the journey was only $2\frac{1}{2}$ d., the line paid cent. per cent. annually upon an original cost of £18,000. Shares in the concern, the purchase of which had been forced by Mid-hat Pāsha upon his unwilling official subordinates, could no longer be purchased at Baghdād, for there were no sellers. The light in which the tramway was locally regarded in 1880 was thus described by a* traveller:

La répulsion instinctive des Turcs pour toutes les manifestations du génie occidental n'empêche pas les Bagdadiens de tirer beaucoup de vanité de leur tramway que ne se sont jamais enorgueillis les Français du percement de l'isthme de Suez, ou les Américains de l'exécution du chemin de fer de New-York à San-Francisco.

Establish-
ment of a
Turkish post
between
Baghdād and
Damascus,
1881.

In 1881 the Turkish Government instituted postal communication by camel between Baghdād and Damascus, running side by side with the old British Dromedary Post; it provided a more rapid line of correspondence between Baghdād and Constantinople than that by Mūsāl and Diyārbakr; and it probably soon superseded the latter for the conveyance of letters. Further information in regard to this post, which continued in existence up to the end of the period, will be found in the Appendix on Mail Communications.

British
railway
schemes in
Turkish
Irāq, 1878-
1879.

The scheme for a Euphrates Valley Railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, abandoned by British promoters in 1872 after sixteen years of endeavour during which they failed to enlist the

*Mme. Dieulafoy in *La Perse, la Chaldée et la Susiane*, page 586.

financial support of the British Government, was succeeded by another British project for a Tigris Valley Railway. With this later scheme the name of the Duke of Sutherland was associated ; and Mr. Andrew, hopeless of the success of his own earlier project, appears to have lent it his support. The alignment which it was intended to follow was one by Diyārbakr, Mūsāl, and Baghdād to Kuwait, and a guarantee by the British Government of a return on £20,000,000 capital to be expended was sought ; but it could not be obtained, and the new project went the way of its predecessor. One of those who interested themselves in it, as also in other competing schemes, now not less than nine in number, was Commander V. L. Cameron, R. N., who in the winter of 1878-1879 travelled and made surveys in the country to be traversed by the line.

In 1898 it was reported that a concession for a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was being sought at Constantinople in the name of Count Kapnist, a Russian subject, and there was reason to think that Russia aimed at establishing a coaling station at Kuwait. This scheme, however, if it really existed, did not take shape ; and its sole result was the conclusion of an important Agreement, as described in the chapter on the history of Kuwait, between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the British Government. But about the same time, on the occasion of a visit paid by the German Emperor to Turkey, rumours became current, which were not taken very seriously at the time, of a German project for connecting Baghdād with Constantinople by railway. The scheme was a natural corollary of the rapid development of German railway enterprise in Asia Minor since the foundation of the Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie by the Deutsche Bank and Württembergische Vereinsbank in 1889.

German
Baghdād
Railway
scheme and
concession,
1898—1905.

We cannot here enter on a detailed account of the steps by which German financiers eventually secured a concession for extending the Anatolian railway system from Konia to the Persian Gulf, or of the circumstances in which British financiers, though offered an opportunity, which in the opinion of the leading British statesmen ought to have been accepted, abstained from participating in the enterprise. Suffice it to say that preferential rights in respect of the project previously conveyed to the Anatolian Railway Company were confirmed by the Turkish Government at the end of 1898 ; that in 1899 an Agreement, in general terms, between the Porte and the Company was signed ; that, after an examination of the proposed *tracé* and commercial prospects of the line by a German Technical Commission in 1899-1900, a draft Convention was submitted by the Company ; that on the 21st January 1902 a Convention came

1898—1903.

into existence; and that finally, on the 5th March 1903, a revised and definite Convention was concluded, authorising the enterprise and prescribing in great detail the manner of its execution. In the Convention of 1903 it was laid down that the concessionnaire, *viz.*, the Anatolian Railway Company "formera une société anonyme ottomane sous le nom de " Société Impériale ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, qui remplacera la Société du Chemin de Fer ottoman d'Anatolie pour tout ce qui concerne la nouvelle ligne de Konia au Golfe Persique avec ses embranchements, et qui sera régie par les statuts ci-annexés." Statutes governing the constitution and proceedings of the Baghdad Railway Company were accordingly attached to the Convention and signed along with it.

1905. Up to the end of 1905 no construction or work under the concession had as yet taken place in the province of Turkish 'Irāq.

Bearing of
the Baghdad
Railway on
British in-
terests.

Setting questions of detail aside, we may observe that the aspect of the scheme most nearly concerning Britain was its ultimate effect on the British military, political, and commercial position in the Persian Gulf. It was generally considered that the completion of a railway from Constantinople to the shores of Persian Gulf under auspices predominantly, if not exclusively, German and Turkish involved a potential menace to that position; and it was therefore held necessary to prevent the execution of the scheme, if possible, unless and until a sufficient share in the control of the railway should be obtained by Britain, and in any case to oppose the formation of a port at the Gulf terminus of the line except under conditions which would preclude its becoming a danger to British interests. At first, however, these opinions did not command universal acceptance.

The views of the Government of India on the general question were conveyed to His Majesty's Government in February 1904 in a despatch from which the following is an extract:—

We differ from the views that have been expressed in some quarters upon the construction of the Baghdad Railway as a flank defence to the position of Great Britain in Southern Persia and the Gulf, and we deprecate the idea that our political and strategical interests in those regions can only be adequately protected by an understanding with Germany. In our view the interests of Germany in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf are more likely to be antagonistic than favourable to our own; and we see no sufficient ground for thinking that there is any international combination to which we should look as a buttress to our interests or influence in that quarter. These views are expressed independently of the question, which has never been referred to us for opinion, of the ultimate completion of the German Asia Minor Railway to the Gulf; for we presume that it is an accepted principle with His Majesty's Government that, should be line over be continued south of Baghdad, this cannot be done without

British co-operation and consent ; and that no terminal port can be selected, unless a similar consent has been obtained, and unless the port is made open and international in character ; further, if these views are also entertained by His Majesty's Government, we think that nothing but good could result from Germany being made acquainted with them, lest, when her railway reaches Baghdad, she might complain of having been kept in ignorance of British policy and intentions.

The construction of the projected, and at length authorised, railway involved the raising of large amounts as capital ; the engineering difficulties of certain sections of the line were known to be great ; and the security to investors consisted in financial guarantees for construction and working such as the Turkish Government were able to give. By some British authorities it was hoped that these obstacles, the importance of which would be greatly enhanced by the abstention of Britain from participation in the scheme, might suffice to bring the undertaking to a standstill before it had gone very far ; but these hopes were vain. Germany could not but be sensible of the inconveniences and dangers of isolation with reference to the Baghdad Railway ; but, confident in her political and financial ability to carry it through successfully, even single-handed, she did not desist from the enterprise.

The only visible effect produced by the attitude of Britain was postponement of a decision as to the point where the railway should reach the Gulf. As related in the chapter on the history of Kuwait, the German Technical Commission which visited that port at the beginning of 1900 seem to have favoured the selection of Kādhmah in Kuwait Bay as a terminus ; but a difficulty was thrown in the way of this by British diplomatic representations made to the Porte and to the German Ambassador at Constantinople in April 1900, with reference to the political status of Kuwait. In the autumn of 1901, when the Anatolian Railway Company approached the Turkish Government with definite proposals for a Baghdad Railway Convention, they suggested, it would seem, a terminus on the lower Shatt-al-'Arab near Fāo instead of one at Kuwait. The Porte, however, were loath to assent to this arrangement, which appeared to imply doubt as to the validity of their claims to sovereignty over Kuwait ; and finally in the Convention of 1903 it was laid down, as a compromise and by way of shelving the difficulty for a time, that the line should run from Baghdād by Karbala and Najaf to Zubair and Basrah, and that from Zubair it should be prolonged to a point on the Persian Gulf “ a déterminer d'un commun accord entre le Government Impérial ottoman et le concessionnaire.”

British relations with Arabs and Persians in Turkish 'Iraq, 1876-1905.

It is impossible that British officials, residents, and travellers in Turkish 'Irāq should not be brought into contact with the Arabs who form almost the entire population of the province, and with the Persians of whom important communities exist at Kādhimain, Karbala, and Najaf; but the relations which thus arise are generally regarded with extreme suspicion by the local Turkish authorities. This was particularly the case after the Russian war of 1877-1878.

Turkish sus-
picion of
British deal-
ings with the
Arab tribes,
1877.

In 1877 official obstacles were thrown in the way of a journey which Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt wished to make, and eventually succeeded in making, among the Arab tribes of northern Mesopotamia. The attitude of the Turkish authorities in this connection was* described as follows:—

The Turkish Government has always been very jealous of foreign intrigues among the Bedouin tribes, whom it is their policy to keep as children in ignorance of all that passes in the outer world. It has equally been their policy to sow dissensions among them; and, as I have already described, by good fortune or good management, the most dangerous tribes were this winter hotly engaged in civil war. It would be a pity, the authorities doubtless thought, that so satisfactory a state of things should be interfered with by mere busybodies from Europe, who might possibly inform the Bedouins of the ill turn things had taken for the Sultan in Bulgaria, and of the denuded state of the garrison towns and military roads of Syria. "Divide and rule" was an excellent motto; and Europeans had before now attempted to unite the tribes against Ottoman rule, or patch up peaces between them out of foolish humanitarian motives. Moreover, any day might bring the news of a crisis in the affairs of the Empire; and England was known to have her eye on the Euphrates. What then more likely than that ours should be a semi-official mission, to spy out the nakedness of the land?

Nevertheless the intercession of foreign Consuls was still sometimes desired by Arab notables who had difficulties with the Turkish Government; and in this very year Sumair, an outlawed Shaikh of the Northern Shammar tribe, had recourse to the good offices of Colonel Nixon, the British Resident at Baghdād; but the result of his application is not recorded.

* Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, vol. I, pages 110-111.

The feelings of the more civilised non-Turkish inhabitants of the province were * delineated by a British traveller in 1878 as more favourable to the British Government than indicative of fervent loyalty to the Porte. He remarked :—

Local feeling
towards the
British Gov-
ernment,
1878

... men of old Baghdadi families, Musulmans in religion, and Arabs and Christians, seemed to think that the days of the Sultan's rule were numbered, and that his independence was already a thing of the past.

*

*

*

*

I was more than once asked confidentially by good Mohammedans why England did not come and take possession of the country, and keep it from the Russians? Everybody, I was told, would be glad of the change, for the conscription and the war-taxes had made the people very discontented. If England, they said, took over the country, it would soon prosper; trade would increase at once; and there would be no conscription. I found that the splendour and civilization of Bombay filled a large place in the popular imagination in Baghdad; and that the trade and prosperity, and fine buildings of that city, were attributed to the fact that the port of India was under British rule. The Arabs who visit Bombay every year for purposes of trade are by no means few, and on their return they give glowing accounts of its wealth and magnificence, which far exceed, it must be allowed, anything to be seen in the Baghdad of this degenerate age. To exchange the yoke of the Sultan for that of the British would not be regarded by the Arab-speaking population of this region as a misfortune, but rather the reverse; and it is the opinion of men who have had abundant opportunities of forming a correct judgment that no one, not actually an official or a soldier, would raise a finger to prevent such a consummation. But it is quite another question whether, the exchange once made, the nomadic Arab population would long willingly submit to be ruled by Kaffirs, especially when acted upon from without by accomplished intriguers. A British annexation of the country, were such a thing politically possible or desirable, could only be made permanent by a tedious war. But our ambition does not lie that way; aggrandisement in that part of the world would be the last thing to suggest itself to any English statesman. On that very account I was the more struck with the number of the inquiries which were made as to the possibility of the country being brought some day under British rule. The deduction is two-fold; that the population has in one way or another acquired a conviction of the mildness and justice which characterise our sway, and that public opinion is gradually preparing the way for great changes.

In 1881 Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, was led by the troubles which then convulsed the Muntafik country and endangered, indirectly, navigation and trade on the Tigris as well as on the Euphrates, to suggest intervention by Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. Mr. Plowden, remarking that the influence of the Muntafik might in certain eventualities be of the utmost value to British interests, and that their friendship was worth an effort to secure, recommended as a remedy for the existing disorders the re-institution of

British
intervention
in the
Muntafik
difficulty,
1881.

* Geary in his *Through Asiatic Turkey*, vol. I, pages 273-274.

the Basrah Wilayat abolished in the previous year, and the appointment to it of Nāsir Pāsha, who had held charge of it not many years before, but had been removed and was detained at Constantinople for political reasons, and who, Mr. Plowden thought, would be a strong and capable ruler, friendly to British interests.

This attempted revival of methods which might have answered in the days of Major Rawlinson and Captain Kemball was, however, a failure; Nāsir Pāsha was not repatriated or restored to power at Lord Dufferin's suggestion; and the restoration of the Basrah Wilāyat did not take place till three years later, by which time the counsels of the British Ambassador had probably been forgotten.

In 1883 the question arose of extending the good offices of the British Government to Qāsim Pāsha-az-Zuhair, Chalabi, of Basrah,—the same who in 1872 had performed valuable services* in bringing to justice the pirates who attacked the British mail steamer "Cashmere," and in recovering part of the property plundered on that occasion. The Chalabi had subsequently, in consequence of quarrel with a Wāli of Basrah, been summoned to Constantinople; and he was there detained with the rank of Member of the Council of State, much in the same manner as Nāsir Pāsha, Muntafik. British aid in obtaining his release having been requested, through the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, by the Chalabi's friend Shaikh 'Isa-bin-Qirtās, who was about to undertake the journey to Constantinople, arrangements were made by the Government of India for introducing the Shaikh to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy there. The British Chargé d'Affaires found, however, that his intervention was more likely to prejudice than to advance the Chalabi's interests, and he therefore abstained from action. According to the statement of 'Isa-bin-Qirtās on his return to Basrah, evidently unsuccessful, the cause of Qāsim Pāsha's detention was a suspicion on the part of the Sultān that he had been plotting to hand Basrah over to the British, but he was well treated at Constantinople, and a reconciliation had taken place there between him and Nāsir Pasha, Muntafik, like himself a political *détenu* from the Basrah Wilāyat, with whom he had formerly been at enmity.

A so-called secret circular from the Grand Vizier of Turkey was received in 1884 by the Wāli of Baghdād, in common with the Wālis of Yaman and other provinces of the Empire, in which British foreign policy was strongly criticised and the recipient was enjoined to exercise reserve in his dealings with foreign consular representatives, especially those of Great Britain. There was reason, however, to think that the instructions

Case of
Qāsim
Pāsha-az-
Zuhair,
1883.

Attitude to-
wards British
consular
officers en-
joined by the
Porte on the
Wāli of
Baghdād,
1884.

in regard to the treatment of Consuls really meant nothing, and that the circular had been drafted simply in order that it might be divulged, with the object of producing an impression on the mind of the British Government.

In 1899 Sulaimān Baig, the son of Mansūr Pāsha, a former Shaikh of the Muntafik tribe, approached Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah with a view of obtaining British protection, by which "nationality" was probably meant, for himself; but his advances were declined by Mr. Wratislaw. In 1902 similar steps were taken by other leading members of the same tribe through the medium of an Indian Muhammadan. The applicants in the latter case seem, after meeting with a rebuff from the British representative at Basrah, to have addressed themselves unsuccessfully to the Russian Consul-General at Baghdād.

Applications
by Muntafik
tribesmen for
British pro-
tection, 1899-
1902.

In 1903, on the advice of Sir Arthur Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, an effort was made through the British Residency at Baghdād to moderate the action of the Persian Mujtahids at Karbala and Najaf, whose influence was being exerted, as has already been described, to promote opposition in Persia to measures of the Shāh's Government. Sir A. Hardinge thought that the chief motive by which the Mujtahids were actuated might be fear of Russian preponderance in Persia; and he hoped that, by a friendly and sympathetic attitude on the part of the intermediary employed, these reputed leaders of Persian public opinion might be induced to explain their real views and objects, which were somewhat obscure, and even to address him a letter on the subject. The message below, after being approved by Lord Lansdowne, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was accordingly communicated verbally in July 1903 to Āgha Muhammad-al-Garāwi, Sharabiyāni, through Mīrza Muhammad Hasan, Muhsin, then First Dragoman of the British Residency at Baghdād and afterwards British Vice-Consul at Karbala, than whom no one more suitable for the accomplishment of such a mission could have been chosen :

Relations of
British
officials
with the
Persian
Mujtahids of
Karbala and
Najaf, 1903.

The British Government is a firm supporter of the independence of Persia; their political interests are identical with those of that kingdom; their administration of the Oudh Bequest is, to take a small matter, one of the many proofs of their respect for the Muhammadan religion, which is that of millions of their subjects; and they will never favour measures which could injure or weaken Persia. But they strongly deprecate all appeals to religious hatred as likely to do Persia more harm than good. Whatever may be said against the Persian tariff, it has been agreed to, not only by the Russians, but also by England and Turkey, and can only be changed by negotiation with those three powers, which at present would entail great difficulties. If the Hazrāt have any complaints against the Persian administration, let them address them

to the Shah or Grand Vizier in a respectful manner, and in the meantime discourage all language by the clergy here which might be misunderstood by the ignorant as inciting to riots or violence.

The result, however, was disappointing; the Sharabiyāni merely said that he had already sent injunctions to all the Mujtahids in Persia to keep quiet and to prevent disturbances; and that, while he was willing to correspond with Sir A. Hardinge, he thought, as a tribute to his dignity and importance, the first letter should be written by the British Minister. He seemed to have confidence in the British Government and to believe that they were really the friends of Persia; but his reluctance to seek help of unbelievers could not be concealed.

The matter went no further, Lord Lansdowne foreseeing little advantage from a correspondence with the Mujtahid, even if one could be instituted. At the end of 1903 Sir A. Hardinge, in returning to Tehrān from the Persian Gulf where he had met Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, passed through Baghdād. An opportunity was thus afforded him of studying, more nearly on the spot, the question of the influence of the Mujtahids and their characteristics.

Case of
'Abdul 'Ali, -
Herati,
1903.

In the summer of 1901 an Afghān named 'Abdul 'Ali, a native of Herati, was expelled from Tehrān for complicity in a conspiracy against the Atabaig-i-A'zam, the Shāh's principal Minister. 'Abdul 'Ali drifted to Constantinople, and from Constantinople to Baghdād; and eventually in May 1903, after waiting on the British Resident at Baghdād, who gave him no encouragement, he proceeded to Karbala. Arriving there he joined in the agitation which was then being conducted by the Persian Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf against the existing Government of Persia. There was some reason to suppose that he was financed by the Amīn-ud-Dauleh, who was a political rival of the Atabaig. The Persian Government, probably because the man was an Afghān subject, applied to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehrān for his removal from the Holy Cities; and on the 8th July 1903 Sir A. Hardinge, in a telegram, asked Colonel Newmarch, the British Resident at Baghdād, to arrange for his voluntary departure elsewhere. It was expected that the Persian Government would also move the Porte to order his deportation. On the 16th July 'Abdul 'Ali was despatched to India at the expense of the British Government, and there he remained until after the fall of the Atabaig and his supporters. In October 1904 'Abdul 'Ali was informed that the Persian Government had no objection to his returning to Turkish 'Irāq, and the Commissioner in Sind was authorised to provide him with a passage to

Baghdād in case he elected to go there; but he preferred to remain in India. Sir A. Hardinge had contemplated the possibility of his being employed as a confidential agent in dealings with the Mujtahids; but Colonel Newmarch was relieved at the man's decision not to return, for he regarded him as a useless and even dangerous instrument, and he held that, his identity and connection with the British authorities being well known, it would have been impossible to use him as a confidential agent.

We turn now to matters of political interest in which the Turks were the active, the British the passive party.

In 1880 the Naqīb of Baghdād, then Saiyid Sulaimān or Salmān, visited Constantinople, where he remained for about six months as the guest of the Sultān of Turkey and was treated with high distinction. The prestige which the Naqīb of Baghdād derives from his descent from Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gīlāni, and from his custodianship of the tomb of that saint at Baghdād, extends to all parts of the Sunni Muhammadan world, including Afghanistān, India, and Northern Africa; and in Turkey his religious position at the time in question was so exalted that even the Shaikh-al-Islām at Constantinople was obliged to kiss his hand. The Sultān 'Abdul Hamīd attached much importance to his own position as Khalīfah or head of the Muhammadan faith; and it was his policy to extend his religious influence as Khalīfah, through media such as the Naqīb of Baghdād and by other means, to Muhammadan countries including the British dominions, in which there could be no question of his exerting political authority. When Saiyid Sulaimān was about to return from Constantinople to Baghdād it was reported to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople: "Il est possible que l'on se serve de "ce personnage pour travailler les populations des Indes. Il serait par conséquent prudent que le Consul-Général de Sa Majesté à Bagdad "reçoive pour instructions de surveiller les mouvements de Seid Selman "Effendi;" and the attention of the British Resident at Baghdād was "accordingly directed to the matter.

Supposed
employment
of the
influence of
the Naqīb
of Baghdād
among
British
Muhamma-
dans, 1889—
1905.

A number of years later different members of the Naqīb's family, as mentioned in the Appendix on Religious Sects, travelled extensively in India, and even in Afghanistān; but it was not established that their proceedings had any political intention or effect; indeed the tendency of the evidence collected was rather to show that the objects of their activity were pecuniary and personal.

In May 1898 Saiyid Sulaimān died and was succeeded in the Niqābat of Baghdād by his brother* Saiyid 'Abdur Rahmān.

Turkish
naval
activity,
1898-99.

In April 1899 Hamdi Pāsha, who was by training a naval officer and held the rank of Vice-Admiral, was re-appointed to the Wāliship of Basrah, which he had previously held; and a sort of naval re-organisation or expansion was attempted by the Porte, partly, it may be presumed, by way of preparation against the imaginary danger of a British descent by sea on Turkish 'Irāq, which appears never to be absent from the Ottoman official mind. The Turkish corvette "Zuhāf" had a few months previously visited Lingeh, ostensibly in connection with local disturbances there; and it was now announced that the Turkish flotilla at Basrah was about to be augmented, and that Harbour-Masterships would shortly be created at Baghdād, Kūt-al-Amārah and 'Amārah on the Tigris, at Nāsiriyyah and Sūq-ash-Shuyukh on the Euphrates, at Qūrnah at the junction of the two rivers, and at Kuwait and other places in the Persian Gulf, while Basrah itself would be raised to the status of a "préfecture de port principal." Complications which supervened at Kuwait, and which are fully detailed in the history of that principality, prevented the complete execution of this programme; but, in so far as it related to Turkish 'Irāq, it was carried out in its entirety,—except that no vessels were added to the existing flotilla.

Turkish
manifestations of anti-British feeling, 1905.

Strongly anti-British sentiments and conduct were remarked in 1905 on the part of Turkish officials generally at Baghdād and Basrah and necessitated remonstrances at Constantinople. The chief causes seemed to be recent displays of British activity in the Persian Gulf, including the tour there of Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in 1903, and an Anglophobic campaign which was being waged in Egypt by a section of the native press of that country. The prevalent feeling showed itself partly in a disposition to attribute all trouble between the Turkish administration and the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia to British intrigues.

*Since the establishment of a non-religious Government in Turkey (1909—1912) there has been, apparently, no question of the employment of the Naqib of Baghdād or his relations as propagandists of the Khalifatic principle abroad. The family, whose importance in Turkey has been greatly reduced with that of religious interests in general, regard the altered state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire with intense, though concealed, dissatisfaction; and their relations with the British Residency, though necessarily reserved and somewhat distant, have been characterised by unmistakable friendliness. Their attitude, in fact, has been the attitude natural towards a power in whose territories their prestige has not been subverted as it has been in Turkey.

Questions relating to British Government vessels in Turkish 'Irāq,
1876—1905.

It will be remembered that in 1874 exception had been taken by the Porte to the ascent of the Shatt-al-'Arab from Basrah to Qūrnah by British men-of-war. The discussion at that time was apparently closed by a request on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople "that, if at any time the Sublime Porte should wish to "propose new regulations, or to alter a practice that has prevailed, in "reference to the presence of ships of war in any part of the Sultan's "dominions, due notice of it may be given to Her Majesty's Government "who will not fail to give such instructions as will ensure from the "Commanders of British ships of war every respect for the rights of the "Sublime Porte."

Right of
British war
vessels to
navigate
above
Qūrnah or
Basrah, 1881.

In 1881 the question was re-opened, in a somewhat vague manner, by a communication from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs; the questionable statement was made that British war vessels had never ascended "the river" higher than Qūrnah without the previous consent of the Turkish authorities; and it was suggested that, with a view to avoiding any "conflict," orders should be given by the British authorities to prevent British vessels of war from passing above Qūrnah. If appeared probable that there was some mistake in the Turkish communication as made or reported, and that what the Porte really wished was that British men-of-war should be forbidden to visit the Shatt-al-'Arab above Basrah; but the communication was dealt with according to its literal purport, orders being issued merely that British war vessels were not to proceed beyond Qūrnah. Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād was opposed even to this restriction, for though warships of the class ordinarily calling at Basrah could hardly pass above Qūrnah and were not known to have attempted to do so, he thought that it might be advisable that a gunboat of the Royal Navy should be substituted for the "Comet" to patrol the Tigris,—an idea which may have been suggested to him by the Arab attack on the "Khalifah" in the previous year.

Even the visits to Basrah of gunboats of the British Navy, though the port was frequented by ocean steamers, were not regarded with equanimity by the Porte. In 1883 the Turkish Ambassador in London

Question of
British war
vessels at
Basrah, 1883
—1886.

enquired the reason for the presence of a British ship of war in Basrah waters: he was informed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, "in deference to the wishes of the Sublime Porte, British ships of war do not proceed further up the Shatt-al-'Arab than Kurna, but Her Majesty's Government are not aware of any "regulation precluding such ships from visiting Basrah." In December 1885, two British gunboats being then simultaneously at Basrah, the meaning of their visit was anxiously demanded by the Turkish Government from the British Embassy at Constantinople, and assurances were given that it had no special object.

Turkish
objections to
the use of
the "Comet"
on the
Tigris above
Baghdad,
1885—1894.

In April 1885, with the previous approval of the Government of India and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, Mr. Plowden, the British Resident at Baghdād, undertook in the Residency steamer "Comet" a tour upon the upper Tigris reaching Tikrit on April 29th. On the return journey however the "Comet" stranded on May 1st at a place named Waushaush and the Resident returned to Baghdād; but the opportunity was taken by the Porte to protest against the employment of the "Comet" above Baghdād. In a note dated 11th July 1885 Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explained that the British Consul-General at Baghdād had merely proceeded up the river to visit a part of his consular district, and expressed a hope that no objection would be raised to the *stationnaire* of the Consulate-General ascending the river again for the same purpose, if previous notice were given to the local authorities. This note was accepted by the Porte without demur.

In 1894, a serious disturbance having taken place at Sāmarrāh, where the lives of British Indian subjects were reported to be in danger, Colonel Mockler, the British Resident, went there in the "Comet" after giving notice to the Wāli, who made no objection. The Porte, however, complained of the action of the Resident and were referred in reply to the note of 1885, to which they had taken no exception at the time or later. It was further urged on them that the use of the "Comet" in a manner so reasonable and purely on grounds of convenience, was not a legitimate subject of protest; the Consul-General's voyage had been necessitated by the interests of British subjects and had been made with the approval of the Wāli; and it was hoped that, in the circumstances, the Porte would acquit Colonel Mockler of blame, and that they would not object to the occasional use of the "Comet" by Her Majesty's Consul-General for the purpose of visiting places in his consular district on the Tigris above Baghdād. The Turkish Govern-

ment, however, replied that the employment of the "Comet" on the upper river was, in their view, objectionable, because it might be cited as a precedent in support of a claim for the grant of similar privileges to the vessels of other foreign nations.

In December 1893, the "Comet" visited Basrah, where she was docked for survey and her machine guns were replaced by others of a newer pattern which had been sent from India. Every opportunity was allowed to the Turkish officials of seeing what was done. Nevertheless, the Wāli of Basrah having given orders that she was to be watched, the "Comet" was at three different points in the ascent of the river to Baghdād called on to stop by the Turkish police, with threats that she would be fired on if she did not. Her Commander, however, disregarded the challenges; and afterwards, when representations were made to the Wāli of Baghdād concerning this "demonstration of puerile insolence," he expressed regret at its occurrence. The Turkish authorities had, however, the temerity to question the truth of the British Commander's account of the facts. Colonel Mockler, the Resident, in reporting the matter to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, described it as too trivial to call for diplomatic action.

Discourteous
treatment of
the "Comet"
by the
Turkish
authorities,
1893-1894.

Official questions between Turkish and British authorities in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905.

The attitude of the Turkish authorities towards British interests in Turkish 'Irāq during the whole of this period was generally one of obstruction, and occasionally one of active malevolence. Illustrations of this fact will be found in what has gone before, as well as in what follows.

On the 6th January 1881, Mr. James Milne, a former employé of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, who had entered on business on his own account at Baghdād as a general engineer, was fatally stabbed in one of the principal streets of Baghdād. He was a man of inoffensive character; but there was enmity between him and Muhammad Sālih, an influential Muhammadan of the town, on account of a Christian prostitute name Faridah, whom Milne had married; and Muhammad Sālih had threatened to be revenged on him.

Murder of
Mr. Milne
and proceed-
ings thereon,
1881—1888.

On the night of the crime Mr. Plowden, the British Resident, wrote to the Wāli, requesting that effectual measures might be taken for the

discovery, arrest, and punishment of all persons implicated therein. On the next day, the 7th January, Mr. Plowden telegraphed to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, urging that the Porte should be moved to issue stringent orders for the vigorous handling of the case without fear or favour. On the 8th and 9th the Resident investigated the case and collected evidence; but almost the only material fact disclosed was that one Ahmad, a servant of Muhammad Sālih, had visited the house of the deceased on the day of the murder and had probably ascertained the victim's intended movements. Mrs. Milne and a servant who was with Milne when he was attacked showed themselves "most reluctant to say anything which might possibly connect Muhammad Sālih with the crime"; but the former, having expressed fear of Muhammad Sālih and a wish for protection, was sent for safety on board the "Comet". On the 9th January Mr. Plowden telegraphed to the Foreign Office urging that the formation of a special Commission, including two European members, should be arranged for the investigation of the case; he mentioned that a menial of the Residency establishment had been obliged to leave Baghdad for fear of Muhammad Sālih; and he reported that the action of the British authorities in the case was being keenly scrutinised. On the 10th January the Resident wrote a second time to the Wāli, asking for copies of the depositions so far recorded in the case, protesting against Muhammad Sālih's alleged release on bail, and demanding his re-arrest. On the 11th the Wāli replied; he merely ignored the request contained in Mr. Plowden's letter, stated that prompt and energetic measures were being taken, and asked that a Dragoman might be sent to watch the proceedings. The same day the Wāli requested that Mrs. Milne might be sent to Court to give evidence, accompanied by an official; but the Resident did not comply. On the 12th January Mr. Plowden again wrote to the Wāli, repeating his request for copies of the depositions taken and his demand for the arrest of Muhammad Sālih. On the same day he telegraphed to the Foreign Office, reporting that even Englishmen at Baghād were afraid to give evidence against Muhammad Sālih. On the 14th he conferred with his French and Russian colleagues; they concurred in his proposals for a Mixed Commission and telegraphed to their respective Governments supporting them. The Wāli replied on that day to Mr. Plowden's last letter; he argued that Muhammad Sālih could not be arrested except on evidence, and that evidence was not forthcoming in consequence of the refusal of the Resident to let Mrs. Milne appear; and he complained of Mr. Plowden's having instructed the British

Dragoman not to sign the depositions taken in Court. Two days later Mr. Plowden rejoined that, if evidence was not forthcoming, it was because the action of the police had been perfunctory and inefficient in the highest degree, and that, the police being under the control of the Wilāyat, a very grave responsibility rested on His Excellency.

In reporting the case at length to the Foreign Office, Mr. Plowden justified such of his actions as might appear open to criticism by explaining the peculiar features of the régime then existing at Baghdād. There was absolutely no prospect of foreigners obtaining justice in the Turkish Courts or of the Turkish police doing anything to secure the perpetrators of even the worst crimes against them. This had been fully proved by other recent cases, and the Resident was supported in his attitude by the opinion of his* foreign colleagues.

Mrs. Milne eventually appeared in the Turkish Court to give evidence, and Muhammad Sālih was taken into custody. He and his servant Ahmad were tried; but, while the latter was convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, the former was acquitted on the ground that there was no proof of his complicity.

At the urgent instance of Lord Dufferin, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, the proceedings of the Baghdād Court were quashed by the Court of Appeal at Constantinople on an application for revision, and a fresh trial was ordered. But the result of the second trial was the acquittal of both accused on the 19th June 1882, and they were then released on bail.

Renewed representations by the British Embassy procured the transfer of the case for retrial to Diyārbakr; but again the proceedings ended without a conviction.

The judgment of the Diyārbakr Court was annulled, like those preceding it by the Court of Appeal at Constantinople; and in 1887 or 1888 a final trial was held at Aleppo, which terminated in favour of the accused. Of the guilt of the prisoners there seems to have been no moral doubt; but the wealth and influence of Muhammad Sālih, aided doubtless by racial and religious feeling availed to frustrate the demands of justice.

* Madame Dieulafoy probably reflects the French official view of the case when she says (*La Perse, etc.*, page 588); "Dernièrement encore, un mécanicien qui arrivait de Newhaven a été poignardé en plein jour. Le consul anglais a fait connaître le nom de l'assassin et a désigné les témoins du crime. Peine perdue : le coupable, un Turc naturellement, vague à ses affaires ; il n'a jamais été question de l'arrêter, moins encore de le mettre en accusation."

Opposition of the Turkish authorities to the British Post Offices at Baghdād, and Basrah chiefly in 1881—1887.

Question of official tours by the British Resident, 1885.

During the greater part of the period under review, especially between 1881 and 1887, persistent attempts were made by the Turkish authorities to obtain the abolition, or obstruct the working, of the British Post Offices at Baghdād and Basrah; but as related in the Appendix on Mail Communications, they were defeated with but small loss of advantages previously enjoyed.

In the Barāat or *exequatur* granted by the Porte to the first British Resident at Baghdād in 1802 it was distinctly ordered that, "should the said Consul find it necessary to travel into any part of the country, "either by land or by sea, at any stations or ports he may arrive at no "one shall molest him or his servants, or cattle or baggage, or anything "connected with him;" and until the year 1885 no opposition seems to have been offered by the Turkish authorities to the free movement of any British official in the province. Numerous and extensive tours were made by Mr. Rich, Colonel Rawlinson, and Colonel Kemball during their tenure of the Baghdād Residency or Political Agency, as also by Commander Felix Jones; and down to a much later period, even, journeys by British officials in the country were treated as a matter of course.

In 1876 a proposal by Colonel Nixon to travel on the Persian frontier was approved by the Government of India in principle, but for some reason the tour was not carried out; and Colonel Miles, in 1879, visited the towns of Karbala and Najaf, where, notwithstanding the existence of a large British Indian community, the Political Agent had not been seen for some years. In 1881 Mr. Plowden sought permission to make the frontier tour for which Colonel Nixon had previously obtained sanction, but which he had not executed; it was granted; and in the summer of 1881 Mr. Plowden, who had then lately visited Karbala and Najaf, travelled to Kirmānshāh in Persia, and thence by Sulaimāniyah, Kōi Sanjāq and Arbil to Mūsul, whence, being taken ill, he returned by raft on the Tigris to Baghdād. In 1882 Colonel Tweedie, as Acting Resident, visited Karbala. In 1884, Mr. Plowden proposed a fresh tour on the Persian frontier to the south east of Baghdad and to Musul in the north; the assent of the Government of India and of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was given; and scientific instruments were provided for his use. However, unless his abortive trip up the Tigris in April 1885, already referred to, be reckoned, no part of the scheme would seem to have been carried out.

In 1885 Colonel Tweedie, having succeeded Mr. Plowden as Resident, proposed to substitute a tour to Karbala and Najaf for that on the Persian frontier. It was at this time that the Turks first raised objections to movements by the Resident in camp. The Government of India accorded their sanction as usual to the Resident's proposals; but Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador found it necessary to request him to abandon his intended journey to the Holy Cities, "in view of the strong political objections raised by the Porte." Colonel Tweedie at once addressed the Ambassador, Sir W. White, on the subject of this prohibition, submitting that the right of the British Consul-General at Baghdād to move about freely in the Wilāyat had always hitherto, been asserted and maintained; that there were large British Indian communities in, and numerous British Indian pilgrims to, Karbala and Najaf; that the adequacy of the arrangements for the protection and supervision of these by means of an honorary un-official Agent at Karbala depended on effective surveillance by the British Consul-General at Baghdād, which could not be exercised from a distance; that acquiescence in the Turkish objections to his visiting Karbala and Najaf might result in his being prevented from going to Mūsāl a much more remote place, where there was a British Vice-Consulate under his control; and finally, that if his movements were now to be, for the first time, restricted to journeys between Baghdād and Basrah, his usefulness, especially as an officer of the Government of India, would necessarily be much diminished. In consequence of these representations a note was presented to the Porte, in June 1886, drawing attention to the necessity which the British Consul-General at Baghdād was under, with a view to the proper performance of his duties, of visiting from time to time the consulates under his orders, and of attending on the spot to the affairs of the British Indian subjects under his jurisdiction. A reply was received to the effect that the Wālis of Baghdād, Basrah, and Mūsāl had been instructed to afford the British Consul-General every assistance that he might require within their respective districts.

Colonel Tweedie availed himself of these orders to make, in the winter of 1886-1887, a very long tour lasting from October to February, in the course of which he visited Abu Ghuraib, Hit, Tikrīt, Kirkūk, Sulaimānīyah, Kōi Sanjāq, Arbīl, Mūsāl, Sinjār, Dair-az-Zor, 'Ānah, Hit, Rumādī, Rahaliyah, Shifāthah, Karbala, and Najaf; and he would have continued it to Basrah, *viā* the country of the Khazā'il, Muntafik, and

Dhafir, had not changes in the Turkish administrative staff demanded his return from Najaf to Baghdād. On this journey Colonel Tweedie amassed a large quantity of valuable and interesting information, much of which he embodied in a report. At the outset he was somewhat hampered in his intercourse with the people of the country by the commander of a Turkish police escort sent with him from Baghdād, who watched his every movement, and whose appearance had a repellent effect on some of the Arabs met with, "he looking on them as of the nature " of *Fera Naturae*, and they on him as a kind of executioner and tax-gatherer in one. This made them but surlily civil, and indeed they " looked truculent enough to cut one's throat for the sake of the gilt " buttons on his cloak, which they, no doubt, thought were gold."

The right of free movement by the British Resident, thus re-established, was not again called in question by the Turkish authorities; and Colonel Newmarch during his Residentsip (1902-1906) made numerous useful journeys in different parts of the country.

It may be mentioned that in 1897, Colonel Loch, then Resident, proposed three tours for sanction by Her Majesty's Government, *viz.*, one from Basrah to Hail and Jauḥ-al-'Āmir in Central Arabia, a second between Baghdād and Mūsā *via* Kirkūk, and a third from Baghdād to Kirmānshāh and thence through Luristān to Ahwāz. The first of these was prohibited on the ground that it might excite the suspicion of the Ottoman Government and provoke accusations of British intrigue in Najd, and the third was disallowed as lying chiefly in Persian territory, but the second was permitted as unobjectionable.

Direct land-
ing from
steamers
at the
British Resi-
dency, Bagh-
dād, prohibi-
ted, 1888-89.

It was until 1888 the invariable custom that Indian officials and other travellers to Baghdād who were guests of the British Resident, as also their luggage, should be dropped with the mails at the Residency by the British steamers before reaching the customs house. In the year mentioned, however, exception was taken to the practice by the Turkish authorities on the ground that it might give cover to evasion of customs duty, and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople directed that it should be discontinued.

Prohibition
of the im-
portation of
loaded cart-
ridges from
abroad, 1891.

Reference may be made to a matter of minor importance which had a bearing on the amusements of British subjects, and even officials, in Turkish 'Irāq. The Commercial Treaty of 1861 between Britain and Turkey permitted the importation into Ottoman territory from abroad of fowling-pieces and small quantities of gunpowder for private use; and in 1863 a Turkish ordinance had been issued freeing *bond fide* sporting

weapons and ammunition from every restriction. This ordinance was, however, abrogated by a regulation made in 1870, and with it all other existing rules; and thereafter, though the exclusion of sporting requisites from the country was not strictly enforced, difficulties were of occasional occurrence. In 1887 a gun and some cartridges addressed to Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, were detained for a time in the local customs house, but were finally released on an order from the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and a rifle and ammunition consigned in the same year to Major Mockler, who held the same post, were similarly treated. In 1891 Lieutenant Stratton, a successor of Mr. Robertson and Major Mockler, having obtained a pass from the Wali, ordered 2,000 shot cartridges from India; but they were impounded by the Turkish Customs at Basrah for return to the port of shipment under a regulation prohibiting the entry of loaded cartridges of any kind into Turkey; Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople informed the Resident at Baghdād, through whom the matter had been referred to him, that no action was possible. Sportsmen in Turkish 'Irāq thus laboured under an irksome restriction, ammunition being either unprocurable locally or, if procurable, of doubtful quality.

In 1893 a system of harassment of British Indian sailing vessels on the lower Shatt-al 'Arab was initiated by the Turkish authorities: it was evidently a part of their scheme for asserting absolute Turkish jurisdiction over the whole river in which the construction of a fort at Fāo and the attempted recovery of customs duty there and at Dawāsir on goods consigned to Muhammareh were also elements.

Vexatious interference with British Indian sailing vessels on the Shatt-al 'Arab 1893—98.

In the autumn of 1893, the season for the exportation of dates having begun, the Turkish Mudir at Fāo began to oblige the crew of every British Indian sailing vessels proceeding up the river to deposit in his charge, pending their return seawards, all the firearms in their possession except four which they were allowed to retain for defence against pirates; the reason alleged was that surplus arms might be sold by the owners to natives of the country. Money was also extorted from the depositors at the time of returning their arms to them. The British authorities had not been consulted in regard to this innovation affecting their subjects.

In the autumn of the following year wholesale blackmailing of British Indian craft began. It had for long been a custom, though an irregular one, that native sailing vessels from the Persian Gulf, even if bound for Muhammareh, should stop at Fāo and be subjected there to the requirements of the Turkish quarantine regulations; and it now

1893.

1894.

became a practice on the part of Turkish officials at Fão, other than those of the Quarantine establishment, to invade the detained vessels and extort money from the crew on the pretext that the possession of arms, gunpowder, tobacco, snuff, etc., which they carried for their personal use, was illegal in a Turkish port. No receipts were granted for payments, and it was plain that the sums exacted merely went into the private pockets of the extortioners; but the Turkish Government had no motive for checking the abuse, which conduced to the establishment of their authority over the river. In this year several vessels which neglected to halt at Fão were boarded further up the river by Turkish quarantine officials and subjected to extortion and vexatious delays. Seizures were also made at Fão and at Basrah, on board British Indian craft, of arms carried for self-defence; and, on objections being raised by the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, he was informed that the Turkish police were not aware of the nationality of the vessels. Difficulties were also raised in regard to the non-possession by native Indian boats of bills of health granted at the ports from which they sailed. Accordingly, in June 1895, a notice was issued by the Assistant Political Agent, advising masters of British Indian sailing vessels to fly their flag night and day during the whole of their sojourn in the Shatt-al 'Arab, to provide themselves in future with bills of health at their ports of departure, not to pay any money to Turkish officials without obtaining a receipt, and to report at once to the British Consulate at Basrah any irregular treatment which they might experience at the hands of the Turkish authorities. The notice also stated that vessels from the Persian Gulf bound for Muhammareh were not subject to Turkish sanitary control on the way and need not stop at Fão, but that those of which the destination was Basrah or another Turkish river port should do so, and comply with the Turkish quarantine regulations.

1895. In autumn, 1895, there was a renewal of the difficulties which had become customary at that season. Turkish soldiers boarded British Indian vessels on pretext of searching for "illicit" arms and refused to leave until they had been satisfied with bribes; and other kinds of extortion in money and kind took place. The matter was now raised at Constantinople, but at first without result.

1896. Sir P. Currie, the British Ambassador at the Porte, in reporting on the subject to Her Majesty's Government in February 1896, remarked: "There can be no doubt that the Foreign Missions at Constantinople

"have hitherto maintained, and the Turks have accepted, the principle "that foreign merchant ships in Ottoman waters are assimilated to foreign "domiciles in Ottoman territory and cannot be boarded without the "consent of their Consular Representatives" but he doubted, for reasons unconnected with Turkey, the expediency of basing a protest on this ground. At length, in May 1896, he was instructed to inform the Turkish Government that, until a British ship passed upstream beyond the Khaiyain creek—the place above which both banks were considered to be Turkish territory—or until it touched a point on the right or western bank within the Turkish dominions, it could not properly be subjected to interference, whether on sanitary or on other grounds, by Turkish officials; and that the searching of British vessels for arms could be allowed only at Basrah or at Fão, in the presence of a British Consular Officer. Meanwhile, however, the Porte had ordered the Wāli of Basrah to disregard all British remonstrances, and to direct his subordinates at the mouth of the Shatt-al 'Arab to continue stopping and inspecting all vessels that entered the river, whatever their nationality and destination, and without regard to whether they had entered Turkish jurisdiction or not.

It was then resolved by Her Majesty's Government to locate a British consular representative at Fão; but the Turkish Government refused to recognise such an appointment; and on the 22nd September it became necessary to inform them that, unless they granted recognition, a British man-of-war would be sent to Fão. At this juncture some British Indian sailing vessels bound for Muhammareh were again intimidated by the Turkish authorities and obliged to put in at Fão, where quarantine dues were recovered from them; and the proceedings of the Mudir of Fão was sustained by the Wāli of Basrah, who stated that that official was merely acting in obedience to his orders. These events precipitated matters; Captain Whyte, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, proceeded in person to Fão; and on the 23rd October, Her Majesty's Ship "Lapwing" arrived there. On the appearance of the "Lapwing" the annoyances complained of ceased, and it became known to many masters of British Indian sailing vessels for the first time that interference with them by the Turkish officials at Fão was in many cases irregular.

Finally, in December 1896, an exchange of notes took place between the Porte and the British Ambassador at Constantinople, of which the result seems to have been an understanding that any searches of British

vessels which it might be necessary to make should be carried out at Basrah, that British vessels should enjoy perfect liberty to proceed direct to Muhammareh or to any other river port in Persian territory, and that they could not be compelled under any pretext to stop at Fāo on their way either to Muhammareh or to Basrah.

1897. The "Lapwing" apparently remained in the neighbourhood of Fāo until March 1897, when she was withdrawn, having accomplished the purpose for which she was sent. A Turkish *stationnaire*, in the shape of a wooden sailing vessel carrying three guns, had in the meantime been placed at Dawāsir some distance above Fāo; but, in view of the settlement reached, it was considered unnecessary to press for her removal, as had at one time been suggested.

1898. In 1898, plague having broken out in India some time before and quarantine having been imposed at Basrah, the officials of the Turkish sanitary post at Fāo proceeded to violate the understanding of 1896 by obliging British Indian sailing vessels to stop at Fāo and undergo quarantine there. A threat of renewing the British demand for consular representation at Fāo induced the Porte, however, promptly to countermand the proceedings in question.

Abuse of
quarantine
on the Shatt
al-'Arab,
1890—1905.

A weapon of which the Turkish authorities freely availed themselves to obstruct British navigation and trade, as also to damage Persian interests and assert their own mastery on the Shatt-al-'Arab, was the imposition of quarantine restrictions on foreign vessels. The first instance of abusive procedure of this kind was in 1890, when an attempt was made to penalise or prevent the landing of passengers at Muhammareh by British steamers bound from the Persian Gulf to Basrah. The orders in this case seem to have been issued by the Turkish Government without reference to the Constantinople Board of Health, the only competent authority in the matter; and a protest sufficed to bring about the withdrawal of the interdict. Other examples of the use of sanitary precautions as a political stalking-horse to the detriment of British and Persian interests will be found in the immediately preceding paragraph and in the earlier section of this chapter on Persian relations; and the restraints placed on commercial activity at Basrah from 1896 onwards, generally more onerous than was warranted by the findings of the latest international Sanitary Conference, and to that extent open to the suspicion of being political in their object, may be learned on reference to the Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation.

British official matters and interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905 .

In a reorganisation of the Government of India's Political Service effected by a notification in the Foreign Department dated 19th February 1880, the British representative in Turkish 'Irāq was again graded as a Resident of the second class ; and in the table appended to the notification his appointment was specified as that of Resident, instead of Political Agent as formerly. From this time, accordingly, "Resident" seems to be his correct appellation ; but it may be mentioned, to illustrate the confusion prevailing on the subject, that the copy of the notification sent him was itself addressed to "the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia."

Rank in the Indian Political Service of the British representative at Baghdād, of 1880.

A list of the incumbents of the Baghdād Political Agency or Residency during the period will be found in the Appendix on Diplomatic and Consular Representation. Mr. Plowden (1880—1885) was the first member of the Indian Civil Service appointed to Baghdād since the death of Mr. Rich in 1821, and his successors during the period were all military officers.

In 1884, apparently in consequence of a refusal by the Porte to recognise certain British consular districts in Turkey as being of the extent claimed by the British authorities, information on particular points was required from various consular officers in a circular letter from Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. In answer to this circular Mr. Plowden, the Resident at Baghdād, replied that in his own Barāat (or Turkish *exequatur*) and in the Barāats of the Vice-Consuls at Basrah and Mūsāl the only places mentioned were "Baghdād," "Basrah," and "Mūsāl," respectively ; but that in practice no attempt had been made by the Turkish authorities to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the officers in question by limiting it to the town in which they were located. In his own case, no objection had been taken to his intervening in affairs at Basrah and Mūsāl, beyond the limits of Wilāyat of Baghdād, as they stood since its reduction in 1879-1884. Mr. Plowden suggested that, if a favourable opportunity should occur, the Porte might be moved to amend the Barāats of the British Consular representatives in Turkish 'Irāq in such a manner as to make it clear that the district of the Consul-General at Baghdād included the whole Wilāyats

General status and extent of jurisdiction of the British Resident at Baghdād, 1884—1888.

of Baghdād, Mūsāl and Basrah, that of the Vice-Consul at Basrah the whole Wilāyat of Basrah, and that of the Vice-Consul at Mūsāl the whole Wilāyat of Mūsāl. It does not appear that action on this recommendation was found practicable.

In 1887 on a complaint made by the Resident that the Wālī of Basrah during a visit to Baghdād had omitted to call on him, Sir W. White, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, remarked that Colonel Tweedie, as Consul-General at Baghdād, was not accredited to the Wālī of Basrah and, for that, and for other reasons, was not entitled to expect a visit from him in the circumstances described. Colonel Tweedie, on receiving this reply, raised once more the question of the dual nature of the Baghdād appointments, last discussed in 1874. He remarked that the British representative at Baghdād was, primarily, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia on behalf of the Government of India, and, secondarily, Consul-General of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the Pashāliq of Baghdād; that ever since the consular title had been conferred on him the Ottoman Government had shown a tendency to ignore his status as Resident and treat him merely as a Consul-General; and that, as the dominions of the Baghdād Pashāliq had recently been reduced by the separation therefrom of Basrah and its districts, so the duties and responsibilities of the British representatives at Baghdād were being gradually curtailed and restricted, with the result that his influence in the country was being destroyed. The tendency was now to regard him as Consul for the Baghdād Wilāyat only, whereas what in Colonel Tweedie's estimation was required, especially in the circumstances of the time, was a "vigorous unfettered" Political Agent in the Government of India's sense, pervading with his "person, his influence, and his money every portion of the Ottoman Empire lying within reach of the Persian Gulf." The principal questions raised by Colonel Tweedie's letter were, firstly, that of the official status of the Resident in future with reference to Basrah, and, secondly, that of the steps needed to save his official position from disintegration. Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in forwarding the correspondence to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made, among others, the following observations :

The position of a Foreign Political Resident in an independent country like the Turkish Empire is most anomalous, and its very origin, unrecognised as it is by the Sublime Porte, is for me a matter of pure conjecture * * * So far as Her Majesty's Embassy is concerned, Colonel Tweedie is a Consul-General and nothing else, nor has he ever been recognised by the Sublime Porte in any other capacity. His

Burat and Firman are the same as those accorded to other Consular officers ; and he enjoys the same privileges as other Consular Officers * * Any attempt to obtain his recognition as a political Resident would inevitably rouse the strongest feelings of jealous resentment on the part of the Imperial Government, which could only be allayed if at all, by re-assuring explanations of the duties and position of such a functionary.

It appeared to Sir W. White that either the position and duties of the " British Political Resident " in Turkish 'Irāq should be defined, with a view to an attempt being made to obtain their recognition by the Porte, or that the advisability of abolishing the title should be considered. The India Office, on being consulted deprecated any change in the nature of the Baghdād appointment ; while the British Ambassador at Constantinople stated, in reply to an enquiry by the Foreign Office, that the Resident's usefulness had not in his opinion been diminished because, though Basrah had been removed from the Baghdād Wilāyat, a British Consul existed there who corresponded with and acted under the Consul-General at Baghdād. Sir W. White also remarked : " The Sublime Porte does not recognise the jurisdiction of a Consular Officer outside of the single Wilāyat in which he is appointed to reside, for which he holds a Burat exequatur ; and Her Majesty's Embassy has never succeeded in obtaining any deviation from this hard-and-fast rule since it was laid down. "

The following were the orders on the case finally communicated to Sir W. White by the Marquis of Salisbury in March 1888.

Colonel Tweedie is probably not aware of the objections that would certainly be raised by the Porte to the recognition of this title, inasmuch as, according to diplomatic precedent, it might be taken to imply that the chief authority of the district in which the Consul-General resides has a semi-independent position similar to that of the former Princes of Servia or Roumania, or of the present Khedive of Egypt or Prince of Bulgaria.

So long as the Political Agent was the representative not of the British Government, nor a branch of that Government, but of the East India Company, this objection did not apply with the same force.

There can be no doubt, however, that in former times the Governors of the distant provinces of the Empire did, in fact, hold a position of far greater independence than is now the case. The progress of centralisation in the administration of the Ottoman Empire has of late years been very marked ; and there is a continual tendency to limit the authority of the provincial Governors and to bring them into more complete dependency on the Government at Constantinople. There is, as Your Excellency has more than once noticed, a no less marked increase of jealousy of foreign interference, of the privileges and immunities of the foreign Consulates, and of the rights of protection which they have acquired by agreement or usage.

These symptoms, which Colonel Tweedie seems to imagine to be personal to himself are equally observable in other parts of Turkish dominions ; and no advantage

would be gained by endeavouring to claim the formal acknowledgment of a title which, while it properly marks Colonel Tweedie's position in the Indian service, is not in accordance with general international usage.

It may, perhaps, be questioned whether the British Political Agent at Baghdād has ever held that acknowledged position as a diplomatic representative which Colonel Tweedie seems to imagine once attached to the office ; and whether the consideration and influence enjoyed by some of his predecessors have not, in great measure, been the result of the personal good-will and respect of the Ottoman authorities.

There can, however, be no question as to the importance of the interests which are entrusted to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Baghdad in the capacity as Agent of the Government of India. They were the original causes of the creation of the office, and are the main reason, at all events, of its continuance. In the protection of those interests, and in discharge of the duties connected with them, Colonel Tweedie will, I am convinced, always have, as heretofore, Your Excellency's full support and assistance whenever he may require them.

Colonel Tweedie should understand that the position which he holds and the immunities he enjoys, as Her Majesty's Consul-General differ widely from what are accorded to Consular Officers in most European countries, and would be considered as belonging only to a diplomatic appointment. But considerable moderation and judgment are necessary in the exercise of rights which took their origin in concession and comity, and which it is often in the power of the territorial authority to defeat in practice, even while they are acknowledged in principle. An attempt to assert them too ostentatiously and to procure their extension is sure at the present moment to excite suspicion and jealousy both at Constantinople and on the spot, and to occasion increased hostility and obstructiveness in the transaction of business.

The Government of India remarked, with reference to these orders in a despatch to the Secretary of State for India, in June 1888 ;

We have no doubt that Her Majesty's Government will take any steps which may be thought necessary to guard against the possible risk of general decrease of British influence in Turkish Arabia owing to the contraction of the geographical limits of the *vilayats* to which its consuls are accredited. As far as Indian interests are concerned, we are of opinion that they can be sufficient protected by the Political Resident without any further recognition of his title by the Sublime Porte.

Lord Salisbury's letter of the 20th March 1888 to Her Majesty's Ambassador and Plenipotentiary at Constantinople appears us to meet the requirements of the case, and we concur with your Lordship in not considering it necessary to move further in the matter.

Question of
the use of
the title
"Resident,"
1903-1904.

In connection with the King-Emperor's birthday in November 1903 Colonel Newmarch, the British Resident, wrote letters to his foreign colleagues at Baghdād which he subscribed with the double title of Resident and Consul-General. The French, German and Russian consular representatives thereupon sent him identical communications requesting that he would not use the style of Resident, but only that of Consul-General, in addressing them. Colonel Newmarch reported the matter to the Government of India and asked for instructions : it

appeared from the Residency archives that Mr. (afterwards Sir Trevor) Plowden during his incumbency of the Baghdād appointment had generally employed both titles in his correspondence with his foreign colleagues, and that no objection had been made by them, though they in their replies addressed him simply as Consul-General. Since Mr. Plowden's departure in 1885 the dual title had fallen into disuse in correspondence with foreign Consulates ; but Colonel Newmarch in reviving it had at first experienced no opposition. The question was referred to His Majesty's Government, by whom it was finally ruled in January 1904, that the title " Political Resident " should not be used by the British representative at Baghdād in communications to the Ottoman authorities or the Consular body. On receipt of these orders Colonel Newmarch replied to the identical letters of his foreign colleagues in a communication ending with the word : " In future, therefore, you will be addressed by me only in my capacity of Consul-General."

An instance of something approaching insubordination on the part of the British Political Agent occurred at Baghdād in 1877. The case, though not creditable, calls for notice, as illustrating certain dangers incidental to divided control which all other Political Agents and Residents at Baghdād, both before and after Colonel Nixon, have been able to avoid.

Reprehen-
sible conduct
of Colonel
Nixon, Bri-
tish Political
Agent at
Baghdād,
1877-78,

Colonel Nixon seem to have disliked Mr. Robertson, Assistant Political Agent and Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Basrah, who was under his orders ; and in 1875 he preferred charges against him to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and suggested his removal. Sir H. Elliot did not support Colonel Nixon's recommendations, and the only result of the reference was that Mr. Robertson was admonished concerning a tendency he had shown to raise unnecessary difficulties with the Turkish authorities. The Government of India were left in ignorance of these proceedings with regard to one of their officers. In 1877, Mr. Robertson having been temporarily transferred by the Government of India to Masqat as Acting Political Agent at that place, Colonel Nixon proceeded of himself to instal a successor to Mr. Robertson at Basrah in the person of a Mr. Carter.* It seems probable that his object was to prevent the return of Mr. Robertson, for,

*Mr. Carter, who was an employé of a local British firm and who eventually died at Basrah, was known as " the White Shaikh " on account of a remarkable personal influence over Arabs which he was believed to possess.

in informing His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Mr. Carter's willingness to accept the post *en permanence*, he observed : " If approved, I would beg your Lordship will intimate your sanction to " the Indian Government from whom pay is drawn, and (by whom) " promotions appear now to be made." The Government of India, having become aware of Colonel Nixon's irregular action, informed him that Mr. Carter's appointment must be regarded as provisional only, and called upon Colonel Nixon himself for an explanation of his conduct. Colonel Nixon replied by referring to a Foreign Office Circular under which he was empowered, in certain conditions and for certain purposes, to appoint Pro-Consuls, and added : " My position here is somewhat " peculiar, for, while my desire is to act in strict accordance with the " wishes of the Indian Government, still it must be remembered that I " have also to act in subordination to the English Foreign Office and our " Ambassador at Constantinple." This defence drew from the Government of India the following severe observations :

The explanation contained in your letters above quoted is not considered satisfactory by the Government of India. The substantive office held by Mr. Robertson, before his transfer to Muscat, was that of Assistant Agent. The salary and allowances attached to that office are defrayed by the Government of India, and all appointments thereto, whether officiating or permanent, vest in His Excellency the Viceroy in Council and no other authority. It is true that the Assistant Political Agent for Turkish Arabia usually receives from the Foreign Department of Her Majesty's Government the rank and powers of Vice-Consul, but his Vice-Consular appointment carries with it no stipend, and is secondary to his substantive one.

Accordingly in nominating Mr. Carter as successor to Mr. Robertson, and recommending him for appointment as Vice-Consul, without the previous sanction of the Government of India, you exceeded your own authority and ignored the authority of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

The Governor-General in Council is glad to learn from your letter under acknowledgment that the apparent disrespect in your proceedings was unintentional ; but, while acquitting you of intentional disrespect, His Excellency in Council is constrained to regard your proceedings as wanting in intelligence and care. *

On the 30th July 1877 the Government of India informed Her Majesty's Government and Colonel Nixon that the appointment of Mr. Carter to Basrah was not approved by them, and that Captain E. A. Fraser from Bûshehr had been ordered to relieve him.

* This communication concluded with the phrase. " I am to add that, on further consideration His Lordship is not prepared to appoint your son to the office " (See the Assistant Political Agency at Basrah).

Colonel Nixon's error described above was, however, venial in comparison with a second into which he fell. In November 1877, Captain Fraser having been recalled to India and Mr. Robertson's return to Basrah being imminent, Colonel Nixon wrote almost simultaneously to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department and to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, opposing Mr. Robertson's re-appointment to Basrah. In his letter to the Ambassador he revived his complaint against Mr. Robertson which had been dealt with and disposed of in 1875, accused him of "an unconciliatory disposition," and suggested that he should be transferred permanently to the Government of India or receive Consular employment elsewhere." Such a presentation of the case was inexcusable, for it had already been very clearly explained to Colonel Nixon by the Government of India that Mr. Robertson was an officer of the Indian establishment, and that the Basrah appointment was an appointment under the Government of India. The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department replied that Mr. Robertson could not be removed; but the representations made by Colonel Nixon to the Embassy obtained the qualified support of the Foreign Office.

The matter having come into discussion between the Foreign Office and the India Office, however, Colonel Nixon's proceedings underwent a general illumination; and the question then arose whether he could be allowed to remain at Baghdad. His term of service under the Political Department of the Government of India had expired in 1877, on his attaining the age of 55 years; but, on representations made by the Foreign Office, he had been granted a special extension of two years to the 1st July 1879. His record was brought under review by the Government of India, and it was recalled that he had in 1876 been severely reprimanded for his conduct towards Captain Warner, commanding the "Comet," and that his action in Kulsūm Nisa Begam's case—to be described hereafter—had been characterised by the highest authorities in India as feeble and obstructive. The Government of India suggested the cancellation of his special extension of service, and His Majesty's Secretary of State for India left the action to be taken in this respect to their discretion. Sir H. Layard, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople interposed on Colonel Nixon's behalf, representing that he appeared to have been much liked at Baghād and to have stood well with the Turkish authorities and that consequently his presence in Turkish Irāq was useful in the state of affairs then prevailing; but His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declined to

intervene. Eventually, in August 1878 the Government of India addressed Colonel Nixon, commenting on the inadequacy of certain explanations which he had offered, and informing him in the following terms of the decision at which they had arrived :

His Excellency the Governor General in Council is of opinion that it would be ineffectual either to explain a second time the impropriety of referring elsewhere than to the Government of India for orders regarding appointments under this Government, or to pass a second censure on you for the error. It appears certain that you find great difficulty in keeping separate your relations with two quite different superiors. and in maintaining the necessary distinction. Having regard, therefore, to the material inconvenience and confusion in public business which are caused by your inability to comprehend the position which you and your subordinates hold in Turkish Arabia and your double functions with two Governments, His Excellency in Council has determined that you should be transferred from Baghdad to an appointment in India.

But in the end, Colonel Nixon having tendered an apology for his conduct, it was accepted by the Government of India, the orders for his transfer were rescinded, and he was allowed to finish his service at Baghdād.*

Relations of
the British
Residency at
Baghdād
with the
Local
Government
and Foreign
Consulates,
1889.

In 1889 the practice of paying an official visit in uniform to the head of the Local Government on the birthday of His Majesty the Sultān of Turkey was revived by Major Talbot, the Acting British Resident at Baghdād, and M. Pegnon, the French Consul, after it had fallen into desuetude for some years. It had ceased, apparently in the time of Taqi-ud-Dīn-Pāsha, a fanatical Wālī of Baghdād, visits by Dragomans having been substituted for visits by officers ; and with it the exchange of official visits by the representatives of European powers at Baghdād on the fête days of their respective countries had been discontinued. The first step towards a return to the former more friendly custom was taken by Major Talbot, who paid

* It is possible that Colonel Nixon, like his less fortunate predecessor Colonel Taylor, was unlucky in the parts of his conduct which came most conspicuously under official notice. More than one traveller alluded to the Anglo-Indian hospitality which distinguished his house at Baghdād, Lady Anne Blunt observing, " Colonel Nixon is hospitality itself, and his doors seem always ajar to take in unfortunate strangers like ourselves, arriving grimed and weather-worn in an otherwise inhospitable city " (*Bedouins of the Euphrates* Vol. I, page 189). See also Commander Cameron's *Our Future Highway*, Vol. II, page 285. Mr. Geary remarked, with reference to a more important point : " Colonel Nixon, the present Political Agent at the Baghdad, is an Anglo-Indian officer of great experience, who has a natural gift, developed under Sir Henry Lawrence, for conciliating the affection of orientals "; and again : " The British Political Agent was, I noticed, saluted with great respect, and even cordiality, by people of all classes and creeds, Musulman, Christian, and Jewish " (*Through Asiatic Turkey*, Vol. I, pages 141—42 and 202).

an official visit in uniform to the French Consulate on the 14th July 1888 ; and on the 17th April 1889, on the occasion of His Majesty the Sultān's birthday, the British, French, and Persian representatives called in uniform on Mushīr Nasrat Pāsha, the acting head of the Baghdād Government, on an understanding that the compliment should be returned at the first opportunity.

Accordingly, on the 24th May 1889, the birthday of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, an open air reception was held at the British Residency after sunset, the month being Ramadhān, which was attended by the Wālī of Baghdād and Mushīr Nasrat Pāsha ; by the French, Russian, American, and Persian Consuls ; by the Armenian, Chaldaean, and Syrian clergy ; by all the European British subjects and other Europeans in Baghdād ; and by an unusually large concourse of British Indian subjects, and of Christian and Muhammadan natives of Baghdād in general.

In February 1881 the question of providing a European Assistant to the Resident at Baghdād was raised by Mr. Plowden, who was then in charge ; but the Government of India replied that they were not prepared to strengthen the staff. In July of the same year Mr. Plowden returned to the point, but without success, and was authorised to fill up the appointment of Native Agent in the Residency, which he had apparently left vacant in the hope that a European Assistant would be sanctioned. In 1883, Mr. Plowden being then on leave in England, a memorandum written by him was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Government of India, and in it the request for an Assistant at Baghdād was reiterated on the following grounds ;

Question of
supplying an
Assistant to
the Resident
at Baghdād,
1881-1891.

There is no officer in the Indian Political service who has to deal single-handed with so large a charge as that entrusted to the Resident in Turkish Arabia and Consul-General in Baghdad. The country under my political supervision measures about 140,000 square miles, and it is part of my duty to keep the Imperial and Indian Governments informed of all political events of importance which may happen throughout this extensive country, of the movements of the Kurds in the North and North-East, of the condition of affairs on the Turco-Persian Frontier, and of the relations of the Arab tribes towards each other and towards the Ottoman officials. I have to correspond with the Local Ottoman officials, with the Foreign Consuls, French, Russian, and Persian (with the two former the correspondence is in French which I have to translate myself), with my two Assistants at Basrah and Mosul, with the Resident in the Persian Gulf, with the Governments of India and Bombay, with the English Foreign office and the Ambassador at Constantinople, and occasionally also with the Minister at Tehran. I have also the charge of an Indian Post Office, which is largely used as a channel for the import of valuable merchandise, and of a Treasury. And whereas in India the duty of personally certifying the balances of cash in the Treasury on the last day of the month and submitting the Treasury and stamp accounts on certain fixed dates, is ordinarily assigned to a young Assistant Magistrate, at Baghdad the duty devolves upon me.

It hampers me very much, for it obliges me to be present in Baghdad on certain specified days. Petty litigation and petty disputes among the British Indians take up a further large share of my time. Then I get a number of telegrams, necessarily in cipher, for every open telegram is seen by the Turkish authorities, and which have to be answered in cipher. The English and the Indian Governments do not use the same code so that I have sometimes to communicate the same message in two different ciphers, and as I am obliged by stringent orders to do cipher work entirely by myself, all other business has in the interval to be put aside.

* * * * *

Naturally, I have frequent business with the Vali and other Ottoman officials. Very little can be done in Baghdad by despatch writing and at the same time it is not always convenient or proper that I should go in person to the Vali or his subordinates. And yet I have no person on whom I can rely to send in my place. The Native Agent and the Armenian Dragoman are local Christians who carry no weight and who are really afraid of the Vali. I am most reluctant to send them for they can rarely get anything done, and yet practically I have no choice. Contrast my position with that of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. I have at least as much work to do and yet while I am single-handed, the Resident at Bushire has an Assistant Resident (until lately he had two), and a Treasury officer of the status of an Extra Assistant Commissioner. There is no comparison between my work and that of the French Consul at Baghdad, the proportion is as ten to one, and yet the latter is allowed by his Government an European Assistant carefully trained in the Oriental College at Paris.

Moreover, the value of Baghdad as a field for training a young Political Officer is worthy of some consideration. He would have an unrivalled opportunity of learning Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, of mixing with Orientals of many and various types, and of seeing what Muhammadanism is like in a country where Islam is the dominant faith. I cannot help thinking that, if Baghdad were nearer India, the necessity of giving the Resident an Assistant would have been recognised long before this, and I am strongly of opinion that the public interests suffer through the omission to appoint one.

The reply of the Government of India to the Secretary of State was to the following effect :—

It would undoubtedly be useful to the Resident, and advantageous to the Government of India, to add an Assistant to the Residency Staff. At the same time we are not satisfied that the work of the Baghdad Residency and Consulate is sufficiently heavy to justify the expense which would be incurred in creating a fresh appointment in our political service, as proposed by Mr. Plowden. We shall endeavour, however, to depute to Baghdad from time to time any young officer who may not be required for more urgent duty elsewhere.

Colonel Tweedie about the same time, while in acting charge at Baghdad, suggested that one or two Sunni Muhammadan attachés from India might be added to the Residency instead of a European Officer.

At length in 1891, in submitting a scheme for the reorganisation of the Oudh Bequest by which a considerable amount of additional work would be thrown on the Residency, Colonel Tweedie, who had become Resident, referred to an opinion expressed by Colonel Kemball in 1867

and represented that, if his own proposals were accepted, the addition of an Assistant to the Residency staff would certainly be required. But he did not base the suggestion exclusively on the increase of work which might be expected to attend the alteration of the Oudh Bequest arrangements, as will appear from the following extracts from one of his letters :

The only second commissioned officer we now have is the Residency Surgeon. As it happens, Brigade-Surgeon Bowman is not without experience of civil charges, and his readiness to help in non-professional work deserves the fullest recognition. But his successor may not be equally qualified for the performance from time to time of political, consular, judicial, treasury, duties ; and in any case the charge of an important Residency, or even the assisting of the Resident in his daily duties and correspondence, does not form properly part of a Medical Officer's role, especially when, as is here now and usually the case, that Medical Officer practices his profession equally in Russian, French and Osmanli circles.

* * * * *

Firstly, there are *general* grounds. Russia is fast projecting her shadow over the Tigris and Euphrates. In May of last year she re-established a Consulate here after it had been in abeyance for three years. The other day a young gentleman of the same nationality and social status as the Consul, fresh from the Oriental College, St. Petersburg, which has made him a good Persian linguist to start with, arrived at Baghdad as Secretary or Assistant. Two Frenchmen similarly officer the Consulate of France, and yet the subjects of the latter Consulate at Baghdad and Mosul fall short, I believe, of a hundred ; while the stream of pilgrims from newly made Russian provinces, if now beginning, is only just beginning to flow towards Karbala and Najaf. On the other hand, the British Resident with a *clientèle* (English, German, Greek, Afghan, Indian) counted by thousands ; with as many calls on him from the side of Europe as of India, and with the seaport of Bussorah for an outpost ; has no one except an over-occupied medical officer to confide in ; no one to assist him in his secondary duties so that he may engage the more in cultivating and extending through intercourse with all classes that personal influence on which so much is here dependent : most serious of all ; no one to whom he can fittingly entrust the Residency, with all its multifarious responsibilities and contingencies, on his moving out were it but to Karbala or Bussorah.

Later, however, Colonel Tweedie allowed that, until a serious increase in work connected with the Oudh Bequest or in the touring duties of the Resident occurred, the question of adding an Assistant to the Residency might be suffered to remain in suspense ; and it apparently dropped for the time being.

In November 1904 Major Newmarch, then Resident, represented the difficulty he experienced in drawing up trade reports and disposing of the consular work of the Residency, besides performing the more important political duties which occupied most of his time. The result of his application was the appointment to Baghdad in 1905 of an Assistant to the Resident for Trade and Commerce, whose salary was debited in equal moieties to the Government of India and to His

Appointment
of a Commer-
cial Assistant
to the Resi-
dent at
Baghdad,
1904-1905.

Majesty's Government; but the new officer was not invested with consular powers. The first occupant of the post thus created was Mr. J. C. Gaskin, who had been for a number of years employed under the Government of India in the Persian Gulf in different capacities; but it was suggested that his successors should be supplied from the Levant Consular service.

The British
Government
steamer
"Comet,"
1880—1894.

It will be remembered that so far back as 1868 it had been decided to replace the Residency steamer "Comet" by a new vessel, and that in 1869 authorisation for doing so had been obtained from the Porte, but that delay due to various causes supervened.

1880—1884.

It was only in 1880 that it was at last decided to build a new vessel; and in 1882, before it was ready, the "Comet" had become unserviceable. A steamer named the "London" was accordingly hired for the Resident's temporary use, but she foundered in the Shatt-al-'Arab without reaching Baghdād; and, though efforts were made to obtain a suitable steam launch as a substitute, none could be got. When the successor of the "Comet", built at Bombay, was finished, it was found that she had been made too large for the navigation of the Tigris; the result was further delay. At last the new vessel was ready: her cost was Rs. 93,494, towards which His Majesty's Government apparently contributed £3,000; she was armed with two Nordenfelt guns; and the long familiar name of "Comet" was perpetuated in her. There was some doubt as to the manner in which the replacement of the old by the new "Comet" would be received by the Turkish authorities, but permission was granted by the Porte on condition that both vessels should not be in the Tigris at the same time. The old "Comet" was accordingly broken up at Baghdād, and* the new ship entered the river in October 1884.

1887—1889.

In 1887, the "Comet" having grounded during a voyage, Colonel Tweedie, the Resident, suggested that she should be removed elsewhere and a vessel more suitable to the rivers of Mesopotamia supplied for Baghdād; but, as she could not be utilised at any other place or sold (except at a great loss), and as Her Majesty's Government would have to be consulted regarding her disposal, the suggestion was negatived by the Government of India. In 1889 Colonel Tweedie again remarked on the unsuitability of the "Comet" and urged her replacement by a steam launch, which would be more economical and more useful. Afterwards,

* The new "Comet" was taken back to Bombay and lengthened in 1904-5. Her length is now (1912) 131 feet 6 inches, her gross tonnage 182 and her draught 3 feet, to 3 feet 6 inches. In 1909 she was provided with bullet-proof steel plating, completely protecting the bridge-deck, guns, and engine-room.

his meaning having been misunderstood, he explained that he was far from advocating the "Comet's" removal "except as a companion measure to Baghdad being furnished with another vessel, built on different lines and administered less as a unit in a great department (Indian Marine) than as a means of carrying out certain reasonable duties in Ottoman waters ; " and he anticipated that, if the Eupharates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's steamers one day ceased to run, the "Comet" would be invaluable as a despatch boat and a means of transport. Such being his views, he was informed that the replacement of the "Comet" presented many difficulties, and that no immediate action would be taken.

In the meantime a proposal to station the "Comet" principally at Basrah had fallen through, in consequence of the rejection of a scheme for the appointment of the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah to be Consul at Muhammareh also, under which the services of a British Government steamer on the Shatt-al-'Arāb and Kārūn would frequently have been required.

In the winter of 1893-1894, as already mentioned in another connection, the two Nordenfelt machine-guns forming the "Comet's" armament were exchanged at Basrah for others of a newer pattern, taking the Martini-Henry cartridge. 1893-1894.

In 1904 Major Newmarch, the Resident, asked to be furnished with a launch for short journeys on the river at Baghdad, representing that the need for some such convenience was now great in consequence of the removal of the Residency from the centre to the outskirts of the town. The Government of India were willing to provide a launch ; but His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople thought that great difficulties might arise if the Porte were approached on the subject of this proposed addition to the Residency establishment, and suggested other methods. The matter was arranged, but not till after 1905, when a motor launch by Thornycroft was supplied. Question of a launch for the Baghdad Residency, 1904-1905.

It has been shown that in 1861 the Indian military guard of the Baghdad Residency consisted of only 10 men, having been reduced from a former strength of about 30 on the institution of a small mounted escort for the Resident, recruited locally. British military guard at Baghdad, 1878-1905.

In 1878 the military guard, which had to watch the Residency building, in which there was a Treasury, as well as their own quarters and the stables of the mounted escort which were then at some distance from the Residency, was found to be too small for the duties required of 1878-1882.

it and was increased to 16 rifles. In May 1882 it was raised to 25 of all ranks, including a Native Officer.

1883—1885.

In 1883 the Porte complained of the increase ; and at the beginning of 1884 Mr. Plowden, the Resident, reported on the question, giving the history of the guard and its fluctuations from the first, explaining the circumstances which necessitated its presence and governed its strength, and deprecating any reduction of it as a concession to Turkish demands. For the better part of a century the guard had been annually relieved without remark on the part of the Turkish authorities ; and Mr. Plowden was inclined to attribute the objections now raised to the influence of the Wāli, Taqi-ud-dīn Pāsha and other leading Turkish officials at Baghdād, whose dispositions were intensely anti-British, and to the policy of the Turkish Government of the day, which aimed at the suppression of foreign influence in all parts of the Empire. The facts of the case having been explained to the Porte, nothing more was said upon either side ; but in March 1885, on the arrival of the yearly relief of the guard by British steamer, the Turkish Chief of Customs at Baghdād expressed to the Dragoman of the British Residency a doubt, eventually overcome, whether in the absence of special authority from Constantinople he would be justified in allowing them to land with their arms.

1914.

At the beginning of 1904 an atrocious and discreditable affair took place in the Residency guard, which during the hundred years of its existence had hitherto remained, so far as is known, free from serious crime.

During the absence of Major Newmarch, the Resident, on a winter tour, Jamadar Ghulām Dīn, the Native Officer commanding the guard, which was then a detachment from the 125th (Napier's) Rifles, disappeared ; and for some time no trace of him could be found. The Jamadar, as a strict disciplinarian, was not very popular with his own men ; and there was also considerable feeling against him in the regiment as a whole, on account of his having been promoted into it with a commission from the 9th Bombay Infantry, in which he had been a non-commissioned officer. At length, on the 11th February, information was given by a Lance-Naik of the detachment named 'Abdul Karīm which resulted in the discovery of the Jamadar's body, buried with his hand lantern in a Khān or warehouse on the further side of the river rented by Mr. D'Arcy of the Persian Oil Company : the corpse bore fourteen dagger wounds. Enquiry showed that the murder was probably the result of a conspiracy in the detachment.

On the 18th February Lance-Naik 'Abdul Karīm suddenly ran amok and shot dead three of his comrades of the guard and two Afghan Qawwāses belonging to the Residency establishment. The only motive that could be assigned for the deed was that he feared the consequences of disclosures which he had made to the Resident concerning some of the men in the detachment, and thought to anticipate revenge. From the Residency he retired to the quarters of the detachment in the town, where he established himself on the roof and threatened to shoot anyone who came near; but Major Newmarch and Captain Cox, the Residency Surgeon, having approached him by a neighbouring roof, persuaded him to give himself up.

The guard as a whole appearing untrustworthy on account of these occurrences, and the death of the Qawwāses having caused among the Afghans of Baghdād a ferment that greatly alarmed the Turkish authorities and was only allayed by the influence of the Naqīb, Major Newmarch handed over 12 men of the guard suspected of complicity in the murder of the Jamadar, as also Lance-Naik 'Abdul Karīm, to the Turkish authorities for temporary custody; the remainder he confined to their own lines, where a Turkish guard was posted for their protection. A Turkish guard was also, at Major Newmarch's request, sent to the Residency as a provisional substitute for the Residency guard, and remained until the 21st March, when a new detachment from the 120th Bombay infantry arrived from India under the command of Captain Fisher.

In the case of the Jamadar's murder no evidence could be obtained warranting the commitment of any person for trial. The most plausible theory, on the few facts ascertained, was that the victim had been decoyed to the Khān where his body was found, and where the only resident was an Afghan caretaker named 'Abdullah, and there murdered by 'Abdullah and another Afghan named Akram, possibly with the assistance of a boatman named 'Abbās who was a Turkish subject.

The circumstances of the murders committed by Lance-Naik 'Abdur Karīm were investigated by Major Newmarch; and the accused was tried at Baghdād on the 19th April by Mr. G. B. Piggott, the Judge of His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Consular Court in the Ottoman Dominions, who travelled from Constantinople for the purpose. This was the procedure approved by the Government of India, to whom His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had recommended that the case should be disposed of either by the Supreme Consular Court, or by the High Court of Bombay, or by an Indian Court-Martial. The result of

the trial was the conviction of the prisoner, who was sentenced to death ; but his punishment was afterwards commuted to imprisonment for 20 years with hard labour, the maximum penalty that could be inflicted under the Ottoman Order in Council, and he was removed to India to undergo his sentence there. .

The remaining men of the guard were sent back to India and discharged from the army ; 'Abdullah and Akram, the two Afghans supposed to have been implicated in the murder of the Jamadar, were deported to India and thence to Afghanistan ; and pensions, payable till death or remarriage, were granted to the Arab widows of the two murdered Qawwāses.

It should be mentioned that the Turkish authorities showed a strong disposition to retain in their custody the men of the guard handed over to them who were suspected of complicity in the murder of the Jamadar, and claimed that the whole of the suspects in that case should, on account of the Turkish subject Abbās being one of them, be dealt with by the Turkish police and courts. The demand was successfully resisted, however, by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople ; the prisoners in question were retransferred to British custody ; and on the 23rd April the outgoing detachment left Baghdad for India in charge of Captain Fisher.

At one stage of the affair the Resident called on the Commander of the "*Comet*" to furnish a lascar guard for the custody of sepoy prisoners in the Residency. The Commander complied with the requisition ; but a strong protest against it was lodged by the Director of the Royal Indian Marine on the ground that " the action of the "Resident was illegal, inasmuch as the crew of the *Comet* was neither "enrolled under the Indian Marine Act nor subject to the Indian "Articles of War, and that had it been necessary to use force, the "Officer Commanding the *Comet* might have been involved in serious "consequences." These objections were overruled by the Government of India, however, who remarked :

The Government of India are advised that the action of the Resident was not illegal, and that the matter was one for him to deal with purely from the standpoint of expediency. As he considered that he could not trust the prisoners to a guard of their brother soldiers, it was incumbent upon him to take any step he considered necessary, in reason and good faith, for their safe custody. He was competent, therefore, to require for that purpose the aid of any officer or man serving under the Government of India, and the fact that the lascars were not subject to the Marine Act or Articles of War does not alter the position. The Government of India, therefore, consider it unnecessary to issue any instructions to restrict the Resident from employing lascars as a guard in future. The Resident must be the sole

judge of the expediency of such a measure, and the propriety of any similar action taken by him in reason and good faith cannot be questioned. In these circumstances the responsibility for any untoward circumstances arising from the employment of lascars would rest with the Resident.

On the 1st April 1905 the British Residency at Baghdād was transferred from the place where it had been established at a date earlier than 1840, on the river front about the middle of the town, to a more eligible site further down the river, but on the same (that is, the eastern) bank.

The
Residency
building at
Baghdād.

The old Residency had its advantages and was thus described by a traveller * in 1878 :

By far the pleasantest place in Bagdad is the British Residency, a beautiful old house built round two large courtyards and having a long frontage to the river. There is a delightful terrace overlooking the water, with an alley of old orange trees and a Kiosque or summer-house and steps, leading down to a little quay where the consular boats are moored. Inside, the house is decorated in the Persian style of the last century, one of the most elaborate and charming styles ever invented, with deep fretted ceilings, walls panelled in minute cabinet work, sometimes inlaid with looking glass, sometimes richly gilt. Only the dining room is studiously English, in deference to Anglo-Indian prejudice, its decorations, apparently fresh from Maple's, forming a theme for admiration for the Bagdadis who come to pay their respects to Her Majesty's Consul-General.

The building was the property of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah at the time of his death in 1887 and was held on lease from him at a rent of R4,014 a year, towards which the Government of India contributed R1,884, the Resident R1,200, the Residency Surgeon R570, and His Majesty's Government R360. After the death of the Nawāb the property continued to be leased on the same terms from his trustees. In 1896 the building was bought by Āgha Muhammad, himself a trustee, who was also British Agent at Kādhimain, for R1,24,750 ; and from the 1st May of that year the rent was increased to R4,990 per annum, of which R2,550 was borne by the Government of India (who also allowed a sum not exceeding R1,200 a year for repairs), R1,400 by the Resident, R570 by the Residency Surgeon, and R470 by His Majesty's Government. The lease was renewed for three years on these terms in 1899, and once again for three years in 1902, on the old conditions for the first year but on a monthly rent of R460 for the second and R580 for the third year, exclusive of the allowance for repairs.

* Lady Anne Blunt (*Bedouin's of the Euphrates*, Volume I, page 188).

Meanwhile various disadvantages of the old Residency had made themselves felt. The site was central, with reference to the town; but the quarters of the military guard were in another place; the Residency building was falling into decay; and, in so far as the Resident was concerned, the arrangement under which he occupied a few rooms in what was otherwise a public office was inconvenient on account of the want of privacy. The disposition of the rooms and courtyards was appropriate from the point of view of a Muhammadan nobleman possessing a large harem, but it was unsuitable for the quarters of a British Officer. Moreover, the proprietor, after 1896, was an Honorary British Agent whose management of affairs under the Oudh Bequest had given rise to unfavourable comments; his intentions were uncertain, but it was believed that he wished to get the property into his own hands; and it was undesirable that the British Resident (and it might be said the British Government) should lie under any obligation to him. In event of his refusing to renew the lease, it was doubtful whether other suitable premises could be found at Baghdād, at least on any reasonable rent.

In these circumstances Colonel Mockler, the Resident, drew attention in 1892 to another property belonging to the late Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, which also had passed into the hands of Āgha Muhammad; this was a river bank estate of about three acres which he suggested should be acquired by the Government of India as a site on which to construct a new Residency of their own. Matters moved slowly; but in 1900 the purchase of the land at a cost of R36,000 was sanctioned and effected, the property being registered in the Turkish Land Records Department, on the analogy of the British Consulate at Basrah—in regard to which there had been a long controversy with the Porte—in the name of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople. The construction of the buildings, including public offices, quarters for the Resident, a separate house for the Residency Surgeon, military barracks and guard-house, a hospital, a post office, servant's houses, stables, godowns and a high enclosure wall, was entrusted to Messrs. Herman & Co. of Karachi, by whom it was completed between 1902 and 1905 at a total cost of R3,24,303. The new Residency was satisfactory in all respects, except that the public offices and the Resident's quarters were again included under the same roof, and that a house projecting further in the direction of the river was subsequently constructed by the Naqīb of Baghdād immediately

upstream of it, which considerably impaired the amenity of its situation. When finished, it was the most imposing edifice in Baghdād.

Difficulties were at one time created by the local Turkish authorities in connection with the retaining wall of the terrace on the river, which they asserted would interfere with the course of the stream; but their objections were frivolous, and by the intervention of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople they were removed.

The question of the representation of British interests at Karbala and Kādhimain during the greater part of the period now under consideration was very closely bound up with that of the administration of the Oudh Bequest, as will be apparent on reference to a later section of the present chapter in which that subject is discussed. In 1877 the affairs of the domiciled British Indian colony at Karbala, always a large one, were superintended by Haidar 'Ali Khān, an Indian nobleman, a native of Lucknow, and a connection it is understood of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, who was styled in correspondence the Honorary British Agent; and a similar position was held at Kādhimain by Muhammad Husain Khān, a son of Ghulam Muhammad Khān, of Arcot. Haidar 'Ali Khān was succeeded at Karbala by Muhammad Taqi Khān, another son of Ghulam Muhammad Khān, about 1884; and in 1888, on the death of Muhammad Husain Khān, the Kādhimain appointment was conferred on Āgha Muhammad, the son of the deceased. Muhammad Taqi Khān and Āga Muhammad were generally described as "Honorary Agents" of the Residency; and so in a sense they were, for the British Government paid them nothing; but, as is explained elsewhere, they were allowed to pay themselves salaries out of the Oudh Bequest, under which they were "Indian Distributors." Their work was to represent the Resident in all local matters and to supervise the legal business, disputes, etc., of resident British Indians; and a functionary for the performance of these duties was undoubtedly necessary at Karbala; but at Kādhimain, only a short distance from Baghdād, the need for one—apart from the distributions under the Oudh Bequest carried on there until 1902—was open to question.

Representation of British interests at Karbala and Kādhimain, 1876-93.

Difficulties frequently arose from the unofficial character of the Agencies and from their non-recognition by the Turkish authorities. In 1879 Colonel Miles, the Resident, after a tour to Karbala, advised that Haidar 'Ali Khān, the Agent there, while remaining Honorary, should be invested with consular *status quo* at Karbala and Najaf, and provided with a small staff; but the proposal was negatived by His Majesty's Government on the ground of expense. In 1885

Mr. Plowden, then Resident, advocated the creation of British Consular Agencies at Karbala and Kādhimain; but the time was considered inappropriate for moving in the matter on account of discussions in regard to new Consular Agencies which were already in progress between His Majesty's Government and the Porte.

In 1890 Colonel Tweedie, as Resident, in proposing a reorganisation of Oudh Bequest arrangements, made further suggestions on the subject; and the terms of his reference may be quoted verbatim, as throwing considerable light on the character of the Karbala Agency at that and at an earlier period :

At Karbala, on the contrary*, not only is it impossible for the Residency to be left unrepresented; but one of the wants of the present time is the provision of a better agency than we have had there hitherto. This twofold statement requires some exposition. *Imprimis*, Karbala, as already noted, is three days by ordinary travelling from Baghdad. Next, some four or five thousand British Indian subjects (counting Kashmiris, but not mere pilgrims) are settled there. Cases are therefore frequent in which immediate action or protection on the part of the Residency is demanded. Perhaps an Indian commits a murder, or is murdered, or dies suddenly, leaving mule-loads of valuables; perhaps another is pressed as a conscript, or sent to prison. Out of this might naturally issue the proposal to retain *in situ* the present Indian Distributor, Muhammad Taki Khan, gazette him Agent, and pay him from imperial revenue. But not to touch again on the contingency (*i.e.*, if Nawab Sir Ikbāl-ud-Daula's Will should stand) of this man's finding himself soon a principal executor under it, with all his amiable qualities, and all his prestige as an Indian of position, it is perfectly impossible to regard him as in our sense an official. In Dr. Bowman's memorandum a glimpse of him is given, also a typical instance of how a factotum lodged in his skirts has been suffered to fleece people. Under the old régime he simply was a post set up by the Nawab Sir Ikbāl-ud-Daula at Karbala. With the Nawab's influence (at time possibly even wealth) to back him, there is no doubt that he could by innumerable circuitous methods protect at Karbala those having to be protected, and constrain even the town officials; many of whom may have owed their appointments to Sir Ikbāl-ud-Daula's interests with their Government. But all that is ended. What is now required for Karbala *cum* Najaf is an out and out official, transferable elsewhere at any time; whose status should be that of an Attaché posted to this Residency, and available for service chiefly at those two important centres. Some may hold that because our subjects there are Shias, the Attaché should be a Shia also. With deference I am here inclined to differ. A European would be out of his element; but as the Ottoman officials of the two towns in question, as of this country generally, are chiefly Sunnis; and as it would be on his personal influence and acceptance with them that our representative's power of helping Indians in their affairs with the Local Government would turn, I think he should be a Sunni. A coin of the realm is as good for Osmanli officialdom in the hand of a Shia as of a Sunni. But for an employé with no secret service fund to aid him the more in touch he is personally with the authorities the better for those depending on him. Dr. Bowman also, as will be observed, records it in his memorandum, and the truth of it may be taken as absolutely certain, that

* *Viz.*, in opposition to Kādhimain and Najaf.

among all the Indians settled in Karbala not one is to be looked for possessed of the smallest qualifications to serve the Government there as salaried agent. I knew Muhammad Taki Khan's predecessor; and unstable as is the present Distributor, the other was even more so. Had it been possible to set up a stronger one out of existing material, or without bringing this whole subject exhaustively under the review of Government, Muhammad Taki Khan would not all this time have been left in office.

In the same year a case occurred in which the Turkish authorities absolutely declined to recognise or deal with the Agent at Karbala; the occasion was the arrest of three Indians by the Turkish police. In 1891 Colonel Tweedie further remarked:

The Residency Agent at Karbala *cum* Najaf as (a) naturally of weak and circuitous character; (b) generally in but feeble health; (c) an Indian; (d) a Shia; (e) invested with no very definite, or recognised official, status, is unequal to the task of influencing two potent Mujtahids or fathers of his religion. I say this not to disparage him. Not only do I know of no one better than he, but I know of no one at all among Indians domiciled at Karbala fit to fill his very peculiar situation, supposing him to resign it.

Colonel Tweedie's representations did not, however, result in any change of system chiefly perhaps in consequence of the Government of India's declining, for the time being, to authorise any changes in the administration of the Oudh Bequest.

In 1892 Colonel Tweedie's successor in the Residency, Colonel Mockler, again represented the matter, requesting that an *exequatur* should be procured for the Agent at Karbala; and, it having been explained to His Majesty's Government that the Agent's salary would, as heretofore, be paid from the Oudh Bequest, the proposal was adopted. On the 10th August 1893 the Porte instructed the Wāli of Baghdād to recognise the British Agent at Karbala as a Consular Agent. Muhammad Taqi Khān had in the meantime been succeeded by his nephew Āghā Ibrāhīm, a brother of Āghā Muhammad, who consequently became the first British Consular Agent at Karbala. In 1894 the Wāli of Baghdād paid a visit to Karbala, where he treated Āgha Ibrahim—largely, it was thought out of personal considerations—with marked civility and attention.

Appoint-
ment of a
British
Consular
Agent at
Karbala,
1893.

After this no change occurred until 1902, when Major Newmarch, as Resident, undertook a radical reform of the Oudh Bequest arrangements. As mentioned in another place, he abolished the irregular and (by the Turks) unrecognised Agency at Kādhimain, along with emoluments of the Agent (as Indian Distributor) under the Oudh Bequest; and, while he recommended the retention of a British representative at Karbala and

Appointment
of a British
Vice-Consul
at Karbala
and abolition
of the
Kādhima
Agency,
1902-03.

provisionally continued the salary allowed to the existing Agent from the Oudh Bequest, he proposed that the salary of the post should in future be paid from Government revenue, and that there should be a change of personnel. His recommendations ran as follows :

The question of the future payment of the Consular Agent at Karbala is a somewhat important matter. I think it would be a great pity if the post were abolished, for in the charge of a competent man it might be a very useful and important outpost. The present incumbent is in my opinion unsuited for the charge. He cannot talk Hindustani, he is not in my opinion sufficiently intelligent or energetic, and he has been too much implicated in the scandals arising out of the Oudh Bequest to render his retention there expedient.

If any suggestions from me are allowed, I would recommend that he be succeeded by a Shiah Muhammadan of good family from India, who has had some official experience either in the lower grades of the Civil Service or in a Native State. It is essential he should know Persian well and it would be good if he knew enough English to write a confidential letter.

I do not suggest the appointment of a European officer, because his position would be insupportably lonely and might in times of religious excitement be even dangerous. Moreover, I imagine that the cost of his appointment and maintenance would be considerably greater than that of a Mahomedan. To a Shiah, residence at Karbala should be most acceptable, and there are probably many worthy Deputy Collectors in India who would gladly spend their pensions and die there.

The outcome of Major Newmarch's proposals was the establishment of a British Vice-Consulate at Karbala on the 1st November 1903, with the assent of the Porte, under Mirza Muhammad Hasan Khan Muhsin, an intelligent and well educated British subject of an Afghan but Persianised family, born in Turkish 'Irāq. The cost of the Vice-Consul's salary and establishment became a charge on Indian revenues exclusively, no contribution to it being made payable by Her Majesty's Government.

We have seen that in 1873 the designation of Mr. Robertson, the British Agent (and Vice-Consul) at Basrah was altered to that of Assistant Political Agent, and that he was at the same time admitted to the Indian Political Service. In 1877, as has been described in another connection, a question arose as to the exact position of Mr. Robertson with reference to the Indian and Home Governments, which was then defined. In October of that year the Basrah appointment was formally brought on the graded list of the Political Department of the Government of India.

In 1879, on an application from Mr. Robertson supported by the Resident at Baghdad, his consular status was enhanced from that of Vice-Consul to that of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, subject to the proviso, laid down by the London Foreign Office, "that the appointment

British Assistant Political Agent at Basrah and its elevation (1879) from a Vice-Consulate to a Consulate, 1876-98.

“gives Mr. Robertson no claims upon Her Majesty’s Government for his services as His Majesty’s Consul, and he will remain as heretofore under the jurisdiction of His Majesty’s Consul-General at Baghdād.”

In 1884 a question arose as to the necessity of obtaining a Turkish *exequatur* as Consul in the name of every Assistant Political Agent appointed to take charge, temporarily or permanently, at Basrah. The occasion was the absence on leave of Mr. Robertson, the substantive Consul, during which application had been made for a fresh *exequatur* in the name of Lieutenant H. Ramsay, one of the officers nominated to officiate in his place. The Government of India were informed, on the authority of Her Majesty’s Foreign Office, that, when a permanent Consul holding an *exequatur* for the post existed, it was within the competence of Her Britannic Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make an acting appointment without reference to the Porte.

In 1885 Colonel Mockler, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, having entered into direct correspondence, in his capacity as Consul, with Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Tweedie, the Political Resident at Baghdād, protested against the innovation; and it was ordered by the Government of India that the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah should transmit his consular correspondence to the Foreign Office through Her Britannic Majesty’s Consulate-General at Baghdād. In 1888 Colonel Tweedie remarked that orders were being sent direct by the Foreign Office to the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, and the Government of India informed both the officers concerned that all correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Basrah Consulate should take place, under flying seal, through Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul-General at Baghdād.

At the end of 1897 Mr. G. S. Mackenzie, London, a partner in the firm of Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co., at Basrah, approached Her Majesty’s Foreign Office with reference to the frequency of changes in the personnel of Her Britannic Majesty’s Consulate at Basrah. A table attached to his letter showed that charge of the Consulate had changed hands 19 times in 16 years. He contended that under such a system the officers appointed had no time to acquire the requisite influence over local Turkish officials and the native community, and that the result was disadvantageous to British trade.

Transfers of the Basrah appointment from the Government of India to Her Majesty’s Government, 1897-98.

The Government of India, on the matter being referred to them, considered that changes must inevitably be frequent so long as the appointment was filled by officers on the graded list of their Political Department, as that Department was then organised; and they therefore suggested the

transference of the post to Her Majesty's Government with a view to its being manned in future from His Majesty's Consular Service. At the same time they offered a money contribution for the maintenance of the Consulate equal to its whole average cost during the previous five years, and intimated their willingness that Her Majesty's Government should adjust the relations of the Consul at Basrah with the Resident at Baghdād, to whom he had hitherto been subordinate.

These proposals were accepted by Her Majesty's Government. The Indian contribution was fixed at £1,400, a charge which was to be liable to revision at the end of five years; and Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah was placed under the superintendence of the Political Resident at Baghdād in his character of Consul-General. The British Indian Post Office at Basrah was retained, in connection with the Consulate, at the expense of the Government of India; but an Indian Sub-Treasury which had existed in the Consulate was closed. The first Consul under the new arrangements was Mr. A. C. Wratislaw, who assumed charge of his duties at Basrah on the 12th December 1898.

Allowance
for a medical
officer at
Basrah, from
1890.

The need of medical arrangements for the benefit of the British community at Basrah, which had long been felt, was emphasised by the death of Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent, and his two children from cholera in August 1889; and in the following year his successor, Captain Ravenshaw, met with an accident and could obtain no skilled assistance. There was a small resident British community, and the number of Europeans on board British vessels lying in the port was at times considerable. In these circumstances the Government of India agreed to contribute £100 per mensem towards the salary of a private medical practitioner whom the British mercantile firms at Basrah proposed to engage for their employés, on condition of his affording his services to Government servants at Basrah. Dr. Eustace, Dr. Jagannatham and Dr. Dobbryn were the first medical men employed at Basrah under the combined arrangement. The contribution of the Government of India to the doctor's salary merged in the payment of £1,400 a year which, after 1898, they made to Her Majesty's Government on account of the Basrah post.

Official
residence of
the British
representa-
tive at
Basrah,
1878-1903.

It will be remembered that in 1875 the British representative at Basrah was accommodated in a hired house for which rent, at the rate of £100 a month, was paid to an ostensible owner, Hāji Ibrāhīm, regarding whose title to the property there was some doubt. The lease was not terminable except by consent of the tenant, and the Assistant

Political Agent's position was therefore legally a strong one. But about 1883, in view of the dissatisfaction of the Hāji, which had been vigorously manifested in 1878 and 1881, the Government of India directed the Political Resident in Turkish 'Irāq to report what other arrangements for a house could be made; and meanwhile the rent paid to the Hāji was increased to $\text{R}250$ a month on an understanding that no objection should be made to the retention of the house by Government during the year 1884. Good sites on which a house might be built by Government were available on the further bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab at Gardilān, Tanūmah, etc., but there were obstacles in the way of their purchase, and a fresh lease of the house occupied by the Consulate had to be taken for the year 1885, and apparently for subsequent years. Eventually, in consequence of recommendations made by Colonel Tweedie as Resident in 1885, the Government of India in 1890 decided to buy the premises for so long hired, together with other land, for $\text{R}65,000$. The great delay in reaching this decision was due to difficulties regarding validity of title and other points, which were at last overcome.

When the time arrived for registration of the transfer of ownership, the Turkish authorities tried to insist that some private individual should be entered in their official records as the owner, and objected strenuously to the property being shown as acquired by the Government of India, Her Majesty's Secretary of State, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, or even "the British Consul." Their obstruction seems to have been prolonged from 1890 or 1891 until 1895, when His Majesty the Sultān at last, by an *Irādē*, sanctioned the registration of the property in the name of the British Embassy at Constantinople.

About 1900, owing to subsidence of the foundations, the Consulate building became uninhabitable; and in 1901-02 the Consul had to take up his abode temporarily in a hired building. The Basrah appointment had in the meantime passed to Her Majesty's Government; but the Government of India, in view of the bad state of the building at the time of its transfer, undertook to reconstruct it at their own expense; and a new and good building on the same site was completed in 1903, under arrangements made by them, at a cost of about $\text{£}4,000$. A special agreement was made as to the division of the cost of future repairs between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, the post office rooms in the building being regarded as the property of the latter.

His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Mūsāl, 1876-1905.

Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Mūsāl, founded before the middle of the 19th century, continued in existence during the greater part of the period now under review and remained under the superintendence of the Political Resident at Baghdād as Consul-General; but its affairs came little under notice, owing to the non-existence of British subjects or material interests at Mūsāl. The erection of Mūsāl into a Wilāyat in 1879 increased the importance of the Vice-Consulate; but so late as 1886 the Vice-Consul himself was, as a rule, the only British subject resident in the Mūsāl Consular district.

The British representative at Mūsāl in 1878 was Mr. J. F. Russell, who had served under Sir Samuel Baker in equatorial Africa, and who was a son of the distinguished journalist Dr. Howard Russell. He was succeeded by Mr. W. S. Richards, who remained in occupation of the post from November 1883 to December 1885; and Mr. Richards was followed by Mr. H. H. Lamb.

Proposed British Consular Agency at Fāo, 1894-1896.

At the end of 1894, in view of the persistent harassment of British Indian vessels on the lower Shatt-el-'Arab by the Turkish authorities, already described, Colonel Mockler, Resident at Baghdād, suggested that an officer of the British Telegraph Station at Fāo should be appointed British Consular Agent there during the season of the exportation of dates, *viz.*, in the months of September, October and November, in each year. The Government of India approved of the suggestion, and Her Majesty's Government adopted it and allotted a sum of £30 per annum for the remuneration of the post. In 1896 Colonel Mockler, by a letter of authority, appointed Mr. Mungavin of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to be British Consular Agent at Fāo; but the Porte refused to recognise the appointment. On the 22nd September 1896 a note was addressed to the Turkish Government informing them that unless the point were conceded, a British war vessel would be sent to Fāo for the protection of British interests; and a month later H. M. S. *Lapwing* proceeded thither. At length, in December 1896, satisfactory assurances having been received from the Porte in regard to the future treatment of British Indian vessels, as related elsewhere, the demand for a British Consular Agency at Fāo was withdrawn.

The British Indian Post Offices in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876-1905.

The affairs of the British Indian Post Offices in Turkish 'Irāq are fully related in the special Appendix on Mail Communications. After 1899 there were complaints of irregularity and unpunctuality in the carriage of the British mail by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam

Navigation Company, which did not cease on the conclusion of a new contract with the Company in 1904.

Special British Indian interests in Turkish 'Irāq, 1876—1905.

The powerful personality of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah of Oudh, G.C.S.I., looms through our pages from time to time, in connection especially with the Oudh Bequest and the British Agencies at Karbala and Kādhimain ; and a few words may be said in regard to himself and his personal affairs. His history up to 1866 has been given already in an earlier section of the present chapter. Two interesting pictures of the Nawāb are given by British travellers of the time and may be quoted *in extenso*.

Nawāb
Iqbāl-ud-
Daulah and
his affairs,
1876-1887.

* The Nawab Ikhbal-ood-Dowlah was, some forty years ago, King of the Oudh for a few days, but his right to the succession being overruled by the British Government, he left Lucknow and India, and took up his abode at Baghdad. He visited Europe on two or three occasions, and in London maintained in argument with the India Office, ineffectually of course, his right to the throne of Oudh. A pension of seven †or eight thousand rupees a month, paid him by the British Government out of the revenues of the Oudh, forms only a portion of his income, his private property being considerable. He is a man of strong good sense and active mind ; if he had remained on the throne of Oudh the misgovernment which furnished Lord Dalhousie with an excuse for the annexation of that country would most probably never have existed. The Nawab is commonly spoken of as "the King of Oudh," and he enjoys great influence, which he turns to the best account. He is regarded as the head of the large community of Indian Mussulmans settled in Baghdad ; and at Kerbella, and Najaf, by his tact and personal ascendancy keeps his countrymen out of much mischief into which they might very easily fall in a country where "moral order" is as yet almost unknown, and where Arabs and Persians, and Turks, and Christians, are all in a state of antagonism. The services rendered by His Highness to the British Political Agent in controlling and guiding the eight or ten thousand "Hindis" settled in the vicinity of the holy places, and in keeping the pilgrims from India out of harm's way, have been cordially acknowledged by the Government of India from time to time, and recently an addition to his pension has been granted him as a mark of appreciation.

* * * * *

† Bagdad is an abode of political exiles from India, Mussulmans who dislike living under Christian rule, and who have settled here as the nearest place of refuge

* Geary's *Through Asiatic Turkey*, Volume I, pages 640-641.

† This seems to be erroneous : see page (1475) *ante*.

‡ Lady Anne Blunt's *Bedouins of the Euphrates*, Volume I, pages 212-15. The talented authoress dedicated this book of hers to the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah.

in Islam. Their position is a pleasant one, for they enjoy the double advantage of religious agreement with the Bagdadis and of foreign protection as British subjects. Many of them are very well off, living on the revenues of their lands in India, and a few are on excellent terms with the Consul General. Of these the most remarkable, by his birth, his wealth, and still more by the dignity of his private character, is the Nawab Ikbalet Dowlah, the dispossessed and pensioned king of Oudh. With him we are now staying, at his "desert-house" near Kasmeyn, the first step on our journey northwards. I hardly know how to speak of the Nawab without seeming to say too much. He is an old man now and a philosopher, and he would not care to have his good deeds paraded, and yet I cannot help recording what I feel about him, that, little as he affects the character of ex-king, he is the most truly dignified personage I ever met. In manner and way of living he is very simple, having something of the Bedouin contempt for appearances, along with the more real absence of pretension of a well-bred Englishman of fifty years ago. He has travelled much and seen much, and understands the European way of thinking as well as that of eastern people, having besides considerable originality of his own independent of any school of ideas. In conversation he is most agreeable, constantly surprising one with unexpected turns of thought and new ways of saying things, and, if we had been able to understand him better, I am sure we should have found him full of the best sort of wit. He is besides a kind and charitable man. His position in Bagdad is a great one, so great, from a moral point of view, that it may well console him for the loss of his former sovereignty and the splendours of his court at Lucknow. Here at Bagdad he has real power, the power of doing good, and real freedom to say what he thinks right to consuls, pashas, doctors of divinity and all alike, down to the poor Bedouins who live at his gates. I fancy his advice is asked on most of political difficulties of the Serai, where his knowledge of men and cities, so essential a part of wisdom in the East, and his wit in expressing his ideas enable him to speak without offence more truth than is often heard in those high places. The consequence of this is that his name is a power in Baghdad, and that he has made himself friends in all classes of society. Amongst the rest, Ferhan, the Shammar Chief, is his sworn ally; and, whenever the Sheykh comes to town, it is to the house of his brother the Malek el Hind, or King of India, as the Arabs call the Nawab. This circumstance is most fortunate for our plans, as now we shall start for the desert with letters of recommendation, which ought to give us the best possible reception there.

The "desert-house," where we are enjoying so pleasant and so unceremonious a hospitality, is one of the many owned by the Nawab in and about Bagdad. It stands quite alone, in the barren plain which surrounds the town, and is about half a mile distant from the mosque of Kasmeyn. The towns-people, who are very timorous about venturing outside the city at night, think the Nawab foolhardy in the extreme to live in such a spot; but to him as to us the isolation of the house is its principal charm. He generally, however, lives in Bagdad, but comes here from time to time to make a retreat, partly philosophical, partly religious, among the ulemas and doctors of theology of Kasmeyn, for the mosque is a sanctuary and place of repute among pious shiahs.

The house itself is as original as its situation, and was built from the Nawab's own designs. It is constructed like a fortress, with high walls and a single entrance, a very necessary precaution against common robbers as well as marauders from the desert. Above, on the upper story, the rooms are placed, some with the windows facing outwards, after the fashion of Turkish rather than of Arab buildings, others looking on to a terrace, over which there is yet a second story. The entrance is through a courtyard, with stables on either side and dovescotes inhabited by thousands of white pigeons. The ground-floor is merely a basement, and stone steps lead up

from the court to the apartments. These consist mainly of small rooms furnished with carpets only ; but the drawing-room is large and is so peculiar that I have made a plan of it. Its shape is that of a cross, each of the three shorter ends being occupied by a window, so that the upper half of the room is almost a lantern. The recesses are filled up with broad divans, on which it is pleasant to sit and look at the view.

The originality of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah appeared as markedly in his testamentary dispositions as in any act of his life. So early as 1847 the bestowing of his property after his death began to weigh upon his mind, and he expressed to the Political Agent, Major Rawlinson, his wish to make a will whereby, after providing for his wife and some old servants and for the maintenance of the tombs of himself and his only son (who predeceased him), his estate should be transferred in trust to the British Resident at Lucknow for the benefit of some of his relations in that city. He also asked that he might be allowed to deposit the will which he would make with the British Political Agent at Baghdād, and to appoint the Political Agent who might be in office at the time of his demise to be his official executor. The matter having been referred to the Government of India, the desired permission was granted by them in 1848 ; but it does not appear that any will was deposited by the Nawāb in the Political Agency until 1875. The will then deposited seems to have been attested by the Residency Surgeon and two other English witnesses in 1883.

In 1884 the Nawab requested that Government of India Promissory Notes for Rs. 1,00,000 of which he was the holder might be enfaced for payment of interest at the Government of India's Treasury at Baghdād ; and the request was granted, as a personal favour, though the payment of such interest at places out of India was contrary to practice and could not be claimed as a right. In 1885 the Nawab was anxious for the transfer of the Notes to the name of the Resident, by whom the interest accruing thereon should be applied to the maintenance of his (the Nawāb's) tomb after his death, and for the continuance of payment at Baghdād of the interest in question. The Government of India, however, decided that the concession regarding the place of payment was personal to the Nawāb and must cease at his death ; they pointed out that the Promissory Notes could easily be deposited in a bank in India, whence the local executor or trustees could obtain the interest as it fell due by drawing bills on the bank ; and they apparently prohibited the Resident at Baghdād from undertaking any responsibility in regard to the Nawab's tomb.

The Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah died at Kādhimain on the 21st December 1887. His will was found to be eccentric and obscure ; but it is

unnecessary to enter at length here on its provisions. Briefly, it seemed to devote nearly all the property of which he died possessed to the upkeep of his tomb at Kādhmain, and of the house containing it, for ever ; and it purported to constitute the British Resident at Baghdād manager of a trust fund into which the bulk of the estate was to be formed for the purpose just mentioned. In the management of the trust Muhammad Husain Khān, British Agent at Kādhmain, and Muhammad Taqi Khān, British Agent at Karbala, and others were apparently to be associated with the Resident.

The Government of India were anxious to respect, in so far as possible, the wishes of the late Nawāb ; but the will bristled with difficulties which only a court of law, upon proper proceedings being taken, could have resolved. Under Muhammadan law the deceased was not competent to dispose by will as he had done, of more than one-third of his estate ; and some of the subsidiary dispositions which he made were in themselves legally invalid. It was not clear, moreover, that the Resident was actually appointed executor ; and if it were held that he was, the directions in this respect were so worded that they could only apply to the Resident holding office at the time of the Nawāb's death, in his personal capacity. These serious difficulties apart, the Government of India thought it undesirable that a British official in a foreign country should be made responsible for the management of a trust such as that contemplated in the will ; and they accordingly instructed the Resident not to take upon himself the obligation.

Interim charge of the estate was assumed, however, by the Resident in his character of Consul-General ; and a receiver was appointed for its administration. The Turkish authorities evinced much interest in the disposal of the estate and a strong desire to take charge of the immoveable portion of it through the Turkish Land Records Department, which provoked from Colonel Tweedie, the Resident, a remark that, "if the heirs of the late Nawāb once let his property or its money "proceeds pass out of British into Osmanli custody, they may consider it "gone from them for ever, and as little worth going to law about as if it "were situated in the moon."

In 1889 a suit for invalidation of the will was brought in the High Court of Calcutta, the plaintiffs being nine of the Nawāb's next-of-kin, and the defendants the British Government and the native trustees mentioned in the document itself. In 1890, an application for probate of the will was filed in His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Consular Court at Constantinople by the native trustees in question, and was

opposed by the plaintiffs in the suit at Calcutta. Eventually, in 1891, a compromise was arranged between the parties, under which two-thirds of the whole estate was assigned to the next-of-kin and one-third to the native trustees under the will. There was breach of faith, and consequent delay, in carrying out the agreement ; but at length, by the end of May, 1896, all claims had been adjusted. Some, if not all, of the shares of the next-of-kin were* purchased from them by Āgha Muhammad, the British Agent at Kādhimain, in his own name, but, as it became known at his death in 1903, out of trust funds. Among the items which he thus acquired was the British (Old) Residency.

The dispute between Kulsūm Nisa Begam and Ramzān 'Ali Khān in regard to the great inheritance of Nawāb Tāj Mahall still continued at the end of 1876.

Kulsūm
Nisa Begam's
case, 1876-
1879.

The judgment of the court of first instance in India, passed on the 26th October 1876 in favour of Kulsūm Nisa Begam, was affirmed on appeal ; and by April 1878 her original adversary, Ramzān 'Ali Khān, was dead ; but, as Ramzān 'Ali Khān left a son named Saiyid Ahmad Husain, and the possibility of an appeal to the Privy Council still remained, neither the pension of Nawāb Tāj Mahall nor the capital amount for which it was liable to be commuted could be safely paid to either party by the Government of India, who were anxious to discharge themselves of the liability ; and this position of dead-lock lasted until 1879.

Meanwhile Kulsūm Nisa Begam proceeded to raise loans at Baghdād on the strength of her provisionally established title ; and the Government of India directed their Political Agent at Baghdād to notify that they would accept no responsibility for the repayment of such loans, to advise Kulsūm Nisa Begam to proceed to India, and to do what he could to prevent her incurring debts or contracting an imprudent marriage. In May 1879 Kulsūm Nisa Begam announced her intention of marrying her first cousin, Saiyid 'Askar Hussain, to whom she had long been betrothed, and of remaining permanently in Turkish 'Irāq. The Government of India, who seem to have regarded her in the light of a ward, consented ; and the marriage took place on the 5th June 1879.

* There is no doubt that the trust has since been corruptly administered, being under no disinterested supervision ; but the Nawāb's tomb and the house in which it is are still (1912) decently maintained, though very little of the large endowment seems to be spent on them.

In 1879 it was alleged, in a newspaper, that some jewellery belonging to Nawāb Taj Mahall's estate had been misappropriated by Ahmad 'Ali Khān, Native Agent in the Baghdād Residency, whom the Political Agent, Colonel Nixon, seems to have sent to Karbala to take charge of the personal effects of the deceased. The Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah was also charged with complicity in the alleged fraud. Ahmād 'Ali Khān was tried, but must have been acquitted.*

Movements
of Ayūb
Khān, 1888.

Ayūb Khān, a member of the ruling Bārakzai family of Afghanistan, whose removal to India, after his last unsuccessful attempt to assert his pretensions in Afghanistan, had been ordered by the British Government, arrived at Baghdād from Tehrān on the 28th March 1888 and left for India on the 28th April.

The Oudh Bequest, 1876-1905.

In the period now under review the affairs of the Oudh Bequest attained a prominence and importance which necessitate its consideration apart from all other British official concerns in Turkish 'Irāq. The influence of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah in its management remained very powerful until his death in 1887; and the system of a distribution of the bulk of the proceeds of the Bequest through one selected Mujtahid at Karbala and one at Najaf, adopted in the beginning, as also the plan of treating one-third of the proceeds as a separate fund for the relief of Indians, which came into vogue as already explained about 1860, remained in force until 1902.

Mujtahid-
Distributors
and the in-
fluence of the
Iqbāl-ud-
Daulah,
1876-1887.

The Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala was, until his death on the 13th December 1891, Mīrza Saiyid Abul Qāsim, Tabatabāyi, known as the Hujjat-ul-Islām, a Persian subject, whose appointment dated from 1872. The corresponding authority at Najaf was, until 1881 when he died, a certain Saiyid 'Ali, Bahr-ul-'Ulum on whom the post had

* Ahmad 'Ali Khān, better known as Ahmad Āgha was brought into the Residency as Native Agent on the retirement of Mr. Michael Minas (see page 1473 *ante*) in 1875. There was great opposition to his introduction on the part of certain Armenian members of the Residency office establishment, and it culminated in his being accused, in 1876, of having purloined some property which had been officially handed over to an Indian in a case of inheritance. A formal enquiry, held by Colonel Nixon, Surgeon-Major Bowman, Mr. Raitt (First Officer of the "Comet") and the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, sitting as a Committee, resulted in the exoneration of Ahmad 'Ali Khān, and the dismissal of the head clerk (Mr. Johannes Thaddeus) by order of the Government of India.

Ahmad 'Ali Khān who was an Indian and belonged to a distinguished Oudh family, died at Baghdād, at an advanced age, in August 1910. He was at his death the doyen of the Indian community at Baghdād, conspicuous for his loyalty to His Majesty the King-Emperor, and a general favourite in European society. His son Sajjād 'Ali Khān was made a Nawāb on the occasion of the Imperial Darbar at Delhi in 1911, at which he was present.

† *Vide* page 2012 post.

been conferred in 1858 or 1859 ; he was succeeded by Saiyid Muhammad, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, a Turkish subject. These Mujtahid-Distributors were all, it would appear, nominated by the British Political Agent or Resident at Baghdād on the recommendation of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud Daulah ; and the Nawāb's position with reference to the Bequest was greatly fortified by this circumstance.

The separate fund for the relief of Indians, which had existed in practice for a number of years, was placed on a regular footing in 1877 by means of letters which the Mujtahid-Distributors at Karbala and Najaf addressed to the British Political Agent at Baghdād. In these they signified their desire that one-third of the amounts payable to them, or over Rs. 3,000 in all, should be deducted for the relief "through the British Residency" of poor Indians at Karbala and Najaf and Kādhimain, especially such as were of noble family. The letters, which were almost identical in their wording, can hardly have been the spontaneous production of the Mujtahids ; and, in view of the contents of his own memorandum of 1866, it is difficult not to see in them the finger of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah. The proposed arrangement received the immediate assent of Colonel Nixon, the British Political Agent, who also undertook its execution in so far as that depended upon himself. The receipts given by the Mujtahid-Distributors to the Political Agency Treasury at Baghdād included the amounts assigned by them for the relief of Indians ; and the Indian Fund was consequently regarded, with perfect correctness, as existing under their sanction. Distribution to Indians seems to have taken place on lists of names prepared after enquiry. The Kādhimain Indian list is known to have been revised in 1881, "when Mr. Plowden, in concert with the Nawab Sir Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, or perhaps the latter only under instructions from the former, went through it, and made such changes in it as seemed necessary."

The separate
Indian Fund,
1877-1881.

In October 1882 Colonel W. Tweedie, then officiating as Resident in the absence of Mr. Plowden, visited Karbala and enquired on the spot into the reputation of the Mujtahid-Distributors there and at Najaf, Mīrza Abul Qāsim and Saiyid Muhammad, and into the local working of the Bequest. He found that :—

Investigation
of the posi-
tion and
conduct of
the Mujtahid-
Distributors,
1882-1883.

- (1) "Although the name and rank of Mujtahid was conceded by
"all reasonable persons to both these scholars, yet not their
"greatest admirers could claim for them pre-eminence over
"several of their brethren who might be mentioned ;

- (2) "on the contrary the acceptance by them of this* mundane
 "care and duty formed, in the eyes of many, a lamentable
 "defection from the type of character proper to them ;
- (3) "according to the general belief, both of them took care that
 "if, for the above or other reasons, their receipts in presents
 "from the pious suffered diminution, the Oudh money
 "passing through their hands should be properly taxed in
 "compensation for it."

In 1883 Colonel Tweedie, on relinquishing charge of the Residency, recommended to the consideration of Mr. Plowden a statement which he had received from Rāja Bāqir Husain of Faizābād, Oudh, a visitor to Karbala and Najaf and a worthy, wealthy, and entirely disinterested man, in which it was stated that the proceeds of the Bequest were being misapplied "to the detriment of the right parties entitled to be benefited and to (? of) the British name ;" that the money was being appropriated mainly to the enrichment of the Mujtahid-Distributors and the support of their relatives and friends, the poor deriving but little advantage from it ; and that the two Distributors employed were not Mujtahids (doctors of theology) but only Tullāb (students). The writer suggested that lists of truly indigent Indians at the shrines should be prepared, and that none of those whose names were entered should receive less than Rs. 2 a month,—the actual rate of distribution to the poor being then half or quarter of a rupee per mensem.

Effect of
 the death of
 the Iqbāl-ud
 Daulah,
 1887.

The Nawab Iqbāl-ud-Daulah died in December 1887, his last visit to Karbala and Najaf having been paid in company with the British Resident in 1881 ; and his decease was followed by that of his trusted friend, Muhammad Husain Khān, the Indian Distributor and British Honorary Agent at Kādhimain. The death of the Nawāb, to whom the existence of the separate Indian Fund—at first on an informal, but later on a regular and defined basis—and the arrangements for its working were undoubtedly due, profoundly influenced the course of Bequest affairs. Whatever may be thought of the propriety of his interference, its results seem to have been on the whole beneficial ; and his disappearance from the scene was followed by a change for the worse in the attitude, already unsatisfactory, of the Mujtahid-Distributors, who had been accustomed to defer to his advice, and by a growth of abuses.

The successor of Muhammad Husain Khān as Indian Distributor and British Honorary Agent at Kādhimain was his son Āgha Muham-

**Viz.*, the administration of the Bequest.

mad, who had until then been Persian writer in the British Residency at Baghdad. Colonel Tweedie was careful to warn Āgha Muhammad, in informing him of his appointment, that its duration might be temporary, and to advise him not to alter the scheme of Indian distribution at Kādhimain arranged by the late Iqbāl-ud-Daulah without first consulting the Resident.

In March 1889 Major A. C. Talbot, who was then officiating for Colonel Tweedie as British Resident, visited Karbala and Najaf and enquired into numerous complaints which had been made in regard to the Hujjat-ul-Islām's distributions at the former place; these complaints were of old standing and seemed to be well-founded. Major Talbot found that this Mujtahid-Distributor was deeply in debt; he had borrowed Rs. 13,000 from the Sarraf of the British Residency on the security of the Oudh Bequest payments due to him up to the end of the month of August following; and he was said to owe Rs. 10,000, bearing interest at 42 to 48 per cent. per annum to an Astrābādi named Hasan, son of Hāji Mehdī. Mirza Abul Qāsim contended that these debts had been contracted for charitable purposes; but subsequent enquiries by Colonel Tweedie showed that they owed their origin to his three sons, "over whose borrowings and ongoings he was too weak and bookish to exercise adequate control." In regard to the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, the Mujtahid-Distributor at Najaf, it appeared to Major Talbot that he, instead of running into debt, had "gone to the opposite extreme of making himself a rich man out of the Bequest." Complaints against him, also, poured into the Residency.

Attempted reform of the distribution arrangements by Major Talbot, 1889.

Major Talbot having informed the Hujjat-ul-Islām that a continuance of the state of affairs discovered would necessitate a reference to the Government of India which might have disagreeable consequences, that Mujtahid was induced to agree to the preparation of a regular list of payees and to the submission of the payees' receipts, verified by the British Agent at Karbala, to the British Residency at Baghdad. The Resident was also successful in persuading the Residency Sarraf to reduce the interest on his loan to Mirza Abul Qāsim to 12 per cent. a year; and he thought that the Mujtahid would be well advised to consolidate his debts, but did not press him in this respect.

An admonition was addressed by Major Talbot to the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm at Najaf, to whom also he suggested the drawing up of lists.

On the whole Major Talbot regarded the condition into which the affairs of the Oudh Bequest were drifting as "a crying scandal," but one with which it was very difficult to deal. His impressions were

recorded in a memorandum, dated 2nd May 1889, in which by way of a final recommendation he remarked :

It would probably also be an advantage in some ways to have the bequest distributed by a committee, as being more public and with a better chance of satisfying varying interests than the present arrangement, which, in being entrusted to one man, is not in accordance with the terms of the bequest. This, however, must be a reform from within, which Mirza Abu'l Kasim might be advised to propose himself as relieving him of a thankless responsibility, though not one which it would be possible to carry out without his consent.

A list for the regulation of payments at Karbala was eventually drawn up in September 1889 ; but it does not appear whether any was prepared at Najaf.

Attempted
reform of the
distribution
arrangement :
by Colonel
Tweedie,
1889-90.

On return to his post from leave, Colonel Tweedie endeavoured to give effect to the suggestions of Major Talbot regarding the creation of committees. After several interviews with the Bahr-ul-'Ulûm, and communications with the Hujjat-ul-Islâm through common friends, small committees were appointed at Karbala and Najaf, consisting of the Mujtahid-Distributor at each place, the British Agent at Karbala, and a third member. The unofficial member at Karbala was Saiyid Hasan, Hakîm-zâdah, a disinterested Persian gentleman of that town ; at Najaf it was an equally disinterested and highly respected Shi'ah merchant of Baghdâd. The results obtained may be described in Colonel Tweedie's own graphic words :

At Najaf the result proved nil. The "highly respected Baghdad merchant", wishing to remain "highly respected", played dummy, in which he was seconded by our "Honorary Agent", whose rôle and nature it is to make everything pleasant to everybody, and so the Bahru'l Ulum remained as unruffled as his ways of distribution remained unstraightened. At Karbala the independent member tried to bring about reform, thereby exciting in the highest degree the animosity of the Hujjatu'l Islam and all his party. Seeing this, I resolved, after several months of patient trial, to have done with the "Committee", the net product of which may be thus stated—(1) distribution through the Hujjat-ul-Islam at Karbala and the Bahru'l Ulum at Najaf certainly is what Major Talbot called it in his memorandum, a "crying scandal";—(2) every attempt to improve it founded on the fallacy of those two Mujtahids, or any other Mujtahids to whom may be afforded in lieu of them a similar opportunity of making money, being inclined to pay out to others sums which they can by any possibility keep to themselves is fore-doomed to failure. The idea of making over to a Mujtahid the distribution of money is anything but a business man's idea. . . . A Mujtahid's proper occupation is study. Outside of that, if a Mujtahid at all, and not a mere pretender, he is a child, (and) the entrusting to him of money for division surely leads to the gathering round him of parasites (to say nothing of the members of his own family) for the purpose of taking it from him .

At the beginning of 1890 Brigade-Surgeon R. Bowman, the Medical Officer of the Baghhdād Residency, who had eleven years' experience of the country, visited Karbala and Najaf and reported, at the desire of Colonel Tweedie, on the state of Bequest affairs. He referred, in concluding his report, to the possibility of establishing a school for Indian children, and a dispensary for the treatment of poor Indians, at Karbala at the cost of the Oudh Bequest.

In regard to the distribution by the Mujtahids, great dissatisfaction prevailed in 1890 and was not of recent origin. Colonel Tweedie and his predecessors had received representations at various times "not directly only from individuals, but circuitously through the Ottoman, Persian, Bombay, and even Hyderabad Governments, . . . to the effect that the two Mujtahids appointed to distribute this money treated it as their own, bought lands with it, and diverted it in other ways from its proper uses." The admonitions addressed to the Mujtahid-Distributors by Major Talbot, and after him by Colonel Tweedie, had produced no effect; the committees formed to control or support them had been a failure; and, though nominal rolls of payees were submitted from both Karbala and Najaf, they were of little or no practical use. In regard to these rolls Colonel Tweedie observed :

State of
affairs in
1890.

. . . doubt remains: (1) how many of the recorded names are real; how many dummies? (2) Of those that are real, how many merely are the wives, children, or servants of the Mujtahid distributors, that is, those distributors themselves in different forms? (3) How many names are those of persons without due claim to benefit by the bequest, such as landowners and thriving shopkeepers?

* * * *

The difficulty of course centres in the accounts. The Mujtahid-Distributors postpone submitting them: and then, with the strong ground behind them that "the poor" are suffering, press by post and telegraph for the prompt issue of more money. In my humble opinion, if the present system of distribution is to be maintained, the calling for rolls of recipients, or at all events the professing to check such when they are before us, is but little likely to conduce to satisfactory results.

An objectionable feature of the distributions, as made, was the payment of considerable amounts to the Kilid-dārs and other officials of the Shi'ah Shrines at Karbala and Najaf, who had other sources of income, and among whom immense sums were often divided by wealthy pilgrims from India and other places.

The distributions made of the separate fund for Indians were open to criticism in different respects, particularly with reference to a large sprinkling of the late Iqbāl-ud-Daulah's relations and their dependents

among the recipients of relief at Kādhimain, and to the undue proportion of the Fund swallowed up by the Agencies at Kādhimain and Karbala and their hangers-on. The monthly cost of the Kādhimain Agency alone, which had an establishment of eleven persons besides the Indian* Distributor, was Rs. 488½.

Change of
system re-
commended
by Colonel
Tweedie,
March 1890.

In March 1890 Colonel Tweedie addressed the Government of India and advocated an entire change of system in the Bequest. He represented that the existing arrangements, to some extent workable in the lifetime of the Iqbāl-ud-Daulah, had now ceased to be so, remarking :

Two facts of themselves here go far towards furnishing the explanation. One, the perplexity which must necessarily be felt by a British officer when circumstances require him to single out a Muṭtahid for a money trust. The other, the even greater difficulty, or rather impossibility, of his controlling from Baghdād two such nominees (the subjects of other Governments) in a matter of money. Every Muṭtahid has his own circle. One who is on the rise to-day may be on the wane to-morrow; perhaps from a suspicion of heresy; perhaps through showing signs of worldliness. A Muṭtahid whose reputation for rectitude and benevolence is unquestioned may, after a large monthly sum shall have been entrusted to him, become an altered character.

Colonel Tweedie's representations were, in effect, that the separate distributions to India at Kādhimain, Karbala, and Najaf should be discontinued, the Indian paupers at Kādhimain being left to emigrate to Karbala and Najaf, where all resident Indians could take their proper place among persons entitled to benefit by the Bequest; that the Indian Distributorships at Kādhimain and Karbala should be abolished; and that the proceeds of the Bequest should be allotted among the Muṭtahids and Muṭāvirs of Karbala and Najaf by the British Resident, who would prepare and revise lists of them with the help of an Assistant Political Agent (to be added to the staff of the Residency), of unofficial local committees (which might be expected to grow up), and of the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād.

It should be mentioned that these proposals, besides to some extent anticipating others which were adopted in 1903, were strictly in accordance with the terms of the Agreement of 1825 as known to the Baghdād Residency at the time. The copy of the Agreement preserved in the Residency archives not only followed the incorrect bilingual version, but contained an interpolated "va" between the words "Muṭtahidān"

*It was remarked that the sum overtly passing into the pockets of the family of Agha Muhammad, Agent at Kādhimain, whose uncle, Muhammad Taqī Khān, was Agent at Karbala, was Rs. 678 a month in salaries and allowances; and it was suspected that this did not fully measure the degree in which they benefited by the Bequest,

and "Mujāvirān," and was therefore a highly misleading document. Under its terms a distribution of the proceeds of the Bequest by the representative of the British Government among "Mujtahids" and "Mujāvirs" of Karbala and Najaf would have been permissible, and the British representative would not have been precluded from dealing direct with such of the beneficiaries as were only Mujāvirs,—a term considered by Colonel Tweedie to include all resident Indians.

In May 1890 the Government of India, after considering Colonel Tweedie's arguments, informed him, with a reference to the orders of 1867, that they did not desire to interfere in any way with the distribution of the fund after it had been made over to the proper recipients specified in the deed of 1825, that this had been their consistent attitude for many years, and that they had no desire to change it. In regard to the distribution to Indians at Kādhimain, Colonel Tweedie was asked to report whether it had been instituted under the direction of the Mujtahid-Distributors or otherwise: in the former case there were no grounds, the Government of India remarked, for their intervention; in the latter there must have been some departure from the orders of 1867, authority for which should be shown.

Colonel Tweedie in reply explained that, in raising the matter, he had been actuated by a doubt whether the *de facto* Mujtahid-Distributors as Karbala and Najaf could be considered the proper recipients under the Agreement of 1825; and he described how the separate Indian Fund had come into existence with the concurrence of the Mujtahid-Distributors.

No further orders were passed on the case by the Government of India.

Early in 1891 Colonel Tweedie, in view of the disinclination of the Government of India to a change of system, made a fresh effort to improve the working of the actual arrangements. At the time when he took action the Karbala allotment under the Bequest had been paid to the end of September, and the Najaf allotment to the end of October 1890. A good basis of distribution existed at Karbala in the shape of the list of payees drawn up in September 1889; but the nominal roll at Najaf had not been scrutinised or verified for some years. It was known that at Najaf the Mujtahid-Distributor had been borrowing funds on the strength of his connection with the Bequest; and, both there and at Karbala, persons accustomed to benefit by the distributions had begun to raise money on the security of the future payments which they expected to receive.

Orders of the Government of India on Colonel Tweedie's recommendations, May 1890.

Further attempted reforms by Colonel Tweedie, 1891.

Colonel Tweedie accordingly issued funds, completing payment of the Karbala allotment to the end of 1890, for distribution in accordance with the list of 1889 in the presence of the British Agent, Karbala; but he withheld the arrears due at Najaf until new and proper lists of Mujtahids and Mujavirs at that place should have been prepared by the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm with the assistance of the Agent. He offered, or rather threatened, in case of difficulties arising, to proceed to Karbala and Najaf himself. In March 1891 the Agent, after a month's delay during which he did nothing towards executing his instructions, represented to Colonel Tweedie that the only means by which affairs could be brought into order was payment of all arrears up to date; and the Resident, though he inferred from the request that the Karbala allotment for the last quarter of 1890 had already been disposed of in some unavowable way, directed payment to be made to the Mujtahid-Distributors to the end of February 1891.

These proceedings were duly reported by Colonel Tweedie to the Government of India, for information; but at Najaf, unfortunately, the attempt at reform was thwarted by the greed, arrogant behaviour, and even violence of the Mujtahid-Distributor, who completely overbore his colleague, the Agent; and later the Resident reported of the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm: "He and his Karbala colleague are helping themselves harder than ever."

Re-examination of the question of the Bequest-arrangements by the Government of India, 1890-1891.

Meanwhile the question of the Oudh Bequest had been taken up by the Honourable G. Curzon, M. P.,—afterwards Lord Curzon and Viceroy of India,—who had visited Karbala and Najaf at the beginning of 1890, had spent a day at each place, and had discussed the Bequest with Colonel Tweedie and with Saiyid Hasan, Hakīmzādah, the unofficial member of the Committee instituted at Karbala in 1889. Mr. Curzon wrote in October 1890 to Lord Lansdowne, then Viceroy of India, suggesting that the working of the Bequest might be investigated. He had been informed by the Hakīmzādah that the Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala misappropriated the money there, while the British Agent remained neutral, and that the Hakīmzādah's own action in exposing his colleagues on the Committee had involved him in great odium.

By this time petitions by post and telegraph on the subject of the management of the Bequest had begun to reach the Viceroy of India and His Majesty's Secretaries of State for India and Foreign Affairs; and representations of the kind became, from this time onward, so common as hardly to merit notice in what follows.

The Legislative Department of the Government of India, being consulted by the Foreign Department unofficially, were inclined to think that there was much in Colonel Tweedie's letters deserving of serious consideration; and that, under the terms of the Bequest, Government were bound to take reasonable pains to secure that the stipulated payments under the Bequest were made to the persons intended to be benefited.

A reference was made also to Colonel Jarrett, Secretary to the Board of Examiners, Calcutta, who was requested to furnish an accurate English translation of the Agreement of 1825, together with his opinion as to the meaning of the terms "Mujtahid" and "Mujāvir." The version of the Agreement supplied to Colonel Jarrett appears to have been the corrupt bilingual text, or, if others were sent him, he did not take them into consideration. His rendering of the crucial passage in the Agreement was: "One-half shall be paid on account of Najaf the Noble, and "the other half on account of Karbala the Sublime, into the hands of "the supreme theological doctors who are continuous residents near the "holy shrines"; and he thought that Colonel Tweedie was inclined to give an undue extension to the meanings of the words "Mujtahid" and "Mujāvir."

In March 1891, the result of the enquiry from Colonel Jarrett was communicated to Colonel Tweedie, who was asked to say, the correctness of Colonel Jarrett's translation being assumed, "who were the recognised "Mujtahids resident at the shrines, and whether it would not be possible "to pay the money to them collectively, or to a Committee selected by "them from time to time." Mr. Curzon was duly informed of the steps taken on his representations.

In May 1891, Colonel Tweedie, who was then on the eve of relinquishing the Residentsip in Turkish 'Irāq and of retiring from the service, replied to the reference. He admitted that Colonel Jarrett's interpretation of the (supposed) correct text as referring to "Mujtahids resident at the shrines," not to "Mujtahids and Mujāvirs at the shrines" was correct; but he criticised the importation by the translator of the adjectives "supreme" (with reference to doctorhood) and "continuous" (with reference to residence) which he did not find in the Persian. As regards the meaning of the word "Mujtahid" he referred to the greatest Mujtahid of the day, Hāji Mirza Muhammad, Shīrāzi, of Sāmarra, and obtained an answer from him; as also, through the Persian Consul-General at Baghdād, from Saiyid Muhammad Taqi, a Mujtahid of Kādhimain. The latter remarked in his disquisition "And the Mujtahid has grada-

tions," from which Colonel Tweedie deduced "the impossibility of a [too] hard and fast line being drawn between, so to speak, the Bachelor and the Master of (theologic) Arts." He also submitted two lists, obtained from different sources, of persons at Karbala and Najaf reputed to be Mujtahids; but he did not comment on them. With reference to the practical suggestion conveyed in the Government of India's letter he remarked :

One thing may be ranked with the impossible, and that is, that the body of Karbala and Najef Mujtahids, or so-called Mujtahids, shall ever, whether under the lead of this Residency or independently, act in concert, like a Committee, for the partition of the money among themselves, or for its dispensation to the poor. The prevailing feeling among them one towards another is too surcharged with odium theologium and scholastic rivalry to admit of that. If a meeting of them were to be convened for such a purpose, they would not attend it, but each send a servant. This Mujtahid's adherents and expectants and the other's would at the same time hang about the meeting place : any day a tumult might happen.

Further discussions, enquiry by Major Jennings, and opinion of Colonel Mockler, 1892.

Colonel Tweedie had already, in February 1891, expressed the important opinion that a mere change of the personnel of the Mujtahid-Distributors would be useless, saying : "..... as far as I can judge, the "expedient of appointing other than the present Mujtahid distributors, "even were we quite free to try it, would yield no better results."

Colonel Mockler, who succeeded Colonel Tweedie in the Baghdad Residency, was requested demi-officially, in January 1892, to inform the Government of India of his opinion in regard to the practical points at issue in the case, *viz.*, the proposed distribution of the proceeds of the Bequest among a number of Mujtahids at Karbala and Najaf instead of their payment to one Mujtahid at each place, and the proposed abolition (by a process of gradual reduction) of the separate Indian Fund, particularly of the branch of it at Kādhimain.

In March 1892 Major R. H. Jennings, Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, visited Baghdād, and Colonel Mockler took the opportunity to obtain fresh information in regard to opinion and feeling at Karbala through him. In the meantime the Mujtahid Distributor at Karbala, Mīrza Abul Qāsim, had died, and Colonel Mockler had appointed his son Saiyid Muhammad Baqir, Tabatabāyi, in his place. Major Jennings, who was accompanied by Mr. Townley, Secretary of Her Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehrān, then travelling in the country, was instructed to interview, if possible, Shaikh Zain-ul-'Ābidīn, the greatest Mujtahid of the day at Karbala, who was understood to have telegraphed to the Government of India alleging that Saiyid Muhammad was not a Mujtahid. In this mission Major Jennings was successful; the Shaikh

at a private interview admitted having telegraphed to the Viceroy of India protesting against an alleged intention on the part of the British Resident to make the distributions in future "without a Mujtahid;" he asserted that the only universally recognised Mujtahid at Karbala was himself; and he indicated that he would be willing to accept the post of Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala. Major Jennings reported, as the result of his enquiries, that Saiyid Muhammad Bāqir was undoubtedly a genuine and much respected Mujtahid; that Shaikh Zain-ul-'Ābidīn was unsuitable for the post of Distributor; that at Najaf no better Distributor than the Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, the actual incumbent, who had worked well, was available; and that the distributions, as carried out at Karbala and Najaf were satisfactory, but that a representative of the Residency should be deputed from Baghdād to attend them.

Eventually Colonel Mockler informed the Government of India of his opinion that "the present distribution satisfied all, but a very few, and that it would be difficult to better it." After remarking that only one-sixth of the whole money was distributed to Indians at Kādhimain, while another sixth went to Indians at Karbala, he described the Kādhimain distribution as "absolutely within the terms of the bequest, and a most useful, beneficial, and politic measure," adding: "It gives us a "most excellent Native Agent at Kādhimain who settles all disputes "among the large Indian population there, saving the Residency immense "labour. It relieves the wants of needy Indian scholars, pilgrims, and "pious but indigent settlers; provides for the deportation of pauper Indians "at the rate of 15 to 20 weekly from Baghdād to Basrah; gives us a "tremendous hold on the fanatical neighbouring population of Shia "Kādhimain, and, having now become an institution, is *objected to by* "nobody (except Colonel Tweedie). My Native Assistant, Mr. Marine "(a Christian), personally superintends or assists the Native Agent "in this distribution, and, under his excellent tact and *régime*, no complaint is ever raised....."

On these data the Government of India decided, and informed the Resident officially, that no change in the arrangements need be undertaken, at least during the lifetime of Shaikh Zain-ul-'Ābidīn, by whom it was evident that difficulties were likely to be created.

Later it was proposed by Colonel Mockler, the Political Resident, in order to avoid the difficulty of drawing up lists of Mujtahids, that he should be empowered to appoint Muqassims (or Distributors) who should make payments in the presence of Nāzirs (or Supervisors), the latter being held responsible that in the distribution lists only such pay-

Renewed
discussions,
1894.

ments were entered as were made in their presence, and no others. The Government of India sanctioned this arrangement as a temporary measure; but at the same time they pointed out that "the Bequest was intended to benefit those residents at the shrines at Najaf and Karbala who were regarded as Mujtahids", and remarked: "It must be clearly understood that the ultimate object to be aimed at is that the recipients of the income of the bequest shall be limited to members of the class specified above." Instructions were accordingly given for preparation of a list of Mujtahids, which should be revised from time to time. This was in 1894, after which much time passed without any list being submitted by the Political Resident.

Enquiry by
Major New-
march into
the working
of the Oudh
Bequest,
1902.

The question of the Oudh Bequest lay dormant for ten years; but it had not been settled. It was raised again, in a very energetic manner, by Major L. S. Newmarch, soon after his appointment as Resident at Baghdād in March 1902.

The state of matters which he found prevailing was described by Major Newmarch as discreditable and unsatisfactory in the extreme. The proceeds of the Bequest were not paid direct to the Mujtahid-Distributors at Karbala and Najaf, nor to the Indian Distributors at Kādhimain and Karbala, but to the Jewish Sarraf of the British Residency at Baghdād, who periodically produced a receipt from each of the Mujtahid-Distributors for half of the whole amount. The portion of the Indian Fund destined for Karbala and Najaf was sent to the Indian Distributor at Karbala not direct, but through the Indian Distributor at Kādhimain. Accounts of the distributions made were submitted, but greatly in arrear, *e.g.*, the account of the Mujtahid-Distributor at Karbala for the quarter ending 31st October 1901 was not received at Baghdād until April 1902; and the accounts, such as they were, revealed a lamentable misapplication of the money, both by the Mujtahids and by the Indian Distributors.

Each of the Mujtahid-Distributors retained for himself Rs. 630 *per mensem*, and to this there could be no objection. But large amounts were admittedly paid to relations and dependents of the Distributors, both Mujtahid and Indian; considerable sums were shown as going to females who did not appear in person to receive them; and there were entries, chiefly relating to "deposits" which suggested malversation by members of the distribution staff. Employés on the Baghdād Residency establishment who had little or nothing to do with the work of the Bequest were in receipt of remuneration from the Indian Fund. The following statement was made to Major Newmarch in confidence by an

individual well acquainted with the facts, Saiyid Hasan Hakīmzādah, and was corroborated by information from other sources :—

The late and present distributors at Karbala used to put down in the accounts fictitious names and take the money themselves. * * * They do it still, only more so. They enter the names of their children, servants, negroes and others as receiving certain amounts, but these amounts are pocketed by the distributor. This is still the practice. Another practice of the distributor is to enter the names of really poor persons as receiving (*e. g.*) Rs. 10 per mensem, but the poor man really only gets one rupee and the distributor keeps the balance. The poor man is really paid one rupee for his signature and is told that if he discloses the fact, his name will be struck out altogether.

The staff under the Indian Distributor at Kādhimain now consisted of nine persons, that of the Indian Distributor at Karbala of thirteen, not counting servants; the former official now paid himself at the rate of over Rs. 300, the latter at the rate of over Rs. 290 a month; and Āgha Hasan, a brother of Āgha Muhammad, had slipped into the position of "Assistant Distributor" at Kādhimain on a salary of more than Rs. 50 per mensem. Each of the Indian Distributors, who were also Agents of the British Residency at Baghdād, had surrounded himself with "a little court," in which a place was found even for salaried "Medical Attendants"; and, when the Agent at Karbala went to Najaf to superintend the proceedings of the Mujtahid Distributor there, his journey was "a kind of royal progress", debited of course to the Oudh Bequest. The supervision exercised by the Karbala Agent over the Mujtahid Distributors was, moreover, a farce: he admitted to Major Newmarch "without any apparent sense of shame, that he did not supervise the distribution at all, that he was never present at it, but left it "all in the hands of one of his Munshis, who was himself a stipendiary "of this trust fund." "Muhammad Ibrahim Khan had signed his name "in English on every page of the distribution account, and when I "asked him what this meant, he frankly admitted that it meant nothing "that his signatures were put on each page of the account several "days after the distribution, at which he was never present, had been "completed." The superintendence of the Kādhimain distribution by Mr. Marine, the Residency Dragoman, was found to have been equally futile and perfunctory.

Major Newmarch immediately grappled with the abuses described above and removed them in so far as it was in his power to do so. The separate Indian Fund having been already condemned by the Government of India as an irregularity, Major Newmarch reduced the portion of it devoted to Kādhimain from about Rs. 1,800 to Rs. 800 a month,

Preliminary
reforms by
Major New-
march, 1902.

of which Rs. 350 was allotted for the maintenance of the Kādhimain Agency and Rs. 450 for the continuance of such allowances to poor Indians at Kādhimain as could not be immediately abolished; but the Agent was dissociated by the Resident's orders from the distribution of the latter allotment. The portion of the Indian fund affected to Karbala and Najaf was similarly cut down from about Rs. 1,800 a month to Rs. 450, the whole of which was appropriated to the upkeep of the Karbala Agency. Major Newmarch, it should be observed, did not think that the maintenance of the Agencies at Karbala and Najaf was a justifiable charge on the Oudh Bequest. He contemplated the eventual abolition of the Kādhimain Agency, and the payment of the Agent at Karbala in future from some other source; but it was not practicable to dismiss both Agents on the spot without the sanction of Government, and without other arrangements having been made for the representation of British interests at Karbala.

Recommendations by Major Newmarch to the Government of India, September 1902.

Major Newmarch's general views concerning the position of the British authorities in relation to the Oudh Bequest were summed up in his first letter on the subject, addressed to the Government of India in September 1902, in the following paragraph :—

Of course the original idea of the distribution was that the money should be devoted more to the really poor and less to the distributors, who from the very earliest times appear to have appropriated as much as they could for themselves and their relatives. The appointment of a supervisor from time to time to check these distributions has only produced friction between the distributor and himself, endless complaints, and counter complaints, then a new supervisor or may be a new distributor, and then the same story over again. In many cases, and specially of late years, the supervisor appears to have been worse than the supervised.

The idea of the distribution is benevolent, but I am satisfied that it is practically impossible to supervise it effectually, and I therefore think that it should be abolished. It seems to me that the only distribution with which the Government of India or its officers are concerned is the distribution of the Bequest among the Mujtahids, and I am of opinion that if you go beyond that distribution, we are travelling outside the limits of the Bequest and undertaking duties and responsibilities which are unnecessary, undesirable, and impossible.

His chief proposals which he had reason to expect would be acceptable to the Government of India, were :—

- (1) That a list of Mujtahids who are permanent residents at Karbala and Najaf should be prepared and revised from time to time, including any Mujtahid who may have added himself to the number, and striking off any who may have ceased to reside at those places or who may have ceased to deserve the title of Mujtahid.

- (2) To distribute the whole of the Bequest among the Mujtahids on this list, either in equal shares or in such proportion as may hereafter be determined.
- (3) To stop the distribution at Kādhimain.
- (4) To take no official cognisance of any distribution other than that (already indicated) among the Mujtahids.

While admitting the great difficulty of determining who was a Mujtahid and who was not, Major Newmarch recommended that Mujtahids for the purposes of the Bequest should be chosen by the Resident, whose selection should be final. Another possible course was to leave the nomination of Mujtahids to vacant allowances under the Bequest to the Mujtahids themselves; but this, he apprehended, would result in the formation of a Persian clique and the total exclusion of Indian and Arab Mujtahids. At a later time he suggested that nominations to vacant allowances should be made by the actual holders of allowances, but should be subject to the approval of the Resident. Colonel Newmarch thought that ultimately all Mujtahid beneficiaries under the Bequest should receive allowances of equal amount, and that the number of Mujtahid recipients at Karbala should be not less than ten, and the same at Najaf, to prevent the concentration of excessively large amounts in the hands of individuals.

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the sanction of the Government of India, Major Newmarch proceeded to carry out the policy which he recommended in regard to Mujtahids. After collecting information with reference to the theological and other qualifications of all who pretended to Ijtihād at the Holy Cities, he offered shares under the Bequest to those of the best repute; and these were accepted by a number of very respectable Mujtahids, though not by any of the highest standing. By May 1903 the separate distribution to Indians had been abolished, even at Kādhimain, and the Mujtahids shown below were regularly receiving the monthly Bequest allowances shown opposite their names :

Further reforms by Major Newmarch, 1902-03.

At Karbala.

1. Saiyid Muhammad Baqir, Hujjat-ul-Islām, the original Mujtahid Distributor , , , Rs. 1,500

At Najaf.

1. Saiyid Muhammad, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, the original Mujtahid Distributor . , . Rs. 1,500

2. Saiyid Hāshim, Qazvīni.	} each Rs. 500	2. Mulla Āli, Nahāvan-di.	} each Rs. 500
3. Shaikh Husain, Māzandarāni.		3. Shaikh Muhammad Hasan, Jawāhiri.	
4. Saiyid Ja'far, Tabatabāyi.		4. Shaikh Ābdullah Māzandarāni.	
5. Shaikh Āli, Yazdi.		5. 'Abdul Hasan.	
6. Saiyid Murtaza Husain.		6. Saiyid Muhammad, Hindi.	
7. Sibta Husain.		7. Muhammad Kāzim, Khurāsāni.	

Orders of the Government of India on Major Newmarch's recommendations, July 1903.

In July 1903 Major Newmarch's proposals, already in a great measure executed, were approved by the Government of India in the following terms :

. . . you correctly stated the general view of the Government of India, which is, that the income of the Bequest should be distributed under the supervision of the Political Resident to a certain number of Mujtahids residing permanently at the shrines of Karbala and Najaf, and that it is not a mere charitable grant for the benefit of the poor of those places. It is noticed with satisfaction that the distribution at Kadhimair has entirely ceased, as this diversion of a portion of the funds of the Bequest was inconsistent with the declared policy of the Government of India and unjustifiable under the terms of the Bequest. The funds available should ultimately be distributed in equal shares, so far as this can be effected without undue hardship to Mujtahids who are permanent residents at Karbala and Najaf, and no official cognisance will be taken of any distribution other than that to the Mujtahids themselves. Your provisional selection of Mujtahids is accepted by the Government of India, who agree * that the difficulty of choosing a suitable person on a vacancy occurring may, in future, as a general rule, be met by obtaining the approval of the remaining recipients to the successor suggested, subject to the consent of the Political Resident with whom the final appointment must always remain, and who will have the power of removing on sufficient grounds any Mujtahid from the list of recipients. The number of Mujtahids should probably not be less than ten or more than twenty at each place; the lower limit may, . . . be observed for the present at Karbala.

It was further intimated to Major Newmarch "that the Government of India appreciate the industry and thoroughness with which, in face of considerable difficulties, you have treated this troublesome and complicated piece of work, and I am to congratulate you on the satisfactory results of your efforts."

Basis and effect of Major Newmarch's re-organisation

The basis of Major Newmarch's scheme, and of the orders passed thereon by the Government of India, was the corrupt bilingual text of the Agreement of 1825, in which there was no indication of the purpose

* Major Newmarch had modified his original views on this point.

of the Bequest by the King of Oudh in favour of the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf. Consequently, in all that was done and ordered in 1903, it was assumed that the Mujtahid recipients under the Bequest were unfettered by its terms in their disposal of the money, and that the Government of India, under whose auspices they were selected and maintained as beneficiaries, were not concerned with their conduct in disposing of it.

of the
Bequest
arrangements,
1902-05.

The reorganisation effected by Major Newmarch did not, apparently, result in the distribution of the income of the Oudh Bequest in a manner which could be described, from a charitable or philanthropic standpoint, as better than before. Such, indeed, was not the object of his scheme, which aimed only at bringing the administration of the funds into accordance with the terms of the Agreement of 1825, as then understood, and at abolishing abuses due to the intervention in the past of British authorities. In both of these latter respects his action was effective and successful. Protests against the new arrangements were received in the shape of petitions to the King-Emperor, the Viceroy of India, and other authorities ; but, in view of the number of personal interests adversely affected by the change, such manifestations of feeling were inevitable and possessed little significance.

Owing to the predominance of Persians—generally retaining their Persian nationality—among the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf, and to the influence then wielded in Persia by the more important among them, the radical reorganisation of the Oudh Bequest in 1902-03, had important political aspects to which no reference has yet been made. Major Newmarch was conscious of these ; he expected to acquire some influence over the Mujtahids through the power vested in him of selecting from among them the recipients of allowances under the Oudh Bequest ; and in June 1903, in an official letter, he remarked that Saiyid Muhammad Bāqir of Karbala and Saiyid Muhammad, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm, of Najaf were now on very friendly terms with him and deferred to his authority. A similar appreciation of the position had been arrived at by Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, who thought that the influence of the Mujtahids at Karbala, and Najaf might be utilised, through the British Residency at Baghdād, to prevent riots and disturbances in Persia and to frustrate Russian policy in that country.

Political
aspects of the
reorganisa-
tion of the
Bequest,
1903-05.

The cases of two or three Persians were recommended by Sir A. Hardinge to Major Newmarch for favourable consideration ; and in a couple of instances the latter was able, though he could not reconcile

his action with the principle of non-interference with the distribution of Oudh Bequest, money by the Mujtahids, to induce one of the recipients to make a monthly allowance to these protégés. In a third case, however, in which the assignment of R500 a month (or £400 a year) to one Shaikh Muhammad Mehdi in the character of a Mujtahid was suggested by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān to the Government of India, Major Newmarch felt himself obliged to deprecate compliance with the suggestion, on the ground that the Ijtihād of Shaikh Muhammad Mehdi was at least doubtful, and that a pronouncedly political handling of selections to Oudh Bequest allowances would not conduce to the establishment of that influence over the Mujtahids of Karbala and Najaf which it was desired to secure.

Mujtahid
beneficiaries
under the
Bequest,
April 1906.

In April 1906 the Mujtahid beneficiaries under the Oudh Bequest at Karbala and at Najaf were as follow :—

Karbala.

1. Saiyid Muhammad Baqir, Tabatabāyi
(till 1902 sole Mujtahid-Distributor).
2. Shaikh 'Ali, Yazdi.
3. Saiyid Muhammad Hashim, Qazvini.
4. Saiyid Murtaza Husain, *Indian*.
5. Saiyid Muhammad Kāshāni.
6. Saiyid 'Ali, Tangabūni.
7. Saiyid Muhammad Bāqir, Behbehāni.
8. Kalb-i-Baqir, *Indian*.
9. Saiyid Husain, Qumi.

Najaf.

1. Saiyid Muhammad, Bahr-ul-'Ulūm
(till 1902 sole Mujtahid-Distributor
and at that time old and very nearly
blind).
2. Shaikh 'Abdullah, Māzandarāni.
3. Saiyid Muhammad Hasan, Jawāhiri.
4. Mulla Muhammad Kāzim, Khurāsāni.
5. Shaikh 'Abdul Hasan.
6. Shaikh 'Fat-h Ullah Shari'at.
7. Saiyid Abul Qāsim, Ishqāwari.
8. Akhund Mulla 'Ali, Khonsāri.
9. Saiyid Abu Turāb, Khonsāri.
10. Āgha Shaikh Mehdi.

Annexure No. I. Journey of English Travellers to Baghdād, 1583.

EXTRACT FROM FITCH'S JOURNAL.

In the yeere of our Lord 1583, I Ralph Fitch of London marchant being desirous to see the countreys of the East India, in the company of M. Iohn Newberie marchant (which had beene at Ormus once before) of William Deedes Ieweller, and Iames Story Painter, being chiefly set forth by the right worshipfull Sir Edward Osborne knight, and M. Richard Staper citizens and marchants of London, did ship my selfe in a ship of London called the Tyger, wherein we went for Tripolis in Syria: and from thence we tooke the way for Aleppo, which we went in seven days with the Carouan. Being in Aleppo, and finding good com-

pany, went from thence to Birra, which is two dayes and an halfe travaile with Camels.

* Birra is a little towne, but very plentiful of victuals : and neere to the wall of the towne runneth the riuer of Euphrates. Here we bought a boate and agreed with a master and bargemen, for to go to †Babylon. These boats be but for one voiage ; for the streame doth runne so fast downewards that they cannot returne. They carie you to a towne which they call ‡Felugia, and there you sell the boate for a little money, for that which cost you fittie at Birra you sell there for seuen or eight. From Birra to Felugia is sixteene dayes iourney, it is not good that one boate goe alone, for if it should chance to breake, you should have much a doe to saue your goods from the Arabians, which be alwayes these abouts robbing : and in the night when your boates be made fast, it is necessarie that you keepe good watch. For the Arabians that bee theeues will come swimming and steale your goods and flee away, against which a gunne is very good, for they doe feare it very much. In the river of Euphrates from Birra to Felugia there be certaine places where you pay custome, so many Medines for a some or Camels lading, and certaine raysons and sope, which is for the sonnes of § Aborise, which is Lord of the Arabians and all that great desert, and hath some villages upon the river. Felugia where you unlade your goods which come from Birra is a little village : from whence you goe to Babylon in a day.

Babylon is a towne not very great but very populous, and of great traffike of strangers, for that is the way to Persia, Turkia and Arabia : and from thence doe goe Carovans for these and other places. Here are great store of victuals, which come from Armenia downe the riuer of Tygris. They are brought vpon raftes made of goates skinnnes blowne full of winde and bordes layde vpon them : and thereupon they lade their goods which are brought downe to Babylon, which being discharged they open their skinnnes, and carry them backe by Camels, to serue another time. Babylon in times past did belong to the kingdome of Persia, but nowe is subject to the Turke. Over against Babylon there is a very faire village from whence you passe to Babylon upon a long bridge made of boats, and tyed to a great chaine of yron, which is made fast on either side of riuer. When any boates are to passe up or downe the riuer, they take away certaine of the boates until they be past.

The || Tower of Babel is built on this side the riuer Tygris, towards Arabia from the towne about seuen or eight miles, which tower is ruinated on all sides, and with the fall thereof hath made as it were a little mountaine, so that it hath no shape at all : it was made of bricke dried in the sonne, and certaine canes and leaues of the palme tree layed betwixt the bricke. There is no entrance to be seene to goe into it. It doth stand upon a great plaine betwixt the rivers of Euphrates and Tygris.

* Doubtless Birjik.

† Meaning Baghdād, as will appear further on.

‡ Fallūjah.

§ Evidently Abu Rish.

|| The reference is clearly to 'Akr Qūf.

By the river Euphrates two dayes iourney from Babylon at a place called Ait, * in a fiede neere vnto it, is a strange thing to see : a mouth that doth continually throwe foorth against the ayre boyling pitch with a filthy smoke : which pitch doth runne abroad into a great fiede which is always full thereof. † The Moores say that it is the mouth of hell. By reason of the great quantitie of it, the men of that countrey doe pitch their boates two or three inches thicke on the outside, so that no water doth enter into them. Their boates be called Danec‡. When there is great store of water in Tygris you may goe from Babylon to Basora in 8 or 9 dayes : if there be small store it will cost you the more dayes.

Basora in times past was vnder the Arabians, but now is subject to the Turke. But some of them the Turke cannot subdue, for that they holde certaine Ilandes in the riuer Euphrates which the Turke cannot winne of them. They be theeues all and have no settled dwelling, but remoue from place to place with their Camels, goates and horses, wiues and children and all. They have large blew gownes, their wiues eares and noses are ringed very full of rings of copper and siluer, and they weare rings of copper about their legs.

Basora standeth neere the gulfes of Persia, and is a town of great trade of spices and drugges which come from Ormus. Also there is great store of wheate, ryce, and dates growing thereabout, wherewith they serue Babylon and all the countrey, Ormus, and all the partes of India. I went from Basora to Ormus downe the gulfes of Persia in a certaine shippe made of boordes, and sowed together with cayro, which is threede made of the huske of Coccoes, and certaine canes or strawe leaues sowed vpon the seames of the bordes which is the cause that they leake very much. And so having Persia always on the left hande, and the coast of Arabia on the right hande we passed many Ilandes, and among others the famous Ilande Baharim§ from whence come the best pearles which be round and Orient.

Ormus is an Island in circuit about fve and twentie or thirtie miles, and is the driest Island in the world: for there is nothing growing in it but only salt : for their water, wood, or victuals, and all things necessary come out of Persia, which is about twelue miles from thence. All the Ilands thereabout be very fruitfull, from whence all kinds of victuals are sent vnto Ormus. The Portugales haue a castle here which standeth neere vnto the sea, wherein there is a Captain for the king of Portugale having under him a conuenient number of souldiers, whereof some parte remaine in the castle, and some in the towne. In this towne are marchants of all Nations, and many Moores and Gentiles¶. Here is very great trade of all sortes of spices, drugs, silke, cloth of silke, fine tapestrie of Persia, great store of pearles which come from the Isle of Baharim, and are the best pearles of all others, and many horses of Persia, which serue all India. They haue a Moore to their king which is chosen and gouerned by the Portugales. Their women are very strangely

* Hit.

† i.e., Mahammadans.

‡ Danak.

§ i.e., Barain.

¶ Probably meaning Hindus ("Gentoos").

attyred, wearing on their noses, eares, neckes, armes and legges many rings set with iewels, and lockes of silver and golde in their eares, and a long barre of golde vpon the side of their noses. Their eares with the weight of their iewels be worne so wide that a man may thrust three of his fingers into them.

Here very shortly after our arriuall wee were put in prison, and had part of our goods taken^{*} from us by the Captaine of the castle, whose name was Don Mathias de Albuquerque; and from hence the eleuenth of October he shipped us and sent us for Goa vnto the Viceroy, which at that time was Don Francisco de Mascarenhas.

Letter from Fitch.

"Louing friends Master Poore, etc. Since my departure from Aleppo, I have not written vnto you any letters, by reason that at Babylon, I was sicke of the fluxe, and being sicke, I went from thence for Balsara, which was twelve dayes journey downe the riuier Tygris, where we had extreme hot weather, which was good for my disease, ill fare, and worse lodging, by reason our boat was pestered with people. In eight daies that which I did eate was very small, so that if we had stayed two dayes longer vpon the water, I thinke I had died: but comming to Balsara, presently I mended, I thanks God. There we stayed 14 dayes, and then we imbarcked our selues for Ormuz, where we arrived the fifth of September, and were put in prison the ninth of the same moneth, were we continued untill the 11 of October, and then were shipt for this citie of Goa in the captaines ship.

Letter from Newberie.

My last I sent you, was the 29 of May last past from Aleppo, by George Gill the purser of the Tiger, which the last day of the same moneth came from thence, and arriued at *Feluge the 19 day of Iune, which Feluge is one dayes journey from hence. Notwithstanding some of our Company came not hither till the last day of the last moneth which was for want of Camels to cary our goods: for at this time of the yeere, by reason of the great heate that is here, Camels are very scant to be gotten. And since our comming hither we have found very small sales, but divers say that in the winter our commodities will be very well sold, I pray God their words may prooue true. I thinke cloth, kersies and tinne have never bene here at so low prices as they are now. Notwithstanding if I had here so much readie money as the commodities are woorth, I would not doubt to make a very good profite of this voiage hither, and to Balsara, and so by Gods helpe there will be reasonable profite made of the voiage. But with halfe money and halfe commoditie may be bought here the best sort of spices, and other commodities that are brought from the Indies, and without money there is here at this instant small good to be done. With Gods helpe two dayes hence, I minde to goe from hence to Balsara, and from thence of force I must goe to Ormus for want of a man that speaketh the Indian tongue. At my being in Aleppo I hired two† Nazaranies, and one of them hath bene twice in the Indies, and hath the language very well, but he is a very lewde fellow and therefore I will not take him with me,

* i.e., Fallujāh

† Nasranīs, i.e., Oriental Christians.

Here follow the prices of wares as they are worth here at this instant.

From Babylon the 20th days of Iuly 1583,

Yours,

Iohn Newbeie.

ANNEXURE NO. II. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH RESIDENCY AT
BAGHDAD.*

Appointment and Letter of Instructions to Mr. Jones from Mr. Secretary Ramsay.

Dated the 5th July 1798.

From W. RAMSAY, Esq., Secretary,
To HARFORD JONES, Esq.

Reason of
Mr. Jones's,
Appointment.

It having been judged advisable by the Secret Committee, with the consent and approbation of his Majesty's Ministers, [that] under the present aspect of Affairs and the rumours which have prevailed, that the French might endeavour to penetrate to India either by the Red Sea or the Persian Gulph, that a Resident should be established at the Court of the Pashaw of Bagdad, you have been selected for that purpose.

Instructions
for his Route

and

You will therefore proceed with the greatest Expedition to Vienna, where you will collect every Information that is to be obtained concerning the destination and progress of the French Force now in the Mediterranean. With such Intelligence you will proceed without delay to Constantinople, where your Enquiries must be repeated (especially through the Medium of our Ambassador there, to whom you will have letters of Introduction) as also on your Route from thence; and all such Information as you may collect you will, immediately on your arrival at Bagdad, forward in Cypher to Aden on the Coast of Arabia or to Mocha, as may be judged advisable, there to meet Commodore Blankett, who is dispatched from this Country with a Naval force for the purpose of watching the Straits of Babel Mandeb and the Persian Gulph, and obstructing the Progress of the French should they attempt to penetrate to India by either of these Routes.

Correspond-
ence with
Commodore
Blankett.

Correspond-
ence.

You will also immediately forward to the Government of Bombay a Copy of the like Information, together with the dispatches with which you may be entrusted by the East India Company and His Majesty's Ministers.

* Taken from copies in the original letter-book of the Baghdad Residency in 1912.

It will be necessary that you should continue from time to time to forward both to Commodore Blankett and the Government of Bombay such Information as may in any way relate to the objects of your Mission.

You will take care to notify in due form your arrival to the Pashaw of Bagdad; and, having presented him with such presents as may be usual, and that you think will be acceptable to him, you will proceed to inform him that you have been deputed by the East India Company to strengthen the friendship that has always existed between him and the Company; and, should the appearance of affairs render it necessary, you will point out to him the fatal Consequences which must ensue to his Dominions and the Turkish Empire in general, should the French be permitted to enter or pass through any part of the Turks Dominions or be suffered to obtain a footing there, or in Egypt. You will endeavour to prejudice him against such attempt on the part of France, and also to engage him to oppose it by all the Means of which he is possessed, either by his own Resources or his Influence with the Beys of Egypt and the wandering Tribes of the Desert.

Conduct to be observed on Mr. Jones's arrival at Bagdad.

You will endeavour by all the Means in your Power to collect every Information respecting the Population, military force, Resources, and Commerce of the Territories subject to the Pashaw of Bagdad, or to any Shieks or Princes under his Influence, as also of the Persian and Egyptian Governments, or of any independent Princes inhabiting Arabia, or of any of the Parts through which an inroad might be made into India, either by the Inhabitants or strangers.

Future objects of the Mission.

In short you will endeavour to collect Information of every particular that you imagine can in any Way be useful, either to the East India Company or to Great Britain in General.

You will also from Time to time transmit the Information so collected to the Government of Bombay, and to the Chairman for the Time being of the East India Company, with whom also you will keep up a regular correspondence. Directions will be given to the Government of Bombay to furnish you, from Time to time, with such funds as may enable you to carry into Execution the objects of this Expedition; and a salary suitable to your Rank and standing in the Service and the necessary Expenses of your Mission will be settled as soon as the requisite Information can be obtained to enable the Court of Directors to determine on the subject.

Fund for the Expenses of the Mission to be supplied by the Government of Bombay.

The Secret Committee rely on your Vigilance and Zeal in Carrying into Execution the Measures here pointed out, and in keeping a watchful Eye upon all Matters any Ways connected with or relating to your Mission or the Interests of the Company in general.

The Hon'ble the Secret Committee rely on Mr. Jones's zeal, etc.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

W. RAMSAY,

Secretary.

EAST INDIA HOUSE, LONDON,

The 5th July, 1798.

Letter from the R. H. Henry Dundas to the Pashaw of Bagdad.

Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, Treasurer of His Majesty's Navy, First Commissioner for the Affairs of India, Member of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, etc., to His Highness Soliman Pashaw of Bagdad and Bussora, etc., etc., etc.

Illustrious Sir,

Notification
of H. Jones's
Appointment.

The English East India Company under whose Government the British Territories in India are placed having appointed Mr. Harford Jones their Resident at your Highness' Court, I have received the Commands of the King my Master to inform your Highness that this appointment has met with His Majesty's full and cordial approbation.

Mr. Jones
sent to
Bagdad to
strengthen
the friend-
ship and
good under-
standing
between
the Pashaw
and the
Hon'ble
Company.

It is His Majesty's warmest Wish that Mr. Jones's Residence at Bagdad may prove agreeable and satisfactory to your Highness, and that it may in all respects answer the Purpose for which it is intended, namely, to strengthen and increase the friendship and good understanding which have so long and so happily subsisted between your Highness and the English East India Company. This being the object of Mr. Jones' Mission, I feel satisfied that your Highness will honour him with that degree of Confidence and favour which may tend to render it of mutual Advantage to your Highness and the East India Company.

Circums-
tances require
the strictest
union and
Concert
between
them.

I cannot disguise to your Highness that the present Circumstances of the World appear to require that the strictest union, concert and unreserved Friendship and Alliance should be forthwith established between your Highness and the East India Company for your respective safety, Happiness and Preservation. Everything that is dear to your Highness and to them is threatend and coveted by that Enemy to the Peace, Tranquillity, and Existence of all States and Princes, the Republican Government of France. This restless and detestable Power, after exciting the People in all the States immediately surrounding them to revolt against their lawful Princes and Governors, and having in too many Instances succeeded in driving these last into Exile, sometimes even in putting them to death, and in all in robbing them of their Wealth, Treasures, and Possessions, is now said to have its favorite General, and an army most notorious for these horrid proceedings, to execute the same system of devastation and Plunder in the rich and happy Provinces of the East. It is against these Plunderers and subverters of all Governments that the King my Master has now been obliged to defend himself for six Years, during which, by the Vigor of his Army and the Blessing of God, he has resisted their Plans of destruction in every part of his vast Dominions. Should these Enemies of

all Princes bend their steps of Desolation towards the Territories now so happily placed (under) your Highness' Government, it is only by acting against them with the same determined spirit manifested by the King my Master and in Concert (with) the East India Company that your Highness can expect to (preserve) the Power and Wealth you now enjoy, for whatever false promises they might hold out to the Country, they would certainly avail themselves of the first opportunity to dispossess you of both to excite your People to Rebellion, and to deprive your Highness of Liberty, and perhaps of Life, in the same Manner as they did their own unfortunate and virtuous King whom they deposed, imprisoned, and murdered before they declared War against the King my Master with a view of the same horrid Purposes.

Fresh
atrocities.

That God may ever preserve your Highness from these or any Misfortunes, and enable you with Health and increasing Happiness to fill your present high Situation, is the Wish of the King my Master and, with this sentiment, I bid your Highness Farewell.

Your Highness's faithful and affectionate Friend,

HENRY DUNDAS.

London,

fourth of July, 1798.

Letter from the Hon'ble the Chairman to the Pashaw of Bagdad.

Copy of a letter from the Hon'ble Jacob Bosanquet, Esq., Chairman of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Hon'ble United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, to His Highness Soliman Pashaw of Bagdad and Bussora, etc., etc., etc, After Compliments.

In these times of particular Felicity be it known to your Highness that the Hon'ble the English East India Company, regarding with the greatest satisfaction the long and uninterrupted Friendship and good understanding which has so long subsisted between them and your Highness, have resolved, in the hope of its being satisfactory to you, and for the purpose of cementing and increasing an Amity so desirable, to appoint one of their Servants to reside at your Highness's Court in the renowned and ancient City of Bagdad, and, believing that the Appointment of Mr. Harford Jones, who has the honor of being known to your Highness, would be the most agreeable selection that we could make amongst our Servants for this honorable Mission, We have, with the approbation of His Majesty's Ministers, appointed Mr. Jones to reside at Bagdad, and have given him the most positive and particular Instructions to omit no opportunity during his Residence at your Highness's

Mr. Jones's
Appointment.

Court, by such attention to your Highness's Wishes as may be in his power, of carrying into effect the intention of this honourable and friendly Mission.

Diabolicalness
of the present
French
Government.

We presume Your Highness, to be sufficiently and accurately informed of the Overthrow of the Ancient and monarchical Government of France, and the desolation and Destruction which the French by their Intrigues and their Armies have spread over many parts of Europe by exciting in the lower order of people a Spirit of discontent and Rebellion towards their ancient Governors and Governments, and by trampling, with the assistance of those become Converts to their principles, on all Systems moral and divine, substituting in the place of order, anarchy, in the place of Justice, Cruelty and oppression, and in the place of Religion, Licentiousness and Atheism.

Necessity to
the Pashaw
to be on his
guard against
the schemes
of it.

It cannot escape a person of your Highness's Penetration and Judgment that all regular Governments are equally interested to prevent the Extension of Principles which strike at their very essence and Basis: but, as these Principles in the persons at present in power in France are connected with an unbounded Ambition and an insatiable Thirst for Plunder, which may induce them to undertake enterprizes the most distant and extraordinary, which will commence under the Specious Mask of Friendship and Protection and conclude, as has been experienced by all Countries which have suffered French Interference, (with the destruction) of everything valuable and sacred.

Offer of
friendly
Assistance in
cases of
Need.

We therefore esteem it an act of Friendship to assure your Highness that, if they should be attempted to be put in Practice in the Countries under your Government or Influence, we will, whenever you desire us to do so, afford you any assistance in our Power towards Suppressing them; and we shall give the necessary directions to our Governments in India for that Purpose, as well as for their Communicating frequently with your Highness and paying the strictest attention to all your Requests. We doubt not, however, that your Highness's Vigilance and Exertions on such an occasion would render any such Assistance from us unnecessary.

Confidence
placed in Mr.
Jones.

We have directed Mr. Jones to acquaint your Highness of the present state of the Politics of Europe, and, as we have the greatest Confidence in his Zeal for our Service, We entreat your Highness to regard whatever he may say to you, by our order, as authentic and to be depended on.

We very Sincerely and heartily wish your Highness every sort of happiness, and that your Glory and Grandeur may daily increase.

JACOB BOSANQUET,

Chairman.

GIVEN under the GREAT SEAL of the EAST INDIA COMPANY in the CITY of LONDON on the sixth day of July in the year 1798.

**PRESIDENT'S
SECRETARIAT
LIBRARY**